DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200230002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 10, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Developments in Afghanistan
10 January 1986
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Developments in Afghanistan
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1 Perspective-Afghanistan: More Leadership Changes Looming?
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Recent leadership changes in the Afghan regime strengthen the Parchami faction,
but may presage more far-reaching changes, including the replacement of Babrak
Karmal. 25X1
11 Najibullah: An Heir Apparent?
The Soviets appear to be grooming former intelligence chief Najibullah to succeed
Babrak Karmal-a move we believe would reinforce the regime's image as a
narrowly based, Soviet-controlled police state.
We estimate that Afghan farmers produced 2.9 million metric tons of wheat this
year-up from last year's 2.7 million tons. Food supplies should be adequate,
although localized shortages will probably still occur because of transportation
problems and disruptions caused by the war.
23 Divide and Rule: Soviet Regional Policy in Afghanistan
Soviet operations in Afghanistan are evolving in a way that suggests a regionally
differentiated strategy that demographic trends reinforce. Moscow may believe
that a regional approach offers it the best prospect of controlling strategically
important parts of the country in the medium term, while long-run trends in the
region work to their advantage.
27 Afghanistan: A Selected Political Chronology, October-December 1985
This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor,
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Developments in Afghanistan
Perspective Afghanistan: More Leadership Changes Looming?I 25X1
High-level shifts in the Afghan party leadership in November have strengthened
the dominant Parchami faction. Although factional rivalry contributed to the
leadership shifts, we strongly suspect that they were motivated by other factors:
? They are part of a larger, Soviet-instigated strategy-including the addition to
the Cabinet of several nonparty members in December-to improve the image of
the Afghan regime and press Pakistan to deal with Kabul directly.
? They may also presage Soviet intentions to replace Babrak with former KHAD
head Najibullah, who was elevated to the Central Committee Secretariat in the
recent leadership moves.
Whatever the reason, the Soviets, in our view, would have had to approve changes
of this magnitude and most likely initiated them.
The Party Shuffle
Party leadership changes made at the 16th plenum of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan included the following: Najibullah (Parchami), head of
KHAD and already a member of the Politburo, became a secretary of the party
Central Committee. Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad (Khalqi) and Minister of
Nationalities and Tribal Affairs Solayman Laeq (Parchami) were named
candidate members of the Politburo, and Gholam Faruq Yaqubi (Parchami),
KHAD First Deputy, was promoted from candidate member of the Central
Committee to full member and was subsequently named head of KHAD. Removed
from the Politburo were former Minister of Mines and current Ambassador to
Libya Esmail Danesh (Khalqi), former Defense Minister Qader (Parchami), and
Writers' Union head Ghola.m Dastagir Panjsheri (Khalqi).
The changes, the most extensive in the party leadership since 1983, have
strengthened the Parchami faction. Of the eight full members of the Politburo,
only two are Khalqi and only one of the four alternate members is Khalqi-for a
net loss of one Khalqi member. The total number of Parchamis on the Politburo is
nine.
not from continuing to engineer shifts in the party leadership.
Although permitting Babrak to surround himself with Parchami loyalists, the
Soviets in the past have supported Interior Minister Gulabzoi and other important
Khalqis, and the Khalqi Minister of Defense, Nazar Mohammad, was elevated in
the recent round of changes. Substantial Khalqi power in the provincial police and
in the military will prevent the Babrak regime from risking a full-scale purge, but
The moves will also give the Defense Ministry and KHAD, the intelligence service,
more power within the party. Former KHAD head Najibullah, considered a
possible successor to Babrak, was promoted to Central Committee secretary. In
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this post, he will supervise KHAD and the Interior and Defense Ministries.
Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad was elevated to candidate member of the
Politburo.
A Pretext of Broadening the Government Base
Although factionalism in the PDPA periodically produces shakeups in the
leadership, the recent changes appear to be more than that. In our view, the
shakeup was the first in a series of leadership moves designed to give the regime a
face-lift and strengthen the credibility of the Babrak regime prior to the March
round of indirect peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan at Geneva. The
party shifts were followed by Cabinet-level government changes in late December,
when 14 new Cabinet and subcabinet appointments were announced. The majority
of these were nonparty members, and they represent a broad spectrum of tribes
and ethnic groups. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the regime also went
out of its way to point out that two of three newly appointed provincial governors
are not party members.
The changes do not represent a true broadening of the regime. Almost all of the
new appointees-even the nonparty members-have been loyal regime supporters
and none have ties to the resistance. Creating the appearance of a more
representative regime in Afghanistan, however, will allow Moscow and Kabul to
claim that Islamabad, by refusing to deal directly with the Babrak government, is
obstructing the peace process.
A Prelude to Increasing Pressure on Pakistan?
Kabul could then maintain the appearance of broader based rule and, at the same
time, increase its potential to threaten Pakistani control in the North-West
Frontier Province. Such a move would be in keeping with Kabul's recent efforts to
stir up unrest by arming tribes in the Pakistani border area and encouraging them
to hamper insurgent infiltration through the eastern provinces.
The strengthening of KHAD influence in the party by promotion of Najibullah
and Yaqubi would be in accord with a plan to pressure Pakistan. KHAD has been
involved in efforts to subvert Pashtun tribesmen since 1983, and any personal
relationships that KHAD leaders may have built with tribal leaders would have
been enhanced by the recent party leadership changes. Despite Yaqubi's having
been named to replace Najibullah as head of KHAD, Najibullah will continue to
be de facto head of the intelligence service. Also significant is the elevation of the
Minister of Tribes and Nationalities, whose ministry has cooperated closely with
KHAD to develop tribal support.
Looking Beyond Babrak
The Soviets may also be considering replacing Babrak. Moscow is almost certainly
disappointed in the failure of the PDPA to win broadly based popular support and
recognizes that its commitment to defend Afghanistan could drag on for years if
the insurgents are not neutralized, either militarily, politically, or diplomatically.
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Najibullah, known as an ambitious man, has long had strong ties to Moscow, and
the Soviets consider him capable, energetic, and
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dedicated. His new position as Central Committee secretary will present
Najibullah with a rare opportunity to expand his power base in the Interior and
Defense Ministries. Should Moscow decide to replace Babrak
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Najibullah would be 25X1
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Outlook
At best, only marginal improvement in the running of the Afghan Government
would result from replacing Babrak. The odds are against anyone-even
replacing Babrak would increase factional strife.
the prospect of having a Kabul government that combined a threat to
Pakistan's stability with a new, and arguably more legitimate face might be
sufficiently enticing to cause Moscow to reshuffle the Afghan leadership.
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Afghanistan
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Afghanistan-USSR-Pakistan: Geneva Talks Produce No Breakthrough
The recently completed sixth round of the UN-brokered talks on Afghanistan did
not break the stalemate over the issue of direct talks between Islamabad and the
Kabul regime, but both sides reportedly agreed to examine ways to skirt the
problem in future talks. According to the US Mission in Geneva, the Afghan
Government came to the talks with a timetable for withdrawal but refused to
reveal it until Islamabad agreed to direct talks. Both UN Special Representative
Cordovez and the Pakistanis are expressing optimism that new proposals to avoid
the impasse on format will permit progress on a troop withdrawal agreement
during the next round of discussions scheduled for late February or early March.
Moscow has offered no evidence that it is willing to negotiate a troop withdrawal.
Cordovez has consistently oversold the prospects for movement in the talks, and
the optimism from the Pakistanis-who do not want to be blamed for obstructing a
settlement-probably is largely for diplomatic show. Islamabad almost certainly
will not agree to direct talks without solid assurances from Kabul that the Soviets
have agreed to a timetable for withdrawal.
We estimate that Soviet combat-related aircraft losses increased slightly to 140 in
The increase in Soviet and regime losses is due both to more effective insurgent air
defense and to more aggressive and frequent Soviet use of airpower:
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Najibullah: An
Heir Apparent?
The Soviets appear to be grooming former intelligence
chief Najibullah to succeed Babrak Karmal.
Najibullah would bring vigor and decisiveness to the
Afghan regime's leadership but, unless handled
carefully, his elevation could mean more headaches
for Moscow. Najibullah's further advancement,
moreover, would imply that Moscow placed little faith
in the prospects for a negotiated, compromise solution
on Afghanistan.
New Opportunities
Najibullah's appointment in November as a Secretary
of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) Central Committee appears designed to give
him a much broader role in the regime and to expand
his already considerable power. Diplomatic sources of
the US Embassy in Kabul report that he will oversee
the Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as the
Afghan intelligence service, KHAD-giving him the
chance to consolidate control of all of the regime's
security forces.
In addition, Najibullah's new position should give him
broader experience in party affairs, and increase his
public visibility, already considerable for a secret
police head. Moscow may see such expanded horizons
as essential preparation for assuming the top post in
the regime. A Soviet diplomat in Kabul has
acknowledged the similarity between Najibullah's rise
and Yuri Andropov's movement from KGB chief to
party secretary to General Secretary. (Karmal is
currently PDPA General Secretary, as well as
President of the Revolutionary Council).
The Man from KHAD
The new Secretary brings numerous professional,
party, and personal assets to his position. As President
of KHAD since the Soviet invasion, Najibullah
presided over the growth of the secret police into a
powerful and feared organization which has at times
overshadowed the party itself.
An Ahmadzai Pashtun ... probably born in Kabul
... graduated Kabul's Habibia High School in
1964... longtime medical student at Kabul
University ... uses title 'Doctor, " but unknown if he
graduated ... known for running spies and informers
as a student ... imprisoned briefly in 1970 for
leading demonstrations against visit by US Vice
President Agnew ... briefly in military, civil
service ... briefly Deputy Minister of Interior after
April 1978 coup ... exiled as Ambassador to Iran by
Khalqis ... accused of plotting to kill Khalqi leader
Taraki ....fled to Eastern Europe, joining Karmal
Organized KHAD in
wake of 1979 Soviet invasion ... elected full
Politburo member June 1981 ... holds rank of
Lieutenant General.
.. likes expensive cars,
clothes .
speaks Urdu, some Russian, English,
French, German ... married, at least one
child ... about 38 years old.
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Najibullah adroitly balanced his own bid for domestic
power with total acquiescence to Soviet control of his
or anization.
A fervent Communist, he has impressed His relations with Karmal, while not always smooth,
those around him as fanatically pro-Soviet in outlook.
power base he has built there. Lt. Gen. Ghulam Faruq
Yaqubi, the new secret police head, has been a key
lieutenant of Najibullah's since 1980, as well as his
friend and confidant
Parchamis and Other Strangers
Links to others in the PDPA hierarchy could ease
Najibullah's rise to power. As an early party
activist-he was a student organizer for Karmal in
the late 1960s-Najibullah has longstanding ties to
most high-ranking members of the Parchami faction.
have traditionally been close.
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Najibullah, while no longer formally in charge at
KHAD, should have little difficulty maintaining the
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Najibullah's links to other Parchami luminaries also
go well back in the PDPA's turbulent history. Along
with Nur Ahmad Nur, Anahita Ratebzad, Mahmud
Baryalai, and Babrak Karmal, Najibullah was sent
into ambassadorial exile by the Khalqis in 1978.
emissary to Pashtun tribal leaders, Najibullah has
also worked closely with Solayman Laeq, the Minister
of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs.
His impressive personality should also assist
Najibullah in his new position.
Problems Ahead?
Despite his many assets, Najibullah will have to
overcome his reputation as violently anti-Khalqi to
become the successful, effective leader the Soviets
apparently want.
We believe that a Soviet diplomat's recent assurance
to the US Embassy in Kabul that Najibullah enjoys
widespread support among Khalqis contains a large
dose of wishful thinking. In his new post, Najibullah
Najibullah's advancement.
is expected to supervise the Interior Ministry, which
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stronghold, and the heavily Khalqi armed forces. In
order to invigorate the security forces, Najibullah will
have to win at least the acquiescence of many rank-
and-file Khalqis-something his past behavior will
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In his efforts to mold the PDPA into a more effective 25X1
governing body, Najibullah may also encounter
resistance from the party's old guard. While the
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gerontocracy, seven of the 12 full and candidate
members are a full decade older than the new
Secretary and may resent his rapid advancement. 25X1
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Karmal may not stand the strains of power* 25X1
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competition" has arisen between the two as a result of
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Outlook
The Soviets appear to be grooming Najibullah for 25X1
PDPA leadership, probably because they deem him
most capable of molding Afghan security forces and
the PDPA into a more effective, cohesive unit. The
Soviets probably hope such a new, improved regime
would prove capable of shouldering a greater share of
what they expect to be a long, grinding struggle-
permitting, in effect, an "Afghanization" of the war.
Najibullah will probably be given a long period-
possibly from six months to two years-to grow into
his new Secretariat position, a time during which he
will presumably work to bring Interior and Defense
under his control and improve the overall efficiency
and performance of the Armed Forces. If he succeeds,
the Soviets may gradually expand his sphere of
authority, possibly making him party General
Secretary while retaining Karmal as figurehead
President. Finally, if the Soviets feel he is fully
prepared, they could allow him to replace Karmal.
The further elevation of Yaqubi or other KHAD
proteges of Najibullah to high party and government
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progress
The elevation of a former secret police head, in our
view, would reinforce the regime's image as a Soviet-
controlled, narrowly based police state, however.
KHAD will almost certainly continue to grow in
power as its longtime head advances in the regime. If
Najibullah is pushed into the top spot too quickly-
perhaps in the event of Babrak's death or his refusal
to cooperate in his own gradual obsolescence-we
would expect to see more purges of Khalqis, further
desertions and disaffection in the military, and a
regime that, while perhaps more cohesive and
vigorous, would be even more narrowly based than the
present one.
In any event, a regime led by Najibullah would
almost certainly complicate Afghanistan's relations
with Pakistan and might even ensure the collapse of
diplomatic efforts to reach a compromise solution to
the war. Efforts to destabilize Pakistan can also be
expected to continue with Najibullah's rise to power.
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Afghanistan: A Good 1985
Grain Harvest
Afghan farmers have harvested a good 1985 grain
crop. We estimate that 2.9 million metric tons of
wheat-the staple of the Afghan diet and historically
about 60 percent of annual grain output-were
harvested. Food supplies should be better than last
year when, by our estimates, the Afghans produced
2.7 million metric tons of wheat. Localized shortages
could still occur, however, as the result of military
action or transportation problems.
We identified very few incidents of intentional crop
destruction this year, and our analysis continues to
indicate that the amount of destruction, whether
intentional or incidental to military combat, is
insignificant compared to total production.
Abandonment of agricultural land continues in
combat areas, but we estimate that at most it does not
exceed 5 percent of total cropland, and it could be
considerably less. Furthermore, some limited evidence
suggests that the loss of production due to
abandonment is being offset by shifting agricultural
production from cash to food crops and by bringing
new land under civilization.
The Wheat Estimate
Afghanistan's 1985 wheat crop is estimated at 2.9
million metric tons, bringing production back to the
level attained prior to the 1984 drought.' This
assessment is based primarily on analysis of Landsat
half of the entire agricultural area of the country was
' Our estimate is consistent with that of the Afghan Government,
which has reported that over 2.85 million tons of wheat was
produced in 1985. Favorable reporting on harvest and procurement
activities in neighboring countries, which are generally affected by
the same weather patterns as Afghanistan, also supports our
assessment of above-average Afghan crop prospects. The size of the
grain harvest in south Uzbek, SSR-which adjoins the Afghan
dryland area on the north-was above plan in late June, according
to Moscow Domestic Radio. Unclassified reporting from
Pakistan-to the east of Afghanistan-indicates that domestic
grain procurements for the May-July period ran about 10 percent
Afghanistan is mostly unsuitable for agriculture,
with mountains, desert, and forest extending across
the country. The poorly structured soils, limited
water availability, severe climate, and primitive
farming practices all limit Afghanistan's agricultural
production. The soils are alkaline, high in calcium,
and low in organic matter. Precipitation can fluctuate
considerably from year to year, with most of the
country unable to support dryland farming. Agricul-
ture depends heavily on irrigation from the rivers and
streams formed by snowmelt in the mountains. The
and continental climate is comprised of hot, dry
summers and wet, usually harsh winters. Agriculture
is largely of a subsistence nature.
3.3 million hectares, of which
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Irrigated crops Approximately 85 percent of
total agricultural production
Dryland crops Approximately 15 percent of
total agricultural production
Crops
Food
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10 January 1986
Wheat (60 percent)
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Corn, rice, barley, and mili25X 1
(30 percent)
Fruits and vegetables (6
percent)
Cotton, sugar beets, oilseeds,
and poppies (4 percent)
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also imaged with the unclassified multispectral
Landsat system
The number of targets and the amount of land imaged
were sufficient to provide a statistically valid sample
of crop yield conditions countrywide. The imagery
included coverage of part of every province, although
coverage was limited in a few areas at harvest time,
when yields can be estimated directly from imagery.
Agricultural output was good in most areas of the
country, except where lengthy and intense combat
had occurred and forced farmers to abandon the land.
Our analysis indicates that in a few provinces-
Parvan, Kabol, and Baghlan-yields were excellent.
Food Distribution and Imports
Afghanistan must import grain each year to feed its
rapidly growing urban centers. Based on past import
figures, we estimate grain imports, mostly wheat, will
amount to about 400,000 tons this year.
Approximately 225,000 tons arrives from the Soviet
Union, of which 100,000 tons is purchased and
approximately 125,000 tons is provided as grant aid.
year, farmers have almost totally abandoned the
valley, and crops are not being cultivated. However,
this abandonment does not have a significant impact
on Afghanistan's total grain production because this
long, narrow valley is only a minor grain producer.
total grain production for this valley.
The Charikar Basin, a fertile valley at the base of the
Panjsher Valley, traditionally produces surplus grain
for the Kabul region. Harvest occurred on schedule in
June this year, and yields across the basin were
excellent. With the exception of some fields that had
been burned near the entrance to the Panjsher Valley,
the only destruction observed in the area was caused
by armored vehicles crossing some fields; the minor
destruction observed will have no significant effect on
In the Nangarhar Valley surrounding Jalalabad and
in the adjacent Konar Valley, harvest occurred on
schedule in May. Yields were good to excellent in the
Nangarhar area and were fair to good in the Konar
Valley, despite the effects of continued military
activity. Some destruction, caused by vehicles driving
through fields and the burning of crops, was observed
in both the Nangarhar and Konar Valleys. Some of
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Since the Soviet occupation, Kabul
has nearly doubled its imports of grain to alleviate
food shortages in urban areas. The tremendous
population increase in Kabul, combined with
disruptions in areas traditionally supplying food to
Kabul, is the major cause for increased imports. F
A Regional View of Yields
Eastern Valleys and Provinces. The 11 provinces
surrounding Kabul contain approximately 30 percent
of the country's agricultural land and some of its most
fertile and high-yielding valleys. It is, however, also
the area most affected by the Soviet occupation. At
least three of these valleys (Panjsher, Konar, and
Nangarhar) have been the sites of heavy military
operations.
The Panjsher Valley is one of the few locations where
deliberate burning of grainfields was identified in
1984. Because of the continued military presence this
the burned fields in the Konar Valley appeared to
have been intentionally destroyed.
The factor most affecting agricultural production in
these valleys is the steady decline in population and
abandonment of land since the Soviet invasion in
1979. In the Konar Valley, the abandonment stems
mostly from frequent military operations, but in the
Nangarhar area it is also due to efforts by the regime
to secure large defensive zones around military
installations. For example, a large agricultural area
adjacent to Jalalabad Airfield is almost totally
uncultivated this year.
Grain yields were good in both Paktia and Paktika
Provinces this year. Military activity continues in this
area adjacent to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
However, only minor damage from vehicle tracks
through agricultural fields was observed in Paktia
Province. Although its population was never large,
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Arable Land in Afghanistan
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
abandonment in the Khowst Valley in Paktia is the
greatest we have seen in Afghanistan. Total
production in Paktia as a whole is probably slowly
decreasing as abandonment of cropland continues.
Elsewhere in the region, crop yields were generally
good:
? Crop yields in Ghazni Province this year looked
good with lodging-a condition that occurs when
the weight of the mature head cannot be supported
by the stalk-observed in many of the fields.
Percentage
of total
arable land
Northern provinces
50
Eastern provinces
30
Western provinces