HAL FORD'S PAPER THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL ESTMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100180005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT Hal Ford's Paper "The Future of National
Estimates"
1. Let me start by citing those of Hal's observations with
which I agree:
-- The NIOs themselves probably need to do more in the way
of marketing estimates, particularly to customers below
the principal level. In this regard, we may wish to
consider expanding the distribution of the separate key
judgments of estimates down to the Assistant Secretary
level in order to increase readership. People at that
level do not have any more time than the principals to
read full estimates and if we could put out a short
version such as that and somehow keep the classification
on as many as possible below codeword I believe we would
vastly expand our readership.
-- I also agree with Hal on more regular evaluations of
estimates. I'm not sure that the SRP is the way to do
that but perhaps a combination of the SRP, ad hoc
committees of the NIOs themselves, and occasionally
bringing in outsiders under contract to do it for us.
-- I'm also sympathetic to the notion of less emphasis on
predicting specific events and more on predicting forces
and trends at work.
-- I also strongly endorse more estimative emphasis on
giving policymakers handles (opportunities) and in being
less shy about providing those to policymakers.
-- I certainly have no problem with more contact by NIOs
with people outside the Intelligence Community. We've
encouraged this to good effect in the Directorate and
the NIOs can do more.
S T C1 By Signer
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-- Like the poor, the problem of getting and using US blue
data will always be with us. I hear a good deal of this
even from DoD and perhaps we should explore how we can
make better use of blue data in the estimates within the
constraints of the agreements you have reached with
Secretary Weinberger.
2. Now let me go beyond Halls comments with a few notions
of my own of where we still have a problem on the estimates:
-- As stated above for the senior policymakers, they are
way too long.
-- All too often there is not enough time spent at the
outset of an estimate thinking about the problem,
identifying the real questions that need to be asked,
and structuring the paper in the best possible way. Too
little time is spent at the front end of the process.
-- The NIC still is insufficiently collegial. There are
too many estimates on which other NIOs can make a
contribution where they do not have the opportunity. I
am taking steps to correct this.
-- The estimates still do not adequately put forward
alternative scenarios. These do not emerge in the
coordination process and must be incorporated into the
draft at the outset by the NIO or the drafter.
-- There still could be greater involvement of other
agencies in the preparation of estimates, for example,
Army, Navy, Air Force and perhaps others.
-- There is still a problem in representation at the
working level Community coordination meetings. These
people are still hesitant to speak out and take
alternative views, are too often eager to submerge
differences, and are rarely in direct contact with their
principal.
-- I still do not believe that NIE 11-3/8 on Soviet
Strategic Forces needs to be done in its entirety every
year.
3. All that said, and before addressing specifics of Halls
paper, it seems to me important to see how far we have come in
three years and to return to first principles and look at the
purpose of the NIC. With respect to how far we have come, I
refer you to the two memos I did for you in the spring of 1981 on
"Fixing the NIC." I think you will see in rereading those we
have covered a great deal of ground.
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4. As I conceive it, the purpose of the NIC is to produce
on behalf of the DCI interagency intelligence assessments (NIEs,
SNIEs, IIMs, IIAs, etc.), to cultivate relationships with policy
level counterparts to ensure that estimates are relevant and
timely or at least are focused on issues of importance to the
policy community, and finally for each NIO to serve as the DCI's
senior substantive representative in his or her given area. The
premium in this conception of the NIC is placed on the initiative
and calibre of the individual NIO. More recently, an additional
positive trait has been the NIO's ability to make the rest of the
Intelligence Community feel a part of the process -- to involve
other agencies in that process so they believe their views have
received a fair hearing.
5. On all of these counts, it seems to me that over the
last 2 1/2 years or so, the NIC has made strides in achieving
these objectives. Production of NIEs has increased
substantially; all of the evidence we have suggests that the
estimates are being read and listened to to a degree unparalleled
within the past dozen or more years; the NIOs are getting out and
cultivating relationships with policy people; the calibre of the
NIOs themselves has improved significantly in the past 2 1/2
years (look at the lists in my 1981 memos); and because the DCI
cares about the estimates and gives them his attention, the rest
of the Community (both intelligence and policy) gives them
greater attention as well. Relationships among the Community
principals are perhaps closer than ever before.
6. Before giving consideration to the major changes Hal
suggests, it is worth examining whether the NIC is performing up
to expectations or at least headed in that direction and whether
or not it is successfully doing its job.
7. This can perhaps
be done by addressing Hal's points:
I do not believe that the coordinated national estimate
has become an outdated art form. The estimates still
are far too long in my view for the busy consumer but we
have made an important step forward in the production of
separate key judgments and their delivery with the
President's Daily Brief. More estimates are read now by
senior policy people than at any time in the last twenty
years. In a world where policymaking is increasingly
affected by pressures of complexity, time and disorder,
estimates since 1981 on important issues stand out as
timely, relevant and, where appropriate, have forced
policymakers to recognize a view independent of and
often different from their own. I need cite only the
estimates over the last year or so on Lebanon,
Iran/Iraq, Soviet Response to INF, the Soviet Gas
Pipeline, El Salvador and others as examples of
estimates that have played a key role in policy
deliberations. They were timely and they were read.
The unanimity of the Intelligence Community on some of
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these controversial issues forced the policy community
to sit up and take notice. An outdated art form? The
estimate today plays a more influential role than it has
in many, many years.
Hal says that the NIC can better serve the policymaker
by doing more national estimating that takes the form of
less formal memos, think pieces, face to face
encounters, new methods of communicating estimative
judgments and so on. Hal forgets that just because the
NIC produces something does not make it national
intelligence -- when the NIC produces something it
represents just the views of a handful of individuals
many of whom may or may not be the best people in their
field either in or out of government. What makes
national intelligence is the involvement of a number of
elements of the Intelligence Community. While that is
an awkward and irritating and sometimes cumbersome
process, it is what "National" intelligence is all
about. Having a group of independent people with no
long term responsibilities firing off think pieces and
individual assessments (however useful these may be at
times) is a sorry representation of what either an
Office of National Estimates or National Intelligence
Council should do for a living.
I disagree that advocacy will always have the advantage
of being simpler and more seductive as opposed to
dispassionate estimates. A well done estimate will
almost always be more persuasive and carry more weight
than the role of the single advocate. Again, that is
why the concept of "National" intelligence is so
important. It represents not the views of a single
individual nor even a single agency but the considered
views of the whole professional intelligence corps of
the United States. And while some of those estimates
are not congenial to the policymakers or are not
received with open arms, I submit there continues to be
a ready market for them. The number of requests we get
from policy people for estimates attests to this.
-- The creation of Richard Beale's operation in the White
House and other operation centers is essentially
irrelevant to the NIC. They are tied to current and
crisis related intelligence, an area in which the NIC
essentially is not and should not be deeply involved.
The NIC cannot keep itself current enough to support
crisis management.
-- I disagree that there will be more disorder in
tomorrow's world and tomorrow's policymaking and that
this is as inexorable process as Hal states. -I have
worked at the most senior levels of the US government
now for more than ten years and if anything the process
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has become somewhat more rational and more orderly than
before. I might point out that during the Nixon, Ford
and Carter Administrations estimates played almost no
role whatsoever in the policy process. Indeed, I
believe I can attest that not more than a half dozen
estimates made it to the President during the entire
Carter Administration. On the other hand, there is no
quarrel that tomorrow's estimates will have to be datum
good in quality and utility.
To the degree that the tie between estimates and
policymaking is "somewhat hit and miss with no
systematic match up," the NIO has failed in his job. At
the same time, I would contend that that is an overly
pessimistic appraisal of our performance over the past
two years: in fact, on the issues mentioned above and a
number of others, the estimates have been timely, on the
mark and directly relevant to key policy issues. That
is one reason why we have done so many Memorandum for
Holders and Special National Estimates, not to mention
vulnerability studies and other national intelligence
papers to serve the policymaker.
I disagree that most principals at NFIB are essentially
managers and that this fact will make the outcome of
NFIB meetings a result driven by the DCI or the view of
assertive, creative personalities rather than collective
wisdom. Hal has sat in on few of the NFIB meetings in
the last two years. I do not believe there has been in
fifteen years a more substantive and creative group of
NFIB principals. Ask the drafters of the estimates and
the NIOs who have often had to go back and revise their
estimates to reflect independent views and wisdom of the
principals.
I disagree that the most valuable inputs made by senior
estimative officers over the years have been sharp ad
hoc or inhouse studies breaking new ground, pointing out
new developing world threats or opportunities,
questioning conventional wisdom, etc. The variety of
forms we now use -- NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, IIAs, interagency
intelligence assessments, vulnerability studies, dual-
agency studies under NIO auspices, and others have made
national intelligence a more responsive and well
coordinated tool than it has been perhaps at any time in
the past. We have broken new ground with the biological
warfare/genetic engineering estimate, we have certainly
questioned conventional wisdom on Lebanon and a number
of other issues, we certainly have examined the
consequence of contingent developments, we have looked
at vulnerabilities and a variety of other approaches. I
think that this present range of capabilities-have made
a unique contribution. I can't disagree with the
dangers of overcoordination, but generally speaking I
believe we have been responsive.
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-- Where the initial concept of the paper is only so-so, I
hold the NIO responsible, not the drafter.
There is no guarantee that even with an expanded AG that
the drafters will be top rate. There is a fairly
significant failure rate in the AG itself. In my view,
it is an important component of the effort to make the
Community feel a part of the process, to have the
agencies participate in the drafting of the estimate.
With regard to drafters from the Directorate of
Intelligence, I find it difficult to take NIO complaints
of drafters seriously given the number of commendation
letters from NIOs I see that speak so highly of the work
performed by the DDI drafter. I think that the problem
associated with "farming out" drafts to various agencies
is balanced by the virtues of having the estimates
drafted by people who are genuinely up to date
substantive experts on the subject. A draft gone
seriously wrong in my view is a draft that an NIO
ignored too long.
8. Let me now turn to the two main thrusts of Hal's paper.
The role of the AG: In 1981, I defended maintaining a
relatively small AG as a place where the Community could
send promising young officers and let them learn the
skills of estimates drafting, how to do macroanalysis,
and to learn at the elbow of some of the most senior
substantive experts in the government in their
particular area. I agree with Hal that estimates
writing is a peculiar art form and that the second
estimate anyone writes is always easier and usually
better than the first. I believe the AG should spend
its time drafting estimates and not doing individual
think pieces. At the same time, as I mentioned above,
it would be substantive suicide to isolate estimate
writing from the work and workers in the rest of the
Intelligence Community. It may be more difficult this
way, it may impose a somewhat greater burden on the NIO,
he might not have full control and a lot of other
things, but the plusses of Community involvement and
participation in the estimate drafting process far
outweigh the convenience of the NIO in this instance.
And, I would submit, that a review of the drafts over
the past two years would support the view that by the
end of the process the quality of the estimates is
fairly even and at a high level. It is a process that
the good NIOs like Gershwin, Gries and Fuller have used
successfully and without great additional pain. It
sounds like Hal simply wants to reestablish the old ONE
and I believe that is marching to the past.
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Chairman, NIC: This is an awkward subject for me to
address and it is basically your and John's call to make
whether you continue the double-hatting. There is no
doubt that carrying both jobs as presently structured is
a burden. On the other hand, I sense that by and large
you and John are essentially content with the way things
are going. The NIC is continuing to turn out an ever
larger number of Community assessments of various kinds
and yet at the same time is essentially causing you no
bureaucratic headaches. Perhaps without making an out
and out recommendation of my own I can make several
observations:
The key to the quality of the estimates in my view
is not a big thinker or a famous one as Chairman,
NIC but rather an activist and interested DCI,
exceptionally high-quality NIOs, involvement of the
NFIB principals in the substance of the issues and a
NIC Chairman who makes things run smoothly, who
works day in and day out to maintain and improve
quality, and who has a good working relationship
with the other NFIB principals.
It seems to me that the record of the last three
years demonstrates that the NIC has in fact worked
very well and made enormous strides in improving the
estimates process. I believe most of this progress
is due to the efforts of you, John and I, more
recently Herb, the appointment of better NIOs, and
the NFIB.
I have come to believe (whether or not I stay in the
job) that a prominent person has little impact in
attracting high-quality staff to the NIC; a
potential NIO is going to come to the organization
principally based on his or her perception of access
to you and role in the intelligence process -- not
because of the high prestige Chairman, NIC.
Similarly, the quality of the estimates generally
speaking will depend more on the originality and
creativity of the NIO and those on the outside the
NIO works with as well as direct access to senior
policymakers and knowledge of the issues and agenda.
9. With regard to continuing the double-hatted arrangement
for me, there are pros and cons. The disadvantages include the
wearing effect on me personally of doing both (which is
tolerable), the degree to which holding both jobs takes some time
from each that might be put to good use, the perception of a link
between the two organizations by virtue of the double-hatting,
and the degree to which I do not have time to get around the
country talking to conferences and academics and so forth. On
the "pro" side, the present arrangement brings considerable order
to the potentially disruptive and factious relationship between
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CIA, the collectors and the NIOs. There is no longer quarreling
over who attends meetings, feedback from the meetings, or the
role the people should play in supporting you. Nor do we have
NIOs independently getting involved with collectors and screwing
up the interagency priorities process. There is also someone who
as a career intelligence officer can deal with the NIOs on
security and bureaucratic problems where they have a tendency to
get into trouble. The other pro is that continuing the present
arrangement may be the easiest route for everyone.
10. In sum, I disagree with Hal's recommendations for
structural change in the NIC but endorse and applaud many of his
suggestions for specific improvements that can be made. ONE
failed because it became isolated from the analytic process and
the estimates became decreasingly imaginative, provocative,
timely and relevant. An estimator as in ONE without regular
policy contacts in a concrete environment loses sight of the
policy agenda and becomes irrelevant. An NIO who does nothing
but deal with the policymaker and write think pieces while
allowing a staff to do estimates makes for the worst of both
worlds. The NIOs must remain engaged in the production of
estimates and as inconvenient as it is the estimates process must
involve the entire Intelligence Community from terms of reference
to drafting to final approval. Separating the NIC from the
Community by giving it the staff to do most estimates drafts
itself, I think is extremely dangerous. As for whether to go
forward with the original plan to choose a new Chairman of the
NIC after the election, it is basically your call. I am willing
to continue if you wish; I also will step aside quite willingly
if you want to go ahead and appoint someone else after the
election.
Attachments:
As Stated
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14 May 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Robert M. Gates
SUBJECT : Fixing the National Intelligence Council
1. Your apparatus for-producing national intelligence estimates, other
interagency papers and representing you in interagency forums is presently
crippled. It is handicapped-not only by a number of vacancies in NIO positions
but also by a Chairman who has-run out of ideas, energy, creativity and who does
not manage. It also is handicapped by the very uneven quality of the drafting
staff, called the Analytic Group, and by a clumsy,. time consuming estimates
process that almost assures mush.
The Chairman
2. Dick Lehman is.a_valuable resource for you, a man well experienced in
the ways of Washington and intelligence and whose judgment and wisdom continue
to be an important resource. At the same time, Dick simply has run out of steam.
He does not manage the NIC.at all except in a very superficial administrative
sense. As a result, the NIC very much resembles an academic department at a
fairly sleepy university. There is little sense of vigor, energy, urgency or
purpose. There is little creative vitality: Some of the best NIOs--e.g. Holdridge,
Ames--have left or are-leaving-
3. You need to find a-new Chairman. Whoever this person is, in my view he
should not have NIO responsibilities (as Dick does for Warning) but should be
solely responsible for running the NIC. His responsibilities should include the
following:
On his own, through you and via the NIOs, he should be current
on policy issues of interest and concern to the Administration
not only for today but also with respect to the future. Through
his own aggressive contacts with analysts, academics and the private
sector, he should be alerting you and through you the policymakers,
his NIOs and his drafters about issues over the horizon that must
be given attention. In short, the Chairman should be all over the
map--in Washington, in the U.S. and abroad--in picking people's
brains so that he can alert you and NFAC about problems that we
should be addressing. He ought to be an intellectual sparkplug
for the Community.
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The Chairman not only should be the driving force in collaboration
with you for identifying issues to be addressed in estimates and
other interagency work, but also must be the whip hand to ensure
that such papers are prepared in a timely manner. Discipline
must be instilled in the NIC, in the Community and among the NIOs
that estimates simply cannot be allowed to string out over months.
Most estimates are relevant to issues and problems that face the
Administration now or in the near future. We must give attention
to the faster preparation of both NIEs and SNTEs. The Chairman
must assume this responsibility.
The Chairman also must be the first and most important level of
quality control. In my view, it is unacceptable to have a situation
in which your uncertainty about quality is so great that you believe
you must review drafts even before they are circulated at the working
level in the Community. The Chairman must take a critical view of
papers being issued to ensure that they are not only responsive to
.a specific request or need but also that they address larger
questions that may flow out of a specific request and that are
important to policymakers. Beyond this, a Chairman ought to enforce
standards about how evidence is treated as well as the quality of
the writing and reasoning. Finally, it is up to the Chairman to
take the lead in bringing alternative views into drafts and educating
the Community-that "wordsmithing" is a lazy and cowardly way to
avoid the clear expression of dissenting views and that this can
no longer be accepted.
Additionally, the Chairman must ensure consistently high standards
of--performance by the NIOs and by their assistants. The old "live-
and-let-live" attitude of NFAC toward those doing only satisfactory
work cannot.-be tolerated in a small and important organization such
as the NIC. Not everyone can write estimates well or adequately
represent you-in interagency forums. People who cannot do these
things well shouTd be. returned to their component, if appropriate
without prejudice to their careers. At the same time, the quality
of the Analytic Group must be u raded. There are a handful of
absolutely first-rate people who are being 25X1
worked to death. because of the high calibre of their work. Those
who are not in this league should Be returned from whence they
came and others- given an opportunity. It is in this Group, more
than in any other single place in the Community, that the Director
has the opportunity to develop a cadre of people with the broad
perspective to write the kind of geostrategic/geopolitical analysis
that is so lacking. Selection for this Group should be a high
honor and should be appropriately rewarded when people are successful.
It should be regarded among analysts as the plum job in CIA and in
the Intelligence Community. It is the Carman of the NIC, with
your help, who must make this happen.
Finally, of course, the Chairman must be responsible for the
administrative functioning of the NIC.
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Where to put the NIC
4. John McMahon and John Bross both. feel very strongly that the NIC should
continue to reside in CIA and not be subordinated to the Intelligence Community
organization. They cite the 1947 law to the effect that CIA is responsible for
preparing "national" intelligence; that any effort simply to change the plumbing
chart will not make a dent in the Community conviction that the NIC belongs to
you and that you are CIA; and that putting the NrC in the IC Staff would be an
administrative nightmare. There is validity to these arguments. At the same
time, they do. not help answer whether the NIC should be directly subordinate to
you or to the Director of NFAC.
The arguments in favor of subordinating the unit directly to you
include increasing the independence of the NIC and eliminating
the potential conflict of interest that will face the Director
of NFAC whenever his NIOs and his line offices disagree on the
substance-of an estimate. Whenever he sides with the line offices,
he will limit your flexibility and the independence of the esti-
mating operation. The head of the NIOs under DCIs Colby and Bush
reported directly to them. I was an Assistant NIO for a time under
these arrangements and they seemed to work satisfactorily. The
NIOs continued to depend on NFAC for most of their staff support,
as they do now, and it generally was given willingly. After all,
both NFAC and the NIC belong to the DCI, which ensures that any
disputes can be resolved internally.
The arguments in favor of subordinating the unit to the Director
of NFAC include recognition that the NIOs do depend heavily upon
NFAC resources and therefore are more likely to get them if their
own component-.head (i.e. D/NFAC) can order the allocation of such
resources. Additionally, it might be noted that the old Office
of National Estimates was subordinated administratively to the
DDL, even though at times the head of the Office reported directly
to the DCI.. Further,.John would argue that the conflict of interest
Iproblem is not a serious one`and that where there was a serious
disagreement between the NIOs and NFAC it is always possible for
NFAC simply to take a footnote. The CIA member of the NFIB can
then decide whether he wishes to vote NFAC's stock or NIO's stock
on-a-partfcular estimate. Further, there is something to be said
for the adm-fnistrative simplicity of having the NIC inside NFAC.
Adding the-NIC to the DCI area would increase that complement by
another 50 or 60-people, although that is basically a bookkeeping
-problem. Moreover, having the Chairman of the NIC report directly
to you would increase your span of control (although the head of
the NIC has direct access to you now even though he technically
reports to D/NFAC). Last but not least, John is very concerned
about the establishment of an independent production arm of the
DCI apart from NFAC. He is worried that existence of two competitive
centers will produce duplication of effort and generally complicate
the production of high quality intelligence. (I have noted to him,
however, that one produces interagency intelligence and the other
produces CIA intelligence--two very different products which
usually are not duplicative.)
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5. All things considered, and it is a close call, I am inclined to favor
reestablishing the NIC as an independent entity under the DCI. I share John's
views that placing the NIC even administratively under the Intelligence Community
Staff would be very complicated, would raise questions about whether the Chairman
reports through or to the Director of that Staff, and would not persuade anyone
in the Community that the NIC was other than in your back pocket. Furthermore,
if you bring in a high-powered outsider as Chairman of the NIC he will assume
his mandate comes from you and will not hesitate to by-pass John, which could
cause considerable tension; this will probably be true also of outsiders you
hire as NIOs. The potential for conflict would be great. Additionally, leaving
the NIC under NFAC--especially with the departure of Lehman--would make the NIC
resemble simply another production office of NFAC, an inappropriate derogation
of its role and. responsibility. Also, I am persuaded that even the appearance
of a conflict of interest on the part of D/NFAC between the NIC and the line
offices is unhealthy and contributes to the sense that the views of NFAC pre-
dominate in interagency intelligence production.
Improving Estimating
6. Once you have an intellectually creative and energetic new Chairman,
have filled the NIO slots with great minds and bureaucratic wunderkinds, have
developed a cadre of highly skilled hired pens, and have decided where to put
the NIC organizationally, the problem of improving the estimates still will be
unfinished. Times without number the coordination process in the Community
itself has turned a silk purse into a sow's ear. It is a process in which
middle-level, professional meeting-goers (often unaware of the positions of
their principals) perfer to spend day-long meetings wordsmithing drafts to tone
-down forthright judgments in ways that produce bureaucratic oatmeal generally
known as the "lowest-common denominator." It is time for a change in the way
estimates are produced-fn the Community. A process Is needed that will move
estimates quickly and permit the introduction of new information, the correction
of factual errors, and above all, the identification of alternative views in clear
terms and by agency. -
Representation at the working level Community coordination
meetings -needs to be upgraded. In interdepartmental forums,
NIOs participate-at the assistant secretary level. Yet, when
they chair an NFIB representatives meeting they are confronted
with GS-13s to 15s who are hesitant to speak for their agencies
in any forthright manner. This contributes enormously to the
tendency to--obfuscate differences rather than clarify them.
Few of these people want to take a stand and risk having their
principal undercut them. Also, I believe the practice of each
agency sending the same representative to meetings on all estimates
is counter-productive. Middle-level representation (with pro-
fessional meeting-goers) at these meetings is a shirking of an
important responsibility by more senior officials. For example,
it is ridiculous that CIA should be represented by a branch chief
(GS-14 or 15) at such meetings. At minimum, the office chief
or his deputy from the office most involved with the subject
(e.g. OSR for the military estimates; OPA for political estimates;
etc.) should attend. They would bring more wisdom, greater
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perspective and more experience to the coordinating table. It
would ensure that drafts are reviewed before the meetings at a
more senior level than analysts and branch chiefs. And it surely
would end these absurd, days-long coordination meetings. I think
the kind of upgrading of NFAC's representation described above
should apply to other agencies and that this would accelerate
the coordination process and improve the quality of what comes
out of that process.
Another change in the process I recommend is to make estimates
shorter. In recent years, few senior policymakers even have read
NIEs. We can perhaps change that unhappy reality not only by
improving quality but by making these papers more to the point
and physically less staggering to see hit one's desk. No one at
a senior level has time to read a 25-50 page printed document.
Why not strive for 5-10 pages or thereabouts--except on the big
military estimates. Longer papers encourage the inclusion of
marginal material, beating around the bush, and flaccid logic.
Short estimates also would diminish the present tendency to
haggle endless-ly over key judgments because everyone knows that
is the only part of a paper anyone will read. We can even
occasionally do away with key judgments if we make estimates
brief, and thereby encourage senior people to read our entire
-case.
-- We should do fewer standard "country" estimates and focus more
on SNIEs that are highly responsive to specific policy issues.
These should-be done generally with a two-week deadline and we
.should not always wait to be asked. (There has been some progress
in this area, but more is needed.)
- We need to get more facts and hard evidence into summaries and
key judgments. Judgmental or "opinion" prose is never as
-persuasive as a hard fact or.two. The key judgments/summaries
too often -sound like political science tutorials.
-- Something must be done about the two big military estimates. The
-draft-of the analytical volume of NIE 11-14 (Warsaw Pact Forces)
that came-to-you a month ago was 450 pages long. That's ridiculous.
NIE 11-3/8 (Soviet Strategic Forces) takes four months to write
and four to-six months to coordinate. Both devour resources here
and in other agencies. Do they really need to be done every year
as 11-3/8 is? The claim that it is necessary to the DoD budget
process is dubious--last year's NIE wasn't out until four months
after the budget was submitted. I know Dave Brandwein has been
looking into alternatives, but I do not believe his inquiry goes
far enough.-
Finally, we need to make greater use of the "NIC Memorandum."
The "Soviet-Policy in Africa" paper you liked was a NIC Memorandum--
which meant we could write a coherent paper, offer it to others
for corrections and comment, but were able to avoid the watering
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down so endemic to formal coordination. This vehicle is well
suited for the kind of global view, geostrategic perspective we
need and that is so hard to coordinate formally. It would be a
good vehicle for highly speculative papers such as the one you
have asked for on the implications of Poland absent a Soviet
invasion. It also would be a good way to get before people our
thoughts on possibly highly controversial "over-the-horizon"
issues. In short, if you have a stable of very talented NIOs
and analyst-drafters, their creativity and experience should be
exploited fully--and beyond the confines of formal estimates.
7. The National Intelligence Council is a potentially valuable, yet largely
untapped intelligence resource.. Now that you have sorted out the DDO, I believe
you should turn to-revitalizing the NIC. The above suggestions, in my view, offer
a start toward that objective.
Rober
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29 May 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Robert M. Gates
SUBJECT : Revitalizing the NIC (Part 21
1. You have asked me for further thoughts on how to revitalize the National
Intelligence Council. 'It seems---to me that this falls into two categories, people
and process. First, -tfre- people.
NIC Personnel
2.--.You have the-following people already on board:
- -NIO/Africa--Grey Cowan. Grey is one of the better NIOs. He is
-here from Columbia University and has been an NIO for about two
years. He travels widely in Africa, has a lot of contacts, knows
-most of_the-'people in the_ academic community and in Washington
dealing._Wrth.4frican affairs. He has good common sense, is
real-istic-and..an important asset, in my view.
;the--year, per . ps as early as. the end of summer. He will be
iealaced Fw..rharlia Waforma n
- NIO Near East:~`Bob Ames. As you know, Ames is leaving later in
NIO Latfr erica Jack Davis. Davis'is a CIA careerist. You
have some- osure to him as a result of the Cuban Estimate. I
need-not say-more. You have mentioned Kemp and Sternfield as
-possible replacements.
-- .NIO/General Purpose'Forces. Major General Ennis Whitehead. This
position has traditions y been filled by a two-star military
officer. Ennis seems competent in the position, although the
nature of the large projects that this NIO traditionally has
undertaken significantly limits his flexibility.
-- RIO/Strategic Programs: David Brandwein. Brandwein is leaving
as-of-29-May-
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-- NIO at Large. Hans Heymann. (Now acting as NIO for USSR/EE.)
I think you have known Hans for some time. Hans is hard to get
to the point and is generally discursive. He sounds erudite but
seems to me a little fuzzy-headed. I have not seen Hans do a
crisp piece of work in the seven or eight years I have known him
in his present capacity.
-- NIO at Large. Davis Bobrow has been recommended for employment,
pending your approval.
3. The quality of the Assistant NIOs is mixed, with some--like) 25X1
being very good and several of the others being very average. In terms of upgrading
the-Assistants, it seems to me that this is primarily a responsibility of the
individual NIOs, although they may need their courage bucked-up where there is an
Assistant that is'really not meeting the grade and has been permitted to linger too
long.
4. With-respect-to NIO vacancies:
NIO/Western Europe: My understanding is that you still are hoping
.to obtain the services of the fellow from the law firm who has
spent a_ good deal of time. in Europe.
NIO/USSR-EE: Q memo indicates that they are in the process 25X1
of selecting and that it has been narrowed to two or three people.
This comes as a surprise to me. If is interested, he is 25X1
obvious-Ty-a.possibility. I' believe this NIO should come from
outsfde-the-government. I can't help but wonder whether we might
not obtain the-services for a year or two of someone like ~ 25X1
Other alternatives that would be worth investigating would 25X1
include Fritz Ermarth,.possibly Sy Weiss, or maybe even Bill
Stearman on the present NSC Staff--who has been an old Soviet
Yhand around the government fpr a number of years.
-- NIO/East.Asaa., apparently is coming to see you next 25X1
week.- -Shou~-she not prove suitable, this is one place we might
l-ook_to State for a Betailee. I had in mind someone like Mike
Armacost, but the paper this morning says he has been chosen
Ambassador--toindonesia. There must be other good people at
-State -though.
-- N10/Strategic Programs: Again, the indicates the 25X1
choice has been narrowed to two or three people. This also is
news to-me. I have just been informed of a potentially very
satisfactory candidate who would seem to meet a lot of desirable
cri.teri --Charles Henkin of the Department of State. Henkin
is in-the-Bureau of Political/Military Affairs at State and is
being edged out in a ower play in which Chris Lehman (Secretary
of the-Navy's brother is being given Henkin's job to cement
political relations between Rick Burt, Lehman and the latter's
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conservative sponsors. Henkin has a PhD in nuclear physics and
has worked on SALT and SALT-related problems for nearly ten years.
This apparently included a stint at the Department of Defense.
I am told that he would come with the strong recommendation of
Rick Burt, Paul Nitze and, in our own Agency and 25X1
Evan Hineman. He is possibly being considered as Deputy Director
of Program Analysis and Evaluation at the Pentagon. He has
considerable knowledge of the blue-side data and also of the
policy issues relating to strategic programs. He is already a
supergrade in the SES, is 38, and is regarded as imaginative,
thoughtful and sensible. We would need to move fairly quickly
on him however..
5.. This leaves two NIO-at-Large positions of the present complement which
could be_fi`l1ed by the likes of or other senior people whom we 25X1
might persuade to come. in on a-regular rotating basis for a one-year-assignment
to take-on special: projects for us, to troubleshoot, or generally serve as wise
men who could,consul-t-on a broad range of estimates. and serve as-important resources.
You-could bring in two this year, replace them with two others in another year,
and so on. There area number of outstanding people in and out of government who
might, it seems to me, 5a persuaded to come here and play this kind or role if
they knew it was-only for one. year. Additionally, you have indicated an interest
in hiring an NIO for'Special Projects and another 25X1
for Science and Technology. -The DDCI en on is inter st in possibly
appointing--an NIO to-run certain special collection projects, a position Barry
Kelly held several years aga. -
6. On the present cast of NIOs, the two that I would recommend looking at
closely with. a. view to,-easing them out in the next six months or so would be
Jack Davis-and Hans-Heymann:- With. Hans gone you could then look to bring in an
NIO for Economics,- an area- that is now not being covered by the NIC.
7. All concerned must recognize that revitalizing the NIC is intimately
related to-r-ti#a1iztrg_estimates and the estimating process. The two go hand
in hand. In addition:to--filling-the vacant slots for NIOs, adding two or three
NIO posittons.to cover territory not now receiving attention, and doing some
weeding of Assistant NIOs and the Analytic Group, there are some steps that
can he tak.eet-to-revital-ize the NIC and the estimates process:
The I ational .tntelligence'Council exists in name only. I
-bel ieve that. if you assemble T15 very talented people, the
whale can be greater than the sum of the parts. All the NIOs
should..revtew all estimate drafts and meet together to discuss
the substance before an estimate draft is sent out to the
Commun.i.ty. - or example, a ould offer useful insights
on a Cuba estimate; n a estimates; an Ermarth on
military as well as Soviet estimates; and so forth. The NIC
is now simply 12 individuals, who do not have any collegial
role--or interrelationship. Greater use of them as a Council--
tncluding-occasional sessions with you and the DDCI el-`her -
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brainstorming or exploring new territory--would serve greatly
to revitalize the NIC. Working together is bound to have a
synergistic effect and bring greater insight to estimates. I
think you both also would have greater confidence knowing
that the NIC as a body--with its range of talents and per-
spectives--stood behind a draft.
Separating the NIC from NFAC will be essential.
Changing the estimates process also will be important, including
,upgrading the level of people who represent the NFIB principals
at-the working group meetings; closer collaboration between
these people and their principals; doing more to obtain alter-
native views; and altering the coordinating process to put the
It is essential that the NIC continue to provide staff support
to.you-.and. the DDCI for NSC meetings and SrGs on substantive
;topic.::.
would_still represent you when covert action was the primary
By the same token, it will be essential for the NIC to rely
on staff support of the-DDO and NFAC and in exchange to keep
..the two directorates well informed of what is going on. DDO
emphasis on divergent views rather than wordsmithing will all
help-revitalize the process and through it the NIC itself.
When the_NIC is separated from NFAC, it will be important for
the NIOs-:Ito remain your representatives in policy meetings.
issues,
-- Steps should-be taken to upgrade the NIC and help build the
pride of-its members in it. While such pride should grow
primarily out of performance, some bureaucratically important
things need to be done as well to help bring the NIC out of
' he_backwater. Lehman sits inn a tiny office that conveys no
sense ?f-the-importance of the NIC (or its Chairman) as having
the-leading role. in preparing the premier work of the Community--
a National Intelligence Estimate--or of serving as your principal
----- substantiveadvisers: So, little things that have large bureau-
cratic .impact:need to be done: (1) an office for the Chairman
-that-befits his role; (21 moving all NIOs to the 7th floor and
present NIO-assistants and NIC Staff now on the 7th floor to
NIC space on the 5th floor (no more space is needed--just
reshuffling, what they have); (3) a larger role in substantive
triefings on the Hill; CO regular:monthly meetings with you;
and-so on. -
8_ In--sum, I think the. key to revitalizing the NIC lies in both people
and process. The whale estimates business has become very routine and the people
involved in. it very bureaucratic, not only in the NIC but in other agencies.
Through the recruitment of special and very vigorous people the NIC must be seen
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EYES-ONLY
to be a special place to serve. The NFIB must itself recognize the Council-
the collective entity--as a source of realistic wisdom and insight. This, of
course, will have to be earned. At the same time, the process must be elevated
to convey that NFIB principals regard the estimates business--the substantive
essence of national intelligence--as very high priority for them. This in turn
will help revitalize the NIC.
9. A final thought. At the risk of repeating what you already must know,
the task of revitalizing and rebuilding the NIC is not a short-term one, any
more than is the improving of analysts in NFAC. The NIC needs sustained support
from the DCI and?DDCI and sustained direct leadership for several years in order
to return to the competence and reputation for quality that the Office of National
Estimates had many years ago under William Langer and.. the early years of Sherman
Kent. Neither you nor anyone else should be led to expect immediate-results,
although you-can justifiably expect the quality of individual estimates coming
to you to begin to improve right away.
Robert M. Gates
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C AL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhington, D.C. 20505
'1e
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Hal Ford
National Intelligence Officer At Large
SUBJECT: The Future of National Estimates
NIC 02989-84
18 May 1984
1. As a practictioner, observer, and critic of the national estimates
business since 1951, in and out of CIA, I believe strongly that certain
fairly substantial additional changes have become necessary in this business
if national estimating is to make the impact it deserves in tomorrow's
world. This memo examines problems which will increasingly beset the
estimate-policymaker relationship, and offers certain recommendations to
meet that more troubled future environment.
2. My chief observations/recommendations, as spelled out in the body of
this memo, are in brie :
-- That in some respects the coordinated national estimate has become
an outdated artform in the heavy competition for consumers'
attention -- in a world and a policymaking milieu increasingly
affected by pressures of complexity, time, and disorder.
-- That certain types of coordinated national estimates remain highly
necessary and should be produced, but that the NIOs, the A/NIOs,
and the NIC's Analytic Group (AG) can better serve the interests of
policymakers by continuing to increase that proportion of national
estimating which takes the form of less formal memos, think-pieces,
face-to-face encounters, new methods of communicating estimative
judgments, and so on.
-- That the key to the quality of written estimates is -- and will
continuo be -- the quality of the drafters; that the practice of
CL BY SIGNER
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borrowing drafters on an ad hoc basis from other offices has proved
a mixed blessing; that the best system yet devised for producing
the bulk of estimates is a cadre of elite, experienced estimates
officers concentrated in the estimates office staff (NIC, at
present); and that to these ends something like the present AG
should be substantially upgraded in size, stature, and recruitment
base.
With no disrespect to Bob Gates' heroic dual performance, that the
production and impact of estimates can be best maximized where the
chief estimates officer (C/NIC, or however titled) holds that
position as a full-time job, and is himself/herself a figure of
national reputation who is a hard-headed thinker/doer.
That many additional changes -- spelled out below -- are also
needed to improve the utility of future national estimating. These
encompass matters of purpose, format, procedure, media, and
marketing.
3. An increasingly difficult future market for national estimates:
The always difficult market for estimates is going to get worse.
The producers of estimates, up and down the chain of command, must
recognize more clearly that their efforts will face heavy
competition indeed for the time and attention of senior
policymaking consumers. These key targets of ours are the very
officers who have the least time and energy to absorb our wisdom.
They carry their own NIEs around in their heads. They often feel
that they do not need us, especially in fields where general
knowledge is plentiful, but unique augmenting intelligence is thin.
-- There is going to be no automatic market of expectant consumers,
just waiting for our estimative insights before they proceed to
policy decision. Dispassionate estimates are going to be up
against advocacy, with the latter having the advantage of always
being simpler and more seductive. And in particular, our estimates
will not encounter a ready market on those occasions where their
t
it
h
f
'
por
ra
s o
t
e world are not congenial with policymakers
own
images or commitments.
The expanding hazards to estimates' impact will be both foreign and
home-grown. Tomorrow's world will bring not only the growing
weight of the Soviet global challenge, but increasingly more
volatile threats to US interests from instabilities in the Third
World and elsewhere. Such rising disorder will create a more
difficult policymaking milieu. The demands of meeting pressing
crises has always produced what past evaluations have correctly
termed a "stranglehold" by current intelligence, to the deteriment
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of sufficient consumer or producer attention to longer-term -- and
often more serious -- problems. This situation will intensify as
policymakers are beset by a rise in the number, complexity,
insistence, and time-squeeze of world problems.
-- Accompanying this trend will be certain new hazards to estimates
arising from improved White House and other operations centers such
.,~ as that of Richard Beal's. These efforts will be good/bad: they
MC will tie intelligence to policy on a more immediate basis, but at
the same time may damage decision making by surrounding senior
policy officers with facts and judgments which in some instances
are more high-impact than accurate or meaningful.
-- For many reasons, hence, there will be more disorder in tomorrow's
world and tomorrow's policymaking -- and, consequently, a greater
gap between the very rational purposed theory of national
estimating on the one hand, and the more haphazard practice of
policymaking on the other. This means that tomorrow's national
estimating will have to be damn good in quality and utility, on and
beyond recent improvements, if it is to justify the time, talent,
energy, and taxpayers' money spent on its preparation.
4. The case for fewer interagency national estimates and more national
estimating:
-- The case still exists -- more than three decades since the creation
of the NIE art form -- for the traditional purposes of certain
national estimates. Those purposes, as expressed by then DCI
Bedell Smith,* sought in the national estimates an authoritative
interpretation and appraisal that would serve as a firm guide to
policymakers and planners, a disinterestedness above question, the
collective judgment of the highest officials in the various
intelligence agencies -- hence commanding respect throughout the
government as the best available and most authoritative body of
estimative judgments. These considerations still apply for many of
the basic studies, such as the NIE 11-3/8 series, where an NIE
serves as an agreed reference point for key planning; and for
evaluations of certain other crisis or troubling situations of
pressing importance to the United States where authoritative,
dispassionate basic assessments may be in short supply.
But in the case of many of other types of national estimates, the
/ institutions of orderly policymaking for which estimates were
designed originally to serve have long since disappeared. Apart
largely from long-range military planning, policymaking takes place
much more on the run. The best step the estimates business has
tare-n-
o cT en -to mee 'tffi"s'changed circumstance is the creation and
*IAC-M-1, 30 October 1950.
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strengthening of the NIO system. Well and good: through various
means the NIOs have moved out smartly into this policymaking
scene. But the ties of estimates and policymaking are still
somewhat hit-and-miss, with no systematic match-up, and with the
time and talent of senior NIC officers overly drained off in often
feckless coordination.
-- There continues to be a sizable gap between the theory and the
practice of the coordination process. At the representatives'
level there is often a lack of individual candlepower, geniune
expertise, and actual authority to represent the Principal. With
some exceptions, representatives tend to defend prior established
positions, or just insure that nothing too objectionable gets in
the text, or just pass the buck along to the Principals. There is
strong reluctance at many representatives' meetings to take clear
dissents, or to undertake new kinds of inquiry or lines of march,
or to venture out beyond demonstrated intelligence at hand, or to
judge the possible consequences of possible future developments.
These drawbacks are reduced, the better and stronger the texts, and
the stronger and better the NIO Chairman. Often the coordination
process improves an estimate's precision and introduces new
subtleties into the text. Drawbacks nonetheless persist, and so
create many other situations where the final coordinated draft that
emerges is essentially that which entered the reps' arena, only
less sharp, less clear, of less utility -- and much delayed.
-- There have been worthwhile efforts to increase the participation of
Principals in the estimative process. Again, well and good, and
the more such continuing pressure on them the better. But,
41r . realistically speaking, the fact that most Principals are
essentially managers is always going to make the outcome of NFIB
meetings largely the result of given DCI's and whatever assorted
creative personalities happen to attend the particular session,
rather than the collective wisdom foreseen by General Beedle Smith
and his original IAC.
-- Given all these limitations on national estimates, there is a
strong case to be made that the NIC (and future central estimative
offices, whatever their title) can best serve policymakers by
conceiving of themselves more as national estimators rather than as
just the producers of national estimates. This means that t e
NIC and the AG can and should manne y the most sophisticated,
broadly experienced officers that can be gathered together; and (2)
that these NIC officers not dilute their contribution to national
estimating by having to spend too great a proportion of their time
grinding out coordinated NIE packages.
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-- Constructive critijs have long warned estimators of the dangers of
over-coordination. What have been often the most valuable
inputs made by senior estimative officers over the years have been
sharp ad hoc or in-house studies which break new ground, point out
new developing world threats or opportunities, question
conventional wisdom, examine the consequences of contingent
developments, or otherwise give policymakers more direct, focussed
assistance than can the necessarily more ponderous estimates --
even the recently improved fast-track variety. NIOs, A/NIOs, and
AG members are in the best possible spot to contribute such
insights, and should be encouraged to continue to enlarge the
proportion of such efforts, checking carefully in each instance
with DDI or other appropriate specialists, and indicating clearly
to the readers the status of the views being presented.
-- Policymakers would be well served also if, on occasion, memos of
comment were offered on such think pieces by individual NFIB
Principals or other senior intelligence and policymaking officers.
-- NIOs, A/NIOs, and AG officers, if freed somewhat from the sizable
paper-shuffling demands of coordinating and producing formal
estimates, would have more time also to assist other senior
intelligence officers in guiding collection and in devising new
means of communicating estimative findings, in addition to that of
the printed page. Impact on the faster-moving policymaking world
will require much more in the way of video, graphics, face-to-face,
and other measures. Also more emphasis, see below, on marketing
and follow-up.
-- In all such cases of estimating by means additional to national
estimates, the payoff must of course remain on the quality and
utility of estimative assistance to policymakers, not on the
quantity of NIEs or other estimative pieces being produced.
5. The key importance of an estimate's drafter:
-- Another clear fact which three decades of US estimates experience
has demonstrated is the absolutely primary importance of the
particular drafter to that finished estimate's quality and
41/a usefulness. Where initial concept and drafts are only so-so, or
i worse, they not only clog up the estimates schedule but often
*For example, this ancient but still apt recommendation, from a senior
CIA officer, 1957: "The sum and substance of what I have been saying is
that the US national security system would be better served if the
Intelligence Community took a less vigorous view of the meaning of
coordination and substituted more informal techniques of consultation."
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remain relatively impervious to subsequent tinkering and
re-drafting.
Where drafters are top-rate there is no problem. But the record is
not one of unblemished success, now or in the past. Traditionally
the toughest cases exist where the drafter proves mediocre or
poor. It is not always easy to know in advance whether an untested
drafter will do a good job of preparing an estimate: some good
current intelligence officers, for example, have put facts and
chronology together in an "estimate," but one which to the consumer
has no so-what. The writing of estimates calls for distinctive
experience and breadth, as well as distinctive skills in
conceptualizing, organizing, and presenting an estimate's findings.
The 1974-1980 experiment which required NIOs to scrounge estimates
drafters as best they could proved a failure -- one recognized in
the decision to reorganize the NIOs into a NIC, supported by its
own AG. Since that time the drafting situation has improved
somewhat, but because of the AG's small size and the many demands
on the time of the NIOs and A/NIOs, tht majority ofestimates still
has to be farmed out to other offices.
This farming out of drafting assignments involves various
problems. Outside drafters do not belong to the NIOs. They are
not answerable to NIC discipline or standards. They are sometimes
physically separated from the NIO chairman, even across town. NIOs
don't always get the drafting stars they seek, but have to settle
for those the parent offices make available. In some host offices
the drafting of national estimates is not treated as part of a
career-enhancing pattern, but an external chore. Drafters are
caught between the demands and views of their own offices and those
of the NIO. In result, enthusiasm, priority, quality, and an
estimate's usefulness all suffer.
Some farming out of estimates must of course continue. This
certainly applies for many of the complex military estimates where
outside-the-NIC analytic offices have produced many good drafting
teams. The same applies for those particular occasions where the
dimensions of a given estimative chore happen to fit the analytic
culture well, and where the host offices do ante up first-team
drafting talent. But there are limits to such practice, including
distinct limits on how much burden NIC projects should exert
especially on DDI production offices' own responsibilities.
The answer: an increasing proportion of coordinated estimates and
in-house pieces can best be done by an experienced AG of
*The 1983 record: 32 interagency estimates were drafted by DDI
officers; 24 by NIC; 9, DIA; 5, INR; and 8, joint.
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strengthened proportions, the best type of system yet devised for
developing creative estimates drafters. A group encompassing such
breadth, intellectual leadership, and skills can also constitute a
high-class drafting pool for special ad hoc DCI and C/NIC chores.
-- This cannot be done well, however, by the present AG. As initially
organized by D/NFAC in early 1980,* this group was to consist "of
about 20 officers;" those officers were to draft "the bulk" of
coordinated estimates; they were in addition to "initiate ad hoc
estimative memoranda for NIC discussion and futher disposition;"
and rotational tours in the AG were to be an "important element in
the career planning of NFAC offices." None of these situations
exists at the present time. The AG now has only 11 professional
slots. Its members draft only coordinated estimates, not think
papers as well. CIA chiefs do not willingly provide the AG their
best officers for rotation tours but understandably husband them
for their own offices' purposes. Nor, except for military hardware
questions, is there much sophisticated drafting talent available in
the Intelligence Community -- we have had one such tour in the AG
which was successful (NSA), one which proved mis-cast, and one
(DIA) up-coming. The record has also been mixed in drawing top
talent into the AG from academia, etc., where this path also
entails special bureaucratic hazards.
-- In short, if intelligence is to offer the maximum possible support
to policymaking, it must have an estimates cadre of the best brains
and effectiveness in town. This did obtain at certain times in the
past, witness the wealth of talent represented by such former
estimates staffers as Hyland, Billington, Komer, Maury, Cline, W.
Bundy, Carver, Byrnes, R. J. Smith, A. Smith, D. Graham, Huizenga,
Clarke, Whitman, Chet Cooper, and many others. The principal
reason such talent had been made available was that the estimates
office was initially conceived to be "the heart of the CIA and of
the national intelligence machinery,"* and early DCI's made sure
that the estimates office got assigned the elite drafters it
required. I submit that something like this concept of an
estimates drafting group is required, or at least something
approaching the AG as initially envisaged in early 1980, if the
estimates business is not to continue bumping along, doing a fairly
good job, but not living up to the potential it could contribute.
6. The need for a full-time C/NIC:
-- The C/NIC is a more than full-time job in itself. The Chairman
must furnish intellectual leadership, get the most out of his/her
*NFAC Notice No. 1-19, "Responsibilities and Structure of the NIC
Analytic Group," of 30 January 1980.
*IAC-M-1, 20 October 1950.
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officers, administer the office, and relate actively to senior
members of the intelligence and policymaking communities. This
latter requirement is of paramount importance inasmuch as
estimates, being somewhat free-will offerings, will always have
greater impact the more the estimators are known commodities to the
policymakers, not faceless officers somewhere across town. To
important degree the regard in which given estimates are held rests
on the personal respect in which their producers are held. This
applies of course to all the members of the NIC, but in particular
to C/NIC. He/she must have the opportunity to spend needed time
with senior officers around town (and with the country's best
4~a1 brains, wherever) before, during, and following the preparation of
estimative support -- and so multiply the impact of the estimates
effort.
-- Although there have been excellent chiefs of the estimates office
who came there from CIA careers, there will generally be an edge in
stature, contacts, and impact -- all other things being equal --
where C/NIC is a scholar or official of national reputation. In
0 short, future NIC's can be most effective when they have something
like latter-day Bill Langer's in charge.
7. Additional recommendations for improving the qualiU and impact of
estimative products. Here purposely avoid familiar criticisms many others
have made, and confine my points to capsule presentations. In brief, there
is need for the DCI to direct that much greater attention be devoted to:
-- The marketing of estimates -- by the DCI, C/NIC, and NIOs alike.
We -most rewarding imeasures involve personalized intervention at
various stages of key exercises, before and after their
production. There is some of this now, from time to time, but
unless pressed much more, our finished products will continue to
tend just to pile up, undifferentiated from other mail, on the
desks of special assistants and other filters. There needs to be
much greater consciousness that our work is not completed at NFIB.
Otherwise we short-circuit the process and the purpose of
estimating.
-- More regularized evaluation of estimates. To date this has been
confined to sporadic ad hoc efforts, -aimed generally at examining
"failures." Fuller and more regular evaluations, conducted by
senior, objective groups, could transmit back much-needed guidance
as to what has and has not been accurate, useful, etc. This cannot
be done by just reading stacks of old papers, but must involve
considerable interviewing, the building of personal contacts with
consumers, and demonstrated evidence to them of the worth of such
inquiry. Some estimates could benefit by making a review of
previous judgments on the same topic an explicit part of their
content.
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-- More attention to collection re Third World developments. Here is
where most of the action is and where the prime detonators to
world peace are. The Intelligence Community (especially State)
must be prodded from on high to get US missions out of their
cocktail cocoons and into their host societies, so that blindsided
analyses and estimates do not inflict more self-harm on US
policymaking.
-- More attention in estimates to factoring out the respective
indigenous - external ormunis n re ens in Thit World hot
spots. Such crises are o course of enormously greater danger to
US interests where Soviet or other hostile elements are at work in
the picture. But US policymakers have paid dearly in the past for
their relative ignorance of those basic forces in certain world
settings which create the local pro-Communist and without whose
remedy many US well-intentioned policies will go unavailing.
-- Less emphasis on predicting events, more on depicting forces and
trends at work in given estimative situations.
-- More estimative emphasis on giving policymakers handles: that is,
poin ing up opportunities as well as threats, and differentiating
between those forces in a given picture which seem inexorable, and
those others that may to x degree be amenable to US or other
friendly remedy.
-- Bein less shy, in estinates, in suggesting opportunity handles to
po is ,a ers. No trying o ma a policy, but not stopping either
with just telling the consumer that he/she faces a hell of a
situation in Ruritania.
More contact b estimators with the country's best brains outside
of ro_ess ona intelligence ranks. Contact with outside experts-
and consultants remains sporadic. More is needed, and on a fuller,
more systematic basis, to avoid certain stultifying effects
Washington localitis can involve.
Much more effort b and on behalf of the estimators to know the US
Blue element muc better -- and making sure that such knowledge o
the ingredient is ground into analyses and estimates of foreign
situations.
Better appreciation amon anal sts and estimators that the, too,
not only the o c ma ers, must keep alert to -the distorting
influences of prior belief.
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Finally, applicable in relation to all the above, a fierce
determination by estimators to tell it like his: that Ts, the
necessity to give our consumers the fuT eT stand most objective
analysis/judgment possible -- without regard to the policymakers'
particular preconceptions, commitments, or sensibilities. It is
the job of estimators to tell the truth, not to make our customers
happy. Otherwise we will just be spending taxpayers' money to help
policymakers deceive themselves, on occasion, about how well things
are going in Vietnam, or Iran, or Lebanon, or wherever.
8. I will be pleased to learn your reactions to this memo's
observations/recommendations, and to discuss these matters further.
lff444..
Hal Ford
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SUBJECT: The Future of National Estimates
DCI/NIC/NIO/AL/HFord:
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - SA/DCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - ADDI
1 - VC/NIC
1 - SRP
1 - Each NIO
1 - AG
1 - Ford Chrono
18 May 84) 25X1
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30 May 1984
NOTE FOR: DCI
SUBJECT: Hal Ford's Paper, "The Future of National
Estimates"
Bill:
Some points have merit.
Most of it is outrageous and is tantamount to establishing the NIC as
an independent agency. This is something I feared all along and reflects
an undercurrent in the NIC. On the whole I take issue with most of Hal's
comments.
It is outrageous to say that the coordination of national estimates
is an outdated art form. This is a key, basic charter of the Central
Intelligence Agency and although it is complex, we should not abandon it.
As far as the NIC's Analytic Group (AG) goes, I have always feared
the establishment of this entity within the?NIC. It provides an
independence without data base and sows the seed of developing an
independent organization. That organization can run contrary, counter
and independent of the DDI. Frankly it is an abortion and we can best
serve our intelligence process by reducing it dramatically or doing away
with it completely. There is no need to upgrade the size, stature and
recruitment base of the AG but rather we ought to look to the DDI and
other organizations of the Intelligence Community to improve the quality
of their intelligence.
It should come as no surprise to you that I believe there is
considerable merit in the DDI and Chairman/NIC being one and the same.
To say that there is going to be no automatic market of expectant
consumers of our estimates runs completely counter to recent history.
The policymakers have never been better served by our estimative process
nor have they been timid themselves in expressing their requirements to
satisfy their insatiable needs.
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The reference to the White House and Richard Beal's operation to me
are not an added argument in favor of what Hal proposes but an argument
of what I feared from Beal's operation to start with. That it is the
intent of some quarters in the White House to set up an independent
analytical capability within the White House, something again which my
gut says will produce hal f-assed information to the White House as well
as step on DCI responsibilities and prerogatives.
The suggestion that because there will be more disorder in tomorrow's
world should cause us to bifurcate our present in-house intelligence'
process makes no sense at all.
If there is any gap between theory and practices of the coordination
process then that fault rests with the NIOs doing their basic job. And
that is an individual responsibility of each NIO. Enlarging the AG will
not solve that obvious deficiency. The suggestion that the NIC serve the
policymakers by conceiving themselves as national estimators and
increasing their sophistication and size is what was done in 1947 and
they called the organization at that time CIA.
The farming out of drafts is just what was intended in trying to
develop Community participation in the national estimate process. To
look upon this as a problem as opposed to an accomplishment just boggles
my mind.
In short, I can give no truck to any of Hal's rationale for expanding
the AG. It would be nice simply to see the NIC function as it ought to.
As far as a full-time Chairman/NIC, again I differ with Hal. The
thought that a scholar or an official of national reputation will bring
substance to the job as opposed to awe is without merit. A good many
scholars have their own bag and their own view of life. What we are
trying to produce here is unbiased intelligence and not a mechanism for
someone with their own agenda to take advantage of. I also feel that the
responsibility for scholarship and national reputation shall rest with
the DCI and not some subordinate. Unless, of course, we want to fashion
a DCI who will abandon his role as the President's principal advisor.
As far as evaluation of estimates, the SRP seems to be doing that job
quite well and Helene Boatner's work in evaluating the overall DDI
product has been extremely helpful.
Collection of the Third World has been a large item now for the last
two years. Obviously more is to be done but the problem of getting State
and other embassy officials to play an intelligence role has been very
much on the front burner of the HUMINT Committee; the "Focus Reports" as
well as the collection plans which the IC Staff circulates in your
behalf. Larry Eagl eburger' s message to all embassies a few months ago
was a gig to prompt the embassies into more reporting.
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The complaint to have the estimators receive more U.S. Blue
information is old hat and it's a problem that is not going to be solved
with or without the'NIC. It's inherent in operators to not want to
provide anyone operational information. That goes for submarine ops,
destroyer ops and DDO ops.
The final paragraph which suggests that the estimators tell the truth
and tell it like it is is a lousy and bum rap. The identification of
Vietnam, Iran or Lebanon as examples of where we spent taxpayer's money
to help policymakers deceive themselves is not only factually incorrect
but outrageous in the inference.
Needless to say my emotion runs high with this lousy piece of paper.
STAT
-- n McMahon
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