WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100100009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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RETJ
The Director oo1 Central Intelligence
W oe, D.C. 20505
National' Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FUR: See Distribution
~IIC -85
ctober
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 24
October 1985. If there are any significant amendments or additions you
wish to make, please let me know.
2. Next month's warning meeting will be held on 14 November 1985 at
1015 in room 7E62- CIA ters. Please have your clearances passed
and call with names of the attendees by noon 13
3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and
proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have
your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 4 November 1985.
All paragraphs are
classified SECRET
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SECRI"
The Director o ence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 05352-85
25 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
In a lively session, the NIO/NESA warning meeting discussed the
fallout and implications--for the region and for the US--of recent
developments in the Middle East such as the Achille Lauro hijacking,
Israel's raid on the PLO Headquarters in Tunis, and whether there are
still any prospects for the peace process.
NIO/NESA led off by positing two alternative views of October's
developments. In the more widely shared view, the Arab-Israeli conflict
is threatening to turn into an Arab-US conflict; the peace process has
been severely--if not fatally--wounded; and, America's allies in the
region--moderate Arab regimes like those in Tunisia and Egypt--have been
weakened and alienated from the US. A more optimistic view holds that by
finally asserting itself against terrorism, the US has broken a
psychological barrier that stretches back to occupation of our Embassy in
Tehran; reasserting US willingness to act to defend its interests in the
region will force Middle Eastern and West European regimes to pay more
attention to US interests; moderate Arab regimes are mad at Arafat for
bringing them into conflict with Israel (in the case of Tunisia) or the
US (in Egypt's case); and the limiting of Arafat's options may push him
further toward pursuing the peace process option.
A key question for the next few months is how the PLO, and its
Chairman Yassir Arafat, will react to recent events. Arafat is caught
between wanting to maintain the PLO presence in Jordan--and thus having
to make noises that he is still interested in the peace process--and PLO
hardliners who advocate targetting US as well as Israeli interests.
Fatah, Arafat's organizational base of support in the PLO, is
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Stl.Kt I I r
increasingly hardline, and Arafat will have to listen to Fatah leaders if
he is to keep his own position. Many analysts believe that, in fact,
Arafat, has largely become only a figurehead leader of a PLO that is
increasingly splintered. He remains, however, an important symbol of the
Palestinian movement for diaspora Palestinians.
There was broad agreement that, no matter how much Arafat and the PLO
may be weakened at the moment or in disrepute with moderate Arab regimes
(much less Israel and the US), there can be no meaningful peace process
without the PLO. There was general agreement that while King Hussein may
try to bluff Arafat that he would accept Peres' invitation to negotiate
without the PLO, the Jordanian King is highly unlikely to do so, knowing
that it would be tantamount to signing his own death warrant. Hussein
does not have the independent power base or freedom of movement to make
the unilateral moves toward peace that Sadat did.
? In reality, the prospects for any successful outcome of the peace
process may be nil, but too many parties--moderate Arabs, Arafat, the US,
and Israel--have an interest in'maintaining at least the illusion of a
peace process, so the hopeful talk is likely to continue.- But behind the
talk, there are signs of potentially major realignments in Arab politics,
including:
A Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement, as Hussein concludes that the
peace process is dead and that he should mend his fences with
Damascus.
A possible move of PLO headquarters to Iraq, along with
disturbing signs that Baghdad may be easing its ban on allowing
terrorists to operate from Iraq.
The apparent splintering of the PLO and the diminution of
Arafat's more moderate influence in Palestinian councils may
result in a new wave of Palestinian terrorism aimed at
non-Israeli targets as well as Israel. Should further terrorist
incidents occur that result in US military operations against
Palestinians (as opposed to Shia in Lebanon), the mainstream PLO
as well as more radical fringe groups are likely to target US
interests for terrorist attacks.
Warning Notes
The Community agreed that Middle Eastern politics are entering a
period of unusual fluidity, and that the dynamics of developments in the
region make it difficult to foresee all the possible consequences of
recent developments.
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Since Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the US has become ever
more closely identified with Israel in Arab perceptions, and initial US
praise for the Israeli raid on Tunisia and the denouement of the Achille
Lauro'incident reinforce that perception. Most analysts believe the US
is therefore increasingly likely to become a target for Palestinian
terrorism, with or without Arafat's sanction of such activities.
Further Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel--especially a
foreign-based terrorist "spectacular" that caused large civilian
casualties--are likely to provoke Israeli retaliatory strikes like that
on Tunisia. Such Israeli attacks against Algeria from whence some
intercepted Palestinian seaborne attacks have been launched) or Iraq (if
the PLO sets up headquarters there) would greatly"complicate the US
position in the Arab world as well as with the country involved. There
would be almost no downside risk for Israel in such an attack. The Peres
government would also retaliate against Jordan if sufficiently provoked,
but would hesitate a bit more to do so because of the likely US reaction
and because it would completely end chances for a peace settlement with
King Hussein.
Future US military action against Middle Eastern terrorists will
always have its downside risks;- although the potential costs are greater
in actions against Palestinians--with whom all Arabs feel at least some
sympathy--than if the US struck back at Lebanese Shias. The Achille
Lauro incident has permanently affected--but certainly was not fatal
to--the US relationship with Mubarak. Many aspects of the bilateral
relationship appear to be getting back on course, but US-Egyptian
military cooperation is likely to suffer some lasting damage. Egypt will
continue joint military cooperation when it directly serves Egyptian
interests, but is less likely to go along with CENTCOM or other
cooperation designed for distant contingencies in places like the Persian
Gulf.
Closer Iraqi-PLO ties could prove troublesome for the US, especially
if Baghdad relaxes its ban on terrorism launched from Iraq. An Iraqi
reassertion of leadership in Arab politics is likely to involve sharper
criticism of US policies in the region, and further evidence of an Iraqi
reinvolvment with terrorism would be likely to have major implications
for US policy toward the Iran-Iraq war and Gulf security.
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SECRETI ..
25 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBECT: Warning Meeting Report for Near East and South Asia
NIC/NIO/NESA
25 Oct 85
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Exec. Dir.
1 - ADDI
1 - SA/IA
1 - C/IPC Staff
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
2 - NIO/NESA
5 - NIO/W
1 - Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - SRP
1 - NIC/AG
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