ATTACHED PLEASE FIND SOME OF MY THOUGHTS THAT I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU CONCERNING PRESIDENT MARCOS AND THE PHILIPPINES.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100090009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 18, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NIC #04693-85
National Intelligence Council 18 September 1985
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: NIO for East Asia
Attached please find some of my
thoughts that I wanted to share with you
concerning President Marcos and the
Philippines. At your convenience, a
meeting to discuss your reactions and
any suggestions you may have would be
most helpful.
C~%~'~
Carl Ford
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 NIO/EA
18 September 1985
President Marcos -- Less Than Meets the Eye
Many Americans give President Marcos high marks for his past performances
in administering the Philippines. Even today, he is seen as far more capable
than any of his potential successors and a formidable candidate in the 1987
election. A recent Asia Foundation sponsored poll reinforces the view that
Marcos retains considerable popularity among Filipinos. Indeed, Marcos is a
remarkable leader with many talents. His twenty-year rule demonstrates a
staying power few world leaders can match. But, a realistic assessment of
Marcos's record and his possible future contributions falls far short of the
near legendary qualities attributed to him.
In comparison with the accomplishments of other contemporary
authoritarian leaders in Asia, Marcos does not fare well. Lee Kuan Yew of
Singapore, Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan and President Suharto of Indonesia each
have accomplished much more, and in some ways with less, than has President
Marcos. They each promoted a cadre of technocrats to oversee economic
development accompanied by careful, and often slow, movement toward greater
political freedom. Their authoritarian rule brought stability while economic
success lessened demands for more rapid political modernization. In
contrast, after 20 years of Marcos's rule, the Philippine economy is in
shambles, the gap between rich and poor has widened, the military is
ineffective, and a serious communist-led insurgency rages in the countryside.
Marcos missed his best opportunity to put the Philippines back on track
when he failed to take full advantage of the powers he assumed when he
proclaimed martial law in 1971. Most Filipinos seem to have recognized that
conditions had reached a crisis stage and were prepared to support strong
authoritarian stewardship.* And, under the structure Marcos created in 1971
he certainly did not lack for power and authority. Marcos, therefore, must
accept that the deteriorating situation is in no small measure his own
doing.
Marcos's strengths include a strong will, intelligence, repeated examples
of tactical genius and an undeniable charisma. Throughout his career, he has
met numerous personal challenges successfully and has mastered the art of
manipulating the Philippine political system superbly. Moreover, the changes
implemented during martial law appear similar to the successful formulas
adopted by Taiwan, Singapore and
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Indonesia, e.g., greatly strengthened presidential powers, enhanced role for
military and civilian technocrats and the formation of anew political party
(the KBL). But his accomplishments have differed markedly from those of his
peers.
Despite his considerable capabilities, Marcos appears to lack the
strategic vision of other prominent Asian leaders and has failed to use his
authoritarian powers to advance national interests. A detailed search of
the records finds that quelling the Moro rebellion is Marcos's greatest
achievement. Land reform failed. Foreign debt rose to crisis proportions
due to mismanagement of the economy. The military has become corrupt and
politicized. And, an independent judiciary system inherited from U.S.
colonial days, including the Supreme Court, now serves the ruling groups'
interests, not the constitution or Philippine law. All indicators,
including the degree of law and order, have declined under Marcos's
stewardship. The truly remarkable thing about Marcos is that he has
survived so long having accomplished so little.
The secret to his success, and his first priority throughout his tenure,
has been consolidating his own power and enriching friends and key
supporters. Loyalty, not talent, have been far more important in the choice
of subordinates. Moreover, he has given the most power and authority to the
least capable, such as General Ver. More capable people were either
carefully micromanaged from the top or excluded from power altogether. He
has neutralized political rivals or forced them to leave the country as in
the case of Aquino. Loyal subordinates, in true traditional Philippine
style, were rewarded with favored treatment, including ample opportunities
to obtain profits from graft and corruption. Marcos seems to have left to
family and retainers the task of enriching his own fortune while closing his
eyes to other supporters plundering the system. This was a common practice
before Marcos, but no prior administration had accumulated so much power or
remained in place nearly so long.
Marcos's precarious health adds a further complication. He no longer
can spend long hours overseeing the day-to-day activities of a system
designed specifically for one man rule. His essentially half day schedule
every other day and unwillingness to delegate authority insures that
government programs move forward at a snail's pace, if at all. In this
context, his preoccupation with political survival also limits the amount of
time available for other pressing problems such as the economy and the
insurgency. Marcos's periodic public displays of attention to these issues
present an appearance of being on top of things when, in truth, the
situation continues to deteriorate alarmingly. The prognosis for the
President regainin4 his health sufficiently to make the system work oro~erly
is also not good.
Even if Marcos's health stabilizes, he is unlikely to respond favorably
to US or internal pressures for reform. The changes we demand of him run
counter to his first priority--political survival. Each of the urgent
reforms necessary, whether they be political, economic or military,
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undermine and weaken his ability to control future events. Marcos probably
also calculates that sacking his loyal friends, such as General Ver and the
crony capitalists, at this critical juncture would highlight his
vulnerability and satisfy no one. His remaining supporters would wonder if
their heads might be next on the chopping block and his critics, sensing
weakness, would demand even more concessions. And, although withholding our
approval for his actions would almost certainly cause Marcos's tarnished
"mandate of heaven" to slip away irretrievably, his actions bespeak a man
who thinks that this is a problem he can manage. Our leverage with
assistance monies amounts to little and he probably believes that he can
count on President Reagan not to abandon him. Only such ultimate sanctions
worry him. He turns lesser threats and pressure skillfully to his advantage
with nationalistic-loaded charges of US meddling and interference.
Marcos also shows no signs of stepping aside anytime soon or preparing
for an eventual succession. On the contrary, he repeatedly sounds the theme
that he is the only person in the Philippines who can cope with current and
future problems. His indispensability is likely to be a central campaign
message between now and 1987. But, based on past performance, his current
physical condition, and an eroding base of support, he has little or no
chance of stopping the Philippines' declining fortunes and will likely
exacerbate the trend.
Marcos's departure from the political scene--whenever and however it
occurs--will almost certainly create a period of instability. Several
members of the KBL--Emelda Marcos, Defense Minister Enrile, party stalwart
Rono and Blas Ople, among others--covet his job and the scramble to succeed
Marcos could touch off a debilitating inter-party rift. But, if anything,
the opposition is even more divided than the KBL. The loss of their shared
enemy, Marcos, is likely to make it more difficult for these disparate
groups to unify behind a single slate of candidates. Similarly, the army
lacks cohesion. A KBL figure stands the best chance of gaining tacit
military backing, but it seems just as likely that it will remain neutral on
the sidelines immobilized by factionalism. And, regardless of who emerges
victorious after Marcos, the problems to be resolved remain formidable.
As the drama in the Philippines plays itself out, time looms as the
single most important variable in determining the outcome. The prospects
are not promising. Marcos seems intent on hanging on to the bitter end.
The overall situation continues to deteriorate noticeably. And a smooth
transition appears unlikely. All the while the CPP/NPA are busily
organizing and gaining military strength.
Over time, the problems awaiting any new government promise to
increase. More alarmingly, the risk is greater over time of a communist
takeover either by exploiting the instability of the transition or the
failures of anew administration. Unfortunately, we cannot avoid either the
instability when the end comes for Marcos as it must or the risk of a
communist Phili fines.
ut, i that is the case, we better hope that 25X1
na ure runs i s course sooner rather than later, otherwise we may find that
Marcos's departure from the Philippines and our own coincide. Time is
definitely not on our side.
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