AFTERMATH OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100070031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 2, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET NOFORN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505 Hi(.w'i,.io
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Aftermath of the Hostage Crisis
7-85
985
1. The hostage crisis came out better than most of us had reason to
expect. It seems that Nabih Barri's calculated gamble to insert the
moderates into the hijacking crisis has paid off. The odds were high
against him, but he seems to have succeeded. Ironically, the major
reason for his success springs from the unusual coalescence of anti-US
forces--the USSR, Syria, Iran--which had concluded that getting out from
under this crisis was in the radical states' best interests.
-- It is important that we analyze and understand the dynamics
behind which these radical forces acted in the way they did. In
a nutshell, the USSR, Syria, Iran, and the Hizballah--probably
in that order--probably came to realize the full risks of the
game as it was unfolding.
2. The USSR. The Soviets spoke with Assad at some length in Moscow
and have _'in indicated both publicly and privately their disapproval of the
hijacking. The USSR can obviously profit from American discomforture,
apparent impotence, and preoccupation produced by the crisis, but seemed
to have grown uncomfortable at the prospect that the US might undertake
serious military action to free the hostages or otherwise pose military
challenge. Such military action could have spilled over in a way that
could damage Moscow's radical allies in the Middle East. It is
furthermore difficult for Moscow to publicly uphold such a flagrant act
of international piracy.
3. Syria. Syria on its own probably would have reached many of the
same conclusions as Moscow but was probably pushed further along by
Moscow's position. Syria must have recognized Moscow's unwillingness to
support Syria in a major international adventure of this kind where the
risks were high.
This Memo is Classified
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-- Assad himself--harsh and uncompromising in the pursuit of
greater Syrian national interests--never shrinks from acts of
murder, assassination and violence. He prefers unattributable
violence, however, and rarely enjoys gratuitous confrontation
with the US on grounds where the US is strong.
-- Assad had another major reason in moving to bolster Barri. He
unquestionably sensed, as we did, that Barri by himself was
probably on the way to defeat at the hands of the radicals in
the evolving dynamics of the crisis. Assad does not like a
powerful Amal movement, but he likes a powerful Hizballah even
less. He moved to ensure a Barri victory. Assad also wants a
strong Amal in the south against the Israelis.
-- Assad has other important strategic business to get on with in
the Middle East--not the least of which is blocking the
US-sponsored peace process. Although this hijacking incident
helps delay such a process, it is not Assad's instrument of
choice at this time. I would not rule out, however, Syrian
support for some such incident in the future if the US peace
process is clearly moving toward success.
-- Syria always wishes to demonstrate its own power and presence as
essential to anything happening in the area.
4. Iran. The Iranians had a great deal more to gain from the
incident. Tt was clear they moved to exploit and complicate the issue
early on--despite apparent lack of initial involvement. Iran must keep
its eyes on several simultaneous goals in Lebanon however:
Above all, maintenance of Iran's own position in Syria and
Lebanon. Without access to Syria and Lebanon--at Syrian
sufferance--Iran is unable to pursue its strategic interests
within Lebanon. It cannot afford to cross Syria to the extent
that this access is threatened.
Support for the Shia movement as a whole within Lebanon. Amal
is not Iran's favorite vehicle but it is nonetheless a Shia
vehicle. Iran cannot afford to go to war with Amal as long as
Aural remains a powerful determinant of the future of the Shia
community. Iran will always want a powerful Shia community even
if that community has not yet adopted Khomeini's own cherished
philosophy of Islamic government.
Iran wishes to support the existence of Hizballah within the
Shia community as the ultimately preferre ppooTitico-religious
movement in the country. Iran was in the process of assisting a
Hizballah win over Amal when Assad interrupted the process.
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When faced with growing Syrian discomfort over the hijacking,
Rafsanjani--in personal conversations with Assad--had to accede to
Assad's wishes if Iran wished to remain in the Lebanon game.
Unquestionably Iran would have liked to have played it tougher but its
influence was limited.
-- This development does represent a significant tactical victory
of Amal's not-so-radical secular forces in Lebanon as supported
by Assad, as opposed to relgious fund amentalist forces as
supported by Iran. This was an important battle in a war that
is far from over.
5. The Shia Movement in Lebanon. Nabih Barri seemingly has emerged
more powerful in the internal a struggle. It might not have happened
this way had Syria not decided to intervene. We do not yet understand
enough about the dynamics of the struggle between Barri and Hizballah to
understand what gains Hizballah may have made--if any.
-- Syria obviously prefers a victorious Amal over Hizballah but
probably will not seek to destroy Hizballah power entirely.
Syria will pay some deference to Iranian feelings about
Hizballah, and Hizballah may be of some use to Syria down the
road in keeping Amal whittled down to size. Above all, Assad
wishes to prevent any single faction in Lebanon from becoming so
strong as to challenge Syrian power.
-- We cannot tell yet how Hizballah may come to feel about Syria.
They must be angered that Syria helped to conspire in snatching
potentially dominant control of the hostage crisis from their
hands. Will hostility between Hizballah and Syria intensify in
the months ahead or will there be a pragmatic modus vivendi?
6. The Peace Process. The press is filled with suggestions that
something may now have c anged in the US-Syrian relationship. I don't
believe it. Still, as formidable an opponent as Syria is, we must
remember Syria is not essentially ideological in outlook. Syria's use of
violence and terror and its cooperation with Iran and Libya is based on a
calculated goal of Syrian geopolitical interests. It will not be
gratuitously and vociferously anti-American. Hence Assad emerges as the
"pragmatic humanitarian" in this crisis in the eyes of the world.
-- Despite occasional tactical accommodations such as we have
witnessed, the US nonetheless remains on a collision course with
Syrian strategic interes s. Syria cannot allow the peace
process to succeed because it strikes at the very heart of
Syrian ambitions in the region:
-- Maintenance of an anti-Israeli coalition under Syrian
control.
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-- Syrian strategic domination of Lebanon.
-- Syrian domination of the Palestinian movement.
-- Syrian unwillingness to accept Jordanian dominance over the
West Bank.
-- Syrian determination to foil formulation of a moderate Arab
bloc.
The Syrians will soon return to very hard ball indeed on all of these
issues. However much the US may wish to accommodate Syria, our interests
are contradictory.
7. Violence and the Peace Process. Syria will devote maximum
resources to blocking the strategic challenge. It will enlist Iran
and Libya and radical Palestinians to this end. It will seek to
radicalize anti-peace elements in Israel. It will seek and get Soviet
support--although the Soviets will not give Assad a blank check of
support. Moscow will probably limit itself to defense of Syria proper
and provision of weapons.
-- The peace process itself may not be able to succeed if the
radical states of the Middle East are able to operate
unchallenged in the months and years ahead. The US may have to
decide between strategically weakening this radical coalition,
or abandoning the peace process as too difficult and risky in
the face of radical challenge to the US, Israel, Jordan, Egypt,
the Arafat PLO, and other pro-Western Arab states.
-- To the extent that the peace process may founder on its own,
Syria at least will somewhat relax the intensity of opposition
to the US in the region.
Graham E. Fuller
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SECRET NOFORN
NIC 03377-85
2 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Aftermath of the Hostage Crisis
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 2 July 85
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
-1- DDI Registry
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DD0
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NI0/CT
1 - NIO/AT-LARGE (Hal Ford)
1 - SRP
2 - NIO/NESA
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