SSCI HEARING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
16 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/EA
NIO/AF
NIO/LA
NIO/NESA
FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Acting Chairman, NIC
SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing
1. The attached memorandum from the SSCI to the DCI outlines the
subject matter for a hearing on 18 June. Dick Kerr and I will attend
this hearing and we need your support. Please prepare by noon, 17 June
a one- to two-page memorandum covering the following points:
-- Describe the regional security policy for your area as we
understand it and describe what that means for our intelligence
collection and production. Indicate how this problem may
change.
-- A brief comment also would be appreciated concerning the
requirement and utility of covert action as an element of US
regional security policy.
2. Please do not be concerned with drawing too fine a measure on
resource allocations in terms of regional security policy and the issues
of production and collection, a relatively aggregated judgment will be
sufficient. We are seeking insights and not necessarily seeking budget
data at this point. Sorry to task you on such short notice, but we do
need your help.
Attachment:
As stated
H. F. Hutchir Jr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
1 MEMORANDUM FOR: Dick Kerr
1. Attached are the four memos you requested in
order to provide some insights into the regional security
issues to be addressed at the SSCI hearing on 18 June.
2. By now we know this introductory, overview session
has been postponed until 24 June. Despite that postpone-
ment, I understand the senior experts series of hearings
begin on the 19th with East Asia and the Philippines
being the focal point.
3. If there is anything else we should do to pre-
pare for the 24th, please advise.
Attachments:
As stated
SECRET 17 June 1986
Date
FORM USE PREVIOUS
5.75 lo' EDITIONS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SECRET
NI0/Africa
17 June 1986
SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing
US security policy for Sub-Saharan Africa can be broadly defined as
having the objective of facilitating orderly political, economic, and
social development in Africa so that the region does not become a growing
and long-term liability to the United States and a cockpit for external,
especially Soviet Bloc, involvement. This Administration's assistance
programs reflect the traditional US emphasis on economic development,
with the various manifestations of economic assistance holding a 4-to-l
ratio over military assistance. In more specific security terms, this
policy breaks out into US interest in internal and external security
threats, and these represent the major foci of intelligence
collection/analysis efforts.
Under the rubric of internal security, in recent years both
collection and analysis have emphasized economic problems and factors as
well as the more traditional objectives of examining political
interrelationships and government capabilities and intentions. The
dominant reality in Africa in the 1980s is the massive and fundamental
economic crisis facing virtually the entire continent and its impact on
the societies and-governments in Africa. The destabilizing aspects of
growing economic distress are profound and, for example, played a major
part in the extra-constitutional changes of government in Nigeria, Sudan,
and Guinea in the past year. Virtually every government in Africa faces
increasing stresses arising from economic factors.
Since 1983, external meddling in Africa has also increased, led by
Libya and the USSR. Libyan subversion has spread to a dozen African
states and overt Libyan military aggression has occurred in Chad and
Sudan. Increased Soviet military engagement in Africa since 1983 has
also occurred, with over $4.5 billion in Soviet military aid sent.
Soviet involvement in defending its political/ideological clients in
Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique from domestic insurgencies has
significantly increased. The presence of 40,000 Cuban troops in
expeditionary forces mostly in Angola has added leverage to this renewed
Soviet destabilization of the continent.
The increase in Libyan and Soviet meddling, combined with the
continuing Cuban military presence, has required the allocation of scarce
collection and analytical resources to monitor these difficult targets.
Special mention must also be made in South Africa, the continent's
dominant power, which is of strategic significance to the United States.
US policy promotes political and social reform away from apartheid in
South Africa and seeks to defuse both internal violence and regional
cross-border violence. A number of forces and processes are
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SECRET
unfortunately at play within South Africa and within the southern African
subregion which act against these policy objectives, and additional
resources have been committed to define and assess these negative forces
and processes.
The intractability of Africa's economic problems will require a
continued heightened awareness of and focus on economic collection and
analysis for the next several years. The renewed emphasis of the Soviet
Union on militarily assisting their beleaguered clients serves as an
important indicator of Soviet intentions in the Third World and will
require the continued application of scarce resources to monitor and
assess. The continued subversive activities of Qadhafi's regime will
also pose new demands on our resources.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89TO1032R000100070017-5 _ __
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Regional Security Policy for Latin America
REFERENCE: Your memorandum dated 16 June 1986,
Subject: SSCI Hearing
1. US regional security policy for Latin America has the following
major objectives:
-- A region free of Soviet-dominated or other hostile governments
which would require a significant commitment of defense
resources.
Stable and democratic political systems and institutions that
are capable of dealing with local social, economic and security
problems and are amenable to cooperating with the US on regional
and global problems.
Cooperative bilateral relations to enable the US and the South
American countries to deal effectively with mutual concerns and
to collaborate on international issues. Activities in South
America can have an important direct impact oo issues that
affect US security and society (narcotics trafficking, foreign
debt, counter-terrorism, and illegal immigration are perhaps the
most outstanding examples).
Stable and viable economic systems which, within the context of
interdependence, are capable of providing for the basic needs of
their peoples.
Protection of major US trade and investment and access to raw
materials.
In support of the above objectives, the US is particularly concerned with
preventing the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence in the region and
insuring that the Sandinistas are not able to establish another Cuba on
the Central American mainland.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SE T
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 17 June 1986
NOTE FOR: AC/NIC - H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
FROM: NIO/EA
SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing
Attached please find my contribution
for the Wednesday SSCI Hearing.
64-c~
Carl Ford
Attachment
SEC ET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02: CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SFCIK e2
SSCI Hearing -- East Asia
-- The regional security policy for East Asia includes these principle
features:
- Defending the vital interests of the United States from potential
threats posed by the Soviet Union. This particularly includes
securing the well-being of allies such as Japan, South Korea, and
the Philippines, and our other friends in the region.
- Promoting stability on the Korean peninsula, particularly by
maintaining sufficient force to deter a North Korean attack
against the South.
- Promoting improvement in the political situation in the
Philippines, especially by assisting the new government in
resisting a Communist takeover by force.
- Securing the peace, tranquility, and friendship of the ASEAN
states, including supporting their lead in an effort to resolve
the Indochina imbroglio.
- Encouraging the further development of a positive and cooperative
relationship with the People's Republic of China.
- Continuing to maintain good, cooperative relations with Australia
and New Zealand, with the latter insofar as possible under the
strains posed by Prime Minister Lange's port call ban.
- Through economic, diplomatic, and other instruments of power,
securing the Sea Lines of Communication, and other key economic
and political interests of the United States in the Pacific Basin.
-- The implications of this for intelligence collection and production
include the following:
- There must be continuing high priority given to Soviet military,
diplomatic, economic, and propaganda activities in East Asia, and
a wide variety of intelligence assets must be unceasingly
dedicated against these activities. Of particular import will be
the growth of Soviet military power in the region. National
Intelligence Estimates and other intelligence products will
continue to give the highest priority to these Soviet activities.
- The intelligence community is now devoting special attention to
the situation in Korea. A special Korean analytic group now meets
bi-monthly and can meet more frequently if the need arises.
Additionally, a SNIE was completed recently on Soviet-North Korean
relations, and another is now underway on the situation in the
South. This problem will continue to receive high priority.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
- Last year, the community produced four SNIEs on the Philippines,
and another one assessing the Aquino government after its first
six months in office is now under way. The special Philippine
Analytic Group continues to meet regularly. The situation in the
Philippines will continue to command considerable resources and
attention.
- The community is also now examining the situation in several ASEAN
countries, particularly the issues of leadership succession and
political stability. A SNIE on Thailand is now under
preparation. The Indochina problem has been the subject of two
SNIEs and further work is planned.
- Two Estimates have just been completed on China, one on the
succession to Deng, and another on the prospects for China's
reforms. Another on China's defense policy is now being drafted.
The community will continue to regularly evaluate the situation in
China as changes there have a potential to affect US interests.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SEOR'ET
17 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, NIC
FROM: Daniel K. Webster
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing
1. American security policy in the Middle East is structured to
support four major US foreign policy goals in the Area:
-- The maintenance of an unimpeded flow of oil from the Persian Gulf
to the West.
-- The continued existence and security of a democratic Israel.
-- The limitation of the presence, control, and influence in the
region of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
-- The encouragement of the Arab-Israeli peace process to provide
the basis for long-term peace and stability of the region.
2. In the pursuit of these goals, major obstacles continue to be
encountered:
-- State supported terrorism, with Libya, Syria, and Iran as the
primary practitioners.
-- Widespread conflict, including major wars such as the Soviet
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War.
-- The Soviet presence and influence in key states of the region,
including Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and South Yemen.
-- The lack of significant recent progress in the Arab-Israeli peace
process.
3. A great deal of intelligence collection and analysis is focused
on this troubled region because the above obstacles put US security
objectives at constant risk. The Intelligence Community dedicates
considerable assets to:
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
-- Military targets, including developments in the Iran-Iraq war,
the Syrian and Israeli military buildup, the Soviet assistance to
client states and its military presence in Afghanistan, and a
variety of low intensity conflicts.
-- Soviet political, military, and intelligence penetration of the
region, and support and involvement in terrorism.
-- The political dynamics surrounding the peace process, including
the stated positions and hidden agendas of key players, and the
effect of regional developments.
-- The stability of regional states--especially Jordan, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia--that are key to US policy objectives.
-- Intentions and actions of states who undermine US objectives in
the Middle East--particularly Libya, Syria and Iran--through
terrorism, threats to the free flow of oil, efforts to sidetrack
the peace process, or other actions.
-- Terrorist groups, methods, support networks and intentions.
4. Trends and changes in the region: There are several trends in
the Middle East area which have significant implications for US policy,
and for intelligence collection and analysis:
-- The uneven distribution of oil wealth has magnified differences
between the "haves" and "have nots." Further economic problems
and dislocations have been introduced with the oil price
collapse, with consequent potentially severe social and political
stress and increased opportunities for foreign meddling and
interference in the region.
-- Beginning with--but not limited to--the Iranian revolution of
1979, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in a variety of forms
is on the increase. Much of the Islamic fundamentalism, even in
its most benign form, exhibits anti-Western, specifically
anti-US, characteristics.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
Daniel K. Webster
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP 6
TO: C /V-,r~ r t.'
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
ROOM NO.
E6 Z
BUILDI
S
1~FEB 56 24 1 WHICH MAY BE USED. 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SE E11
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02907-86
18 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for Regional Security Policy
1. The SSCI hearings on this subject look like an inquiry into the
so-called Reagan Doctrine... which isn't yet really a doctrine (i.e., a
coherent policy) but rather a general aspiration (support anti-communist
resistance movements to help block Soviet expansionism) and a set of
disconnected programs. A number of critics are probably interested in using
any door, of which intelligence support is one, to get into the core issue:
Does the Administration know what it is doing, the costs and risks it is
incurring, and how far it is prepared to go? The answer is probably "no"...at
least, not yet. And this will be a more troublesome issue for any witnesses
on this subject than the plusses and minus of intelligence support.
2. The onset of these hearings might well be used as an occasion to
press the NSC principals into forming a more coherent policy and policy
process on this matter, i.e., defining what the doctrine really is. Among the
many issues which need to be addressed, the following are most important:
What are the criteria for deciding which anti-communist resistance
movements are worthy of support?
What political, paramilitary, logistics, and other instrumentalities
must we develop to be seriously in this business? Just giving
supplies to the "good guys" is almost certainly not enough.
How do we manage our relations with resistance movements and with the
crucial "interface allies" (e.g., Honduras, Pakistan, South Africa,
Thailand) to maximize resistance effectiveness, prevent allies from
being destabilized or our policy from becoming hostage to pariah
governments, and strike the right balance between assuring our
necessary influence and avoiding an "Americanization" of the conflict
in question?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
SECRET 25X1
Even if the several conflicts addressed by the Reagan Doctrine
intensify because of escalating US and Soviet support to respective
clients, the costs and risks to the Soviets are still relatively
modest and bearable. After all, backing Leninist regimes is the
core, albeit not the whole, of Soviet policy in the Third World. How
far are we prepared to go to drive up the costs and the risks
(escalation, confrontation, damage to other Soviet interests) to the
USSR? How far do we go in backing neighboring allies against Soviet
or surrogate reprisals and pressures?
How do we manage our overall political relations with the USSR on
these "regional security" issues? How much linkage do we press?
Does it make any sense to talk at the Soviets about "negotiations
among the local warring parties" since these tend to be
uncompromisable battles over political legitimacy and power?
It would be helpful if our witnesses could testify that the Administration is
currently examining these issues.
Intelligence Support Relating to the USSR
3. There is good, mixed, and bad news.
The good news is that we are in a fairly strong position to follow general
Soviet policy toward the Third World and toward specific regimes, including
the Leninist clients. We do this by tracking leadership pronouncements,
diplomatic relations, aid flows, and elite debates about Soviet doctrine.
The latter are a bit out of harmony with actual Soviet behavior lately.
Some Soviet specialists on the Third World are arguing that the Leninist
clients are poor investments, while the big countries are more important
(Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia). Soviet policy clearly rejects the
first, but accepts the second point.
We have a mixed picture with respect to understanding Soviet tactics,
especially military tactics, for managing the counter-insurgency business.
Part of the problem is that the Soviets themselves are still learning...and
probably getting better. We have a good deal of data here, but need to focus
some analytic resources on exploiting it. Lack of a clear policy from the NSC
level has given us little incentive to do this so far.
4. In my opinion, the bad news is in the area of the close-in political
relations among the Soviets, their allies (such as Cuba) and the individuals,
factions, and tribes who make up the Leninist clientele. These politics are
tricky and volatile for the Soviets. In almost all cases they face risks of
being set back or even blown out of their position by coups or factional
strife. This is why they strive so mightily to turn small Leninist Mafiosi
into full-blown Leninist parties, to create instruments of control, not social
progress.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5
jtLKt I Lz X1
5. Because our aim is, presumably, to maximize the impact of necessarily
rather weak resistance movements, we have a keen interest in learning when and
how we can have an influence in the fractious politics of the enemy side, or
at least exploit their divisions. We are not in a good position to do this
now. We need a program to improve. But that requires some guidance from the
policymaker as to where to focus our efforts, beyond the current obvious cases
of Afghanistan and Nicaragua. For example, are we going to get seriously into
the cases of Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen?
A Concluding Thought
6. In terms of positive intelligence, meeting the requirements of the
Reagan Doctrine to-be will be a difficult but managable task. For CIA, a far
more contentious and costly issue is how and how much to build from the
current level of effort toward the full-blown paramilitary competence which is'
cc: DDI
DDO
D/SOVA
NIO/EA
NI0/EUR
NI0/AF
NI0/LA
NI0/GPF
NI0/CT
NI0/NESA
SECRET
Frit1 W. Ermarth
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/02 : CIA-RDP89T01032R000100070017-5