USR REVIEW: SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00992R000100170001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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ar4t, Directorate of I cur et
Intelligence 25X1
USSR Review: Supplement
PRCOECT NER
IWMJK
PAGE NUMBERS
-'(739 '1
July 1988 TarAL NLEBER OF COPIES //Kg
DISSEM DATE gYE9
ECM COPItS -
71
RECORD C:ENIER J 7A ? /
JOB NUMBER
?
SOV UR 88-008CX
July 1988
Copy 351
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Intelligence
USSR Review: Supplement
July 1988
est
This supplement of the USSR Review is published
by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and
queries regarding the articles are welcome.
Reverse Blank
Top Secret
so V UR 88-008CX
July 1988
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Contents
Page
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Articles
Soviet Air Defenses: Worries About Low Readiness
Public criticism of the Air Defense Forces since a West
German Cessna landed in Red Square in 1987 has focused on
deficiencies in combat readiness, especially in the Radar
Troops. The severity of the problems revealed suggests that
considerable time and additional resources would be required
to remedy them
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Soviet-Syrian Military Relations:
Is the Tide Turning?
Moscow may be preparing to supply Syria with new weapon
systems, possibly including the SU-24 Fencer light bomber.
Up to now, the Soviets have refused to supply Damascus with
long-range weapons capable of striking military targets
throughout Israel from bases deep inside Syria. Nonetheless,
Syrian permission for Moscow to construct a naval repair and
maintenance facility at Tartus and Damascus' increased
willingness to turn to China and North Korea as alternative
sources for weapons are providing Moscow with new incen-
tives to liberalize its arms assistance to Syria
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Soviet Air Defenses: Worries
About Low Readiness
Prolonged and specific criticism in Soviet media of the
performance of the Air Defense Forces (ADF) indi-
cates a perception among the Soviet leadership that
serious deficiencies exist in the ADF's combat capa-
bility. Public criticism began after the ADF failed to
prevent a Cessna piloted by West German Mathias
Rust from reaching Moscow in May 1987 following a
series of Soviet air defense failures during peacetime.
Soviet speeches have associated the Rust fiasco with
shortcomings in the ADF's readiness for war. The
military press has focused on personnel, logistics, and
training problems in the Radar Troops?a branch of
the ADF probably most responsible for many of the
recent air defense failures.
Recent Soviet statements have described a readiness
improvement program under way throughout the Air
Defense Forces to correct the errors uncovered by the
Cessna affair. These efforts apparently concentrate on
increasing individual responsibility and discipline.
However, given the severity of the problems uncov-
ered, the announced reforms probably will remain
inadequate without the commitment of additional
resources.
Peacetime Air Defense Failures
During observances of Air Defense Troops Day on 10
April 1988, senior Soviet officers admitted that prob-
lems in combat readiness and command of air de-
fenses had allowed Mathias Rust's Cessna sports
plane to fly to Moscow and land in Red Square nearly
a year earlier. These official comments, moreover,
acknowledged that the Air Defense Forces' deficien-
cies persisted. Army Gen. Ivan M. Tret'yak, who took
over command of the ADF in the aftermath of the
Cessna affair, called the Politburo's assessment of the
failure "harsh and just," and he described an im-
provement program under way to remedy the prob-
lems.
7
The AD F's failure to stop Rust followed a history of
poor reactions to unexpected events in peacetime:
? In 1978, a Korean Airlines (KAL) passenger liner
strayed into Soviet airspace near Murmansk and
flew for several hours before Soviet air defenses
located it and forced it down.
In 1983, another KAL plane violated the Soviet
border over the Kamchatka Peninsula.
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ZOA I
The airliner flew across Sakhalin and was shot
down, before it was positively identified.
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Implications for Wartime Effectiveness
The Air Defense Forces' peacetime performance does
not necessarily represent their potential wartime ef-
fectiveness because their alert level would be much 25X1
higher during a period of hostilities, and they would
face entirely different kinds of targets and situations.
Our view has been, however, that the peacetime
record does point to deficiencies in Soviet air defense
readiness, which would have an adverse impact on
wartime operations.' Although the Air Defense Forces
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would be at a higher state of alert in war, their
personnel, communications, and logistic network
would face additional stress because of sustained,
high-intensity operations, combat attrition, and the
need to deal with many targets rather than just one at
a time.
In particular, the peacetime air defense failures dem-
onstrate that the ADF have difficulty responding to
unexpected circumstances. This difficulty would ham-
per them as much in responding to enemy airstrikes in
war as to border violations in peacetime?perhaps
more so. Air raids against the Soviet Union would be
planned to maximize tactical surprise and to compli-
cate tracking. Further, Western military aircraft are
equipped with radar jamming equipment and attack
missiles to counter air defenses and often are capable
of high speeds that also serve to enhance tactical
surprise.
The negative Soviet public characterization of the
ADF since the Cessna incident suggests that Soviet
authorities believe that the succession of peacetime air
defense failures does reflect potential wartime defi-
ciencies. The leadership's policy of glasnost, or open-
ness, apparently has made possible some public dis-
cussion of the record and its implications for the
combat readiness of Soviet air defenses. During an
interview of General Tret'yak in February 1988, his
interviewer stated that many believed the Rust inci-
dent represented more than a fluke. In April, the
narrator of a Soviet television program about Air
Defense Day mentioned the downing of KAL-007 in
conjunction with the Rust affair and asked whether
air defense personnel had become "too self-assured
and complacent." In contrast, earlier public refer-
ences to the KAL shootdown had tended to describe it
as a demonstration of the effectiveness of Soviet air
defenses
Focus on the Radar Troops
A series of military press articles over the last year
indicates that the Soviet leadership blames many of
the failures of its air defenses on ihe Radar Troops,
the branch of the ADF responsible for target detec-
tion and tracking. Several articles that appeared in
Krasnaya Zvezda in August 1987 describe in detail
the training and maintenance problems of the Radar
Troops.
One article examines the condition of radar units in
the Moscow Air Defense District?through which
Rust had flown unchallenged two months earlier. The
article describes several personnel deficiencies,
including:
? Difficulties with late arrival of conscripts.
? Lack of Russian language ability in new recruits.
? Lack of realism in training.
? Incompetence with modern equipment.
? Excessive use of soldiers for noncombat-related
duties such as construction.
The article also describes a mismanaged and ill-
functioning logistic system, which results in low readi-
ness of radar units because of a lack of spare parts.
The author visited a radar station that had been out of
service for 24 hours because a warrant officer had to
be sent by train to regimental headquarters for spare
parts. Shocked that such a situation could exist in the
"capital military district," the author describes the
unit's supply problems, including:
? Inadequate stocks of spare parts.
? Slow delivery by haphazard means.
? Defective repair work.
? Excessive redtape.
? Lack of responsibility among officers.
? A redundant and ineffective command structure.
The article concludes that these problems are charac-
teristic not only of that district but also of all the Air
Defense Forces
Such negative publicity about the radar forces lent
credence to unconfirmed Western press reports in
February 1988 that the Radar Troops' commander,
Lt. Gen. Nikolay Sechkin, had been replaced as a
result of the Rust affair. Reprimand of the radar
forces' commander would not be unprecedented, as
circumstances surrounding Sechkin's appointment in
1984 suggest that his predecessor was dismissed for
the KAL-007 failure.
The explicitness of the 1987 Krasnaya Zvezda article
indicates a real concern among the leadership with
the combat effectiveness of the Radar Troops. Most
speeches and articles shortly after the Rust incident
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Soviet Senior Officer and Press Commentary on
the Effectiveness of the Air Defense Forces
Serious shortcomings in combat readiness and con-
trol of troops contributed to the flight of an FRG
sports plane over our territory with impunity in May
of last year. . . . The harsh and just assessment given
to the Armed Forces and Air Defense Troops by the
Central Committee Politburo made all of us double
and treble our efforts to perfect the air defense
system. A target program, including a package of
political, organizational, educational, and cadre mea-
sures. . . . has been developed and is being implement-
ed. . . . aimed at substantially increasing combat
readiness and strengthening military discipline.
Army Gen. Ivan M. Tret'yak,
Commander in Chief of Air Defense
Forces,
Moscow Television Service,
10 April 1988
"We have drawn practical conclusions from last
year's incident involving the violation of the USSR
state border by the West German sports aircraft. We
have carried out a recertification of servicemen. . . . "
(Interviewer) "But, clearly, some unresolved prob-
lems remain?" "Yes, unfortunately. For instance, in
some units and subunits the tendency to cut corners
in training has still not been overcome. Providing
amenities in our military settlements and ensuring
that our subunits have everything they need to lead a
normal life remain quite acute."
Col. Gen. V. Silakov,
Chief of the Air Defense Forces Politi-
cal Directorate,
Krasnaya Zvezda,
10 April 1988
9
Many new recruits have a poor knowledge of the
Russian language. . . . This creates great difficulties
in mastering specialist skills and the service in gener-
al. . . . It is bad enough that many draftees are
inadequately prepared for service, but this year they
are also arriving with long delays. It is bad enough
that there are scarcely enough people sometimes to
carry out details and combat duty, but commanders
are also being forced to detach servicemen for con-
struction work.
The regiment's sites do not have the necessary stock
of parts. Spare equipment accessories are not re-
stocked and are scarce. . . . The military district fails
to fill orders. . . . promptly and then only partially
fills them . . . . There is no documentation for the
technology involved. . . . and there are no instru-
ments or tools . . . . Because of this, equipment is not
combat ready.
The problems of spare equipment accessories and the
servicing and repair of equipment . . . . go beyond the
framework of the military district . . . . There is an
urgent need to concentrate the troops' logistic and
technical supplies in one pair of hands . . . . Having
multiple departments generates irresponsibility, red
tape, and formalism . . . . These problems are also
characteristic of Air Defense Forces directorates and
services.
From a two-part article about the Mos-
cow Air Defense District,
Krasnaya Zvezda,
August 1987
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top
blamed that failure on the irresponsibility and bad
attitudes of officers and servicemen. But, this article
was unusual in going beyond vague criticism and
actually addressing specific problems of the force.
Another Krasnaya Zvezda article published in Au-
gust 1987 mentions a visit to a radar unit by a
"commission of experts" and complains of the lack of
effort to improve readiness once the commission had
left. This reference to an inspection by experts sug-
gests that investigations were carried out after the
Rust fiasco, and that they uncovered significant prob-
lems in the radar forces
Yet another article of February 1988 describes unre-
alistic training by Moscow District radar units and
the resulting low state of combat readiness. The
article charges that unit commanders, in order to
improve performance scores, routinely give their per-
sonnel advance warning of target approach during
training exercises. It also states that commanders do
not make full use in training of the sophisticated
radar and communications equipment or the experi-
enced personnel at their disposal. Like the second
August article, this article complains of the lack of
improvement in readiness, concluding that "urgent
problems" remain to be solved.
Because these articles were published over two
months after the dismissal of senior officers following
the Cessna affair and did not mention Rust's flight,
their purpose was probably more than justification of
politically motivated personnel changes. Rather, they
appear intended to express honest dismay at the
persistence of the Moscow District's military short-
comings, despite investigations and any corrective
measures taken in the aftermath of the Rust incident.
If the criticisms in Krasnaya Zvezda were accurate,
then the problems uncovered in the radar forces
probably are not confined to the Moscow District. We
know from emigre reporting that poor logistics similar
to those illustrated in the articles have long plagued
remote Arctic radar units. Personnel and logistic
troubles in the Moscow District?which, given its
prestige and location, should be as well supplied and
staffed as any other?probably indicate serious vul-
nerabilities in the radar force as a whole.
Top Secret
Improvement Program Under Way
Frequent references in the Soviet press to the need for
reform of the ADF indicate that the Soviets are
working to correct these vulnerabilities. In April
1988, senior officials described an improvement pro-
gram under way throughout the Soviet Air Defense
Forces designed to increase both readiness for war
and effectiveness during peacetime. The measures
described include greater officer responsibility for
troop discipline, for vigilance during alert duty, and
for flexibility and realism in training. A Krasnaya
Zvezda article indicates that, in addition, a "recertifi-
cation" of servicemen is involved, probably consisting
of follow-up examinations of servicemen's skills.
We are uncertain about the extent of reform because
Soviet comments on the improvement program have
been far less detailed than their descriptions of the
problems to be solved. Several commentaries have
referred to a "restructuring" program in the ADF.
That term's popularity and the specific measures
described indicate that this is likely to consist of
attempts at greater personnel performance and disci-
pline rather than an actual reorganization of the
force.
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Prospects
The potential impact on the Radar Troops of the
announced program to increase readiness is difficult
to evaluate, because our knowledge of its elements is
limited to Soviet public discussions. Our analysis of
the severity and persistence of personnel and mainte-
nance deficiencies?which is based on emigre report-
ing and the long history of peacetime failures, in
addition to the recent press criticisms?suggests that
measures to improve training, discipline, and responsi-
bility alone will not be sufficient. An increase in
resources devoted to air defense?perhaps a major
one?would be necessary.
Emigre reporting confirms that problems similar to
those of the Moscow District as described in the press
have plagued radar units of other districts for some
time. In a radar unit near the Barents Sea during the
late 1970s, according to an emigre
lack of sufficient transportation and
personnel de-
layed delivery and installation of new radars for over
two years. Training of new personnel also was de-
layed, because troops were required for construction
and snow-clearing, resulting in a severe shortage of
experienced radar and communications personnel.
These conditions existed despite the region's primary
importance for air defense against strategic bombers
from North America.
these problems wors-
ened after the 1970s. Personne shortages were so
serious in a radar battalion in the Black Sea area
during the mid-1980s, according to an emigre, that
radar operators were forced to stay at their scopes for
six hours at a time, even though regulations specified
a two-hour maximum. One conscript alone operated
radar equipment, which usually would require a crew
of six or seven, and had to live inside the radar's van
for a year to perform his duties
Reverse Blank
These accounts, together with the succession of peace-
time failures since the late 1970s, indicate the long-
standing nature of Radar Troops' problems. Soviet
reforms to increase efficiency, in our view, are unlike-
ly to solve those problems completely without the
commitment of additional resources:
? To end the apparently worsening radar personnel
shortage, the Soviets would have to extend con-
scripted service periods to allow sufficient time for
combat-related training as well as noncombat-relat-
ed labor duties?or transfer new conscripts from
other services. Such changes either would require
longer absences of conscripts from the civilian labor
force or would create personnel shortages elsewhere.
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? Resuscitation of the radar forces' logistics network
would probably require a large increase of invest-
ment in spare parts, repair equipment, transporta-
tion vehicles, and automated inventory management
systems. The types of supply and maintenance
problems reported?no spare parts available for
delivery, no trucks or helicopters to deliver them?
indicate that inadequate infrastructure, not just 25X1
poor organization and excessive bureaucracy, is
behind them. 25X1
These requirements for increased labor commitment
and equipment expenditures come at a bad time for
the Soviet leadership, which appears to be seeking
savings in the military sector to support a drive for
economic growth. Yet, the leadership's open criticism
of the ADF puts pressure on the Air Defense Forces
and their commander, General Tret'yak, somehow to
solve the force's shortcomings. Tret'yak has been the
most vocal opponent of reductions in the Soviet
defense effort? probably reflecting a calculation on
his part that the desired level of readiness in the ADF
cannot be achieved without substantial increases in
outlays, much less with reductions.
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IOUJCUIFCt
Soviet-Syrian Military Relations:
Is the Tide Turning?
There are some, as yet, inconclusive indications that
Moscow is preparing to supply Syria with new weapon
systems, possibly including the SU-24 Fencer light
bomber. Up to now, the Soviets have refused to supply
Damascus with long-range weapons capable of strik-
ing military targets throughout Israel from bases deep
inside Syria, and they have been reluctant, since 1985,
to provide new weapon systems to Syria. At the same
time, Syria's ability to absorb new systems has de-
clined during this period
Nonetheless, Moscow has a number of new incentives
to supply arms to Syria more liberally. Syria has
permitted the Soviet Union to construct a naval repair
and maintenance facility at Tartus. Moreover, Syria
has shown increased willingness to turn to China and
North Korea as alternative sources for weapons.
Indications that new deals for advanced arms may be
in the works belie the image of moderation toward the
Arab-Israeli conflict that Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev has sought to cultivate.
The SU-24: An Offensive Weapon for Syria?
13
Figure 1. SU-24 Fencer
Provision of the SU-24 would mark a clear
escalation in the weapon systems Moscow is willing to
supply to Syria. The SU-24 is a two-seat strike
aircraft with terrain-avoidance radar, and it has about
twice the operational radius of any fighter-bomber
previously exported by the Soviet Union. It is the only
Soviet tactical aircraft capable of day-night, all-
weather, medium-to-low altitude penetrations of ene-
my territory. The SU-24 would, in theory, allow Syria
to attack military targets throughout Israel from
bases deep inside Syrian territory.
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Moscow up to now has refused to provide weapons
with this capability. The Soviets consistently have 25X1
denied Syrian requests for the SS-23 ballistic missile,
claiming that the system's range (400 kilometers) and
accuracy are beyond Syria's defensive needs. Al-
though they have supplied the 300-km range Scud
missile system to Syria, the Soviets apparently regard
it as primarily a deterrent in the Arab-Israeli theater,
because its relative inaccuracy makes it ill-suited to
strike hard military targets. The Soviets have also
supplied the more accurate SS-21 missile system to
Damascus, but its short range (70 km) limits its use to
tactical operations. Moscow may believe that the
SU-24 would not prove to be as destabilizing in the
region as would the SS-23 ballistic missile, because
the aircraft would have greater difficulty penetrating
Israel's strong air defenses. 25X1
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op secret
Other Arms Deals
In addition to indications of SU-24 exports, a number
of other indicators suggest the Soviet-Syrian military
relationship may be on the upswing. The value of
Soviet arms deliveries to Syria more than doubled last
year after three years of decline. The delivery of a
squadron of MIG-29 fighter aircraft?the only new
system delivered?was the highlight of Soviet ship-
ments, accounting for about 26 percent of the total
value of Soviet deliveries in 1987. Moscow also pro-
vided Syria with self-propelled artillery for the first
time since 1982
Since March 1988, five high-level Soviet officials
have visited Syria, intensifying an already high ex-
change of official visits between the two countries (see
inset). The unusual number of visits would seem to
indicate that new arms agreements are in the works,
although the emphasis of the visits appears to be on
Syrian training and utilization of equipment.
Figure 2
Composition of Soviet Arms
Deliveries to Syria, 1982-87
Current billion US $
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Support
equipment and
consumables
Major equipment
(percent of total)
1982 83 84 85 86 87
317875 788
the Soviets are proscribing
the provision of "offensive" weapons to Damascus,
and they believe the Syrian military still has not
adequately mastered many weapons already in the
Syrian inventory.
Indications that new deals may be in the works call
into question the moderation Gorbachev sought to
display when Syrian President Assad visited Moscow
last spring. In a speech during the visit, Gorbachev
claimed that a military solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict had been "completely discredited." He added
that the Soviet Union would help Syria maintain her
"defense capacity at the proper level." At the time, it
appeared Gorbachev was putting Assad on notice that
Syria should not expect Soviet military support to
match that of previous years.
Counterindications
Tot) Secret
Moscow had refused as of late April to supply
Syria with "new generation" weapons and was urging
Syria to master fully existing systems.
the Soviets would be imposing a "needs test"
on Syrian arms requests as of 1 July 1988. Future
Syrian arms requests would have to meet certain
criteria concerning Syria's defensive needs as defined
by Moscow, Although the
Soviets have informally applied such criteria in the
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Chronology of High-Level Visits
November 1987
Admiral Chernavin, Commander in Chief of
the Soviet Navy, to Syria, according to press
reports.
February 1988 Lt. General Khuli, Deputy Commander of the
Syrian Air Force, to Moscow,
March 1988
April 1988
May 1988
General Pikalov, Commander in Chief of
Soviet Chemical Troops, to Damascus, ac-
cording to press reports.
Lt. General Turkmani, Syrian Armed Forces
Chief of Staff for Training to Moscox
Marshal Yefimov, Commander in Chief of
Soviet Air Forces, to Syria, according to
press reports.
General Kobets, Chief of Main Directorate
for Signal Troops, Soviet General Staff, to
General Titov, Senior Soviet Cosmonaut,
visits Syria, according to press reports.
Admiral Sorokin, First Deputy Chief of the
Defense Ministry's Main Political Director-
ate, to Syria, according to press reports.
past, this would mark the first time, as far as we
know, that the Soviets have formally spelled out such
an approach to Syria.
he high number of military
visits may simply be an effort by Moscow to reassure
Syria of its importance to the Soviet Union and to
check the status of Syrian training on Soviet equip-
ment already in the Syrian inventory.
Marshal Yefimov, Com-
mander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces, told the Syrians
15
that shipment of a second MIG-29 squadron would be
delayed until after the Syrians have fully integrated
the first squadron. General Pikalov, the Commander
in Chief of Soviet Chemical Forces, informed the
Syrians during his visit in March that they must use
their current chemical defense equipment more effec-
tively before they will be supplied with new =lin-
ment,
Meanwhile Syria is
increasingly unhappy with Soviet refusals of its re-
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quests for new arms.
Syrian Defense Minister 'l alas believes that Gorba-
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chev can be expected only to supply Syria with
military equipment and spare parts covered under
existing agreements; he also thinks that, if Syria fails
to provide the political support required by the Sovi-
ets, defense cooperation between the two would suffer
significantly.
Moreover, despite the increase in arms deliveries in
1987, the composition of those deliveries suggests
Moscow continued to emphasize more effective use of
existing Syrian equipment rather than large increases
of new Soviet arms. The one weapon system delivered
last year that was new to Syria's arsenal, the MIG-29,
had probably been promised to Syria several years
earlier, and it was delivered to Syria several months
after it was supplied to Iraq. Soviet deliveries also
have included fewer pieces of major equipment, with
support equipment and consumables making us a
growing proportion of arms shipments.
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Why Gorbachev Might Liberalize Arms
Assistance to Syria
Gorbachev's past reluctance to supply Syria with new
weapon systems may have arisen from Syria's inabil-
ity to pay for arms. He also may have believed his 25X1
freedom to risk Syrian unhappiness over Soviet arms
policies stemmed from Syria's lack of alternative 25X1
suppliers. Two new developments in the Soviet-Syrian
relationship?increased naval access and a growing
Syrian willingness to look elsewhere for weapons?
may provide incentives for Gorbachev to liberalize 25X1
Soviet arms policies, however. 25X1
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New Naval Access. By permitting the Soviets to
construct a naval repair and maintenance facility at
Tartus, Syria may have offered Moscow one of its few
means of repayment.
the Soviets will cancel $500 million of Syria's debt
and will supply Syria with coastal defense weapons?
including patrol boats and at least one submarine?in
exchange for a facility at Tartus.
The com
known.
lete sco e and size of the facilit is not yet
the facility
the land will
will be for exclusive Soviet use, but
remain Syrian.
Syrian Diversification. The Syrians have looked to
North Korea in an attempt to solve their recurring
military spare parts shortages. A Syrian military
delegation headed by Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi
visited North Korea in January 1988.
the
purpose of the visit was twofold: to inspect North
Korean industrial plants that have the capability of
milling and reproducing small repair parts for mili-
tary equipment, and to negotiate arrangements for
North Korean assistance in establishing similar facili-
ties in Syria
Syria is also attempting to cultivate a military rela-
tionship with China. Damascus is probably particular-
ly interested in procuring China's M-9 missile system.
The M-9 would give Syria a ballistic missile of
greater range (600 km) than the Soviets have been
willing to supply.
It remains unclear how Moscow will respond to
Syria's efforts to diversify its arms suppliers. Damas-
cus's success in consummating other arms deals might
Top Secret
well prod Moscow to boost the quality of its military
assistance. The Soviets would almost certainly view
the Chinese supply of M-9 missiles, or other weapons,
to Syria with discomfort, both because of the implica-
tions such a sale would have for increased Chinese
influence in Syria and because the Soviets would lack
leverage over Syria's decision to use the weapons.
According to the US Embassy in Beijing, the Soviet
Charge there revealed to US officials that Moscow
had formally raised the issue of M-9 sales with both
China and Syria.
Consequences of the SU-24 Decision
A decision by Gorbachev to supply the SU-24 to Syria
could have important consequences. Perhaps most
significant is the damage such a deal might inflict on
Moscow's carefully honed image as a "responsible
actor" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under Gorbachev,
the Soviet Union has moved to secure a meaningful
role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, expanding
contacts with Israel and touting a "peaceful" ap-
proach to settling regional conflicts.
Delivery of the aircraft would go far to soothe Syrian
irritation over past Soviet refusals of its arms re-
quests. Moscow may promote the aircraft as a substi-
tute for the SS-23, claiming that the INF Treaty has
now slated this missile system for destruction. It is
unlikely that Moscow would be able to derail a
Syrian-Chinese M-9 deal, however. Syria would pre-
fer a longer range missile to the SU-24, realizing that
the missile has a better chance of penetrating Israel's
air defenses than does a Syrian-piloted aircraft even
one with the capabilities of the SU-24.
Conversely, Moscow would almost certainly provoke
Syrian anger if it provided the Fencer to Iraq and
refused to supply Syria with the aircraft, particularly
in the wake of the US sale of F-16Ds to Israel. Such
an affront could damage Syria's regional prestige. In
addition, Moscow could jeopardize any new naval
access to Tartus that it might have received.
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op ecret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP89T00992R000100170001-7