USSR REVIEW: SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00992R000100130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
USSR Review: Supplement
May 1988
Copy 3 51
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USSR Review: Supplement
queries regarding the articles are welcome.
This supplement of the USSR Review is published
by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and
Top Secret
SOV UR 88-006JX
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Contents
iii Top Secret
a7G7 y 1988
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Over the past several months Moscow has expressed some concern
about Iran's meddling in Afghanistan after the Soviet troop with-
they have been reluctant to engage the Iranians
in serious discussions. In the wake of the Geneva accords, the
Soviets probably will continue avoiding talks with Iran, convinced
that these would not resolve conflicting interests between them but
risk a negative spillover to other areas of their bilateral relationship.
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The Iranian Factor
in Moscow's Withdrawal
From Afghanistan
Moscow continues to be concerned about longstand-
ing Iranian designs on Afghanistan and Tehran's
strong opposition to the Geneva accords and is search-
ing for ways to minimize Iranian meddling after the
withdrawal of Soviet forces. The Soviets made some
efforts to win Tehran's support for the Afghan settle-
ment and the postwithdrawal Afghan regime but did
not push hard, probably convinced that participation
by an intransigent Iran could scuttle the agreement.
Aware that the conflict of their respective interests in
Afghanistan is unlikely to be resolved in the near
future, the Soviets are for now probably less interest-
ed in serious discussions with the Iranians. We think
Moscow will continue to temporize, while publicly
seeking assurances from Tehran that it will not
meddle in Afghanistan after the Soviet troop with-
drawal, hoping to avoid a confrontation that could
damage other areas of its bilateral relationship with
Iran.
Soviet Concern Over Iranian Involvement
A recurrent theme in Soviet statements about Tehran
as a factor in the Afghan settlement has been the
concern that Iran would decline to abide by the
Geneva accords and cause mischief in Afghanistan
after the Soviet troop withdrawal. Soviet press com-
mentaries have called on the Iranians to provide a
"positive contribution" to the Afghan peace process.
In Gorbachev's 8 February statement announcing
Moscow's plan to withdraw from Afghanistan, the
General Secretary urged Iran not to stand in the way
of a political settlement but did not make Iranian
support for a settlement a precondition for Soviet
signature.
Publicly, Iran has remained intractable. Tehran has
consistently objected to the Geneva negotiations and
called for the inclusion of pro-Iranian mujahedin in
any future Afghan government. Iran viewed the talks
as a ploy by Moscow to delay withdrawal and feared
Pakistan would use the negotiations to sell out the
The 2-3 million Shias living in the poor and remote
mountain region of Hazarehjat in central Afghanistan
have been radicalized by the Afghan war and the rise
of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. The Shias generally
have been isolated from Afghan society and alienated
from both the pro-Soviet Kabul regime and the
Peshawar-based resistance parties, which are Sunni
dominated. Tehran has used Afghan Shia groups not
only to further both Iranian influence in Afghanistan
and Iran's image as sponsor of the "Islamic struggle,"
but also as a means for disseminating Iranian propa-
ganda and controlling the Afghan refugee community
within Iran. Iran has 21 camps where Afghan fighters
receive military training. Iranian clergy are involved
throughout the training program, teaching both the
value of martyrdom and techniques for spreading the
Khomeini revolution throughout Afghanistan.
Iran's control over its Shia clients, however, is not
likely to help Tehran extend its influence elsewhere in
Sunni-dominated Afghanistan. Moreover, Iran proba-
bly would not significantly increase its military sup-
port to the Afghan resistance while the war with Iraq
continues and Afghan Sunni leaders remain deeply
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suspicious of Iranian motives. 125X1
Moscow's concerns about Iranian activities in Af-
ghanistan may be an outgrowth of Soviet sensitivities
to the issue of Muslim fundamentalism in the larger
context with its potential repercussion in the USSR's 25X1
volatile ethnic situation. Nevertheless, although they
may have an exaggerated perception of Iran's ability
to influence events in Afghanistan, Soviet officials
appear genuinely concerned that Iran may be able to
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increase its long-term influence in Afghanistan
through its ties to pro-Iranian mujahedin-who are
largely from Afghanistan's Shia minority and play
only a minor role in the resistance.
According to the US Embassy in Damascus, an Iraqi
source said that in January the Soviets had asked
Syria to intercede with Tehran to help assure an
orderly Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Iran at
that time responded that it would not cooperate and
would make the Soviet withdrawal as difficult and as
bloody as possible. It is unlikely, however, that Tehran
will carry out its threats. The Iranians probably
reacted more with an eye to the Iran-Iraq war and
were trying to exploit Moscow's defensiveness about
Iraq's launching of extended-range Soviet-made mis-
siles against Iranian cities.
the benefit of the Islamic Republic."
Publicly, the Soviets have distanced themselves from
bilateral negotiations with Tehran, claiming that Ira-
nian views on the Geneva agreement were a matter to
be addressed by UN Special Representative Cordovez
and that Cordovez himself would have to negotiate
Iran's specific role in observing the agreements. On
the other hand, they have sought to involve Tehran in
the multilateral UN talks and gain its implied en-
dorsement of the results, asserting, for example, that
Tehran consistently had been engaged as an observer
in the UN-sponsored proximity talks between Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva and that UN
Special Representative Cordovez regularly informed
Tehran about the negotiations. The Soviet Ambassa-
dor to Tehran in a January press conference warned
that, if Iran were to abstain from participating in the
Afghan talks, the emerging situation would not be "to
Linking Afghanistan to Other Bilateral Issues
Moscow undoubtedly would like to avoid having its
differences with Tehran over Afghanistan undo the
progress made since last summer in Soviet-Iranian
bilateral ties. Over the past year, Moscow has shown
tactical agility in maneuvering toward improved rela-
tions with Tehran in spite of growing Arab unhappi-
ness over this policy. The Soviets undoubtedly hope
that working out a modus vivendi with Tehran on
Afghanistan could lead to a significant improvement
in the overall bilateral relationship. In view of earlier
Iranian threats to complicate the Soviet withdrawal,
Moscow was probably encouraged by developments
such as Majles speaker Rafsanjani's public statement
in early February that, if Soviet forces honor their
word to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Islamic
Republic will have no other problem with the Soviet
Union.
may have promised support to Iran on the Iran-Iraq
war by continuing to delay as long as possible a UN
vote on an arms embargo resolution against Tehran in
return for Iranian restraint in Afghanistan. A Dutch
Foreign Minister told a US diplomat that, according
Moscow
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to the Dutch Embassy in Tehran, the Soviets were
prepared to hold up a follow-on to UN Resolution 598
if Iran helped the Soviets "depart honorably" from
Afghanistan.
Iran, nevertheless, probably believes it has gained
increased leverage with the USSR because of Mos-
cow's concern that Iran might attempt to sabotage the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Tehran proba-
bly is using the implied threat of interfering with the
Soviet withdrawal to pressure Moscow to continue to
stall passage of a UN arms embargo and to weigh in
with Baghdad to end the war of the cities. Soviet
statements that the war of the cities and Iraq's use of
chemical weapons against Kurdish tribesmen make
this an inauspicious time to pass an embargo almost
certainly have encouraged Tehran to believe this
tactic is working. Iran probably discounts the fact
that Moscow may have had other reasons for continu-
ing its delaying tactics.
Outlook
Although Moscow has achieved a Geneva settlement
on Afghanistan without Iranian participation, it al-
most certainly still hopes to minimize meddling by
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Tehran after Soviet troops leave. The Soviets proba-
bly are aware that Afghanistan will continue to cloud
the bilateral relationship, and they will seek a formula
for dealing with the problem that minimizes damage 25X1
to their broader objectives in Iran. 9 X1
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Moscow probably is aware of its limited options and is
likely to delay taking any action to prevent Iranian
interference until the denouement of the Afghan
internal situation in the wake of the withdrawal of
Soviet forces. If the mujahedin take over the govern-
ment, the Soviets will have little leverage over what
Iran does in Afghanistan, but they probably believe
that Iran also will not have the ability to impose its
will among the dominant Sunni rebel groups. Any
action Moscow might decide to take to convince Iran
to cease interfering in Afghanistan-such as increas-
ing Soviet military aid to Iraq or augmenting Soviet
troops along the Soviet-Iranian border-is likely to
have a minimal impact on the overall Afghan domes-
tic situation while negatively affecting the long-term
bilateral relationship with Tehran. If, however, the
Najibullah regime in Kabul survives the Soviet with-
drawal-in our view, a less likely scenario-Moscow
will be better positioned to counter Iranian mischief.
Nonetheless, Soviet options-including continuation
of military aid to the pro-Soviet Afghan Government,
public calls for Iran to desist from meddling, and
threats to hold back on political and economic issues
important to Iran-would be few and potentially
harmful to broader Soviet interests in Iran
Top Secret
TCS 3073/88
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