USSR REVIEW: SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00992R000100060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 'lop Secret
Intelligence
USSR Review: Supplement
January 1988
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SOV UR 88-001CX
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USSR Review: Supplement
January 1988
This supplement of the USSR Review is published
by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and
queries regarding the articles are welcome.
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Top Secret
SOV UR 88-001CX
January 1988
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Articles
Contents
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Restructuring in the Soviet Defense Sector: A Status Report
Since the Cessna incident, the campaign for perestroyka in the
defense sector has been stepped up. The measures taken so far,
however, are too limited to effect the radical improvement in
efficiency and capabilities that General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev seeks. Much of the military-industrial establishment,
moreover, would clearly prefer that these measures become
substitutes for rather than the forerunners of, more far-reaching
changes.
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SOV UR 88-001CX
January 1988
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Restructuring in the
Soviet Defense Sector:
A Status Report
Until recently, the military largely paid lip service to
Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to extend "restructuring"
to the defense sector. Following the military's poor
handling of the Cessna incident last May, however,
the General Secretary stepped up his efforts to reform
the defense sector. He has made changes in the
highest levels of the Defense Ministry and General
Staff, revitalized the military's party organizations,
called for improvements in training and education for
both officers and enlisted men, cracked down on
discipline and alcohol abuse, and demanded greater
efficiency in the defense sector's use of economic
resources. Gorbachev is also considering reducing the
size of the officer corps, making major organizational
changes, and shifting resources from defense to the
civilian sector. Although resistance to these changes is
brewing in the armed forces, Gorbachev shows no
signs of backing down. Still, because these major
reforms are politically risky, he is likely to move
cautiously in implementing them in the months
ahead.
Perestroyka in the Military
Before last year, there was little evidence that the
military was restructuring itself or even felt pressed to
do so. On the contrary, while publicly supporting
Gorbachev's reforms, elements in the military were
still avoiding compliance with his policies early in
1987.
celebrations last February for Soviet Armed Forces
Day, for example,
Moreover, although the military press has endorsed
restructuring?and leaders such as Air Defense Chief
Ivan Tretyak and General Staff First Deputy
Vladimir Lobov have publicly endorsed the reform
drive?there was a pro forma quality to the
endorsements from many senior officers. During
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detached
endorsement of restructuring in his keynote address.
Other key officials, including First Deputy Defense
Ministers Victor Kulikov and Petr Lushev, also have
been lukewarm in their public support of
restructuring.
The humiliating failure of the Soviet Armed Forces to
stop the Cessna intrusion, however, has given crucial
impetus to perestroyka in the defense sector by
publicly exposing air defense shortcomings.
Reportedly enraged by this instance of incompetence,
Gorbachev made immediate personnel changes?
including the firing of Defense Minister Marshal
Sergey Sokolov and the promotion of Army Gen.
Dmitriy Yazov as his replacement?and publicized
the Politburo's criticism of the Defense Ministry. The
Cessna affair gave Gorbachev additional justification
to demand that the ministry make restructuring a top
priority. Thus, in contrast to the limited coverage
earlier, since May 1987 the military and civilian press
have carried numerous articles pushing restructuring
in the military.
Nonetheless, there is no consensus among Soviet
spokesmen about what restructuring means for the
defense sector or how far it will go. Many
representatives of the military apparently are
attempting to limit the scope of restructuring by
defining it as a program to end corruption, improve
discipline and training, and conserve resources.
According to other political and military spokesmen,
however, this definition is too narrow. In August
Krasnaya zvezda, the leading military newspaper,
wrote, "restructuring (in the military) is not merely a
'repair operation'" although many define it as such;
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rather, it "is conceived as a truly revolutionary
transformation." Indeed, for some Soviet spokesmen,
especially some civilian commentators, restructuring
has become an umbrella term covering both moves to
increase efficiency and more fundamental reforms,
including reallocating resources from defense to
civilian purposes, reorganizing the Soviet Armed
Forces, and adopting a new military doctrine.' So far,
measures to restructure the defense sector have hewed
to the more limited view, focusing on cadre changes,
tighter party control, resource conservation, better
training, increased discipline, and more glasnost and
"democratization."
Cadre Policy. Sokolov's dismissal from the Defense
Ministry made the point that leadership
accountability is a key element in restructuring. Even
earlier, however, the power to appoint and promote
was being used extensively to advance restructuring.
Since coming to power, Gorbachev has replaced or
reshuffled officers at the highest reaches of the
Defense Ministry and the General Staff, apparently
with the aim of bringing those willing to support his
reform drive into leadership positions (see inset).
Gorbachev also apparently is considering trimming
the top officer corps
Gorbachev's tenure, 16 of 24 chief political officers in
the military districts, fleets, and groups of forces also
have been replaced.
this turnover of political officers is occurring
throughout the Defense Ministry.
Coincident with these changes in the leadership of the
MPA, party aktiv meetings at various levels of the
Defense Ministry increased noticeably, judging by
coverage in the military press. Lizichev, in particular,
has promoted restructuring at meetings with Defense
Ministry party organizations in Moscow and at the
military district level. Defense Minister Yazov and
other military leaders have joined in this effort.
Resource Conservation. Improving operations and
maintenance practices and reducing costs are also
major goals of restructuring.
some ground force units have been
given specific goals for reducing resource use in what
may have been a reaction to the perestroyka
campaign (see inset). In addition, longstanding Soviet
efforts to extend the service lives of various
weapons?thus extracting more bang for the ruble?
may have been given additional impetus by the
imperative to restructure.
Some in Moscow's attache
community believe that nonoperational headquarters
staffs from the military district level up will be cut by
15 percent and that many billets will be downgraded.
Tightening Party Control. Gorbachev also has moved
to revitalize the military's party organizations in
support of his agenda. In July 1985 he installed
Aleksey Lizichev, an officer sympathetic to the
reform drive to replace
the ineffective Aleksey Yepishev as the Chief of the
Main Political Directorate (MPA). During
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Training. Gorbachev has sought to upgrade the
quality of education and training given draftees and
officers in response to longstanding complaints by
military leaders that junior officers and soldiers often
lack initiative and cannot handle unexpected
situations. The leadership is probably counting on the 25X1
education reform now under way to help. The Soviets
have also announced plans to improve
political/military education and premilitary training.
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Turnover in the Soviet Defense Ministry
The high rate of turnover throughout the military
since Gorbachev came to power is shown in the
tabulation below. Some turnover was inevitable due
to death and retirement, and the extent of the
commitment of many of the new military leaders to
perestroyka is unclear. Still, they all assumed
authority with Gorbachev's explicit approval, know-
ing that Gorbachev is holding generals to a higher
standard than in the past, and aware that support for
his program is necessary for continued advancement.
1985
1988
1985
1988
Minister of Defense
Sokolov
Yazov
Belorussian
Shuralev
Shuralev
First Deputy Ministers
Akhromeyev
Akhromeyev
Carpathian
Belikov
Skokov a
Kulikov
Kulikov
Central Asian
Lobov
Kovtunov b
Petrov
Lushev a
Far Eastern
Yazov
Moiseyev a
Deputy Ministers
Kiev
Osipov
Osipov
Service Chiefs
Leningrad
Snetkov
Yermakov b
Navy
Gorshkov
Chernavin a
Moscow
Lushev
Arkhipov b
Ground Forces
Ivanovskiy
Ivanovskiy
North Caucasus
Skokov
Shustko
Air Forces
Ye,fimov
Yefimov
Odessa
Yelagin
Morozov
Air Defense Forces
Koldunov
Tret'yak a
Siberian
Vostrov
P'yankov
Strategic Rocket Forces
Tolubko
Maksimov a
Transbaykal
Postnikov
Betekhtin b
Armaments
Shabanov
Shabanov
Transcaucasus
Arkhipov
Kochetov b
Civil Defense
Altunin
Govorov b
Turkestan
Popov
Popov
Rear Services
Kurkot kin
Kurkot kin
Ural
Grachev
Madudov
Construction/Billeting
Shestopalov
Shestopalov
Volga
Ryakhov
Patrikeyev a
Personnel
Shkadov
Sukhorukov a
Groups of Forces
Main Inspectorate
Govorov
M. Sorokin a
Germany
Zaytsev
Snetkov b
Chief, Main Political
Directorate of
the Army and Navy
Yepishev
Lizichev a
Northern Group
Kovtunov
Korbutov a
Central Group
Yermakov
Vorob'yev a
Southern Group
Kochetov
Demidov
Theater Commands
Fleets
Far Eastern
Tret'yak
Voloshin a
Baltic
Makarov
Ivanov a
Southwestern
Gerasimov
Gerasirnov
Black
A. Kalinin
Khronopulo a
Southern
Maksimov
Zaytsev a
Northern
Mikhaylovskiy
Kapitanets a
Western
Orgarkov
Orgarkov
Pacific
Sidorov
Khvatov a
Military Districts
Baltic
Betekhtin
Grishin a
, Promoted.
b Lateral move within the Ministry of Defense.
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Goals for Military Perestroyka in 1988
In late December, a Krasnaya zvezda article
described how perestroyka is to be implemented in a
tank regiment of the Kantemirov Division, a
"Moscow Parade" division considered to be a
pacesetter in the Ground Forces. Although articles
demanding ever greater performance are common,
this is one of the first articles to appear under the
restructuring banner that sets targets for
improvements in training and resource conservation,
and goals like these probably will be adopted
throughout the Ground Forces in the corning year.
Taken as a whole, they fall neatly under the narrow
interpretation of military perestroyka that was
discussed above.
In addition to improving discipline and enhancing
combat readiness, the regiment is to:
? Increase the number of highly qualified soldiers in
combat and political units by 25 percent.
? Master modern weapons and equipment by
improving the training given to specialists so that
65 percent of them are considered "highly rated" by
the end of each training cycle.
? Upgrade the physical conditioning and abilities of
soldiers so that 95 percent of them are considered
"qualified sportsmen."
? Raise the intensity of training by slashing by 15
percent the time required to achieve training norms.
? Cut electricity use by 10 percent.
? Reduce expenditures on POL, rubber, and
automotive products by 5 percent.
? Increase the time between vehicle overhauls by 5
percent.
DOSAAF (The Volunteer Society for Cooperation
With the Army, Air Force, and Fleet) training is to be
expanded and upgraded, and a program of military
summer camps begun. Military schools are also under
pressure to improve the training of young officers.
The leaders of several schools have been sacked for
corruption, and efforts to revise the curriculums may
be under way.
Top Secret
An important component of restructuring has been
renewed emphasis on improving combat training.
Writing recently in the military press, for example,
one general claimed "restructuring means resolutely
overcoming stagnation . . . in the combat readiness
and training of troops and naval forces." Several
articles have called for increased realism in combat
training. But the more intensive training is to be
accomplished while conserving resources.
Addressing the Human Factor. Gorbachev has also
sought to impose greater discipline and accountability
in the military by extending his civilian campaigns
against corruption, drunkenness, and indolence to the
defense sector. The antialcohol effort has been pushed
especially vigorously in the armed forces because,
according to official accounts, alcohol abuse is
responsible for about 30 percent of the discipline
problems in some regiments. As in the civilian sector,
Gorbachev has balanced calls for greater
accountability with promises of improvements in
working and living conditions. During his September
visit to Murmansk, he called for better housing and
benefits for servicemen
At the same time, the military justice system is being
revamped. A new legal body has been established to
strengthen discipline. The Military Prosecutor's
Office also has been told to go after those who
physically abuse soldiers. An increasing number of
articles have condemned officers for assaulting
subordinates.
Glasnost and Democratization. Meanwhile,
Gorbachev has ended the military's immunity from
criticism in his pursuit of greater efficiency in the
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defense sector. Following the Cessna incident, former
Moscow Party boss Boris Yel'tsin participated in a
meeting at which the military was publicly ridiculed
for the number of "toadies, bootlickers, and window
dressers" in the ranks. Apparently as part of a
concerted campaign, the civilian and military press
have expanded their coverage of military inadequacies
and illegalities. Krasnaya zvezda has exposed many
cases of corruption in recent months, including the
accusation that several general officers had sold draft
exemptions. Other articles have condemned field
grade officers for negligence. While lax military
behavior and discipline were exposed under Andropov
and Chernenko, senior officers were rarely ridiculed
publicly as they have been under Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's efforts to "democratize" or create a
greater sense of individual participation in the system
have also sparked similar, but controversial, calls in
the armed forces. A recent Krasnaya zvezda editorial
advocated democratization in the military, describing
it as "the wide development of glasnost, criticism...
and the rejection of blatant rule by administrative
decree."
But because democratization does not fit easily with
the idea of one-man command, the military continues
to be lukewarm in its support. Indeed, of the reform
measures adopted so far, glasnost appears to have
caused the most concern in the military. While
Krasnaya zvezda has exposed some military failures,
it has also used glasnost against its critics. Its articles
have accused civilian authorities of promoting
permissiveness and anti-Soviet sentiments. In
December the newspaper charged a "pseudopacifist"
group with inciting young people to "violate" the duty
of military service. Other military press articles have
decried the irresponsibility of unqualified civilians
who speak out on military issues. Meanwhile,
glasnost has eroded
discipline in some units.
The Defense Industries
Gorbachev also is pushing the defense industrial
sector to eliminate waste and use resources more
productively. The sector's reputation for producing
higher quality goods than the civilian sector?while
well earned?has been purchased at a high resource
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cost, and the Soviets have extended some elements of
restructuring into these industries. Fundamental
reform has been lacking, however.
So far, the reform that has had the most impact on
the defense industries has been gospriyemka, the state
acceptance system introduced on 1 January 1987. The
program attempts to improve the quality of consumer
goods production by giving inspectors at plants the
right to reject items that fail to meet state standards,
and is modeled after the military representative
system used in the defense industrial sector.
Like the military, the defense industries have also
been exposed to greater public criticism. Soviet
leaders have publicly rebuked the sector for failing to
support the industrial modernization program and for
not devoting greater attention to the production of
civilian goods. At the June 1987 plenum, for example,
Gorbachev scolded the Ministries of the Radio
Industry and the Communications Equipment
Industry for "taking a formal attitude to consumer
goods as something secondary" and for failing to meet
production targets. There has been no public criticism
of the defense industries, however, for failing to meet
weapons production targets or for wasteful use of
resources in producing military equipment. This may
reflect the leadership's belief that there have been no
serious problems on this score. A more likely
explanation is that discussion of such problems is
deemed too politically sensitive.
Recently, the leadership has stepped up its efforts to
increase the defense industries' involvement in
retooling the light industrial and food-processing
sectors. In October Premier Ryzhkov ordered the
defense industries to support civilian modernization
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amid signs that the leadership will take a more
activist role in the future to force the sector to
cooperate. Subsequently, Politburo member Victor
Nikonov stated that the defense industrial ministries
would be expected to increase equipment deliveries to
the food-processing sector by "fourfold to ninefold"
by 1995.
Although interested in promoting greater efficiency,
Moscow appears reluctant to apply to the weapons
production sector those reforms that would
decentralize authority. Statements from Soviet
planning officials indicate that?despite the
scheduled switch to wholesale trade in industry, which
will encompass 75 to 80 percent of all trade by
1992?the defense industries will continue to have
guaranteed access to supplies without having to
negotiate with other plants. Similarly, defense
industrial enterprises apparently will be exempt from
some of the provisions of the new law on state
enterprises. Under this law, enterprises?unless
specifically exempted?are responsible for financing
most of their capital improvements. The leadership
has stated, however, that it will continue to finance
the most important projects, which, we believe, would
include those related to defense production.
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Finally, the negotiations carried out so far suggest
that the participation of defense industries in joint
ventures?unless it clearly increases Soviet access to
restricted technologies?will be limited to projects for
the production of civilian goods. We expect the
recently announced joint venture, in which a Spanish
firm and the Soviet Communications Equipment
Ministry will cooperate in producing telephones, will
set the tone for any future defense industrial
participation in joint ventures with Western firms.
Prospects and Implications
Despite the measures taken so far, the pace of
restructuring remains slow and uneven. An early
October 1987 editorial in Krasnaya zvezda, for
example, lamented that while a "storm of paper and
words were raging at the top," there is a "complete
standstill" at lower levels. Subsequently, the
controversial nature of the campaign was indicated by
an article reporting that Gorbachev's discussion of
restructuring with personnel of the Northern Fleet
last fall was "emotional and heated."
Nonetheless, saving resources, eliminating corruption,
and enhancing efficiency and combat readiness have
been favorite topics for military spokesmen for years,
and we expect them to garner continued military and
political support. If some of the minor reforms already
introduced in these areas are implemented carefully,
they could improve Soviet military effectiveness and
efficiency, although they would probably have only a
small impact on overall defense spending. Glasnost
and democratization, on the other hand, have
generated apprehension in military ranks and,
together with suspicion that Gorbachev has more
fundamental reforms in mind, may poison the
atmosphere for perestroyka in the military.
Large reductions in the officer corps and major troop
or budget cuts, moreover, would inevitably be
contentious and would almost certainly be resisted by
some of the more conservative members of the
leadership. Despite an extensive turnover since the
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Brezhnev era, some members of the Defense Council,
the key national security decisionmaking body, may
share the concern of some elements in the military
about the more far-reaching aspects of Gorbachev's
program for reform in the defense sector.
Within the defense industries, the potential for the
widest application of perestroyka exists in production
for the civil sector. Gospriyemka and glasnost are
already affecting civil production, as evidenced by
rejections of consumer goods manufactured within the
defense industrial sector and increased public
criticism of the sector for poor performance in this
area. Leadership calls for defense industries'
assistance to the civilian sector, presentation of a
specific plan for their participation, and their receipt
of the assets and responsibilities of the recently
dissolved industry for light and food industry
machinery provide further evidence that the
leadership has decided to commit the defense
industrial sector to a sizable, long-term role in the
civilian modernization program and will hold it
accountable for meeting civilian production targets.
National security is a particularly sensitive area for
the Soviet leadership, however, and Gorbachev
probably would be reluctant to leave himself open to
charges of weakening Soviet defenses by pushing
fundamental reforms that many in the military
leadership oppose. Such reforms would almost
certainly take time to be worked through and to gain
support. Moreover, if Gorbachev is involved in battles
on other fronts?as the recent dismissal of Moscow
Party boss Yel'tsin suggests?he would probably
move even more cautiously in this sensitive area.
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The handling of the defense industries portfolio on the
Secretariat could provide an indication of how hard
Gorbachev intends to push restructuring in the
defense sector in the near term. Post-Stalin precedent
suggests that Lev Zaykov, who recently became
Moscow party boss, should relinquish these
responsibilities:
? If a current member of the Secretariat less
sympathetic to Gorbachev?particularly
Brezhnevite Vladimir Dolgikh?takes over this
sector along with his other responsibilities, it would
suggest the party may be letting up the pressure on
defense industries.
? If Zaykov retains the defense industry portfolio or a
new party secretary is selected?particularly one
with a record as an aggressive and efficient
manager?this might mean that Gorbachev will not
allow any slackening of party oversight of this
sector.
Even if Gorbachev pushes hard, we believe few in the
military would risk potential confrontation through
direct opposition to restructuring. Overt resistance
would provide the General Secretary with a strong
rationale for more extensive personnel cuts and
radical change in the Defense Ministry, thus speeding
the reforms. Passive resistance, on the other hand,
would be a more likely and troublesome response.
Such resistance not only could stall Gorbachev's plans
but could, by increasing confusion and
demoralization, erode the military's performance.
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