NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 1 MARCH 1988
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89T00576R000100010009-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 18, 2013
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 1, 1988
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
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fCentral
A
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
1 March 1988
Top Secret
CPAS NID 88-049JX
1 March 1988
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Contents
Iran: Preparing for an Afghan Settlement
1
Argentina-UK: Protesting Falklands Exercises
2
Argentina: New Promises to IMF
3
France: Mitterrand's Position at NATO Summit
4
Notes
Iraq-Iran: Iraqi Missile Attack on Tehran
5
Afghanistan: Trying To Sow Discord Among Rebels
5
Bangladesh: Army Frustrated With Opposition Politics
6
Panama: General Strike Begins
7
Brazil: Debt Agreement
7
Thailand-US: Steps To Ease Tensions Over Refugees
8
Bulgaria: Air Force Modernization
8
In Brief
9
Special Analyses
Iran: Preparing for Offensive
10
Haiti: Religion and Politics
14
Israel: Youth Bulge Points to Trouble
15
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IRAN: Preparing for an Afghan Settlement
Iran has reaffirmed support for an Afghan settlement that
satisfies resistance leaders while trying to avoid offending the
USSR.
Tehran publicly has lauded General Secretary Gorbachev's statement
on withdrawal but indicated skepticism about whether it would follow
through.
Comment: The Iranians apparently are stressing their support in
order to strengthen the insurgents' bargaining position in
negotiations. Tehran is trying to force Pakistan to bear the brunt of
fashioning an Afghan settlement or of supporting the resistance
militarily if negotiations fail. The Iranians probably believe that good
relations with the new Kabul government and Moscow depend on a
political settlement acceptable to the resistance. If the negotiations
fail, Iran probably expects Pakistan will have to continue supporting
the resistance while Iran continues to limit its own involvement.
Iran's military support to the resistance probably will increase if
Pakistan attempts to force an agreement on the resistance. Iran
would be reluctant to assume as large a role as Pakistan has played
because the war with Iraq and support for Hizballah in Lebanon are
already a burden. If Pakistan and the resistance have a falling out,
Iran probably would marginally increase its military aid to the
insurgents and threaten an expanded role to press Moscow and
Islamabad to be more accommodating to the resistance. If this failed
Tehran probably would follow through on its threat.
If civil war breaks out after a Soviet withdrawal, Iran's preoccupation
with other issues would limit its involvement. It might aid its favored
resistance groups while working with Pakistan to arrange a truce.
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1 1 March 1988
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ARGENTINA-UK: Protesting Falklands Exercises
Growing Argentine domestic opposition to British military
exercises in the Falkland Islands has caused President Alfonsin
to increase diplomatic protests of the exercises scheduled to
take place from 7 through 31 March.
Arguing that the emotional response the exercises are evoking will
make further progress toward negotiations with the UK impossible,
Alfonsin has requested US help in convincing London to cancel the
reinforcement exercises. A regional grouping of Latin American
countries, the Group of Eight, last week publicly criticized the
exercises and urged London to resume talks with Buenos Aires over
sovereignty. The OAS will consider an Argentine resolution today
condemning the maneuvers. Foreign Minister Caputo has not ruled
out taking the issue to the UN Security Council and made an
unscheduled trip to New York after the Group of Eight meeting.
Concerned that OAS action will encourage Argentina to pursue its
case at the UN, London has asked for US help in moderating the OAS
resolution. A British Embassy official also raised London's concerns
about a possible US sale of arms to Argentina and a change in a
longstanding US commitment to consult with London beforehand on
any major arms transfers.
The Alfonsin government is taking political advantage of intense
domestic press coverage by playing up its actions in defense of
Argentine interests, such as breaking around for a new naval base in
southern Argentina.
Comment: The strength of the Argentine public opposition to the
maneuvers will prevent Alfonsin from making further contact with the
UK and may even set back progress made so far?such as Buenos
Aires's readiness to declare an end to hostilities. Despite support
from the Group of Eight and likely backing from the OAS, Buenos
Aires probably will not bring the issue to the Security Council, fearing
that it would fail to muster enough support there. Once the exercises
are under way, Buenos Aires probably will not react militarily, but its
verbal attacks against the UK will intensify and it ma,condemii the
US for failing to persuade London not to proceed.
London appears to have underestimated the strength of South
American opposition to its exercises and may have second thoughts
about timing. Still, OAS action and any US statements of concern are
not likely to cause cancellation or delay of the exercises. Moreover, as
long as Thatcher remains Prime Minister, the British will not nertiate
on the issue of Falklands sovereignty.
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ARGENTINA: New Promises to IMF
An IMF agreement will give Argentina's economy some breathing
room, but Buenos Aires probably will not be able to institute the
sweeping reforms needed to resolve more fundamental
problems.
Argentina's latest letter of intent with the IMF probably will be
approved by the end of this month and calls for reducing the budget
deficit to 2.7 percent of gross domestic product from the 7-percent
level last year. Other terms include a drop in the monthly inflation rate
to 4 percent by the end of 1988 and an economic growth rate of
4 percent in 1988. An IMF agreement will free $225 million under a
standby agreement and provide another $175 million in funds to
compensate for previous drops in export earnings.
Buenos Aires's Bank Advisory Committee also has recommended
that creditor banks waive preconditions for the disbursement of
another $550 million, US
banks hope to avoid a deterioration in Argentina's creditworthiness
that would occur if past due interest payments of $250-300 million are
not paid by 31 March.
The Argentine Treasury has started printing money to cover about
$70 million in debt to government suppliers and to pay a portion of
$430 million on maturing government bonds due this month
Comment: Printing money to cover internal debt payments will fuel
inflation and will make it difficult for Buenos Aires to meet the
watered-down IMF reform targets. Moreover, Argentina probably will
achieve little, if any, economic growth this year. IMF and creditor bank
arrangements should keep Argentina solvent until June or longer if?
as appears likely?major banks commit to a new money package.
There are few indications, however, that Buenos Aires will implement
reform measures sufficient to stem the country's continuing economic
deterioration
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FRANCE: Mitterrand's Position at NATO Summit
Top Secret
French President Mitterrand is likely to bring the doctrine of
flexible response and the need for NATO to modernize short-
range nuclear forces under public scrutiny during the NATO
summit in Brussels this week, probably hoping to express
support for West Germany and to play to French public opinion.
During a meeting with Irish Prime Minister Haughey last week,
Mitterrand said he did not favor modernization of NATO's SNF,
according to the US Embassy in Paris. Mitterrand said publicly this
week that Europe should try to negotiate a balance on conventional
forces rather than modernize SNF systems at a time when the
superpowers seemed to be making progress in arms control. He
claims the US and NATO err the 1960s by adopting a
strategy of flexible response.
Comment: This will be only the second NATO summit a French
President has attended since France left the integrated command in
1966. Mitterrand probably will restate his opposition to SNF
modernization during the summit, at least in some bilateral meetings.
French officials, and Mitterrand in particular, have increasingly sought
a greater say in NATO policies in the aftermath of the US-Soviet
summit meetings. Although Mitterrand had not previously raised SNF
modernization of NATO publicly, such statements are consistent with
his privately expressed doubts about flexible response and the utility
of short-range systems, as well as his emphasis on the value of
France's strategic nuclear deterrent.
Any statement by Mitterrand at the summit that opposes Alliance SNF
modernization probably would be in part to provide tactical support
of West German Chancellor Kohl. He also may hope that if NATO
postpones the modernization debate it will ease domestic pressure on
Kohl to seek early SNF negotiations with the Warsaw Pact.
Mitterrand, who is likely to announce in the next two weeks that he
will seek a second term in the presidential election this spring,
probably hopes to rally domestic support by supporting the arms
control process and asserting his dominance over foreign policy and
defense issues. His position was probably not coordinated with Prime
Minister Chirac, who will also attend the summit. Chirac and his
advisers probably disapprove of Mitterrand's stance but will be
reluctant to take the lead in advocating Alliance SNF modernization
before the election.
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IRAQ-IRAN: Iraqi Missile Attack on Tehran
Iraq used ballistic missiles yesterday and today for the first time in the
war. As many as nine missiles were fired from near Al `Amarah in
southeastern Iraq at the Iranian capital?a distance of about
580 kilometers. At least three missiles hit the vicinity of Tehran.
Baghdad threatened to fire more missiles at the Iranian capital in
retaliation for Iranian artillery and missile attacks on Iraqi cities last
weekend.
Comment: Iraq's unprecedented missile strikes on Tehran suggest
Baghdad's resolve to respond strongly to Iran's recent attacks even
at the risk of starting a new war of the cities. Iraq's leaders will use the
attacks to boost Iraqi morale by claiming that further Iranian Scud
missile attacks on Baghdad will be met with more Iraqi missile attacks
on Tehran. Iraq's claims last August that it had manufactured and
tested a missile with a range of more than 600 kilometers are
unconfirmed. Baghdad has been interested in acquiring longer range
missiles from the Soviets or missiles and related technology from
Argentina and Egypt.
AFGHANISTAN: Trying To Sow Discord Among Rebels
Insurgent leader Rabbani recently warned Jamiat-i-Islami colleagues
not to believe any regime announcements that former King Zahir
Shah, Jamiat-i-Islami Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, or other
prominent insurgent figures had accepted positions in a coalition
government. The Mongolian Ambassador in Kabul told US officials
that Masood was in Kabul negotiating with the regime.
Comment: The Afghan regime almost certainly hopes to encourage
infighting among the insurgents by claiming it has reached
agreements with prominent commanders. Although Masood
negotiated a cease-fire in 1984, he is not likely to do so now. He is in a
stronger military position and negotiations would undermine his claim
to political leadership after the war and disrupt the political and social
organization he has painstakingly built in the north.
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BANGLADESH: Army Frustrated With Opposition Politics
Support for President Ershad has risen in the Bangladesh Army,
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troops blame the opposition for strikes that have damaged
Bangladesh's economy and lowered living standards for their families.
Soldiers also view the opposition parties as weak and increasingly
ineffective. Nevertheless, many in the Army believe that the
parliamentary election on Thursday?which the opposition is
boycotting?will not solve the country's political crisis and that
President Ershad has not tried to compromise with the opposition.
Comment:
the opposition's strategy to oust Ershad has backfired.
Opposition leaders had hoped to foment enough unrest to cause the
Army to move against him and call a new election under a caretaker
government. The election this week will test the Army's support for
the regime, and Ershad plans to deploy an Army company at each
district headquarters to deter violence at the polls. If the opposition
can pit soldiers against large numbers of angry citizens, the Army may
yet decide that the damage to its reputation caused by continued
backing of Ershad is too great.
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PANAMA: General Strike Begins
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More than half the nongovernment employees and many Panamanian
banks took part in the general strike called by Panama's opposition
Civil Crusade to protest President Delvalle's ouster, but it failed to
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closed shops discouraged some potential strikers. Although the
police briefly detained a prominent Crusade leader, there were no
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Comment: The strike is the most successful opposition activity since
the indictment was announced, and Crusade leaders will try to
prolong it until participation begins to wane. Unless the strike quickly
brings tangible political results, compliance by the business
community is likely to fall off significantly because of concern about
individual economic losses.
BRAZIL: Debt Agreement
The agreement Brazil and its major creditor banks announced
Sunday resolves several issues critical to a multiyear debt
rescheduling and new money package, but a final accord will take a
few more weeks. The two sides hope to reach agreement on
remaining issues?such as the details of an exit bond program?
within three weeks.
Comment: The size of the new money package was a sticking point
to an accord because Brazil originally had requested more than
$11 billion. Of the issues remaining, the most contentious probably
will be the role of the IMF. Brazilian officials have promised an
IMF-supported program, but they remain adamant that
disbursements of money from commercial banks not be contingent
on meeting IMF economic performance targets. Many foreign banks
have expressed concern that, in the event of political turmoil, Brazil
will quickly fall out of compliance with its IMF program. Already there
are signs, for example, that President Sarney is backing away from
many of the deficit reduction measures his Finance Minister
proposed.
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THAILAND-US: Steps To Ease Tensions Over Refugees
Prime Minister Prem, in an effort to calm tension with the US over
refugee issues, has ordered senior cabinet officials and their
subordinates to end public criticism of the US and other countries
that have pledged to resettle refugees
Prem has also designated Thailand's National Security Council as the
focal point for refugee matters.
Comment: Prem probably hopes to end internal squabbling over the
refugee issue, and his intervention is likely to ease official criticism of
the US. Nonetheless, most ministers, including Sitthi and Prachuap,
view the growing influx of Vietnamese boat refugees as a national
security threat and are likely to remain critical of the slow rate of
resettlement by Western countries. Although official policy is to
continue providing asylum to Vietnamese who land on Thai shores
while publicly discouraging future arrivals, dissension within the Prem
government probably means enforcement will be difficult and some
mistreatment of refugees will continue.
BULGARIA: Air Force Modernization
Bulgaria is taking action to address weaknesses in air defense and
combat readiness noted by Defense Minister Dzhurov in a speech in
December. Bulgaria's Air Force this year probably will be the first
among non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries to receive MIG-29s?
standardly equipped with sophisticated lookdown radar-
This follows recent delivery of modern SU-25
ground attack aircraft to a Bulgarian regiment.
Comment: The acquisition of MIG-29s and SU-25s will greatly
improve Bulgaria's Air Forces. Moscow probably is encouraging the
purchase to improve southern tier defenses. Sofia may be reacting to
Yugoslavia's recent acquisition of a squadron of MIG-29s and
continuing programs by NATO members Turkey and Greece to
acquire modern US and French aircraft. Delivery of MIG-29s to
Bulgaria marks the beginning of Pact-wide transition to Moscow's
latest export interceptor, a move that will take place over the next
decade.
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In Brief
Middle East
East Asia
Americas
Europe
Africa
? Amal militia chief Nabih Barri asking Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini to
send representative to southern Lebanon .. . probably reflects
slipping Amal influence there after Hi ins kidnaping as well as
attempt to curry favor with Tehran.
? Illegal sale of Austrian arms to Iran touching high-level Socialist
politicians.., party chairman offering to resign if President
Waldheim does so also ... conservatives rejecting deal robably
calculating scandal diverts attention from Waldheim.
? Taiwan legalizing indirect imports of raw materials from China . . .
response to domestic pressure to lower input costs to maintain
export competitiveness ... broadens limited indirect trade, which
reached $1.5 billion last year
? Uruguayan, Soviet negotiators failed to reach agreement in talks
last week ... Montevideo reluctant to grant fishing rights or to
consider countertrade... may send delegation to Moscow before
President Sanguinetti's visit next week.
? GATT to hold ministerial-level review of Uruguay Round in
Montreal beginning 5 December... agenda not set yet ... EC will
obstruct US hope for agreement on a riculture unless accord on
services, other issues, also reached.
? Franco Nicolazzi, leader of small Italian Social Democratic Party in
ruling coalition, resigned yesterday ... follows allegations of
corruption when public works minister in previous governme
unlikely to hasten Goria government's expected resignation.
? Senegal declared emergency in Dakar yesterday, detained
opposition leaders following student protests of President Diouf's
reelection Sunday ... unrest, threats of violence by opposition ...
unlikely to impair Diouf's control.
Top Secret
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Special Analysis
IRAN: Preparing for Offensive
Iran's failure to launch an offensive so far this year may stem
from domestic and international concerns, but its continuing
military preparations suggest Tehran could initiate major ground
operations over the next six weeks. The pressures facing Tehran
are more likely to influence the timing and location of an
offensive than to deter Iran from launching one.
Domestic political issues probably have influenced Iran's decisions
about an offensive more heavily than in previous years. Recent edicts
by Ayatollah Khomeini that dramatically expand the government's
role in the economy and in preparation for a parliamentary election
next month are causing factional infighting and diverting the attention
of the same leaders who direct the war. Iranian leaders probably are
concerned that an offensive will further unsettle the domestic scene,
especially if it fails or results in heavy casualties.
Foreign developments have also contributed to the pressure to delay
or forgo an offensive. Tehran probably is concerned that an offensive,
by flouting the UN call for a cease-fire in Resolution 598, might be the
final impetus the Security Council needed to pass an arms embargo
resolution against Iran. The delay may also have been intended to
encourage a reduction of US forces in the Gulf and to give UAE-
brokered negotiations with the Gulf states a chance to work. An
offensive this year is more likely than in previous years to result in
serious damage to relations with the USSR, Syria, Japan, and
Western Europe because of Resolution 598.
Nonetheless, postponing a major offensive presents risks to Tehran,
and the military disadvantages of delaying action eventually may
outweigh any advantages. With international opinion increasingly
depicting US intervention in the Gulf as a victory for Washington and
its regional allies, Tehran may come to believe that indefinite
postponement of an offensive will create the appearance it is being
checkmated in both the ground and naval wars.
Iranians in general might view inaction as a sign that the war is
winding down, which might lower their willingness to respond to
future mobilizations or to make sacrifices for the war. Hardliners in
the regime?who often see their survival tied to success in the war?
might become disgruntled and threaten regime stability if the war is
not actively pursued.
continued
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Military Preparations Continue
Iran's preparations so far would enable it to launch multiple attacks of
varying sizes from the Al Faw peninsula to northern Iran. Although
there were a few reports of problems with the mobilization last fall,
troop strengths and training have increased through early this year.
With the acquisition and deployment of more tanks, artillery, and air
defense systems during the past year, Iran has greatly increased its
firepower. Iran's regular army appears to be taking greater steps to
prepare for offensive operations this year. Iranian forces, however,
still face strong Iraqi defenses, longstanding supply problems, and
potential difficulties with using new weapons effectively
Iran's Options
The continuing military preparations suggest the regime could launch
major offensive operations?with 50,000 or more soldiers?to score a
significant victory during the next six weeks. A major attack against
an important strategic objective such as Umm Qasr or Al Basrah
would present great risks, but a victory may further strengthen
support for the regime, reduce war weariness, and possibly weaken
Iraq's will to resist.
Tehran might try to limit international and domestic criticism by
launching attacks that could be characterized favorably regardless of
their outcome. The attacks may be away from the southern front to
soothe Gulf Arab nerves and possibly limit damage to relations with
Moscow and Damascus. By avoiding an assault on a heavily defended
strategic target, the regime would be more likely to avoid high
casualties in the period leading to the parliamentary elections next
month.
Tehran is almost certain to exploit militarily any initial success against
the Iraqi forces if it perceives the opportunity for significant gain.
Iranian leaders would expect a major victory to improve its overall
position despite likely setbacks at the UN and with the Gulf Arabs.
If the offensive remains relatively limited, Tehran would still have the
option to launch a larger one in the fall. Khomeini could upset the
regime's calculations at any time, however, by ordering an immediate,
large-scale attack on a key Iraqi target. Passage of a UN embargo, a
sharp downturn in relations with the Gulf Arabs, or clashes with the
US also could result in more aggressive ground operations.
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Special Analysis
HAITI: Religion and Politics
Key Haitian religious institutions continue to have the potential
to profoundly affect the course of political events.
The Catholic Church, which claims 80 percent of the population as
members, is torn between moderate church leaders, who tacitly
support President Manigat, and radical leftist clerics, who advocate
revolutionary change, according to US Embassy reporting. To keep
the division from growing wide enough to split the church, Catholic
leaders will stay out of a central role in assisting Manigat to
implement political and economic reform. The perception that
Manigat is unwilling or unable to implement real change, however,
might well move the church to take a more active opposition role as it
did in the final months of the Duvalier regime.
Protestant churches, which represent a growing minority of the
population, appear unwilling to jeopardize their religious gains by
becoming too active in politics. The Embassy suggests that
Protestant leaders generally will probably maintain moderate political
positions, such as reiterating calls for free elections, unless the
government becomes brutally repressive or a dictatorship.
Voodoo, the spiritualist folk religion that most Haitians practice in
conjunction with Christianity, is generally apolitical but may be
increasingly used by both the government and the opposition to
further their political interests. Although voodoo is not easily
compatible with a political ideology because it is loosely organized
and channels disaffection into appeals to the supernatural, voodoo
beliefs and practices can reinforce nationalism, xenophobia, and
acceptance of arbitrary authority. The pervasive character of voodoo
in Haitian society is a strong indication that it will remain a significant
determinant of popular reaction to political events.
The secretive nature of Haitain society raises the possibility that
radical religious elements might be able to organize unrest that would
not be easily detectable by foreign observers. Such activity might
produce sudden popular outbursts for no apparent reason and with
little warning. Radical Catholic clerics in particular appear to have
made progress gaining followers of their liberation theology, and their
parishes may become the basis for a grassroots subversive
movement.
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Occupied Territories: Youth Bulge, 1988'
West Bank
Age Gaza
65 and over
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
Under 5
1
20 15 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20
Percent
a Compiled from December 1987 projections, US Census.
3160302-88
Top Secret
1 March 1988
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/05: CIA-RDP89T00576R000100010009-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/05: CIA-RDP89T00576R000100010009-8
Top Secret
Special Analysis
ISRAEL: Youth Bulge Points to Trouble
Israel will face a very young and increasingly disaffected
population at home and in the occupied territories for the
foreseeable future. A surge in the population of both young
Arabs and young Jews will intensify strains on Israeli rule in Gazal
and the West Bank throughout the next decade and test the
patience of either side in seeking peaceful compromise.
By definition a "youth bulge" occurs when 15- to 24-year-olds make
up about 20 percent or more of the population. It is almost always
accompanied by instability of some sort, and, when high
unemployment and ethnic or religious discrimination are added, the
unrest is usually violent. The Arab youth bulge in the West Bank and
Gaza is 21 and 19 percent, respectively. When the 10- to 14-year-
olds?who have been active in recent unrest?are included, the youth
bulge becomes a substantial 32 percent for Gaza and 34 percent for
the West Bank. The bulge will remain high at least until the year
2000 because 65 percent of the population in the West Bank and
Gaza currently is under 25 years old.
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Two factors compound the frustrations of young Arabs in the
occupied territories. First, they are among the best educated youths
in the region. Second, they live and work in proximity to Israelis and
have daily reminders of the inequality of the current situation. I 25X1
Israel, too, has a smaller but still significant youth bulge of about
18 percent. Many of these young Israelis are moving to the suburbs in
the West Bank, and many are religiously orthodox immigrants from
other countries. Many have become the catalyst for local Arab
hostilit and themselves require increased Israeli police protection.
Young Gazans and West Bankers?spurred by sympathetic press
coverage and their success in shutting down the territories?will be a
wellspring of violent unrest for years to come. Israel seems to be
having a particularly difficult time dealing with the spontaneity of the
young Arab rioters. Despite speculation in the press and elsewhere
about a "faceless organization" behind the Palestinian uprising, most
observers, including diplomatic sources, report that
young Palestinians acted largely on their own and that their elders
and the PLO have had to scramble to catch up. The persistence of
unrest, however, reportedly has led to the emergence of
neighborhood coordinating committees. The situation has left
Tel Aviv with no focal point for negotiations and, by its own thinkina.
little alternative to its tou'gh approach to the unrest.
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Top Secret
1 March 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/05 : CIA-RDP89T00576R000100010009-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/05: CIA-RDP89T00576R000100010009-8
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/05: CIA-RDP89T00576R000100010009-8