SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OCEANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00296R000300290003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Relations
With Oceania
An Intelligence Assessment
SOV 87-10034X
July 1987
Copy 4 0 2
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
With Oceania
Soviet Relations
This paper was prepared b
Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from
SOVA~
]Office of East Asian
Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division,
Secret
SOV 87-10034X
July 1987
9.5
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With Oceania
Key Judgments Since 1984 the Soviets have increased their activities in Oceania, the
Information available region that includes the South Pacific island states, Australia, and New
as of l July 1987 Zealand. They have signed two fishing agreements, established diplomatic
was used in this report.
relations with Vanuatu, and sent Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to
Australia in March 1987. Moscow's heightened interest in the region
probably stems in part from a general thrust toward greater activism in
Asia, as well as Soviet perceptions of exploitable opportunities afforded by
strained US relations with Oceanic states and the worsening economic
conditions in many of the island states.
The Soviet Union's attempts to establish an economic and political
presence in Oceania are linked to Moscow's two primary objectives in
Asia-(l) gaining recognition as a major political force in Asia as well as a
military power, and (2) limiting the influence of the United States in Asia
and the Pacific. Oceania is a region of low strategic priority to the Soviets;
Moscow has no socialist-oriented clients and little commercial or military
interest in the area. The Soviet Union has historically had little influence
and practically no political or military presence in the region. Conse-
quently, the key Soviet goal in Oceania is the reduction of Western
influence, particularly the denial or reduction of US military access.
Specific Soviet objectives are to disrupt the ANZUS relationship and to
encourage the transformation of the region into a nuclear-free zone. We
believe that, for the time being, the Soviets are not striving to establish a
substantial presence, political or military, in the region and that they would
be satisfied with any increase in their regional influence at the expense of
the West. Soviet expectations for the next few years are probably modest.
Moscow uses a double-pronged strategy to achieve its goals in Oceania,
encouraging antinuclear and anti-Western sentiment while promoting itself
as a commercial partner for Pacific nations. Soviet propaganda focuses on
tensions between regional states and the United States, seeking opportuni-
ties to portray the United States and its allies as the true threats to the re-
gion. At the same time, Soviet approaches to local governments and
propaganda toward the region portray the Soviet Union as a distant but be-
nevolent advocate of Pacific interests. The Soviets also maintain ties to
local labor unions and other leftist groups pursuing antinuclear goals.
Secret
SOV 87-10034X
July 1987
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initiatives and expanded commercial relations.
Soviet relations with Australia have improved since the early 1980s, when
they were strained by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the KAL
shootdown. These relations appear to be on an even keel, and Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paid an uneventful visit to Canberra in
March 1987. Moscow appears to expect few political gains in the near
future, however, and has chosen to concentrate on promoting disarmament
treatment.
In the case of New Zealand, relations are still at arm's length, despite
Moscow's public support for Wellington's antinuclear position. Prime
Minister Lange's sensitivity to any implication that the ANZUS estrange-
ment has opened the door to closer Soviet-New Zealand relations has led
New Zealand to deny Soviet requests for expanded commercial contacts
and Aeroflot landing rights. Wellington and Moscow traded diplomatic
expulsions in April 1987, although the Soviets gave the incident low-key
1987 that permits shore access for Soviet fishing vessels.
The smaller Pacific island states, which suffer from growing economic
problems, are the best targets for Soviet commercial overtures. For
example, Vanuatu signed a fishing agreement with Moscow in January
the Soviets believe that if they can win over a few
Moscow's offers
key island states, such as Vanuatu and Fiji, the rest will eventually follow.
Moscow recently has suffered a loss of momentum in its aggressive
courtship of the smaller Pacific island states, however, and the Soviets
probably suspect that their highly visible campaign in the South Pacific
spurred Western countermeasures that lessened the attractiveness of
against French rule of New Caledonia
We believe that in the near future the Soviets will continue to pursue
commercial relations with the Oceanic states, using attractive initial deals
to establish ties. Moscow almost certainly will continue to use the ANZUS
rift and the US decision not to sign the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
Treaty protocols as themes for antinuclear and anti-American propaganda
in the region. The Soviets also will try to expand their ties to local leftist
groups and labor unions, especially in the South Pacific island states. In
addition, Moscow will continue to agitate in the United Nations against
the US termination of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and
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Australia and New Zealand are unlikely to warm to the Soviets in the near
future, although indigenous antialliance and antinuclear sentiments there
may serve Soviet regional interests. The Australians are concerned that
increased Soviet activity in the South Pacific island states may lead to an
erosion of Canberra's influence in the region. New Zealand's Prime
Minister Lange is anxious to avoid being seen as moving closer to Moscow
in the wake of the ANZUS dispute. A number of factors also probably will
limit the increase of Soviet influence in the South Pacific island states,
including their pro-Western orientation and the preponderance of Western
aid in the region. Nevertheless, economic woes may lead local states to
respond to Soviet commercial overtures.
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Soviet Objectives in the Region
Prospects for Future Soviet Activity in Oceania
8
Promotion of Commercial Activity
8
Fostering Antinuclear Sentiment
9
Probable Regional Responses to Soviet Initiatives
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Soviet Relations
With Oceania
Introduction
The recent flurry of Soviet activity in the Oceanic
states follows a long period of relatively cool relations
with the region. Both Australia and New Zealand
imposed strict sanctions on Moscow after the 1979
invasion of Afghanistan. Sanctions were relaxed in
the mid-1980s and Soviet commercial relations with
both countries expanded gradually, but spying scan-
dals and the shootdown of KAL 007 kept bilateral
relations cool. These events also fueled the antipathy
toward the USSR of the newly independent, strongly
pro-Western South Pacific island states. The South
Pacific states refused Soviet economic offerings be-
tween 1976 and 1980, owing to modest increases in
aid from the United States and other Western donors
and the reluctance of island governments to deal with
Moscow. Until 1984 Moscow apparently considered
any new initiatives in the South Pacific as bound to
fail
Since 1984, however, the Soviets have stepped up
their activities in the region. Their heightened interest
probably was due in part to a growing realization that
the USSR had up to then shut itself out of Oceania,
and in part to strained US relations with states in the
region. Disputes over tuna fishing rights between
American fishermen and the island states and grow-
ing antinuclear sentiment in New Zealand may have
suggested to the Soviets that new opportunities were
to be found in the region. In addition, Moscow may
have judged that worsening economic conditions in
many of the island states would make them more
receptive to Soviet offers of economic cooperation.
Pacific states had been previously lumped in with the
United Kingdom and Canada in the European De-
partment
Soviet Objectives in the Region
Soviet attempts to establish an economic and political
presence in Oceania (see foldout map in back) are
linked to Moscow's two primary objectives in Asia-
(1) gaining recognition as a major political actor in
Asia as well as a military power, and (2) limiting the
influence of the United States in Asia and the Pacific.
The Soviet Union historically has had little influence
and practically no political or military presence in
Oceania, and the region is of low strategic priority to
Moscow for a number of reasons:
? It is geographically isolated from both the Soviet
Union and the United States.
? It does not sit astride sea lanes that the Soviets view
as important and that they must protect. 25X1
? There are no socialist-oriented countries in the
region, precluding the need for Moscow to operate
militarily there to support clients.
? Moscow's commercial relations with the region are
small.
Oceania is, however, a region of some strategic impor-
tance to the United States. The ANZUS alliance,
which in addition to its military cooperation in the
area also affords the US access to Southern Hemi-
sphere sites for tracking Soviet space operations, is the
focus of US interest in Oceania. As a result, the key
Soviet goal in Oceania is the reduction of Western
influence in the region, particularly the denial of US
military access. The expansion of Soviet influence 25X1
there is a much lower priority. 25X1
A sign of increased Soviet interest in the region is the
Soviet Foreign Ministry's recent formation of a new
department for Oceania. The Pacific Department,
whose creation the Foreign Ministry announced in the
summer of 1986, is responsible for Soviet relations
with Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific island
states, and Japan. Australia, New Zealand, and the
To achieve its goals in Oceania, Moscow uses a
double-pronged strategy of encouraging antinuclear
and anti-Western sentiment while promoting itself as
a commercial partner for Pacific nations. Specifically,
Moscow's main objectives are to disrupt and, if
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the Pacific-to provide propaganda support for their
primary objectives
The Soviet military presence in Oceania is limited.
Soviet naval combatants do not operate in the region,
although missile-tracking ships have been sighted-
most recently off the Cook Islands in March 1987.
The Soviets send several oceanographic research
ships a year to the South Pacific; the last such
expedition took place in January 1986. Although
these vessels are civilian, the data gathered have
military applications related to submarine operations
and antisubmarine warfare
The Soviet Navy maintains two sophisticated intelli-
gence collection ships permanently stationed just
outside the 12-mile coastal waters of Kwajalein to
monitor the US missile range there. Long-range
reconnaissance aircraft based in Cam Ranh Bay also
periodically fly over the northern fringe of the region.
The presence of Soviet fishing vessels in the South
Pacific is unlikely to improve significantly Soviet
intelligence-gathering capabilities.
The Soviets do not use any facilities in Oceania for
support of air operations into and out of Antarctica.
Their main airbase for Antarctica is at Maputo,
Mozambique. Some Soviet ships call at Australia
and New Zealand on Antarctic support routes that
also include calls at Singapore; others use Atlantic
Ocean routes. The number of Soviet port calls to
Australia varies from year to year, depending on
Antarctic station staffing and equipment require-
ments.
possible, break up the ANZUS relationship and to
encourage the transformation of the region into a
totally nuclear-free zone. Its efforts are helped consid-
erably by the fact that the USSR is not militarily
involved in the region. As a result, Moscow has been
able to exploit anger directed against French nuclear
testing in the region and concerns about the presence
of US ships. The Soviets manipulate other regional
issues involving the United States-the termination of
the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, fishing
disputes, US opposition to increased Soviet activity in
Although secondary to the denial of a Western mili-
tary presence, Moscow seeks expanded Soviet trade
and economic cooperation in the region as well. The
Soviets would like to increase their exports to Austra-
lia and New Zealand, from which the USSR imports
foodstuffs and wool, to reduce their trade deficits with
those countries. Moscow may also see those countries
as potential sources of high technology. In addition,
the USSR seeks fishing deals with the island states,
particularly those that include shore access for Soviet
ships. Besides reducing fishing fleet costs by permit-
ting crew changes and local repairs, such access would
help establish a Soviet regional presence and could
bring intelligence benefits.
Recent Soviet Activities
Soviet approaches to Oceanic governments are rela-
tively low key, vary from country to country, and are
designed to convince both leaders and citizens that the
Soviet Union is not a military or political threat.
Direct Soviet approaches to local governments focus
on commercial proposals and requests for routine
diplomatic contact. According to US Embassy report-
ing, Soviet delegations to Australia and New Zealand
have stressed noncontroversial issues such as Mos-
cow's interest in enhancing "Asian security," a theme
expressed in General Secretary Gorbachev's Vladivos-
tok speech of 28 July 1986. Soviet delegations to the
island states have emphasized that Moscow is simply
seeking commercial access to the region equal to that
of the West. Soviet propaganda on the South Pacific
discusses Soviet interest in the region in terms sug-
gesting a distant but benevolent spokesman for re-
gional concerns
Australia. Soviet relations with Australia in the early
1980s were strained by the invasion of Afghanistan-
for which Canberra imposed strict economic sanctions
on Moscow that were not lifted until 1983-and by
the KAL shootdown. In 1983 a Soviet first secre-
tary as expelled for cultivating a
Canberra lobbyist who was formerly the national
secretary of the Australian Labor Party. The US
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Figure 1. Some 170,000 Australians march 'n a
antinuclear demonstration, 198
relations.
Embassy also reported that, during a two-day visit in
March 1985, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ka-
pitsa, who appeared inebriated from the outset, was
boorish in his behavior and engaged in shouting
matches with his hosts over US-Australian security
panded commercial relations.
Nevertheless, Soviet-Australian relations have recent-
ly settled on a more or less even keel. Moscow
apparently does not expect a change in Australian
policies in the near future and has chosen to concen-
trate on promoting disarmament initiatives-for ex-
ample, praising Australia's role in formulating the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZI-and ex-
The Soviets have sent a number of delegations to
Australia in the last year, probably to foster the image
of the Soviet Union as a nation involved in Oceanic
affairs, and have solicited visits by Australians. Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Canberra for
three days in March 1987, accompanied by Deputy
Foreign Minister Rogachev and MFA Pacific Depart-
ment Chief Chizhov. Chizhov had already visited
Canberra for five days in September 1986, and an
Australian parliamentary delegation visited the Soviet
Union in June 1986. In each case, the Soviets ap-
pealed to Australian interest in arms control and in
enhancing regional security. Shevardnadze also
stressed the peaceful nature of Soviet interest in the
South Pacific, and, during his trip, Moscow and
Canberra signed an agreement permitting a Soviet
vessel to do fisheries research in Australian waters.
Nevertheless, according to the US Embassy in Can-
berra, the visit achieved relatively little. Furthermore,
according to the US Embassy in Moscow, President
Gromyko's criticism of US bases in Australia and his
inadequate knowledge of the SPNFZ proposal did not
go over well with the Australian parliamentary dele-
gation to Moscow in 1986.
In the commercial area, the Soviets have maintained
imports of grains and wool from Australia and have
tried to expand exports of machinery to Canberra to
correct the USSR's trade deficit-$589 million in 25X1
1985. In June 1986, the Australian Wheat Board
announced that it would purchase 39 Soviet-made
tractors in an effort to facilitate continued Soviet-
Australian trade, but no followup deals have yet been
signed.
New Zealand. Soviet relations with New Zealand also
were cool in the early 1980s. In 1980 the Soviet 25X1
Ambassador to New Zealand was declared persona
non grata for contributing funds to New Zealand's
pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party, and ambassadors
were not exchanged again until three years later. New
Zealand Prime Minister Lange, despite holding to
plans to ban nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered
ships from New Zealand's ports, has emphasized both
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Soviet public relations efforts in Australia suffered a
double blow in February 1987. According to the US
Embassy in Canberra, in late January the Canberra
Times ran several stories probably leaked by the
Soviet Embassy-about supposed Soviet success in
obtaining Australian permission to establish a
"USIS-style" information office. To the Soviets' em-
barrassment, Foreign Minister Hayden subsequently
announced that the office would not be established
until the Soviets acceded to Australian requests for a
new embassy site in Moscow.
The second Soviet blunder was stimulated by an
article in the newspaper The Australian in which
defense writer Peter Young, detailing the growing
Soviet presence in the Pacific, referred to the Soviet
base at Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet Embassy in
Canberra sent a letter to the editor several days later
calling Young's description of Cam Ranh Bay "a
fantastic story" and denying the presence of a Soviet
base there. Young refuted the Soviet claim in an op-
ed piece several days later, citing a range of sources,
including Foreign Minister Hayden, the 1984-85
Australian Defense Report, CINCPAC, and the In-
ternational Institute of Strategic Studies. Young and
other Australian columnists observed that the Soviet
Embassy's easily refutable assertions call into ques-
tion overall Soviet credibility-something that Gor-
bachev has been trying to shore up. The Soviet slip
possibly was motivated by a desire to provide a
figleaffor leftwing groups in Australia attempting to
combat the "myth" of Soviet expansionism in the
Pacific, or by concern for Soviet- Vietnamese rela-
tions. The US Embassy in Canberra noted, however,
that the incident attracted a good deal of publicity
and distracted media attention from the US decision
not to sign the SPNFZ Treaty-an issue that the
Soviets had hoped to exploit.
before and during the ANZUS crisis Wellington's
determination to maintain its Western alignment. In
early 1985 Lange went so far as to call in the Soviet
Ambassador to protest Soviet media coverage of the.
ANZUS crisis. Lange has also on occasion warned
the South Pacific countries considering fishing trea-
ties with Moscow of the dangers of Soviet "meddling"
in the area.
Soviet relations with New Zealand are still at arm's
length, reflecting Lange's sensitivity to any implica-
tion that the ANZUS estrangement has opened the
door to closer Soviet-New Zealand relations, but the
chill of the early 1980s has diminished. Moscow has
shown itself sensitive to New Zealand's aversion to
politicization of routine diplomatic and commercial
relations. When then Deputy Foreign Minister Mik-
hail Kapitsa visited Wellington for three days in
August 1986-the first visit by a high-level Soviet
official since at least 1980-he almost completely
ignored the subject of ANZUS tensions and focused
instead on Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech. A trip to
Moscow by New Zealand Minister of Overseas Trade
Moore was also devoid of political references. In
addition, when Wellington expelled a Soviet diplomat
in April 1987 on unspecified charges of "conduct not
befitting a diplomat," the Soviet Foreign Ministry
avoided trading insults, and, after waiting a week,
retaliated with an expulsion at a much lower level.
While Soviet propaganda on the ANZUS rift did not
link New Zealand and the Soviet Union, Moscow did
not hesitate to support New Zealand's antinuclear
position. Soviet propaganda also played up the theme
of US interference in other countries' domestic affairs
and attempts to dictate to its allies. During Kapitsa's
Wellington visit, according to New Zealand officials,
he raised "almost casually" the possibility of sharing
information on Soviet ship movements as an example
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Figure 2. Members of the
Peace Squadron surround the
USS Queenfish as it enters
the South Pacific would not be appreciated.
of confidence-building measures that could help set
the stage for a Helsinki-like meeting on the Asia-
Pacific region. The New Zealand Government
reacted noncommittally, however, and warned the
Soviets that superpower interference of any kind in
Soviet trade with New Zealand is down sharply from
the early 1980s, mainly because Moscow has been
able to purchase dairy products-New Zealand's
chief exports to the USSR-more cheaply and conve-
niently from Europe, and New Zealand's market for
Soviet goods remains small. Nevertheless, the Soviets
renewed a fishing agreement with New Zealand and
will continue to push their exports to Wellington.
South Pacific Island States. Soviet prospects in the
South Pacific are significantly better than those Mos-
cow faced until recently. Until 1984 the newly inde-
pendent island states were suspicious of Moscow
because of the invasion of Afghanistan, the KAL
shootdown, and the influence of Western govern-
ments. Soviet economic offerings were universally
refused. Only four of the nine island states-Fiji,
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Western Samoa-
had established relations with Moscow by 1984.
Soviet prospects began to improve in 1984 and 1985,
however, as the worsening economic conditions of the
island states forced them to begin to look for new
sources of income. The falling level of Western eco-
nomic aid to the region, combined with bitterness over
what the island states regarded as unlawful fishing in
island waters by US tuna fishers, led Moscow to
attempt to exploit local disenchantment with the
West. In June 1985 the Soviet Union and Kiribati
signed a $1.2 million one-year fishing agreement that
provided access to Kiribati's 200-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ) but not landing rights or access to
coastal waters. In June 1986 Vanuatu established
diplomatic relations with the USSR-the first South
Pacific state to do so since Western Samoa and Papua
New Guinea in 1976. During the summer of 1986,
Fiji also lifted its Afghanistan-inspired ban on Soviet
cruise ships stopping at Suva, primarily for economic
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The foundation for the fisheries disputes between'the
United States and the South Pacific island states was
laid in the 1970s when it became accepted interna-
tional practice for countries to claim 200-mile exclu-
sive economic zones (EEZs) adjacent to their coasts.
The United States, while generally adhering to the
principle of EEZs, refused to recognize the zones'
jurisdiction over highly migratory species offish,
which include the tuna. As a result, disputes arose
over the presence of US tuna boats in the waters of
other, primarily South American, countries, and US
boats were impounded. In 1976 Congress passed the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act, which, in addition to asserting jursidiction over
fishery resources within 200 miles of the US coast,
stated that if a foreign country impounded a US tuna
boat in its EEZ the US Government would (a) pay the
fines and other charges necessary to regain the boat,
and (b) impose an automatic embargo on fishery
products from the country in question.
Although US tuna boats were not frequenting South
Pacific waters when the Magnuson Act was passed,
the depletion of South American waters eventually
led US boats into South Pacific waters in the early
1980s. Papua New Guinea seized a US boat in 1982,
and in 1984 the Solomon Islands seized the US boat
Jeanette Diana. Although an agreement was reached
with Papua New Guinea to avoid an embargo, the
United States embargoed Solomon Islands 'fisheries
products for nearly a year.
On 20 October 1986, after several years of protracted
negotiations, the United States and the 16-member
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) signed
a $60 million agreement giving 35 US tuna boats the
right to fish in certain areas of the FFA member
nations' EEZs for five years. The agreement takes
precedence over the Magnuson Act, which is still in
effect.
reasons. The Soviets have taken advantage of cruise
ship stops in Suva to stage cultural exhibits and to let
Soviet officials tour the region unofficially. Moscow
also offered various forms of economic cooperation to
Fiji, Western Samoa, Papua New Guinea, and Van-
uatu, and sent a two-member delegation from the
Soviet Embassy in Canberra to Fiji in September
1986 for trade talks.
Moscow has suffered a loss of momentum, however, in
its aggressive courtship of the South Pacific states. In
September 1986 the Soviets publicly announced their
intention to cut the fee for any renewal of the fishing
agreement with Kiribati to half the original amount,
citing poor catches but probably motivated by Kiriba-
ti's continued unwillingness to grant access to shore
facilities. The agreement expired 14 October 1986,
and negotiations for renewal were marred by Soviet
intransigence on financial issues and last-minute can-
cellations of meetings. Kiribati stopped renewal nego-
tiations after the United States and the nations of the
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)-which
includes Kiribati and Vanuatu-signed a five-year
fisheries agreement in mid-October. Tonga and
Tuvalu both turned down Soviet proposals for fishing
deals in early 1987, and Kiribati reportedly has
rebuffed a recent Soviet offer to establish diplomatic
relations. Other local states have not responded to
Moscow's often impractical economic offers. As a
result, the Soviets have let drop most of their unsuc-
cessful economic proposals and appear to have post-
poned indefinitely the idea, discussed sporadically
during 1986, of a high-level Soviet visit to the smaller
island states.
Vanuatu remains the Soviet Union's best contact in
the South Pacific, and the state with which Moscow is
the most likely to establish a lasting relationship. In
early December 1986, Vanuatu agreed to allow eight
Soviet ships to fish in its 200-mile exclusive economic
zone and to use three local ports for refueling and
maintenance for a fee of $1.5 million. The draft
agreement reportedly contains an article providing for
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Why Did Moscow Let the Kiribati Deal Drop?
Moscow's South Pacific strategy has a low cost. The
$1.2 million the Soviets reportedly paid Kiribati for
fishing rights in 1985 is a paltry sum for Moscow, but
the fee amounted to nearly 12 percent of the Kiribati
Government's annual budget and was higher than free
market value. By insisting that Kiribati lower its fees,
Moscow eventually led Kiribati-which was asking
for an increase to $1.6 million-to cancel the fisher-
ies agreement renewal negotiations. There are several
possible explanations for Moscow's stingy behavior:
? By threatening to cut their payments, the Soviets
may have hoped to increase the pressure on Kiribati
to accept at least some form of shore access, as well
as to demonstrate to regional states that they are
no-nonsense negotiators. If this were the case, then
Moscow underestimated Kiribati's resistance to the
notion of a Soviet presence ashore and failed to
anticipate the signing of the South Pacific Forum-
US agreement.
? Moscow may have concluded that Kiribati intended
to continue to reject requests for shore access and
decided to cut back its payment as a result. Alter-
natively, the Soviets may have believed that, be-
cause they had portrayed their interest in the
periodic bilateral consultations to examine the pros-
pects for expanding fisheries cooperation. The article
reportedly states that the Soviet Union and Vanuatu
will consult on the possibility of port calls by Soviet
vessels other than those licensed to fish in Vanuatu's
EEZ and on possible crew replacement by Aeroflot
charter flights to and from Vanuatu. According to
press reports, Soviet negotiators have hinted that
Moscow's success in signing an agreement with Van-
uatu may convince Kiribati to come back to the table
this year.
Moscow probably hopes to coax the island states away
from their historically close ties to the West and to
guide them toward nonalignment. Moscow represents
itself as a friend of Third World states that has an
Kiribati deal as being purely economic, they could
not renew the deal at a level that had been shown
to be higher than free market value without harm-
ing their credibility. These possibilities are more
plausible if Moscow judged that its negotiations
with Vanuatu were likely to be successful, in which
case the Soviets would be less concerned about
keeping afoot in the South Pacific door through
Kiribati.
? By holding to a low price with Kiribati, citing
economic reasons, Moscow may also have hoped to
hold down Vanuatu's price for a fishing agreement.
If Moscow had agreed to a $1.6 million deal with
Kiribati, whose waters are not as rich as those of
Vanuatu and which was not prepared to offer shore
access, Vanuatu might have insisted on a much
higher price than the $1.5 million on which it
finally agreed.
Soviet budgetary restrictions or hard currency short-
ages could have contributed to any of the scenarios
listed above.
unthreatening interest in the Pacific, and has sought
to present the USSR as a counterbalance to Austra-
lian and New Zealand-as well as to US-influence
in the region. For example, the Soviet press has
denounced as patronizing Australian, New Zealand,
and US attempts to warn island states away from
deals with Moscow. Soviet propaganda stresses that
the larger states are denying the poorer islanders
economic opportunities with Moscow that the larger
states enjoy, such as fishing deals. The Soviet press
also has alleged CIA involvement in the May 1987
coup in Fiji as proof of US interference in local
affairs.
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The Soviets probably suspect that their highly visible
campaign in the South Pacific spurred Western coun-
termeasures that lessened the attractiveness of Mos-
cow's offers. Moscow believes, for example, that the
United States signed the deal with the FFA to block
future Soviet fishing deals in the region. As a result,
although the Soviets almost certainly will continue to
court the South Pacific states, they are likely to move
more deliberately and may focus their attention on
states they judge to be especially receptive, such as
Vanuatu, rather than make vague offers to a large
number of states.
some Soviet officials believe that if Moscow
can win over the key island states-probably includ-
ing Vanuatu and Fiji-the rest of the Pacific states
will follow.
The Nuclear Issue and Labor Fronts
The Soviets continue to try to nourish antinuclear
sentiment in Oceania through contact with local
leftists and antinuclear seminars sponsored by Soviet
front groups. In Australia and New Zealand, Moscow
works primarily through indigenous Communist
groups. While total membership is small, the Commu-
nists enjoy influence in local trade unions and, with
Moscow's assistance, have been active in promoting
causes that parallel the Soviet line. The Soviets have
longstanding contacts with a small number of well-
placed and organized political radicals who can sub-
stantially affect labor's position on antinuclear issues.
The Soviets get these Communist contacts to arrange
for other Australian and New Zealand socialists to
travel to the USSR. In New Zealand, Moscow has
been especially successful in using this technique to
cultivate high-level members of the Federation of
Labor (FOL), the country's most important trade
union.
Moscow also works through the Communists to pro-
mote the activities of its front groups such as the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the
World Peace Council, which in October 1985 spon-
sored the International Peace Conference for the
Pacific and Asia Region in Sydney. Such forums
allow Moscow to promote antinuclear and anti-
American political initiatives
In the island states, the Soviets work through the
Asian Oceanic Trade Union Coordination Committee
(AOTUCC), the WFTU regional affiliate, to influ-
ence the local trade unions. They are also providing
support to Australian and New Zealand activists
seeking to radicalize the South Pacific trade union
movement. For example, AOTUCC reportedly has
funded the WFTU affiliate in the Solomon Islands
and the Fiji Labor Party. To date, however, local
trade union bodies remain suspicious of Soviet inten-
tions, and the pro-Moscow initiatives among unions in
the Pacific Islands have met with only limited success.
The Soviets probably believe that radical Australian
and New Zealand unionists in the Pacific Trade
Union Forum (PTUF) offer more promise for Mos-
cow's efforts to mobilize antinuclear and anti-
American sentiments in the South Pacific. The PTUF
was established in 1980 under the auspices of Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and Fiji with the proclaimed
purpose of ridding the Pacific of nuclear arms and
terminating military agreements between nuclear
powers and Pacific nations. Soviet and WFTU observ-
ers at PTUF conferences-the most recent was held
in Auckland in May 1986-have not appeared very
influential, according to the US Embassy in Canber-
ra. Nevertheless, the PTUF has adopted an increas-
ingly anti-American and antinuclear posture-serving
Moscow's foreign policy objectives. The PTUF also
played a behind-the-scenes role in the establishment
of the Fiji Labor Party, which, although it is not
explicitly pro-Soviet, has had some successes in chal-
lenging existing political lines in Fiji.
Prospects for Future Soviet Activity in Oceania
Promotion of Commercial Activity. We believe that
the Soviets will continue to pursue commercial rela-
tions with the South Pacific states, using attractive
initial deals to establish ties. Moscow will continue to
take advantage of any frictions between the United
States and island nations to try to convince local
states to enter into additional fishing agreements with
the USSR. The Soviets will also continue to make
proposals that would afford them some shore access,
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The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
(Rarotonga Treaty)
The notion of an SPNFZ sprang from indigenous
antinuclear sentiment among the Oceanic countries in
the early 1980s. In August 1985 the 13-member
South Pacific Forum approved a draft of the treaty,
which became effective on 8 December 1986 after
eight local states ratified it. The treaty prohibits the
acquisition, stationing, and testing of nuclear weap-
ons in the South Pacific. However, the treaty guaran-
tees unimpeded transit of nuclear powered and
nuclear-armed ships on the high seas and allows
individual countries to decide on the question of port
access.
Australian Prime Minister Hawke was instrumental
in formulating the draft treaty to preempt more
radical elements from barring nuclear-armed or
nuclear powered ships from all ports in the zone. The
New Zealand Government, against the wishes of
domestic radical antinuclear groups, joined Australia
in promoting the present form of the treaty. Several
of the smaller island nations fear that the treaty may
restrict US and ANZUS activity in the region. Van-
uatu and the Solomon Islands, on the other hand,
believe that the treaty does not limit nuclear activity
strictly enough.
The nuclear powers have been asked to accede to
three protocols that prohibit manufacturing, station-
ing, testing, and using nuclear weapons in the zone.
Any signatory has the right to withdraw with advance
notice. The Soviet Union signed the relevant protocols
on 15 December 1986.
such as shipping fish caught on Soviet boats in the
region to local canning factories. Moscow undoubted-
ly also will continue to push Soviet exports to Can-
berra and Wellington, while maintaining grain and
wool imports from those countries.
Fostering Antinuclear Sentiment. The Soviets will
continue to seek out contact with antinuclear groups
in Oceania and probably will devote special attention
Figure 3. A crowd in French Polynesia protests
France's nuclear test program being conducted
to building their ties to South Pacific island antinucle-
ar labor activists. Soviet propaganda will continue to
stress Moscow's interest in nuclear-free zones, both in
the Pacific and elsewhere.
Moscow has repeatedly provided both diplomatic and
media support for the South Pacific Nuclear-Free 25X1
Zone since its inception and was the first nuclear
power to sign the protocols to the SPNFZ Treaty, also
known as the Rarotonga Treaty. In announcing their
decision to sign the protocols, the Soviets stated:
The Soviet Union reaffirms its stand that the
permission of transit of nuclear weapons ...
and the calls at the ports and airfields within
the limits of the Nuclear-Free Zone of foreign
war ships and flying vehicles with nuclear-ex-
plosive devices on board would be in conflict
with the aims of the treaty and incompatible
with the nuclear-free status of the Zone.
With this statement, the Soviets have left open the 25X1
option of backing out of the treaty if US nuclear-
armed ships continue to make port calls in the region.
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the treaty and to use it as a propaganda issue.
Moscow undoubtedly will attack Washington's rejec-
tion of the treaty as a lack of commitment to arms
control and will try to use the issue to disrupt US
relations with local states. Moscow will attempt to fan
local suspicions of US nuclear activity in the South
Pacific and may suggest that US indecisiveness im-
plies lack of concern for regional sensitivities. The
Soviets are likely to encourage Pacific governments to
take a highly restrictive stance on port calls in an
effort to restrict US military operations in the South
Pacific.
Maneuvering Over Micronesia and New Caledonia.
The Soviet Union is opposed to the proposed termina-
tion of the UN Trusteeship over Micronesia and to
the free association of islands within the Trusteeship
with the United States, and it has hinted in private
and in the press at a Soviet UN Security Council veto
of a termination vote. Soviet opposition is rooted in
Moscow's fear that the United States will establish
military bases on the islands, which are considered to
be good alternate sites for the US Philippine bases
and which are not covered by the SPNFZ. Moscow
apparently expected support for its position from the
island states, especially from Vanuatu, but so far this
development of Cam Ranh Bay, and about the in-
crease of Soviet activity in the South Pacific island
states. While not necessarily viewing Soviet activity in
the island states as a threat to Australian security, the
Australian Government is concerned that an in-
creased Soviet presence may lead to the erosion of
Australian influence in the region.
In our judgment, New Zealand's antinuclear policies
do not imply a tolerance of Soviet involvement in the
South Pacific:
? New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange is anxious to
avoid being seen as moving closer to Moscow in the
wake of the ANZUS dispute. He has rejected Soviet
efforts to increase bilateral ties, including Moscow's
requests for Aeroflot landing rights, expanded fish-
ing agreements, and a drydock for Soviet ships. He
reportedly was not pleased that the New Zealand
Labor Party President and General Secretary were
going to visit Moscow for nine days in January
1987, and agreed to sign a letter of introduction to
Gorbachev only after he had, according to US
Embassy reporting, "made a few points" in the body
of the letter. Lange implied that his comments in
the letter would ensure that the New Zealanders
would not get to meet with Gorbachev, which
indeed they did not.
has not materialized.
The separatist movement in New Caledonia received
limited propaganda support from Moscow in 1984
and 1985. In the last year, however, the Soviet press
has reported primarily in a factual manner on events
in New Caledonia, probably because of concern for
Soviet-French relations. Nevertheless, the Soviets vot-
ed in favor of a December 1986 UN resolution adding
New Caledonia to the list of non-self-governing terri-
tories and provided propaganda support for the resolu-
tion.
Probable Regional Responses to Soviet Initiatives
The Australian Government will almost certainly
resist any Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between
Canberra and Washington. The Australian military
are concerned about
growing Soviet military power in Asia, especially the
? According to the US Embassy in Wellington, Lange
was angered when the Soviets attached reservations
to their signing of two SPNFZ protocols. He also
interpreted the Soviets' early signing of the proto-
cols as a propaganda effort.
? Wellington has also been reluctant to address a
trade imbalance with the Soviets running 34 to 1 in
New Zealand's favor.
Despite the Western orientation of Canberra and
Wellington, we believe that the Soviets hope to exploit
some strains in US relations with Australia and New
Zealand to attempt to drive those countries away
from Washington. Indigenous antialliance sentiments,
not necessarily Soviet influenced, may also be spread-
ing in Australia. If the Australian Government is
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Soviet Opposition to Termination
of TTPI Trusteeship
The Soviet Union is stepping up its efforts to block
the termination of the UN Trusteeship over the
Micronesian islands grouped in the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). In his speech to the UN
General Assembly on 23 September 1986, Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze drew comparisons
between US administration of the TTPI and South
Africa's illegal administration of Namibia by urging
the United Nations to "exercise all its rights" to
determine the fate of both regions. The US Embassy
in Bangkok reports that the head of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry Southeast Asia Division, Anatoliy
Zaytsev, told Thai Government officials that Moscow
will try to take the TTPI issue to the UN General
Assembly.
Moscow's opposition to the termination of the UN
Trusteeship stems from its fear of new US military
bases in the Pacific. The Northern Mariana Islands
have voted to become a commonwealth of the United
States after termination of the Trusteeship; the other
islands of the TTPI are seekingfree-association
compacts with the United States. All of these rela-
tions would give the United States basing rights on
the islands for the duration of the compacts. In
particular, Palau is thought to be a possible alterna-
tive site for a US base if the United States ever were
ejected from the Clark and Subic bases in the
Philippines. Micronesia is not in the area covered by
the SPNFZ Treaty.
The Soviets know that TTPI matters can be handled
only by the UN Security Council. Moscow initially
had hinted that it would veto a Security Council vote
to end the UN Trusteeship. The Soviets probably
suspect, however, that the United States will try to
get around a Soviet veto simply by informing the
Security Council of the termination of the Trustee-
ship rather than by a vote. By bringing the issue up to
the General Assembly, Moscow probably hopes to
drum up support from its allies to try to influence the
Security Council to support a Soviet motion con-
demning the US action. Although such a vote proba-
bly would fail to block termination-the United
States could veto the motion-the Soviets could hope
to at least gain propaganda points by accusing the
United States of disregarding international opinion.
forced to accommodate these sentiments in the years
ahead, the United States might lose access to the US-
Australian joint defense facilities. Such a loss, while
not necessarily Soviet induced, nonetheless would
serve perfectly Moscow's purpose in the region
A number of factors militate against greatly increased
Soviet involvement in the South Pacific island states,
including:
? The pro-Western orientation of most of the island
states. Only Vanuatu is formally nonaligned.
? The preponderance of Western and Japanese aid in
the region.
? The strong Christian faith of many Pacific island-
ers. The Soviet Union often is perceived locally as
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antireligious.
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? Clumsy Soviet tactics in the region.
Kiribati was angered by
Soviet tactics in the negotiations for the renewal of
the fishing agreement and by the rudeness of the
Soviet representatives. In addition, island states are
unlikely to be attracted by Soviet propaganda that
discusses the region only in terms of superpower
conflict.
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? Fresh US interest in the region. The signing of a
fishing treaty between the United States and the
South Pacific Forum has done much to defuse anti-
Nevertheless, local states will continue to be interest-
ed in Soviet commercial overtures:
? The island states are desperately short of cash. In
addition, commercial deals such as Soviet fishing
agreements are seen in the islands as being prefera-
ble to aid handouts. Kiribati's President Tabai is
willing to renew the fishing deal with the Soviets if
they will match their previous fee, and several
Cabinet members in Papua New Guinea favor
negotiating a fishing pact with Moscow.
The ANZUS split has added to these factors:
? The breakdown of ANZUS, an alliance previously
considered by Pacific states to be indestructible,
raises questions in the island states about the
strength of US and Australian commitment to
defense of the South Pacific.
? The US reaction to New Zealand's antinuclear
policies and Washington's refusal to sign the
SPNFZ Treaty have angered many island leaders
and add to the perception that the United States is
indifferent to regional concerns. Most of the South
Pacific Forum states are eager for the United States
to sign the SPNFZ Treaty.
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? The island states may believe that by increasing
contact with Moscow they can play the "Soviet
card" against the West. Islanders may believe that
they can scare the Western states into "paying
attention" to the region by holding out the specter of
increased Soviet access to the South Pacific.
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