THE USSR CONFRONTS THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00296R000200230004-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The USSR Confronts the
Information Revolution
SOV 87-10029
May 1987
Copy 9 31
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Intelligence
A AL J
The USSR Confronts the
Information Revolution
Proceedings of a conference held at Airlie House,
Virginia, 12-13 November 1986.
SOV 87-10029
May 1987
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On 12-13 November 1986 a conference, convened under the auspices of the
Director of Central Intelligence, analyzed the implications of the informa-
tion revolution for the Soviet Union. The conference brought together
distinguished experts from the academic, business, and public policy
communities:
Ivan Selin (conference chairman) Chairman, American Management
Systems
Norman Augustine
President and Chief Operations
Officer, Martin-Marietta
Corporation
Carter Bales Director, McKinsey & Company
Michael Brunner
Leo Cherne
Diana Lady Dougan
Executive Vice President, AT&T
Federal Systems
Vice Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Ambassador, Coordinator, Interna-
tional Communication and Infor-
mation Policy US Department of
State
Robert J. Eckenrode Executive Vice President, Nynex
Corporation
Seymour Goodman
Professor, College of Business and
Public Administration, University
of Arizona
Jan Herring Former National Intelligence Offi-
cer for Science and Technology
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Professor, Department of Political
Science, State University of New
York at Albany
Ambassador, Former Special Assis-
tant and Senior Director for Euro-
pean and Soviet Affairs, National
Security Council
SOV 87-10029
May 1987
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This paper, prepared by staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, docu-
ments the findings of that conference. It represents only the views of the
above participants, except where noted in the text. It does not necessarily
represent the views of the participants' affiliated organizations, the Central
Intelligence Agency, or any other US Government agency.
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Technology Ingredients
1
Where Are the Soviets Starting From?
8
Technologies
8
How Fast Will the Soviets Progress in the Information Revolution?
10
The Economy and the Military
12
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The USSR Confronts the
Information Revolution
Summary Western economic, military, and social development is being increasingly
influenced by the advance and application of information technologies.
Microelectronics, computers, telecommunications, and software are sup-
porting explosive growth in the availability of information in all aspects of
Western life. Rapidly expanding applications of information technologies
are supporting fundamental change in Western economies and societies,
affecting relationships among individuals, interest groups, institutions, and
countries.
Judging from their writings and statements, Soviet officials view Western
developments with a mixture of concern and admiration. They recognize
the growing contribution of information technologies to Western industrial
and military might and the difficulty of playing catchup in such a rapidly
accelerating technology base. They also recognize the potential for infor-
mation technologies to undermine state control, both through greater
penetration by Western "propaganda" and through the growing ability of
Soviet citizens to independently obtain, analyze, and disseminate informa-
tion. At the same time, they admire Western innovation and dynamism,
which they use as a standard to evaluate (and rebuke) their own govern-
ment and industry.
After a period of drift and lethargy in the 1970s, the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev has embraced information technologies as critical ingredients in
efforts to maintain Soviet international competitiveness. Soviet officials
expect information technologies to:
? Provide an important impetus to restructuring the economy and support-
ing sustained high growth through the 1990s. They expect substantial
productivity dividends from rapid growth in the application of computers,
instrumentation equipment, robots, and advanced machine tools and will
concentrate these applications on modernizing the industrial base.
? Support development of considerably more capable weapon systems and
their manufacture in more efficient factories. Advances in sensor, signal
processing, and battle management technologies are increasingly deter-
mining weapon effectiveness.
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? Contribute to an improvement in the quality of life and the development
of at least elements of a Western "information culture." The Soviets are
initiating a massive computer literacy program but expect to move very
slowly into the realm of consumer electronics. They express confidence
that they can increase information technology applications without
fostering significant social or cultural change, or suffering loss of state
control.
The Soviets have a lot of ground to make up to attain their goal of equaling
Western technical, economic, and military strength by the year 2000:
? Western experts generally hold that Soviet information technologies lag
those of the West by five to 10 years or more. The Soviets have done bet-
ter in major hardware development than in the development of support
technology like computer peripherals and software. In information
technologies they have depended to a particularly great degree on
Western advances.
? The Soviets lag the West to an even greater degree in applying
information technology. They have achieved considerable success in
certain military applications but have established only islands of automa-
tion in industry and have made inroads into the home only in the form of
state-sanctioned entertainment media.
Conferees believe that the major roadblock to Soviet progress is the
failure to establish an economic system that effectively rewards develop-
ment and application of information technologies. An information revolu-
tion cannot be imposed from the top. Soviet progress will depend in part on
the extent to which the Soviets create a hospitable environment, which
risks at least some loss of central control. Conferees concluded that-
despite signs of "openness"-the Soviet Union will not move from a party-
dominated command system to a more pluralistic system. They predicted
that:
? The Soviets in 1995 probably will remain five to 10 years behind the
West in information technologies, doing relatively better in areas that
lend themselves to a "national program" approach (for example, telecom-
munications) and relatively worse in areas that do not (for example,
software).
? The Soviets will preferentially apply information technologies in the
military, government, science, industry, and, as a means to an end,
education. Applications in economic planning, battle management, and
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internal security will support the maintenance of centralized control.
Industrial applications-mainly computer-aided design and computer-
aided manufacturing-will aim at improved quality and (especially) effi-
ciency. Entertainment applications will spread, but personal computers are
likely to make few inroads into the home through at least the early 1990s.
Conferees judged that even those modest objectives would be jeopardized if
the Soviets chose to substantially reduce their historically high dependence
on Western information technology. Continuing resort to Western technol-
ogy might afford some Western leverage over Soviet development, but, in
the light of diminishing US technical advantages, only if Western allies
acted in concert.
Conferees agreed that the new, more pragmatic Soviet leadership will be
more effective than its predecessors in making information technology
work for productivity growth and military advancement. At the same time,
materially closing the gap with the rapidly advancing Western target
would require substantial change in the Soviet system to make it more
hospitable to innovation and growth. Conferees judged that such change
was unlikely, even to the degree achieved in the mid-1980s in China. Thus,
they expect steady if unspectacular Soviet development, with little change
in the governing political and social institutions:
? Most doubt that Gorbachev will transform the Soviet Union into an
engine of economic development, achieving his goal of 5-percent annual
growth in the 1990s. There is at least as much skepticism that Soviet
technology and products will become competitive with the best Western
alternatives. If they do not, the USSR will continue to have an export
profile like that of a Third World country-selling mainly raw materials.
? Western programs to develop "smart" conventional weapons, advanced
reconnaissance and battle management systems, and systems associated
with the Strategic Defense Initiative may place the Soviets at a severe
disadvantage if they do not keep pace with the West.
To make matters worse for the Soviets, information technologies (like high-
density integrated circuits) are difficult to reverse engineer; thus, the
traditional Soviet answer to their shortcomings-a crash program to
acquire and copy-is of limited value.
On the political and social front, many Western analysts expect that there
will be a gradual moderation of party-state control of information technol-
ogies-partly intended, and partly unintended:
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? Over the next five years, modest challenges to control could emerge from
direct Western broadcasts, the growing availability of consumer enter-
tainment media (especially videocassette recorders), and increasing access
to telecommunications.
? In the 1990s the Soviet "computer culture" may take hold in earnest,
when millions of Soviets will be computer literate and domestic produc-
tion should support widespread industrial applications and the beginnings
of widespread private ownership. Security authorities then would con-
front greater problems in monitoring telecommunications use and access
to data bases and efficient, high-speed production reporting systems.
Soviet economic authorities will see their chronic battle against data
falsification move to the information technology frontier and will be hard
pressed to avoid at least isolated instances of computer crime and even
sabotage.
Conferees nevertheless judged that such potential threats to state control
could be contained, albeit not without forfeiting some of the potential
benefits offered by unfettered information technologies.
The conferees concluded that by the mid-1990s at the very latest the
shortcomings of the strategy to close the information technology gap with
the West may force the Soviet leadership to reevaluate its approach.
Tension may increase between advocates of greater economic decentraliza-
tion and advocates of tight political control. Although there is room for
compromise and innovative management, conferees concluded that Soviet
leaders will place a premium on maintaining political control, which raises
the prospect of continuing and possibly intensifying economic and technical
shortfalls.
If this happens, the United States may confront a Soviet Union in the
1990s even further from its goal of achieving equality with the most
advanced Western countries in terms of economic and technical develop-
ment and citizens' welfare. The Soviet Union may be forced to rely to an
even greater degree on military power to maintain its influence in the
world. Conferees did not address the consequences of dealing with a "sick
bear" but noted that Soviet progress in the "information revolution" will
significantly influence the severity of the bear's illness.
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The USSR Confronts the
Information Revolution
Advances in computing and communications promise
to transform global society in the 21st century. The
massive, sustained increase in the capability to access,
process, analyze, and transmit large amounts of data
has emerged as a major force in technological innova-
tion and a key determinant of national economic
health. Information technologies have remolded exist-
ing industries and created entirely new ones. Cheap
yet powerful computers have dramatically expanded
information available to the ordinary citizen and
simultaneously placed his privacy at risk. Military
programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative call for
successful integration of computing and communica-
tions activities of unprecedented scope and
complexity.
This paper draws together published research and
conference findings to assess the promise and chal-
lenge of information technologies in the Soviet Union.
It begins with a brief overview of the so-called
information revolution in the West and summarizes
Soviet reaction to it. It then analyzes where the
Soviets are today and enumerates their published
goals for the future. Finally,-it assesses likely Soviet
progress and the potential consequences of this pro-
gress for Soviet economic development and political
control.
industry and broader information society has been
change.' Moreover, despite occasional fitful progress,
false starts, and dashed expectations, the advance of
the information industry is contributing to fundamen-
tal structural change in Western economies and soci-
eties. Such change is affecting relationships among
individuals, interest groups, institutions, and countries
and threatens to do the same for the Soviet Union.
Most experts hold that Western progress has depend-
ed in large part on a hospitable economic and social
system that provides both support and incentive.
Fierce competition-domestic and international-
drives progress. Effective government generally has
(1) provided "seed" money to support fledgling indus-
tries, either through acquisition policies (such as those
for defense) or outright grants; (2) eliminated barriers,
as in the US deregulation of the telecommunications
industry; and (3) stayed out of the way by exercising
relatively little control of information dissemination
or social change. Development of the technologies,
support infrastructure (such as education and
finance), and applications has been generally balanced
and mutually reinforcing. This has supported the very
rapid spread of applications and the development of a
nearly universal user community.2
Technology Ingredients
The information revolution is dependent on a handful
of interrelated technologies.
Advanced Western countries are experiencing explo-
sive growth in the amount and availability of informa-
tion, a phenomenon supported by rapidly expanding
applications of computing and communications sys-
tems. A variety of public, corporate, and academic
institutions have contributed to the rapid development
of what has been termed the information society. By
measures of product development, cost trends, and
applications, the key attribute of the information
Microelectronics. Advances in semiconductor manu-
facturing have increased exponentially the density
and performance of integrated circuits (ICs) -the
basic ingredient of all modern computer and commu-
nications hardware. Some IC prices have remained
stable, but mass production of inexpensive, general
purpose ICs has resulted in the proliferation of micro-
electronics-based computing and communications by
the military, industry, and the public. Continuing
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advances in manufacturing methods ensure that this
trend will continue. Globally, electronics is reportedly
a $300 billion a year business that is expected to triple
by the year 2000.'
Computers. Although advances in the power, speed,
and efficiency of large mainframe computers were
fairly predictable, the surge in the use of minicomput-
ers and personal computers (PCs) was largely unfore-
seen. In 1985 US business bought 2,000 mainframes
for $6.9 billion, while 84,000 minicomputers were sold
for $9.5 billion. Sales of minicomputers are expected
to grow at an annual rate of 8 to 9 percent for the bal-
ance of the decade, while sales of mainframes are
projected to grow at 2 percent. PC sales in 1985 stood
at $3 billion worldwide and are expected to grow 20
percent in 1987.? A modestly priced PC typically used
in an office today often outperforms the large, costly
mainframe computers used as recently as a decade
ago.
Telecommunications. The advent of digital transmis-
sion and switching systems has substantially reduced
the cost of voice communications and has permitted
new services, such as teleconferencing and facsimile
transmission. Advances have also supported high-rate
data communication services, linking computers and
data bases in commerce, government, and industry. In
1983 sales of communications equipment-such as
communications satellites, cable television, cellular
radios, video data systems, and local area networks-
totaled almost $60 billion worldwide and were expect-
ed to climb to $90 billion by 1988. In 1983 one large
telecommunications network was linked to 100,000
computer terminals and required 4,000 minicomput-
ers and 300 mainframe computers to operate.'
Software. Perhaps the most rapidly growing and
changing component in the information industry is the
software that generates the myriad instructions that
operate, link, and apply computers and telecommuni-
cations hardware. Global sales of software totaled $26
billion in 1985 and were growing at an annual rate of
more than 17 percent. In the United States alone, PC
software sales have doubled annually since 1980 and
now account for one-third of total software sales of
$18 billion. By 1990 business is projected to spend
more on computer software than on hardware.6
Software increasingly determines the function and
performance of digital systems, enables hardware to
be ever more generally applied, and serves as the
nervous system of national and local telecommunica-
tions and information networks. Development of soft-
ware for artificial intelligence will strongly influence
progress in meeting major US information-processing
challenges-such as SDI battle management and the
fifth-generation computer.'
Applications
Intensifying global technological and economic com-
petition makes the effective exploitation of these
information technologies a key factor in military and
economic survival. Most modern weapon, command
and control, and logistic systems, for example, depend
on these technologies.
Information technologies already pervade Western
science, industry, and society, aiding analysis and
decisionmaking, managing industrial operations, and
providing convenience and entertainment for the con-
sumer. Scientists use large, high-performance main-
frame computers to access and analyze enormous
streams of data, while engineers routinely use mini-
computers to grapple with more modest problems and
employ PC networks to share information. Desktop
terminals and PCs provide executives and white-collar
workers in government and industry with a rapidly
growing capability to access and analyze statistical,
financial, and operational data. Advanced telecom-
munications links within and between organizations
support high-speed information networks used to ac-
cess or share information, thereby enhancing a com-
pany's productivity and competitive position!
In industry, information technologies have moved
onto the plant floor. In the United States, purchases
of factory automation systems doubled between 1980
and 1985-to $18.1 billion-and are expected to
double again by 1990.' Minicomputers and microcom-
puters routinely control manufacturing processes, ma-
chine tools, and robots. Flexible manufacturing sys-
tems link machine tools and programmable robots
under the supervision of a computer to further auto-
mate manufacturing processes. Local area networks
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integrate production scheduling, procurement, and
material handling. Computer-aided design terminals
with complex and often specialized software packages
create in hours designs that would require months to
complete manually. Many larger manufacturers are
developing computer-integrated manufacturing ap-
proaches that will eventually integrate many of these
functions into a fully automated factory.'?
Information technologies have rapidly expanded the
variety and quality of services available to private
citizens. "Smart" appliances, pocket calculators,
automatic teller machines, and laser scans at stores
and supermarkets save time. Cable television and
videocassettes provide high-quality entertainment and
in some areas even make it possible to shop in the
home. PCs and telephone modems that can be linked
to remote data bases or to local and national networks
enable professionals to work at home, help students
with their homework, allow hobbyists to readily share
information, and host video games. The application of
information technologies in medicine created more
precise, nonintrusive diagnostic tools to monitor indi-
vidual health, linked service paramedics to diagnostic
equipment at hospitals, and allowed for the implanta-
tion of pacemakers with built-in microchips. Fire and
police departments increasingly control their vehicles
with the aid of computer networks, and local govern-
ments use office automation to speed customer
services.
Impact
The impact of advancing information technologies on
US economic productivity, growth, and international
competitiveness is debatable. Some analysts argue
that productivity for white-collar workers-three-
fourths of the US labor force-is no greater than it
was in the 1960s. They hypothesize that managers
and workers either have not yet learned how to use
computers properly (if at all), or that the burden of
meeting more intrusive government demands for tax,
fiscal, and labor relations reporting has overwhelmed
productivity gains. Other assessments point to the
advantages major airlines and financial service firms
have gained over domestic and foreign competitors by
raising productivity through office automation. There
is a consensus that the introduction of information
technologies has streamlined US manufacturing oper-
ations, renewing growth even in mature industries like
those for automobiles and aircraft.
Nevertheless, manufacturing productivity gains in
Japan-even in critical elements of the electronics
industry-have outstripped growth in the United
States, inducing fears that America is losing the high-
tech race." For example, in the early 1970s US firms
totally dominated the market for integrated circuits.
Today, these firms account for 39 percent of the value
of sales by non-Communist countries, while Japan
accounts for 42 percent and its share is increasing
rapidly. The high cost of developing new technologies
has forced many US companies out of the market,
whereas Japanese companies generally have ready
access to substantial financial resources.
Information technologies are increasingly important
in weapons development and production. Superiority
in "smart" munitions, avionics, missile guidance, fire
control, and surveillance and command and control
systems-rooted in advances in microelectronics, mi-
crocomputers, and software-is widely viewed as
America's primary military advantage. Information
technologies offer tremendous improvements in locat-
ing and hitting targets and are consuming ever-
increasing portions of development costs. Computers
and software accounted for less than 2 percent of
development costs for the F-4 Phantom, the mainstay
of the US fighter inventory during the 1960s and
early 1970s. The corresponding percentage for the
F- 15 was over 26 percent, and that for the F- 18 was
greater than 40 percent. In 1985 the Department of
Defense spent $194 million for the very-high-speed
integrated circuit (VHSIC) project, with the goal of
achieving a hundredfold increase in the density and
performance of silicon-based ICs by 1990. The Penta-
gon reportedly has plans to use the first generation of
VHSIC chips in 37 major weapon systems by 1992.
Military software demands will also be fueled by the
250,000 computers estimated to be in military opera-
tion by 1990.12
Computer and communications security is a vital
concern throughout government, business, and indus-
try, given the danger of espionage and sabotage. A
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recent survey of more than 17,000 computers used in
the Department of Defense concluded that one-half
required better access control. Disaffected engineers
or programers could insert a few lines of code among
the millions of lines of operating code a large comput-
er may use and severely disrupt the machine func-
tions. Hackers-often teenagers-share information
on techniques for illegally accessing computers on
some of the roughly 1,000 computer bulletin boards
operated in this country. The question of how to
proceed against hackers has raised unprecedented
issues in jurisprudence.
The information revolution is also placing, at least
potentially, the privacy of the individual at risk. Some
estimate that the individual is referenced on average
in roughly 40 local and Federal Government agency
files and in about the same number of private-sector
files. The Internal Revenue Service is obligated to
pass its records to 38 different government offices. A
1984 Gallup Poll revealed that two-thirds of the US
population believed that they had lost or are likely to
lose some privacy. A 1983 Harris Poll revealed that
86 percent of the citizenry felt it was possible for the
government to use available information to persecute
its "enemies .1113
Although there appears to be general agreement that
the information revolution is likely to bring about
sizable changes in the world's economies, the ques-
tions of how much, how soon, and in what direction
are hotly debated. Some analysts make the point that
it is difficult to forecast the effects of these new
technologies because their application will be heavily
determined by economic, political, and demographic
conditions. In any event, the importance of product
"intellectual content" is likely to increase the domi-
nance of the services sector in national economies.
Dislocations of workers in aging smokestack indus-
tries, the semiskilled, and-increasingly-white-col-
lar workers may be a substantial force as well.
How Do the Soviets View the Western
Information Revolution?
The Soviets closely follow developments in Western
information technologies and applications. As in
many other aspects of the East-West competition, two
themes frequently arise in their statements and writ-
ings: concern over the potential threat and a carefully
crafted balance of admiration and criticism as they
move to emulate Western progress. Although differ-
ent factions in the Soviet establishment may place
varying emphasis on each theme, nearly all spokes-
men toe the official line: Western development must
and can be matched, borrowing positive aspects and
sidestepping the negatives. Soviet officials, however,
are at odds over where applications will provide the
greatest benefit.
Concern
Soviet leaders-especially Gorbachev-have ac-
knowledged the danger of lagging the West in the
development and application of information technol-
ogies. They have criticized the lethargy of the 1970s,
implying that the Brezhnev leadership failed to act on
the promise of information technologies and to appre-
ciate the pace and consequences of Western advances.
They have specifically criticized overreliance on copy-
ing Western advances. Officials have noted the diffi-
culty of reverse engineering, as well as the accelerat-
ing Western progress in many of the key technologies.
They express concern over the prospect of a perma-
nent and possibly increasing lag.
The economic consequences are frequently highlight-
ed. Soviet leaders and officials talk about achieving
international competitiveness in manufacturing, both
in the high-technology products themselves and in the
many product groups-like vehicles and machine
tools-where applications of information technologies
greatly affect cost and quality. Other officials-
frequently scientists-talk about the importance of
maintaining prestige as a first-rate technical power.
More broadly, Soviet officials cite the contribution of
information technologies to productivity growth and
economic development in all advanced industrial
countries. Noting that productivity increases must
fuel virtually all Soviet growth for the remainder of
the century, they have argued that the mastering of
information technologies is essential in their efforts to
match Western industrial might, international influ-
ence, and consumption levels. They believe economic
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competition between the two systems is more notice-
ably moving into the scientific and technical sphere
and will be decided precisely in that sphere. They also
acknowledge the "bandwagon" effect in the West-
the tendency of advances in information technology to
rapidly promote further advance-as a way of high-
lighting the danger of playing catchup.
Military concerns also surface. Generally, Soviet mili-
tary and political leaders have acknowledged the role
of a strong economy in supporting military power.
More specifically, Soviet military leaders have cited
the contribution of information technologies to ad-
vancing Western weapon capabilities-most recently
in smart conventional weapons and SDI. Western
improvements in command and control technol-
ogies-never a Soviet strength-are causing consider-
able concern. The Soviets note that progress in infor-
mation technologies is essential to emulate and, in
many cases, also to counter.14
The Soviets also voice concern over the effects of
Western information technology applications on the
Soviet populace. Western broadcasts convey Western
viewpoints and values and, accordingly, have been
jammed for many years. The Soviets recognize that
the advent of direct-broadcast satellites will make
Western propaganda more readily available to the
Soviet citizen. Although Soviet officials do not openly
admit it, their efforts to tightly control means of
information production and distribution-like copying
machines-indicate fear over the consequences of
Western computer, telecommunications, and video
technologies falling unrestrictedly into the hands of
the Soviet consumer.
Admiration and Criticism
Active Soviet proponents of information technologies
and applications, probably encouraged by Gorba-
chev's admonition to confront and acknowledge short-
comings, speak and write favorably about Western
accomplishments. They are impressed by Western
dynamism, particularly in rapid industrial assimila-
tion and mass production, and admit that they were
caught by surprise. The Soviets cite Western cost
advantages-comparing, for example, Western com-
puters costing in the hundreds of dollars with the
Soviet-designed 8-bit Agat, costing up to 3,000 rubles.
They have praised Western innovators like Stephen
Wozniak, the cofounder of Apple Computers. And
some have even acknowledged that Soviet systems like
the Agat are modeled after Western systems and
basically use Western-developed components.
Open criticism seems to come from two quarters.
Some officials with a vested interest criticize aspects
of Western development-like decentralized comput-
ing-that are incompatible with Soviet approaches.
Other writers in the popular press frequently use
Western experience with information technologies to
criticize the capitalist system. Information technol-
ogies are variously accused of causing bankruptcy,
unemployment, alienation, and invasion of privacy
and of supporting Western militarism and espionage."
Soviet officials reassure their people that socialism
can reap the benefits and avoid the pain: "We, of
course, do not have these problems and cannot have
them." In a variation of the same theme, Gorbachev
stated that "we can and must cope with acknowledged
problems."
Conferees concluded that the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev is determined to confront and respond to
the Western information revolution. Soviet leaders
believe that information technologies can radically
alter industrial competitiveness and the military bal-
ance. They particularly fear the West's growing abili-
ty to increase military effectiveness by stressing quali-
ty and management of weapon systems rather than
quantity. They seem ambivalent about a strategy of
copying Western advances. They recognize the advan-
tage of a quick fix to Soviet industrial productivity
and military capability, but many fear that a follower
strategy will relegate the Soviet Union to an economic
backseat and cause its R&D capabilities to atrophy.
Yet many Soviets either do not fully understand or
reject implications of the political root cause of
Western success-the interaction between a private,
decentralized, high-reward entrepreneurial economic
system and the development and application of infor-
mation technology.
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Soviet leaders probably do not believe that adopting
Western information technologies will seriously affect
their ability to control their people. They probably
intend to minimize decentralization of control by
forgoing certain applications of electronic systems,
microcomputers, and printers. Many uses in the
West-for example, banking and retailing-need not
be extensively pursued in the USSR. The Soviets also
probably have faith in the ability of their oppressive
state security and centralized economic apparatuses
to control the more restricted industrial applications
that they intend to pursue. Soviet leaders, however,
clearly fear the spread of Western political and social
views and fear that the "demonstration effect" of
Western living standards may lead Soviet consumers
to demand more consumer amenities.
What Are the Goals of the Soviet
Information Revolution?
Gorbachev has embraced the information revolution.
He has called for the "technical restructuring" of the
Soviet economy and singled out information technol-
ogies and their supporting industries for highest prior-
ity development in the USSR and Eastern Europe.16
Gorbachev expects to recharge the Soviet economy as
information and other advanced technologies reverse
the long-term decline in the growth of Soviet labor
productivity and GNP, a goal made more urgent by
the prospect of very little increase in the Soviet labor
force." Overall, he wants to launch the Soviet Union
on a new development course and holds out the hope
that it will be in the same league as the United States
and Japan by the year 2000.
Gorbachev's domestic policy initiatives related to
these goals represent moderate-not revolutionary-
reform. He is seeking and getting immediate gains by
enlisting greater worker commitment. He is directing
investment toward civilian engineering R&D and
production, sources of much dual-use technology, in
the hope that technology advances will sustain long-
run productivity and quality improvement in all sec-
tors, including the military.
Gorbachev's goals for information technologies, while
ambitious, reflect these moderate efforts to reform the
Soviet economic system. Information technologies are
to help make centralized planning and control viable,
not obsolete. As in the West, they are to help
modernize the Soviet economy and maintain military
power. They are to help remedy perceived low pres-
tige, enabling the Soviet Union to project a strong,
progressive image, both internally and internationally.
The information technologies are not expected to
foster great social and cultural change, and any
impact on the quality of life is to be largely a
controlled byproduct of their general impact on eco-
nomic development.
Gorbachev has set ambitious economic targets for the
suppliers of information technologies, and prominent
officials promise substantial gains from information
technology applications:
? Production of computer equipment is slated to grow
18 percent annually through 1990. By that time the
Soviets are to produce 1.1 million personal comput-
ers, after producing virtually none until the mid-
1980s.
? Output by the main producer of instrumentation
equipment is to grow by 19 percent per year in the
1986-90 period, up from 6 percent in the previous
five-year period.
? Compared with 1981-85 production, production of
robots in the 1986-90 period is to more than double,
NC machine tools almost double, and machining
centers more than quadruple.
The conference concluded that, unlike the West,
where information technologies have had the greatest
effects in financial sectors, the Soviet Union can
obtain the greatest benefits through industrial appli-
cations. The Soviets can use information technologies
to improve industrial planning, enlisting more low-
level participation in the process. Their priority objec-
tives are to increase R&D productivity and to drasti-
cally modernize their manufacturing infrastructure.
They are counting on flexible manufacturing systems
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and other computer-aided machinery to provide the
necessary precision to meet the design requirements of
advanced military systems, including subsystem min-
iaturization, increased structural strength, and re-
duced weight.
In the 1960s the Soviets had hopes of creating
industries totally linked by computer networks. They
have begun to back away from that objective and, for
the present, appear content to create islands of auto-
mation within industry. Nevertheless, installation of
computer-assisted design and manufacturing (CAD/
CAM) equipment is increasing dramatically in R&D
and production enterprises. Optimistic Soviet officials
have claimed that CAD systems will shorten product
development times by 50 to 80 percent. (Such gains
have been realized in US industry.) Other officials
have claimed that automation in engineering indus-
tries will at least double labor productivity and that
automation of continuous processing can free up to
one-half of the laborers.
Specific Soviet military goals are less clear. It is
evident, however, that the Soviets have not become
any less aggressive in meeting the challenge of ad-
vancing Western weapons technology. As weapon
costs skyrocket and technology breakthroughs offer
large performance gains, there are indications that the
Soviet military is pressing harder than in the 1970s
for weapons of better quality, even at the cost of
reduced quantities. Continued development of SDI, in
particular, will induce the Soviets to give priority to
the development of the sensor, signal processing, and
battle management technologies necessary for devel-
opment of comprehensive countermeasures or a com-
parable system. Information technologies are central
to Soviet military strategy, both in the weapons and in
the factory.18
The authorities also promise an improvement in the
quality of life and a smooth transition to the new
information society. Gorbachev has come down force-
fully in support of changing the information cultures
in bureaucracy and society. Perhaps because of this
support, the Soviets are beginning to print more
statistics on sensitive issues, more open and frank
evaluations of the performances of officials in all
bureaucracies, and more open criticisms of bureau-
cratic and social pathologies such as withholding
information and lying about production fulfillment. In
the near term, the regime will emphasize education
and training; for example, in 1985 a mandatory
course on the basic principles of computers and
computer programing was begun for 9th and 10th
graders. The Soviets are planning to supply 500,000
personal computers to the schools by 1990-about 45
percent of total production-and 5 million by the year
2000. Mass communication services, as well as home
personal computers and VCRs, are expected to in-
crease and improve. Advocates claim that citizens'
lives will be enriched and creative forces unleashed
throughout society. As a leading indicator of Gorba-
chev's policy, the national press has shown an in-
creased openness that contrasts sharply with the
continued conservatism of the local press.
Gorbachev also realizes that he faces opposition from
a wide spectrum of society, including segments of the
party and state bureaucracies at all levels. But, like
his conservative opponents, he has given no indication
that he endorses any fundamental reduction in nation-
al party control. Conservative officials point to the
need to mobilize control organs to guard against
"infection" by "bourgeois" ideas but express confi-
dence-at least in public-that such infection can be
contained. An architect of the computer literacy
program has promised that information technologies
"will change our life, making it fuller, wiser, more
sensible and, in the end, happier than now."
The Soviets have several options for developing infor-
mation technologies, all promising progress but none
offering much prospect of overtaking the West by the
end of the century. They are poorly positioned to tap
the domestic sources that fueled Western develop-
ment. The Soviets lack a broad commercial base,
having geared their industry to military needs. West-
ern commercial applications of consumer electronics,
for example, have driven progress and rapid growth of
the electronics industry. In the West, defense applica-
tions of ICs account for only about 7 percent of the
value and 3 percent of the physical volume of IC
production. The conferees also concluded that the
Soviets are unlikely to introduce measures that would
substantially improve the effectiveness of their mas-
sive R&D base in serving the needs of producers.
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The Soviets probably will continue to rely heavily on
imported technology. They will favor the acquisition
of production technology with both military and
civilian applications, including turnkey facilities, and
will eschew reliance on Western countries for continu-
ing supplies of components. Their efforts will be
hindered by hard currency shortages and by the
growing difficulty of reverse engineering increasingly
sophisticated information technologies. Moreover, the
greatest Soviet needs-in microelectronics, systems
engineering, and software-are extremely difficult to
satisfy through imports without active Western par-
ticipation, something constrained by export control
regulations. Moreover, even a successful follower
strategy probably would condemn the Soviets to being
at least one technological generation behind.
The Soviets will probably focus the application of
information technologies on industry and the military.
Increasing industrial productivity is the most pressing
goal. Military leaders are aware that production
technology advances are necessary for a strong mili-
tary, and they will push for modernization of the
defense industrial base and a gradually growing em-
phasis on quality over quantity in weapon acquisition.
On the social front, the Soviets probably will move
only gradually to increase the supply of consumer
electronics such as VCRs.
Soviet and Western observers generally agree that the
USSR trails considerably behind Western nations in
the development and application of information tech-
nologies. These lags have persisted-and in some
areas lengthened-despite a massive commitment of
resources to information technology R&D dating back
to the 1960s. Today the USSR has the largest R&D
establishment in the world and has achieved impres-
sive success in many areas of science. While this
competence has enabled Moscow to erode certain
Western leads at the laboratory stage, familiar prob-
lems in industrial innovation and application have
hindered Soviet progress. The massive size of the
Soviet R&D effort, coupled with its failure to signifi-
cantly narrow the technological gap with the West,
suggests an ineffective R&D management strategy, a
diagnosis with which Gorbachev has openly
concurred.
Technologies
Western experts generally hold that Soviet microelec-
tronics, computer, and telecommunications technol-
ogies lag those in the West by five to 10 years and, in
some cases, by even more, depending on the specific
technology." In general, the Soviets probably fare
better in major hardware development than in the
development of support technology such as computer
peripherals and software.
Where advance is more amenable to a massive,
focused campaign-such as in certain telecommuni-
cations and microcircuit development programs-the
Soviets do relatively better and the Western lead may
shrink; where advance depends more on coordinated
and mutually reinforcing development in a host of
interrelated technologies-such as in computers or
computer-aided manufacturing-the Western lead is
more likely to be sustained or even increased:
? In microelectronics, the Soviets are at least two
generations (approximately five years) behind the
United States and Japan and are following Western
approaches. In part because of their late start, the
Soviets have built their microelectronics industry
primarily by copying the West and using Western
equipment.
? Soviet computers are by and large copies of Western
computers and are at least one generation behind.
? The Soviets have an archaic telecommunication
system, but one that is being modernized and made
more effective with heavy investment.
? Software has always posed a major problem for the
Soviets. Their systems software is primarily of
Western origin. Application software is their
Achilles' heel, because it is job specific and is
difficult to modify for another area of operation.
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Across all information technologies, Soviet advance-
ments have depended significantly on imported or
stolen Western technology.20
In the last several years, Soviet officials appear to
have become more acutely aware of the need for
much-improved coordination of interrelated informa-
tion technologies. Support services-software, periph-
eral equipment, maintenance, and user training-
have repeatedly been singled out as the most serious
problem areas.21 Soviet leaders have responded by
creating organizations to coordinate development and
foster compatability among the hundreds of indepen-
dent product lines." To date, the response appears to
be largely bureaucratic-new oversight committees,
expanded technical standards, and formal quality
certification.
Moreover, to obtain hardware, software, and other
support, the Soviets are trying to capitalize on the
resources of their East European partners in the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
This also is not new-computer development (initially
the Ryad Series) was the first major product of
CEMA integration of R&D in the early 1970s.
Recently, CEMA announced the S&T 2000 program,
singling out key information technologies for much-
expanded cooperative development efforts. Soviet or-
ganizations will manage these development efforts
and try to direct them toward areas where East
European countries are technical leaders." They will
also gain by using Eastern Europe as a conduit for
Western information technology.
Applications
According to Soviet official data, information tech-
nologies are being applied on an increasing scale
throughout the economy. R&D and industrial custom-
ers are receiving preference in the allocation of com-
puters, for example. Mainframe computers used for
inventory control, payroll, and other management
support functions are fairly common in large plants,
while minicomputers are applied extensively in pro-
cess control. Soviet and Western authors, however,
claim that Soviet computers are generally used less
intensively than those in Western firms.
Western authors have described the Soviet telephone
system as primitive by Western standards and notori-
ous for poor-quality transmission and unreliability,
even though Soviet telecommunication has followed
US architectural strategy. The plan for 1985 called
for increasing the level of existing network automa-
tion-switching of long-distance calls without the
assistance of an operator-to a mere 55 percent. The
Soviets also have a large but unsophisticated commu-
nications satellite network. They have launched six
times as much payload weight as the US Intelsat
system but have less than one-fifth the communica-
tions capacity. Leading-edge technologies such as
optical fibers for data transmission, network control
programs, and digital switching currently appear in
Soviet literature as problems that must be solved
before wide-scale use begins. At the same time, the
Soviets make more modest demands on their telecom-
munications system than is typical in an advanced
Western country.24
The development of the computer, microelectronics,
and telecommunications industries allowed the Sovi-
ets in the mid-1970s to begin introducing automated
management systems (ASUs) on the plant, regional,
and national levels. They use ASUs for economic,
administrative, inventory, product-planning, and pro-
cess control applications. By 1985 the USSR reported
it had installed over 6,800 ASUs. Difficulties in
applying large-scale ASUs apparently have convinced
the Soviets to deemphasize ministerial- and enter-
prise-level systems in favor of lower level systems for
production control and information processing, as
illustrated in the tabulation below: 25
1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 Total
1971-85
Number of ASUs
installed
Technical process
control
564
1,306
2,611
4,481
Ministry manage-
ment
168
92
60
320
Enterprise manage-
ment
838
389
296
1,523
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In general, Soviet and Western analysts agree that in
range and intensity of applications the USSR remains
well behind the West. The Soviets have highly auto-
mated factories, but many are islands in a sea of aging
industrial plant. Uneven development-especially in
services-has also contributed to a failure to achieve
desired gains in efficiency." Even when technology
does not threaten state control, the Soviets have not
moved aggressively to exploit the potential for produc-
tivity growth. For example, they could supply their
engineers with substantial numbers of domestically
manufactured hand-held calculators, but they choose
to produce only small numbers of elementary models.
The Soviet system itself weakens a manager's interest
in understanding-much less embracing-the infor-
mation age, whether he provides or uses information
services. There is a -huge disincentive to apply automa-
tion in the management structure of the Soviet econo-
my, and until there is a change in the incentive
system, few substantive changes can be expected.
Soviet authors acknowledge that these shortcomings
significantly reduce the economic benefits obtained
from automated management systems.27 Moreover,
they recognize that the Soviets do not require state-of-
the-art technology to realize substantial gains.
Conferees concluded that the Soviets have been effec-
tive in using dated technology to create competitive
weapon systems but will move to use considerably
more advanced technologies in future generations of
weapons. More extensive military applications of in-
formation technologies-especially in command and
control-may require changes in military doctrine
and tactics as the Soviets move away from relying on
overwhelming numbers of men and weapons. This
could cause political and social problems, and these
would be intensified if greater reliance on information
technologies drove up military expenditures. The So-
viets probably have little choice but to move in this
direction. Information technology promises such huge
increases in military capability that they would be
increasingly hard pressed to compensate with
numbers.
Information technologies have had varying impact in
the home and have made limited inroads into the
schools. The USSR has significantly upgraded and
expanded its television and radiobroadcasting capabil-
ities." Soviet surveys reveal that most citizens obtain
an increasing share of their information from broad-
cast media at the expense of print media and lectures.
Videocassette recorders are in great demand; an
estimated 300,000 are already in homes.29 Personal
computers appear to have made the least impact,
because of shortages of equipment, maintenance, and
training."
Information technologies also have the potential to be
used by organs of political and social control. Western
analysts have assumed that the privileged position of
the KGB, police, and Communist Party apparatus
would assure them ready access to the best available
technology for communications intercept and
surveillance.
How Fast Will the Soviets Progress
in the Information Revolution?
Judgments about the pace of Soviet progress depend
on assumptions about how Moscow will choose be-
tween partially incompatible goals. Most authors
agree that the centralized, socialist Soviet system
creates an inhospitable environment for maximizing
advance in information technologies and their appli-
cations. Thus, as one author (Rex Malik) puts it, the
Soviets face an "agonizing dilemma"-balancing the
gains of development with the risks of losing political
and social control.
Experts differ, of course, over where the Soviets will
end up along this continuum and what the conse-
quences will be for their position in the world. We
summarize below the key elements of a consensus that
seems to emerge in the literature-the Soviets will
"muddle through" but will not reach the levels of
leading Western nations by the year 2000.3'
The Ingredients
Even before Gorbachev, most Western experts be-
lieved that Soviet information technologies would
continue to advance at a healthy rate, benefiting from
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the traditional impetus of massive resource commit-
ments, exploitation of Western developments, and
leadership attention. Gorbachev has given a strong
boost to the program, especially in terms of resources.
Even so, few observers expect the Soviets to narrow
the gap significantly, except possibly in some specialty
military applications. Most believe the USSR will
remain five to 10 years behind in most technologies-
that is, in 1995 they will have about the same array of
technologies available that the United States has
today. Moreover, most expect Soviet progress to be
faster in information technologies that lend them-
selves to a "national program" approach (for example,
telecommunications) than in those that do not (for
example, software)."
These judgments are predicated on the widely held
belief that Gorbachev is trying to modernize the
Soviet system but will not fundamentally change it by
moving from a party-dominated command system to a
more pluralistic, decentralized system. He is moving
aggressively on weak links-orienting science to the
needs of production; stressing services, maintenance,
and computer literacy; and generally trying to create
an environment that encourages individual initiative
and creativity. These measures, together with efforts
to alter the information cultures of the bureaucracies
and society, are moderately reformist. Although many
Soviet officials support Gorbachev's moderate policy
reforms, most Westerners believe the Soviet govern-
ing apparatus and society will resist or delay advances
in information technology."
The conference endorsed these views and concluded
that prospective Western advances in information
technologies will make it hard for the Soviets to
remain only one or two generations behind. Conferees
felt that the Soviets could leapfrog a generation in
certain information technologies, like microelectron-
ics, but only if they can obtain major help from other
countries, like Japan. The telecommunication system
shows the greatest chances for substantial improve-
ment, mainly through the heavy investment in foreign
technology. Software, especially for applications, is
likely to continue to be a major shortcoming. The
microelectronics and computer industries are unlikely
to obtain sufficient resources to close the gap with the
West.
The Applications
Western and Soviet experts seem to agree that infor-
mation technologies will be applied preferentially in
the military, government, science, industry, and, as a
means to an end, in education. Conservative Soviet
authorities write of the need for "unified state con-
trol" of information technologies, and even the most
vocal believers in these technologies generally write
about the provision of centralized services.
In the government, police, and military establish-
ments, information technologies are likely to be ap-
plied extensively to support the maintenance of cen-
tral control. For economic management, computers
have been described as the "last great hope of central
planning." Although early dreams of "computerizing"
the entire economy have been scaled back considera-
bly, computers are likely to find increasingly wide-
spread use at all levels in planning production and
supply. The conferees judged that the Soviets are
capable of doing most of what they wish to do with
their existing telecommunication system, and that
programed improvements for automated data links
will increase Moscow's ability to collect information
and convey instructions. In the military, information
technologies will continue to be incorporated in weap-
on systems, but the real frontier is command and
control. Soviet military literature extolls such comput-
er applications, and most experts believe that informa-
tion technologies will be more extensively applied in
combat modeling, operational planning (including re-
connaissance and fire support), and strategic battle
management. Conferees presume that the KGB and
militia will be quick to pioneer surveillance and
recordkeeping applications, but doubt that the tech-
nologies will support truly all-encompassing measures
of control-at least by the year 2000.
In the economy, most experts expect that the Soviets
will apply information technologies extensively in
information dissemination, product design, and manu-
facturing process control. They have long invested
large sums in acquiring and disseminating technical
information, and they are moving to automate this
process more extensively. Access to Western data
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bases will be aggressively pursued. Soviets acknowl-
edge-and Western experts agree-that computer-
aided design will be a high priority as the Soviets
move into components and systems that are either
impossible or prohibitively expensive to develop by
other means (for example, very dense integrated cir-
cuits and high-performance aircraft). Computer-aided
manufacturing probably will be pursued the most
vigorously, because it is so important for reaching
Gorbachev's productivity and growth goals. Many
Western experts believe the Soviets will succeed in
producing large numbers of robots, automated ma-
chine tools, materials handling equipment, and con-
trol computers, but will not develop an effective
integrated systems approach. Islands of automation
will spread, but continuing deficiencies in software,
maintenance, technical standards, and incentives will
impair comprehensive advance and efficient use.
In the home, Western experts expect substantial
progress in entertainment applications but see little
prospect of a "computer culture" comparable to that
in the West. Mass communication services already
permeate Soviet society. Given the receptivity of
Soviet citizens to radio and (especially) television,
Soviet officials probably will try to improve the
quality, timeliness, and variety of offerings, if only to
compete with Western alternatives. At the same time,
information technologies are likely to be used in
jamming or other means of interfering with these
Western alternatives. Ownership of videocassette re-
corders and possibly video cameras will become more
widespread as Western systems and Soviet products
become increasingly available. The apparent Soviet
concern over the impact of these systems makes it
difficult to forecast how rapidly this process will
unfold. Ownership of personal telephones will in-
crease, but most experts believe that even by the mid-
1990s it will not reach levels prevalent in the West in
the mid-1980s. Finally, most Western experts seem to
believe that personal computers will reach Soviet
citizens in relatively small numbers. The priority of
applications in the computer literacy program and in
industry, along with restrictions on imports, makes it
unlikely that large numbers will be available to the
Soviet consumer before the early 1990s. Deficiencies
in or unavailability of peripheral equipment-such as
printers or modems-will further restrict personal
applications.
The conferees concluded that the Soviets would fall
far short of meeting information technology targets if
they chose to rely on indigenous resources. Thus, the
West may have some leverage over Soviet advance,
primarily through the denial of technology for dual-
use applications. US leverage is eroding, however, as
the Soviets become increasingly able to obtain state-
of-the-art information technologies from other West-
ern, and especially Japanese, sources.
What Will Be the Consequences
for the Soviets?
All conference participants agreed that the new, more
pragmatic Soviet leadership will be more effective
than its predecessors in making information technol-
ogy work for productivity growth and military ad-
vancement. At the same time, developments in the
West-at least in terms of quality and effectiveness-
are moving forward rapidly and in some areas are
probably accelerating. Conferees judged that materi-
ally closing the gap with the Western moving target
would require substantial change in the Soviet system
to make it more hospitable to innovation and growth.
They judged that such change was unlikely, even to
the degree experienced in the mid-1980s in China.
Thus, the conferees expect steady if unspectacular
Soviet development, with little change in the govern-
ing political and social institutions.
If the Soviets do indeed "muddle through," the Soviet
Union of the 1990s will not be much different than it
is today-a repressive society still trying to catch up
to the West, but still dangerous militarily. Progress
and change will be constrained by a Soviet system
that resembles the current model. Of course, the
scenario assumes that the West will continue to hold
the Soviet Union at arm's length in its quest for high
technology and influence the evolution of Soviet polit-
ical and social systems mainly by the provision of
information.
The Economy and the Military
Conferees agreed that improved worker effort, mas-
sive infusions of R&D and investment resources, and
selected technology transfers would raise industrial
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productivity, but probably not enough to meet Soviet
goals. This, in turn, makes it unlikely that the Soviets
will reach Western levels of per capita production and
quality of life by the year 2000. Although no one is
willing to hazard a precise forecast, most doubt that
Gorbachev will transform the Soviet Union into an
engine of economic development, achieving his goal of
5-percent annual growth in the 1990s. There is at
least as much skepticism that Soviet technology and
products will become competitive with the best West-
ern alternatives. The Soviets probably will continue to
have an export profile like that of a Third World
country-selling mainly raw materials. A continua-
tion or worsening of the USSR's position in those
markets would impair its ability to rely on the West.
Soviet priorities and the organization of the Soviet
system are likely to ensure that the most rapid
progress in information technologies will be in the
military. Arms control agreements or Gorbachev's
civilian modernization programs could lead to diver-
sion of some military-industrial resources. But there is
no sign of any fundamental shift in priorities, and the
military evidently recognizes that they stand to bene-
fit from advances in industrial information technol-
ogies like factory automation. Soviet weapon program
management techniques serve to concentrate high-
quality resources, including imported or stolen West-
ern technology, on weapon programs. The Soviets
have generally been successful at deploying improved
weapons on schedule, thereby cutting selectively into
Western military technology leads in fielded military
systems.
At the same time, the Soviets also will be aiming at a
moving target in the military arena. Western pro-
grams to develop smart conventional weapons, ad-
vanced reconnaissance and battle management sys-
tems, and systems associated with the Strategic
Defense Initiative suggest that an acceleration-if not
an explosion-in information technologies will be
driving much of the Western advance. Conferees
judged that the Soviets would do well to keep pace
with the West over the next decade.
These pessimistic conclusions are based on the fact
that progress in the information industries-of all
technology areas-is particularly incompatible with
key features of the Soviet-style socialist, command
economic system. Development of information indus-
tries requires a coordinated advance across a broad
front of interdependent technologies and the provision
of supply, support, and financial services. Spontaneity,
"bottom-up" creativity, powerful incentives, and tech-
nical support provide the impetus for change, and
flexible management, well-developed horizontal com-
munications, and material support accommodate
change. The Soviet system, even moderately re-
formed, furnishes virtually the antithesis of this envi-
ronment. It is ponderous, cumbersome, vertically ori-
ented, and penalizes innovation. To make matters
worse, information technologies like high-density inte-
grated circuits are difficult to reverse engineer; thus,
the Soviets' traditional answer to their shortcom-
ings-a crash program to acquire and copy-is of
limited value.
The Political System
On the political and social front, many Western
analysts expect that there will be a gradual modera-
tion of party-state control of information technol-
ogies-partly intended, and partly unintended. Gor-
bachev's "openness" campaign sets the stage for
greater individual access to information systems. His
industrial automation drive and his efforts to encour-
age individual and local administrative initiative re-
quire some moderation, certainly more delegating of
responsibility for decisions of secondary importance,
and possibly more sharing of authority with regional
and local officials. Moreover, Soviet officials have
acknowledged that the increasingly sophisticated and
demanding Soviet citizen must be catered to, and
indeed one Western author (Wilson Dizard) argues
that the Soviet "yuppie"-and not the dissident-will
be the driving force behind any loosening of control.
Finally, the technologies themselves can work both
ways; some at least potentially support increased state
surveillance, but many (especially in the factory) are
compatible with more decentralized decisionmaking.
At the same time, the Soviet leadership has reason to
worry that an increasingly computer-literate citizenry
may develop the ability to obtain, manipulate, and
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transmit unauthorized information, whether at home
or on the job. Even within the bounds of the official
system, information technologies can be a double-
edged sword-Moscow can use them to centralize and
penetrate, but local authorities can use them to
deceive. Moreover, according to Academy of Sciences
Vice President Yevgeniy Velikhov, Soviet social scien-
tists are also looking into possible consequences of the
information revolution that have been discussed in the
West-worker alienation and reduced peer contacts.
There are also hints of concern over worker "disloca-
tion," if not unemployment.
Challenges to control are likely to arise. Several areas
offer threats and opportunities over the next five
years:
? Direct Western broadcasts, most likely to become
increasingly accessible to ordinary citizens-al-
though increased jamming or Soviet cable television
could check this trend." Foreign radiobroadcasts
like Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have
forced the Soviet leadership to be more forthright
with their populace over such issues as the KAL-007
incident and the Chernobyl' disaster. In the early
1990s direct-broadcast satellites for television could
carry Western programs and advertisements, illus-
trating what is available to the Western consumer.
Paradoxically, to the reported consternation of party
officials, even Soviet television may have a moderat-
ing influence. Television, a major entertainment
medium, is undermining the effectiveness of politi-
cal lectures and other, more traditional means of
conveying propaganda. The conference concluded
that jamming of foreign radiobroadcasts, especially
Western broadcasts, can be expected to continue.
? The growing availability of consumer entertainment
media, especially videocassettes, both Western
origin and blank tapes.35 The Soviets fear propaga-
tion of "antisocial" values and behavior-crime and
moral degeneration. They also fear that such access
may foster growing consumerism, undermining ef-
forts to promote continuing sacrifice to shore up
Gorbachev's growth strategy.
? Telecommunications. Increasing access to tele-
phones (and possibly modems), plus improvement in
the national systems, increases control and surveil-
lance problems for the KGB. Conversely, installa-
tion of a system similar to the US "911" telephone
system, an idea that came from a Soviet patent,
could be used by the KGB to monitor personal
communications and facilitate tracking. The So-
viets' 1982 cutoff of international direct dialing
illustrates their willingness to take drastic measures.
In any event, the state's burden will be eased by the
fact that Soviet information networks are and will
continue to be considerably narrower and more
focused than Western networks.
Beyond the next five years the Soviet "computer
culture" may take hold in earnest. By that time,
millions of Soviet citizens should be computer literate.
Soviet production of personal computers and peripher-
al systems should be adequate to support widespread
industrial applications and at least potentially the
beginnings of widespread private ownership. At that
time Soviet security authorities could confront prob-
lems of monitoring telecommunications use, data base
access, and access to efficient, high-speed report
production systems. Soviet economic authorities will
see their chronic battle against data falsification move
to the information technology frontier, and Soviet
experience suggests that they will be hard put to avoid
at least isolated instances of computer crime and even
sabotage.
The conference judged that such potential threats to
state control could be contained, albeit not without
forfeiting some of the potential benefits offered by
unfettered information technologies. Conferees ac-
knowledged, however, that alternative scenarios of-
fered by Western authors raise the possibility of more
serious conflict or disruption within the Soviet system:
? One scenario holds that Soviet authorities may
underestimate how quickly and how seriously
spreading information technologies may challenge
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state control. As information technologies expand, a
"crossover point" is reached-possibly suddenly-at
which developing installations and networks over-
whelm the ability of controls."'
? Another scenario raises the possibility of a policy
crisis. Tension may grow between "conservatives"
and "modernizers" as one or both sides become
dissatisfied with trends in Soviet economic progress
and political control. Disagreement could lead to an
abrupt change in policy, with ramifications extend-
ing beyond the world of information technologies. It
could prompt a dramatic liberalization of the Soviet
system, or a monumental internal crackdown and
external belligerence. Malik, perhaps the most
alarmist of the writers on this topic, concludes that
"we are on track for a highly dangerous situation."
On balance, the conferees expect Gorbachev's poli-
cies, applied to information technologies, to foster
some moderation of political and social control over
the next 10 years. Yet the Soviets probably will not
accept a Chinese-style trade-off in which central
control is substantially relaxed to improve the coun-
try's economic position. They also are not likely to
resort to Western techniques-like extensive reliance
on market forces-to create a truly hospitable envi-
ronment for information technologies. Moreover, ele-
ments of the Soviet leadership will try to buck any
moderation, while the technological innovators push
for more moderation.
The conferees concluded that by the mid-1990s at the
very latest the shortcomings of the strategy to close
the information technology gap with the West may
force the Soviet leadership to reevaluate its approach.
The conferees expect growing tension between advo-
cates of greater economic decentralization and advo-
cates of tight political control, but do not foresee a
crisis developing. Although there is room for some
compromise and for innovative methods of leadership
and management, Soviet leaders probably will place a
premium on maintaining political control. This raises
the prospect of continuing and possibly intensifying
economic and technical shortfalls.
If this occurs, the Soviet Union in the 1990s may be
even farther from its goal of achieving equality with
the most advanced Western countries in terms of
economic and technical development and citizens'
welfare. It may be forced to rely to an even greater
degree on military power to maintain influence in the
world arena-becoming, as the Economist put it, an
"Upper Volta with rockets." Conferees did not ad-
dress the consequences of dealing with a "sick bear,"
but noted that Soviet progress in the "information
revolution" will significantly influence the severity of
the bear's illness.
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S. E. Goodman, "The Information Technologies in Soviet Society:
Problems and Prospects," a study prepared for the National
Intelligence Council.
I Ibid; Tom Forester, ed., The Information Technology Revolution
(MIT Press, 1985), pp. 45-55; and Harry L. Freeman, "The
Information Revolution: Trade in Services," Vital Speeches of the
Day (13 May 1986): pp. 572-575.
'Gene Bylinsky, "The High-Tech Race: Who's Ahead?" Fortune
(13 October 1986): pp. 26-32; and Forester, op. cit., pp. xiii-xviii.
John Browning, "Information Technology," The Economist (12
July 1986): pp. 7-8.
Forester, op. cit., pp. 116, 122.
6 Browning, op. cit., p. 10.
Forester, op. cit., pp. 27-44.
' Forester, loc. cit.; and Stuart Gannes, "The Soviet Lag in High-
Tech Defense," Fortune (25 November 1985): pp. 107-120.
' "High-Tech to the Rescue," Business Week (16 June 1986):
pp. 100-108.
" ? Ibid; Forester, op. cit., pp. 260-272.
" "A Puzzlingly Poorly Productive America," The Economist (29
March 1986): p. 55.
Z Gannes, loc. cit.
" David F. Linowes, "Privacy Protection in the United States in
1984: Is It Adequate?" Vital Speeches of the Day (27 November
1986): pp. 168-171.
" See, for example, Gannes, loc. cit.
" D. Vydrin, "American Capitalism Criticized for Use of Compu-
ters," JPRS-UCC-85-007 (7 October 1985): pp. 1-4; and Steve
White, "USSR: Academic Journal Takes Up Debate Over Compu-
ters," Foreign Press Note (12 February 1985).
16 Excerpts from Gorbachev's speech on science and technology,
11 June 1985.
" The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader, Joint CIA-DIA report
for the US Joint Economic Committee, DDB-1900-122-86, July
1986, p. 2.
" Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Weapons Industry: An
Overview, DI 86-10016 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence
Agency, September 1986).
" S. E. Goodman and Alan Ross Stapleton, "Microcomputing in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," Abacus 3, No. 1 (1985): pp.
6-22; and Ivan Selin, "Communications and Computers in the
USSR: Successes and Failures," Signal (December 1986): p. 8.
Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology:
An Update, September 1985, a White Paper; and Bruce Parrott,
ed., Trade, Technology and Soviet-American Relations, (Indiana
University Press, 1985), pp. 117-136.
Z' See, for example, Ye. Zamura, "Microcomputer Repair Service
Excoriated," JPRS-UCC-85-002 (4 March 1985): pp. 12-14.
21 "Computerization Encounters Difficulties," The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press XXXVIII, No. 28, p. 10.
Z' "Computer Bang-or Whimper," The Economist (20 April
1985): pp. 13-15.
'? Goodman and Stapleton, loc. cit., and Ivan Selin, "Ma Bell's
Spirit Is Alive and Well in Moscow," The Washington Post,
(8 June 1986): p. Fl.
15 Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR, 1985.
16 L. Volchkevich, "Problems of Production Automation," JPRS-
UST-85-003 (28 February 1985): pp. 84-87.
" See, for example, Daniel Seligman, "The Great Soviet Computer
Screw-Up," Fortune (8 July 1985): pp. 32-36, and V. Piven,
"Problems in Acceptance of Computers Reported," JPRS-UCC-
85-007 (7 October 1985): pp. 5-8.
38 "The Rapid Expansion of Soviet Satellite TV Broadcasting,"
United States Information Agency Contract Report #R-6-85,
prepared by George Jacobs and Associates, Inc. (February 1985).
" Victor Yasman, "The Collectivization of Videos," Radio Free
Europe/Liberty, RL355/86 (22 September 1986).
3? Victor Yasman, "Home Computers Have Gone On Sale...,"
Radio Free Europe/Liberty, RL407/85, (6 December 1985).
3' S. E. Goodman, "Advanced Technology: How Will the USSR
Adjust?" and Rex Malik, "Communism Versus the Computer: Can
the USSR Survive the Information Age?" Computer (9 July 1984):
pp. 35-48; and Wilson Dizard, "Mikhail Gorbachev's Computer
Challenge," The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1986).
'Z Selin, "Communications and Computers in the USSR: Successes
and Failures."
" Loren Graham, "The Soviet Union is Missing Out on the
Computer Revolution," The Washington Post (11 March 1984):
pp. Cl-C2.
14 George H. Quester, "Transboundary Television," Problems of
Communism (September-October 1984): pp. 76-87, and Igor Reich-
lin, "Big Brother's Grip Can Fail," Science Digest (January 1984):
pp. 14-15.
" Yasman "The Collectivization of Videos"; and Victor Yasman,
"Video in the Soviet Union: Trouble With the Capricious Step-
child," Radio Free Europe/Liberty, RL129/86 (21 March 1986).
36 Malik, "Communism versus. the Computer: Can the USSR
Survive the Information Age?" and Dizard, "Mikhail Gorbachev's
Computer Challenge."
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