THE RETURN OF SOVIET EMIGRES TO THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00296R000100110002-5
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 25X1
Directorate otntelligence 1.-7G?6,1
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PROJECT NUMBER
OW M J K
The Return of Soviet
Emigres to the USSR
An Intelligence Assessment
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--Secret-
SOV 87-10015X
February 1987
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reverse Blank
The Return of Soviet
Emigres to the USSR
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA
Secret
SOV 87-10015X
February 1987
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 24 February 1987
was used in this report.
The Return of Soviet
Emigres to the USSR
In a policy shift, Moscow has allowed over 150 "third wave" emigres to re-
turn to the USSR since late October 1986. Most, if not all, of the returnees
had first applied to return years ago but had their applications denied.
These emigres, almost all of whom were in the United States, apparently
had trouble adapting to life here and were genuinely unhappy. According
to rumors in the emigre community as well as claims by Soviet spokesmen,
a total of about 1,000 emigres?out of over 80,000 who have come to the
United States since 1970?have submitted applications to return.
The Soviet Union has generally denied requests for repatriation except
during two repatriation campaigns in the 1920s and 1950s directed at
earlier "waves" of emigration. The present campaign is less comprehensive
than those, but apparently includes some economic and legal induce-
ments?primarily assistance in finding housing and employment and
promises of no legal penalties for having "deserted" the motherland.
Several prominent cultural figures who had emigrated or defected to the
West?all of whom had been blacklisted during the Brezhnev era?have
been contacted personally by emissaries from the Soviet cultural world and
invited to return to the USSR, but as yet none have accepted the offer.
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Moscow has been orchestrating the emigres' return for propaganda gain?
having them return in groups over a limited period of time to give the illu-
sion of a large exodus, setting up staged interviews with Western reporters,
and publishing accounts of emigres' personal hardship in the domestic and
emigre-targeted press. One family immediately returned to the United
States after Soviet authorities dictated what they should say to reporters
upon disembarking in Moscow. Stepped-up denunciations of life in the
West fit in with the broader human rights counteroffensive conducted by
General Secretary Gorbachev since 1985. 25X1
Moscow's implicit acknowledgment that all who disagree with select Soviet
policies and leave the USSR are not "traitors to the motherland" is part of
Gorbachev's campaign to convince the intelligentsia that he is serious
about "democratizing" Soviet society. No Soviet leader since Khrushchev
has put as much effort into courting intellectuals, suggesting that Gorba-
chev believes their support is important for the success of his domestic
revitalization program. 25X1
Secret
SOV 87-100I5X
February 1987
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The decision to allow some repatriation is probably related to the
reassessment of emigration policy that appears to be taking place. There
are indications the Soviets are seeking a way to ease up on emigration
restrictions without encouraging a large-scale movement among Jews to
apply for exit visas. If the Soviets are planning to relax restrictions
somewhat, they may hope that testimony provided by the returnees about
hardships encountered in the West might reduce the number of citizens
interested in leaving. They may also believe that such testimony will
buttress their claims that the West grossly overstates the number of Jews
who want to leave the USSR, and enable them to portray a limited
increase in emigration as the beginning of an open-door policy.
In repatriation policy, as in other policies in the human rights area,
Gorbachev is attempting to balance his desire to burnish the regime's
image at home and abroad with his desire to maintain ultimate political
control over the "movement of people and ideas." Although he has
demonstrated a remarkable willingness to make concessions to win over the
Soviet intelligentsia and a high degree of political ingenuity in taking
initiatives that score propaganda points in the eyes of the world, over time
it may prove increasingly difficult for Gorbachev to balance these funda-
mentally irreconcilable objectives.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Recent Initiatives To Encourage Emigres To Return I
Appeals to Prominent Russian Cultural Figures 2
Why a Policy Change Now?
3
Prospects for More Repatriation 4
Appendix
Previous Repatriation Policy
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The Return of Soviet
Emigres to the USSR
Recent Initiatives To Encourage Emigres To Return
According to our best count, 155 Soviet emigres and
their children have returned to the USSR since late
October 1986.' Almost all had come to the United
States during the "third wave" emigration of the
1970s. According to a Soviet spokesman, most of the
returnees are Jews. They cover a span of ages and
occupations.
Moscow is taking a series of steps to encourage some
emigres to return to the USSR and is carefully
orchestrating the process for maximum propaganda
effect. The principal policy change has been to ap-
prove outstanding applications for repatriation. Ac-
cording to Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy
Gerasimov, Moscow decided last year to start treating
requests for repatriation more favorably. Soviet Con-
sul General to the United States Vladimir Kuleshov
recently claimed that "people will be leaving practi-
cally every day."
Rather than act on applications individually over
time, however, Moscow since October has granted
approvals in blocks and has arranged for the emigres
to return in groups to give the illusion of a large
exodus. Most, if not all, of the recent returnees first
applied to return to the USSR several years ago but
were refused. lzvestiya claims that some made their
request within months of their arrival in the United
States in the 1970s.
The Soviets appear to have contacted emigres person-
ally in some cases. An emigre source reported that the
Soviet Embassy recently invited emigres interested in
returning to come to Washington and discuss their
situation with consular officers. Reports from the
emigre community claim that emigres living in low-
cost housing projects in New York City and Cleve-
land received unsolicited applications for repatriation
(not usable for tourist visas) in their mailboxes in mid-
January.
TASS announced on 23 February 1987 that "around 200 people
have returned to the Soviet Union lately.'
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There are no indications that threats or other sinister
tactics have been employed. There are rumors in the
emigre community in New York City that one of the 25x1
returnees who was featured in interviews with the
Western press had visited the USSR for six weeks 25X1
about a year ago and might be a "plant" being used
for display, according to an emigre source.
Inducements for repatriation evidently include prom-
ises of economic security. Some of the emigres going
back told Western reporters that they had been
assured there would be no problems securing housing
and employment in their hometowns. Several said
that they had already been allotted apartments in
Moscow, a prized commodity in a city where citizens
without political connections often wait on housing 25X1
lists for years. According to Gerasimov, the delay in
bringing back more of the emigres who have allegedly
applied to return is due to the need to find them
housing and jobs, a task being handled by local
authorities. The appropriate ministries are giving
returnees priority over other Soviet citizens,
A Soviet
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official announced at the Moscow airport that buses
and hotel rooms were waiting for those without
relatives in Moscow. 25X1
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It is possible the Soviets have defrayed transportation
costs. We have no evidence of this, but it seems likely
that many of the returnees, most of whom worked in
the United States as laborers and returned with
children, could not afford the airfare on their own.
There are some indications the Soviets may allow
emigres to exchange dollars for scarce luxury items if
they return to the USSR. In early January 1987, a
New York law firm announced in Novoye Russkoye
Slovo, a widely read Russian-language emigre news-
paper, that they had negotiated an official agreement
with the Soviet Union whereby dollars can be deposit-
ed through the law firm into an account. They can
then be converted at a favorable exchange rate into
special rubles that can be used by dependent relatives
still in the USSR to buy two- and three-room coopera-
tive apartments ($6,500 to $9,000), Lada or Volga
automobiles ($2,100 to $4,500), and other durable
goods?apparently without the several-year wait that
usually applies to these items. It is not clear whether
emigres can draw on such funds themselves, but many
may try to have relatives acquire goods to be shared
or transferred upon the emigres' return to the USSR.
An emigre source was told by someone who had been
in the USSR in December 1986 that the recent
returnees were encouraged to bring with them as
many dollars as possible, which could be exchanged
for rubles in order to buy cooperative apartments.
Finally, the Soviets appear to have provided assur-
ances of immunity from any legal penalties or restric-
tions. Although Soviet propaganda has traditionally
referred to emigration as "betrayal of the mother-
land," one of the returnees told Western reporters in
New York that "Soviet authorities here say we should
not have any problems with the authorities there."
According to the Western press, Radio Moscow re-
ported that the returnees may leave the USSR again
if they so desire. Of the recent returnees, one family
of five and two other individuals immediately changed
their minds on arriving in Moscow, and the Soviets
allowed them to go back to the United States. The
authorities may have made this decision because of
the particular circumstances; Western media cover-
age of the returnees was heavy, and the Soviets
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probably did not want to spoil the propaganda effect
by refusing the request of these few. But the action
may have convinced many emigres that a decision to
repatriate to the USSR is not irrevocable.
Appeals to Prominent Russian Cultural Figures
Well-known Russian artists and writers living in
Western exile have been particular targets of the
campaign to entice emigres and defectors back to the
USSR. The Soviets have recently made individual
approaches to some of these cultural figures, while
using the official media to make more general over-
tures.
In recent months, according to Western press reports
and US Embassy sources, Soviet intellectuals visiting
the West have contacted a number of their colleagues
in exile with the message that their return to the
Soviet Union would be welcomed. Among those con-
tacted were theater director Yuriy Lyubimov, sculp-
tor Ernst Neizvestny, writers Viktor Nekrasov and
Vassily Aksyonov, ballet dancers Mikhail Baryshni-
kov and Natalia Makarova, and film director Andrey
Tarkovskiy (recently deceased). Some of the contacts
have claimed to be speaking in the name of the
leadership:
? A CPSU official, whom Neizvestny knows personal-
ly, visited Neizvestny's mother in the USSR. The
official passed the message that General Secretary
Gorbachev had Neizvestny in mind to build a World
War II memorial in Moscow.
? The artistic director of the Bolshoi Ballet visited
Mikhail Baryshnikov in New York in late January
and claimed that he had "official sanction" from the
Soviet Government to invite him to dance at the
Bolshoi.
? After Lyubimov's former students at the Taganka
Theater delivered an appeal to Gorbachev, Soviet
Embassy officials in Washington telephoned Lyubi-
mov and suggested they discuss the possibility of his
returning
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No direct official invitations or specific assurances
about professional opportunities and working condi-
tions have as yet been issued. The use of intermediar-
ies allows Soviet authorities to "test the waters"
without risking an embarrassing rebuff or absolutely
committing themselves to honor any informal prom-
ises. Thus far, none of the individuals approached
have returned.
A number of articles in the Soviet press have rein-
forced the message purveyed through these personal
visits. For example, in an unusual, laudatory obituary
for Tarkovskiy in early January, TASS lamented the
continued exile abroad of Russian cultural figures and
praised works by Tarkovskiy that originally had been
banned in the Soviet Union. A week later, a Soviet
film critic wrote that, had Andrey Tarkovskiy re-
turned home, there would have been "no obstacle in
his way to the audiences, to the people."
Why a Policy Change Now?
These efforts to encourage repatriation constitute a
shift in Soviet behavior. The two previous "waves" of
Soviet emigration also led to temporary repatriation
campaigns in the 1920s and mid-1950s. During most
periods of Soviet history, including recent years,
however, Soviet emigres (that is, Soviet citizens who
leave the USSR legally) generally have not been
allowed to return. While the regime has always
wanted to secure the return of defectors (that is,
Soviet citizens who leave the USSR illegally), the
current blandishments to cultural defectors are strik-
ingly different from standard Soviet practice. Until
now, the Soviets have encouraged redefection only on
their own terms. Few redefectors in recent years have
returned to any semblance of ordinary life.
The change in repatriation policy appears to be part of
a broader effort by Gorbachev to strengthen his
support among reform-minded intellectuals and offi-
cials. Gorbachev also wants to persuade foreign audi-
ences that he is serious about "democratizing" the
Soviet system. Finally, the use of repatriates for
propaganda purposes reflects a desire to reduce the
average Soviet citizen's attraction to things Western.
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Gorbachev has gone to further lengths to court the
intelligentsia than any other Soviet leader since Khru-
shchev. Like his campaign for "openness" in Soviet
media, the partial relaxation of censorship in cultural
works, and the bold move to release Andrey Sakharov,
Gorbachev's effort to seek a reconciliation with the
emigre community is undoubtedly prompted in part
by a belief that the cooperation of the intelligentsia is
needed if his program for revitalizing the system and
modernizing the economy is to succeed. He may also
hope that increasing his personal popularity among
intellectuals and lower level elites who favor broad
systemic changes will enable him to step up pressure
on his Politburo colleagues to go along with his policy
initiatives.
The Soviet effort to get propaganda mileage out of the
emigres who have returned thus far is in keeping with
a human rights counteroffensive under way since
1985. This counteroffensive has sought to deflect
attention from Soviet abuses by accusing the West of
its own human rights violations?especially racism,
unemployment, and poverty. In 1985 the Soviets
published a white book compiling individual stories
about Soviet emigres' painful separation from the
homeland, their "lure" to the West by "Zionist
propaganda," and their encounters with poverty, un-
employment, crime, and uncertainty about the future.
The frequency of articles on emigres' disenchantment
with the West?with particular attention toward
those individuals who chose to return to the USSR?
has increased considerably since then. The increase
has been evident both in the domestic press and in
Go/os Rodiny, the Soviet paper distributed in emigre.
communities abroad. In September 1986, the regime
made the bold decision to televise a US documentary
on the life of Soviet emigres, apparently having
judged that testimony about the difficulties of adjust-
ing to a different culture would have a greater
impression on viewers than the higher US living
standard evident in the film
Apparently as a condition of returning, repatriates
have participated in staged interviews with the West-
ern press, which have focused on the shortcomings of
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life in capitalist countries. There have been no oppor-
tunities for returnees to discuss their motivations with
reporters without Soviet supervision. Soviet officials
arranged three press conferences for returnees from
the United States and Canada at Soviet diplomatic
missions in late October and November. Members of
the large group of about 50 emigres that left on 29
December refused to speak to reporters at the airport
in New York unless an Aeroflot representative
was present. At the airport in
Moscow, about 20 of this group were ferried into a
special press room to facilitate interviews with Soviet
and foreign journalists. Two weeks later, the Foreign
Ministry press office declined a Western reporter's
request for followup interviews, claiming that all of
the December returnees had left Moscow.
The family of returnees that immediately reversed
their decision and returned to the United States had
been given prepared statements to deliver upon arrival
in Moscow, and one family member was instructed to
throw her US passport on the floor. Another family,
while out of earshot of the "Aeroflot" escort in New
York, confided to a reporter that its permission to
return was contingent on an agreement to go on a
publicity tour in the USSR.
The decision to allow some repatriation is probably
related to the reassessment of emigration policy that
appears to be taking place. There are indications the
Soviets are seeking a way to ease up on emigration
restrictions without encouraging a large-scale move-
ment among Jews to apply for exit visas. Soviet
officials are talking publicly about reconsidering up to
10,000 applications for emigration that were previous-
ly denied, and the Foreign Ministry claims that about
500 exit visas were awarded in January 1987?half
the number for all of 1986. But some officials are
privately expressing concern that relaxing emigration
restrictions could result in a flood of requests to leave.
If the Soviets are planning to relax restrictions some-
what, they may hope that testimony provided by the
returnees about hardships encountered in the West
will reduce the number of citizens interested in apply-
ing (although those who would not consider emigra-
tion because they would never see friends or family
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again might be emboldened to apply in light of the
new evidence that emigration apparently is not irrevo-
cable). They may also believe that such testimony will
buttress their claims that the West grossly overstates
the number of Jews who want to leave the USSR, and
enable them to portray a limited increase in emigra-
tion as the beginning of an open-door policy.
Prospects for More Repatriation
According to statistics of the US Immigration and
Naturalization Service, over 80,000 Soviet citizens
came to the United States during the "third wave"
emigration that began about 1970. The coverage of
returning emigres in the Soviet press over the years
leads us to estimate that the number who have
returned is not higher than the low hundreds. Author-
itative Soviet spokesmen?including Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze, Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasi-
mov, and chief CSCE delegate Kashlev?have an-
nounced over the last four months that about 1,000
Soviet emigres in the United States and several
hundred in other, unspecified Western countries have
requested to return to the Soviet Union. It is also
rumored in the emigre community that over 1,000
emigres in the United States have submitted applica-
tions to return,
Soviet authorities have not as yet granted a blanket
amnesty permitting all emigres who want to return to
do so. Moscow radio, broadcasting in English to
North America, has said that Moscow will continue to
treat applications favorably. But Consul General Ku-
leshov remarked in late October that permission to
return is not automatic, and Moscow radio (broad-
casting domestically in Russian) repeated in early
January that "the road to the homeland is not by any
means open to all of those who would like to say good-
bye to the free world." Thus, Moscow presumably will
continue to attach strings to repatriation by making
returns contingent on returnees publicly apologizing
for leaving and expressing gratitude to the Soviet
Government for allowing them to come home.
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Expressions of willingness to shed US citizenship have
been a theme repeated by the latest returnees. If the
Soviets are pressuring them to make such statements,
this could be a maneuver to make it harder for them
to turn around and go back to the United States
unless they attempt to do so immediately after arrival.
Until their Soviet citizenship is restored, Moscow
cannot restrain those emigres who had acquired US
citizenship from leaving the USSR without violating
consular agreements. After receiving Soviet citizen-
ship, the returnees would need to process new emigra-
tion applications through the Soviet bureaucracy to
leave again.
Disaffected emigres who have not yet applied to
return are taking a wait-and-see attitude and will pay
close attention to the treatment afforded those who
have recently returned. For a variety of reasons, many
emigres may decide to go back if they become
convinced they will not be treated poorly in the
USSR. Large numbers of Soviet emigres have had
serious problems adjusting to life in the United States.
Some of these problems?the difficulty of learning a
new language, for example?affect emigres to and
from any country. Others are specific to emigres from
the USSR
Many Soviet emigres complain of the impersonalism
of life in large US cities. They miss the close friend-
ships characteristic of Soviet society that provided
them with strong personal support systems.
A large number of the returnees claimed they wanted
to be reunited with family members still in the USSR.
Others who have recently returned had
similar dashed hopes. Several emigres have reported,
however, that since December 1986 Moscow has been
granting tourist visas to emigres for visits to the
USSR, and a few emigres have already visited the
USSR and returned without incident. This might
limit the number who repatriate chiefly to end their
separation from relatives and friends in the USSR.
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Soviet citizens tend to be psychologically unprepared
for the competitiveness, emphasis on individual initia-
tive, and degree of choice that accompany life in the
United States. Coming from a society that guides
one's choices from cradle to grave, many are over-
whelmed by the alternatives available in housing,
education, and consumer goods. Emigres who worked
in commonplace technical fields, such as engineering
and medicine, in the USSR are inadequately trained
to enter those fields in the United States. Others, such
as teachers and social scientists, were trained in
theories and methods not widely accepted in Western
society. Because they were limited to employment in
blue-collar jobs, the standard of living of several of
the emigres who returned, particularly those who
were elderly, was reportedly low. Even those whose
material conditions are superior in the United States
sometimes find their underemployment and drop in
social status unacceptable.
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Soviet emigres tend to form ethnic ghettos in large
urban centers and are exposed to a crime rate far
exceeding that in the USSR. Soviet propaganda de-
votes much attention to the extent of violent crime in
the United States, and a large number of recent
returnees have publicly cited their personal victimiza- 25X1
tion as a major reason for returning. While Soviet
authorities may have directed the returnees to exag-
gerate this point, the complaints are often genuine.
According to FBI records, for example, one of the
returnees who cited crime as his reason for leaving
was shot during a street robbery in 1982 and applied
for repatriation soon afterward.
For many Russian expatriates, the emotional pull of
the rodina (motherland) predisposes them to consider
going back if they judge that internal conditions in the
USSR have improved. Over the past decade, about
one Soviet defector in 10 has redefected, even though
many of them had good reason to believe they would
"face the music" when they returned. In a statement
representative of the attitude of many redefectors, a
computer technician, even when reminded of the
punitive consequences, said he felt compelled to rede-
fect because, although he was still not in agreement
with the Communist regime, his "soul would know
peace only on Russian soil."
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For many Russian cultural figures in exile, the lure of
the motherland is reinforced by the cultural thaw that
is under way in the USSR. Although, for some artists
and writers, financial incentives were a factor in their
decision to leave the USSR, for most of them a desire
for greater artistic freedom was paramount. They
have therefore been carefully following developments
under Gorbachev's policy of increased glasnost (open-
ness) in the cultural arena. While many of these
emigres have received critical acclaim in the West,
several, especially those who deal in the written word,
have expressed disappointment in not being able to
create for their native Russian audience and could be
susceptible to calls for help in revitalizing morale in
their native society. Lyubimov has stated that he is
considering the Soviets' indirect offers because "I am
needed there, not here."
If any prominent artists were to return to the USSR,
it would almost certainly be only with the guarantee
that their creativity would not be constrained by
censorship and that they would have the right to
travel regularly to and from the West. Gorbachev has
allowed a few intellectuals, such as poets Andrey
Vosnesensky and Yevgeny Yevtushenko, to travel to
the West with increasing frequency and to publish
controversial works. But Gorbachev probably sees
Vosnesensky and Yevtushenko as goodwill ambassa-
dors who serve the purpose of promoting his image in
the West as a Soviet "liberal," and he may be
unwilling to accord similar privileges to other cultural
luminaries. If Gorbachev were to accede to the condi-
tions being demanded by exiled artists, it would set a
precedent that could heighten expectations among
intellectuals?many of whom keenly desire greater
opportunities for foreign travel?beyond the regime's
ability to satisfy them.
In repatriation policy, as in other policies in the broad
human rights area, Gorbachev is attempting to bal-
ance his desire to burnish the regime's image at home
and abroad with his desire to maintain ultimate
political control over the "movement of people and
ideas." Although he has demonstrated a remarkable
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willingness to make concessions to win over the Soviet
intelligentsia and a high degree of political ingenuity
in taking initiatives that score propaganda points in
the eyes of the world, over time it may prove increas-
ingly difficult for him to balance these fundamentally
irreconcilable objectives.
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Appendix
Previous Repatriation Policy
There has always been a natural tension between the
Soviets' interest in making emigration irrevocable, to
discourage others from considering that path, and in
allowing some emigres to return as a testament to
propaganda claims that life in the West is undesir-
able. As a result of this tension, Soviet repatriation
policy has not been without ambiguity. But, during
most periods of Soviet history, emigres have usually
been denied reentry.
Emigres are stripped of Soviet citizenship upon leav-
ing the USSR. Until recently, emigres were usuall
not even allowed to a 1 for re atriation.
Emigres who have periodically applied to
return have reported that even those applications that
have been accepted have generally resulted in formal
rejection after a long processing period?about eight
months.
Some exceptions have been made, and those who
return are exploited for propaganda gain. Over the
past several years, the Soviet domestic press has
published about one article per month about returning
emigres.' US prosecutors claimed that convicted spy
The Soviet Union also maintains an official Soviet Committee on
Cultural Ties With Compatriots Abroad (also called the Rodina, or
motherland, society). Its primary activity has been the publication
since 1955 of Go/os Rodiny (Voice of the Motherland), a weekly
newspaper written specifically for circulation in emigre communi-
ties in 83 countries. (From 1955 to 1960, the newspaper was issued
under the title Za Vozvrashchenie na Rodinu, For the Returning to
the Motherland.) It includes cultural news, elaborate claims of
Soviet political and social accomplishments, and letters from
homesick compatriots who regret that circumstances (usually
World War 11) separated them from the Soviet Union. From 1960
until at least the late 1970s, the committee also sponsored Go/os
Rodiny foreign radiobroadcasts that sometimes included personal-
ized messages to individual emigres from their relatives still in the
Soviet Union.
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Svetlana Ogordnikova had wanted to return to the
USSR and was told to "earn" her way 25X1
back by convincing emigres to repatriate and by
locating defectors, among other things. According to
the pastor of her Russian Orthodox church in Califor-
nia, Ogordnikova did persuade one parish family to
return to the USSR. 25X1
The incentives for wanting defectors back have always 25X1
been considerably greater than for wanting emigres
back:
In the case of positive intelligence defectors, rede- 25X1
fection may limit the amount of classified informa-
tion that passes to foreign governments, while offer-
ing the opportunity of debriefing that may provide
information about the modus operandi of Western
intelligence services.
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? The regime wants to demonstrate its power and 25X1
ability to punish those who violate Soviet law. Thus,
redefectors in recent years have usually received
long prison terms.
? The Soviet leadership probably believes that the
political statement made by defection, which by its
character is seen as a more desperate attempt to
escape from Soviet society, is stronger than that
made by emigration and must be more forcefully
countered. Because of a generally held impression
that emigration is a Jewish phenomenon, many
Soviet citizens have negative feelings toward emi-
gration, rooted in anti-Semitism. But defection af-
fects various groups in Soviet society, including the
party, government, and cultural elite
Thus, the Soviets have employed a variety of induce-
ments and threats to encourage redefection. They
have traditionally tried to foster homesickness in
defectors by forwarding letters from family members
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still in the USSR and selectively allowing phone calls
to family members to get through. Threatened retri-
bution against family members, such as the denial of
medical care or employment, has also been used to
coerce some defectors to return. Firsthand accounts of
redefections in the Soviet media are designed to
persuade the population that the individual did not
choose life in the West of his own free will but was ei-
ther duped or abducted by hostile governments.
Past Repatriation Campaigns
During the 1920s and the mid-1950s, the usual
prohibition against emigres returning was temporarily
lifted. During these periods, the Soviet Union em-
barked on a multifaceted campaign to undermine the
emigrations as an external anti-Soviet political force.
The methods employed included the granting of a
general amnesty from the crime of deserting the
motherland, the circulation within emigre communi-
ties of newspapers and pamphlets encouraging return,
personalized letters and radio appeals to individual
emigres, personal visits from Soviets traveling abroad,
and threats of reprisal against relatives and friends
still in the USSR. In a few cases, emigre leaders were
kidnaped and subsequent statements from the USSR
denouncing the emigre movement were attributed to
them.
Appeals to the exile community were designed to play
on the national feelings of the expatriates, to convince
them that a basic change of policy and conditions had
taken place in the Soviet Union (in the 1920s, with the
New Economic Policy, and, in the 1950s, with de-
Stalinization) and to convey the impression that re-
turning was danger free. In the 1920s, special atten-
tion was concentrated on luring back the
intelligentsia, who were called on to "work with the
whole people for the reconstruction of the country."
Strong Russian nationalism motivated many of the
intellectual repatriates, who included writers Alexey
Tolstoy, Nikolay Gogol, Ivan Kuprin, and Marina
Tsvetayeva.
In 1921, 121,000 emigres returned to the USSR,
followed by 60,000 over the next eight years. Between
January 1955 and February 1956, 245 emigres re-
turned to the USSR
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In some respects these two earlier repatriation cam-
paigns resemble the one that is now emerging. Both
came at a time when the party was embarking on
economic or political reform, moving to relax stric-
tures on cultural life, attempting to build bridges to
the intelligentsia, and seeking to forge a bond between
the regime and society.
In other regards the earlier campaigns were conduct-
ed under political circumstances that were strikingly
different:
? In both of the earlier periods the Soviet leadership
probably regarded the emigration as a serious sub-
versive threat to the regime.
? The character of the emigration was different. The
earlier emigration waves included many Russians as
well as members of minority Soviet nationalities,
rather than mostly Jews. Also, many of those who
returned to the USSR might have been people
displaced by war?the Civil War of the 1920s and
World War II.
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