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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00295R000300360002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
France:
The Immigrant Problem
A Research Paper
-Sec1gt
EUR 86-10039
November 1986
Copy 318
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Directorate of
Intelligence
France:
The Immigrant Problem
Issues and Applications Division, EURA,
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EUR 86-10039
November 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 12 September 1986
was used in this report.
The Immigrant Problem I 25X1'
France:
faces continual problems in passing legislation.
One of the key issues in the recent election in France was the large
immigrant-in particular, North African-communities in most French
cities. The kidnaping of French journalists in Lebanon one week before the
March legislative election increased popular hostility toward Arab immi-
grants and caused some last-minute swing from center-right parties toward
Jean-Marie Le Pen and his extreme-right National Front. 'T'his has had an
impact on subsequent events because it gave Prime Minister Jacques
Chirac such a slim majority in the National Assembly that his government
polity.
The proportion of immigrants in the French population has increased only
slightly since the 1930s, but today's immigrants come largely from the
Third World, especially North Africa, and are far more visible. There are
now about 3 million North African Arabs-or about 5 percent of the
population-living in France. They occupy mostly low-paying, unskilled
jobs, cluster at the lower edge of the social stratum, and remain largely
apolitical. Even second-generation Arab immigrants resist integration into
French society, perhaps out of ethnic pride, and maintain their own culture
and religion in the midst of the culture-conscious and culture-proud French
Tougher policies toward Arab immigrants respond to the French public's
perception that these foreigners contribute to the social problems of
unemployment, housing, education, and crime-particularly violent crime
and terrorism:
? Many Frenchmen believe that immigrant labor-which played an essen-
tial role in rebuilding the economy after World War II--now represents
an economic drain -on the country. They point out, correctly, that
foreigners send much of their income back to their home countries and
claim they draw a "disproportionate" share of benefits from a social
welfare program that is in deepening financial difficulty. The public also
focuses on the number of jobs held by foreigners in a time of high
unemployment.
? Arab immigrants form highly visible enclaves in public housing projects
on the fringes of most French industrial cities, especially around Paris
and the south.
Secret
EUR 86-10039
November 1986
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? The immigrant birthrate far exceeds the French, and Arab children
crowd ghetto schools and special education programs.
? North African immigrants account for a much larger share of arrests and
convictions for misdemeanors, homicides, and drug trafficking than their
share of the population should warrant. About 16 percent of the inmates
in French jaits as of 1983 are from North Africa.
? Arabs are often involved in opposition activities directed against their
home country governments-but they are also beginning to figure
prominently in indigenous French terrorist groups such as Direct Action.
We believe that the sheer number of North Africans in France has
provided cover for Middle Eastern terrorists, many of whom carry North
African passports.
The government's response to these problems has been somewhat schizo-
phrenic, alternately clumping immigrants together in specific neighbor-
hoods on the outskirts of major population centers and then attempting to
disperse them when their French neighbors complain about the foreign
presence. Both policy approaches appear designed primarily to make Arab
immigrants less visible:
? Some government officials might like simply to expel the foreigners-
and, indeed, Chirac's government has proposed easing the expulsion
procedures for those involved in criminal activity and for the illegal
immigrants that make up perhaps 10 percent of the alien population.
Although mainstream French political parties are likely to maintain this
tough posture toward the Arab population, they become somewhat
constrained when in power by traditional French desires for harmonious
relations with former colonies in Africa and by pressures from French
human rights organizations and leftwing parties.
? Over the longer term, we believe official policy will focus increasingly on
assimilating Arab immigrants into France, especially through programs
aimed at children within the school system, although this policy has met
little success to date.
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Tensions stemming from the immigrant population are likely to be highest
during times of high unemployment and crime and whenever Middle
Eastern terrorism erupts against French targets or interests. If Arabs take
a more activist stance outside the political system by engaging in organized
protests, for example, or through increased terrorist activity, we think the
state of uneasy coexistence could give way to a cyclical escalation of
French repression and Arab violence.
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Contents
Summary
iii
Demographics of the Immigrant Population
1
The Changing Face of Immigration
1
Immigration and the Economy
3
Political Behavior of Immigrants
4
Immigrants and Terrorism
8
The French Response to Immigration
9
Historical Background 19
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France:
The Immigrant Problem
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Immigrants have entered France throughout the 20th
century, but the current immigrant "problem"-capi-
talized on by Jean-Marie Le Pen and his far-right
National Front party-appeared only in the 1970s.
The economic slowdown following the 1973-74 oil
price hikes created severe unemployment problems for
domestic workers as well as for immigrants who were
recruited in the 1960s and who were becoming perma-
nent residents. Government officials in the 1960s had
assumed that these foreign recruits-particularly the
large number of unskilled North Africans-would fill
a temporary demand for labor in France and then
return home. As the Arabs began to settle, bring in
their families, and have children, French resent-
ment-focusing on social problems associated with
this culturally distinct, economically deprived foreign
community-expressed itself first through a growing
number of open attacks on Arabs in the street and
later through support of Le Pen's racist platform in
the election booth. The settlement of Third World
immigrants and the growing racism prompted by it
have contributed to the contradictory nature of
French immigrant policy-which has attempted alter-
nately to isolate and to assimilate the foreign popula-
tion. The elevation of Middle Eastern terrorism in
France in recent weeks has drawn new attention to
the large North African immigrant community in
that country. This paper examines the rise of the
"immigrant problem" in France in recent years and
the policy the French are developing to deal with this
issue.
Authorities disagree about the exact number of for-
eign residents in France. The March 1982 census put
the total at 3,680,100-6.8 percent of the population.
Only three months earlier, however, the Ministry of
Interior figured the number of foreigners at
4,223,000, or 7.8 percent of the total. The French
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
pointed out that the difference was due to varying
data collection methods. Illiteracy and a high degree
of mobility meant that some foreigners were left
uncounted by the census. The Ministry of Interior
count, however, was based on the number of residency
permits issued, a method that probably overcounted
the immigrant population because it disregarded those
that have left France. We estimate that the number of
legally resident aliens in France probably fell some-
where between these two 1982 calculations-around 4
million people. Assuming a natural increase of about
3 percent over the period, today's foreign residents
would number roughly 4.5 million.
total population.
Beyond these numbers, the labor ministry estimates
300,000 illegal immigrants reside in France. In addi-
tion, many French citizens culturally belong to the
foreign population as well:
? The harkis, Algerians who collaborated with Paris
during the Algerian war, fled to France after the
war, and have maintained their French citizen-
ship-they number around 400,000.'
? The beurs, second-generation Arabs who were born
in France, many of whom have French citizenship
but who remain culturally apart--as many as
800,000 young people may fall into this category.
? Naturalized foreigners-although most are from
Western Europe (more than a quarter of a million
between 1970 and 1980), at least 55,000 North
Africans were naturalized during these same years.
Taken altogether, the foreign presence in France is
probably about 6 million people, or 11 percent of the
The Changing Face of Immigration
The proportion of immigrants in the French popula-
tion (see table 1) has increased only slightly since the
1930s, but today's immigrants are mainly non-
European and thus far more visible. The number of
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Table 1
Foreigners in France, 1911-75
Immigrants in
Total Population a
Total Population
of France
(millions)
From
Europe
From
Third
World
1921
38.8
3.6
0.3
1931
41.2
5.8
0.8
1936
41.2
4.7
0.6
1946
39.8
3.9
0.5
1954
42.8
3.3
0.9
1962
46.4
3.4
1.3
Figure 1
Foreigners in France,
1881-1982 a
Portuguese
Italians
Spanish
Polish
Belgians
Europeans entering France since 1945 has increased Third World Immigrants
moderately while the number of Third World immi-
grants has grown rapidly and substantially (see
figure 1). In fact, from 1975 to 1980, the total
European immigrant population residing in France
dropped almost 350,000-partially because about
100,000 of them became French citizens during this
time-while the number of Africans grew more than
400,000. From 1975 to 1982, according to census
figures, the Moroccan population jumped 65 percent,
the number of Tunisians rose 36 percent, and resi-
Maghrebians Asians
Algerians Africans
Asians, still a small minority and mostly from Indo-
china, nearly tripled during these years.
Some of the foreign population growth results from
natural increase. Sensational press articles emphasize
that a large number of women of childbearing age
enter the country. The annual birthrate among
French women is two births per 1,000, while that of
non-European female immigrants, although declining,
is still almost five births per 1,000. Alarmists insist
that by the year 2000 France will no longer be
culturally French
Moroccans Turks
Tunisians
'Decline in various immigrant populations is due not only to their
departure but also to aquisition of citizenship.
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Figure 2
Distribution of Gainfully Employed
Foreigners and French in 1982, by
Socioprofessional Category
F-I Foreigners
0 French
Farmers
Skilled trades
Executive and
professional
White collar
Nonskilled
workers
T
Figure 3
Distribution of Work Force,
by Economic Sectors
French and
Foreigners
The concentration of immigrants in only a few areas
increases their visibility. North Africans tend to clus-
ter in slums on the outskirts of industrial areas. Over
half the foreigners reside in three regions: Ile-
de-France (the Paris region), Rhone-Alpes (the area
around Lyon), and Provence-Cote d'Azur (the Mar-
seille region.) The Paris region alone contains 30
percent of all the foreigners in France.
Immigration and the Economy
Approximately 1.5 million of the regularly resident
foreigners in France-about 6 percent of the total
work force-are employed. The vast majority of all
STAT
3106711086 STAT
foreign workers-and roughly 90 percent of North
African workers-are unskilled or semiskilled labor-
ers, often occupying the lowest paid, least desirable
jobs (see figures 2 and 3). According to census figures,
most immigrants are employed in industry-particu-
larly in the automobile, metalworking, and textile
industries. Many foreigners also work in day labor
construction jobs. The third-largest concentration of
immigrant employees-many of whom are women-
is in the service sector, primarily in sales, food
Agriculture
2
Undetermined
4
Service
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services, and hotel jobs. A large number of Portuguese
women also work in private domestic service. Most
immigrants earn minimum wage and, like their
French counterparts, receive transfer payments (social
security benefits, housing subsidies, unemployment
compensation) that constitute one-third of their total
disposable income.
Many Frenchmen believe that immigrant labor-
which played an essential role in rebuilding the
economy after World War II-now represents an
economic drain in several ways. A large portion of the
incomes of foreign workers leaves France in the form
of remittances to their countries of origin; for exam-
ple, France's balance of payments for 1983 had an
outflow of $570 million in foreign worker transfers
destined for the Maghreb. These same foreigners-
who by and large occupy the lowest economic class-
draw disproportionately large benefits from a social
welfare program in deepening financial difficulty. The
public also focuses on the number of jobs occupied by
foreigners in a time of high domestic unemployment.
In addition, North African workers played a large
part in the strikes that disrupted the country's auto-
mobile industry from mid-1982 until March 1983.
The concentration of North Africans in the automo-
bile industry around Paris made them highly visible
and much of the press coverage of the events featured
striking Maghrebian assembly line workers prevent-
ing Asian production workers and native French
supervisory and white-collar employees from perform-
ing their jobs.
Despite popular resentment of foreign workers, they
do play a positive role in the French economy. Foreign
employment in the lowest paying jobs keeps produc-
tion costs low. In addition-contrary to extremist
rhetoric that blames immigrants for unemployment-
foreigners can be seen as a cushion for the French
unemployment rate. They tend to be the first to be
laid off in times of economic hardship, and they are
the first to be replaced by new technology. From 1975
to 1982 the number of unemployed Frenchmen nearly
doubled, but the number of unemployed foreigners
tripled. Unemployment now stands at 10 percent
among the French, but at almost 14 percent among
foreigners. The latter figure varies markedly by na-
tionality; immigrant Portuguese are unemployed at
about the same rate as the French, while about 22
percent of Algerians are without work.
The degree of immigrant integration into France-
and therefore into French political life-varies by
nationality. Southern Europeans and Asians are well
suited for life in France. Most of the people natural-
ized each year in France are from other European
nations. Asians also integrate well. The Asian com-
munity is small enough to remain inoffensive to the
general French population, and its history and culture
serve to its advantage in France. Many of the recent
Asian immigrants perceive France to be a haven from
the political strife they knew in French Indochina.
Moreover, their colonial contact and their own culture
equip them with at least nominal Catholicism, some
knowledge of the French language, a willingness to
work hard for monetary security, and a high regard
for education-particularly French education.
The Arabs in France do not fit in as well as the
Europeans and Asians-nor do most of them try to fit
in (see inset). French involvement in North Africa-
which included large-scale settlement of whites, par-
ticularly in Algeria-was heavy and direct. Neverthe-
less, most North Africans steadfastly clung to their
Islamic faith and culture throughout the French
occupation, shunning French institutions-especially
the educational system-as not only foreign but sacri-
legious. Many North Africans still reject French
language, education, and culture as symbols of a
foreign and unholy invader and view participation in
French society as a form of national and religious
betrayal.
Most immigrants who do not become naturalized
French citizens remain inactive in politics, both in
France and at home. Those who do become active
usually are involved in home country politics-often
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Islam forms the foundation on which the Arab com-
munity in France bases many of its social and
cultural institutions. Neighborhood mosques serve as
gathering places for the community. Muslim brother-
hoods act as Islamic support groups. Arab radio
stations broadcast not only popular Arabic music and
Middle Eastern news, but they also feature sermons
and call-in talk shows with well-known Islamic reli-
gious figures. In essence, maintaining cultural purity
has become nearly a form of jihad or holy war for
many Arab immigrants. Thus, the divide between
Frenchmen and Arab immigrants is partly the prod-
uct of a Muslim separatism that eschews any integra-
tion as sinful, all the more so now, when Muslim
religious fervor takes on violently anti-Western tones.
This cultural distinctiveness is less evident among the
harkis from Algeria, who collaborated with the
French during the Algerian struggle for independence
and came to France after the war as refugees. They
have maintained their French citizenship and do not
harbor the same bitterness toward France as do other
North Africans. In fact, the harkis are often political-
ly conservative and-like the European pieds noirs
who fled Algeria-are probably more disturbed by
the growing number of North African immigrants
than are other Frenchmen. Nonetheless, since they
are physically indistinguishable from other Arabs,
the general public often subjects them to the same
treatment as other Arab immigrants.
Second-generation North African immigrants-the
beurs in French slang-also maintain a distinct
culture. Many of these young people have a right to
French citizenship but choose to retain their Algeri-
an, Moroccan, or Tunisian nationality out of defi-
ance, ethnic pride, or respect for parental wishes.
Nevertheless, they cannot truly lay claim to a North
African homeland that most of them have never seen.
They are coping by developing a subculture of their
own. Beur rock groups, artists, writers, dance
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a place for these young people that acknowledges
both their French and North African roots. Mounsi, a
North African immigrant singer, recently produced
an album showing him on the cover with a small
French flag in his mouth and an Algerian flag in his
hand. The 30-year-old singer explains the picture this
way: `I have the flag in my mouth because the words
it emits are in French. The Algerian flag says I know
what history I am the product of and I don't forget
it. '
as expatriate dissidents. A few children of immigrants
have attempted in recent years to mobilize second-
generation immigrants, but with little success.
Politics at Home ...
Home governments often promote participation in
home country politics as a means of controlling their
emigrants. Moroccans living abroad were even grant-
ed five seats in Morocco's parliament in 1984-two of
which are reserved for Moroccans in France. Most
homeland governments maintain ties to their emigre
communities in France through their embassies and
consuls and by founding and supporting fraternal
organizations. These associations serve to support the
home country regime and to keep track of opposition
activities in the emigre community. The Association
of Algerians in Europe (AAE) is the largest such
organization in France. The Association offers cultur-
al activities and language classes-often with the
financial and logistic assistance of the French Govern-
ment. In addition, the AAE supports religious leaders
within France to watch over the immigrants' spiritual
welfare.
The French Government generally looks with favor on
these organizations, believing that if foreign workers
remain involved in their home countries they will be
less interested in French politics and more interested
in eventually going home (see inset). Further, in the
case of former colonies where the French retain some
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Repatriation: Immigrants Go Home
The French instituted a system of repatriation assis-
tance in 1977 that was designed to encourage immi-
grants to go home. The plan was abandoned in 1981
and reinstituted in 1985. Under the new system, the
state pays the immigrant the equivalent of more than
$2,000 plus a moving allowance ranging from about
$275 to more than $1,000, depending on the composi-
tion of the worker's family. In addition, the unem-
ployment insurance system (UNEDIC) pays in a lump
sum all the compensation the worker would be
entitled to if he remained in France and did not find a
job-an amount that could be $5,000 or more. The
employer signs an agreement with the National Im-
migration Office (ONI) to pay the departing immi-
grant over $1,500 plus indemnities for dismissal.
Employers have also been known to offer additional
funds or easy terms for the purchase of equipment or
a car. Thus, workers may receive from $11,000 to
$17,000 in return for repatriating to their homelands.
Some attempt is made to integrate the plans of the
returnees with the needs of their home countries, so
as not to disrupt the economies of these countries.
The capital the workers bring with them is beneficial
for home country economies, and the skills and
equipment these workers obtain in France aid devel-
opment in their native lands. But returning workers
may exacerbate the usually delicate employment
situation in their home countries that prompted them
to seek employment abroad in the first place. It is
doubtful that a one-time increase in capital brought
home by returning workers outweighs a continuing
flow of remittances had the workers remained
abroad. For example, official Moroccan estimates
indicate that remittances from foreign workers are
that country's number-one source of foreign currency,
and the World Bank estimates that 20 to 25 percent
of all the bank deposits in Morocco originate in the
foreign worker community.
Hassan Moutahir, currently Moroccan Ambassador
to Sweden and former Secretary General of the
Ministry of Interior, pointed out to US Embassy
officials in Rabat the political implications of these
returning emigrants who have been exposed to French
and other "strains of European socialism, union
activism, and other Western ideas. " Moutahir
thought it likely that returning workers could con-
taminate Morocco with these foreign, leftist concepts.
He compared the situation to the mid-1970s, when
40,000 workers expelled from Algeria were confined
to sparsely populated regions in northeastern Moroc-
co until the government was sure they posed no
threat. Furthermore, the social mores learned in
France conflict with those of Islamic North Africa,
posing difficulties particularly for returning women
and children accustomed to the liberal environment
in Europe. As a result of these problems, North
African countries continually request that France
work with them to repatriate foreign workers slowly.
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interest in the internal political situation, Paris views
the immigrant organizations as a stabilizing factor.
Thus, representatives from the AAE and other such
associations have almost diplomatic status in France.
Not all immigrant groups are associated with home
country governments. Leftwing emigre organizations,
independent of either French or home country spon-
sorship, include the Movement of Popular Unity, the
Association of Moroccans in France (AMF), the
Union of Mauritanian Workers, the Committee of
Algerian Workers (CTA), and the Party of the Social-
ist Revolution. These groups foment opposition to
home country regimes by conducting marches, orga-
nizing rallies, holding lectures and meetings, and
publishing antigovernment literature. Paris is tolerant
of their presence as long as their activities remain
nonviolent.
.. And in France
France-like most nations-does not permit resident
aliens to vote and enjoins them from disrupting public
order; French law stipulates further that they must
remain "politically neutral." The latter provision gen-
erally has been interpreted liberally, and France
rarely deports anyone for political activism unless
violence has been involved. No more than a handful of
foreign political activists or trade unionists is expelled
each year, partly because most cases become popular
causes and get overturned through judicial appeal.
Despite the restrictions, foreigners possess certain
rights that form a legal basis for involvement in
French political life. They enjoy freedom of speech, of
association, and of the press within the limits of
security considerations. They have the right to belong
to trade unions and to strike. Except in instances
when illegal aliens are undergoing deportation hear-
ings, foreigners have full procedural rights under the
law, including the right of appeal. They have tenant
rights and can vote in and be elected to tenant
committees. Although they do not have the right to
belong to political parties in France, such membership
is tolerated.
Immigrants have influenced French internal politics
since the 1960s. They have engaged in housing pro-
tests, foreign worker strikes, antiracism protests, and
protests against immigration policies. Foreign resi-
dents often consult with local panels that handle
matters affecting immigrant communities. Further-
more, various institutional allies-including religious,
humanitarian, and civil rights associations-support
foreign workers by informing the public about them
and organizing protests against their condition. How-
ever, recent attempts to organize a voting block of
second-generation immigrants who are eligible for
citizenship has attracted little interest among these
young people, perhaps because no other ethnically
based lobbying group exists within France to serve as
a model.
Membership in labor unions allows foreign workers an
acceptable way to participate in French politics while
sidestepping the law requiring their political neutral-
ity. Most foreign unionists belong to the General
Confederation of Labor (CGT) or the French Demo-
cratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT). Both unions
have reported rapid growth in foreign membership in
recent years, although no exact numbers are available
as nationality is not recorded on union cards. The
numbers are further obscured by the practice of many
foreign workers to share one voting membership-
holding a union card as a bloc rather than as individ-
uals. This method of joining the union may represent
a financial savings to individual members, but it
seems yet another indication that many immigrants
are unwilling to incorporate traditional Western polit-
ical notions of group voting power.
The foreigners are generally organized into national-
ity or language subunits within both the CGT and the
CFDT, although they participate as full members.
The CGT closely controls these subgroups for fear
they will become an organization within an organiza-
tion, dividing foreign from indigenous workers. The
CFDT, on the other hand, allows its local and depart-
mental organizations with large numbers of immi-
grants to undertake autonomous actions on behalf of
foreign workers even without the concurrence of the
national leadership.
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Second-generation foreigners possess the greatest po-
tential for political power because they can easily
become French citizens and exercise full civil rights.
So far, most second-generation Arabs have chosen to
remain aloof from French society, although there are
some indications that this trend is changing. In
September 1983, for example, a number of second-
generation North Africans walked from Marseille to
Paris to protest racism. The marchers more or less
maintained cohesion as a group until after the 1984
municipal election in which the racist National Front
(FN) captured over 10 percent of the vote. At that
point, the group broke into two camps: one wanted to
organize a lobbying strategy representing Arab inter-
ests based on the American-Jewish model; the rest
argued that a separate beur campaign could only lead
to further ghettoization of the Arab community.
The less politically oriented group has become part of
the SOS-Racism youth movement. SOS-Racism-
whose slogan is "Hands off my buddy"-rejects the
lobbying model but is nevertheless involved in civil
rights activism. Based in Paris, the group's founders
range in age from 20 to 30 and come from diverse
ethnic and racial backgrounds. Local chapters,
so-called Stop Racism groups, are springing up
throughout France to monitor incidents involving
immigrants. They are unwilling, however, to define
their interests as unique to second-generation
immigrants.
Camel Adjina, a 28-year-old Marseille socialist mili-
tant of Algerian descent, broke with SOS-Racism,
preferring to organize the beurs into a voting bloc.
According to diplomatic reporting, Adjina formed his
Sahra Party in the fall of 1985 along the lines of
recent movements in the American black community.
He hoped to gain the backing of immigrant North
African community leaders and to mobilize the
young, who are most likely to be eligible to vote.
Muslim businessmen and individual contributors have
supplied his limited finances. He told US officials that
similar movements were forming throughout France
but that there has been no coordination among them.
A Sahra Party rally on 14 February in Marseille
indicated not only that the party has some organiza-
tional problems but also that immigrants may not yet
be ready for political mobilization. Poor publicity, a
hefty admission fee, and a steady rain discouraged all
but about 300 persons. This number dwindled to a few
dozen after the drawing card-a well-known North
African rock group-finished its performance. Adjina
spoke for about a minute and four days later dropped
out of the regional election race.
Immigrants and Terrorism
Foreigners in France-either individually or through
exiled opposition movements-sometimes become in-
volved in terrorist activity. French authorities tolerat-
ed these acts as long as they targeted home country
interests, labeling them "political activities." Recent-
ly, immigrant terrorism seems to focus more on
Israeli, US, and even French interests than on proper-
ty and individuals identified with the terrorists' home
countries. Arabs, in particular, are beginning to figure
prominently among those arrested as members of
French indigenous terrorist groups such as Direct
Action, which sometimes strikes at Israeli sympathiz-
ers. Police reports also indicate that some immigrant
organizations have links to terrorists in France. One
such group is the Marxist-Leninist Movement of Arab
Workers, which often organizes rallies against French
racism]
In addition, the sheer number of North Africans in
France has no doubt provided cover for Middle
Eastern terrorists. Open discussion of a connection
between immigrants and terrorism was rare before
the arrest of a young terrorist in Nancy in early May.
Press reports state that police were distressed
by this young man's assertion that he became involved
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in terrorist activity not for ideological reasons but for
the money-apparently in part to pay for a drug
Table 2
Children Born in France to Married
Couples, by Parents' Citizenship
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habit.
Perhaps in response to the shift in terrorists' targets or
to an awakening awareness that the large Arab
community may increase French susceptibility to
terrorism, official rhetoric on terrorism seems to
indicate that a reevaluation of former "blind-eye"
policies may be under way. At the end of May, the
Chirac government proposed several counterterrorism
measures, including increased scrutiny of identity
papers of foreigners, placing all terrorist cases under
the jurisdiction of Paris, lengthening the period of
detention for suspected terrorists, and increasing the
prison term for terrorism. The government has also
discussed offering monetary rewards and reduced
prison sentences for those willing to turn informant,
allowing the deportation of "menacing" foreigners
without a court action, and increasing French partici-
pation in international counterterrorist efforts.
The French Response to Immigration
Angry and frustrated by high unemployment, deple-
tion of social service resources, and rising crime, all of
which they blame on the increasingly visible North
African presence in their towns and cities, the French
have begun to respond, sometimes violently, to the
"immigrant problem." The French Government dealt
with the immigrants originally at the local level,
where contradictory policies developed that both iso-
lated immigrants-in the hope they would eventually
go home-and tried to cope with their apparent
permanence by encouraging assimilation. More re-
cently, the immigrant issue has entered national-level
politics.
The Social Issues
The French most often associate Third World immi-
grants with the social problems of housing, education,
and crime, focusing especially on the ghettoization of
the Arab community. Press reports indicate that the
French link the deterioration of public housing to the
large size of many immigrant families; they associate
Source: National Institute of Statistics
and Economic Studies (INSEE).
the deterioration of the education system with large
numbers of foreign children in the schools (especially
the primary schools); and they relate rising crime
rates to growing numbers of alienated immigrant
youth who engage in gang violence and petty crime.
The number of immigrants in public housing has
increased steadily since 1968. From 1968 to 1975 the
percentage of immigrants among heads of families
residing in public housing doubled--from 4.4 percent
to 9.2 percent-and we believe it has continued to
grow since then. The proportion of immigrants in
public housing is even higher than this percentage
indicates, since immigrant families, particularly those
from the Third World, are usually larger than French
families. This housing has become especially impor-
tant for North African families. Compared with
native Frenchmen, twice as many Algerians (29 per-
cent) and almost three times as many Algerian women
(49 percent) depend on public housing.
The large percentage of foreign children in the popu-
lation (see table 2) and their concentration in specific
neighborhoods means some schools are flooded with
immigrant children. A little more than 1 million
students of foreign nationality-about half of them
non-European-attended French schools in 1984, and
almost all (95 percent) of them were in the public
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educational system, where they accounted for 10
percent of the enrollment. In Paris nearly a quarter of
the public school children are immigrants; again,
almost half of them are non-European. In the Lyon
region the percentage of immigrant children is lower
than in Paris (17 percent), but nearly two-thirds have
non-European backgrounds. Similarly, in Nice and
Marseille, the percentage of immigrant children is
only slightly higher than the national average, but
almost two-thirds of them are non-European, mostly
from North Africa. In all cases, the number of both
immigrant and Third World children is growing. In
some schools with a large population of non-European
children, European parents (not exclusively French
parents) have withdrawn their children, claiming their
education is held back by the presence of so,,many
non-European youngsters.
Popular concern about rising crime rates and urban
violence intertwines with the issues of immigrants in
public housing and schools. Neighborhoods with large
numbers of immigrants are considered "unsafe."
Likewise, French parents, and on occasion French
students, blame Third World immigrant children for
petty violence in schools. Local authorities report
withdrawals of European children from schools osten-
sibly because of this violence. Moreover, at least one
student strike, held in a secondary school in St.
Etienne, was directed against immigrant students and
called for the "restoration of discipline."
The immigrant population does seem to commit more
than its share of crimes in France, in part because it
contains disproportionate numbers of those most like-
ly to commit crime: the young, the unemployed, and
the poor. Although foreigners account for 11 percent
of the population in France, police records for 1983
attribute 15 percent of all misdemeanors, 23 percent
of all homicides, and 58 percent of drug trafficking
incidents to foreigners. Nearly 16 percent of those in
jail as of 31 October 1983 were North Africans.
Whereas the number of native French juvenile delin-
quents decreased by 3 million from 1973 to 1980, the
number of immigrant delinquents increased by 4
million during that same period. The following tabu-
lation presents the total numbers of arrests in 1984
(the figures are taken from the Ministry of Justice):
Total
Total
Foreigners Jailed
Jailed
Foreigners
for Illegal Residence
89,127
23,584
4,402
(74 percent
(77.8 percent
(50.9 percent
French)
Maghrebian)
Maghrebian)
Local Policies
Local officials, in concert with national administrative
representatives, have attempted to alleviate public
concerns about the foreign population by developing
policies that make immigrants less visible. Initially,
they encouraged immigrant ghettoization by grouping
foreigners in particular neighborhoods on the out-
skirts of major cities. Immigrants probably preferred
to live in areas comfortably surrounded by their own
people. As their numbers grew, however, local resi-
dents began to complain and policymakers reacted by
shifting their focus to the dispersion and the assimila-
tion of Third World immigrants. Both policy ap-
proaches aim at decreasing immigrant visibility either
by isolating them in their own neighborhoods or by
dispersing and absorbing them into the French popu-
lation.
In the Paris region, housing offices sent immigrants to
the old, crowded developments on the periphery of the
city. This pattern also occurred in the suburbs of
Lyon. One of the largest public housing developments
in France, Les Minguettes, is in the Lyon suburb of
Venissieux. Half the population of Venissieux lives in
the development; 62 percent of these residents are
immigrants and two-thirds of these are non-European.
As the number of Third World immigrants grew in
certain areas of France, local officials began to use
quotas to limit the number of immigrants in a given
housing project. Indeed, authorities in Villeurbanne,
another Lyon suburb, decided in the late 1970s to
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purchase Olivier de Serre-a privately owned lower-
class housing project-with the express purpose of
tearing it down and thus dispersing the North Afri-
cans clustered there.
Officials often tilted educational policies as well to
control the numbers of Third World immigrants
attending any one school. For instance, in 1979, the
prefect of the Rhone Department, under pressure
from local authorities, issued a circular strongly urg-
ing that new immigrants be prevented from settling in
neighborhoods where 45 percent or more of the
elementary school children were from foreign fam-
ilies. Similarly, the municipal government of Villeur-
banne, which is responsible for delineating local
school districts, and the Ministry of National Educa-
tion agreed to redraw the boundaries for three schools
in order to eliminate the ghettoization of one of the
schools, described by the press as "entirely Arab."
Several municipalities also have set quotas for school-
related social services. In 1978 the government of the
Paris suburb of Ivry abandoned a traditional distribu-
tion of used clothing to deprived children when it was
found that 80 percent of the recipients were foreign
children. In January 1981 the same municipality
announced that the number of immigrant children
attending the city's summer camp would be limited to
15 percent of the total. The authorities argued that in
some of the camps over half the children present were
foreign, and the quota would serve to "limit and push
back the weight of immigration."
One of the basic problems now confronting the French
educational system is how to deal with the high
failure rate among non-European immigrant children
and how to help them assimilate into French society
(see inset). The percentage of foreigners in special
classes for those with educational difficulties is twice
as great as that in general education classes, and the
proportion of Maghrebians in these classes is greater
than that of foreign students of other origins. French
educators estimate that 80 percent of immigrant
children emerge from the French school system with
great difficulties in basic skills.
A Ministry of Justice study conducted in a sector of
Paris containing a large number of foreigners showed
that the penal process also treats immigrants differ-
ently, contributing to their high rate of arrest and
conviction. The police admitted to targeting immi-
grants for surveillance more often than they do native
Frenchmen. Moreover, the report showed that, for the
same infractions, the police sent on to the public
prosecutor's office 35 percent of the metropolitan
French and 38 percent of the French from the
overseas territories, but 47 percent of the African and
63 percent of the Maghrebian cases. Racism in the
justice system may account in part for this phenome-
non, but the transient lifestyle of many immigrants
contributes as well. The police said that they pre-
ferred to proceed with cases in which they thought the
offender might never be located again should he be
released.
National Politics and the Immigrant Issue
The issue of immigration exploded onto the national
scene during the presidential election campaign of
1981. Ironically, anti-immigrant sentiment was first
seized on by the left, when Communist candidate
Georges Marchais expressed support for several anti-
immigrant actions in Communist-governed towns.
The most dramatic of these occurred in the Paris
suburb of Vitry, where the mayor led an irate
crowd-which included some of the municipal council
members-in a march against a newly installed wor-
kers' dormitory occupied by Malians. The city au-
thorities attacked the dormitory with a bulldozer, cut
off the water and electricity, and demanded that the
occupants leave. The Socialists in Vitry supported
what had been done, and a Socialist mayor in the
region stated that such difficulties were inevitable in
locations with a high concentration of immigrants.
In 1983 thinly disguised racial rhetoric reappeared,
this time in conservative campaigns. In local elections
that year, the right linked high unemployment and
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French policies for educating immigrant children
have swung from trying to assimilate them into
regular classrooms to segregating and teaching them
in their own languages. The most recent program
combines both ideas: integration into French society
and reaffirmation of Arab culture.
The Ministry of National Education established ori-
entation and remedial classes in the early 1970s to
help children with learning difficulties integrate into
the French system. These programs were ostensibly
open to any child who needed them, but they were
established in areas with large foreign populations.
A second program began in 1975 and 1976 to educate
foreign children in their own language and about
their native culture. Immigrant children were to
receive one-third of their instruction in their native
language as part of the normal curriculum or to take
special language and culture classes outside the
normal curriculum. France cosponsored these pro-
grams with the countries of origin, which recruited
the necessary teachers. Both the French and North
African governments supported these programs in the
hope that, by maintaining links to their home coun-
tries, these children might be encouraged to repatri-
ate someday.
The Socialist government, perhaps recognizing that
large numbers of immigrants choose to remain in
France, moved back toward assimilating the children
into French culture, a step that brought it more in
line with rightwing educational theory. The move was
prompted by a government report that concluded
that, although nearly 70 percent of the children of
foreign origin entering primary school were born in
France and speak French when they enter school, few
can hope to master written French under the present
system. The remedial classes, rather than integrating
them into normal courses, cut them off altogether
and left many in special programs intended only for
the handicapped. In addition, native language teach-
ers recruited by the home countries often proved to be
unqualified, and the programs themselves seemed to
disrupt the children's normal educational routine.
Remedial classes will now be reserved for the 20,000
non-French-speaking children entering school each
year; native language and cultural programs will be
incorporated into the normal curriculum and opened
to French children as well as immigrant children.
The remedial courses will teach intensive French,
seeking to move students into the regular program as
quickly as possible. The schools around Lille, Ver-
sailles, Paris, and Lyon will conduct experimental
programs aimed at helping immigrant children suc-
ceed in school on the same level with French children.
Although the former Socialist government began this
new program, the Conservatives are likely to continue
with it. Officials claim that this new approach will no
longer doom immigrant children to life in an ethnic
ghetto, and the assimilationist goal also benefits the
French. Foreign children, by being put through the
same programs as other French children, will obtain
some of the tools necessary to succeed in French
society. Even the National Front agrees that, if these
young foreigners are going to stay in France, it is
important that they be incorporated into the culture.
The French hope that eventually assimilation will
move immigrants up the economic ladder, move them
out of their ghettos, and reduce the potential for a
militant Islamic movement on French soil.
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Figure 4
Comparison Between Foreign Population and National Front Vote Distributions
Percentage of foreigners
in the population in 1982,
by Department
10 and above
7 to 10
4 to 7
1 to 4
Less than 1
Region boundary
Department boundary
Percentage of votes cast for
the National Front Party
European Election,
June 1984
15 and above
10 to 15
-? -Saint
"\ Etieni
Local Election,
March 1985
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crime to the presence of immigrants. Jean-Marie Le
Pen and his extreme-right National Front party
spearheaded this campaign and skillfully maneuvered
alliances with moderate rightists in order to defeat
leftwing candidates. The Front captured between 9
and 17 percent of that vote; in June 1984 it won a
surprising 11 percent of the national vote in the
European Parliamentary election. The FN dropped
slightly in the 1985 local elections but still attracted 9
percent of the nationwide tally.
Many mainline politicians were suprised at the level
of support received by the FN-which, since its
foundation in 1972, had been a haven for an extreme-
right political fringe. Exit polls after the June ballot-
ing showed clearly that Le Pen succeeded best among
voters concerned about unemployment and immi-
grants. A poll printed in the 29 April 1985 issue of Le
Point also suggests a connection between the immi-
gration issue and voting behavior. When asked their
reaction to several different hypothetical situations
with Jews, Asians, and Arabs, the respondents dem-
onstrated a remarkable aversion to Arabs. Analysis of
the poll data indicates that French living in the
southeast, the Mediterranean districts, and the
north-all regions with high concentrations of for-
eigners-are the least sympathetic to foreigners and
minority groups. These same regions have been
strongholds of support for the FN (see figure 4).
Growing concern about immigration-71 percent of
the French polled in the fall of 1985 thought immigra-
tion would play an "essential" or "important" role in
the legislative election in March 1986-led center-
right parties to co-opt the issue. In fact, mainline
parties on both sides of the political spectrum inte-
grated some of Le Pen's milder rhetoric into their
platforms for the National Assembly election, leading
to an apparent decline in the FN fortunes in the early
stages of the campaign. However, the kidnaping of
French journalists in Lebanon immediately before the
election apparently created an anti-Arab backlash
among voters, who supported the Front by as much as
25 percent in some regions of the country. In the end,
Le Pen's party received about 10 percent of the vote
nationwide and captured 35 seats in the National
Assembly. Moreover, in the election of regional coun-
cils held the same day, conservative control became
dependent on the FN in six of the 25 regions.
Current Policies
The conservative coalition's platform for the March
legislative election emphasized the control of illegal
immigration and a tightening of naturalization proce-
dures. It called for stricter surveillance of immigrants
at ports of entry and throughout France, deportation
of illegal immigrants, and punishment of those who
aid illegals. The platform also proposed altering the
naturalization process, stating that citizenship should
not be automatically granted to long-term residents or
to children born in France of foreign parents (see
figure 5). A controversial clause proposing that non-
citizens receive lower social benefits than citizens was
finally dropped, but the platform did state that legally
resident foreigners should be asked to seek citizenship,
to sign a guest worker contract specifying rights and
duties different from those of citizenship, or to leave
France.
Since coming to power, the coalition government has
taken important steps toward the implementation of
much of this program. The Minister of the Interior,
Charles Pasqua, and the Minister for Public Security,
Robert Pandraud, have taken charge of much of the
immigrant issue. Both have strong security enforce-
ment credentials, reflecting in our judgment a shift in
focus from immigration as a broad social issue to
treating the specific problems associated with immi-
grants-in particular law-and-order concerns. The
government has proposed a bill tightening the avail-
ability of entry visas, raising requirements for obtain-
ing resident alien status, and empowering the police to
make spot checks of identification cards and to deport
illegal aliens. Although the Socialists contested the
use of identification cards, this portion of the govern-
ment's proposals was approved by the Constitutional
Council in late August 1986. We believe that once
this bill-which will simplify the deportation pro-
cess-becomes law, the government will proceed with
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Figure 5
Acquiring French Citizenship
Frantala ae nuance
am aa,Mf de ripudiv
to nAWWIl Aa*&e 818 am
Fnrcala i la nai ante,
awc beullf de nipuder
to natlpWllf Bala 818 ana
a31MM Epa geri Is naluna,
Franpala i q ma/a0f dP*
mac p uI 1ll i dt didlno
is Mwandi f hanpla.
11
French by birth,
unable to
repudiate French
nationality at age
18.
ff]
French at birth,
able to repudiate
French nationality
at age 18.
Foreigner at birth,
French at legal
age with the right
to decline French
nationality.
Deux parents strangers nes en France
ou dans une ancienne colonie
enfant n6 en France
Two foreign parents born in
France or in a former
colony and the child born
in France.
Deux parents strangers
dont un seul est ne en France
ou dans une ancienne colonie
" + en fant ns en France
Two foreign parents of
which one is born in France
or in a former colony and
the child born in France.
One French parent and the One French parent and the
child born in France. child born outside of
France.
Deux parents strangers pas nes en France
ni dans une ancienne colonie
Two foreign parents born
neither in France nor in a
former colony and the child
born in France.
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its announced intention to restructure the naturaliza-
tion process. The ease with which young people may
receive citizenship is especially important as their
high rate of juvenile delinquency makes them prime
targets under these new deportation regulations.
North African immigrants will, in our judgment,
continue to provoke considerable hostility, in particu-
lar because of high unemployment, Arab unwilling-
ness to assimilate, and immigrant involvement in
crimes (especially violent crimes). Although proposed
new regulations crack down on individuals hoping to
come to France on tourist visas, it will be difficult to
prevent family migration. More important, the high
birthrate of Third World immigrants means that the
number of young people born in France yet culturally
foreign will continue to increase, further straining
school facilities and social services.
Some humanitarian groups will continue to support
immigrant causes, but most French political parties
are likely to respond to popular concern about immi-
gration and crime by calling for increased controls on
the North African community. Although the coalition
government's approach to immigration is mild com-
pared with FN proposals, the coalition holds only a
two-vote majority in the National Assembly without
the FN. This majority-which depends on the loyalty
of several independent conservatives-is slim enough,
and the immigrant issue is explosive enough that we
believe the government may feel obliged to push
vigorous legislation, regardless of any civil rights
concerns the left might raise. Moreover, FN power in
regional councils may well shape local housing, educa-
tion, and law enforcement policy in ways that will
affect immigrant lifestyles significantly. Given the
current national mood, foreigners are likely to face
greater legal constraints, tighter border controls, and
more frequent police sweeps in search of illegal,
immigrants than at any time since the 1970s.
The French are unlikely to resort to mass expulsions
or to increasing bonuses for departing guest workers.
Paris probably shares the concern of North African
capitals that rapid repatriation of immigrants would
have a destabilizing effect on the home countries. The
French probably also would worry that such draconi-
an tactics would tarnish their image among Third
World countries, particularly former colonies that
look to France as the leader of la francophonie. In
addition, budgetary constraints argue against increas-
ing repatriation bonuses. Instead, the French seem
likely to try longer term solutions in the hope that
expanded employment, educational reforms, and po-
litical participation will eventually help assimilate the
Arab population.
Immigrant attitudes will be shaped in part by the
nature of future French immigration policy. There
seems to be little reason, however, to believe that
foreigners-especially Arabs-will integrate into
France socially or politically any time soon. Policies
cracking down on the immigrant population are hard-
ly designed to inspire cooperation among these groups.
Arab young people face a bleak future: they have no
real country, little chance for employment, and are
growing up in an environment of violence, crime, and
drug abuse. They may choose, as a result, not to
become involved in the French system, becoming
more radically separatist than their parents and cling-
ing to Islamic fundamentalism. A small group of
these young people are likely, in our opinion, to
become involved in criminal activity and will be
susceptible for recruitment by terrorist groups
We believe that immigrants will continue to be unable
to form their own political movements within the
traditional French political system. Indeed, in our
judgment, immigrants can participate in French poli-
tics and society only through public assimilation.
Unsuccessful attempts to organize second-generation
immigrants into a political party indicate that even
the immigrant community does not support the for-
mation of an Arab lobby. The weight of French
history, which has worked to unify and centralize the
country, further works against founding political
groups based on specific interests or common ethnic
backgrounds. Immigrant youth who find jobs are
likely to continue to join labor unions, and they could
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use this venue to participate in French politics. How-
ever, US Embassy reporting indicates that unions are
no longer playing as vital a role in the domestic
political scene as they once did. Like the Asians,
Arabs will have to find a means of "fitting in" to
French culture if they hope to better themselves
economically. They will have to learn to succeed on
French terms. School programs that aim at assimilat-
ing immigrant youth will help these young people cut
a place for themselves in France, but the process will
be slow.
This state of uneasy coexistence could rupture if Arab
immigrants in France become more involved in activi-
ties outside the traditional political system. For exam-
ple, immigrants could protest tougher French counter-
terrorism measures by stepping up terrorist activities
in France, which may have been the case in the recent
bombings protesting the continued imprisonment of
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
leader Georges Ibrahim Abdallah. In the longer term,
a change in the state of affairs in the Middle East-
such as a rise in Islamic fundamentalism due to an
Iranian victory over Iraq or a flareup in the Arab-
Israeli conflict-could prompt a rise in Arab activism
in France. The response of all French political parties
to increased Arab protests and terrorist activity would
no doubt be to increase controls on resident foreigners
and to tighten immigration restrictions. In addition,
we believe increased Arab activism might cause an
impression among voters that mainline parties are
unable to deal with the immigration problem and
related security issues, thereby causing a resurgence
of support for the FN. Some extremists might even
engage in anti-Arab violence. In our judgment, this
heightened French hostility might well lead young
immigrants, in particular, to engage in even more
active protests-perhaps even terrorism-thus caus-
ing a cyclical escalation of violence and oppression.
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Appendix
Historical Background
France has received a large number of immigrants
throughout the 20th century. Resident aliens, primar-
ily Italians and East Europeans, increased from 3
percent of the population before World War I to 6
percent in the 1930s. Unemployment, expulsions, and
naturalization reduced the proportion of resident
aliens to about 3 percent during the 1930s, but
immigration increased again after World War II. The
character of immigration changed after 1945, how-
ever, and it has been the source of growing problems
for France in recent years.
Recruitment of Foreigners, 1945-70
After 1945 France lacked the manpower it needed to
develop its growing economy. During the two world
wars many of the young men had been killed or
incapacitated, and an already low birthrate continued
to decline. As a result, the age distribution of the
French people was radically skewed toward the older
brackets. Many social scientists argued at the time
that the consequences of these demographic trends
could prove militarily, politically, and economically
catastrophic.
As a remedy, the government initiated recruitment
agreements with south European countries, specifying
the number of workers to be admitted each year, the
conditions of work guaranteed, and the requirements
for entry. French employers were to request workers
through the National Immigration Office (ONI) and
to pay a processing fee; ONI organized recruitment
and travel arrangements. ONI statistics indicate
about 2 million European migrant workers arrived in
France before 1970 and were joined by 690,000
dependents.
This recruitment effort was not as organized as it
sounds. The legal monopoly of the ONI quickly
became a fiction, as employers circumvented its pro-
gram to avoid the recruitment fee. In addition, as
competition for labor with other West European
industrial nations (including nations which had previ-
ously supplied labor) increased, ONI proved incapable
of coping. Spontaneous migration began to develop
first from Spain, then from Portugal, and later from
Yugoslavia and Turkey. The proportion of migrants
coming into France clandestinely (on. a tourist visa or
without passports) increased, according to ONI esti-
mates, from 26 percent in 1948 to 82 percent in 1968.
The situation was further complicated by the free
circulation of workers within the European Communi-
ty and by the open-door policy maintained toward
migrants from French colonies and former colonies.
Attempts at Selectivity, 1970-81
By 1970 about 1 million of the 3 million foreigners in
France were non-Europeans-a fact which prompted
attempts to create a more limited and selective system
for immigration. The government wanted to limit
permanent residency to Europeans, while using Afri-
cans to provide labor on a temporary basis. The
economic recession of the 1970s provided further
impetus to these programs. Deportation of young
unemployed migrants who were committing criminal
offenses began, and the most minor offense was
sufficient pretext for deportation. By 1973 several
hundred persons were being deported each month,
many of them young people who had been born and
raised in France. In 1977 the French instituted a
scheme of repatriation assistance whereby foreigners
were offered 10,000 francs and a ticket home in
exchange for relinquishing all claims on the French
social security system. Additional measures intro-
duced in the late 1970s and codified through the
Bonnet Law of 1980 combined work and residence
permits, linked migration to employment, and extend-
ed the reasons for deportation.
The new policies, although not overtly racist, mostly
affected North Africans and blacks, as most Europe-
ans had protection through European Community
citizenship (in the case of Italians) or impending EC
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affiliation (for Spaniards and Portuguese). Moreover,
by publicly labeling migrants a social problem, the
government fueled racism. North Africans-whose
dark skin made them stand out as non-French-found
themselves increasingly targeted by hooligans. Jean-
Marie Le Pen tapped this anger against foreigners in
founding the ultraright National Front party in 1972
with its platform of racism and security concerns.
All these events certainly made immigrants feel less
secure, but they did not lead to a mass exodus as the
government had expected. The number of foreigners
in the labor force fell from its 1973 peak of 1.8 million
to about 1.5 million in 1981 when the Socialist
government was elected on a program promising a
better deal for migrants. The number of foreign
workers has remained fairly constant in the interven-
ing years, but the total number of foreigners in France
has grown considerably as these workers have sent for
the dependents they originally left at home.
Socialist Promises Gone Astray, 1981-86
Upon taking office, the Socialist government reaf-
firmed the ban on the entry of additional foreign
workers; but it took some liberalizing measures with
respect to foreigners already in France and proposed
that immigrants with three years' residence in France
be allowed to vote in municipal elections. Soon after
coming to power, the government stopped deporting
French-born foreign youths and declared an amnesty
for illegal aliens. Under these new laws, foreigners
born in France, aged under 18, married to a French
person, or with a child of French nationality could no
longer be deported except in circumstances concern-
ing the security of the state. "Regularization"-or
legal residence status-was offered to the estimated
300,000 illegal immigrants who could prove that they
had a one-year work contract. In fact, only about half
this number came forward; and of these, a large but
unknown number reportedly lost their jobs because
their employers were unwilling to offer them regular
conditions of employment.
The Socialist government realized after 1982-when
it became apparent that the amnesty program had
encouraged a flood of illegal immigrants to enter
France in the hope of future amnesty periods-that
tightening immigration controls was necessary. The
success of the National Front in the local elections of
1983 and the European Parliament election of 1984
affirmed that a tougher stand on immigration was
also becoming politically expedient. By 1984 the
government passed laws to limit to some degree
immigrant family reunification, facilitate expulsions,
restrict entry, screen asylum requests, and penalize
employers of illegal aliens. Enforcement of these laws
was left to the discretion of local officials, however,
who often proved unwilling, uninterested, or unable to
do much about the problem. Nevertheless, when
President Mitterrand revived his call in April 1985 to
allow immigrants to vote in municipal elections, the
resulting public outcry spawned a debate in the
National Assembly in June of that year. Although the
debate itself achieved little in terms of policy, the
Assembly reached a general consensus that some
limitation on immigration and on naturalization pro-
cedures was needed. Furthermore, party lines were
drawn for the national legislative election of 1986,
with the right calling for "assimilationist" policies
and the left maintaining that-although something
must be done about the problems associated with
immigrants-cultural diversity was desirable for the
French Republic.
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