FRANCE: THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
of the Media
France:
The Role and Influence
EUR 86-10035
September 1986
Copy 3 3 3
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
of the Media
France:
The Role and Influence
This paper was prepared by
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ib
utions from
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EURA, a
nd
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Office of Leadership Analysis.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, European Issues Division,
EURA,
Confidential
EUR 86-10035
September 1986
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France:
The Role and Influence
of the Media
Summary Economic and political pressures in the last decade have precipitated
Information available changes in both the structure of the French media and the role of the
as of 20 August 1986 media in the political system. The evolution toward more independence and
was used i
thi
r
t
epor
n
s
.
? activism is slowly transforming the press into a significant political actor in
its own right. Legal and cultural constraints ensure that this change will be
slow and uneven, but the direction of change is probably irreversible.
Until very recently, the press was so closely affiliated with political parties
that it had only a limited role in setting the country's political agenda. Now
that voters are beginning to loosen their ties to political parties, newspapers
are being forced to redefine their role. Political parties are finding it
difficult to attract and hold voters, and newspapers of both the left and the
right are losing readers at a rapid rate. In an effort to survive, many papers
are asserting their independence and experimenting with investigative
journalism, which increasingly is helping to define the critical policy
questions.
The broadcast media, formerly monopolized by the state, have also been
transformed in the last five years. The Socialists' audiovisual law of 1982
legalized private radio and television and created an independent regula-
tory authority to insulate broadcasting from direct government interven-
tion. Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's government's own audiovisual law
continues the process of deregulation, denationalizing one of the three state
television networks and establishing a new regulatory council with broader
technical powers and greater autonomy from political intervention. The
controversial divestiture of the first state channel-and the possibility of a
second divestiture by the end of the year-and the resale of two existing
private channels will inject a formidable degree of private enterprise into
broadcasting.
The political consequences of structural changes in the media have become
increasingly obvious. In the last decade there has been an accelerating
tendency for French politics to import some of the factors that have
transformed US politics-media consultants, public opinion polls, presi-
dential press conferences, and preelection debates. Media consultants are
now standard features of every campaign team, and the ability to play
media politics effectively is becoming a key to political power. Effective
exploitation of these resources has become crucial to any political cam-
paign and increasingly may spell the difference between success and
Confidential
EUR 86-10035
September 1986
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Confidential
failure. The simultaneous decline in ideologies has magnified the impact of
these developments as politics increasingly revolves around personalities,
rather than issues and ideologies.
At the same time that the political role of the media-in particular
television-has grown exponentially, the control of the state over broad-
casting has steadily declined, largely as a result of public pressure. If
formal control of the media is no longer politically viable, however, the
techniques of government influence must become more subtle. Since 1982
formally autonomous regulatory agencies insulate the media from direct
government intervention, but the advent of private television, far from
emasculating the government, may create a new method of partisan
intervention. Thus far, decisions on state contracts for private TV stations
have been based as much on political criteria as on economic criteria.
Moreover, Chirac has pledged to annul those contracts granted by the
Socialists. We therefore believe that a new pattern in media policy may be
emerging: just as in the past newly elected governments purged the
management teams of state TV networks in order to appoint their own
people, governments may now void the old contracts and sell new ones to
ensure an acceptable political coloration. The form of government interfer-
ence may change, but its substance will probably remain.
Media policy in France is controversial in the best of times, and the debate
over Chirac's audiovisual law has exacerbated underlying divisions within
the government coalition and seriously damaged its public image. The
conservative majority failed to rally behind the government's bill in
parliament-in part because the bill was poorly constructed, but also
because it touched on basic ideological disputes over the role of the state-
and free market liberalism surfaced. This most public airing of disputes
within the razor-thin majority has raised new doubts about the cohesion
and durability of the coalition.
Regardless of changes in the media, and with the obvious exception of the
Communist organs, the press and broadcasting media will remain critical
of the Soviet Union and fair, though not uncritical, toward the United
States. The media will continue to reflect the nation's overall foreign policy
consensus: a firm commitment to the Atlantic Alliance but reserving the
right to differ on specifics.
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Summary
iii
Changing Structure of the Press
3
The Press and Foreign Policy
6
The Evolution of Broadcast Policy
12
The Continuing Government Role
14
Changes in Political Style
16
Implications for the United States
19
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France:
The Role and Influence
of the Media
Print and broadcast media have very different histor-
ies in France, but in the past they have shared one
trait: inhibited by a variety of formal and informal
restrictions, they have shown limited independence at
best and have enjoyed only limited political influence.
They are now in a period of rapid and fundamental
change, and the question of independence has become
a critical issue for the media themselves and for the
French Government and society:
? The print media have an illustrious past but have
been declining in circulation and prestige through
most of this century. Although they are almost all
privately owned, they have long been constrained by
the laws and conventions buttressing the authority
of the French state. They now face challenges and
opportunities that may encourage a more indepen-
dent, more investigative approach to journalism.
? The broadcast media did not come to prominence
until World War II. Always closely controlled by
the government, they were often used by President
de Gaulle and his successors for blatantly partisan
political purposes. As a result of a controversial law
passed by the left in 1982, they now are expanding
rapidly; and like the print media, they may be
allowed-or may be able to assume-greater inde-
pendence than in the past.
Media policy is a major political issue in France, but
there is surprisingly little real difference in principle
on the independence issue among the major contend-
ers for power. The debate generally centers on the
broadcast media, and the most noticeable fissure has
usually been between the "ins" and the "outs." Those
out of power call for wholesale reorganization and
liberalization, but change their minds when they take
office: the Jacobin notion of central influence, if not
control, remains strong in the political elite.
This resistance notwithstanding, we believe a trend
toward greater independence has been established in
both the print and the broadcast media. This paper,
using circulation and viewer data as well as evidence
gleaned from the media themselves, will examine the
trend and explore its implications for the workings of
the French political process - including the formula-
tion of foreign policy.
The French press peaked early, and its 20th-century
experience has been almost unremittingly downhill. In
1789 France became the first nation in the world to
codify freedom of the press, and for over a century
France dominated European journalism. The golden
age of the press, between 1881 and 1914, produced a
dazzling array of newspapers, with as many as 80
dailies in Paris alone, including the largest newspaper
in the world. Censorship during World War I de-
stroyed its credibility, however, and during the inter-
war period, newspapers sacrificed any sense of profes-
sional objectivity, becoming sounding boards for their
publishers, most often from the extreme right. During
World War II the mainstream papers were propagan-
da organs for the occupation forces, and the French
public began to turn to the relatively new medium of
radio for uncensored news.
Immediately following liberation, print journalism
enjoyed a short-lived renaissance, with newspaper
readership reaching an alltime high of 15.1 million in
1945, but by 1952 newspaper circulation had fallen
back to 1914 levels. From 1953 to 1968 readership
again increased dramatically, reaching another peak
during the student revolt in May 1968 and subsequent
events. Since then, circulation has again dropped,
with no end to the decline in sight.
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The most likely explanation for the downward trend,
in our view, lies in the relationship of the press to
political parties. Readership of the press seems to be
directly correlated with the strength of party affili-
ation: when the parties flourish, so do newspapers;
when party affiliation falters, so does readership. This
correlation reflects the unique political role of the
French press. Since the beginning of mass politics in
the mid-nineteenth century, national and regional
newspapers not only were virtually the only sources of
political information but were also important agents
of political mobilization as well. French political
parties were weak, and the political scene was domi-
nated by a succession of broad ideological camps with
flagship parties. Lacking the usual mechanisms for
recruiting and socializing members, or for carrying
out an electoral campaign, the camps created newspa-
pers to carry out these functions. Thus, unlike news-
papers in the United States, the French press made no
pretense to objectivity and called itself a presse
d 'opinion. A symbiotic relationship developed be-
tween political movements and the press: to a large
extent the success of an ideological grouping was
dependent on its ability to develop a popular newspa-
per, and the fate of the newspapers themselves was
inextricably tied to the health and popularity of their
associated ideologies. Somewhat paradoxically, how-
ever, the presse d opinion has historically played only
a minor role in setting the policy agenda on specific
issues: it has served more as an ideological sounding-
board than as a goad to the government.
The circulation trends shown in figure 1 suggest three
phases since World War II that roughly correlate
with phases in the degree of party affiliation among
the electorate. A period of recognized growth in party
affiliation (1952-68) corresponds to a rise in circula-
tion, bracketed by two periods of downturn in both
(1945-52 and 1968-present). The steady decline in
press circulation since 1968 can be directly correlated
with "dealignment"-the decline of traditional politi-
cal parties and ideologies. Poll results indicate that
between one-third and one-half of the electorate
believes that ideological distinctions are no longer
relevant. Just as the political parties are finding it
difficult to attract and hold voters, newspapers
aligned with those parties-on both the left and the
right-are losing readers at a rapid rate.
Figure 1
Forty Years of the French Daily Press,
1945-85
I I I I I I I I I
0 1945 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Source: Adapted from Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot,
Pierre Gurial, and Fernand Terrou, eds., Histoire generate de la presse
francaise, Tome V, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976), p. 208
and other sources.
This relationship suggests that newspaper circulation
may be a useful indicator of the condition of the party
system in France. Furthermore, television-which
many observers consider the major cause of falling
readership-may actually have little impact on press
circulation. Indeed, there is some evidence that televi-
sion may even have a positive impact on newspaper
reading, possibly by whetting the public's appetite for
more information.' Television's sharpest growth peri-
od-from about 1957 through about 1970-coincided
with a period of growth in newspaper circulation.
' In a press conference in December 1985, President Mitterrand
used this argument to defend the licensing of the first private
television channel. For instance, newspaper circulation in Italy has
increased in recent years precisely during a time of tremendous
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Changing Structure of the Press
The circulation decline and its financial ramifications
have produced a movement toward concentration of
ownership - of the provincial press in particular. A
recent attempt by the new government to legalize
concentration by abrogating a 1944 statute that pro-
hibits an individual from owning more than one daily
was judged unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Council. Nevertheless, the law has never been an
impediment to concentration. Indeed, the only at-
tempt to implement the law was the Socialist govern-
ment's effort in 1983 to break up Robert Hersant's
publishing empire, which is the largest in the country
and accounts for more than 20 percent of total
newspaper circulation, including over 30 percent of
the readership of the national dailies (see inset). The
government's zeal was roundly criticized as politically
motivated, and the effort was ultimately overturned
by the courts in a major embarrassment for the
government. The following year Hersant parlayed his
newfound image as a martyr for press freedom into a
seat in the European Parliament, which carries with it
immunity from prosecution. Early this year, flaunting
that immunity and perhaps believing that the govern-
ment elected in March would take a more benign view
of his activities, he bought yet another regional group.
Ten large chains now dominate most of the newspaper
industry; the provinces are controlled by so-called
ducs de la presse, a small group of magnates, almost
all of them politically conservative. The local papers
that formed the original basis for the chains have
largely ceased to exist except as inserts in the provin-
cial dailies. Independent papers are becoming rare as
the number of papers decreases and the press becomes
increasingly homogenized within regions and across
the country (see figure 2).
Thanks to economies of scale, the provincial newspa-
pers have been able to take advantage of the latest
technologies to produce attractive copy using photos
and graphics. As result, although overall newspaper
circulation continues to fall, that of the provincial
papers has stabilized since the mid-1970s (see figure
2). The Paris papers, on the other hand, have seen a
precipitous decline in circulation. The drop has long
been particularly noticeable with the popular press,
such as L'Aurore, France-Soir, and Le Parisien
Libere, but, beginning in the late 1970s, it hit even
quality newspapers like Le Monde and Le Figaro (see
figure 3).
The drop in newspaper circulation has been partially
offset since the 1960s by a dramatic increase in
readership of weekly news magazines modeled after
Time and Newsweek. These magazines stress their
objectivity, considering themselves clearly distinct
from the presse d opinion. Their coverage does tend to
include more factual information than is common in
newspapers, but each magazine nevertheless has a
political perspective that is more or less overt (see
table).
After a somewhat shaky start, the weeklies have
become a major presence in the press world. Indeed,
the newspapers are beginning to adopt some of their
stylistic features. A weekly magazine supplement to
Le Figaro helped boost that daily's sales in the late
1970s, and other papers have also adopted photos,
graphics, and a punchier writing style. Even Le
Monde, the last bastion of Gallic puritanism, has
made a concession to changing norms by using the
occasional graph, but its editors remain steadfastly
opposed to photos (see inset).
Political Orientation of the Press
Given the inherently partisan nature of the press in
France, newspapers and magazines tend to be fairly
obvious in their political biases. Mirroring the de-
alignment of the party system, however, a number of
independent national newspapers have emerged in the
last decade that tend to be more "objective" and less
obviously biased, although there is a clear sympathy
for a leftist agenda. These papers-such as Liberation
and L'Evenement du Jeudi-are leading the way in
the evolution toward investigative reporting and in-
creasingly seem to be helping to define the crucial
issues.
The Paris-based national press is diverse in its politi-
cal orientation, whereas the provincial press-signifi-
cantly larger in circulation-is overwhelmingly con-
servative (see table). On the right, the most striking
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Hersant: Spokesman for the Right
Robert Hersant, 66, popularly known as "Citizen
Hersant " after Citizen Kane, has aroused controversy
over the extent of his newspaper and magazine hold-
ings and the suspicion that he uses his journalistic
soapbox to meddle openly in partisan politics on an
unprecedented scale. It is widely believed that he
exploits his close ties to the conservative leadership
for business purposes and that his empire will grow at
an accelerated pace following the conservative victory
in the March 1986 legislative election. According to
the US Embassy in Paris, it is widely rumored that
Prime Minister Chirac has promised him a privatized
television channel, probably Antenne 2.
Hersant has switched alle-
giances back and forth across the political spectrum
and is said to have friends in most political parties. In
his present incarnation, he is ardently right wing, but
he has scrupulously avoided committing himself to a
specific political leader, apparently enjoying equally
close ties to the three major figures on the right:
Chirac, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond
Barre. In a revealing statement in 1984 Hersant
boasted, ' I offer the Elysee to [whoever] will offer me
[private] French television, " and it is widely rumored
that before the election he cut a deal with the unified
opposition for one of the newly privatized television
stations. He harbors political ambitions of his own,
despite his assurances that he seeks office only out of
a sense cif civic duty, considering journalism more
"noble and serious" than politics. Hersant successful-
ly ran for a parliamentary seat in the March election
on Giscard's (UDE) Union for French Democracy
ticket, and between eight and 11 deputies are associ-
ated with him. He is clearly interested informing his
own parliamentary group, but has thus far failed to
attract the minimum of 30 deputies. Nevertheless, his
faction may be able to wield disproportionate influ-
ence within the splintered conservative majority.
While the government may be impressed by his
political skill, however, the voters clearly are not. In
a 1978 press evaluation of the 228 members of the
European Parliament, Hersant rated dead last in
effectiveness.
The prospect of Hersant assuming a direct political
role compounds growing uneasiness about his domi-
nance of the media. In just 25 years Hersant has built
a vast newspaper empire from scratch-although it is
widely suspected that his ties to leading politicians
helped him get crucial bank loans at highly favorable
rates. He is generally acknowledged as a managerial
genius, buying a number of failing newspapers in one
region, merging them under one title with several
editions, and reducing the staff, facilities, and sales
departments to cut overhead and advertising rates. In
1975 he bought his first national paper, the insolvent
and fading but still imluential Le Figaro. He rapidly
followed up that purchase with two more large
national dailies, France-Soir (1976) and L'Aurore
(1978).
Critics-who are legion-come from across the polit-
ical spectrum. Those on the left are perhaps more
vociferous, claiming that Hersant's papers are merely
a soapbox for his peculiar rightwing perspective and
provide him with enormous political influence. With
every purchase Hersant faced bitter resistance, in-
cluding strikes and mass resignations, from his fu-
ture employees, many of whom belonged to Socialist
and Communist unions. Even his ideological brethren
are concerned that Hersant's appetite may threaten
the principle of ideological pluralism in the media.
But the most general criticism is that his papers tend
to become "hollow shells, " tabloids devoid of serious
journalism and catering to the baser interests of the
public.
We believe that the most extreme charges from the
left of Hersant's day-to-day editorial manipulation
are exaggerated; he does not need to interfere on a
regular basis. Most of the writers who disagreed with
his politics left the papers when he took over, and he
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Figure 2
Newspapers: Paris vs. Provinces, 1945-85
has installed numerous former and current conserva-
tive politicians in top posts, leaving the day-to-day
guidance to them. Thus, while some disgruntled Number of Newspapers
former employees have seen his hand behind obvious-
ly slanted articles, he has only rarely been involved in Parisian papers Provincial papers
determining the coverage or content of editorials, 160
In any case, the papers accurately reflect Hersant's 120
views, including a generally favorable view of the
United States and NATO as well as a visceral hatred
of the Communist Party, the one constant throughout
his checkered career. From the 1950s through 1968 80
Hersant was a Socialist, but since 1981 he has
relentlessly lambasted his former colleagues and
accused President Mitterrand of presiding over
40
Frances political and economic ruin. The government
responded by enforcing antitrust laws that had lain
dormant for almost 40 years in an effort to break up
his media empire. Paradoxically, the action not only 0
failed to accomplish its purpose but had the unin-
tended effect of transforming Hersant into a popular
martyr for freedom of the press. ~ Total Circulation
His relations with the new government will almost
Millions
Paris
certainly be more cordial-and more profitable. 8
There is a potential for tension, however, if Hersant
allows his unabashed ambition to get out of hand.
Hersant will be hard pressed to remain an indepen-
6
dent force within the right as the factions jockey for
position in anticipation of the presidential election.
Chirac in particular will be sensitive to shifts in
Hersant's leanings. Moreover, while the right's court-
ing of him has given Hersant a certain leverage over
the three conservative rivals for the past four years,
the new Prime Minister will be able to take advan-
tage of his position to redress the balance. Chirac
could deny Hersant the television station that he
clearly hungers after and in the extreme could-in
the ultimate irony-take legal action to restrain the
I I 1 1
55 65 75 85
Source: Adapted from Expansion, special edition, "Medias: Tous Contre
Tous," Oct-Nov 1985.
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Figure 3
Circulation of Paris Newspapers, 1960-85
L'Aurore
Les Echos
L'Equipe
Le Figaro
France-Soir
L'Humanite
Liberation
Le Matin
Le Monde
phenomenon is Hersant's growing empire; on the left,
it is the decline of the Communist press, paralleling
the precipitate fall in support for the Communist
party. Circulation for the official Communist organ,
L'Humanite, has remained fairly stable, but many of
the party's more than 400 other publications-includ-
ing magazines and regional papers-have foundered
because of falling readership and resultant financial
problems. In addition, splits within the party over
policy and strategy have caused considerable friction
between editors and journalists. The deepening crisis
of conscience within the party has spawned an effort
by members of the dissident "renovator" faction to
launch an independent magazine, W, " dedicated to
promoting open discussion of party strategy and lead-
ership.
In contrast, since the mid-1970s the rest of the leftist
press has flourished, as has the Socialist Party, now
the largest party in France. Curiously, the more
independent papers on the left-most notably Libera-
tion-seem to be reaping the benefits; the circulation
of Le Matin, considered to be an unofficial organ of
the Socialist Party, has grown, but not at the same
rate as the party's electoral support.
The Press and Foreign Policy
Coverage of foreign affairs-especially in former
colonies-is frequently excellent, particularly in Le
Monde. Despite differences over domestic politics, the
press-with the obvious exception of the Communist
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The Major National Press: Political Orientation and
Attitudes Toward the United States and the USSR
Average Daily
Circulation a
Political
Orientation
L'Aurore b
France-Soirb
Le Figaro b
35,000
569,268 (1981)
361,206
Quotidien de Paris
80,000
Conservative
Le Monde
385,084
Center-left
Affiliated with the Mauroy wing of
the Socialist Party
Liberation
105,000 (1984)
Independent left
L'Humanite
118,710
Communist Party organ
Conservative
Center-right
Independent
Independent left, but highly sym-
pathetic to Socialist Party
a 1983 figures unless otherwise noted.
b Part of Hersant chain.
Attitude Toward
US and USSR
A "popular" paper with little cov-
erage of foreign affairs. Highly
critical of USSR; generally favor-
able to US.
Highly critical of USSR. Strong
supporter of NATO, generally
favorable to US.
Generally favorable to US.
Very reliable, extensive, and criti-
cal coverage of USSR; supporter of
NATO, on occasion critical of US
but generally favorable.
Critical of USSR; mildly critical
of US.
Critical of USSR; critical of US.
Extremely critical of US.
Highly critical of USSR. Strong
supporter of US, NATO.
Generally favorable to US, though
sometimes critical.
Little coverage of foreign affairs
but generally sympathetic to US.
Critical of US, but highly critical
of USSR. Only limited coverage of
foreign affairs.
organs-tends to fall in line with the consensus that
has emerged in the last five years: a firm commitment
to the Atlantic Alliance and the European Communi-
ty and a tough stance toward the Soviet Union.
Attitudes toward the United States and US foreign
policy tend to be generally favorable, but not uncriti-
cal. Predictably, the leftist press is often more vocal in
its criticism-especially regarding US policies toward
the Third World-but the press across the board
reflects the French insistence on foreign policy inde-
pendence.
Coverage of the Soviet Bloc, in our estimation, is both
objective and often sharply critical. The major nation-
al papers, especially Le Monde, often provide detailed
and sophisticated commentary that is almost unremit-
tingly critical. French papers have been in the fore-
front in covering the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and have been vehemently critical of the Polish
Government and its policies. More recently, the press
has given extensive coverage to revelations of KGB
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In recent years, the institution that decisively shaped
French intellectual and political life since the end of
World War II has fallen on hard times, both finan-
cially and editorially. Since 1980 Le Monde has been
rocked by internal problems, strikes, and three dis-
ruptive turnovers in its editorial staff. The immediate
causes of the crisis are mounting economic problems
and huge debts-$9.6 million by 1985-caused by
topheavy management and declining sales. Its daily
circulation, which hovered around 450,000 during its
heyday a decade ago, has dropped in five years to
below 350,000 and continues to fall. Stringent auster-
ity measures were tried, but the paper's journalists,
who own a major interest, refused to accept them.
Consequently, the paper shut down for two days in
1984 and the editor was forced to resign.
Le Monde has always been associated with the
traditional left and strongly supported the successful
Socialist Party campaign in 1981. Paradoxically,
however, the left's triumph proved disastrous for the
paper. Reluctant to criticize the new government with
the same vigor that it had used to attack conservative
governments, Le Monde lost some of its credibility as
an independent force. At the same time, its position
as spokesman for the "thinking" left was challenged
by Liberation, founded in 1973.
Many observers believe that the paper's economic
problems stem from a more profound crisis of politi-
cal and journalistic identity. Ponderous, opinionated,
and authoritative, Le Monde is still identified with
the generation that came to power and influence after
World War II. Liberation is the product of the
cultural and political upheavals of 1968 and has
captured the younger generation of the left. Le Mon-
de's new chief editor, Andre Fontaine, acknowledges:
'Before, when you became 18 it was automatic that
you began to subscribe.... No longer. We have a
definite problem with the youth."
Fontaine is a highly respected commentator on inter-
national affairs, with 36 years experience on the
paper. Since his election in early 1985 as a compro-
mise candidate in a stormy contest, he has developed
a radical rescue plan to rejuvenate the paper both
financially and spiritually. He convinced the staff
that drastic measures were necessary, including the
sale of Le Monde's building; 10 percent salary cuts;
elimination of 250 jobs; and an injection of $3.7
million of outside capital for the first time from
readers, investment institutions, and "disinterested"
friends of the paper. To calm journalists 'fears, he
pledged that although their stake in the paper would
be reduced from 40 to 30 percent, they would retain a
right of veto and that the paper would remain
independent.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the plan,
however, is editorial. Fontaine envisages dropping the
old polemic style in favor of a more balanced,
objective stance. He believes that the days when
Frenchmen fought battles over ideology are finished.
"We cannot change too quickly, too abruptly, as to
lose our identity ... but we must modernize. Our
reporting must become less partisan and subjective
and our style clearer, simpler, and easier to read. "
These changes will not be easy, however. Much of Le
Monde's influence derived from its emphasis on
commentary, often by some of the most eminent
academics, which frequently defined the terms of
public debate. Sacrificing this kind of in-depth re-
portage may well alienate Le Monde's remaining
audience.
It is too early to tell how far this tinkering will go or
whether it will be enough to save Le Monde, but the
return of the right after the March election may help
the paper redefine its editorial stance, reinvigorating
both the staff and the readership.
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activities in France. Ironically, only the Hersant
group of papers-normally considered to be the most
conservative-has remained silent. An editor of a
respected independent paper suggested to US Embas-
sy officials that Hersant, despite his vaunted anti-
Communist credentials, may be hesitant to criticize
the Soviets because in 1954 a loan from a Soviet bank
bailed him out of a particularly difficult financial
crisis. Thus, to some extent the leftist press is more
consistently anti-Soviet than the right is.
The Press and the State
The state has substantial leverage over the press
through both regulatory agencies and the judicial
system. On the regulatory side, it provides eligible
newspapers with substantial subsidies, which accord-
ing to some scholars exceed 2 billion francs annually
(approximately $300 million) in direct and indirect
aid, or about 12 percent of total print media revenues.
The aid is designed to compensate for regulations that
restrict the amount of advertising to no more than
one-third of the paper's surface in order to limit the
influence of advertisers. Registration with the joint
state-industry commission for these subsides is totally
voluntary, but the financial benefits ensure participa-
tion by most newspapers, many of which now depend
on them for survival. Some observers-particularly
those on the left-have noted with growing alarm the
increased importance of these revenues and the im-
plicit danger of censorship. The guidelines to deter-
mine eligibility for the awards are sufficiently vague
that the government can interpret them at will, and
potentially can cut off papers that are uncooperative.
Similarly, although individual journalists are not re-
quired by law to register for the state-issued profes-
sional identification card, registration has become a
practical necessity for employment with an estab-
lished newspaper. The registration commission, com-
posed of working journalists and government officials,
certifies journalists for a 30-percent tax reduction and
for protection against summary firing under the gen-
erous state labor code. This "conscience clause" is
commonly invoked to dispute dismissal for political
reasons. These regulatory functions imply potential
influence of the state over journalists, and press and
scholarly sources note that there have in fact been
isolated cases in which individuals and papers were
denied certification in order to pressure them to
conform.
The juridical relationship between the press and the
French state has been a considerably more complex
compromise between the principles of press freedom
and political expediency. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of Citizens, which established
freedom of the press, also established the state's right
to limit that freedom:
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is
one of the most precious rights of mankind. Each
citizen may therefore speak, write, print in liberty,
except in abusing this freedom in cases set forth by
the law. (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, current law-actually a complex of laws
scattered throughout the civil and military legal sys-
tem-provides an unusually wide definition of press
offenses punishable by civil and criminal procedures.
Moreover, the burden of proof in libel cases rests with
the accused (the publisher, the journalist, even the
street vendor) rather than the aggrieved party, and the
tests of good faith are stringent indeed.
Perhaps most startling is the "no-fault" libel, in which
publications may be fined or their personnel impris-
oned, for publishing information-even if true- that
is judged by the courts to be in any of the following
categories:
? Anything potentially damaging to a person's honor
that is printed without permission. This stricture has
been broadened to include any "word or image"
published from a private place without consent, such
as classified documents.
? Facts more than 10 years old, if they may damage a
person's reputation.
? Reference to crimes that were specifically pardoned
or occurred during a period that is officially amnes-
tied or off limits. This seals off an enormous range
of cases because wholesale pardons are a common
aftermath of elections. But, most important, the
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most politically charged periods, such as World
War II and the Algerian war, have been sealed off
and can be discussed only at risk of civil or criminal
prosecution or both.
? Incitement to commit crimes. This ambiguous pro-
vision allows the prosecution of journalists as ac-
complices in any crime for which they provided
direct or indirect "provocation," including present-
ing the crime in a "praiseworthy, meritorious, or
legitimate light."
? Offenses against public authorities, official bodies,
and "protected persons." At the highest level, the
definition does not require a precise libel, but only
an assault on the dignity or authority of the Presi-
dent or members of a foreign government. Further-
more, the prosecutor's office may pursue the case
even without the participation of the aggrieved
party. The law also grants special protection to
"institutions playing an important role in public
life," including the prestigious elite schools, aca-
demic councils, chambers of commerce, and the
Legion of Honor, as well as the courts and the
armed forces. In addition, the deceased of France
are fully protected against defamation, while politi-
cal officials on both the national and local levels
receive partial immunity.
? "Any scornful expression that diminishes respect for
the moral authority of a public function, or the
purpose for which it is exercised." The broadest and
most ambiguous of the categories, journalists con-
sider it the most serious because it draws the
harshest penalties. This is the real minefield for
journalists especially for those who cover the courts.
Intent is irrelevant; the courts will punish any action
that results in the discrediting of a judicial act or
decision. This category was used in 1980 by Presi-
dent Giscard to punish Le Monde for its persistent
investigation of the scandal in which Giscard was
alleged to have received diamonds from Central
African "Emperor" Bokassa. Even though Giscard's
highhanded tactics in this case helped to sour his
public image and contributed to his defeat in 1981,
the case is a potent example of the government's
power to control the press.
? Exempted subjects, such as anything that might
damage the "effectiveness or morale" of the mili-
tary; anything that might "attack the credit of the
nation, whether undermining confidence in its cur-
rency or the value of public funds"; anything relat-
ing to parliamentary investigations or commissions;
or anything that might "outrage public morals."
Punishments for these offenses range from fines to
imprisonment. Seizure of the contested publication is
an extreme measure that has been invoked in the past,
especially against the Communist press and during
the Algerian war, but has been used infrequently in
recent years. A more common judgment is the forced
insertion of retractions and "corrections," even when
the original material was factually accurate.
Censorship is formally prohibited in peacetime but
has been imposed during crises, as in the Algerian war
and in 1958 during the military rebellion. Far more
effective, however, is self-censorship. Given the formi-
dable potential for prosecution and the lever of state
funding, newspapers and journalists often engage in
what one leading journalist called "prudent conform-
ism ... the silence of complicity." The state's leverage
over the press is thus most effective when it remains a
potential threat rather than an actual retaliation.
Journalism and Politics
Given these constraints, it is not surprising that the
French press has little history of investigative report-
ing. The power of the American press shown in
Watergate impressed journalists but thus far has had
only a minor impact on the French press. Over the
years, the only consistently iconoclastic papers have
been the satirical biweekly Le Canard Enchaine on
the left, and the weeklies Le Crapouillot and Minute
on the extreme right.
French news coverage of the "Greenpeace affair" in
the summer of 1985 prompted many foreign observers
to draw parallels with Watergate and to predict that
the French press was at last embracing investigative
reporting. Two small leftist weeklies broke the story of
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the security service's responsibility for the sinking of
Rainbow Warrior, the flagship of the Greenpeace
environmental group that was interfering with French
nuclear testing in the Pacific. In an unusual move, Le
Monde-experimenting with a new style to boost
falling readership (see inset)-picked up the story,
which quickly blossomed into a full-blown crisis.
Ultimately, Minister of Defense Hernu accepted re-
sponsibility for the episode and resigned his post, the
first time since the establishment of the Fifth Repub-
lic in 1958 that press disclosures had forced the
resignation of a Cabinet minister.
American commentary at the time tended to exagger-
ate the role of the press, in our view. Press reports
make it clear that the investigations were paradoxical-
ly pushed by the government itself, out of either
political miscalculation or its own desire to get to the
bottom of the affair. Le Monde refused to admit that
it had a government source, but the rest of the press
speculated that the source was in fact the Minister of
the Interior, Pierre Joxe. A prominent Parisian politi-
cal journalist insists that, without government instiga-
tion, the crisis probably would never have happened:
"The big mistake of the government was to have said
it would reveal the full truth in the first place....
Nobody was asking for the truth. The French support
the testing program and accept that something was
done to prevent Greenpeace from interfering with it."
By October, anxious to limit further political damage,
the government turned off the leaks and the crisis
quickly dissipated.
Nevertheless, in the French context, the pursuit of the
scandal was unusually persistent and suggests the
gradual evolution of new norms of journalism. In the
last decade the independent papers-most of them
left of center, edited by and for members of the sixties
generation-have become more openly critical of the
government, whether left or right, and have engaged
in limited investigations. By US standards, papers like
Liberation are quite tame, but we think their marked
success in drawing away readers from the more
mainstream papers like Le Monde is slowly pushing
French journalism toward a more active role in
seeking out and publishing news. Just as the increased
competition within the print media for an audience
and advertising revenues has promoted changes in the
editorial styles of newspapers, we expect the emer-
gence of private television as another competitor to
further hasten the trend toward more independent
journalism.
The shift signals a change in the role played by the
press, in our view. Historically, newspapers were so
closely tied to ideological camps that their main
function was to convey information and opinion from
the top down. As those ideologies lose their power,
newspapers gain the freedom to develop independent
editorial positions and gradually to take on a more
active agenda-setting function. The constraints on this
movement are formidable, ranging from the qualms of
journalists themselves to the political elite's willing-
ness to use state sanctions against the press, but we
believe that the chap a toward more activism is
probably irreversible
Currently, the press exerts its greatest independent
political influence through the growing use of political
polls. Public opinion surveys have a long history in
France, going back to the 1950s, but, as in the United
States, their political salience has increased dramati-
cally in the last decade. No poll can produce absolute-
ly accurate predictions of electoral results, and the
reliability of French polls is complicated by the
peculiarities of the French electoral system since the
institution of proportional representation in 1985.
Nevertheless, the pollsters' creditable performance in
predicting the March election points up their increas-
ingly sophisticated methods, including computer sim-
ulations. Reporting from the US Embassy in Paris
confirms that the monthly polls published by the
major national newspapers (Le Figaro and Le Monde)
and the newsweeklies (Le Point and L'Express) have
become a critical factor in determining electoral
strategies.
The audiovisual law enacted in 1982 by the Socialist
government opened broadcasting to private initiative
and diluted centralized control. A proliferation of
private radio stations and regional state television
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Confidential
companies sprang up immediately after the law was
promulgated, but the first private television station
was licensed only in 1986 amid substantial controver-
sy. Following historical precedent, the Chirac govern-
ment has proposed its own reorganization of broad-
casting, including the denationalization of at least one
state television station and the establishment of a new
regulatory authority with expanded powers.
The Evolution of Broadcast Policy
Broadcast media policy has been a major focus of
attention in France since at least World War II. The
remarkably effective use by the extreme right of radio
and cinema for propaganda during the war demon-
strated the new technologies' power to shape the
political environment. At Liberation, the Provisional
Government by consensus retained the the Vichy
government's monopoly over broadcasting, not only to
deny extremists a potent weapon, but also, the
founders of the Fourth Republic hoped, to give the
new regime a method of cultural and ideological
socialization that could overcome the nation's histori-
cal fragmentation.
It was left to President de Gaulle, however, to use the
media to their fullest potential; in the words of one
scholar, turning the monopoly into "the absolute
weapon of the regime." In the de Gaulle era, radio
and television news content was directly controlled by
the government, and reportage on election and refer-
endum campaigns was blatantly biased. A 1964 re-
form created a board of governors, the Office de
Radiodiffusion Television Francaise (ORTF), that was
supposed to act as a buffer between politicians and
broadcasters; but in practice the board, whose mem-
bers were appointed by the government, continued to
follow the directives of the Minister of Information.
Four years later, one of the most dramatic episodes of
the May student and worker revolt was the strike by
broadcast journalists and production staff against
continued government manipulation of the media.
The strikers' demands for greater autonomy, freedom
from government pressure, and impartial news ser-
vices still define the issues in state media policy.
Following de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, a short-
lived reorganization of the media promised a real
loosening of government control, but by 1972 Presi-
dent Pompidou had reaffirmed the ORTF as the
official mouthpiece of the French state. Another
reorganization was introduced in 1974 in the early
months of Giscard's presidency; as had happened
previously, however, the very practical political ad-
vantages inherent in government control of the media
overcame any lingering reformism in Giscard. Within
two years he reverted to media manipulation that
would have made de Gaulle proud. A telephone with
direct access to the newsrooms of the three state
television stations was installed and, according to
press reports, was used often and to great effect.
The blatancy of Giscard's interventions, however,
helped to undercut the legitimacy of the monopoly at
the same time that technological advances-for in-
stance, the expansion of FM radio that permitted
significantly smaller, cheaper transmitting facilities
as well as the more recent advances in satellite
technology-made its defense increasingly difficult.
The first effective challenge to the monopoly was the
creation of pirate radio stations all over the country in
the late 1970s. When Giscard prosecuted a number of
their owners, "free radios" (radios libres) became a
rallying cry and a major issue in the 1981 presidential
election.
Sensing the growing unpopularity of the broadcast
media monopoly, Mitterrand made reform of broad-
casting a major plank in his platform and pledged that
it would be a priority of the new government. Once in
power, he faced a familiar dilemma: fulfilling his
campaign promises would deny the new government a
proven means of mobilizing support; in addition, it
would break with the Socialists' longstanding ideolog-
ical commitment to state broadcasting as a means of
cultural and social education. Nevertheless, popular
pressure and the increasing difficulty of enforcing the
monopoly in the face of technological change finally
convinced Mitterrand to sign the July 1982 audiovisu-
al law, which for the first time effectively dismantled
the state monopoly and opened the way for private
initiative in broadcasting.
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Effects of the 1982 Law
Radio. Radio before 1982 had been the exclusive
domain of the "big four" national stations: Radio
France, wholly owned by the state, and three periph-
eral stations-Europe 1, Radio-Television Luxem-
bourg, and Radio Monte Carlo-all partly owned by
the state. The 1982 law legalized private local sta-
tions, and almost immediately hundreds of them
sprang up, catering not only to a wide variety of
musical tastes but also to groups previously ignored by
the state broadcasting services: ecologists, feminists,
immigrants, Boy Scouts, community associations, and
marginal political parties. Many of the largest news-
paper and magazine publishers-led, not surprisingly,
by Robert Hersant-have also gotten into the act;
these include the publishers of L'Humanite, Le Mat-
in, and L'Express. Although municipal radio stations
are prohibited under the law, many cities-especially
Paris-have also established quasi-official stations
that are increasingly used as mouthpieces for local
Figure 4
Radio Audience Market Share, 1975-84
politicians.
Although the media explosion has slowed recently, the
government estimates that there are now 1,400 pri-
vate stations with a steadily growing audience. They
have lured well over 1 million listeners away from the
national stations (see figure 4). Surveys show that
private stations consistently outdraw the national
stations with their musical programing, but attract
less than 40 percent of the audience for national news,
suggesting that the government still retains a domi-
nant influence over electronically transmitted news.
Television. The 1982 law took longer to have an
impact on television, but the effect has been more
dramatic and politically significant. By early 1986 the
number of channels had increased from three to six,
including a cable network and two private networks;
with a seventh channel, owned and operated by the
state and dedicated to cultural and educational pro-
graming, in the works.
Mitterrand managed to antagonize almost everybody
with his decision to sell the first private channel to a
French-Italian consortium that included the contro-
versial Italian television magnate, Silvio Berlusconi,
who has a 40-percent interest in the project. An-
nouncement of the decision immediately provoked an
I I I
0 1975 80 84
? Others (mostly
? private)
% Europe I
Source: Adapted from Expansion, special edition, "Medias: Tous Contre
Tous," Oct-Nov 1985.
310335 9.86
outcry across the political spectrum. Even members of
the Socialist Party criticized the choice of
Berlusconi-nicknamed Mr. Tele Coca-Cola in
Italy-as a major participant, fearing that he would
bring to France the same mixture of old American
soap operas, game shows, and movies interrupted by
commercials that characterizes his three Italian
networks.
Equally controversial was the deal itself. The contract
stipulated that any changes in ownership, broadcast-
ing mode, geographic coverage, or level of advertising
revenue would constitute damage to the franchise,
entitling it to compensation from the state. Thus, the
Socialist government gave the station ironclad insur-
ance against risk and placed any future applicants at
a serious disadvantage.
Radio-Television
Luxembourg
~e
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According to the US Embassy in Paris and to press
reports, political considerations prompted Mitter-
rand's precipitate action. As signs mounted of a
conservative victory in the March elections, Mitter-
rand wanted to ensure at least one station that would
be free of government influence and, given the Social-
ist sympathies of the consortium's principals, friendly
to his party. The opposition went further, charging
that Mitterrand granted the license only after receiv-
ing assurances that his party would be allowed access
if the right won the election. It immediately contested
the contract and won a quick victory when the
Council of State voided the new station's right to
show movies. The Chirac government's first attempt
to abrogate both this contract and that of the sixth
station, the music channel, was excised from the
audiovisual law by the Senate. But the government
has pledged to introduce new legislation in the near
future.
The Continuing Government Role
The 1982 law by no means removed the broadcast
media from government influence. Television re-
mained wholly in the hands of the three state stations
until February 1986, when the first private station
was licensed. The law did end the state's control over
programing, but it continued to treat broadcasting as
a public service and therefore reserved for the state
the right to establish "operating conditions," includ-
ing public service requirements, frequency assign-
ments, and technical oversight.
Moreover, the body created to guarantee media inde-
pendence bore a striking resemblance to the ORTF,
created in the 1964 reform. The High Authority for
Audiovisual Communication was designed to be a
buffer between the government and the state broad-
casting companies, and it took over responsibility for
appointments to the top managerial posts of the state
stations, for granting licenses, and for ensuring com-
pliance by all stations with their operating conditions.
Mitterrand overturned the recommendation of his
own committee by insisting that the source of appoint-
ments to the Authority be political: three members
each are appointed by the President, the President of
the National Assembly, and the President of the
Senate. Furthermore, upon taking office, Mitterrand,
following a time-honored practice, replaced the heads
of the state television channels, and Socialist ministers
seemed never to be off the screen in the first months
of the new government. To underscore the importance
the government placed on television, Prime Minister
Fabius was given a weekly 15-minute slot to explain
government policy.
Under the Socialists the High Authority did prove
somewhat more effective than earlier experiments in
depoliticizing the media. Leaders of the conservative
opposition had marginally more access to the airwaves
before the election in March 1986, and news stories
were rarely as blatantly biased as had sometimes
happened in the past; indeed, in some cases there was
criticism of the government. More often, however, the
Socialist government took full advantage of its privi-
leged access to state radio and television stations to
promote its policies and rein in journalists who took
too seriously the government's claims of media depoli-
ticization. The most dramatic indication of govern-
ment interference was the resignation in 1985 from
Antenne 2 of its news director and its anchorwom-
an-by far the most popular and respected newscast-
er-who charged that the government was trying to
curb the station's independence and enforce party
discipline. The halfheartedness of Mitterrand's steps
to liberalize broadcasting and introduce private com-
petition demonstrate how ingrained the notion of
government control of the media is among the politi-
cal elite.
The Broadcast Media Since the Election
Following the conservative victory in March, many
French observers expected the broadcast media would
be high on the new government's agenda, but formu-
lating a policy proved unexpectedly difficult. The
conservative platform had glossed over basic ideologi-
cal differences between free market liberals and tradi-
tional statists, and negotiations within the coalition
were heated and bitter, according to the press. Fran-
cois Leotard, the Minister of Culture and Communi-
cation and spokesman for the liberals, initially pro-
posed that two of the three state-owned television
channels-TF1, the most popular, and the regional
channel FR3-be privatized, but strong opposition
arose both among his colleagues and in the populace
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as a whole. After a test of wills, in which Leotard
reportedly offered to resign, Chirac forced a scaling
back of the proposal.
as including programs to suit all age groups and
tastes, from the most popular to the most intellectual;
fidelity to French culture; and equal access for com-
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Even after this Cabinet compromise, the bill contin-
ued to be plagued by mishandling and divisions within
the coalition. Despite a governmental majority in the
Senate, deliberation of the proposal took 23 days, the
longest debate in the history of the Fifth Republic,
and produced 1,800 amendments, over 1,000 pages in
the Journal Officiel. Key elements of the govern-
ment's bill were rewritten, the most notable casualties
being the provisions canceling the contracts for the
two private channels granted by the Socialists and the
state monopoly in telecommunications which was sold
off. In addition, the membership of the new audiovisu-
al authority was expanded, adding four more mem-
bers and doubling the number of political appointees.
According to the press, the revised bill authorizes the
sale of TF1, the allocation of five satellite channels,
and the establishment of a new audiovisual authority
with expanded powers to supplant the Authority set
up in 1982.
Reaction to the government's privatization proposals
was swift and largely hostile. Workers at all three
state television stations went out on a one-day strike
and vowed to pursue a vigorous campaign to rouse
public opinion against the government action. The
public expressed its own displeasure: over 100,000
people responded to a petition to "Save the Public
Service," much to the surprise of the two weekly
magazines that launched it. Two polls conducted after
the announcement indicate that over half (55 percent)
of those polled opposed privatization, with only 30
percent in favor. Recent polls indicate a drop in
popularity for both Chirac and Leotard. Moreover,
press reaction seems to be almost uniformly critical
except, not surprisingly, the papers of the Hersant
empire.
Opposition to the shrinking of state television con-
trasts with widespread support for private television;
the public seems to prefer that new channels augment,
rather than replace, state television. Sentiment within
both the general populace and the political elite
continues to favor a strong state role in broadcasting
to guarantee quality programing-generally defined
peting political views.
Chirac has pledged that a decision on privatizing FR3
will be made by the end of 1987. Only Antenne 2, the
most prestigious channel, remains securely in the
public sector. Its official status as the "channel of
reference," however, is still unclear: the government
may intend for it to establish norms of quality pro-
graming or to serve as the mouthpiece for the govern-
ment, the "voice of France." The leading candidates
to purchase TF1, according to the French press, are
the media conglomerate Havas, which already is the
principal shareholder in the first French cable chan-
nel; and Robert Hersant. Other contenders include
British and Luxembourg companies and the
Hachette-Mattera publishing group, as well as Silvio
Berlusconi.
What the new law portends for government relations
with the media is still unclear. The new National
Commission for Communication and Liberties
(CNCL), which is to replace the High Authority, will
have significantly greater authority in such technical
fields as frequency allocation for radio and television
channels, and for cable networks as well. Like its
predecessor, it will appoint the chairmen of the state
radio and television stations, with the exception of
Radio France Internationale, whose head will be
appointed by the Cabinet. There will be 13 members
of the commission, each serving for nine years. One
each is to be elected by the Council of State, the
Supreme Court of Appeal (Cour de caseation) and the
Audit Office (Cour des comptes); two each are to be
appointed by the President, the Speaker of the Na-
tional Assembly, and the Speaker of the Senate; three
are to be chosen-preferably from within the ranks of
the broadcasting bureaucracy-by the six already
appointed; and the last is to be from the ranks of the
Academie Francaise. In addition, the commission is
charged with overseeing the deregulation of the tele-
communications industry, although the Senate bill
mandates that the state retain a majority interest in
the two enterprises.
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The appointment procedures outlined for the CNCL,
which emphasize technical rather than political quali-
fications, were applauded by many as a positive step
toward media autonomy, but the law's limits on
political interference in the media are, in our view,
only as strong as the government wants them to be.
Recent actions suggest that the Chirac government
may try to engage in open interference. Within days
of announcing the bill, Chirac criticized the "excesses
and deformations" of journalists. Not to be outdone,
Leotard attacked the editorial policy of the FR3
station in Corsica. Similarly, according to the press,
Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua threatened
legal action against Radio France and Europe 1 if
they broadcast a report on Socialist reaction to his
outburst in Parliament about Socialist conduct during
World War 11.1 The story allegedly was held for more
than three hours until a compromise was reached
allowing Pasqua the right of rebuttal. The High
Audiovisual Authority thereafter issued a resolution
expressing the members' "anxiety" over "the cam-
paign to put in question the impartiality of informa-
tion" and stated that the Authority would remain
active as the guardian of "the honesty, pluralism, and
balance" of the media until it is officially disbanded.
Politicians of all stripes recognize the increasing
impact of television on politics and political careers in
France, particularly in light of the substantial propor-
tion of time the average citizen spends watching
television compared with reading newspapers or lis-
tening to the radio (see figure 5). There has been an
accelerating tendency in the last decade for French
politics to import some of the factors that have
transformed US politics-media consultants, presi-
dential press conferences, preelection debates, and,
above all, public opinion polls. As a result, French
' The government's offensive has not been confined to the broadcast
media. In April, as part of the government's antiterrorist campaign,
Pasqua ordered the offices of Liberation and another leftist daily,
VSD, to be searched and several journalists held as witnesses in
ongoing investigations. One prominent Socialist commented, "The
Interior Minister has said he was going to terrorize the terrorists.
Figure 5
Average Time Devoted
Note: Based on 112 waking
hours per week. The average
respondent over 15 devotes
more than 25% of his time to
the media, not including mag-
azines, movies, and books.
Source: Adapted from Expansion, special edition, "Medias: Tous Contre
Tons," Oct-Nov 1985.
politics increasingly revolve around personalities as
much as issues and ideologies-the redetisation de la
politique. Further, the immediacy of television is
palpably speeding up the pace of politics.
Perhaps the most eloquent example of these changes
was the preelection debate between Chirac and then
Prime Minister Fabius. Before the debate Fabius had
seemed invulnerable while Chirac's campaign effort
seemed to be stagnating, but Fabius's belligerent
rhetoric during the debate turned things around. In
polls taken immediately after the telecast, Chirac
gained 7 percentage points and Fabius lost 5, a
tailspin from which he never recovered. In the 1974
and 1981 presidential elections the "winner" of the
debates later won the election, lending a predictive
aura to debates. According to the US Embassy in
Paris, the debate was thus seen as a psychological
turning point in the runup to the legislative election.
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The increasing salience of public image is forcing
politicians to revamp their styles. Media consultants
have become standard features of every campaign
team. Jack Lang, Mitterrand's consultant in 1981
(and later Culture Minister), was even credited with
winning the presidential election by changing Mitter-
rand's dour image with stylish clothes and more
"human" speeches. Before the election in March, in
response to falling approval ratings, Mitterrand
launched a media offensive, installing a television
studio in the presidential palace and initiating a series
of press conferences and human-interest interviews to
counteract his remote image. In the same vein, many
politicians vie for the privilege of being interviewed on
a weekly program, Questions a Domicile, reminiscent
of the popular "Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous,"
in which prominent personalities are interviewed in
their homes surrounded by family, pets, and hobbies.
Several regular interview programs similar to Face
the Nation-most notably L'Heure de Verite-regu-
larly receive substantial press coverage, often trigger-
ing heated public debate and, according to Embassy
reporting, playing an important role in shaping public
opinion.
The historical pattern throughout the Fifth Republic
has been for new governments to initiate changes in
media policy within the first months of coming to
power. Thus far, despite policy divisions within the
ruling coalition, the new government appears to be
working true to form. The new audiovisual law pro-
posed in May will undoubtedly be passed, but the
government's mishandling of the issue has exposed it
to criticism. The coalition has been seen airing its
disputes, and to some extent relations have soured
between Chirac's traditional Gaullist contingent and
the new breed of young liberals who constitute an
important minority in the government.
Minister of Culture and Communication Leotard has
been particularly hurt by the controversy. An ambi-
tious man with aspirations to replace Giscard as the
leader of the center right, Leotard needed Cabinet
experience to demonstrate his capacity to govern
effectively and consolidate his claim to leadership. His
decisive, and very public, defeat in his conflict with
Chirac followed by the embarrassing debate in the
Senate tarnished his rising star. His bill was widely
criticized, even by his allies, as poorly written and
badly mishandled in committee. These criticisms were
echoed several days later in the Constitutional Coun-
cil's decision declaring the government's press law
unconstitutional. These setbacks have cost Leotard
dearly in the eyes of both his political colleagues and
the public. He may yet recover if programing of the
newly privatized TF1 wins public approval, but Leo-
tard's appeal has unquestionably diminished.
Despite the heated controversy surrounding the go-
vernment's media policy, now that the bill has become
law we expect the issue to fade from public conscious-
ness. It may resurface if the government tries again to
annul the contracts for the private television stations
or to denationalize FR3, but, ultimately, media policy
is unlikely to last as a major political factor. More
troubling has been the failure of the majority to rally
behind the government's bill. Much of the friction
evident in the Senate can be attributed to Leotard's
clumsiness, but this experience has pointed up divi-
sions within the coalition not only over this particular
policy but also over more fundamental ideological
orientations toward the role of the state and free
market liberalism. Chirac has distanced himself from
Leotard and will probably escape with little damage
to his personal standing. The cohesion and durability
of the coalition, however, are now openly debated in
the press.
Recent statements by Chirac and other members of
his Cabinet suggest that this government, like its
predecessors, may attempt to reimpose some form of
government intervention in the media. Since 1981
there has been some progress toward autonomy of the
broadcasting media, and the new audiovisual law
appears to incorporate, if not advance, the notion of
media independence. This law, like its predecessor,
has been hailed by many analysts as an important step
toward media autonomy-institutionalizing an auton-
omous regulatory agency as a buffer between the state
and the media that insulates them from political
interference. However, this analysis may be mistaken.
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It assumes that the political elite would go against
historical precedent as well as self-interest by willing-
ly divesting itself of a political resource whose impor-
tance is obviously growing. We believe that it is more
likely that once again the form of government control
has changed but the substance remains. If formal
control of the media is no longer politically viable, the
techniques of government influence must become
more subtle.
The advent of private television-almost simultaneous
with the diminution of the state role-gives the
government a new avenue for political influence.
Contracts for stations are allocated by the govern-
ment, and, in the short history of private television in
France, those decisions have been based as much on
political criteria as on economic considerations. When
the first private station was licensed, Mitterrand was
widely accused of cutting a political deal with the
Berlusconi group in order to ensure Socialist access to
television. Chirac has promised to void that contract
and resell the station to someone of his choosing. If he
is legally empowered to do that, a new pattern of
intervention may be shaping up. Just as in the past
newly elected governments purged the management
teams of state television networks in order to appoint
their own people, governments may now be able to
void old contracts and sell new ones to ensure an
acceptable political coloration.
Even if the courts rule against him, Chirac is assured
of deciding on at least one privatized station. An
alternative scenario might then be that television
stations will be gradually parceled out to the various
political camps, and la television d opinion similar to
that of the newspapers may develop. In either case, we
believe it is premature to conclude that the liberal
rhetoric surrounding the media policy debate portends
the depoliticization of television. If historial precedent
holds, once again the form of government interference
in the media will change, but its substance will
remain.
We do not expect, however, that influence will equate
with control. For one thing, today's French leaders are
too much at the mercy of the media, particularly in
the current era of "cohabitation" between a Socialist
president and a conservative government. The media
will provide a highly visible forum for the competition
between the President and the Prime Minister for the
mantle of authority, especially in foreign policy. To an
unusual degree, editorial choices of the press will
determine who succeeds. Recently, for instance, re-
portage of the Tokyo economic summit clearly fo-
cused on Mitterrand, treating Chirac as a hanger-on
Thus, regardless of the reality
of their positions, public perceptions as shaped by the
media are a reality that must be reckoned with at the
polls.
Such calculations will dominate politics for the dura-
tion of cohabitation, the end point of which is entirely
in the hands of the President. Mitterrand's term ends
in 1988, but he can resign any time before then to
take advantage of particularly advantageous condi-
tions. Public perceptions will be a primary consider-
ation in policymaking. Honing their images will be a
principal goal-if not the principal goal-of both
Mitterrand and Chirac, the most likely candidates in
the next presidential election. The absence of critical
differences in substance between the two-with the
exception of denationalization of some industries-
will place a premium on the politics of theater.
Mitterrand and Chirac will therefore engage in a
constant competition for media attention.
Mitterrand can rely on the prestige of the office to
ensure significant media attention, but Chirac might
decide he can more directly influence coverage by
reverting to old patterns and openly intervening. On
the basis of past experience as well as the recent
statements by Chirac and other members of the
government, we might expect the right to be more
activist than the Socialists in applying the state's
residual powers to prohibit or punish the publication
of unwanted information, undoubtedly inhibiting me-
dia independence to some degree. Nonetheless, we
believe the government's capacity for intervention will
be limited by public attitudes toward the state's role
in the media, by the evolution of the media them-
selves, and by changes in the political system as a
whole. However much government intervention re-
tains legitimacy among the political elite, recent polls
25X6
25X1
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suggest partisan intervention has been largely discred-
ited with the public. Thus, Chirac would be playing a
dangerous game that might produce short-term gains
in muting press criticism, but could easily backfire
with the electorate. As a general rule, in our view,
media policy can easily lose votes, but seldom win
them for a government.
At the same time, the media themselves-both print
and broadcast-are undergoing a slow evolution to-
ward more aggressive and independent journalism.
Investigative reporting has intrigued French journal-
ism since Watergate and in recent years has begun to
creep into the newer, more independent newspapers.
More important, structural changes in both the print
and broadcast media, combined with the expansion of
market forces, is likely to increase competition be-
tween the two for an audience and for advertising
revenues, pushing them into experimentation with
new styles and techniques, especially investigative
journalism. Although we expect that the evolution in
this direction will be prolonged and gradual, Chirac
may find that the free play of market forces in the
media makes him a prime target.
In a larger sense, we believe the media's movement
toward a more potent political role is linked to
broader institutional changes that have been noted by
scholars in the last decade: the resurgence of Parlia-
ment as a policymaking institution; the politicization
of the administration; the evolution of broad-based
political parties in place of the personalized or ideo-
logical parties of the past; and, most obviously, the
end of one-party dominance. Since at least 1978 the
"imperial presidency" has been under siege, and
election results are no longer a foregone conclusion.
As a result, party (or coalition) leadership is increas-
ingly tied to general popularity-electability-rather
than simply intraparty power.
Although the trends toward increased salience of
public opinion and media politics has been apparent
for some time, in our view it is greatly accelerated
during campaign periods. Since cohabitation will be in
effect a prolonged campaign, we expect that these
trends will increasingly be seen as the critical factors
in determining electoral platforms and party leader-
ship. The effects are already visible in the challenges
to the incumbent leadership of all parties from a
younger generation that has come of age during this
period of transition. Rising stars-for instance, Lau-
rent Fabius on the left, and Francois Leotard on the
right-as well as the veteran Michel Rocard, the most
popular politician in the country, appear more sensi-
tive to public opinion and willing to tailor policy
pronouncements to the latest poll data. Similarly, they
more readily accept the growing impact of television
and are willing to cater to the needs of a television
strategy.
Equally important to this process is the politicization
of the civil service, historically the most important
barrier to the intrusion of purely political calculations
into the policymaking process. Heretofore, in our
view, technocratic logic guided governmental deci-
sionmaking to a greater degree in France than in most
countries, and public opinion was rarely taken into
consideration. As the new political generation-many
of its members technocrats turned politicians-comes
to power, however, we believe that concern for public
image will impinge on the policy process. This trans-
formation will no doubt be self-limiting to some
degree, but we believe the media will play an increas-
ingly central role in the movement toward democrati-
zation of the policymaking process in France.
The growing impact and independence of the French
media may complicate bilateral relations between the
United States and France, even as it increases the
influence of American popular culture. The ability of
television in particular to arouse emotions about
foreign policy is a cliche since the Vietnam experi-
ence, but it may be increasingly applicable to France.
Historically, foreign policy-with the exception of the
colonial wars-has been a minor issue for most
French citizens according to various public opinion
surveys. In the past few years, however, television
footage from Central America, Beirut, Poland, and
Afghanistan has humanized the distant conflicts and
created broader interest.
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It is unlikely that this factor will provoke any dramat-
ic shift in the French approach to foreign policy, given
the general consensus favoring NATO and the United
States and the hostility toward the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, a residual resentment against the Unit-
ed States that persists just below the surface may be
manipulable, especially by increased television cover-
age of foreign affairs and by the more sensational
newspapers. Both the left and the right have used this
tactic to different ends in the past, the left focusing on
US policy toward the Third World and the right on
East-West issues, especially on perceived slights to
France's status as a major power. Future coverage
will depend to some extent on decisions made about
the status of the state television channels and appoint-
ments to their management, but the difficulties inher-
ent in cohabitation may make the United States an
easy target as the left and right try to score points off
each other.
Moreover, foreign policy will be given increased sa-
lience simply as a result of the competition between
the President and the Prime Minister for control of
policymaking. Television and the media in general
may provide the most visible field of competition
between the President and the Prime Minister, both of
whom will no doubt want to uphold the tradition that
France acts independently of the United States in
world affairs.
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