WESTERN EUROPE: GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Western Europe:
Government Policies
Toward South Africa
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Secret
EUR 86-10022
July 1986
Copy 4 5 2
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Directorate of Secret
Western Europe:
Government Policies
Toward South Africa
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by I Office
of European Analysis, with contributions from F
Office of Global
Issues; and the South Africa Branch, Office of
African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, European Issues Division,
Secret
EUR 86-10022
July 1986
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Western Europe:
Government Policies
Toward South Africa
Key Judgments West European countries abhor apartheid, but most are ambivalent about
Information available how to deal with South Africa:
as of 7 July 1986
was used in this report.
? Although they want to push Pretoria toward meaningful reforms, most
have taken only limited punitive measures such as recalling military
attaches, freezing official contacts in the sporting and security spheres, or
discouraging the import of fruits and vegetables. The collapse of the
Commonwealth initiative to find a basis for negotiations and Pretoria's
imposition of a state of emergency in June escalate pressures on all
capitals to do more.
? A major inhibition to stronger action is that many have a significant
economic stake in South Africa and do not want to risk damage to their
own economies. Even while avoiding imposition of strict economic
sanctions, however, West European business interests have cut back on
their South African investments, a factor in Pretoria's ongoing debt
crisis.
? At the same time, West European governments are promoting good
relations with the South African black majority and the surrounding
black states by providing them educational, humanitarian, and develop-
ment aid.
Most West European countries prefer to take any punitive actions within a
multilateral context such as the European Community and the Nordic
Council, and to wrap their decisions in the mantle of the United Nations.
Predictably, states with the closest economic, cultural, and political
relationships with South Africa are the least inclined to take harsh
measures:
? The EC states vary in their approach from a fairly hard-line stance by
the Danish to strong resistance to further measures by the British and
West Germans. Belgium and Portugal have large expatriate communities
in South Africa and fear that their interests in former colonies in
southern Africa could be damaged by the ripple effect of a besieged
South African economy. France, which under the Socialists was in the
forefront of sanctions supporters, has taken a softer stance under the
center-right government elected in March. We believe these differences
preclude more than modest new EC sanctions unless the situation in
South Africa deteriorates significantly.
Secret
EUR 86-10022
July 1986
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? The Nordic states are the most enthusiastic about sanctions and have
steadily increased their scope. In our view, they will continue to push for
a Security Council resolution calling for binding sanctions among UN
member states.
Limited polling evidence indicates that West European publics are unde-
cided about whether their countries' businesses should continue to operate
in South Africa and whether sanctions would be effective in forcing
Pretoria to make reforms. A USIA poll taken late last year in the United
Kingdom, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and France , however,
shows that the better educated in these countries generally favor sanctions.
We believe, therefore, that, if violence escalates in South Africa, this
group's role as an opinion leader would eventually increase public pressure
on governments to do more. Indeed, lobbying groups have already emerged
in many countries, and individual organizations-particularly labor
unions-are voluntarily boycotting South African goods.
We, therefore, believe that, if Pretoria institutes a massive crackdown to
quell black unrest, West European governments would come under great
domestic pressure to increase pressure on Pretoria. In the unlikely event
that Pretoria initiated meaningful political discussions with black leaders,
the Europeans would probably respond guardedly and remain skeptical of
white intentions. They would probably, however, be more inclined than
previously to help negotiate a settlement.
As long as Pretoria keeps domestic unrest largely in check, the West
Europeans will probably continue trading with South Africa and will focus
their already curtailed investment on short-term profits. Some of the states
with more at stake, like the United Kingdom and West Germany, will
continue to use their influence for moderation and to urge reform on
Pretoria.
West European trade with South Africa is not large in terms of the
Europeans' overall trade, but is still significant. Outside of the trade in gold
and strategic minerals, for which we have incomplete statistics, a complete
trade embargo on South Africa would affect less than 1 percent of the ex-
ports and imports of most West European countries, according to 1984
United Nations figures. Even the United Kingdom imports only slightly
more than one percent-about $1.1 billion-of these commodities from
South Africa, while exporting about $1.6 billion to that country.
A recent analysis of the effect of comprehensive economic sanctions on
South Africa concludes that Pretoria is prepared for-and probably
capable of weathering-such strictures for several years. In addition,
Pretoria relies on gold and diamond sales for about 60 percent of its export
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earnings, and we believe that even in the event of strict sanctions South Af-
rica would be able to continue to trade these high-value commodities by
disguising points of origin and selling through third countries.
Outside of trade aspects, many West European countries worry that
sanctions could affect domestic employment. Both Prime Minister Thatch-
er and Foreign Minister Howe, for instance, claim that 120,000 British
jobs would be jeopardized by full-scale economic sanctions against Pre-
toria. Denmark, which banned trade with South Africa in June, could see
about 2,000 jobs affected, according to employers. In addition, the British
hold assets worth more than $15 billion in South Africa, according to press
reports, and fear these could be at risk from South African retaliation if
London imposes sanctions.
Although British Prime Minister Thatcher adamantly opposes sanctions,
over the past year she has agreed to new measures under both the EC and
the Commonwealth aegis. Her usual tactic is to agree to mild new
measures while proposing diplomatic initiatives, but she probably needs
some concessions from South Africa to keep this tactic viable. In the
absence of such concessions she will be increasingly pressed, not least by
changes in the domestic climate, to take a tougher stance. Nevertheless, we
continue to believe that Thatcher will resist more than mild new measures
unless the US imposes tough sanctions.
The EC as an organization is also likely to seek negotiated solutions to the
turmoil in South Africa. In general, however, these states tacitly acknowl-
edge US primacy in this area and will tend to provide quiet support for US
initiatives and take their cues from Washington on further sanctions.
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Key Judgments
The United Kingdom 6
West Germany 8
The Sanctions Advocates 9
Public Opinion and Government Policy 12
Outlook 17
Positions of West European Governments Toward South Africa 21
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Western Europe:
Government Policies
Toward South Africa
Introduction
West European governments have watched the tur-
moil in South Africa over the past year with some
ambivalence. For years they had been concerned with
the struggle over Namibia, usually in the UN context,
and had imposed an arms embargo in 1977 against
South Africa in response to Security Council Resolu-
tion 418. Several joined the United States in the
Contact Group-the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany, Canada, and the United States-which
tried to find a negotiated solution to end South
Africa's control over Namibia. Although some had
long urged the United States to do more, most
acquiesced in the United States policy of "construc-
tive engagement" aimed at encouraging change in
South Africa through a quiet dialogue with the white
minority regime and the judicious employment of
carrots and sticks. But the increase in social strife and
violence in South Africa, which brought the United
States to advocate a tougher policy toward Pretoria,
also prodded West European governments into action.
In the last year they have enacted some new punitive
measures that range from fairly stiff bans on new
investment and promotion of trade in the Nordic
countries, to milder measures such as recalling mili-
tary attaches, freezing official contacts in the sporting
and security spheres, discouraging the import of fruits
and vegetables, and canceling cultural and scientific
agreements.'
So far, Western punitive measures have been designed
to have more political than economic effect on South
Africa-what one Times of London columnist in late
November tagged "symbolic pinpricks." 2 On balance,
we agree that the sanctions imposed have been largely
symbolic. South Africa's recent economic troubles
have stemmed more from stagnant export revenues
' See appendix for comprehensive list of actions taken by the West
European overnments.
than from sanctions. Nonetheless, the imposition of
even mildly punitive sanctions, as well as the threat of
harsher measures, has contributed to the loss of
investor confidence, slowed economic recovery, and
helped trigger a debt crisis that threatens South
Africa's access to international financial markets.
Differences in political and economic relations with
Pretoria inhibit unanimity of view on what else, if
anything, Western Europe should do. Some countries,
like the United Kingdom and West Germany, which
have both large trading and investment interests and
also former colonial ties to South Africa, oppose
further sanctions on the grounds that these would do
more harm to black interests than to the white
government. The Nordic countries disagree and seem
willing to impose stronger sanctions, but only if their
own economies would not be much affected. Former
colonial powers in the region, which include Great
Britain, Portugal, Belgium, and West Germany, usu-
ally still see themselves as having some special rela-
tionship with their former colonies. They are often
pulled in two directions, therefore, because they do
not want to alienate the black states in the region, the
blacks in South Africa, or the white regime
What has evolved from all these differing points of
view, differing relationships, and differing equities is
basically a two-pronged-occasionally three-
pronged-policy in West European capitals. Most
countries, along with the punitive measures against
Pretoria, offer educational and humanitarian aid to
the black majority such as university scholarships,
teacher training, and refugee assistance. The Nordic
states, for instance, allocate about 35 percent of their
total bilateral assistance to southern Africa. Great
Britain, West Germany, and France have also tried to
facilitate negotiations through the Contact Group
between the Frontline States-Angola, Botswana,
Secret
EUR 86-10022
July 1986
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Table I
Western Europe: Exports to South Africa a
Western Europe b
4,541
3,925
3,592
4,548
5,074
7,792
8,554
7,054
5,845
6,399
Germany
1,383
1,253
1,126
1,546
1,718
2,536
2,734
2,549
1,960
2,359
United Kingdom
1,491
1,167
1,025
1,293
1,545
2,345
2,482
2,107
1,696
1,640
Italy
339
269
265
315
325
594
729
549
485
525
France
433
493
497
606
531
965
1,082
631
509
507
220
192
146
185
213
264
320
237
236
274
Belgium/ Luxembourg
148
116
135
148
174
256
304
231
224
252
Switzerland
200
151
148
206
233
301
344
265
235
239
Sweden
138
97
80
93
121
182
201
162
141
194
Finland
30
36
24
29
34
51
55
70
77
92
Norway
38
38
34
31
51
98
72
56
75
87
Austria
55
52
51
43
60
86
91
75
70
78
Turkey
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
1
UN trade statistics, excluding gold trade.
b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-
and South Africa over the independence of Namibia.
At the same time, countries like the United Kingdom
and West Germany also try to keep lines open to the
South African Government to be able to use their
influence for moderation.
The Economic Stake
Although West European trade with South Africa is
not large in comparison to the trade these countries
conduct with each other, it does put South Africa in
the same league with other significant trading part-
ners (see tables 1 through 4). According to US
diplomatic reporting, Western Europe remained
South Africa's largest trading partner in 1985, ex-
porting goods worth $4.6 billion to Pretoria and
buying about $3.8 billion of South African goods.
According to The Economist, the United Kingdom
and West Germany together supply more than 25
percent of South Africa's imports. The French, who
took a more critical attitude toward the South African
regime under the Socialists, supply less than 4 per-
cent. Even countries with relatively small bilateral
trade are loath to curtail it, although sanctions and
boycotts are chipping away at parts of it, especially
coal. France has announced it will not renew contracts
for South African coal, and Denmark-which has
been Pretoria's largest coal customer-will begin
phasing out its purchases this year.
West European governments worry, however, about
their dependence on South Africa for most of their
strategic minerals-chromium, manganese, vanadi-
um, and the platinum group. Our figures are incom-
plete, but we estimate that Western Europe imports
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Table 2
South African Share of West European Exports a
Germany
1.54
1.23
0.96
1.09
1.00
1.32
1.56
1.45
1.16
1.38
Switzerland
1.54
1.03
0.85
0.88
0.88
1.02
1.29
1.04
0.93
0.93
Italy
0.97
0.73
0.59
0.56
0.45
0.76
0.97
0.75
0.67
0.72
Finland
0.54
0.56
0.31
0.34
0.30
0.36
0.39
0.54
0.61
0.69
Norway
0.52
0.48
0.39
0.31
0.38
0.53
0.40
0.32
0.42
0.46
Denmark
0.37
0.31
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.36
0.42
0.39
0.40
0.44
Ireland
0.49
0.30
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.27
0.45
0.42
0.47
0.44
Netherlands
0.63
0.48
0.34
0.37
0.34
0.36
0.47
0.36
0.36
0.42
a UN trade statistics, excluding gold trade.
b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
from 92 to 100 percent of its requirements for these
minerals from South Africa. South African officials,
including President Botha, have hinted they might
retaliate for sanctions by cutting off the supply.
According to the US Embassy in Pretoria, officials of
the South African Minerals Bureau have argued,
however, that such a move would be counterproduc-
tive over the long term because industrial nations
could find other sources of supply and develop substi-
tutes.
Aside from limited stockpiling of some minerals such
as vanadium and platinum, the West Europeans do
not in fact appear to take Pretoria's rumblings too
seriously, possibly because these minerals are avail-
able-at higher prices-from other sources, including
the Soviet Union.' In any case, it would be relatively
simple to bypass South African export restrictions by
using third-country transactions that obscure points of
origin and intended destinations.
West European investment in South Africa is signifi-
cant, although precise figures are hard to obtain
because many governments, like the United Kingdom
and West Germany, do not require disclosure. The
British have the largest share, and, according to press
reports, hold about $17 billion of the total $44 billion
in foreign investment. West German investment, as
estimated by the US Embassy in 1985, is about $408
million; press estimates go as high as $2.6 billion.
Belgians hold about $400 million in direct and about
$1 billion in indirect investment, with about 20 per-
cent of the latter in gold stocks. The French have been
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Table 3
Western Europe: Imports From South Africa a
5,087
6,041
4,992
4,643
4,006
4,200
823
1,248
1,669
1,555
1,300
1,721
1,354
1,409
1,292
1,132
Germany
585
692
817
943
1,160
1,365
1,041
1,037
899
972
France
232
294
482
705
951
1,162
1,002
739
583
660
Italy
198
214
248
292
559
657
616
496
415
523
Belgium/ Luxembourg
223
251
298
334
429
445
394
389
315
298
72
99
124
188
250
190
217
157
113
151
2
4
5
7
6
5
26
29
35
90
31
29
54
63
87
126
79
77
92
88
Austria
47
54
69
78
88
109
67
65
55
70
Sweden
38
41
29
41
56
62
49
58
53
51
Norway
46
53
32
39
37
35
33
46
32
45
Portugal
24
29
43
49
61
54
42
46
35
37
Greece
13
20
29
28
51
54
21
27
41
30
Finland
10
9
8
10
13
17
22
33
14
21
u UN trade statistics, excluding gold trade.
b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
reducing their share holdings for several years; diplo-
matic reporting indicates they have about $1.6 billion
in direct investments in South Africa. Austria, Swe-
den, and other states also have investment holdings
there. Indirect investment is especially hard to quanti-
fy because much of it is channeled through foreign
banks and multinationals. Whatever their stake, not a
single West European government has advocated a
policy of disinvestment in South Africa, although
several have banned new investment. Nevertheless,
the press documents over 30 multinational businesses
that have either reduced their stakes in South Africa
or have left altogether. Even British firms, which
seem more committed to staying than businesses from
elsewhere, have cut back. Over the past decade, South
Africa has received little, if any, new long-term direct
Pretoria is prepared for,
and could probably weather, even comprehensive eco-
nomic sanctions for several years. Over the longer
term, strong sanctions would impede growth and
intensify domestic political conflict. Since the 1960s,
Pretoria has pursued a program of import substitution
and stockpiling that has included trade subterfuges.
South Africa has also tried to limit its vulnerability to
foreign investment withdrawal by ensuring that most
capital investment-currently about 90 percent-re-
mains in South African hands.
As a consequence, South Africa probably could meet
basic needs in food, clothing, housing, and medical
care indefinitely, and its largely self-contained indus-
trial system could operate with minimal imports for as
investment capital from abroad.
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Table 4
South African Share of West European Imports a
Western Europe b
0.64
0.73
0.83
0.78
0.70
0.70
0.65
0.64
0.57
0.59
United Kingdom
1.54
2.23
2.62
1.98
1.27
1.46
1.34
1.42
1.30
1.07
Turkey
0.05
0.08
0.09
0.16
0.12
0.07
0.29
0.33
0.40
0.85
Belgium/ Luxembourg
0.74
0.71
0.74
0.69
0.71
0.63
0.64
0.68
0.59
0.54
Portugal
0.63
0.68
0.86
0.94
0.93
0.58
0.43
0.51
0.43
0.48
Austria
0.50
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.43
0.45
0.32
0.33
0.28
0.36
Norway
0.47
0.47
0.25
0.34
0.27
0.21
0.21
0.30
0.24
0.32
Greece
0.25
0.33
0.42
0.37
0.53
0.51
0.24
0.27
0.43
0.31
a UN trade statistics, excluding gold trade.
b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
long as four years. Official data show that the govern-
ment spent some $2 billion between 1960 and 1979
building and maintaining nonmilitary strategic stock-
piles. Pretoria's strategic oil reserve reportedly would
last more than three years at present rates of con-
sumption, and
government stocks of industrial spare parts and
other critical items now equal about one year's con-
sumption. Pretoria still relies heavily on imports for
new and replacement capital goods and machinery,
including computers, and the South African chemical
industry cannot produce many essential catalysts and
compounds essential to mining and agriculture.
a partial boycott of South
African exports would have a significant, but not
crippling, effect on earnings. Gold and diamonds
account for 60 percent of export earnings, and we
believe South Africa would be able to circumvent
sanctions on these items by obfuscating their point of
origin. Sales of gold and diamonds are already hard to
trace, and they can be airlifted to overseas markets.
Coal, steel, and agricultural exports are more easily
traced, but they account for only 20 percent of South
Africa's export earnings.
Over the longer term, comprehensive sanctions, or the
cumulative effect of gradually expanding measures,
would stifle growth as resources were diverted to
replace embargoed goods and as capital goods wore
out. A disruption of international financing combined
with lower export earnings also probably would sharp-
ly reduce South Africa's capacity to buy imports
needed for production.
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The Arms Trade
West European trade in arms with South Africa has
largely ended, and what remains has gone under-
ground. Since the UN mandatory arms embargo was
enacted in 1977, South Africa has pursued a policy of
military self-sufficiency, producing equipment suffi-
cient to meet the needs of its ground forces and some
of those of its naval and air forces, according to
various open-source publications. However, more so-
phisticated weapons technology and component parts,
and some spares and ammunition, still must be ob-
tained abroad. The arms embargo, while increasing
the difficulty and cost of procuring foreign arms, has
not isolated South Africa from traditional suppliers
such as France and the United Kingdom.
There is some evidence that Western firms that were
former suppliers of major air and naval weapons
systems continue to meet South Africa's needs for
spare parts and technical services. While not in direct
violation of the arms embargo, these military/indus-
trial firms skirt the letter of the law. In November, for
instance, the French press reported that even the
government-controlled firm Aerospatiale helped set
up channels to funnel spare parts to South Africa
through third countries, maintained and upgraded to
military standards commercial helicopters sold before
the arms embargo, and helped South Africa set up its
own helicopter industry. We believe
that the article is
essentially accurate. Certain gaskets, tubing, washers,
and other specialized components critical to the oper-
ation of South Africa's Mirage aircraft cannot be
produced in South Africa.
The Foot Draggers
The imposition by Pretoria of the state of emergency
in July 1985 in the wake of increased black violence
and US sanctions impelled even reluctant European
capitals to take additional punitive measures. The
drift toward sanctions is most dramatically illustrated
by the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom. Although Prime Minister
Thatcher protested that she would never agree to
economic sanctions, the British agreed in September
to join with the European Community in steps against
Pretoria (see inset). In October, Thatcher reluctantly
became a party to another set of measures agreed to
at the annual Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting. Many of the Commonwealth penalties ech-
oed EC measures, but in addition called for:
? A ban on all new government loans to the South
African Government and its agencies.
? A ban on the importation of Krugerrands.
? No government funding for trade missions or for
participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South
Africa.
? A ban on the sale and export of computer equipment
capable of use by military, police, or security forces.
Thatcher continued to maintain that sanctions are not
effective politically, hurt the blacks disproportionate-
ly, and remove an important lever for influence, but
she was not willing to be the only holdout in either the
EC or the Commonwealth, particularly after the
United States announced punitive measures.
Thatcher faces pressure to take further measures
under the Commonwealth aegis. At the October
meeting member states set up a committee of "wise
men" to monitor the pace of South African reform
measures for six months-later extended to June
1986-and propose possible further measures if Pre-
toria seems dilatory. The Eminent Persons Group
(EPG) pronounced its mission a failure in June and
warned that the lack of further economic pressure on
South Africa would "hasten a descent into bloody
conflict." A Commonwealth minisummit will meet in
London in August to debate the report and Thatcher
may be hard pressed to refuse any proposed further
action. President Kaunda of Zambia is even preparing
a "censure" package for individual Commonwealth
states to implement if Thatcher stands firm, accord-
ing to press reporting, including breaking off diplo-
matic relations with the United Kingdom, expelling
British diplomats, and taking action against British
industries in their countries.
Pressure is also growing within the EC since June to
take further measures, but those leaders who oppose
such action-including Thatcher-managed to hold
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The European Community Position
The EC meeting in Luxembourg in September 1985
agreed to maintain pressure on South Africa by:
? Embargoing arms imports and exports between EC
states and South Africa.
? Banning military cooperation.
? Recalling military attaches from South Africa and
refusing to grant accreditation to military attaches
from South Africa.
? Discouraging cultural and scientific agreements un-
less these would contribute to ending apartheid or
have no possible role in supporting it.
? Freezing official contacts and international agree-
ments in the sporting and security spheres.
? Ending oil exports to South Africa.
? Ending exports of sensitive equipment destined for
the police and armed forces of South Africa.
? Prohibiting all new collaboration in the nuclear
sector.
In addition, the EC agreed to such positive measures
as:
? Expanding programs to increase awareness among
citizens of the EC states resident in South Africa.
The EC Code of Conduct for European firms in
South Africa dates from 1977 and is built on the
Code of Practice already in operation for British
firms. The Code, similar to the voluntary US Sulli-
van principles, enjoins employers:
? To allow nonwhite employees to choose representa-
tive organizations freely and, if they choose a trade
union, to recognize it.
? To do what they can to counter the bad effects of
the migrant labor system.
? To pay initially at least 50 percent above the
minimum subsistence level.
? To give equal pay for equal work.
? To introduce training schools to promote black
advancement.
? To set aside funds for black hiring and education
and other fringe benefits.
? To desegregate places of work.
? To publish a detailed annual report on progress in
? Adapting, reinforcing, and publicizing the code of
conduct for businesses in South Africa.
? Assisting nonviolent and antiapartheid organiza-
tions, particularly the churches.
? Expanding educational aid programs for blacks,
including grants for study in Western Europe.
? Establishing more contacts with the nonwhite com-
munity in the political, trade union, business, cul-
tural, scientific, and sporting sectors.
? Expanding programs to assist the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference- estab-
lished in April 1980 by the leaders of Tanzania,
Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mala-
wi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland to work
together to become more independent of South
Africa-and the Frontline States.
applying the Code.
In November 1985, in accordance with its agreement
in September, the EC issued a stiffer Code that
recommended:
? Recognition of black trade unions.
? Promotion of blacks to "managerial posts. "
? Relocating workers'families nearer the firm.
? Facilitating regular renewal of labor contracts.
? Setting up insurance and pension schemes for black
workers.
? Elimination of all discriminatory practices on the
job, in canteens, and in the fields of education and
professional training.
? Encouraging the creation and development of black
businesses through subcontracting.
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off further sanctions for three months until a Europe-
an delegation could try again to influence South
Africa to release Nelson Mandela and open a dia-
logue with the black community. With the United
Kingdom holding the EC presidency for the rest of the
year, Thatcher must demonstrate that she can coax
some concessions from Pretoria. If the dialogue with
Pretoria fails, however, we believe that Thatcher will
be willing to impose the full scope of the proposed EC
measures-a ban on new investments in South Africa
and on imports of South African coal, iron, steel, and
gold coins.
The British have the strongest ties to South Africa of
the West European countries, with wide-ranging in-
terests in cultural, ethnic, economic, and strategic
affairs there. Great Britain has been the chief source
of white immigrants to South Africa since the early
19th century. Even in the 1974-78 period, Britain
supplied 64 percent of the immigrants to South Africa
from outside Africa. The reverse flow was equally
strong, with 44 percent of South African emigrants
during that time going to the United Kingdom (where
they often became politically active in antiapartheid
circles.) Economic ties have also remained strong.
Diplomatic reporting indicates that perhaps 10 per-
cent of British overseas investment is in South Africa,
and both Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Howe claim
that 120,000 British jobs would be jeopardized if the
United Kingdom participated in full-scale economic
sanctions against Pretoria. The figure may be an
exaggeration but it underlines the strength of the
economic relationship.
Even in Britain, however, a large minority supports
further action. The British press reports a growing
boycott of South African goods by retail chains,
sparked by requests from the Trades Union Congress.
According to the Times newspaper, the companies
involved would normally place orders worth "tens of
millions of pounds" with South Africa. An all-party
group of members of parliament returned from South
Africa in June unanimously calling for further mea-
sures against Pretoria. The Labor Party, in particular,
criticizes the government position and argues for a
tougher stance, and, if it were to gain power in the
next national election-which must be held by early
1988-we believe that British policies would shift
accordingly. Labor leader Neil Kinnock invited exiled
African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo to
speak at last year's party conference, and he is likely
to continue a pro-ANC stance. The Labor Party
pledged in mid-June, for instance, to impose financial
sanctions on South Africa-no new loans, no new
investment, no recycling of South Africa's foreign
debt, and no new South African business in British
financial institutions-if there were no progress to-
ward dismantling apartheid by the time the party next
won power.
West Germany. Like Britain, West Germany is also
resisting economic sanctions against South Africa. It
is Pretoria's only major Western trading partner that
has limited economic sanctions-other than the EC-
sponsored measures-to the area of military sales.
The German Government arguments against sanc-
tions are similar to those of the British. This position
is shared by the opposition Social Democratic Party
(SPD), which is otherwise very critical of govern-
ment's policies toward South Africa. However, the
press reports that SPD Chairman Willy Brandt re-
turned from a "disappointing" trip to South Africa in
late April calling for economic sanctions and greater
cooperation with resistance movements. The Chair-
man of the German trade union federation in April
also supported the introduction of sanctions. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Bonn, Chancellor Kohl is
also under some pressure by Free Democrats in his
cabinet to harden Bonn's stance.
Like the British, the West Germans have considerable
economic interests at stake. West Germany has a
favorable balance of trade with South Africa, export-
ing in the neighborhood of $2.3 billion and importing
about $1 billion in 1984. Private direct investment at
the level estimated by the US Embassy in 1985 would
total just over 1 percent of West German private
domestic investment abroad, and most of the big
names in West German industry are represented
among the 283 subsidiaries of West German firms
there. The US Embassy in Pretoria reported that as of
late 1985 West Germany was South Africa's third-
largest overseas trading partner, behind the United
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States and Japan. And as sanctions continue to
whittle away at Western trade with South Africa,
German economic ties to South Africa probably will
grow in importance.
Both London and Bonn worry that their position will
become untenable if Washington takes further mea-
sures against South Africa; they carefully monitor
current US thinking and work in concert to urge
Pretoria toward reform. Both governments are also
concerned that their lenient stance will be under-
mined by further heavyhandedness in Pretoria toward
continued black unrest. In particular, London almost
certainly worries that this would force it to proceed
along the sanctions path in the name of Common-
wealth unity. For their part, the Germans do not wish
to be seen as the last holdouts against any EC
consensus on the subject. For instance, Bonn let
Thatcher take all the adverse publicity for initially
refusing to endorse the EC sanctions package during
the September Community negotiations even though
the Germans were also reluctant to go along with it.
The Sanctions Advocates
France and the Nordic countries, in response to
socialist constituencies and a large human-rights-
oriented public, have led the West European contin-
gent that argues for imposing sanctions. Although the
center-right government of Prime Minister Chirac has
softened the French stance toward South Africa since
its election in March, it is constrained by the effect its
actions produce within the Nonaligned Movement
and among the former French colonies in Africa. The
Nordic countries also value the opinion of the Non-
aligned, but also think that sanctions are the most
practical way to convince South Africa to refrain
from continuing human rights abuses. So far, howev-
er, the Nordic governments have shied away from
measures that would markedly hurt their own econo-
mies.
France. The most recent series of French measures
was sparked by Pretoria's imposition of a state of
emergency last July while the Socialist Party still led
the government. Within a week, Prime Minister
Fabius announced that Paris was recalling its ambas-
sador, suspending all new investments in South Afri-
ca, and proposing measures to the United Nations
Security Council to reflect international condemna-
tion. Other Western states-the British in particu-
lar-were furious that the French had not coordinat-
ed their UN actions, according to diplomatic
reporting, even though Paris pointed out that its call
for voluntary sanctions preempted what would cer-
tainly have been a much stronger draft from the
African states. After making its proposals in the
United Nations, France then began an internal study
to determine how much they could cost, concluding in
late August that the ban on new investment would
cost neither Paris nor Pretoria much of anything since
new French investment was already on the wane in
light of South Africa's faltering economy. Although 25X1
Paris announced last November that it would no
longer buy coal from Pretoria-an action that the
Prime Minister's office reported could cost about $14
million in price differentials-the US Embassy in
Paris notes that French need for coal imports should
decline in 1986, so the decision does not open signifi-
cant opportunities for other suppliers.
The Socialist government also hardened its line in the
United Nations, voting last December for a Nordic-
sponsored resolution that called for the Security
Council to adopt mandatory sanctions and taking a
similar stance in other forums such as the Franco-
phone summit, the grouping of French-speaking states
that met in Paris this February. This attitude is
already changing under the conservative parliament
elected in March. Jacques Chirac, the neo-Gaullist
prime minister, told the US Ambassador before the
election that France would "turn around 180 degrees"
on South Africa under a conservative government and
would favor dialogue over sanctions. Chirac returned
the French Ambassador to Pretoria in early May,
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after a seven-month absence, and allowed the South
African military attache to return to Paris. However,
Chirac is moving slowly in reversing other Socialist
policies because he wants to avoid offending the
leaders of Francophone African states and he needs
time to sort out his relationship with Socialist Presi-
dent Mitterrand, whose office traditionally dominates
foreign policy. In a tug of war between the Prime
Minister/National Assembly and the President, we
think major policy shifts will not occur, especially
since there is some evidence that many conservatives
support Mitterrand's tougher stance.
The Nordic States. The Nordic countries take the
most hardline attitude toward sanctions. They have
acted together, as in the Nordic foreign ministers'
meeting in Oslo last October, and individually, as in
Denmark's cosponsorship of the French UN initiative
last July, and seem to be moving toward ever-harsher
measures in the belief that only such sanctions will
lead to peaceful change in South Africa. Some busi-
nessmen object to measures that impinge on their
interests and ignore "voluntary" sanctions, but labor
unions, parliaments, and some opposition parties are
pressing their governments to be even tougher. In
Finland, for instance, in addition to government ac-
tion in urging voluntary trade restrictions, the Finnish
Transport Workers Union last October announced a
boycott for an indefinite period that essentially elimi-
nated all trade in goods between Finland and South
Africa. Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish labor unions
have proclaimed similar boycotts. The Nordic states
take pride in "taking the lead" against apartheid. The
Danes note that they have been in the forefront of the
sanctions movement for over 20 years and that their
parliament voted in December to cut off all trade with
South Africa. Sweden ended all state export credit
programs to South Africa as far back as 1965, and
Norway has strictly enforced a 1976 ban on foreign
currency licenses for investments in South Africa.
Nevertheless, there are limits beyond which the Nor-
dic states are not yet prepared to go. According to the
US Embassy in Oslo, the Nordic foreign ministers in
their October meeting declined to issue a call for
disinvestment in South Africa or go beyond "recom-
mending" to private companies that they curtail
business there. They were unwilling to take steps that
would hurt their domestic economies unless such
actions also promised to have a major political and
economic impact on Pretoria. The Embassy points out
that none of the proposals (see inset) agreed to in Oslo,
such as a ban on loans to South Africa and a ban on
state support for all promotion of trade with that
state, are likely to cost jobs or cut profits significantly
in Nordic nations in the near term. In the case of
Denmark, where the parliament voted a harder stance
than the government proposed, the ban on trade with
South Africa could cost about 2,000 jobs, according to
Danish employers. Other Nordic states have almost
nothing to lose. Iceland, for example, has no known
investments in South Africa, and two-way trade is
minuscule.
The business community clearly lacks the enthusiasm
for economic sanctions evidenced by politicians and
the public in the Nordic countries. In Sweden, which
is the largest Nordic market for South African
goods-with bilateral trade worth $245 million in
1984-the Swedish Trade Board reports that the
country's imports from South Africa increased by 57
percent in the first five months of 1985 because of
South Africa's low prices. Government pressure to
reduce bilateral trade with Pretoria caused a down-
turn in these figures in the last quarter of 1985,
according to press reports, but the government un-
veiled plans in April to put further roadblocks in the
path of trade relations. The business community also
has not reduced its investments in South Africa,
despite the 1979 investment ban. Investment has
remained at the 1979 level of about $60 million,
according to a report submitted to parliament at the
end of 1984. According to diplomatic reporting,
Swedish companies were able to maintain this level
only by a liberal application of the 1979 law's waiver
procedures and by such means as leasing-rather
than buying-new equipment. The tightening of the
ban last year and the government's decision to refuse
waivers, along with continued public pressure from
antiapartheid groups, will make it difficult for Swed-
ish firms to maintain this level of investment
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The Nordic program of action against South Africa
announced in March 1978, includes:
? Discouragement of investments in South Africa.
? Discouragement of sports and cultural contacts
with South Africa.
? A commitment to work within the United Nations
to get the Security Council to adopt resolutions
against trade with, and new investments in, South
Africa.
? An increase in humanitarian aid to the victims of
apartheid and in economic aid to the Frontline
States.
The Nordic foreign ministers, in their 17-18 October
1985 meeting, adopted additional measures to reduce
economic and other ties to Pretoria:
? Discouraging new Nordic investments in South
Africa.
? Negotiations with Nordic companies to persuade
them to limit their production in South Africa.
? Requests to Nordic companies that traders with
South Africa seek other markets and suppliers.
? A ban on imports of arms, ammunition, and mili-
tary vehicles produced in South Africa.
? A ban on the importation of krugerrand gold coins.
? A ban on new contacts in the nuclear field.
? A ban on the export of computer equipment with
military or police applications.
? A ban on state purchases from South Africa and on
state promotion of trade with South Africa.
? A ban on loans to South Africa, including partici-
pation in international loans. IMF loans to South
Africa should be opposed under IMF rules.
? A ban on leasing to companies in South Africa.
? A ban on the transfer of patent or production rights.
? Further restrictions on sporting, cultural, and sci-
entific contacts.
? Tougher guidelines for granting visas to South
Africans.
The foreign ministers also agreed to increase humani-
tarian aid to African refugees and liberation move-
ments and to the victims and opponents of apartheid,
and to increase aid to the Frontline States.
In Denmark, too, according to diplomatic reporting,
the minority government and shipowners vigorously
fought an opposition motion to include a ban on all
shipping to South Africa in a bill that bans all other
trade. The insertion would cause serious problems for
one major Danish firm. In addition, the government
claims that such a restriction could potentially cost
"several tens of millions" of dollars in lost earnings,
and, without an international shipping boycott, would
have no effect on South Africa.
The Consensus Seekers
Other European governments, such as the Nether-
lands and Ireland, occupy the middle ground of
supporting consensus policies and only change their
stance when it is part of either an EC or a UN
agreement. Some, such as Belgium and Portugal, are
also constrained by previous colonial ties. Several of
them rely heavily on trade for their economic well-
being and oppose sanctions in principle. What mea-
sures they support against South Africa they justify as
being part of a worldwide UN action.
Italy lacks enthusiasm for further EC action but is
keeping an eye on domestic public opinion as the
situation develops. Ireland and Spain lean toward a
tougher EC position but do not want to lead the
charge. The Netherlands has a large domestic pool of
human rights activists, but the government so far has
dampened pressures for further sanctions.
Portugal's new government is reluctant to take any
action that will endanger its large expatriate commu-
nity in South Africa or the remittances they send
home, but also has special interests arising from its
former colonial role in Angola and Mozambique.
Lisbon probably will abide by current EC guidelines
but will resist further action.
Belgium also endorses the current EC posture but
opposes further sanctions because, according to diplo-
matic reporting, it worries that the collapse of South
Africa would be a disaster for the entire region,
including its former colony, Zaire. In addition, Bel-
gium has extensive business interests in South Africa
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and a large Belgian expatriate community there, and
Flemish Belgians feel a cultural affinity with Afrika-
ners.
Most of the European neutral states have taken some
punitive measures against South Africa. Finland and
Ireland are party to the Nordic and EC actions,
respectively. Austria formerly eschewed sanctions,
but Foreign Minister Gratz announced tough sanc-
tions last September and explained this about-face as
in keeping with the UN position. According to the US
Embassy in Vienna, Gratz's sudden shift was more
likely a result of his dismay at events in South Africa,
pressure from within the ruling Socialist Party, and
growing public concern. The new policy will have
little impact on the Austrian economy, however,
because bilateral trade and investment are small.
Only Switzerland has held out against sanctions. Its
traditional no-sanctions policy is buttressed in this
case by its considerable gold, diamond, and banking
dealings with South Africa, and the government
easily beat back an opposition Socialist Party motion
last September to tighten Swiss capital exports. A
Swiss official told US Embassy officers that only a
UN Security Council call for sanctions would be
likely to induce his government to change its policy.
Public Opinion and Government Policy
Government policy on many issues in Western Europe
is heavily influenced by public opinion, and we believe
the question of sanctions against South Africa has the
potential to be one of these issues. Because polls
suggest most European publics are divided or lack
familiarity with the South African issue, we suspect
that public opinion has not yet played a major role in
government decisions, except perhaps in the Nordic
countries. Although we have no poll results on this
issue there, the tough measures called for within the
Nordic foreign ministers council have considerable
popular support, according to diplomatic reporting.
We have limited polling evidence on public opinion in
the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy,
and the Netherlands provided by the United States
When asked if foreign investment helps or hurts the
blacks in South Africa, publics in Great Britain,
France, and West Germany had difficulty deciding.
In each of these countries, as many people thought it
hurt as thought it helped. About half the people in
France and West Germany could not decide. In Italy
and the Netherlands, pluralities thought investment
hurt the blacks. The better educated in every country
were much more likely to have an opinion. Pluralities
of the better educated in France, Great Britain, West
Germany, and Italy, and a majority in the Nether-
lands, believed that investment hurts the blacks be-
cause it strengthens the power of the white minority
government and the apartheid system.
When asked if foreign businesses-including those of
their own countries-should continue or stop invest-
ment and other activities in South Africa, about one-
third of the Dutch and West Germans did not know or
were unwilling to say. Only bare pluralities opted for
stopping such activities. Larger pluralities in the
United Kingdom and Italy thought businesses should
continue to operate in South Africa, while over one-
third of the publics thought they should stop. The
French were nearly equally divided.
The better educated segment echoed these responses.
Despite a prevailing belief that continued investment
and business activities hurt the blacks, about half the
better educated Britons and Italians thought business-
es should continue their activities, with 40 percent of
the British and one-third of the Italians disagreeing.
Nearly 60 percent of the better educated French and
Dutch respondents thought businesses should stop
operating in South Africa, as did over 50 percent of
Information Agency last fall (see figures 1 through 4).
the Germans.
The general publics differed from country to country
on the question of whether sanctions can force an end
to apartheid. Only in the Netherlands did a plurality
think sanctions could work; in West Germany most
people said they did not know, Italian and French
publics were evenly divided over the question, and
nearly half in the United Kingdom thought sanctions
were useless. Among the better educated, however, a
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Figure 1
Effect of Foreign Investments on Blacks
Doesn't hurt
Whole Sample
United Kingdom
Better Educated
United Kingdom
Question: Some people say that foreign investment because it strengthens the power of the white
in South Africa helps the blacks because it minority government and the apartheid system. On
provides jobs at higher pay and better working balance, do you think that foreign investment in
conditions than South African firms provide. South Africa does or does not hurt the blacks, or
Others say that foreign investment hurts the blacks haven't you heard enough to say?
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Figure 2
Foreign Investment
0 Continue business
0 Discontinue business
0 Don't know
Whole Sample
United Kingdom
Better Educated
United Kingdom
Question: Do you think that foreign businesses-
including those from our own country-should
continue to invest or do business in South Africa,
or do you think they should stop investing and
doing business there?
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Figure 3
Sanctions and Reform
Economic sanctions will not work
Don't know
Whole Sample
United Kingdom
Better Educated
United Kingdom
Question: Some people say that economic will never accept basic reform of apartheid
sanctions by the United States and other Western regardless of outside pressures. Which view is
nations can force the South African Government to closer to your own?
make major reforms in its system of apartheid.
Others say that the South African white population
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Figure 4
United Kingdom: Evaluation of Government's South African Policy
Do you think that the government's policy toward South Africa is Do you think we should or should not apply economic sanctions
too tough, not tough enough, or about right? against South Africa, such as boycotting their goods or withholding
finance?
Too tough
Not tough enough
About right
Don't know
El
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
If economic sanctions were applied against South Africa, do you Do you think sanctions would or would not cause more hardships
think they would or would not lead to a relaxation in South Africa's to South African blacks?
apartheid policy?
Would
Would not
Don't know
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Do you think the United Kingdom has put too much pressure on What is more important:
South Africa to reform its system of racial segregation, too little A. Giving South African blacks more freedom at the risk of weaken-
pressure, or about the right amount? ing stability and ties to the West?
B. Maintaining South Africa as a stable Western ally even if it
means a delay in giving blacks more freedom?
Too much pressure
Too little pressure
About right
Don't know
I I I I I I I I I I I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Should
Should not
Don't know
Would
Would not
Don't know
Statement A
Statement B
Don't know
I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
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majority in every country but the United Kingdom
believed that sanctions would work; the British were
evenly split. But more than one-third of the better
educated in all countries thought that South African
whites will never accept basic reform of apartheid
regardless of outside pressures.
The picture that emerges from these few questions is
one of indecision, both about how European actions
affect the internal South African scene and about how
they affect the South African Government. The better
educated-likely also to be opinion leaders-usually
take a somewhat more unified position on the ques-
tions, but even here there are large minorities that
disagree. We think it is significant, however, that the
better educated nearly everywhere lean toward the
idea that economic sanctions by Western nations can
induce reform in South Africa. We think it likely that
continued widespread publicity of unrest in South
Africa will strengthen this perception. More than 80
percent of the well-educated segment follows the news
about events in South Africa (except in West Germa-
ny, where the figure is 64 percent) and, according to
the USIA poll, is more likely than the public at large
to think that what happens there is important to their
country's interests. If so, and if the better educated
help mold public opinion, then government leaders
eventually may face stronger internal pressures to
implement economic sanctions.
A Gallup poll taken in the United Kingdom last
November tends to support the view that the public
stance is shifting. Although the different phrasing of
questions reduces comparability, the Gallup findings
suggest a hardening of public attitudes toward Pre-
toria since the USIA poll in September. The general
public still thought that sanctions would not lead to a
relaxation of South Africa's apartheid policy, but the
Gallup poll nevertheless found that a plurality (44
percent) thought the United Kingdom should apply
sanctions (up from 37 percent in the USIA poll); 36
percent in the Gallup sample were against sanctions
(43 percent in the USIA poll). Moreover, a plurality
thought that the government has not placed enough
pressure for reform on Pretoria even though a major-
ity thought sanctions would cause more hardship to
South African blacks. When asked to choose between
giving blacks more freedom even if it were at the
expense of instability and loosened ties to the West or
maintaining South Africa as a stable Western ally
even if it meant a delay in black freedoms, 48 percent
chose the former and only 34 percent opted for a
delay. A poll published in June shows a continuation
of this trend, with almost half of Britons supporting
sanctions.
A poll taken in West Germany in October shows
results consistent with the USIA poll in the few
questions that are similar. The public showed consid-
erable sympathy for blacks in South Africa and
tended to think West Germans should not buy South
African goods even though a majority thought blacks
would be adversely affected by such a move.
Outlook
West European policies toward South Africa over the
next few years will be determined largely by the
direction of the black-white struggle there and, in
many cases, by US policies in the region. In all cases,
the general pattern in Western Europe will be for the
Nordic states to take a more activist stance, both in
adopting policies of their own and in prodding other
countries to follow suit. Except for its propaganda
potential with domestic antiapartheid groups, howev-
er, the actions of the Nordic states will have little
effect on the rest of Western Europe. The EC states
will tend to provide more support for US action in the
area by working with Washington to develop and
carry out policy, helping occasionally to add weight to
US demarches, and by generally taking their cues
from Washington on sanctions.
West European governments sharpened their focus on
South Africa in June following the collapse of the
Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group initiative and
Pretoria's reimposition of the state of emergency. The
question of imposing further measures will dominate
several high-level meetings over the summer. Never-
theless, if things continue as they are now, with
widespread black violence, government repression,
and piecemeal reforms, we believe most West Europe-
an states will be reluctant to go much further along
the sanctions route. They will, however, continue to
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urge Pretoria to institute reform measures that can be
endorsed by the black majority. Although individual
states such as Denmark might act on their own from
time to time, most will prefer to work within multilat-
eral frameworks like the UN, the EC, or the Nordic
Council. Depending on the framework, their actions
can be expected to both complement and complicate
Washington's efforts in southern Africa. At the Unit-
ed Nations, for instance, the Nordic countries are
likely to continue their campaign, as they did in 1984
and 1985, to pass a resolution in the General Assem-
bly that urges the Security Council to adopt manda-
tory sanctions against South Africa. This was the only
one of eight apartheid resolutions addressed in both
these years in which the US position received less
support the second time around. According to the US
Mission to the United Nations, the decline was direct-
ly attributable to the French shift from an abstention
to a "Yes" vote. The French decision induced Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Belgium to follow suit.
The vote switch probably reflected both growing
frustration in these capitals with Pretoria's intransi-
gence and some degree of rationalization that the
Security Council is not bound to follow a General
Assembly vote in any case. In the absence of signifi-
cant improvement in the South African situation,
similar language this year is likely to elicit a similar
result.
The Nordic Council is likely to continue to take a
harder line toward South Africa than other European
institutions. Nordic countries will meet in August to
consider additions to their already lengthy list of
sanctions. In the meantime, according to press re-
ports, they plan to step up economic and cultural
cooperation, including technical assistance, invest-
ment, trade, and cultural exchanges, with the Front-
line States.
Within the EC, there are differences of opinion as to
how much further to go regarding sanctions against
South Africa. Although some countries in the EC
would be willing to tighten sanctions, the United
Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and
recently, France, are certain to vote against any more
than mild additional measures. The rotating EC
presidency will mean shifts of emphasis from time to
time, however. The Dutch, for instance, who held the
chair through June, appeared eager to make their
mark. While they were sensitive to US concerns and
were willing to coordinate their actions with Washing-
ton, they looked at southern Africa as an issue where
they could exercise leadership. Accordingly, at a
meeting between EC foreign ministers and ministers
of the Frontline States in Lusaka in early February,
the Dutch successfully pressed for a joint communi-
que that called for dialogue between all parties in
South Africa, and a similar dialogue between the
parties involved in the Namibia question. On the
other hand, the Europeans sidestepped specific prom-
ises about increasing their sanctions against South
Africa or their economic aid to Frontline States.
The British presidency, which runs through the end of
the year, is more interested in fending off the South
African sanctions issue. According to diplomatic re-
porting, the British expect to have to give some
ground, but Dutch officials point out that support for
a go-slow position is fairly widespread among EC
governments.
Government Crackdown. If the situation in South
Africa were to deteriorate markedly, with an escala-
tion of brutality on both sides, and especially if the
white regime were to institute a massive security
crackdown to squash black militancy, we believe most
West European capitals would be forced to contem-
plate harsher punitive measures. The Nordic states
would again take the lead, while the EC would be
slower to act as a result of foot-dragging by the
United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, and Por-
tugal. Prime Minister Thatcher, for one, would be
likely to argue that further sanctions would only
strengthen Pretoria's "laager" or siege mentality, and
that maintaining existing relations allows London to
influence the actions of the South African Govern-
ment. Some EC members, such as Denmark, would
take actions on their own or as members of another
group, like the Nordic Council. The EC will closely
monitor US intentions, and will seek to work in
concert with Washington on any actions taken. At the
same time, the West Europeans would probably step
up their assistance to the Frontline States and the
more moderate South African black nationalist
organizations.
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Although public attention has focused largely on
South Africa's internal policies and problems, West
European relations with South Africa have been
influenced by Pretoria's continuing struggle with the
United Nations over the future of South-West Africa,
or Namibia. This struggle dates from the inception of
the United Nations, sparked largely by Third World
nations pressing to free Namibia from the League of
Nations mandate administered by South Africa since
1920. Although Pretoria was prevented by the terms
of the mandate from annexing Namibia, it adminis-
tered the territory as though it were afifth state in
the South African union, including the introduction
of pass laws and other measures of apartheid. For
many years, South Africa refused to accept the
position of the United Nations that it had inherited
the League of Nations mandate system-renamed
trusteeships-and that Pretoria should allow the
United Nations some say in the future of Namibia.
The controversy has produced many UN resolu-
tions-by 1982 the General Assembly had adopted
112 resolutions on Namibia and the Security Council
18-but little forward motion toward Namibian in-
dependence. Not until 1972 did Pretoria grudgingly
consent to consultations with UN Secretary General
Kurt Waldheim. South African Prime Minister Vor-
ster subsequently described in a memorandum his
government's policy toward Namibia as one of "self-
determination and independence." This statement
followed a 1971 ruling by the International Court of
Justice (with dissenting votes from the judges from
the United Kingdom and France) that the South
African presence in Namibia was illegal and South
Africa should leave "immediately. " This ruling was
adopted later that same year by the Security Council,
again with the United Kingdom and France abstain-
ing.
The breakup of the Portuguese African empire in
1974, the subsequent civil wars, and the introduction
of Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique
focused the attention of Western governments more
sharply on the South African/Namibian struggle. At
the United Nations, the Western states became more
critical of South African policies. Security Council
Resolution 366 (1974), passed unanimously, demand-
ed that South Africa comply with the 1971 Security
Council resolutions, withdraw from Namibia, and-
pending the transfer of power-end racial discrimina-
tion in Namibia and release political prisoners there.
In January 1976, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 385 callingforfree elections in
Namibia under the supervision and control of the
United Nations. The following year, five Western
members of the Security Council-Canada, France,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States-offered to help negotiate terms for the inde-
pendence of Namibia on the basis of Resolution 385.
In April 1978, after consultations with the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), South
Africa, the UN Secretary General, the Frontline
States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zimbabwe, and Zambia) and Nigeria, the Western
Contact Group submitted a proposal for a Namibian
settlement to the Security Council which called for
UN-supervised elections after sufficient time for po-
litical organization and election machinery to be
established; the appointment of a UN special repre-
sentative for Namibia to ensure that elections were
free and fair; and the release of Namibian political
prisoners, the cessation of hostilities, and the confine-
ment of South African and SWAPO military forces
to their bases. South Africa announced its acceptance
in principle of the Western proposal on 25 April 1978;
SWAPO, on 12 July. The plan was endorsed by
Security Council Resolution 435 on 29 September.
Pretoria, nevertheless, decided to proceed with uni-
lateral elections in Namibia in December 1978. UN
Security Council Resolution 439 condemned the
South African decision, declared the election null
and void, and stated that organs or representatives
established by the election would not be recognized
by the United Nations or any member state. These
resolutions are still cited as the basis for any settle-
ment in Namibia.
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Appendix
Positions of West European
Governments Toward South Africa
Austria
New sanctions announced before the UNGA in
September 1985 include:
? A ban on investment by nationalized industries.
? A ban on kruggerand gold coin imports.
? Reduction in cultural and sporting contacts.
? Suspension of government export credits.
? A ban on exports of nuclear technology.
? A ban on exports of computer equipment to South
African police and military.
In October, the Minister's Council approved an ordi-
nance forbidding the export to South Africa of any
kind of weapons and ammunition.
Belgium
Various "restrictive measures" imposed over the
years include:
? Reduced level of diplomatic representation in South
Africa.
? Visa requirements and restrictive issuance policy.
? Suspension of the bilateral cultural accord.
? Prohibition of official sports contacts.
? Official discouragement of emigration to South
Africa.
? Suspension of official support for Belgian invest-
ment and for medium- and long-term state-guaran-
teed export credits; short-term (90 day) credits may
still qualify for government guarantees.
? Prohibition of arms, ammunition, and military
equipment trade (in both directions) with South
Africa and a termination of military cooperation.
? An embargo of sensitive equipment destined for the
police.
? A mandatory code of conduct for major Belgian
firms operating in South Africa.
Denmark
As of 1985, Copenhagen had implemented the follow-
ing sanctions:
? A ban on new investment in South Africa.
? A gradual phaseout of South African coal imports
before 1990.
? A ban on official export promotion programs for
exports to South Africa.
? No export credit guarantees for exports to South
Africa (implemented in 1978, at which time the
Danes also recalled the official responsible for ex-
port promotions in Johannesburg).
? A ban on the procurement of South African prod-
ucts by government departments, like the Danish
State Railways and the Royal Greenland Trade
Department.
? The suspension of civil aviation ties, including an
end to flights to South Africa of Scandinavian
Airlines Systems (SAS), jointly owned with Norway
and Sweden.
? The closure of its only diplomatic post, a consulate
general in Johannesburg.
In addition, all Danish banks have voluntarily stopped
sales of krugerrands. On 6 May 1986 the Danish
Parliament banned all coal imports from South Africa
and Namibia, with a six-month phaseout period for
Danish power plants. On 30 May, the parliament
voted to break off all trade with South Africa, as of 15
June. Denmark also is a party to the sanctions agreed
to by the Nordic foreign ministers at their meeting in
mid-October.
Finland
As of 1985, the government had already urged volun-
tary trade restrictions that include:
? A total ban on imports of fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles, canned fruits, and base metals.
? A total ban on imports of raw materials and semi-
finished goods from South Africa.
? A recommendation from the Finnish Shipowners
Association that no member participate in any
cargo traffic between Finland and South Africa.
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On 31 December 1985, the Finnish President signed a
special powers law that limits economic relations with
South Africa, including a ban on credits and guaran-
tees and the passing of patents. Another decree
banned investments in South Africa. In addition, on
13 September 1985 the Finnish Government abrogat-
ed its extradition treaty with South Africa.
France
On 8 January the French cabinet formally adopted
the economic sanctions agreed to by the EC foreign
ministers in September. It had already:
? Imposed a freeze on new investments as of July
1985.
? Recalled its ambassador to South Africa. (The
Ambassador returned to Pretoria in May, as part of
a measured thaw in relations instigated by the
Chirac government.)
? Imposed an arms embargo.
? Prohibited the importation of krugerrands (in the
late 1960s).
? Banned amateur athletic exchanges with South
Africa.
A press release in mid-November announced that
France will buy no more coal from South Africa as
long as Pretoria maintains its apartheid policy; the
Chirac government has not rescinded this policy.
France also took the lead in submitting a draft UN
Security Council resolution late last July calling for
various trade, investment, and credit sanctions by UN
members against South Africa in response to Pretor-
ia's 20 July State of Emergency declaration.
West Germany
Although Bonn continues to oppose economic sanc-
tions, it agreed to implement the EC measures adopt-
ed in September. It has also taken other measures,
including:
? Suspension of the 1962 cultural agreement.
? Imposing a 50-million-mark limit ($17 million) per
transaction on export insurance coverage available
to South Africa.
? Embargoing paramilitary weapons and other equip-
ment that could have police or crowd-control
applications.
? Refusal to transship or sell oil to South Africa.
? Prohibiting the export of nuclear energy technology
to South Africa.
Greece
According to diplomatic reporting, the Greek Govern-
ment sees no need to restrict its relations with South
Africa because they are already at a very low level.
Except for some limited krugerrand transactions,
which Athens plans to continue, the Greeks were
already in compliance with suggested EC "restrictive
measures" because they had not been engaged in
these activities.
Iceland
The Government of Iceland has not imposed any
sanctions or restrictions against South Africa, but
plans to propose legislation to implement the October
1985 Nordic program of action.
Ireland
Dublin follows policies consistent with the EC decla-
ration, but has so little to do with South Africa that
most of the provisions do not apply. As a matter of
policy, Ireland has no diplomatic relations with South
Africa and discourages sporting, cultural, and busi-
ness contacts between the two countries. Ireland
provides humanitarian aid to programs intended to
assist victims of apartheid. In March 1986 the govern-
ment announced a ban on the import of fruits and
vegetables from South Africa, to phase in on 1
October and be in full force by 1 January 1987.
Italy
Rome restricts sports contact with Pretoria and will
comply with last September's EC decision.
The Netherlands
The Dutch comply with the EC declaration.
Norway
Norway is a party to the Nordic sanctions programs
agreed to in March 1978 and October 1985. Addition-
ally, Oslo:
? Refuses foreign currency licenses for Norwegian
investments in South Africa (since June 1976).
? Provides no credit guarantees for export to South
Africa.
? Refrains from export-promoting activities toward
South Africa.
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? Sells no Norwegian oil to South Africa.
? As one of three government owners of SAS, decided
last June to end flights to South Africa.
In February, the government asked parliament to take
further unilateral measures, including:
? The introduction of a licensing requirement for all
Norwegian exports to South Africa retroactive to 1
January.
? Automatic denial of import licenses for South Afri-
can fresh and processed fruits and vegetables effec-
tive 27 January.
? Government assistance to help Norwegian firms
negatively affected by the measures to find other
sources of supply or new export markets.
? Agreement by the Norwegian Shipowners Associa-
tion to register, on a quarterly basis, with the
government the deadweight tonnage and number of
calls to South Africa by Norwegian-owned oil
tankers.
? Active work at the United Nations with other
Scandinavian countries for the implementation of
binding Security Council sanctions, especially a
transportation boycott.
? Consultations with individual members of the Secu-
rity Council to work toward a resolution requiring
the registration of all ships carrying oil to South
Africa.
? Introduction of a law prohibiting the sale of Norwe-
gian crude oil to South Africa.
In addition, Norway provides humanitarian aid to
liberation movements, refugees, and other victims of
apartheid which reached about $10 million in 1985.
Norway also provides money-about $18 million in
1985-for programs of the Southern African Devel-
opment Coordination Conference (SADCC) designed
to reduce the economic dependence of black states on
South Africa, and another $110 million directly to
these black states.
Portugal
Portugal adheres to the EC declaration.
Spain
Madrid, which was already observing the arms em-
bargo against Pretoria, adheres to the EC declaration.
Sweden
Stockholm leads the Europeans in imposing measures
against Pretoria:
? In 1965, Sweden ended all state export credit
programs to South Africa.
? In 1977, it enforced the UN Security Council
resolution prohibiting the export of arms and related
materials to South African military and police
authorities.
? In 1979 the government banned all new investment
and prohibited loans and credits to South African
companies.
? In 1985, Sweden tightened loopholes in its invest-
ment ban, prohibited loans and credits to South
African Government authorities, required the regis-
tration of all transfer or licensing of technology to
South Africa, and banned the importation of South
African agricultural commodities and krugerrands.
? In April 1986, Stockholm announced it was consid-
ering an executive order to completely ban the
transfer of technology to South Africa through
patent or licensing arrangements.
? In June the Swedish Government decided to intro-
duce import licenses for all goods from South
Africa.
Sweden has also implemented multilateral measures
with other Nordic states, including:
? The March 1978 Nordic action plan.
? The October 1985 Nordic measures.
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? As one of the three government owners of the SAS,
the abrogation last summer of a civil aviation
agreement with South Africa and, by September, an
end to air service between the nations.
Sweden also announced last November a special
contribution of $652,000 in humanitarian aid for the
African National Congress (ANC), an amount that
will bring Stockholm's total contribution to the ANC
to $5.7 million since 1972. The Swedes intend to give
about $265 million in aid to southern Africa, mostly
to the Frontline States in the year starting July 1986.
Switzerland
Switzerland has restricted Swiss capital exports to
South Africa since 1974; the current ceiling is $122
million per year. On 30 September the Federal Coun-
cil issued a statement reaffirming its "permanent
practice" not to participate in sanctions.
Turkey
Ankara has had no diplomatic relations with Pretoria
since 1961, and has neither economic, military, nor
cultural links to it.
United Kingdom
The British Government has refused to agree to
economic sanctions against South Africa, but joins
other countries in banning:
? Military cooperation.
? Arms trade.
? Nuclear cooperation.
? The export of crude oil.
In addition, the United Kingdom:
? Has agreed to abide by the EC declaration.
? Subscribes to the EC code of conduct on
employment.
? Joined last October in the Commonwealth program
of common action.
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