LETTER TO JAMES MURR FROM JOHN L. HELGERSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00234R000300420016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 25, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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Washington DC
25 August 1988
00%2863-88
Mr. James Murr
Assistant Director, Legislative Reference
Office of Management and Budget
%ashington, D.C. 20503
Dear Mr. Murr:
I write to advise you of the opposition of the Central
Intelligence Agency to the "Anti-Stonewalling Act of 1988"
(house Retort No. 100-861, pp. 54-55), an amendment to be
offered by Representative Alexander to the omnibus, anti-drug
legislation that will probably be considered by the House of
Representatives when it returns to session in September.
The amendment would require any Executive Branch employee
obtaining information about "illegal foreign drug activities"
to forward such information promptly to his agency head. The
agency head, in turn, would be required to furnish it to
Presidentially-designated law enforcement agencies and, upon
request, to any committee of Congress and/or the General
Accounting Office (GAO). Information could be withheld from
the Presidentially-designated agencies under certain limited
circumstances but only by the agency head on a non-delegable
basis and only after notification to the President. The
information would have to be disclosed, upon request, to any
committee of the Congress and to the GAO. The President could
withhold the information but would have to report to the
Congress on his reasons therefor. GAO could sue to obtain the
information in accordance with the provisions of 31 U.S.C. ?716
et se.
Our reasons for opposing this amendment are as follows:
Congressional Reporting Requirements
Our primary concern is with those portions of the amendment
dealing with the Congress. Most important, the key phrase
"information about illegal foreign drug activities" could be
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interpreted as requiring intelligence agencies to provide
routinely to Congressional requesters raw, unevaluated
intelligence reports. Currently, it is not our practice tc
forward such unevaluated reports on any subject to the
Congress, even to the intelligence oversight committees. The
proposed amendment would constitute a radical change in this
area and would raise serious questions regarding the protection
of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
Moreover, by permitting any committee of the Congress to
obtain such information on demand, the provision, in effect,
gives every committee oversight of intelligence matters in this
area. This, too, would be a radical departure from present
practice, treaching the understanding between the Executive and
Legislative Branches that oversight of intelligence activities
be confined to the two intelligence committees.
Under present law (Title V of the National Security Act),
the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of the
various agencies in the Intelligence Community are required to
keep the committees "fully and currently informed' of
intelligence matters. Pursuant to this provision, the Agency
and the Community routinely provide the committees with a large
body of narcotics intelligence information otherwise falling
within the scope of the amendment. The amendment is thus, to
some extent, duplicative of existing law.
The provision creates broad new rights of access for the
General Accounting Office (GAC) to Executive Branch
information, most especially intelligence information. As
subsection (c) of the provision indicates, that right is, in
fact, superior to the right of a Congressional committee to
obtain the information. Moreover, .GAO would be given the right
to sue the agency involved to obtain the information in
accordance with the provisions of 31 U.S.C. f716. This raise
the prospect of a lawsuit between two branches of government
over some of what could be the most sensitive information in
the possession of the United States. Involvement
of GAO in the process is particularly objectionable to the
Agency since we have historically taken the position vis-a-vis
GAO that Congressional oversight of intelligence activities
should be limited to the intelligence committees.
The amendment does make provision for withholding
information from the Congress but it is not satisfactory.
Although not clear on the face of the provision, it appears
that if an agency wishes to withold information, it rust too
through the cumbersome process of obtaining Presidential
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approval. In the event the President chooses to withold
information requested, he must notify the chairman and ranking
minority member of the committee involved (the intelligence
committees if it involves intelligence matters). We also see
this scheme as sowing the seeds of future problems similar to
those currently facing the Executive Branch with respect to
Congressional notification of intelligence activities. These
range fron technical questions of the content and form of the
notification to broader questions of what the Congress can dc
upon receipt of notification and the President's countervailing
constitutional authorities in the area. In short, rather than
helping to dampen any future conflicts, it will serve to
institutionalize and sharpen then.
Intra-Executive Branch Reporting Requirements
We are also concerned with the intra-Executive Branch
reportino requirements uhich the amendment would create.
Insofar as the amendment creates such requirements for
intelligence information, it unnecessarily duplicates
long-standing, carefully-crafted administrative mechanisms for
reportino.such information within the Lxecutive Branch. These
include the requirement in Executive Order 12333 for
Intelligence Community agencies to report to the Attorney
General information which comes to their attention concerning
federal crimes. They also include other such mechanisms which
allow for the sharing of narcotics intelligence information
with law enforcement agencies while, at the same time,
protecting intelligence sources and methods from disclosure.
In fact, the Agency and the Community already share
intelligence information of this sort on a routine basis and
will undoubtedly share more in the upcoming years. In this
regard, I note that the conferees on the Fiscal Year 1989
Intelligence Authorization till in their conference report have
requested the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary
of Defense and the various law enforcement agencies to develop
by 1 March 1989 a plan to expand cooperation even further.'
(Eouse Report hc. 100-879, p. 22.)
The statutory scheme with which the amendment would replace
these administrative mechanisms is, by nature, inflexible.
Mandatory involvement of the President and various agency heads
adds to its inflexibility. More important, however, the scheme
is an attempt to resolve by fiat that which has been an
historical conflict between two constitutional areas of
Presidential authority: his powers and duties to enforce the
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laws of the United States, and his powers and duties to conduct
the foreign relations and national defense of the United States.
By mandating the reporting of such information to law
enforcement agencies, the provision subordinates the
President's national security powers and duties to his law
enforcement powers and duties. Vie believe the conflict in this
area is best handled on a case-by-case basis under existing
mechanisms with ultimate resort to the President, if
necessary. A statutory reporting scheme favorinc law
enforcement over national security would be an ill-advised
constraint on Presidential flexibility.
Vie are also concerned with the term chosen to describe the
information that "trips" the reporting requirement: "illegal
foreign drug activities." This tent is vague and subject to
any nunter of interpretations. These will undoubtedly lead to
underreporting or overreporting, which, in turn, will lead to
further conflict within the Executive Branch and with the
Congress.
I also note that there are sore units of the Intelligence
Community that are specifically tasked to collect narcotics
intelligence information. This provision could undoubtedly be
interpreted by some as requiring the entire product of these
units to be used for law enforcement purposes. Again, we
believe the uses of intelligence information vis-a-vis law
enforcement activities should be established on a case-by-case
basis, rather than by an inflexible rule.
Representative Alexander's introductory remarks
(Congressional Record, 11 August 1966, pp.Ii 6646-54) indicate
he introduced the amendment in reaction to positions taken by
the Executive Branch in response to Congressional and GAC
efforts to obtain information on various topics, includinc the
druc trafficking in Central America and the relationship of the
United States Government to Panamanian General Manuel Noriega.
The Agency has cooperated and continues to cooperate with
the intellicence committees in response to their inquiries in
these areas. Because of this, and our historical position
vis-a-vis GAO, WE indicated to GAO that we were not able to
cooperate in their investigation.
tie hope that Representative Alexander's concerns can be
addressed other than through legislation. In any event,
however, we trust that the Administration will take every
appropriate action to oppose this provision. The Director of
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Central Intelligence is prepared personally to contact
appropriate Congressional leaders as a part of coordinated
Administration action to oppose this amendment.
hank you for the opportunity to comment on this important
piece of legislation.
Sincerely,
STAT
Be ger on
Director o Congressio al Affairs
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11 6848 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?HOUSE August II, I70d
least we have broken the logjam to
give Members an opportunity here to
have their say.
We are seeing the results of the hard
work and dedication of the task force
members, bed by the gentleman from
California. Mr. Janie' Lewis, the gen-
tleman invm ?kW:lemma. Mr. MICKEY
EDWARDS, on our side, the gentleman
from Florida.. Mr. Biaa. Mc:Cowen, two
of the three are down on our conven-
tion on the platform currently.
Countless hours of dedicated work
by Members and staff created this op-
portunity to pass quality legislation.
While I cannot list the names of all
these people. I think they know I
mean them. when I express the grati-
tude of this side of the task for their
hard work.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I would have
preferred an open rule, but I must add
that the bipartisan spirit that has per-
meated this process is very much evi-
dent in the rule today. As a result of
the cooperative spirit evidenced by our
Speaker and majority leader and the
Rules Committee, the content of the
bill is not only comprehensive, but it is
of high quality.
Surely we do not agree on every-
thing In the bill, nor do we agree on all
of the amendments, but we have en-
abled Members to address and debate
these key issues when we resume in
September.
So, Mr. Speaker, I want to again
thank the Speaker and the majority
leader and the distinguished chairman
of the committee for his cooperation
here, that when we do come back from
our recess there will be probably three
or more days involved in amending
this comprehensive drug bilL
I urge the adoption of the rule, and
thank the gentleman for yielding this
time.
Mr. PE.1"1-1.1-t. Mr. Speaker, for pur-
poses of debate only. I yield 3 minutes
to the distinguished gentleman from
Arkansas Mir. ALESDER1.
(Mr. ALEXANDER asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks, and to include extraneous
material.)
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I
rise in support of the rule and to ex-
plain my amendment made in order
under the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I first conducted a
forum on drug abuse 16 years ago in
order to attack a dilemma that was
just beginning to invade some areas of
my home State of Arkansee Today,
with Arkansas as well as the rest of
the country seemingly no closer to
solving the problem of drug abuse
than in 19'71, the question arises as to
why America has been unable to deal
with the scourge of drug abuse.
As we debate the rule on the omni-
bus antidrug bill today, we should rec-
ognize that there is no one simple
answer to this question, but a major
obstacle in attacking drug use is the
absence of a clearly defined, unmistak-
able policy. In the void left by the lack
of a clear policy, confusion reigns
among the agencies that are charged
with drug enforcement.
As a remedy to this situation. in Sep-
tember I pian to offer an anti-
stonewalling amendrreent to the anti-
drug bill, which would require the
sharing of information among certain
Federal agencies about illegal foreign
drug activities. My amendment would
require that any exectittve branch offi-
cial baring information about such ac-
tivities would transmit it to the heads
of agencies involved to formulating
U.S. foreign policy or enforcing Feder-
al drug laws. The antistonewalling
amendment would 0. sequire that
such information be shared, when re-
quested, with committees of Congress
and the General Accounting Office.
A classic example of the difficulties
that arise from the national policy
vacuum in drug abuse occurred on
July 11 when John Lawn, the head of
the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion. testified to a congressional sub-
committee that he had written letters
praising the alleged drug interdiction
efforts of Gen. Manuel Noriega and
the Panama Defense Forces. The DEA
Administrator testified that at the
time the letters were written he had
not known about the criminal investi-
gation into General Noridega's involve-
ment with Mega' importation of for-
eign drugs into the United States, be-
came he a-as "left out of the loop" by
U.S. Intelligence agencies and never
given hard evidence tying Noriega to
narcotics traffickers.
That criminal investigation eventu-
ally led to Noriega's indictment, and
was conducted by the Miami U.S. at-
torney general's office, which is a part
of the Department of Justice. We
must prevent this kind of confusion
among agencies charged with drug
laws enforcement in which the left
hand of the Justice Department clear-
ly didn't know what the right hand
was doing.
A second example concerns an ongo-
ing investigation by the General Ac-
counting Office, undertaken at my re-
quest, which would examine how in-
formation about drug trafficking by
high-level Government officials of
other countries affects U.S. foreign
policy decisions, using as a ease study
Information concerning the drug traf-
ficking activities of General Noriega of
Parlama.
GAO indicated in an August 9 letter
to me that "since May 11, 1988 we
have been formally trying to gain
access to personnel and records at the
Departments of State, Justice, and De-
fense." In late May, GAO was in-
formed that the National Security
Council would handle this assignment
for the administration, and the Depart-
ments of State, Justice, and Defense
were instructed by the NSC to cease
cooperation in the investigation until
NSC issued guidelines for GAO access
to information. Repeated GAO re-
quests for information were refused by
State. Justice, and Defense, with each
refusal being accompanied by a refer-
ence to the NSC stonewalling
While is is perfectly justifiable to
withhold certain types of information
that would jeopardize law enforce-
ment or intelligence activities. the
GAO told me that "most of the infor-
mation we need to examine should be
considered to be releasable." GAO of-
ficials met with leSC officials and told
them of ?our previous experience on
other successful assignments Involving
similarly sensitive information." There
is no reason why the executive should
not provide information on the basic
objective of the GAO investigation,
which is the organization and decision
process for foreign policymaking when
Information is available on foreign of-
ficials' drug trafficking.
A series of questions remain unan-
swered about illegal drug trafficking
In Central America. For example, in
Arkansas serious questions continue to
surface about allegations concerning
Adler Berrienan (Barry) Seal's gun
running and drug smuggling. Seal. a
DEA informant who was slain in Lou-
isiana in 1986. was allegedly involved
In an operation to which a plane
loaded with guns to aid the Nicara-
guan Contras flew from Mena. AR,
down to Central America and then re-
turned loaded with drugs One of
Seal's planes, a C-123K that had been
serviced and parked at the Mena air-
port during much of 1984 and 1985,
was shot down over Nicaragua in Octo-
ber 1986, while carrying supplies to
the Contras, and an Arkansan Wal-
lace (Buzz) Sawyer, was killed in the
crash. There have been local. State,
and Federal investigations into the
Mena operation, but many questions
persist. A vital goal of the anti-
stonewalling amendment is to ensure
that all agencies are cooperating in
giving and receiving the Information
they need to do their job.
One question that arises is whether
Federal agencies were working at cross
purposes during the period of Seal's
activities as an informant. There is evi-
dence that the CIA and the NSC both
wanted to divulge Seal's involvement
In a massive undercover drug investi-
gation because of those agencies' in-
terest in influencing the Contra aid
debate that was taking place in Con-
gress shortly before Seal's murder in
February 1986: simultaneously, the
DEA's primary interest was apparent-
ly the undercover effort to break up
the Colombian drug cartel. A news
leak by an unknown US. Government
official resulted in articles alleging
that the Sandinista government was
Involved in drug trafficking, and it
blew the investigation. According to
our distinguished colleague, Chairman
/lux HUGHES of the Rouse Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, the political-
ly motivated leak cost Seal his life.
While everyone respects the need to
avoid disclosing information about the
criminal investigation of Noriega,
there are many other questions the
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August 14 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 11 6849
executive should be able to give the
GAO, including-.
First, what procedures are- there for
law enforcement agencies to communi-
cate their intelligence needs to the in-
telligence community?
Second. how are law enforcement
and/or foreign policymaking officials
further up the chain of command pro-
vided intelligence information?what
procedures are involved, what kind of
information is provided?
Third. were any specific instructions
or directives prepared requesting in-
formation on illegal drng-relatect ac-
tivities in Panama or an Norieg;a's in-
volvement in illegal activities?
Fourth. who received the raw infor-
mation. what did they do with it, what
studies, reports., or analyses were pre-
pared on illegal activities in Panama
or on Noriega?
Fifth, who were these reports sent
to?especially, were any recipients in
the law enforcement community or in
foreign pokicyraaking positions?'
Sixth, how did the law enforcement
recipients use the reports?did they do
further analysis, did they use the in-
telligence as input to timid ac develop
any criminal cases?
Seventh. how did the foreign policy-
making recipients use the reports?did
they discuss them, did they do further
analyses, did they stuamarize for
higher levet recipients?
Mr. Speaker, there is no reason why
the exeeutive branch stionld withhold
information on the primary focus of
the GAO inquiry, which is the organi-
zation and decision process fox foreign.
policymaking when inforraation is
available on foreign &ECM& drug
trafficking. 'The antistanewalling
amendment would toms only on infor-
mation such as that involved in the
GAO's investigation of Noriega and
other officials, which legitimately can
be provided: IL would mat require dis-
closure under three conditions'
First. when it would jeopardize a
U.S. foreign intelligence or counterin-
telligence activity;
Second, when it would endanger a
law enforcement investigation; and
Finally. when ft may adversely
affect MS. defense or national securi-
ty.
A decision not to share irdcwmation
could be made only by the head of an
agency. If the President decided to
withhold the informatian from a. com-
mittee of Congress. he wcturd have to
provide the committee the reasons. for
such action. In the event, that the in-
formation involved TY.S. foreign intelli-
gence or connterititee. the
President would be rewired to
promptly 11104113 the chairman and
ranking minority members of the
House and Senate committees an intel-
ligence.
Mr. Speaker, drug abuse is. the most
devastating plague confronting Amer-
ica today. In battling this evil,. we
cannot any longer tolerate the policy
void in which agencies operate in igno-
rance of each other and occasionally
even. pursue contradictory objectives.
We must replace the current vacuum
with a clearly defined, unmistakable
policy in which all agencies cooperate
fully with each other in. sharing infor-
mation about illegal drug trafficking.
I ftwther submit various copies of
various letters from the GAO, the De-
partment of State. the Department of
Justice. the Department or Defense.
and the National Security Council
which further explains the need for
the antistonewalling amendment
CAMERAL Accounts= Orme. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY sem liereann-
MIMI. Arnim.% Dumas.
Wathiirgtart. DC, August X MX
Hon. BILL Annr_unasn.
Subcommittee on Commerce .Pastice, State,
the fusiticrumr gout Relatel Agencies,
Commie ow AilanorolArratiorss. House of
Representatives.
DEAR MR. Amuse= na May 1988 you
asked us to review haw informarical about
drug trafEcking bre bigh-levei neternment
officials of nations friendly to the Incited
States affects rf.S. foreign policy decisions.
Because the information required GO suc-
cessfully undertake this assigiumunit would
potentially involve infarniatinn related to
intelligence gathering and on-gong law en-
forcement investigations which is difficult
to obtain, we suggested and you agreed.
that we would explore the issue using as a
case study the information concerning the
drug trafficking activities of General Nor-
iega of Panama. The falinwing is a. summary
of the experience we have had so Dar in sat-
isfying Your request.
Since May 11, 1988, we have been formally
trying ta gain access be personnel and
records at the Departments of State, Jus-
tice,. and Defense. We. were successful in
gaining access tip the Department of De-
fense and in fact perfumed a limited
amount of audit work at that agency. In
late May, we were aliened that tbseliational
Security Council iniSCi would serve as the
administration's focal point an this assign-
ment. Concurrentne we vete sensed. that
the Departments of Jaatice and State had
been instructed net to meet wenn the GAO
staff or provide any innerrinatiost to GAO on
this assignment alga NW issued gendelines
concerning GAO access to inforesation. The
Department of Defense notified us on July
12. 1988, that it also was. instructed * the
NSC to cease cooperative with GAG until
such guidelines, are available We base by
letter and, telephone ascensions. continued
to try to obtain information and schedule
meetings. with the Departments of State.
Defense. and Justice but these efforts have
been refused, with each, agency citing the
NSC's direction as the reasan fee refusal.
We have been workbag sonh the NSC to
facilitate access to agency permanent and
records. We met with them on jinn in 1988
arid June 22. 1988, and discussed at mine
length our approach to the work. our views
about our accent In inforanitima. and our
previous experinace on other successful as-
signments involtket anagarly sensitise in-
formation. On June Din legn. at NBC's re-
quest, we delivered a detaned, letter to them
giving further detain on the kinds of infor-
mation we wank/ he seeking. Although that
letter identified some infornatton which. ul-
timately may not be made avenenie the in-
formation related to. the primary focus of
our work. that is. the organization, and deci-
sion process for foreign pericymaking when
Information b anent:Table on lamina Uncials'
drug trafficking would not uniforang be ex-
pected to raise similar concerns. Our menial
procedures in such situations are to consider
access questions on a case-by-case basis, fol-
lowing discussions with agency officials and
examination of otherwise exanable records.
NSC's actions to prohibit such ineliminary
discussions until after guidelines concerning
access ore established has dareclosed that
approach.
On July 13. /98ft tlee NSC wrote in re-
sponse to oar -Tune 23. 1988. letter that our
request "seeks access to sensitive Daw en-
forcement and intelligence files covering a
substantial period of time" and "raises im-
portant statutory and constitutional issues."
The letter advisedi that the administration
is analyzing those issues and would reply
when its deliberations were completed. We
have on several occadriOna. TISOSt recently yes-
terday, asked the NSC about the status of
the operating guidelines. We continue to be
told the issues are being analyzed and guide-
lines will be issued when the review is com-
pleted. NSC officials say they aumot pro.
vi a specific date when guidelines will be
available.
We are net into the filth month of our
effort to address the issue you asked us to
review. and it is difficult to predict, how
much further delay is likely. Although we
have assembled some information available
from public records, we have made essential-
ly no progress on the audit Itself. We believe
it should be possible to. reach agreement
with the agencies involved, as we pursue our
andel questions: that mach of the informa-
tion we need to examine should be consid-
ered to be releasable. and to discuss special
arrangements for security of the informa-
tion if such arrangements are warranted. In
fact, we were successful in such an approach
with the. Department of Defense prior to
July 12,
We will continue- to keep you informed of
the- status of our efforts, and will discuss
further steps which we believe may be ap-
propriate, if any, after we have- reviewed
any guidelines issued by NSC
Sincerely yours..
NANCY R.. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
GENERAL AECONNEENIR OFTICIL Me-
e:ionise Srancrue erns Lemma-
TIONaL AFFAIRS DERISION,
Washington DC. August 3.1988.
Hon. Bun ALEXANDER,
Haase of Repsesentatires.
MAR MR. ALE:IAN:mu In May 1988. you
asked us to review how information about
drug trafficking by kighlevel government
officials of nations friendly to the United
States affects U.S. foreign policy decisions.
Because the information required to suc-
cessfully undertake this assignment would
potentially heroine information related to
intelligence gathering and en-going law en-
forcement investigations which is difficult
for the General Accounting Office to obtain
under our access-to-records authorities, we
suggested, and you agreed, that we would
explore the issue using as a case study the
Information concerning the drug trafficking
activities of General Neeriega of Panama. As.
you; requested at oar meeting on Augusta.
1988. we are providing a detailed summary
on the experience we have had so far- in at-
tempting I. obtain information on this as-
signment.
In summary, although we were able MI
perform a limited amount of audit work at
the Department of Defense in Jane. the. Na-
tional Security Colman 01E3C) has directed
the other Executive Branch agencies tn-
vcrived not. to meet with GAO staff ac pro-
vide any information to GAO on this insigne
men* until NSC issues guidelines concerning
GAO access to information on the assign-
ment. The MSC has informed us that it con-
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11 WSDU WINUK.k.SSIONAL Kt,WKLP ? tilJUJL August LI, .1.YeS6
alders our request for information concern-
ing General Noriega's drug trafficking and
other activities as raising "important statu-
tory and constitutional issues."
As of August 1. 1988, the representative of
NSC who has been our contact said that he
could not tell us when the guidelines would
be forthcoming, but he said that he expect-
ed them to be issued within, perhaps, a
couple of weeks (that is, not within days,
and not after months). We have made sever-
al attempts, by letter and through tele-
phone discussions, to obtain information
and schedule meetings with the Depart-
ments of State, Justice, and Defense, but
these efforts have been refused, with each
agency citing the NSC's direction as the
reason for their refusal. We have also con-
tracted the Central Intelligence Agency,
where our request for information was also
declined.
A detailed chronology of our efforts to
meet with NSC and agency officials, and to
obtain information, is provided in Enclosure
I. Copies of the letters we sent to NSC and
to the agencies are provided in Enclosure II.
The NSC has provided one written interim
response to our letters (Enclosure III); of
the agencies, only the Central Intelligence
Agency has responded in writing (Enclosure
IV).
We are currently awaiting the NSC guide-
lines. We will continue to keep you in-
formed of the status of our efforts, and will
discuss further steps which we believe may
be appropriate, if any, after we have re-
viewed any guidelines issued by NSC.
Sincerely yours,
NANCE R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
ENCLOSURE I
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF GAO CONTACTS
WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND
OFFICIALS
May 11-16, 1988: We sent routine notifica-
tion letters to the Departments of State,
Justice, and Defense, and the National Se-
curity Council advising them of our review
and identifying the subject and scope of our
work. Letters were sent specifically within
the Department of Justice to the Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA). the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys, and Justice's
Criminal Division.
May 23, 1988: We received our first re-
sponse from the NSC. Mr. Nicolas Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Advisor, told us by telephone that he
wanted to "think about it" before schedul-
ing a meeting with us.
May 24, 1988: We sent a notification letter
to the Central Intelligence agency asking
for a meeting to discuss the issues..
May 30-June 1, 1988: We began contacting
personnel at State and Justice to arrange
for initial meetings to discuss the scope and
depth of our audit. Mr. Manuel Rodriquez,
U.S. Attorneys Office liaison who was co-
ordinating the Justice Department compo-
nents, declined to set up a meeting stating
that NSC was coordinating the Administra-
tion's response to our notification and he
was going to wait until he heard from NSC
before proceeding. Mr. Bob Harris, from the
Department of State, advised us that State
would not deal with us on this assignment
until we had discussed our work with the
NSC.
June 1: We conducted our initial meeting
with the Department of Defense. We per-
formed work at the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and the military departments
until July 12, 1988,
June 6, 1988: We had our first meeting
with Mr. Dan Levin, Deputy Legal Advisor,
NSC. Mr. Levin stated he understood the
purpose of our review, but wasn't sure we
could have access to sensitive intelligence or
law enforcement files. He promised to dis-
cuss access with the agencies involved and
would get back to us quickly. We were offi-
cially notified that NSC would be our focal
point on this assignment. We advised Mr.
Levin that we preferred to deal with the
agencies directly without having to clear ev-
erything with the NSC?our normal prac-
tice. Mr. Levin stated we are free to deal
with each agency directly and that NSC
would not be a bottleneck.
June 8-9, 1988: We again contacted the
Departments of State and Justice to ar-
range for initial meetings. Despite Mr.
Levin's statement that we could deal direct-
ly with the agencies. both Mr. Harris at
State and Mr. Rodriquez at Justice advised
us the NSC instructed them not to deal with
us until NSC had developed operational
guidelines on what to do and what not to do
on this assignment.
June 13. 1988: Mr. John L. Helgerson Di-
rector of Congressional Affairs, CIA. re-
sponded to our notification letter. Be stated
that all agency activities in Central America
and information it gathers is under close
and continuing scrutiny by the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees. Further-
more, the CIA advised all policy-related
Questions should be directed to the appro-
priate components of the Executive Branch.
It stated that therefore it could not be of
help to us.
June 15-16, 1988: We began efforts to con-
tact Mr. Levin, NSC, to determine when the
NSC guidance would be issued and we could
continue our review. Mr. Levin requested
another meeting to learn more about the
review.
June 16, 1988: We conducted an initial
meeting with representatives of the Cus-
toms Service. Mr. Bill Rosenblatt. Assistant
Commissioner for Enforcement, did not pro-
vide any information and said he wanted
first for the U.S. Attorneys Office to estab-
lish ground rules as to how much of the in-
formation Customs has is covered by grand
jury secrecy provisions and what informa-
tion they can provide to us.
June 22, 1988: We held a second meeting
with the NSC and White House staff per-
sonnel. Attending for the Executive Branch
were Mr. Nicolas Rostov:, Special Assistant
to the President and Legal Advisor; Mr. Dan
Levin. Deputy Legal Advisor, NSC; Mr. Jon-
athan Scharfman, Assistant Legal Advisor,
NSC; Mr. Dan McGrath, Legal Counsel,
White House Staff; Mr. Bob Harris, Depart-
ment of State; and another official from the
Department of Justice.
? We reiterated our purpose, and our re-
quirements in terms of access to personnel
and documentation to the extent that we
could. We explained that we needed to con-
duct initial meetings to more fully deter-
mine our documentation needs. We dis-
cussed the availability of documents used in
the deliberative process, grand jury and
other enforcement actions, foreign intelli-
gence, and other types of documentation.
Some were considered to fall under execu-
tive privilege and not available to GAO, ac-
cording to the administration officials. We
discussed in general terms our access experi-
ences in other kinds of highly sensitive as-
signments and pointed out that special secu-
rity arrangements could be agreed upon if
circumstances warrant.
At the request of Mr. Levin. we agreed to
submit in writing a more detailed explana-
tion of the specific types of documents and
information we wanted access to so they
could more fully consider our request. They
promised a prompt response. We asked for a
response within one or two weeks. Mr. Levin
was not willing to commit to a specific time
period.
June 23. 1988: GAO hand delivered the ex-
planatory letter to the NSC. The document
explained that in order to accomplish our
objectives, we planned to
(1) obtain agency briefings that describe
the general organizational structure and the
operational procedures related to the agen-
cy's data collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion systems;
(2) interview relevant agency personnel
who are responsible for defining agency in-
formation needs with regard to General
Noriega and Panama. implementing the in-
formation collection process, collecting and
reporting raw data, and analyzing and dis-
seminating data on Panama and General
Noriega;
(3) review documents to include specific
directives, instructions, or taskings to collect
data on General Noriega or alleged illegal
activities involving General Noriega. cables
and reports from field offices regarding
General Noriega's involvement in or tolera-
tion of illegal activities, analyses or summa-
ries of field reporting on General Noriega,
and geographic/subject-area studies discuss-
ing the role or suspected role of General
Noriega in illegal activities; and
(4) examine the use of information about
General Noriega in the foreign policy proc-
ess by identifying the agencies, organiza-
tions, and individuals who play a role in de-
ciding national security and foreign policy
issues with regard to Panama and interview
each and review documents to determine
whether information about General Noriega
reached them and how that information
was used in making decisions.
June 27, 1988: We contacted Mr. Levin at
NSC on the status of its response to our
June 23 letter. Be said they were preparing
a response and it would be provided
"promptly."
July 1, 1988: We called Mr. Levin again at
NSC. He said they hoped to have a response
soon. We inquired about who in the White
House or the NSC is making the decisions
and what the specific problems or objec-
tions are, and Mr. Levin declined to provide
any information.
July 5, 1988: We again called Mr. Levin at
NSC. He advised us that a letter was "in for
signature," but he declined to predict when
it would be signed. He also would not say
what position the response would take or
who it was with for signature. He said he
would not "sit on" a signed response and
that he would call us when it is signed.
July 7, 1988: We called Mr. Bob Harris,
State Department, in another attempt to
gain cooperation and were told State would
not meet with us until it hears from NSC.
We advised Mr. Harris that we planned to
send a second letter to them specifically
asking for an initial meeting and access to
documents.
July 8. 1988: We called Mr. Paul Prise,
DEA, asking to meet. He told us that NSC
gave instructions not to meet with us until
NSC gives the "go ahead." We advised a
second letter was coming.
July 12, 1988: We sent a second letter,
more detailed in what we requested in the
way of cooperation to the Departments of
State and Justice (DEA. Criminal Division
and the U.S. Attorneys Office), and the
NSC.
July 12, 1988: We attempted to continue
our work at the Department of Defense. Up
to this point, we had conducted a series of
interviews with personnel involved in intelli-
gence gathering and analysis in Latin Amer-
ica. We had identified and requested about
100 documents, files, reports, cables, etc.,
that we felt were relevant to our review. We
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August 11, 1$88 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?HOUSE
had some additional meetings scheduled
with agency personae. We were advised by
Mr. Nacho Morales. Army Intelligence and
Security Cainnand. that SSC directed DOD
to postpone any meetings with us on the as-
signment. Mr. Craig Can:ober], a GAO liai-
son official with the DOD/IG, confirmed
that DOD was told to wfthhold contacts
with us. Mr. Martin Sheina, DIA, told us he
could not provide documents we had re-
quested until NSC provides guidance.
July 13, 1981: We at a letter to the De-
partment of Defame, similar to those sent
to State and Justice on Xity 13. Lssa. asking
for a resumption of cooperation?Le.. to pro-
vide the requested documents and to cent/n-
ue meeting with us.
July 13, 1,908: Kr. Don Eattrarnala Justice
liaison, said that the Justice General Coun-
sel staff bad bees workkg with 1543C to de-
velar, a response, and indies.ted that it
would be seat within a day or so.
July 11, 1968: We received a latter from
Mr. Nicolas Rostov, ESC, dated July 13,
19113 which expressed his disappointment
that we had na narrowed the scope of the
Information we wanted and stated that the
administration is still considering our re-
quest.
August 1, 1988: We telephoned Kr. Levin
at NSC asking for the status of the re-
sponse. He said it was being reviewed at the
Department of Justice and there was no
definite date it would be issued. He *sped it
would be issued by the week of August 8,
1988.
August 2. 1988: We advised Mr. Levin,
NSC, that Senator Kerry's staff had in-
formed us that Senator Kerry is prepared to
hold a press eonference about the lack of eo-
operation with GAO. I advised Mr. Levin
that the Senator's staff had stated that if
we ehd not have guidelines by 9 o'clock a.m..
August IL 1983, or at least a definite delivery
date, Senator Kerry would hold a press con-
ference.
Geinataz Accomernm ?erica
GENERAL GMERNIREIrr Divisme.
Washington, DC May 11, 1968.
Mr. PETER F. GRUDEN,
Assistant Administrator, Planning and In-
spection Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice.
DEAR MR. GRuDErc The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Ncaiega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 412165, will examine (I) the
broad parameters of U.S.-Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years, (2) the type of
information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played in decisinn% on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L Patton, Group Director; Mr.
James 0. Bemuse. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Divisian.
The work will he conducted in Washing-
ton at the Drag Enforcement Administra-
tion, the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense. the Department of the
Treasury, and other federal agencies. We
will advise you of any need to visit facilities
outside the Washingtoo area.
We appreciate your assiataece in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 215-1898 or Mr. Benet* at
275-7467.
Sincerely yours.
ARNOLD P. Jams,
Senior Associute Director.
GENERAL Accoingnirc OFFICE, NA-
TTOISAL ERCIIIILITY ANS IhsTRENA-
nu:VAL Arran Dream.
Maki:arm DC. Mae 12, 19*8.
Hon. Peeve C. CARLDC:CI.
The Secretary of Defease.
Attention: DOD Offen of the Inspector
General. Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for GAO Report Analysis.
Dora Ma. Saiatazaay: The General Ac-
counting Office, hos been irequested to an-
dertzdte a stada of Panamanian leader Gen
Mantel Noreigaa aged drug actiaties.
The shady. alder aide 4121E5, wall cammine
(I) the broad parameters of U.Z.-Panamani-
an relations over the past 20 years. (2) the
type of kr:formality about. Nanette devel-
oped by various intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies. (3) the extent to which
this information reached foreign policy de-
cision-makers. and (4) the rale that such in-
formation played in decns on U.S for-
eign policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Geoup Director,. Mr.
James O. Benone. Evaluator-Os-Charge: and
Mr. Jon Chasson of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Groirp.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Department of Defense, the De-
partment of Stale. the Department of Jus-
tice, said other federal agencies. We will
advise you of any need to visit Department
fealties outside the-Washington area.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials a the assigrmient.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
NANCY- R. KINSBURY,
Associate Director
Gratraia. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, NA-
-meat Saucer ILK]) INTERSA-
TIONA.I. AFFAIRS Divisraii,
Washington, DC May 13, 1988.
Mr. PAUL SCALCSIT STEVENS.
Executive Secretary, National Security
Counril, Old Executive Office Bldg.,
Washington, DC.
DEAR Ma. Stavess: The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Pananianian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under tale 472185, will examine (1) the
broad parameters of U.S.-Panarnanian rela-
tions over the past 30 years, (2) the type of
Information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this Infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played hi decisions on US. foreign
policy,
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patina, Group Director: Mr.
James O. Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson: of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted at the Nation-
al Security Council. the Department of
State, the Department of Defense. the De-
partment of Justice, and other federal agen-
cies.
We appreciate any assistance you can pro-
vide to our staff. If you have any questions,
H 051
please metal Mr. Palma at 273-11160 or
Mr. Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
Joanna Keu.v,
Associate Director.
Gramm. Aimacumac. Orrice, Yita-
Taralhat SISCITI2TY INA INCD:RNA-
TiONAL AFFAIRS Dcvms,
vilaahrincittan. DC Maw Li, 298.3-
Hon. GEORGE, P. SiirMEEZ,
The Secretary waggle_
(Attentira GAO Liaison. Office of the
COHIptrUtteTi
DEAR Ms, Encucsierr: The General Ac-
counting Ofnee, has been requested to tm-
dertake a study at Pasuinsentas leader Gen.
Manuel Wortiares alleged drug meth-tries.
The study. =der eode 422165. MR examine
al the broad paxameten t1.1.S.-Pananiara-
an relations over the post Z) years. C2.) the
type of informatiao Scrim devel-
oped by various kitenielmate and law-en-
forcement agencies. (3) the extent to which
this information reached foreign policy deci -
siontnakers, and (4) the role that such karr-
roaLion played io decisions an US. foreign
policy. -
This work will be performed by Mr
Donald L. Patton. Group Diseeteis Mr.
James 0. Benone, Evabaator-in-Ctiarge: and
Mr. Jon Cbassesa of oar Forays Economic
Assistance Group.
The work will be conshated * Washing-
ton at the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Jus-
tice, and other federal agencies. We will
advise you of any need to visit State Depart-
ment facilities outside the Washington area.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials a the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-748'1.
Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH E. KELLY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GENERAL GOgrERNDUrNy
Weshixoton, DC May 18, 1988.
Mr. JOHN C. KEENEY,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, Department oif Justice, Washing-
ton, DC.
DEAR Me. KEENEY: The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Nariega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165, will examine (I) the
broad parameters of U.S -Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years, (2) the type of
Information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that suck informa-
tion played in decisions on U.S. fioreign
This work will be performed be Mr.
Donald L. Patton, Group Director, Mr.
James 0, Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge: and
Mr. Jon Chason, of our Foreign Economic
Assistance GTOUp, Rational Security and
International Affairs Division.
We would like to meet with knowledgeable
Criminal Division officials. We also plan to
conduct work at other Department of Jus-
tice offices, the Department of Defense. the
Department of State, and other federal
agencies.
We appreciate your assistance iiulifyhig
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
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II 6852
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
ARNOLD P. JONES,
Senior Associate Director.
GENERAL Acconirrnec Orrick
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
Washington, DC, May 16, 1988.
Mr. MANUEL RODRIQUEZ.
Legal Counsel, Executive Office for U.S. At-
torneys, Department of Justice.
DEAR MR. RODRIQUEZ: The General Ac-
couting Office, has been requested to under-
take a study of Panamanian leader Gen.
Manuel Noriega's alleged drug activities.
The study, under code 472165, will examine
(1) the broad parameters of US.-Panamani-
an relations over the past 20 years, (2) the
type of information about Noriega devel-
oped by various intelligence and law-en-
forcement agencies, (3) the extent to which
this information reached foreign policy deci-
sionmakers, and (4) the role that such infor-
mation played in decisions on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton, Group Director Mr.
James 0. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Division.
We would like to meet with the US. At-
torneys in both Miami and Tampa. Florida,
who have brought indictments against Gen.
Noriega to discuss the genesis of the indict-
ments, identify other people that we should
talk with, and obtain information about the
- cases. We also plan to conduct work at other
Department of Justice offices, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of State,
and other federal agencies.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
Jolili ANDERSON,
ARNOLD P. JONES.
Senior Associate Director.
GENERAL AccouTTNG OmcE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, May 24, 1988.
Hon. WILLI/Ai H. WEBSTER,
Director, Central Intelligence Agencii.
Attention: Director, Office of Legislative Li-
aison.
DEAR MR. WEBsTER: The General Accout-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165, will examine (1) selected
aspects of U.S.-Panamanian relations over
the past 20 years, (2) the type of informa-
tion about Noriega developed by various in-
telligence and law-enforcement agencies, (3)
the extent to which this information
reached foreign policy decisionmakers, and
(4) the role that such information played in
decisions on U.S. foreign policy.
This work will be performed under the di-
rection of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Associate
Director by Mr. Donald L. Patton, Group
Director; Mr. James 0. Benone, Evaluator-
in-Charge; and Mr. Jon Chasson; of our For-
eign Economic Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Jus-
tice, and other federal agencies.
We would like to meet with Agency repre-
sentatives to discuss these issues and obtain
the Agency's perspective on them. We ap-
preciate any assistance you can provide to
our staff in this regard. If you have any
questions, please contact Mr. Patton or Mr.
Benone at 275-5790.
Sincerely yours.
FRANK C. CONAHAN.
Assistant Comptroller General.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING 01MCE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS Division,
Washington, DC', June 23, 1988.
Mr. C. NIC:HOIAS Rorrow,
Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Advisor, National Security Council.
DEAR MR. Rorrow: As you are aware, Sen-
ator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Interna-
tional Operations and Representative Bill
Alexander, are concerned that information
about illegal activities by high-level officials
of other nations may not be adequately con-
sidered in US. foreign policy decisions. At
their request, the General Accounting
Office is undertaking an initial case study of
how information about General Noriega was
developed by various government agencies,
and what role such information played in
policy decisions regarding Panama.
To satisfy this request, we will:
(1) Obtain an agency overview. At each
agency that develops relevant information
on General Noriega or his possible involve-
ment in illegal activities, we will receive a
briefing that outlines the general organiza-
tional structure and the operational proce-
dures related to the agency's data collection.
analysis, and dissemination systems.
(2) Interview relevant personnel. Once we
understand the basic organizational struc-
ture, we will then interview key personnel
responsible for (1) defining agency informa-
tion needs with regard to Noriega and
Panama, (2) implementing the information
collection process, (3) collecting and report-
ing raw data, and (4) analyzing and dissemi-
nating data on Panama and Noriega.
(3) Review documents. As we learn more
about each agency's collection and reporting
processes, we will request relevant docu-
ments. We anticipate that these will in-
clude: specific directives, instructions, or
taskings to collect data on Noriega or al-
leged illegal activities involving Noriega,
cables and reports from field offices regard-
ing Noriega's involvement in or toleration of
illegal activities, analyses or summaries of
field reporting on Noriega, and geographic/
subject-area studies discussing the role or
suspected role of Noriega in illegal activi-
ties.
(4) Examine the use of information about
Noriega in the foreign policy process. After
completing a systematic review at each
agency, we will attempt to determine how
agency reporting on Noriega may have in-
fluenced foreign policy decisions on
Panama. We will first identify the agencies,
organizations, and individuals who play a
role in deciding national security and for-
eign policy issues with regard to Panama.
Through interviews and a review of relevant
documents, we will determine whether in-
formation about Noriega reached them, and
how that information was used in making
decisions.
As part of our review, we will contact ap-
propriate officials of the National Security
Council who are now or were in the past in-
volved in policy decisions regarding
Panama. We intend to discuss their knowl-
edge and utilization of information concern-
ing General Noriega's illegal activities.
We understand that this review will in-
volve potentially sensitive material that
may require special controls and safeguards.
We are willing to discuss this issue with you
and take appropriate precautions.
August 11, 1988
Mr. Levin indicated that you would
handle this request expeditiously. and I
look forward to hearing from you early next
week. If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Patton
at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
NANCY R. Kneasatrav,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFTIGY- NA-
TIONAL SECITRITy AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DTVISIoN.
Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. LAWRENCE S. MCWHORTER.
Director, Executive Office for U.S. Attor-
neys, Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC.
DEAR MR. MCWHORTER: As we informed
your staff in our letter of May 16, 1988, the
General Accounting Office is undertaking a
case study of how information about Gener-
al Noriega was developed by various govern-
ment agencies, and what role such informa-
tion played in policy decisions regarding
Panama. As agreed with your staff, we ini-
tially postponed audit work at the Justice
Department until we had met with National
Security Council officials to more fully ex-
plain our review objectives and give them an
opportunity to coordinate agency participa-
tion in our review. However, because the Na-
tional Security Council has not acted, and
because of the high level of congressional
interest in this assignment, we must now im-
plement our review independently at each
agency.
We are therefore requesting that you pro-
vide us with the following:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
components involved in, and the operational
procedures related to the U.S. Attorney re-
quests for and analysis of foreign intelli-
gence data.
2. Documents relating to the investiga-
tions of alleged drug trafficking by General
Noriega conducted by the U.S. Attorneys in
Miami and Tampa.
3. Any memos, reports, analyses, studies,
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the office of the
U.S. Attorneys which discuss allegations of
illegal activities by General Noriega. and
interagency communications on these mat-
ters.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses, we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
With the input and cooperation of U.S.
Attorney officials, I am confident that we
can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
NANCY R. KINGSBURy,
Associate Director.
GENERAL AcCoUNTING OrTiCE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DivISION,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. EDWARD S. DENNIS,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC.
DEAR MR. DENNIS: As we informed your
staff in our letter of May 16, 1988, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study of how information about General
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August 11, 1.988
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
Noriega was developed by various govern-
ment agencies, and what role such informa-
tion played in policy decisions regarding
Panama. We initially postponed audit work
at the Justice Department and several other
government agencies until we had met with
National Security Council officials to more
fully explain our review objectives and had
given them an opportunity to coordinate
agency participation in our review. However,
because the National Security Council has
not acted, and because of the high level con-
gressional interest in this assignment, we
must now implement our review independ-
ently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that you pro-
vide us with the following:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
components involved in, and the operational
procedures related to, the Criminal Divi-
sion's development of law enforcement in-
formation and its requests for and analysis
of foreign intelligence data provided by the
various collection agencies.
2. Any memos, reports, analyses, studies,
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the Division which
discuss allegations of illegal activities by
General Noriega or the possible impact of
such activities on U.S. relations with
Panama.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses, we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
With the input and cooperation of Crimi-
nal Division officials. I sin confident that we
can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY, -
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACC017NTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. Joint C. LAWN,
Drug Enforcement Administration,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. LAWN: As we informed your
staff in our letter of May 11, 1988, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165, of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. At the request of
your staff, we initially postponed audit work
at the Drug Enforcement Administration
until we had explained our review objectives
to the National Security Council and had
given them an opportunity to coordinate
the executive agency participation in our
review. However, because the National Secu-
rity Council has not acted, and because of
the high level of congressional interest in
this assignment, we must now implement
our review independently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that DEA
provide us witiv
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to DEA's development of law enforce-
ment information and its foreign intelli-
gence data collection analysis, and dissemi-
nation systems.
2. Documents which establish DEA's pro-
cedures for (a) defining foreign intelligence
information needs with regard to General
Noriega and Panama, (b) implementing the
Information collection. process. (c) collect-
ing and reporting raw data. and (d) analyz-
ing and disseminating data on Panama and
General Noriega.
3. Specific directives, instructions, or task-
ings to collect data on General Noriega or
his alleged illegal activities, cables and re-
ports from field offices regarding his in-
volvement in or toleration of illegal activi-
ties, analyses or summaries of field report-
ing on him, and geographic/subject-area
studies discussing his role or suspected role
in Illegal activities.
To facilitate our review, we are requesting
an opening conference with appropriate of-
ficials no later than July 20. At that time.
we will more fully discuss the specific pa-
rameters of our audit work and establish a
schedule for obtaining the needed docu-
ments.
With the input and cooperation of DEA
officials. I am confident that we can success-
fully complete our review in a timely
manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sinceerly yours,
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS,
Executive Secretary, National Security
Council, Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. STEVENS: As we informed you in
our letter of May 13. 1988, and Mr. Rostow
In our letter of June 23, the General Ac-
counting Office is undertaking a case study
of how information about General Noriega
was developed by various government agen-
cies, and what role such information played
in policy decisions regarding Panama. At
the request of the National Security Council
staff, we initially postponed audit work at
the Council and several other government
agencies until we had met with them to
more fully explain our review objectives and
had given them an opportunity to coordi-
nate agency participation in our review.
However, because we have not received a re-
sponse to our letter of June 23. and because
of the high level of congressional interest in
this assignment, we must now implement
our review independently at each agency.
We have sent requests to each agency,
asking that appropriate officials meet with
us to establish a timetable for collecting and
reviewing relevant documents. We ask that
the National Security Council provide us
with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to the National Security Council's re-
quests for and analysis of foreign intelli-
gence data provided by the various collec-
tion agencies.
2. Any memos, reports, analyses, studies,
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the National Secu-
rity Council staff which discuss allegations
of illegal activities by General Noriega and
the possible impact of such activities on
U.S. relations with Panama.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses, we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
H 6853
With the input and cooperation of Nation-
al Security Council officials, I an, confident
that we can successfully complete our
review in a timely manner.
If you have lily additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVSION,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Hon. GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
The Secretary of State.
(Attention: GAO Liaison. Office of the
Comptroller.)
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As we informed you
in our letter of May 13. 1988. the General
Accounting Office Is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165, of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. At the request of
your staff, we initially postponed audit work
at the State Department until we had ex-
plained our review objectives to the Nation-
al Security Council and had given them an
opportunity to coordinate the executive
agency participation in our review. However,
because the National Security Council has
not acted, and because of the high level of
congressional interest in this assignment, we
must now implement our review independ-
ently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that the
State Department provide us with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to the State Department's foreign in-
telligence data collection, analysis, and dis-
semination systems.
2. Documents which establish the State
Department's procedures for (a) defining
foreign intelligence information needs with
regard to General Noriega and Panama, (b)
implemening the information collection
process, (c) collecting and reporting raw
data, and (d) analyzing and disseminating
data on Panama and General Noriega.
3. Specific directives, instructions, or task-
ings to collect data on General Noriega or
his alleged illegal activities, cables and re-
ports from embassies regarding his involve-
ment in or toleration of illegal activities,
analyses or summaries of field reporting on
him, and geographic/subject-area studies
discussing his role or suspected role in ille-
gal activities.
We anticipate that many of these docu-
ments are available within the Offices of
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, the Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Research, and the As-
sistant Secretary for Narcotics Matters.
To facilitate our review, we are requesting
an opening conference with appropriate of-
ficials no later than July 20. At that time.
we will more fully discuss the specific pa-
rameters of our audit work and establish a
schedule for obtaining the needed docu-
ments.
With the input and cooperation of State
Department officials. I am confident that
we can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Dormld
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
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H 6854
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August 11, 1988
GET4ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION.
Washington, Da July 13, 1988.
Hon. FRANK C. Cetus:tem.
The Secretary of Defense.
(Attention: DOD Office of the Inspector
General, Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for GAO Report Analysis).
Dena MR. Szcerreer. As we informed you
in our letter of May 12. 1988. the General
Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165, of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. With the coopera-
tion of Department of Defense officials, in-
cluding those from the military services and
other Defense agencies, we have already
made substantial progress toward achieving
our review objectives. However, we were ad-
vised on July 12, 1988, that these officials
have been directed to postpone meeting
with us and providing us with documents
until the National Security Council provides
guidance on the extent that the Depart-
ment should participate in our review.
Since initiating this review, we have fully
briefed the National Security Council staff
on our review objectives and methodology
and allowed them time to provide guidance
to executive branch agencies. However, be-
cause the Council has not issued such guid-
ance and because of the high level of con-
gressional interest in this assignment, we
have advised the Council that we must now
implement our review independently at
each agency.
We are therefore requesting that the De-
partment resume cooperating with us on
this assignment and provide us with docu-
ments we need to accomplish our review ob-
jectives. In addition to the documents that
we already have requested, we need to
obtain:
1. Cables and intelligence reports generat-
ed by, or in the possession of, the Depart-
ment of Defense and its various components
which discuss General Noriega and his al-
leged illegal activities.
2. Any other memos, reports, analYses,
studies, briefing Papers, meeting re'eordee
other documents, or recorded information
generated by, or In the possession of, the
Department or its components which dis-
cuss allegations of illegal activities by Gen-
eral Noriega and the possible impact of such
activities on U.S. relations with Panama
To far_ilitate our review, we would appreci-
ate being advised in writing no later than
July 20, 1988, of your intended action on
this matter.
With the Department's renewed coopera-
tion, I sin confident that we can successful-
ly complete our review in a timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
?
ENCLOSURE III
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCLL,
Washington, DC July 13, 1988.
MS. NANCY R. Knecsavey,
Associate Director, National Security and
International Affairs Division, Genera/
Accounting Office, Washington, DC.
Demi MS. KINGSBURY: I SIN writing in re-
ponse to your request concerning a study
of the alleged drug activities of Manuel Nor-
liegs, and the role information about such
activities played in decisions about U.S. for-
eign policy (Study *472165).
As described in Mr. Kelly's May 13, 1988.
letter to Paul Stevens and your June 23,
1988, letter to me. your request seeks access
to sensitive law enforcement and Intelli-
gence files covering a substantial Period of
time. In our meeting, your staff confirmed
that your three areas of interest were intel-
ligence files, law enforcement files and the
deliberative process of the Executive
branch, Including internal communications
and deliberations leading to Executive
branch actions taken pursuant to the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority. I was disap-
pointed that your letter did not contain any
narrowing of the request. The request raises
important statutory and constitutional
Issues. The Administration is anlayzing
them now, and when its deliberation Is com-
plete, I shall reply further to your letter of
June 23, 1988.
Sincerely,
NiCWOLAS ROSTOW.
Specie/ Assistant to the President
and Legal Adviser.
ENCLOSURE IV
Crimea. fivernticsrics Araavre,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1988.
Mr. FRANK C. Columns.
Assistant Comptroller General, National Se-
curity and International Affairs Divi-
sions, General Accounting Office, Wash-
ington, DC
DEAR MR. CONAIIAN: The Director has
asked me to respond to your letter of 24
May 1984 that described the General Ac-
counting Office's investigation of allega-
tions made against General Noriega of
Panama.
All Agency activities in central America,
as well as information we receive concerning
other U.S. Government activities in the
region, are subject to close and continuing
scrutiny by the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees. Furthermore, any assess-
ment of policy-related questions should be
directed to the appropriate components of
the Executive Branch, such as the Depart-
ments of State and Defense.
I am sorrry that we cannot be more help-
ful in this case.
Sincerely,
Jona L. Heizzescur.
Director of Congressional Affairs.
DEPARTMENT OF STAIE,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1988.
NANCY KINGSBURY,
Associate Director, General Accounting
Office, National Security and Interna-
tional Affairs Division,
DEAR MS. KINGSBURY: I am pleased to re-
spond to your July 12 letter on the proposed
care study your office is undertaking about
how U.S. government agencies used infor-
mation about General Noriega In Its policy
decisions regarding Panama.
As you are aware, the National Security
Council staff arid the Office of White House
counsel have been working closely with your
office on this investigation. All executive
branch agencies have been Instructed by the
White House not to take any action on your
request until various legal issues have been
analyzed by the Administration According-
ly, at the present time it will not be possible
for the Department to meet with your staff
or produce information until this examina-
tion is completed. For the time being, Nich-
olas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council, is acting as the adminis-
tration's point of contact on this matter.
Sincerely,
ROGER B. lerunican,
Comptroller.
Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield
3 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. DOMAN).
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr.
Speaker, I passed an amendment in
the Crime Subcommittee and in the
full Judiciary Committee that was bi-
partisan, and noncontroversial, about
these clandestine drug labs, which are
a particular problem in my beautiful]
State of California. Due to California's
size and its ability to grow almost any-
thing, the domestic growing of illegal
crops has become a real problem. More
ominous though are the hidden drug
labs that sometimes are defended with
booby traps, including high explosives.
It is a tragic situation, recognized by
all to the extent that everybody on
the subcommittee and on the major
committee said that my legislation on
clandestine labs was fine and despara-
tely needed.
Because of a jurisdictional dispute,
and only because of that, my language
was taken out of the final bill pro-
duced by the Rules Committee.
Last night, however, in the Rules
Committee they agreed to allow me to
offer my language again as an amen-
dent, when we take this bill up again
in September. I am still put at a disad-
vantage by these actions, however, as
It will appear that I am trying to alter
the original language of the bill. This
Is always an uphill battle.
I would just like to read a statement
that I put out to the Rules Committee
yesterday explaining my point of view.
0 1115
This VMS hand delivered last night to
Hon. CLAUDE PEPPER:
Deere Ma. enenuour. Only moments ago, I
became aware that the Rules Committee
will drop my language regarding Clandes-
tine Drug Laboratories, In Subtitle B of title
VI. This language was accepted by the ma-
jority staff of the Crime Subcommittee even
before subcommittee markup occurred. This
language then survived markup before the
full Judiciary Committee without amend-
ment. In short. Mr. Chairman, this provi-
sion to establish a Task Force on Clandes-
tine Drug Laboratories has always enjoyed a
significant bipartisan support in Congress
and within the Drug Enforcement Agency.
Let me add that the DEA is anxious,
very anxious to get this language in
the legislation, since they are the
major repository of the chemicals used
In these drug labs:
I am disappointed, to say the least, that
the Rules Committee would circumvent the
committee process which I have followed so
diligently.
I am grateful to the Rules Commit-
tee that this was corrected:
It is my understanding that the language
will be allowed as an amendment to the
drug bM during floor debate. I would cer-
tainly hope that I would at least be granted
this opportunity.
Mr. Chairman, I certainly hope that you
can see your way clear to either reinstating
my language- ? ? *
And he did that. I would like to
thank him for it. I look forward to of-
fering it on the floor in September.
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