MR. ALEXANDER.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00234R000200250001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 11, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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v.42,
OCA 3079-88
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Ai Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
? Telephone: [phone]
7.(): Sven E. Holmes
Staff Director/General Counsel
Senate Select Cdmmittee on Intelligence
14 Sept 1988
Dear Mr. Holnes,
Enclosed are material on the Alexander
"Anti-Stonewalling" Amendment. We understand i
may came up
s a on 'ivision
Offide of Congressional Affairs
2FIRM 1533 PORBESVO01. EuTSE
EDITIONS.
OCA/PS/bsb: 5 Sep 88
Distribution:
Orig - addressee
1 - D/OCA (w/enc.)
. 1 - DDL/OCA (w/end.)
1 - PS. Chrono (w/end.)
- OCA Records (w/enc.)
-,_OCA/LEG Subj. FIle (w/enc.D
140;
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STAT
STA7
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2014/04/21 NCIA-RDP89T00234R000200250001-8
N?lie \=,
OCA/PS/hsh:
OCA 3078-88
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
? Telephone: [phone]
AMI
TO: Mr. L. Britt Sninpr
Minority Counsel
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
14 Sept 1988
Enclosed are materials on the Alexander
"Anti-Stonewalling" Amendment. We understand it
may came up toda e House floor.
Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
FORM862 OBSOlETE
533
15 Sep 88
Distribution:
Orig - addressee
1 - D/OCA (w/o enc.)
1 - DDL/OCA Wo enc.)
1 - PS Chrono (w/o enc.)
ri...=_IDCA Records "Ow/enc.)
11,z,IEMLEG Subj:-Pi7R71W7o
PREVIOUS
maioNs.
(40)
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
H 6848
least we have broken the logjam to
give Members an opportunity here to
have their say.
We are seeing the results of the hard
work and dedication of the task force
members, led by the gentleman from
California, Mr. JERRY LEWIS, the gen-
tleman from Oklahoma, Mr. MICKEY
EDWARDS, on our side, the gentleman
from Florida. Mr. BILL McCottubs, two
of the three are down on our conven-
tion on the platform currently.
Countless hours of dedicated work
by Members and staff created this op-
portunity to pass quality legislation.
While I cannot list the names of all
these people, I think they know I
mean them, when I express the grati-
tude of this side of the aisle for their
hard work.
As I said, Mr. Speaker. I would have
preferred an open rule, but I must add
that the bipartisan spirit that has per-
meated this process is very much evi-
dent in the rule today. As a result of
the cooperative spirit evidenced by our
Speaker and majority leader and the
Rules Committee, the content of the
bill is not only comprehensive, but it is
of high quality.
Surely we do not agree on every-
thing in the bill, nor do we agree on all
of the amendments, but we have en-
abled Members to address and debate
these key issues when we resume in
September.
So, Mr. Speaker, I want to again
thank the Speaker and the majority
leader and the distinguished chairman
of the committee for his cooperation
here, that when we do come back from
our recess there will be probably three
or more days involved in amending
this comprehensive drug bill.
I urge the adoption of the. rule, and
thank the gentleman for yielding this
time.
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, for pur-
poses of debate only, I yield 3 minutes
to the distinguished gentleman from
Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER).
XANDkait asked and was
iven permission to revise and extend
his remarks, and to include extraneous
material.)
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I
rise in support of the rule and to ex-
plain my amendment made in order
under the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I first conducted a
forum on drug abuse 16 years ago in
order to attack a dilemma that was
just beginning to invade some areas of
my home State of Arkansas. Today,
with Arkansas as well as the rest of
the country seemingly no closer to
solving the problem of drug abuse
than in 1972, the question arises as to
why America has been unable to deal
with the scourge of drug abuse.
As we debate the rule on the omni-
bus antidrug bill today, we should rec-
ognize that there is no one simple
answer to this question, but a major
obstacle in attacking drug use is the
absence of a clearly defined, unmistak-
able policy. In the void left by the lack
of a clear policy, confusion reigns
among the agencies that are charged
with drug enforcement.
As a remedy to this situation, in Sep-
tember I plan to offer an anti-
stonewalling amendment to the anti-
drug bill, which would require the
sharing of information among certain
Federal agencies about illegal foreign
drug activities. My amendment would
require that any executive branch off i?
cial having information about such ac-
tivities would transmit it to the heads
of agencies involved in formulating
US. foreign policy or enforcing Feder-
al drug laws. The antistonewalling
amendment would also require that
such information be shared, when re-
quested. with committees of Congress
and the General Accounting Office.
A classic example of the difficulties
that. arise from the national policy
vacuum in drug abuse occurred on
July 12 when John Lawn, the head of
the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, testified to a congressional sub-
committee that he had written letters
praising the alleged drug interdiction
efforts of Gen. Manuel Noriega and
the Panama Defense Forces. The DEA
Administrator testified that at the
time the letters were written he had
not known about the criminal investi-
gation into General Noriega's involve-
ment with illegal importation of for-
eign drugs into the United States, be-
cause he was "left out of the loop" by
U.S. intelligence agencies and never
given hard evidence tying Noriega to
narcotics traffickers.
That criminal investigation eventu-
ally led to Noriega's indictment, and
was conducted by the Miami U.S. at-
torney general's office, which is a part
of the Department of Justice. We
must prevent this kind of confusion
among agencies charged with drug
laws enforcement in which the left
hand of the Justice Department clear-
ly didn't know what the right hand
was doing.
A second example concerns an ongo-
ing investigation by the General Ac-
counting Office, undertaken at my re-
quest, which would examine how in-
formation about drug trafficking by
high-level Government officials of
other countries affects U.S. foreign
policy decisions, using as a case study
information concerning the drug traf-
ficking activities of General Noriega of
Panama.
GAO indicated in an August 9 letter
to me that "since May 11, 1988 we
have been formally trying to gain
access to personnel and records at the
Departments of State, Justice, and De-
fense." In late May, GAO was in-
formed that the National Security
Council would handle this assignment
for the administration, and the Depart-
ments of State. Justice, and Defense
were instructed by the NSC to cease
cooperation in the investigation until
NSC issued guidelines for GAO access
to information. Repeated GAO re-
quests for information were refused by
State. Justice, and Defense, with each
August 11, 1.988
refusal being accompanied by a refer-
ence to the NSC stonewalling policy.
While it is perfectly justifiable to
withhold certain types of information
that would jeopardize law enforce-
ment or- intelligence activities, the
GAO told me that "most of the infor-
mation -we need to examine should be
considered to be releasable." GAO of-
ficials met with NSC officials and told
them of "our previous experience on
other successful assignments involving
similarly sensitive information." There
is no reason why the executive should
not provide information on the basic'
objective of the GAO investigation,
which is the organization and decision
process for foreign policymaking when
information is available on foreign of-
ficials' drug trafficking.
A series of questions remain unan-
swered about illegal drug trafficking
in Central America. For example, in
Arkansas serious questions continue to
surface about allegations concerning
Adler Berriman (Barry) Seal's gun
running and drug smuggling. Seal, a
DEA informant who wa0.111/iin in Lou-
isiana in 1986, was allegedly involved
in an operation in which a plane
loaded with guns to aid the Nicara-
guan Contras flew from Mena, AR.
down to Central America and then re-
turned loaded with drugs. One of
Seal's planes, a C-123K that had been
serviced and parked at the Mena air-
port during much of 1984 and 1985,
was shot down over Nicaragua in Octo-
ber 1986, while carrying supplies to
the Contras, and an Arkansan, Wal-
lace (Bla-7) Sawyer, was killed in the
crash. There have been local. State,
and Federal investigations into the
Mena operation, but. many questions
persist. A vital goal of the anti-
stonewalling amendment is to ensure
that all agencies are cooperating in
giving and receiving the information
they need to do their job.
One question that arises is whether
Federal agencies were working at cross
purposes during the period of Seal's
activities as an informant. There is evi-
dence that the CIA and the NSC both
wanted to divulge Seal's involvement
in a massive undercover drug investi-
gation because of those agencies in-
terest in influencing the Contra aid
debate that was taking place in Con-
gress shortly before Seal's murder in
February 1986: simultaneously. the
DEA's primary interest was apparent-
ly the undercover effort to break up
the Colombian drug cartel. A news
leak by an unknown U.S. Government
official resulted in articles alleging
that the Sandinista government was
involved in drug trafficking, and it
blew the investigation. According to
our distinguished colleague, Chairman
BILL HUGHES of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, the political-
ly motivated leak cost Seal his life.
While everyone respects the need to
avoid disclosing information about the
criminal investigation of Noriega,
there are many other questions the
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August 11, 1.988 1CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? }WISE H 6849
executive should be able to give the even pursue contradictory objectives.
GAO. including:
First, what. procedures are there for
law enforcement agencies to conununi-
rate their intelligence needs to the in-
telligence community?
Second, how are law enforcement
and/or foreign policymaking officials
further up the chain of command pro-
vided intelligence information?what
procedures are involved, what kind of
information is provided?
Third, were any specific instructions
or directives. prepared requesting in-
formation on illegal drug-related ac-
tivities in Panama or on Noriega's in-
volvement in illegal activities?
Fourth. who received the raw infor-
mation, what did they do with it, what
studies, reports, or analyses were pre-
pared on illegal activities in Panama
or on Noriega?
Fifth, who were these reports sent
to?especially, were any recipients in
the law enforcement community or in
foreign policymaking positions?
Sixth, how did the law enforcement
recipients use the reports?did they do
further analysis, did they use the in-
telligence as input to build or develop
any criminal cases?
Seventh, how did the foreign policy-
making recipients use the reports?did
they discuss them, did they do further
analyses, did they summarize for
higher level recipients?
Mr. Speaker, there is no reason why
the executive branch should withhold
information on the primary locus of
the GAO inquiry, which is the organi-
zation and decision process for foreign
policymaking when information is
available on foreign officials' drug
trafficking. The antistonewalling
amendment would focus only on infor-
mation such as that involved in the
GAO's investigation of Noriega and
other officials, which legitimately can
be provided: it would not require dis-
closure under three conditions:
First, when it would jeopardize a
U.S. foreign intelligence or counterin-
telligence activity:
Second, when it would endanger a
law enforcement investigation; and
Finally, when it may adversely
affect U.S. defens:, or national securi-
ty.
A decision not to share information
could be made only by the head of an
agency. If the President decided to
withhold the information from a com-
mittee of Congress, he would have to
provide the committee the reasons for
such action. In the event that the in-
formation involved U.S. foreign intelli-
gence or counterintelligence, the
President would be required to
promptly inform the chairman and
ranking minority members of the
House and Senate committees on intel-
ligence.
Mr. Speaker, drug abuse is the most
devastating plague confronting Amer-
ica today. In battling this evil, we
cannot any longer tolerate the policy
void in which agencies operate in igno-
rance of each other and occasionally
We must replace the current vacuum
with a clearly defined, unmistakable
policy in which all agencies cooperate
fully with each other in sharing infor-
mation about Illegal drug trafficking.
I further submit various copies of
various letters from the GAO, the De-
partment of State. the Department of
Justice. the Department of Defense,
and the National Security Council
which further explains the need for
the antistonewalling amendment.
GENERAL Accomeriiic Comet. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
II or; at AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington. DC. August 9, 1988.
Hon. Bna. ALEXANDER.
Subcommittee on Commerce. Justice. State,
the Judiciary and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representafives.
Demi Ma. ALEXANDER: In May 1985 you
asked us to review how information about
drug trafficking by high-level government
officials of nations friendly to the United
States affects U.S. foreign policy decisions.
Because the information required to suc-
cessfully undertake this assignment would
potentially involve. information related to
intelligence gathering and on-going law en -
f o rcement investigations which is difficult
to obtain, we suggested. and you agreed,
that we would explore the issue using as a
case study the information concerning the
drug trafficking activities of General Nor-
iega of Panama. The following is a summary
of the experience we have had so far in sat-
isfying your reouest.
Since May 11, 1988. we have been formally
trying to gain access to personnel and
records at the Departments of State, Jus-
tice, and Defense. We were successful in
gaining access to the Department of De-
fense and in fact performed a limited
amount of audit. work at that agency. In
late May. we were advised that the National
Security Council (NSC) would serve as the
administration's focal point on this assign-
ment. Concurrently, we were advised that
the Departments of Justice and State had
been instructed not to meet with the GAO
staff or provide any information to GAO on
this assignment until NSC issued guidelines
concerning GAO access to information. The
Department of Defense notified us on July
12. 1988, that it also was instructed by the
NSC to cease cooperation with GAO until
such guidelines are available. We have by
letter and telephone discussions continued
to try to obtain information and schedule
meetings with the Departments of State.
Defense. and Justice but these efforts have
been refused, with each agency citing the
NSC's direction as the reason for refusal.
We have been working with the NSC to
facilitate access to agency personnel and
records. We met with them on June 6. 1988
and June 22; 1988, and discussed at some
length our approach to the work, our views
about out access to information, and our
previous experience on other successful as-
signments involving similarly sensitive in-
formation. On June 23. 1988. at NSC's re-
quest, we delivered a detailed letter Lo them
giving further detail on the kinds of infor-
mation we would be seeking. Although that
letter identified some information which ul-
timately may not be made available, the in-
formation related to the primary focus of
our work, that is, the organization and deci-
sion process for foreign policymaking when
information is available on foreign officials'
drug trafficking, would not uniformly be ex-
pected to raise similar concerns. Our normal
procedures in such situations are to consider
access questions on a case-by-case basis. fol
lowing discussions with agency officials and
examination of otherwise available records.
NSC's actions to prohibit such preliminary
discussions until after guidelines concerning
access are established has foreclosed that
approach.
On July 13. 1988. the NSC wrote in re-
sponse to our June 23. 1988 letter that our
request "seeks access to sensitive law en-
forcement and intelligence files covering a
substantial period of tame" and -raises im-
portant statutory and constitutional issues."
The letter advised that the administration
is analyzing those issues and would reply
when its deliberations were completed. We
have on several occasions, most recently yes-
terday, asked the NSC about the status of
the operating guidelines. We continue to be
told the issues are being analyzed and guide-
lines will be issued when the review is com-
pleted. NSC officials say they cannot pro-
vide a specific date when guidelines will be
available.
We are. not into the fifth month of our
effort to address the issue you asked us to
review, and it is difficult to predict how
much further delay is likely. Although we
have assembled some information available
from public records, we have made essential-
ly no progress on the audit itself. We believe
it should be possible to reach agreement
with the agencies involved, as we pursue our
audit questions, that much of the informa-
tion we need to examine should be consid-
ered to be releasable, and to discuss special
arrangements for security of the informa-
tion if such arrangements are warranted. In
fact, we were successful in such an approach
with the Department of Defense prim to
July 12.
We will continue to keep you informed of
the status of our efforts, and will discuss
further steps which we believe may be ap-
propriate, if any, after we have reviewed
any guidelines issued by NSC.
Sincerely yours.
NAncy R. KINGSBUP.Y,
Associate Director,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL. AFFAIRS DIVISION.
Washington, DC, August 3, 1988.
Hon. BILL ALEXANDER,
House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. ALEXANDER: In May 1988. you
asked us to review how information about
drug trafficking by high-level government
officials of nations friendly to the United
States affects U.S. foreign policy decisions.
Because the information required to suc-
cessfully undertake this assignment. would
potentially involve information related to
intelligence gathering and on-going law en-
forcement investigations which is difficult
for the General Accounting Office to obtain
under our access-to-records authorities, we
suggested. and you agreed, that we would
explore the issue using as a case study the
information concerning the drug trafficking
activities of General Noriega of Panama. As
you requested at our meeting on August 2,
1988. we are providing a detailed summary
on the experience we have had so far in at-
tempting to obtain information on this as-
signment.
In summary, although we were able to ?
perform a limited amount of audit work at
the Department of Defense in June, the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) has directed
the other Executive Branch agencies in-
volved not to meet with GAO staff or pro-
vide any information to GAO on this assign-
ment until NSC issues guidelines concerning
GAO access to information on the assign-
ment. The NSC has informed us that it con-
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/I 6850 W CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?MUSE August 11, 1988
siders our request for information concern-
ing General Noriega's drug trafficking and
other activities as raising "important statu-
tory and constitutional issues."
As of August 1, 1988. the representative of
NSC who has been our contact said that he
could not tell us when the guidelines would
be forthcoming, but he said that he expect-
ed them to be issued within, perhaps, a
couple of weeks (that is. not within days,
and not after months). We have. made sever-
al attempts, by letter and through tele-
phone discussions, to obtain information
and schedule meetings with the Depart-
ments of State. Justice, and Defense, but.
these efforts have been refused, with each
agency citing the NSC's direction as the
reason for their refusal. We have also con-
tracted the Central Intelligence Agency,
where our request for information was also
declined.
A detailed chronology of our efforts to
meet with NSC and agency officials, and to
obtain information, is provided in Enclosure
I. Copies of the letters we sent to NSC and
to the agencies are provided in Enclosure II.
The NSC has provided one written interim
response to our letters (Enclosure III); of
the agencies, only the Central Intelligence
Agency has responded in writing (Enclosure
IV).
We are currently awaiting the NSC guide-
lines. We will continue to keep you in-
formed of the status of our efforts, and will
discuss further steps which we believe may
be appropriate, if any, after we have re-
viewed any guidelines issued by NSC.
Sincerely yours.
NANCE R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
ENCLOSURE I
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY or GAO CONTACTS
IA'ITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND
OFFICIALS
May 11-16, 1988: We sent routine notifica-
tion letters to the Departments of State,
Justice, and Defense, and the National Se-
curity Council advising them of our review
and identifying the subject and scope of our
work. Letters were sent specifically within
the Department of Justice to the Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA). the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys, and Justice's
Criminal Division
May 23, 1988: We received our first re-
sponse from the NSC. Mr. Nicolas Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Advisor, told us by telephone that he
wanted to "think about it" before schedul-
ing a meeting with us.
May 24. 1988: We sent a notification letter
to the Central Intelligence agency asking
for a meeting to discus:, the issues..
May 30-June 1, 1988: We began contacting
Personnel at State arid Justice to arrange
for initial meetings to discuss the scope and
depth of our audit. Mr. Manuel Rodriquez.
U.S. Attorneys Office liaison who was co-
ordinating the Justice Department compo-
nents, declined to set up a meeting stating
that NSC was coordinating the Administra-
tion's response to our notification and he
was going to wait until he heard from NSC
before proceeding. Mr. Bob Harris, from the
Department of State, advised us that State
would not deal with us on this assignment
until we had discussed our work with the
NSC.
June 1: We conducted our initial meeting
with the Department of Defense. We per-
formed work at the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and the military departments
until July 12, 1988.
June 6, 1988: We had our first meeting
with Mr. Dan Levin, Deputy Legal Advisor.
NSC. Mr. Levin stated he understood the
purpose of our review, but wasn't sure we
could have access to sensitive intelligence or
law enforcement files. He promised to dis-
cuss access with the agencies involved and
would get back to us quickly. We were offi-
cially notified that NSC would be our focal
point on this assignment. We advised Mr.
Levin that we preferred to deal with the
agencies directly without having to clear ev-
erything with the NSC?our normal prac-
tice. Mr. Levin stated we are free to deal
with each agency directly and that NSC
would not be a bottleneck.
June 8-9. 1988: We again contacted the
Departments of State and Justice to ar-
range for initial meetings. Despite Mr.
Levin's stkiemerit that we could deal direct-
ly with the agencies. both Mr. Harris at
State and Mr. Rodriquez at Justice advised
us the NSC instructed them not to deal with
us until NSC had developed operational
guidelines on what to do and what not to do
on this assignment.
June 13. 1988: Mr. John L. Helgerson, Di-
rector of Congressional Affairs. CIA; re-
sponded to our notification letter. He stated
that all agency activities in Central America
and information it gathers is under close
and continuire seautiny by the House and
Senate intelligence Committees. Further-
more, the CIA advised all policy-related
qucrtions should be directed to the appro-
priate components of the Executive Branch.
It stated that therefore it could not be of
help to us.
June 15-16. 1988: We began efforts to con-
tact Mr. Levin, NSC, to determine when the
NSC guidance would be issued and we could
continue our review. Mr. Levin requested
another meeting to learn more about the
review.
June 16, 1988: We conducted an initial
meeting with representatives of the Cus-
toms Service, Mr. Bill Rosenblatt, Assistant
Commissioner for Enforcement, did not pro-
vide any information and said he wanted
first for the U.S. Attorneys Office to estab-
lish ground rules as to how much of the in-
formation Customs has is covered by grand
jury secrecy provisions and what informa-
tion they can provide to us.
June 22, 1988: We held a second meeting
with the NSC and White House staff per-
sonnel. Attending for the Executive Branch
were Mr. Nicolas Rostow, Special Assistant
to the President and Legal Advisor: Mr. Dan
Levin. Deputy Legal Advisor. NSC: Mr. Jon-
athan Scharfman. Assistant Legal Advisor.
NSC: Mr. Dan McGrath, Legal Counsel.
White House Staff; Mr. Bob Harris, Depart-
ment of State: and another official from the
Department of Justice.
We reiterated our purpose. and our- re-
quirements in terms of access to personnel
and documentation to the extent that we
could. We explained that we needed to con-
duct initial meetings to more fully deter-
mine our documentation needs. We dis-
cussed the availability of documents used in
the deliberative process, grand jury and
other enforcement actions, foreign intelli-
gence, and other types of documentation.
Some were considered to fall under execu-
tive privilege and not available to GAO, ac-
cording to the administration officials. We
discussed in general terms our access experi-
ences in other kinds of highly sensitive as-
signments and pointed out that special secu-
rity arrangements could be agreed upon if
circumstances warrant.
At the request of Mr. Levin. we agreed to
submit in writing a more detailed explana-
tion of the specific types of documents and
information we wanted Recess to so they
could more fully consider our request. They
promised a prompt response. We asked for a
response within one or two weeks. Mr. Levin
was not willing to commit to a specific iitni
period.
June 23. 1988: GAO hand delivered the ex-
planatory letter to the NSC. The document
explained that in order to accomplish our
Objectives, we planned to
(1) obtain agency briefings that describe
the general organizational structure and the
- operational procedures related to the agen-
cy's data collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion systems:
(21 interview relevant agency personnel
who are responsible for defining agency in-
formation needs with regard to General
Noriega and Panama, implementing the in-
formation collection process. collecting and
reporting raw data, and analyzing and dis-
seminating data on Panama and Genera;
Noriega;
(3) review documents to include specific
directives, instructions, or taskings to collect
data on General Noriega or alleged illegal
activities involving General Noriega, cables
and reports from field offices regarding
General Noriega's involvement in or tolera-
tion of illegal activities, analyses or summa-
ries of field reporting on General Noriega,
and geographic/subject-area studies discuss-
ing the role or suspected role of General
Noriega in illegal activities: and
(4) examine the use of information about
General Noriega in the foreign policy proc-
ess by identifying the agencies, organiza-
tions, and individuals who play a role in de-
ciding national security and foreign poliry
issues with regard to Panama and interview
each and review documents to determine
whether information about General Noriega
reached them and how that information
was used in making decisions.
June 27, 1988: We contacted Mr. Levin at
NSC on the status of its response to our
June 23 letter. Be said they were preparing
a response and it would be provided
"promptly."
July 1, 1988: We called Mr. Levin again at
NSC. He said they hoped to have a response
soon. We inquired about who in the White
House or the NSC is making the decisions
and what the specific problems or objec-
tions are. and Mr. Levin declined to provide
any information.
July 5, 1988: We again called Mr. Levin at
NSC. He advised us that a letter was "in for
signature," but he declined to predict uhen
it would be signed. He also would not say
what position the response would take or
who it w-as with for signature. He said he
would not "sit on' a signed response and
that he would call us when it is signed.
July '7, 1988: We called Mr. Bob Harris.
State Department, in another attempt to
gain cooperation and were told State would
not meet with us until it hears from NSC.
We advised Mr. Harris that we planned to
send a second letter to them specifically
asking for an initial meeting and access to
documents.
July 8. 1988: We called Mr. Paul Prise.
DEA. asking to meet. He told us that NSC
gave instructions not to meet with us until
NSC gives the ego ahead.' ? We advised a
second letter was torning.
July 12. 1988: We sent a second letter,
more detailed in what we requested in the
way of cooperation to the Departments of
State and Justice (DEA, Criminal Division
and the U.S. Attorneys Office), and the
NSC.
July 12, 1988: We attempted to continue
our work at the Department of Defense. Up
to this point, we had conducted a series of
interviews with personnel involved in intelli-
gence gathering and analysis in Latin Amer-
ica. We had identified and requested about
100 documents, files, reports, cables. etc..
that we felt were relevant to our review. We
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August II, 1988 katdONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOT& H 6851
had some additional meetings scheduled
with agency personnel. We were advised by
Mr. Nacho Morales. Army Intelligence and
Security Command, that NSC directed DOD
to Postpone any meetings with us on the as-
signment. Mr. Craig Campbell. a GAO liai-
son official with the DOD/IG. confirmed
that DOD was told to withhold contacts
with us. Mr. Martin Sheina, DIA, told us he
could not provide documents we had re-
quested until NSC provides g-uidance.
July 13. 1988. We sent a letter to the De-
partment of Defense. similar to those sent
to State and Justice on July 12, 1988. asking
for a resurnption of cooperation?Le., to pro-
vide the requested documents and to contin-
ue meeting with us.
July 13, 1988: Mr. Don Schramak. Justice
liaison, said that the Justice General Coun-
sel staff had been working with NSC to de-
velop a response, and indicated that it
would be sent within a clay or so.
July 18. 1988. We received a letter from
Mr. Nicolas Rostov.. NSC, dated July 13,
1988 which expressed his disappointment
that we had not narrowed the scone of the
information we wanted and stated that the
administration is still considering our re-
quest
August 1. 1988: We telephoned Mr. Levin
at NSC asking for the status of the re-
sponse. He said it was being reviewed at the
Department of Justice and there was no
definite date it would be issued. He hoped it
would be issued by the week of August 8,
1988.
August 2. 1988: We advised Mr. Levin.
NSC. that Senator Kerry's staff had in-
formed us that Senator Kerry is prepared to
hold a press conference about the lack of co-
operation with GAO. I advised Mr. Levin
that the Senator's staff had stated that if
we did not have guidelines by 9 o'clock a.m.,
August 8, 1988, or at least a definite delivery
date, Senator Kerry would hold a press con-
ference.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION.
Washington, DC, May 11, 1988.
Mr. Pzir...P. P. GRUDEN,
Assistant Administrator. Planning and In-
spection Division. Dr-up Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice.
DEAR M. Gamma The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165. will examine (1) the
broad parameters of U.S.-Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years. (2) the type of
information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers. and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played in decisions on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton, Group Director: Mr.
James 0. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Division.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion. the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense. the Department of the
Treasury, and other federal agencies. We
will advise you of any need to visit facilities
outside the Washington area.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
ARNOLD P. Jorras.
Senior Assoriute Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND IIITERNA-
SION AL AFFAIRS DIVSI ON,
Washincion, DC. May 12, 1988.
Hon. PRANR C. CARLUCCI,
The Secretary of Defense.
Attention: DOD Office of the Inspector
General, Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for GAO Report Analysis.
DEAR MialSzcarraav: The General Ac-
counting Office, has been requested to un-
dertake a study of Panamanian leader Gen.
Manuel Noreiga's alleged drug activities.
The study. under code 472165, will examine
(1) the broad parameters of U.S.-Panamani-
an relations over the past 20 years, (2) the
type of information about Noriega devel-
oped by various intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies. (3) the extent to which
this information reached foreign policy de-
cision-makers. and (4) the role that such in-
formation played in decisions on US. for-
eign policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Group Director; Mr.
James 0, Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge: and
Mr. Jon Chasson: of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Department of Defense. the De-
partment of State, the Department of Jus-
tice, and other federal agencies. We will
advise you of any need to visit Department
facilities outside the Washington area.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment..
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINSEURY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS D/VISION,
Washington, DC, May 13, 1988.
MI. PAUL Scacrsa STEVENS.
Executive Secretary. National Security
Council, Old Executive Office Bldg.,
Washington, DC. .
DEAR Ma. STEVENS: The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165. will examine (1) the
broad parameters of U.S.-Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years, (2) the type of
information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies. (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played in decisions on U.S. foreign
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton, Group Director; Mr.
James 0. Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted at the Nation-
al Security CounciL the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the De-
partment of Justice, and other federal agen-
cies.
We appreciate any assistance you can pro-
vide to our staff. If you have any questions,
please contact Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or
Mr. Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely VOUTS.
JOS EFH E. KELLY.
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OPTIC& NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC. May 13, 1986.
Hon. GEORGE P. SHULT7-
The Secretary of State.
(Attention: GAO Liaison. Office of the
Comptroller.)
Dana MP. SECRETARY: The General Ac-
counting Office, has been requested to un-
dertake a study of Panamanian leader Gen.
Manuel Noriega's alleged drug activities.
The study, under code 472165. will examine
(1) the broad parameters of US-Panamani-
an relations over the past 20 years. (2) the
type of information about Noriega devel-
oped by various intelligence and law-en-
forcement agencies, (3) the extent to which
this information reached foreign policy deci-
sionmakers, and (4) the role that such infor-
mation played in decisions on US. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Group Director, Mr.
James 0. Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Department of State. the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Jus-
tice. and other federal agencies. We will
advise you of any need to visit State Depart-
ment facilities outside the Washington area.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate of of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
JOSEPH E. KELLY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION.
Washington, DC, May 16, 1986.
Ms. Jona C. KEENFY,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, Washing.
ton, DC.
DEAR MP.. KEENEY: The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165. will examine (1) the
broad parameters of U.S.-Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years, (2) the type of
information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played in decisions on US. foreign
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton, Group Director, Mr.
James 0. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge: and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Division.
We would like to meet with knowledgeable
Criminal Division officials. We also plan to
conduct work at other Department of Jus-
tice offices, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and other federal
ageneies.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
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16852 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
ARNOLD P. JONES.
Senior Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
Washington, DC, May 16, 1988.
Mr. MANUEL RODRIQUEZ,
Legal Counsel, Executive Office for U.S. At-
torneys. Department of Justice.
DEAR MR. RODRIQUEZ: The General Ac-
couting Office, has been requested to under-
take a study of Panamanian leader Gen.
Manuel Noriega's alleged drug activities.
The study, under code 472165, will examine
(1) the broad parameters of U.S.-Panamani-
an relations over the past 20 years. (2) the
type of information about Noriega devel-
oped by various intelligence and law-en-
forcement agencies, (3) the extent to which
this information reached foreign policy deci-
sionmakers, and (4) the role that such infor-
mation played in decisions on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Group Director. Mr.
James 0. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Division.
We would like to meet with the U.S. At-
torneys in both Miami and Tampa, Florida,
who have brought indictments against Gen.
Noriega to discuss the genesis of the indict-
ments, identify other people that we should
talk with, and obtain information about the
cases. We also plan to conduct work at other
Department of Justice offices, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of State,
and other federal agencies.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN ANDERSON,
ARNOLD P. JONES.
Senior Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, May 24. 1988.
EOM WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
Attention: Director. Office of Legislative Li-
aison.
DEAR Ma. WEBSTER: The General Accout-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165, will examine (1) selected
aspects of U.S.-Panamanian relations over
the past 20 years. (2) the type of informa-
tion about Noriega developed by various in-
telligence and law-enforcement agencies. (3)
the extent to which this information
reached foreign policy decisionmakers. and
(4) the role that such information played in
decisions on U.S. foreign policy.
This work will be performed under the di-
rection of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Associate
Director by Mr. Donald L. Patton. Group
Director; Mr. James 0. Benone. Evaluator-
in-Charge; and Mr. Jon Chasson; of our For-
eign Economic Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense. the Department of Jus-
tice, and other federal agencies.
We would like to meet with Agency repre-
sentatives to discuss these issues and obtain
the Agency's perspective on them. We ap-
preciate any assistance you can provide to
our staff in this regard. If you have any
questions, please contact Mr. Patton or Mr.
Benone at 275-5790.
Sincerely yours.
FRANK C. CONAHAN.
Assistant Comptroller General.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION.
Washington. DC. June 23, 1988.
Mr C. NICHOLAS ROSTOW,
Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Advisor, National Security Council.
DEAR MR. ROSTOW: As you are aware. Sen-
ator John Kerry. Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Interna-
tional Operations and Representative Bill
Alexander, are concerned that information
about illegal activities by high-level officials
of other nations may not be adequately con-
sidered in U.S. foreign policy decisions. At
their request, the General Accounting
Office is undertaking an initial case study of
how information about General Noriega was
developed by various government agencies.
and what role such information played in
policy decisions regarding Panama.
To satisfy this request, we will:
(1) Obtain an agency overview. At each
agency that develops relevant information
on General Noriega or his possible involve-
ment in illegal activities, we will receive a
briefing that outlines the general organiza-
tional structure and the operational proce-
dures related to the agency's data collection,
analysis, and dissemination systems.
(2) Interview relevant personnel. Once we
understand the basic organizational struc-
ture. we will then interview key personnel
responsible for (1) defining agency informa-
tion needs with regard to Noriega and
Panama, (2) implementing the information
collection process, (3) collecting and report-
ing raw data, and (4) analyzing and dissemi-
nating data on Panama and Noriega.
(3) Review documents. As we learn more
about each agency's collection and reporting
processes, we will request relevant docu-
ments. We anticipate that these will in-
clude: specific directives, instructions, or
taskings to collect data on Noriega or al-
leged illegal activities involving Noriega,
cables and reports from field offices regard-
ing Noriega's involvement in or toleration of
illegal activities, analyses or summaries of
field reporting on Noriega, and geographic/
subject-area studies discussing the role or
suspected role of Noriega in illegal activi-
ties.
(4) Examine the use of information about
Noriega in the foreign policy process. After
completing a systematic review at each
agency, we will attempt to determine how
agency reporting on Noriega may have in-
fluenced foreign policy decisions on
Panama. We will first identify the agencies.
organizations, and individuals who play a
role in deciding national security and for-
eign policy issues with regard to Panama.
Through interviews and a review of relevant
documents, we will determine whether in-
formation about Noriega reached them, and
how that information was used in making
decisions.
As part of our review, we will contact ap-
propriate officials of the National Security
Council who are now or were in the past in-
volved in policy decisions regarding
Panama_ We intend to discuss their knowl-
edge and utilization of information concern-
ing General Noriega's illegal activities.
We understand that this review will in-
volve potentially sensitive material that
may require special controls and safeguards.
We are willing to discuss this issue with you
and take appropriate precautions.
August 11, 1988
Mr. Levin indicated that you would
handle this request expeditiously, and I
look forward to hearing from you early next
week. If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Patton
at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNT/NG OFFICE. NA?
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTER NA -
TI ON AL AFFAIRS DIVISION.
Washington, DC, July 12. 1988.
Mr. LAWRENCE S. MCWHORTER.
Director, Executive Office for U.S. Alto,-
nets. Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC.
DEAR MR. MCWHORTER: As we informed
your staff in our letter of May 16. 1988. the
General Accounting Office is undertaking a
case study of how information about Gener-
al Noriega was developed by various govern-
ment agencies, and what role such informa?
tion played in policy decisions regarding
Panama. As agreed with your staff. we ini-
tially postponed audit work at the Justice
Department until we had met with National
Security Council officials to more full ex-
plain our review objectives and give them an
opportunity to coordinate agency participa-
tion in our review. However, because the NR.
tional Security Council has not acted, and
because of the high level of congressional
interest in this assignment, we must now im-
plement our review independently at each
agency.
We are therefore requesting that you pro-
vide us with the following:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
components involved in. and the opt-rational
procedures related to the U.S. Attorney re-
quests for and analysis of foreign intelli-
gence data.
2. Documents relating to the investiga-
tions of alleged drug trafficking by General
Noriega conducted by the U.S. Attorneys in
Miami and Tampa.
3. Any memos, reports, analyses, studies,
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the office of the
U.S. Attorneys which discuss allegations of
Illegal activities by General Noriega, and
interagency communications on these mat-
ters.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses, we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July -20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
With the input and cooperation of U.S.
Attorney officials, I am confident that we
can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
NANCY R. Kricsauay.
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. EDWARD S. DENNIS,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC.
DEAR Ma. DErarars: As we informed your
staff in our letter of May 16, 1988, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study of how information about General
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%Rol %or
August 11, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 6833
Noriega was developed by various govern-
ment agencies. and what role such informa-
tion played in policy decisions regarding
Panama. We initially postponed audit work
at the Justice Department and several other
government agencies until we had met with
National Security Council officials to more
fully explain our review objectives and had
given them an opportunity to coordinate
agency participation in our review. However,
because the National Security Council has
not acted, and because of the high level con-
gressional interest in this assignment, we
must noa implement our review independ-
ently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that you pro.
vide us with the following
1. Documents outlining the organizational
components involved in. and the operational
procedures related to. the Criminal Divi-
sion's development of law enforcement in-
formation and its requests for and analysis
of foreign intelligence data provided by the
various collection agencies.
2. Any memos. reports. analyses, studies,
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the Division which
discuss allegations of illegal activities by
General Noriega or the possible impact of
such activities on U.S. relations with
Panama.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses. we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
With the input and cooperation of Crimi-
nal Division officials, I am confident that we
can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS Dr-vistas,
Washinaton, DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. JOHN C. LAWN,
Drug Enforcement Administration,
Washinoton, DC.
DEAR MR. Lawn: As we informed your
staff in our letter of May 11, 1988, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165. of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. At the request of
your staff, we initially postponed audit work
at the Drug Enforcement Administration
until we had explained our review objectives
to the National Security Council and had
given them an opportunity to coordinate
the executive agency participation in our
review. However, because the National Secu-
rity Council has not acted. and because of
the high level of congressional interest in
this assignment, we must now implement
our revieu independently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that DEA
provide us with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to DEA's development of law enforce-
ment information and its foreign intelli-
gence data collection analysis, and dissemi-
nation systems.
2. Documents which establish DEA's pro-
cedures for (a) defining foreign intelligence
information needs with regard to Genera)
Noricga and Panama. (b) implementing the
Information collect-ion. process. (c) collect-
ing and reporting raw data. and (d) analyz-
ing and disseminating data on Panama and
General Noriega.
3. Specific directives. instructions, or task-
Ings to collect data on General Noriega or
his alleged illegal activities, cables and re-
ports from field offices regarding his in-
volvement in or toleration of illegal activi-
ties, analyses or summaries of field report-
ing on him, and geographic/subject-area
studies discussing his role or suspected role
In illegal activities.
To facilitate our review, we are requesting
an opening conference with appropriate of-
ficials no later than July 20. At that time,
we will more fully discu_ the specific pa-
rameters of our audit work and establish a
schedule for obtaining the needed docu-
ments.
With the input and cooperation of DEA
officials. I am confident that we can success-
fully complete our review in a timely
manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sinceerly yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOLTNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DivisiON,
Washington. DC', July 12, 1988.
Mr. PAUL SCHOTT STEVEN'S,
Executive, Secretary, National Security
Council, Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. STEVENS: As we informed you in
our letter of May 13. 1988, and Mr. Rostow
in our letter of June 23, the General Ac-
counting Office is undertaking a case study
of how information about General Noriega
was developed by various government agen-
cies. and what role such information played
in policy decisions regarding Panama. At
the request of the National Security Council
staff, we initially postponed audit work at
the Council and several other government
agencies until we had met with them to
more fully explain our review objectives and
had given them an opportunity to coordi-
nate agency participation in our review.
However, because we have not received a re-
sponse to our letter of June 23. and because
of the high level of congressional interest in
this -assignment, we must now implement
OUT review independently at each agency.
We have sent requests to each agency.
asking that appropriate officials meet with
us to establish a timetable for collecting and
reviewing relevant documents. We ask that
the National Security Council provide us
with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to the National Security Council's re-
quests for and analysis of foreign intelli-
gence data provided by the various collec-
tion agencies.
2. Any memos. reports. analyses. studies.
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the National Secu-
rity Council staff which discuss allegations
of illegal activities by General Noriega and
the possible impact of such activities on
U.S. relations with Panama.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses, we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
With the input and cooperation of Nation.
at Security Council officials. I am conlident
that we can successfully complete oni
review in a timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review. pleas( contact Mi. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTER NA -
TION AL AFFAIRS DIVSION.
Washington. DC. July 12. 1988.
Hon. GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
The Secretary of State.
(Attention: GAO Liaison, Office of the
Comptroller.)
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS We informed you
In our letter of May 13. 1988. the General
Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165. of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies. and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. At the request of
your staff, we initially postponed audit work
at the State Department until we had ex-
plained our review objectives to the Nation-
al Security Council and had given them an
opportunity to coordinate the executive
agency participation in our review. However,
because the National Security Council has
not acted, and because of the high level of
congressional interest in this assignment. we
must now implement our review independ-
ently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that the
State Department provide us with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to the State Department's foreign in-
telligence data collection. analysis, and dis-
semination systems.
2. Documents which establish the State
Department's procedures for (a) defining
foreign intelligence information needs with
regard to General Noriega and Panama, (b)
implemening the information collection
process, (c) collecting and reporting raw
data. and (d) analyzing and disseminating
data on Panama and General Noriega.
3. Specific directives, instructions, or task-
ings to collect dat-a on General Noriega or
his alleged illegal activities, cables and re-
ports from embassies regarding his involve-
ment in or toleration of illegal activities,
analyses or summaries of field reporting on
him, and geographic/subject-area studies
discussing his role or suspected role in ille-
gal activities.
We anticipate that many of these docu-
ments are available within the Offices of
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter.
AmericanAffairs, the Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Research, and the As-
sistant Secretary for Narcotics Matters.
To facilitate our review. we are requesting
an opening conference with appropriate of-
ficials no later than July 20. At that time,
we will more fully discuss the specific pa-
rameters of our audit work and establish a
schedule for obtaining the needed docu-
ments.
With the input and cooperation of State
Department officials, I am confident that
we can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. Kraicsituay,
Associate Director.
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?10
H 6854 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
GENERAL ACC'OUNTING OFFICE, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washlngton, DC. July 13, 1988.
Hon. Faaira C. CARLUCCI.
The Secretary of Defense.
(Attention: DOD Office of the Inspector
General, Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for GAO Report Analysis).
DEAR Ma. SECRETARY: As we informed you
in our letter of May 12, 1988. the General
Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study. under code 472165. of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci.
Mons regarding Panama. With the coopera-
tion of Department of Defense officials. in-
cluding those from the military services and
other Defense agencies, we have already
made substantial progress toward achieving
our review objectives. However, we were ad-
vised or, July 12. 1988. that these officials
have been directed to postpone meeting
with us and providing us with documents
wail the National Security Council provides
guidance on the extent that the Depart-
ment should participate in our review.
Since initiating this review, we have fully
briefed the National Security Council staff
on our review objectives and methodology
and allowed them time to provide guidance
to executive branch agencies. However, be-
cause the Council has not issued such guid-
ance and because of the high level of con-
gressional interest in this assignment, we
have advised the Council that we must now
Implement our review independently at
each agency.
We are therefore requesting that the De-
partment resume cooperating with us on
this assignment and provide us with docu-
ments we need to accomplish our review ob-
jectives. In addition to the documents that
we already have requested, we need to
obi air.:
1. Cables and intelligence reports generat-
ed by, or in the possession of, the Depart-
ment of Defense and its various components
which discuss General Noriega and his al-
leged illegal activities.
2. Any other memos, reports, analyses,
studies, briefing papers, meeting records.
other documents, or recorded information
generated by, or in the possession of. the
Department or its components which dis-
cuss allegations of illegal activities by Gen-
eral Noriega and the possible impact of such
activities on U.S. relations with Panama.
To facilitate our review, we would appreci-
ate being advised in writing no later than
July 20, 1988. of your intended action on
this matter.
With the Department's renewed coopera-
tion. I am confident that we can successful-
ly complete our review in a timely mariner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James 0.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
ENCLOSURE III
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
Washington, DC, July 13, 1988.
MS: NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director, National Security and
International Affairs Division, General
Accounting Office, Washington, DC.
DEAR MS. KINGSBURY: I RM writing in re-
sponse to your request concerning a study
of the alleged drug activities of Manuel Not--
legs, and the role information about such
activities played in decisions about U.S. for-
eign policy (Study *472165).
As described in Mr. Kelly's May 13, 1988,
letter to Paul Stevens and your June 23.
1988. letter to Inc. your request seeks access
to sensitive law enforcement and intelli-
gence files covering a substantial period of
time. In our meeting, your staff confirmed
that your three areas of interest were intel-
ligence files, law enforcement files, and the
deliberative process of the Executive
branch, including internal communications
and deliberations leading to Executive
branch actions taken pursuant to the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority. I was disap-
pointed that your letter did not contain any
narrowing of the request. The request raises
importaet statutory and constitutional
Issues. The Administration is anlav-zing
them now, and when its deliberation is com-
plete, I shall reply further to your letter of
June 23, 1988.
Sincerely.
NICHOLAS Ros-row,
Special Assistant to the President
and Legal Adviser.
ENCLOSURE IV
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Washington, DC, June 13, 1988.
Mr. FRANK C. CONAHAN,
Assistant Comptroller General, National Se-
curity and International Affairs Divi-
sions, General Accounting Office, Wash-
ington, DC,
DEAR MR. CONAIIAN: The Director has
asked me to respond to your letter of 24
May 1988 that desrribed the General Ac-
counting Office's investigation of allega-
tions made against General Noriega of
Panama.
All Agency activities in central America,
as well as information we receive concerning
other U.S. Government activities in the
region, are subject to close and continuing
scrutiny by the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees. Furthermore, any assess-
ment of policy-related questions should be
directed to the appropriate components of
the Executive Branch, such as the Depart-
ments of State and Defense.
I am sorrry that we cannot be more help-
ful in this case.
Sincerely,
Joni: L. HELGERSON.
Director of Congressional Affairs.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1988.
NANCY KINGSBURY,
Associate Director, General Accounting
Office, National Security and interna-
tional Affairs Theis-ion.
DEAR MS. KINGSBURY: I am pleased to re-
spond to your July 12 letter or, the proposed
care study your office is undertaking about
how U.S. government agencies used infor-
mation about General Noriega in its policy
decisions regarding Panama.
As you are aware, the National Security
Council staff and the Office of White House
counsel have been working-closely with your
office on this investigation. All executive
branch agencies have been instructed by the
White House not to take any action on your
request until various legal issues have been
analyzed by the Administration. According-
ly, at the present time it will not be possible
for the Department to meet with your staff
or produce information until this examina-
tion is completed. For the time being. Nich-
olas Rostov:, Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council. is acting as the adminis-
tration's point of contact on this matter.
Sincerely,
ROGER B. Fr..-DMAN,
Comptroller.
August 11, MSS
Mr. QUILLEN Mr. Speaker, I yield
3 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia [Mr. DORNAN].
Mr. DORNA.N of California. Mr.
Speaker, I passed an amendment in
the Crime Subcommittee and in the
full Judiciary Committee that was bi-
partisan, and noncontroversial, about
these clandestine drug labs, which are
a particular problem in my beautiful)
State of California. Due to California's
size and its ability to grow almost any-
thing, the domestic growing of illegal
crops has become a real problem. More
ominous though are the hidden drug
labs that sometimes are defended with
booby traps, including high explosives.
It is a tragic situation, recognized by
all to the extent that everybody on
the subcommittee and on the major
committee said that my legislation on
clandestine labs was fine and despara-
tely needed.
Because of a jurisdictional dispute,
and only because of that, my language
was taken out of the final bill pro-
duced by the Rules Committee.
Last night, however, in the Rules
Committee they agreed to allow me to
offer my language again as an amen-
dent, when we take this bill up again
In September. I am still put at a disad-
vantage by these actions, however, as
It will appear that I am trying to alter
the original language of the bilL This
is always an uphill battle.
I would just like to read a statement
that I put out to the Rules Committee
yesterday explaining my point of view.
0 1115
This was hand delivered last night to
lion. CLAUDE PEPPER:
DEAR MR, CHAIRMAN: Only moments ago. I
became aware that the Rules Committee
will drop my language regarding Clandes-
tine Drug Laboratories, in Subtitle B of title
VI. This language was accepted by the ma-
jority staff of the Crime Subcommittee even
before subcommittee markup occurred. This
language then survived markup before the
full Judiciary Committee without amend.
ment. In short, Mr. Chairman, this provi-
sion to establish a Task Force on Clandes-
tine Drug Laboratories has always enjoyed a
significant bipartisan support in Congress
and within the Drug Enforcement Agency.
Let me add that the DEA is anxious.
very anxious to get this language in
the legislation, since they are the
major repository of the chemicals used
in these drug labs:
I sin disappointed, to say the least, that
the Rules Committee would circumvent the
committee process, which I have followed so
I am grateful to the Rules Commit-
tee that this was corrected:
It is my understanding that the language
will be allowed as an amendment to the
drug bill during floor debate. I would cer-
tainly hope that I would at least be granted
this opportunity.
Mr. Chairman. I certainly hope that you
can see your way clear to either reinstating
my language. ? ? ?
And he did that. I would like to
thank him for it. I look forward to of-
fering it on the floor in September.
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100TH CONGRESS 1 Run% 100-861
2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Part 2
PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A BILL
RELATING TO THE OMNIBUS DRUG INITIATIVE
SEPTEMBER 6, 1988.?Ordered to be printed
Mr. PEPPER, from the Committee on Rules,
submitted the following
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
[To accompany H. Res. 521 and to supersede H. Rept. 100-8611
The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House
Resolution 521, by nonrecord vote, report the same to the House
with the recommendation that the resolution do pass.
The following are the amendments made in order under House
Resolution 521.
An amendment to be offered by Representative Wortley of New
York or his designee to be debatable for not to exceed 10 minutes,
equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment
and a member opposed thereto.
Page 11, after line 15, insert the following new section:
SEC. 1010. TRANSFER BY GOVERNMENT AGENCY OF RECORDS
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION.
Section 1112 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978 (12 U.S.C. 3412) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
"(f) Nothing in this title shall apply when financial
records obtained by an agency or department of the
United States are disclosed or transferred to the Attorney
General upon the certification by a supervisory level offi-
cial of the transferring agency or department that there is
reason to believe that the records may be relevant to a vio-
lation of Federal criminal law. Records so transferred shall
be used only for criminal investigative or prosecutive pur-
poses by the Department of Justice and shall, upon com-
pletion of the investigation or prosecution (including any
appeal), be returned only to the transferring agency or de-
partment.".
88-522
88-522 0 - 88 -
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68
Page 341, strike line 14 and all that follows through page 356,
line 5, and insert the following:
SEC. 10006. DRUG TESTING CERTIFICATION PROGRAM REQUIRE-
MENTS.
(a), IN GENERAL?Not later than 6 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall establish a procedure to be used to
(1) certify certain clinical laboratories that analyze and de-
termine the results of drug tests conducted by other enti-
ties or individuals, and (2) ensure that such laboratories
maintain high quality and appropriate security concerning
the results of such tests.
(b) REQUIREMENTS.?Under the procedures established
under subsection (a), a laboratory that conducts drug test-
ing shall, as determined under guidelines prescribed by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services?
(1) meet the mandatory guidelines, or be determined
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
have met the mandatory guidelines, established by the
Secretary under subclauses (I) and (III) of section
503(aX1XAXii) of the Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1987, or
(2) have been inspected and accredited by a national
accrediting body approved for such purpose by the Sec-
retary.
(C) SPENDING RESTRICTION.?
(1) The Secretary of Health and Human Services
may not expend any Federal funds for any part of the
certification of laboratories to conduct drug testing of
Federal employees. Costs associated with such certifi-
cations shall be the responsibility of the laboratories
seeking the certification.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not limit the authority of the
Secretary to expend Federal funds to administer and
provide oversight of the clinical laboratory certifica-
tion process.
An amendment to be offered by Representative Alexander of Ar-
kansas or his designee to be debatable for not to exceed 20 minutes,
equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment
and a member opposed thereto. .
Page 375, after line 21, insert the following new title:
TITLE XI INTERAGENCY COOPERA-
TION RELATING TO INFORMATION
ON ILLEGAL FOREIGN DRUG AC-
TIVITIES
SEC. 11001. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Anti-Stonewalling Act of
1988".
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follows through page 356,
ON PROGRAM REQUIRE.
months after the date
cretary of Health and
-ocedure to be used to
!s that analyze and de-
nducted by other enti-
that such laboratories
le security concerning
irocedures established
Lilt conducts drug test-
idelirres prescribed by
Services?
ines, or be determined
d Human Services to
nes, established by the
and (III) of section
iental Appropriations
credited by a national
ch purpose by the Sec-
and Human Services
l_ds for any part of the
?nduct drug testing of
ated with such certifi-
ity of the laboratories
it the authority of the
ids to administer and
1 laboratory certifica-
z.entative Alexander of Ar-
not to exceed 20 minutes,
)ponent of the amendment
ving new title:
CY COOPERA-
NFORMATION
3N DRUG AC-
ti-Stonewalling Act of
69
SEC. 11002. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION RELATING TO INFOR-
MATION ON ILLEGAL FOREIGN DRUG ACTIVITIES.
(a) IN GENERAL.?Any officer or employee in the execu-
tive branch of the Government, who, in the course of the
official duties of such officer or employee, obtains informa-
tion about illegal foreign drug activities shall promptly
furnish such information through the head of the agency
in which the officer or employee serves or is employed?
(I) to the head of any other agency designated under
sugsection (b); and
(2) upon request of a committee of the Congress or of
the Comptroller General, as the case may be, to such
committee or to the Comptroller General.
(b) DESIGNATIONS.?Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall?
(1) designate agencies involved in the formulation of
United States foreign policy or the enforcement of
Federal drug laws to receive information under sub-
section (a)(1); and
(2) notify the Speaker and the minority leader of the
House of Representatives, the President pro tempore
and the minority leader of the Senate, and the Comp-
troller General of such designations.
The President shall review such designations once each
year and may, on the basis of the review, change any des-
ignation, with notification as provided in paragraph (2).
(c) NONDISCLOSURE.?Except with respect to the disclo-
sure of information to the General Accounting Office, not-
withstanding subsection (a), the head of an agency may
withhold the disclosure of information that, as determined
by the head of the agency?
(1) may jeopardize a United States foreign intelli-
gence or counterintelligence activity or source;
(2) may jeopardize a law enforcement investigation;
(3) may adversely affect the national defense or se-
curity of the United States.
The authority to make such a determination may not be
delegated. Any such determination shall be communicated
in writing to the President, who may direct the head of
the agency to furnish the information under such proce-
dures and safeguards as the President may specify.
(d) APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 716 OF Trz-LE 31, UNITED
STATES CODE.?If information requested by the Comptroller
General under subsection (a) is not furnished within a rea-
sonable time, section 716 of title 31, United States Code,
shall apply to such request.
(e) DUTY OF THE PRESIDENT.?In the event the President
withholds information from a committee of the Congress
for any of the reasons set forth in subsection (c), the Presi-
dent shall transmit in writing to the chairman and rank-
ing minority party member of such committee a statement
of the reasons for the decision. If the information concerns
a United States foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
Or
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70
activity or source, the President shall promptly inform the
chairman and ranking minority party member of the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the *nate of the nature of the information withheld.
This section does not waive or otherwise alter any right or
procedure that the Congress or any committee of the Con-
gress may otherwise have to receive such information.
(f) DEFINITIONS.?As used in this section?
(1) the term "officer or employee in the executive
branch of the Government" means an appointed offi-
cer in the executive branch of the Government, an em-
ployee in the executive branch of the Government,
and a member of a uniformed service; and
(2) the term "agency" means a department, agency,
or establishment in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment.
0
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STAT
?
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Offtrp of ttp Annnwp Griusral
Ivasfiingum,11. Z. 20530
8 September 1988
The Honorable Jim Wright'
Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
The Administration strongly supports and urges Congress to
act swiftly to adopt effective and responsible legislation to
combat drug abuse. United States law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have devoted and will continue to devote
substantial efforts toward achievement of the vital national
objective of halting the flow of illegal drugs.
The amendment proposed to be offered by Congressman Bill
Alexander to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988 (H.R. 5210)
will weaken the hand of the United States in the battle against
illegal drugs. The Alexander Amendment is both unwise and
impermissibly encroaches on the President's constitutional
authority.
The amendment requires Executive Branch personnel obtaining
information about "illegal foreign drug activities" to forward
such information promptly to the head of their agencies. In
turn, the agency heads must furnish it to law enforcement
agencies specially designated by the President and, upon request,
to any committee of the Congress or the General Accounting Office
(GAO). If the agency head personally determines that disclosure
of the information risks specified damage to national security or
law enforcement interests, he need not disclose the demanded
information to a congressional committee, but he nevertheless
must furnish it to the GAO. The amendment also provides for
lawsuits by the GAO against Federal agencies to secure
information covered by its provisions.
The Alexander amendment would diminish the ability of the
United States to collect narcotics intelligence. Sources of
foreign narcotics intelligence, including cooperating foreign
government agencies, would be less likely to share sensitive
narcotics intelligence with U.S. agencies if it must be
disseminated on demand to the General Accounting Office and, in
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- 2 -
many cases, to multiple congressional committees. The proper
executive-legislative arrangements for handling sensitive
narcotics intelligence in a responsible and secure fashion are
those specified by Title V of the National Security Act of 1947,
under which the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of
intelligence agencies keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of intelligence
activities, including nakcotics intelligence.
The prospect of lawsuits between the GAO and intelligence
agencies over some of the most sensitive national security
information in the possession of the United States presents a
substantial danger of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information. Congress recognized this danger when it enacted the
General Accounting Office Act of 1980 that provided for the
exemption of intelligence information from the GAO's current
authority to bring suits to obtain information.
The inter-agency reporting requirements established by the
amendment will disrupt effective, carefully crafted mechanisms
for secure dissemination of narcotics intelligence within the
U.S. Government. These mechanisms ensure that sensitive
narcotics intelligence is disseminated to law enforcement
agencies and that the information is properly protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
In addition to its practical flaws, the amendment
impermissibly encroaches on the powers of the President under the
Constitution to faithfully execute the laws, to supervise his
subordinates in the Executive Branch, to preserve the integrity
of executive deliberations, and to protect national security
information.
We urge the House not to adopt the Alexander Amendment.
z
Sincerely,
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Honorable Bill Alexander
Dick Thor
Attorney
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effirp of Op Artont2R Grruiral
IV astlitupn,13 . al. 211530
8 September 1988
The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Minority Leader
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Leader:
The Administration strongly supports and urges Congress to
act swiftly to adopt effective and responsible legislation to
combat drug abuse. United States law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have devoted and will continue to devote
substantial efforts toward achievement of the vital national
objective of halting the flow of illegal drugs.
The amendment proposed to be offered by Congressman Bill
Alexander to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988 (H.R. 5210)
will weaken the hand of the United States in the battle against
illegal drugs. The Alexander Amendment is both unwise and
impermissibly encroaches on the President's constitutional
authority.
The amendment requires Executive Branch personnel obtaining
information about "illegal foreign drug activities' to forward
such information promptly to the head of their agencies. In
turn, the agency heads must furnish it to law enforcement
agencies specially designated by the President and, upon request,
to any committee of the Congress or the General Accounting Office
(GAO). If the agency head personally determines that disclosure
of the information risks specified damage to national security or
law enforcement interests, he need not disclose the demanded
information to a congressional committee,. but he nevertheless
must furnish it to the GAO. The amendment also provides for
lawsuits by the GAO against Federal agencies to secure
information covered by its provisions.
The Alexander amendment would diminish the ability of the
United States to collect narcotics intelligence. Sources of
foreign narcotics intelligence, including cooperating foreign
government agencies, would be less likely to share sensitive
narcotics intelligence with U.S. agencies if it must be
disseminated on demand to the General Accounting Office and, in
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C.
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- 2 -
many cases, to multiple congressional Committees. The proper
executive-legislative arrangements for handling sensitive
narcotics intelligence in a responsible and secure fashion are
those specified by Title V of the National Security Act of 1947,
under which the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of
intelligence agencies keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of intelligence
activities, including narqotics intelligence.
The prospect of lawsuits between the GAO and intelligence
agencies over some of the most sensitive national security
information in the possession of the United States presents a
substantial danger of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information. Congress recognized this danger when it enacted the
General Accounting Office Act of 1980 that provided for the
exemption of intelligence information from the GAO's current
authority to bring suits to obtain information.
The inter-agency reporting requirements established by the
amendment will disrupt effective, carefully crafted mechanisms
for secure dissemination of narcotics intelligence within the
U.S. Government. These mechanisms ensure that sensitive
narcotics intelligence is disseminated to law enforcement
agencies and that the information is properly protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
In addition to its practical flaws, the amendment
impermissibly encroaches on the powers of the President under the
Constitution to faithfully execute the laws, to supervise his
subordinates in the Executive Branch, to preserve the integrity
of executive deliberations, and to protect national security
information.
We urge the House not to adopt the Alexander Amendment.
Sincerely,
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Honorable Bill Alexander
Dick Th
Attorn
rgh
y Gene
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