SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS- SOVIET BREAK OUT FROM ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030027-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: January 29, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030027-5
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January 29, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
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EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR
THE HOMELESS
MURKOWSKI (AND OTHERS)
AMENDMENT NO. 9
Mr. MURKOWSKI (for himself, Mr.
THURMOND, Mr. SIMPsoN, Mr. GRASS-
LEY, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr.
D'AMATO, and Mr. DOMENICI) proposed
an amendment to the joint resolution
(H.J. Res. 102) supra.
NOTICES OF HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH,
CONSERVATION, FORESTRY, AND GENERAL LEG-
ISLATION
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I wish to
announce that the Subcommittee on
Agricultural Research, Conservation,
Forestry and General Legislation of
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry will hold a hearing
on the status of American foreign food
assistance programs in relation to agri-
cultural trade. The hearing will be
held on Thursday, February 5, 1987 at
10 a.m. in room SR-332. Senator MEL-
CHER will preside. For further informa-
tion please contact David Voight at
224-2644.
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND
FORESTRY
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I wish to
announce that the Committee on Agri-
culture, Nutrition, and Forestry will
hold field hearings on February 9, 10,
and 11 in Minneapolis, MN; Bismark,
ND; Omaha, NE; Underwood, IA; and
Garretson, SD. For further informa-
tion please contact Leslie Dach of the
committee staff at 224-2035.
AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES
TO MEET
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Select
Committee on Intelligence be author-
ized to meet during the session of the
Senate on Thursday, January 29, 1987,
at 1:30 p.m., on pending committee
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY AS-
SISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OP-
POSITION
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Select
Committee on Secret Military Assist-
ance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Op-
position be authorized to meet during
the session of the Senate on Thursday,
January 29, 1987, at 3:30 p.m., to hold
closed hearings.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out, objection, it is so ordered.
DITIONAL STATEMENTS
SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS-
SOVIET BREAK OUT FROM
ARMS CONTROL
*Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I
submit for the RECORD a recent study
entitled "The Death of Arms Con-
trol: Soviet SALT- Break Out." by
David S. Sullivan. The Sullivan study
will be a chapter in the forthcoming
book entitled "The Global Struggle
Over Peace: The Arms Control Dilem-
ma," edited by Dr. William Kintner.
Dr. Kintner is a distinguished profes-
sor emeritus of international relations
at the University of Pennsylvania,
where he taught for many years, after
three other long and equally distin-
guished careers. His first career was as
a combat tested military officer in two
wars, then as a CIA officer, and then
as U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
during the end of the Vietnam war.
The Kintner book will be published
soon by the Washington Institute for
Values in Public Policy.
The Sullivan study contains valuable
information important for the im-
pending Senate deliberations on arms
control. It has been cleared for publi-
cation by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The Sullivan study contains:
The most complete summary of
Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT
and other arms control violations;
The only systematic analysis avail-
able of the military implications of the
Soviet SALT violations, which goes
beyond the mere summary assertions
fo the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
The evidence that the Soviets are al-
ready exceeding the most important
SALT II sublimit, are probably covert-
ly over a second SALT II sublimit, and
are about to exceed the third SALT II
sublimit, as well as being increasingly
over the main SALT II overall ceiling
on missiles, and bombers with their 22
confirmed SALT II violations;
Some recently declassified CIA judg-
ments about the impact of Soviet cam-
ouflage, concealment, and deception in
shrouding Soviet violations in the
arms control arena;
S 1413
A description of the Soviet offensive
first strike capability, and the emerg-
ing Soviet nationwide ABM capability
resulting from the Soviet SALT viola-
tions.
The most complete and detailed ex-
planation available in the unclassified
domain of Soviet violations of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, resulting
in significant contributions to the
Soviet first strike capability;
And finally, an analysis of how
Marxist-Leninist ideology is the princi-
pal obstacle to arms control.
The Sullivan study contains more
details which, are important contribu-
tions to the Senate's arms control de-
bates. For example, the Soviets told
U.S.--START negotiators in Geneva in
late 1983 that they intended to exceed
all three of the SALT II sublimits on
MIRV'd missiles and ALCM-equipped
long range bombers. Now the Soviets
are doing just that-for example, they-
have just launched two more ballistic
missile submarines, which will put the
Soviets over one SALT II sublimit
within 2 to 3 months.
Moreover, President Reagan was
told by Soviet Communist Party Gen-
eral Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland in
October 1986 that the heavily camou-
flaged and concealed Soviet SS-24 rail-
mobile MIRV'd ICBM was operation-
ally deployed even then. This Soviet
admission is conclusive evidence of SS-
24 operational deployment. Intelle-
gence reports from the press indicate
that the Soviets have already exceed-
ed another SALT II sublimit by de-
ploying at least five heavily camou-
flaged and concealed railmobile SS-24
MIRV'd ICBM's. President Reagan re-
portedly informed Congress of his con-
cern about the effects of Soviet cam-
ouflage and concealment. He wrote re-
cently that the inherent mobility and.
transportability of the SS-25 and SS-
24 made it likely that the Soviets will
try to deploy more launchers for these
systems even more covertly than we
are aware of today. The Soviets there-
by could avoid compensatory disman-
tlement of other MIRV'd ICBM's.
This potential is particularly signifi-
cant with regard to the 10 warhead
SS-24. President Reagan thus recently
informed Congress that the Soviets
would probably deploy more SS-24
railmobile MIRV'd ICBM's, and even
more covertly, in an attempt to fur-
ther violate SALT II.
The CIA has stated recently that:
"We can not exclude the possibility, in
the context of the SALT II Treaty,
that several launchers for the SS-24, a
railmobile MIRV'd ICBM, may have
left their place of final assembly and
may therefore be accountable under
SALT II." This CIA judgment has
been confirmed as accurate by Soviet
General Secretary Gorbachev's admis-
sion of SS-24 deployment, by recent
evidence of SS-24 deployment from
U.S. national technical means of SALT
verification, and by President Rea-
gan's suspicion that the Soviets would
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29, 1987
try to deploy even more camouflaged
SS-2.4 railmobile MIRV'd ICBM's even
more covertly than they are already
doing. And this Soviet SS-24 deploy-
ment had already occurred at least by
early October 1986, over 1M months
before the United States exceeded a
SALT II sublimit on November 28,
1986.
Finally, CIA. believes that covert, un-
detectable, deployment of long range
ALCM's on 300 intercontinental Back-
fire bombers could be attractive to the
Soviets in a SALT II breakout environ-
ment. I believe that the Soviets are al-
ready breaking out of. SALT I. and II.
President Reagan has. confirmed 5
Soviet violations of the SALT I inter-
im agreement, 9 Soviet violations of
the SALT I ABM Treaty, and 22'
Soviet violations of the SALT II
Treaty. This pattern of Soviet SALT
violations has been expanding, clearly
indicating Soviet breakout from SALT.
In. sum, the Soviets are confirmed by
their own admission to be already over
the 820 SALT II sublimit on MIRV'd
ICBM's, and by their detected deploy-
ment of more than five camouflaged
SS-24 railmobile MIRV'd ICBM's. The
Soviets clearly intend to exceed within
2 to 3 months the SALT II sublimit of
1,200 MIRV'd ICBM's and MIRV'd
SLBM's, by their launch of two more
ballistic missile submarines, which
would exceed this sublimit. And the
Soviets are also already over the 1,320
SALT II sublimit on MIRV'd missiles
and bombers equipped with. ALCM's,
with their covert breakout deployment
of long range AS-115 ALCM's on 300
intercontinental Backfire bombers.
All these deployments in violation of
the three SALT II sublimits were
clearly intended since the Soviets an-
nounced their intentions to the United
States in late 1983. Indeed, these de-
ployment have almost certainly been
intended since late 1974.
Therefore, the Soviets have already
exceeded the most important SALT II
sublimit, are committed to exceed soon
a second SALT II sublimit, and are
covertly exceeding the third SALT II
sublimit, and this is all part of Soviet
SALT breakout. Those who advocate a
United States return to compliance
with the SALT II sublimits are asking
that the United States comply with
SALT II sublimits that the Soviets ex-
ceeded or were committed to exceed-
ing before November 28, 1986. This
would be nothing but U.S. unilateral
disarmament. I would vote to sustain
President Reagan's threatened veto of
legislation codifying SALT II subli-
mits.
The arms control process and the
Soviet violations of the SALT treaties
have allowed the Soviets to achieve
overwhelming strategic superiority,
while the United States has practiced
unilateral disarmament and appease-
ment. At least eight times since 1982,
President Reagan himself has ac-
knowledged Soviet strategic superiori-
ty.
Mr. President, President Reagan
himself realized that the arms control
process has allowed the Soviet Union
to achieve overwhelming strategic su-
periority over the United States. Presi-
dent Reagan himself stated this as
early as May 9, 1982:
So far, the Soviet Union has used arms
control negotiations primarily as an instru-
ment to restrict U.S. defense programs, and
in conjunction with their own arms buildup,
as a means to enhance Soviet power and
prestige.
The Defence Department agreed in
stating:
Current Soviet policy on arms agreements
is dominated by their attempts to derive
unilateral advantage from arms negotia-
tions and agreements, by accepting only ar-
rangements that permit continued Soviet in-
creases in in strength while using the
negotiation process to inhibit Western in-
creases in military strength * * *. The
Soviet Union regards arms negotiations as
arenas of political conflict in which impor-
tant military advantages can be gained or
lost. The Soviet leadership does not think in
terms of mutuality or perceived arms con-
trol negotiations as a means of reducing
arms. They attempt at every turn to achieve
strategic advantage.
And the CIA agreed in stating on
June 25, 1985, that:
Soviet leaders view arms control policy as
an important factor in advancing their
strategy of achieving strategic advantage.
Moscow has long believed that arms control
must first and foremost protect the capabili-
ties of Soviet military forces relative to
their opponents.
The Sullivan study provides impor-
tant evidence to support all of these
conclusions, and I ask that it be print-
ed in the RECORD for the benefit of my
colleagues.
The study follows:
THE DEATH OF ARMS CONTROL: SOVIET SALT
BREAK OUT
(By David S. Sullivan)
In the wake of the October, 1986, Reykja-
vik Summit, where Soviet Leader Gorba-
chev described the discussions as "heated"
and "sharp", American leaders are finally
beginning to realize that the Soviets have
killed arms control as a means of preserving
international security. This is because
American leaders are beginning to recognize
that the Soviets have long been "Breaking
Out" of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks [SALT] Treaties since SALT I was
signed as long ago as 1972. The two funda-
mental US arms control objectives of 1969,
when SALT negotiations first began, have
not been achieved. Indeed, we are now in
precisely the situation that the SALT trea-
ties and negotiation process was supposed to
prevent. The Soviets now have the capabil-
ity for a first strike attack on most US de-
terent, retaliatory forces, while at the same
time being able to defend with Anti-Ballistic
Missiles an increasing proportion of their
nation against the small percentage of US
deterrent forces that might survive their
first strike and execute a retaliatory attack.
The Soviets are about to have operational a
nationwide ABM defense. The net result of
Soviet offensive and defensive SALT Break
Out is not just the death of arms control,
but much more ominous, the imminent
demise of nuclear deterence itself. The Sovi-
ets are rapidly approaching the capability of
being able to engage in "nuclear blackmail."
As Ronald Reagan stated in 1964: "We are
at war with the most dangerous enemy that
has ever faced mankind." This assessment is
even more true today.
At the Reykjavik Summit there was
Soviet nuclear blackmail already subtlely in
evidence. Soviet Leader Gorbachev threat-
ened to conduct international relations
under the rule of "law by the fist",. meaning
the Soviet fist. Gorbachev also mentioned
"unpredictable; serious consequences" in
future US-Soviet relations if the US did not
acquiesce in the Soviet demands. Finally,
Gorbachev's characterization of President
Reagan before the Summit as a liar regard-
ing Daniloff, and his explicit comparison of
the President to a "madman", were also un-
precedented and provocative. Gorbachev
stated that the US must "accept the reali-
ties" of Soviet strategic supremacy, and he
implicitly referred to a Soviet "break out"
superiority. .
The Soviets are now confirmed to be vio-
lating in significant ways every important
existing arms control treaty. The essential
results of the. Soviet SALT Break Out viola-
tions are their first strike offensive capabil-
ity and their emerging nationwide ABM de-
fense. The US must now take proportionate
responses. As President Reagan stated in
June, 1986, in regard to his strategic mod-
ernization programs, "We come to one of
those unique crossroads of history where
nations decide their fate ... our choices are
clear."
THE MAIN SOVIET SALT BREAK OUT VIOLATIONS
SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement: SS-
19 MIRVed ICBM deployment resulted in a
five-fold increase in Soviet first strike coun-
terforce capability.
SALT II Treaty: Excess fractionation of
SS-18 MIRVed ICBM, deployment of SS-24
rail mobile MIRVed ICBM, deployment of
road mobile SS-25 covertly MIRVed ICBM,
testing of the even heavier throwweight
follow-on to the super heavy SS-18, all fur-
ther enhance Soviet first strike, counter-
force capability.
SALT I ABM Treaty: Deployment of the 9
Pechora-Krasnoyarsk Class ABM Battle
Management Radars providing overlapping,
massively redundant coverage, together
with massive deployment of 3 types of cam-
ouflaged, mobile ABM-capable SAMS, and
mass production of ABM-3 mobile ABMs,
give the Soviets an impending nationwide
ABM capability.
America is now witnessing the Soviet
SALT Break Out deployment of illegal new
mobile ICBMs, carrying illegal new MIRVed
warheads, defended by an illegal nationwide
ABM system using illegal ABM Battle Man-
agement Radars and illegal mobile ABM
and illegal, mobile ABM-capable interceptor
missiles and radars. The net result of these
Soviet SALT Break Out violations is a
Soviet first strike offensive capability, and a
nationwide ABM defense. (See the Annex to
this study for a complete listing of the
Soviet violations confirmed by President
Reagan, together with an evaluation of
their military implications.
As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated
on December 11, 1986: "The Soviets have
regularly violated some of the most impor-
tant SALT II provisions. Their ultimate hy-
pocrisy is their recent statement that they
will 'continue to observe SALT II's limits,'
with their atheistic hands piously raised,
proclaiming another Soviet lie."
WISELY ABANDONING SALT I AND SALT II
President Reagan has wisely decided to
abandon US unilateral compliance with the
expired SALT I and SALT II agreements,
and he should withdraw from the SALT I
ABM Treaty as well. A recent poll shows
that 70 percent of the American people sup-
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January 29, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
port his decision to abandon the SALT II often in history that it was considered an
Treaty. The President's decision was based advantageous military doctrine to make
upon the fact that the Soviets were ignoring your own country deliberately vulnerable."
all three criteria for his "interim restraint" SOVIET IDEOLOGY: WAR PREPARATION
SALT
li
comp
ance policy:
1. The Soviets should make tangible nego-
tiating progress on a new arms control
treaty in Geneva;
2. The Soviets should reverse their SALT
Break Out violations;
3. The Soviets should reverse their threat-
ening strategic and military buildup.
The Soviets have totally ignored each of
these three Presidential criteria, so Presi-
dent Reagan was fully justified in his belat-
ed decision to abandon SALT I and SALT II.
The Soviets have refused to agree to
progress in the Geneva negotiations on an
equitable, realistic basis, have not even ac-
knowledged their ever widening pattern of
SALT Break Out violations, and are ever in-
creasing their ICBM, IRBM, SLBM,
bomber, cruise missile, warhead, and ABM
gaps over the US.
The Soviets are now engaged only in arms
control negotiations by propaganda: Gorba-
chev's duplicitous offensive nuclear weapons
reductions proposals while the Soviet offen-
sive buildup continues relentlessly in viola-
tion of SALT I and II; and Gorbachev's du-
plicitous nuclear test ban moratorium pro-
posals, while the Soviet violations of two ex-
isting nuclear test ban treaties continue re-
lentlessly.
The Soviets are deploying scores of illegal
SS-25 and now SS-24 ICBMs each year. The
Soviets are 75 to 600 missiles and bombers
above the number they had when SALT II
was signed in 1979. Since 1978, there have
been over 20 Soviet violations of the 150 kil-
oton threshold of the 1974 Threshold Test
Ban Treaty, and since 1965 there have been
over 30 unambiguous Soviet violations of
the 1963 Limited or Atmospheric Test Ban
Treaty.(1)
NEED TO WITHDRAW FROM SALT I ABM TREATY
Indeed, American leaders are finally be-
ginning to ask this fundamental question
about the prospects for arms control: Why
should the Soviet Union be willing to reduce
their nuclear weapons at all, when nuclear
weapons are their most important means
for becoming and remaining a super power?
An even more significant factor explaining
the death of arms control is emerging into
the consciousness of American leaders:
Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology is totally
incompatible with arms control. But this
has long been an obvious obstacle to arms
control to those familiar with Marxism-Len-
inism. Just a few examples can be cited. The
6th World Congress of the Communist
International published this Resolution in
1928: "The peace policy of the Proletarian
State... is merely a more advantageous
form of fighting Capitalism."
In 1969, just as SALT negotiations began,
the journal of the Soviet General Staff (the
key body involved in Soviet arms control
policy) Military Thought, stated: "Strength-
ening of its defenses is now the foremost po-
litical function of the Soviet
State ... never before has the internal life
of the country been subordinated to a war
so deeply and thoroughly as at the present
time."
Military Thought added in 1971: In fact, a
[i.e. Marxist-Leninist] nation's diplomatic
activity becomes a part of those non-mili-
tary means of policy implementation
which ... are contained within the concept
of the content of war."
Clearly, to Soviet leaders steeped in Marx-
ism-Leninism, diplomacy and arms control
negotiations are a fundamental element of
war preparations, which is avowedly the
main function of the Soviet State.
The fundamental Soviet war preparation
President Reagan is now confronted with strategy underlying their Marxist-Leninist
the final decision required by Soviet SALT ideological approach to arms control was
Break Out violations-US withdrawal from discerned as long ago as 1958 by three emi-
the SALT I ABM Treaty. In agreeing to the nent Americans. Former Secretary of State
1972 SALT I package of the ABM Treaty Dean Acheson recognized in 1959 that: "In
and the Interim Offensive Agreement, the the present century the Soviet State has
US gave up a potent ABM capability for de- perfected the use of negotiations ... as a
fending ICBMs, in exchange for no con- method of warfare."
straints at all on Soviet offensive programs. Dr. Herbert Dinerstein, wrote prophetical-
Pre-existing Soviet ICBM and SLBM de- - ly in the January 1958 edition of Foreign Af-
ployment plans were actually codified in the fairs: "If they [the Soviets] should acquire
SALT I Interim Agreement. The US thus such preponderant military strength, they
gave up an advantage in ABMs for worse would have policy alternatives even more at-
than nothing, a huge Soviet buildup in the tractive than the initiation of nuclear war.
very first strike, counterforce capability By flaunting presumably invincible
that our ABM was designed to thwart. The strength, the Soviet Union could compel
Soviets also reversed the relative US-Soviet piecemeal capitulation of the democracies.
positions in ABM development in the years This prospect must indeed seem glittering
after SALT I, and now they have deployed to Soviet leaders."
31 large ABM radars, compared to a maxi-' And as the late President John F. Kenne-
mum of only 12 only planned by the US in dy accurately predicted in the 1960 Presi-
1969, more than double the most ambitious dential "Missile Gap" Campaign: "Their
US ABM program. In retrospect, SALT I [Soviet] missile power will be the shield
was clearly detrimental to US national secu- from behind which they will slowly but
rity interests. And SALT II merely again surely advance-through Sputnik diploma-
codified the ongoing Soviet first strike, cy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-
counterforce buildup. overt aggression, intimidation and subver-
Since SALT began in 1969, the Soviets sion, internal revolution, increased prestige
have added over 10,000 nuclear warheads to or influence, and the vicious blackmail of
their arsenal. In the same period, the US our allies. The periphery of the Free World
has scrapped over 8,000 warheads deployed, will slowly be nibbled away."
and 12,000 more planned were cancelled. Thus Kennedy recognized that the funda-
Dr. Henry Kissinger finally conceded to a mental Soviet strategy in international rela-
shocked NATO Brussels Conference on Sep- tions was one of nuclear blackmail.
tember 1, 1979 that: "The amazing phe- President Reagan also seemed to recog-
nomenon about which historians will nize the Soviet war preparation, ideological
ponder is that all this [dramatic growth of approach to arms control earlier in his Ad-
the Soviet strategic power since 19631 has ministration, when he stated on March 31,
happened without the US attempting to 1983 that: "The chances for real arms con-
make any significant effort to rectify that trol depend on restoring the military bal-
state of affairs ... It cannot have occurred ance. We know that the ideology of the
0
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Soviet leaders does not permit them to leave
any Western weakness unprobed, any
vacuum of power unfilled. It would seem
that to them negotiation is only another
form of struggle.
And President Reagan correctly stated on
January 29, 1981 at his first news confer-
ence as President: They [the Soviets] have
openly and publicly declared that the only
morality they recognize is what will further
their cause, meaning they reserve unto
themselves the right to commit any crime,
to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that."
He added on March 8, 1983: ". . . they are
the focus of evil in the modern world."
President Reagan also stated on May 9,
1982, that: "So far, the Soviet Union has
used arms control negotiations primarily as
an instrument to restrict US defense pro-
grams and, in conjunction with their own
arms buildup, as a means to enhance Soviet
power and prestige."
Thus President Reagan has shown that he
is aware of the ideological basis for the
Soviet approach to arms control. It remains
only for the State Department to recognize
this reality.
U.S. SALT OBJECTIVES: NO SOVIET FIRST STRIKE
OR NATIONWIDE ABM CAPABILITY
When the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT) talks began In 1969, the
United States had two fundamental objec-
tives: (1) preventing the Soviets from de-
ploying an offensive first strike capability;
(2) and preventing the Soviets from deploy-
ing a nationwide Anti-Ballistic Missile de-
fense.
These two objectives were integrally
linked in the Preainbles to the 1972 SALT I
ABM Treaty, the 1972 SALT I Interim
Agreement on Offensive Weapons, and the
1979 SALT II Treaty. Evidence for this as-
sessment is clear. Senator Henry Jackson
said this in 1972 about the primary US ob-
jective in SALT i-to preserve the surviv-
ability of US strategic forces: "The intent of
the SALT I Agreements is to enhance our
security by enhancing the survivability of
our deterrent."
And Article I of the ABM Treaty, the
most important provision, prohibits a na-
tionwide ABM defense, or even the base for
a nationwide ABM defense.
But the US has completely failed to
achieve our two fundamental SALT objec-
tives, after almost two decades of the SALT
negotiating process. This US failure results
from the clear facts that the? Soviets now
have a first strike offensive capability, and
they are about to have a nationwide ABM
defense. Thus supreme United States na-
tional security interests should require
America to withdraw from the 1972 SALT I
ABM Treaty, rather than to pledge to
Soviet Dictator Gorbachev to abide by this
failed and violated treaty for another seven
years. Indeed, the US has already decided'to
cease its unilateral compliance with the ex-
pired SALT I Interim Agreement and the
expired, unratified SALT II Treaty, because
of systematic Soviet violations of both. The
same rationale applies even more clearly to
the SALT I ABM Treaty-Soviet violations
of the ABM Treaty are conclusive and point
to deployment of the prohibited nationwide
ABM defense, and the failure of arms con-
trol to prevent a Soviet offensive first strike
capability requires US withdrawal from uni-
lateral compliance with not only the SALT I
Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty,
but also with the SALT I ABM Treaty.
The US should withdraw from the ABM
Treaty partly because of the following US
Unilateral Statement to the SALT I ABM
Treaty, of May 9, 1972, expressing American
policy: "The US Delegation believes that an
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objective of the follow-on [i.e. SALT II] ne-
gotiations should be to constrain and reduce
on a long term basis threats to the surviv-
ability of our respective strategic retaliatory
forces ... If an agreement providing for
more complete strategic offensive arms limi-
tations were not achieved within five years,
US supreme national interests could be
jeopardized. Should that occur, it would
constitute a basis for withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty."
But the Soviets now have deployed a first
strike counterforce offensive capability
which threatens the survivability of our de-
terrent retaliatory forces, according to au-
thoritative Administration statements. The
Soviet first strike capability stems from
their confirmed violations of SALT I and
II-especially the MIRVed SS-19 ICBM de-
ployment, excess fractionation on their
MIRVed SS-18 ICBM, and deployment of
their rail mobile, MIRVed SS-24 ICBM.
Moreover, after 14 years of negotiations on
offensive weapons constraints, there are not
permanent, or even interim limitations on
Soviet offensive forces; the SALT I Interim
Offensive Agreement expired in 1977 and
the fatally flawed SALT II Treaty was never
ratified and expired in 1985. Therefore,
under the two conditions of the 1972 US
Unilateral Statement, US supreme national
interests require US withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty.
There is another criterion available to
judge the failure of the SALT process.
Under the "Brooke Amendment" to the
Senate resolution of approval of SALT I in
1972, the Senate itself stated that SALT I
and the SALT II negotiations would be
based upon: "The preservation of longstand-
ing US policy that neither the Soviet Union
or the United States should seek unilateral
advantage by developing a first strike poten-
tial."
The "Brooke Amendment" thus posited
that the success of SALT I and SALT II de-
pended upon the prevention of a Soviet first
strike potential.
But according to authoritative Adminis-
tration statements, the Soviets have
achieved a deployed first strike strategic of-
fensive capability. President Reagan has
correctly stated in January 1985 that:
"Modern, accurate ICBMs carrying multiple
nuclear warheads-if deployed in sufficient-
ly large numbers relative to the size of an
opponent's force structure, as the Soviets
have done with their ICBM force-could be
used in a rapid first strike to undercut an
opponent's ability to retaliate effectively."
President Reagan's National Security Ad-
visor also stated in January 1985 that:
. American land-based missiles have
become even more vulnerable to Soviet first
strike attack over the past few years."
And in President Reagan's May 1985 Vic-
tory in Europe Day speech, he also de-
scribed the Soviet "first strike" capability,
and alarmingly warned that the Soviet
threat now emerging jeopardizes "deter-
rence itself."
In President Reagan's strategic modern-
ization statement of June 3, 1986, he again
stated that there is a: "Growing strategic im-
balance between the US and the USSR .. .
In calculating what they call the 'correla-
tion of forces,' the Soviet political and mili-
tary leadership are ever mindful of the state
of the nuclear balance between the US and
the Soviet Union ... any weakening of our
nuclear deterrent, leaving the Soviet; Union
with superior nuclear force ... could invite
the Soviet Union to rely on such an advan-
tage ... this loss in survivability of US stra-
tegic forces, coupled with the magnitude of
the Soviet buildup, had begun to erode seri-
ously the stability of the strategic balance."
Moreover, Admiral William Crowe, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to
the Senate on June 19, 1986, that: "The
strategic nuclear balance has shifted dra-
matically. The Soviets now enjoy superiori-
ty in ICBMs." ICBMs are the key element
in a first strike capability, because they are
highly accurate weapons capable of destroy-
ing hardened targets within only 30 minutes
of flight time. The Soviets are acknowl-
edged to have over a 6 to 1 advantage
against U.S. hard targets in ICBM war-
heads. It is in starkest reality more like 8 or
10 to 1 Soviet first strike advantage. As Air
Force Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch,
confirmed on August 18, 1986: "The existing
imbalance in hard target attack capabilities
is very heavily in favor of the Soviets."
The CIA testified to the Senate on June
26, 1985, that: "The Soviets already have
enough hard target-capable ICBM reentry
vehicles today to attack all U.S. ICBM silos
and launch control centers... In such an
attack today, they would stand a good
chance of destroying Minuteman silos."
Finally, a Reagan Administration arms
control official warned on August 7, 1985
that: "The Soviet Union possesses a tremen-
dous capability to launch a devastating first
strike against the United States, and they
are continuing to expand that capability."
In sum, it is clear that the Soviets have a
first strike offensive capability. The signifi-
cance of this conclusion is serious. Former
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stated on
July 24, 1972, that: "If the Soviet Union
goes forward with a program ... which ap-
pears to be a concerted attempt to under-
mine the survivability of the Minuteman de-
terrent force, we would view this with great
concern. In my view, such a program would
be contrary to the intent of the agreements
that have been arrived at in SALT [I] ... I
think the intent of this agreement would be
violated."
What about the second SALT objective-
preventing a Soviet nationwide ABM de-
fense? This objective was integrally linked
to preventing a Soviet first strike offensive
capability. In November, 1985, Defense Sec-
retary Weinberger testified to the Senate
that the Soviets already have "some nation-
wide ABM capability." Of course, even a
base for a nationwide ABM capability is
banned by Article I of the ABM Treaty.
According to authoritative, official, un-
classified US Intelligence estimates, the
Soviet Moscow ABM system modernization
and upgrade will be operational in 1987, as
will the illegal Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle
Management Radar. In fact, three more Pe-
chora-Krasnoyarsk Class ABM Battle Man-
agement radars have just recently been dis-
covered, making total of more than 9 large
ABM Battle Management Radars in the Pe-
chora-Krasnoyarsk Class alone. (Two more
are expected to be discovered.) These three
new radars reportedly provide triple cover-
age of the key Western approaches to the
USSR. Counting the Moscow and Hen
House Class Radars, the Soviets now have
over 31 large ABM Battle Management
Radars, over twice as many as the US
planned in 1969, at the height of our Safe-
guard ABM system ambitions. These nur-
merous large ABM Battle Management
Radars already comprise a prohibited base
for a nationwide ABM defense, because they
are the long lead-time element for a nation-
wide ABM defense.
There has thus been a complete reversal
of roles between the US and the USSR since
1969 in ABM Battle Management Radars,
the key long lead time element of a nation-
wide ABM defense system.
ABM interceptor missiles and small ABM
engagement radars are necessary to be
linked up with ABM Battle Management
January 29, 1987
Radars in order to form a nationwide ABM
system. Ideally, these components should be
mobile, in order to enhance their survivabil-
ity and increase their ability to extend de-
fensive coverage to potential targets. The
Soviets have four types of ABM and ABM-
capable interceptor-radar systems, three of
which are mobile, in mass production even
today. These are the SAM-5, SAM-10,
SAM-12, and ABM-3 interceptor and en-
gagement radar ABM-capable or ABM sys-
tems. There are already over 2,500 ABM-ca-
pable SAM-5 intercepter-radar systems de-
ployed around Moscow, around Kras-
noyarsk, and nationwide, and the also ABM=
capable SAM-10, SAM-12, and ABM-3 sys-
tems are mobile. There are reportedly over
2,000 semi-mobile and mobile SAM-10s al-
ready deployed nationwide. Both the ABM-
capable SAM-10 and SAM-12 mobile sys-
tems will be widely deployed nationwide by
next year, 1987, and the SAM-10 is already
being deployed around Moscow and Kras-
noyarsk. The SAM-12 will probably also be
deployed around Moscow and Krasnoyarsk.
The ABM-3 will also be widely deployed
around Moscow and probably nationwide
and be operational in 1987. So the Soviets
probably already have over 4,600 ABM-capa-
ble launchers, to 0 for the U.S.
The engagement radars for these four
ABM systems are reportedly being internet-
ted with each other, and with both the large
Pushkino and the Pechora-Krasnoyarsk
Class ABM Battle Management Radars. In
particular, the SAM-5 and the SAM-10 al-
ready deployed around Moscow are report-
edly also already internetted with the Push-
kino ABM radar, and also with the ABM-3
system. The SAM-12 is also expected to be
deployed both around Moscow, and also
around Krasnoyarsk, where there are al-
ready large numbers of SAM-5s. Thus the
SAM-10 and SAM-12, all being deployed
around Moscow, are being internetted with
the SAM-5, which is already tied to the
Pushkino ABM radar and the ABM-3
system. The ABM-3 mobile system is also
expected to be deployed around the Kras-
noyarsk ABM Battle Management Radar,
joining the already deployed SAM-5 and
SAM-10, and the expected SAM-12.
In sum, all four of these ABM and ABM-
capable systems are being deployed around
and internetted with the Moscow ABM, and
this deployment and internetting will prob-
ably also occur around the Krasnoyarsk
ABM Radar, all during 1987. These ABM
deployments will connect the expanded and
upgraded Moscow ABM system to the illegal
Krasnoyarsk ABM system, making a nation-
wide Soviet ABM system. This nationwide
ABM defense system will be supported by 31
large ABM Battle Management Radars, in-
cluding more than 9 overlapping Pechora-
Krasnoyarsk Class radars. Even before the
recent discovery of the 3 new ABM radars,
the Defense and State Department's White
Paper on "Soviet Strategic Defense Pro-
grams" of October, 1985 long ago confirmed:
"The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and
ABM-related activities suggests that the
USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of
its national territory-precisely what the
ABM Treaty was designed to prevent".
President Reagan stated on October 13,
1985, that "For some years now we have
been aware that the Soviets have been de-
veloping a nationwide defense" in violation
of the ABM Treaty. President Reagan un-
derstood the stakes involved in Soviet Break
Out from the offensive and defensive con-
straints of SALT I and SALT II, when he
stated in June, 1986: "We come to one of
those unique crossroads of history where
nations decide their fate. Our choices are
clear." He means that the failure of arms
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January 29, 1987 CONGPISSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ?
control is finally being recognized at the
highest levels of the American government.
The Soviets are indeed Breaking Out of
SALT. As long ago as May, 1969, at the very
beginning of the SALT negotiations, US
Chief SALT Negotiator Gerard Smith pro-
phetically conceded that: "If either side is
striving for or appears to be striving for an
effective counterforce first strike capability,
then there is no hope for strategic arms
control."
And Defense Secretary Weinberger stated
in November, 1985 that the US would have
to add to its offensive forces in the event of
Soviet .ABM Treaty Break Out. We are al-
ready adding to our offensive and defensive
forces due to Soviet Break Out from the
SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement, and
ABM Treaty, and the SALT II Treaty. As
the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated to Congress
in July: "Taken as a whole, these viola-
tions-SS-25, encryption, and the Krasn-
oyarsk ABM radar-give the Soviets definite
Advantages..
CONCLUSION: DEATH OF ARMS CONTROL
In conclusion, 'it would be a grave conces.
sion undermining world peace, American se-
curity, and strategic stability for the US to
ever agree to extend our unilateral compli-
ance with the ABM Treaty, especially after
the start of Soviet ABM and offensive SALT
Break Out. Instead, the US should with-
draw from the ABM Treaty ourselves, not
only because of Soviet nationwide ABM de-
fense Break Out violations, but also because
of the 14 year failure of the SALT negotiat-
ing process to prevent a Soviet first strike
offensive capability jeopardizing American
supreme national interests. The US may
succomb to nuclear blackmail by the Soviets
if we were to agree to extend our compli-
ance with the ABM Treaty, against our su-
preme national interests. As Secretary of
State Shultz correctly stated on May 14,
1984: "Arms control will simply not survive
in conditions of inequality."
And as Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former
President Carter's National Security Advi-
sor, stated correctly in 1984: "The time has
come to lay to rest the.expectation that
arms control is the secret key to a more ami-
cable American-Soviet relationship, or
even to the enhancement of mutual securi-
ty.,,
Defense Secretary Weinberger and other
experts have stated that we are now in the
precise situations the SALT process was
supposed to prevent. We are vulnerable to a
Soviet first strike, yet the ABM Treaty pre-
vents us from deploying the same nation-
wide ABM defense that the Soviets are al-
ready deploying in violation of the ABM
Treaty. There is thus really no useful arms
control business left to contract with the
Soviets, because their SALT negotiating du-
plicity and their treacherous SALT Break
Out violations have enabled them to check-
mate us strategically through arms control.
How can we negotiate with an adversary
which is constantly striving to undermine
strategic stability and the fundamental pur-
poses of arms control? Afterall, military
forces are only the reflection of political
hostility. It is therefore futile to try to regu-
late or reduce military forces separately
from their underlying political causes. But
until we can convince Soviet leaders to
abandon their Marxist-Leninist ideology,
there can be no hope for arms control.
Perhaps in recognition of this fact, Presi-
dent Reagan stated profoundly on March 8,
1983, that: "The struggle. now going on for
the world will never be decided by bombs or
rockets, by armies or military might. The
real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at
root, it is a test of moral will and faith."
Will America have the moral will and
faith to recognize that the Soviets have
killed arms control by their SALT Break
Out violations, and that the only way to
preserve international security is by unilat-
eral means, enhanced deterrence? Afterall,
the U.S. was far safer from the Soviet
threat of nuclear war during the 1945-1963
Cold War period when America relied on its
unilateral efforts for deterrence.
The duplicitous history of Detente and
SALT shows that the Cold War never ended
for the Soviets. Thus the US must finally
abandon its futile quest for security
through arms control. We must instead seek
security by the old fashioned method-
through unilateral offensive deterrent de-
ployment programs, and through our own
nationwide Strategic Defense Initiative. We
must regain security by the old fashioned
method-we must earn it. Perhaps this is
what President Reagan meant when he said
we are at a crossroads of history where we
have the choice to decide our nation's fate.
Winston Churchill warned gravely after
World War II: "Sometimes in the past we
have committed the folly of throwing away
our arms. Under the mercy of Providence,
and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been
able to recreate them when the need arose.
But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent,
there will be no second chance. To abandon
it now would be to abandon it forever."
ANNEX: PRESIDENTIALLY CONFIRMED SOVIET
SALT BREAK OUT VIOLATIONS,. AND THEIR
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
A. Presidentially confirmed expanding pat-
tern of Soviet SALT II break out viola-
tions-Total of 22
1. SS-25 mobile ICBM-prohibited 2nd
new type ICBM:
1. Development since about 1975;
2. Flight-testing (irreversible), since Febr.
1983;
3. Deplopyment since 1985-over 100 plus
launchers, "direct violation";
4. Prohibited rapid-refire capability-dou-
bles force;
5. RV-to-Throw-Weight ratio (and dou-
bling of throwweight over old SS-13
ICBM)-probable covert SS-25 2 or 3 MIRV
capability-"direct violation";
6. Encryption of telemetry, "direct viola-
tion".
II. SNDVs:
7. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle limit
of 2,504-Soviets have long been at least 75
to over 600 SNDVs over the number only
they had when SALT II was signed in 1979,
thus illustrating the fundamental inequality
of SALT II. (2)
III. SS-N-23 SLBM:
8. Heavy Throw-Weight prohibited (con-,
elusive evidence);
9. Development since about 1975;
10. Flight-testing (irreversible);
11. Deployment on Delta IV and III Class
submarines;
12. Encryption of telemetry.
IV. Backfire intercontinental bomber:
13. Arctic basing, increasing intercontinen-
tal operating capability;
14. Probable refueling probe, increasing
intercontinental operating capability;
15. Production of more than 30 Backfires
per year for an estimated five years, making
more than .an estimated 12 extra Backfire
bombers; (3)
V. CCD:
16. Expanding pattern of Camouflage,
Concealment, and Deception (Maskirovka),
deliberately impeding verification.
VI. Encryption:
17. Almost total encryption of ICBM and
SLBM telemetry. (3A)
VII. Launcher-ICBM Missile Relationship:
S 1417
18. Reported probable concealment of re-
lationship between SS-24 missile and its
mobile ICBM launchers, and concealment of
the relationship between the SS-25 missile
and its mobile ICBM launchers. (4)
VIII. SS-16:
19. Confirmed deployment of 50 to 200
banned SS-16 mobile ICBM launchers at
Plesetsk test range, now reportedly prob-
ably being replaced by similar number of
banned SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers. (5)
IX. Falsification of SALT II Data Ex-
change:
20. Operationally deployed SS-16 launch-
ers not declared;
21.AS-3 Kangaroo long range air launched
cruise missile range falsely declared to be
less than 600 kilometers and not counted.
X. Excess MIRV fractionation:
22.SS-18 super heavy ICBM: NIE report-
edly says SS-18 deployed with 14 warheads
each, adding 1,232 warheads. (6)
Additionally, deployment of more than
5SS-24 railmobile MIRVed ICBM launchers
in violation of SALT II sublimit of 820
MIRVed ICBM launchers, was reportedly
confirmed to President Reagan at Iceland
Summit on October 11, 1986, by Soviet
Leader Gorbachev. Moreover, the Soviets
are reportedly flight-testing the even heav-
ier throwweight follow-on to the super
heavy SS-18 ICBM, in violation of the
SALT II absolute ceiling on SS-18 throw-
weight. This will certainly result in further
excess MIRVing of the SS-18. The Soviets
reportedly told the US arms negotiators in
Geneva in late 1983 that they intended to
exceed the SALT II sublimits of 820, 1200,
and 1320, which they are now in the process
of doing.
B. Presidentially confirmed expanding pat-
tern of Soviet SALT I interim agreement
break out violations-5 violations
1. Soviet deployment of the Heavy SS-19
ICBM and the Medium SS-17 ICBM to re-
place the light SS-11 ICBM was a circum-
vention defeating the object and purpose of
the SALT I Interim Agreement. Article II of
the Interim Agreement prohibited heavy
ICBMs from replacing light ICBMs. This
violation alone increased the Soviet first
strike threat by a factor of 5.
2. Soviet deployment of modern SLBM
submarines exceeding the limit of 740
SLBM launchers, without dismantling other
ICBM or SLBM launchers, which the Sovi-
ets actually admitted was a violation.
3. Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and
Deception deliberately impeded verification.
4. Circumvention of SALT I by deploying
SS-N-21 and .SS-NX-24 long range cruise
missiles on converted Y Class SLBM subma-
rines, which "is a threat to US and Allied se-
curity similar to_ that of the original
SSBN."(7)
5. "The US judges that Soviet use of
former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of
the deployment and operation of the SS-25
mobile ICBM is a violation of the SALT I
Interim Agreement."
As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated
on December 11, 1986: "SALT I and SALT II
have been largely irrelevant to the Soviet
military buildup. Both agreements merely
codified and authorized large increases."
C. Presidentially confirmed expanding pat-
tern of Soviet SALT I ABM Treaty break
out violations-9 violations
1. The siting, orientation, and capabilities
of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle Man-
agement Radar "directly violates" 3 provi-
sions of the SALT I ABM Treaty.
2. Over 100 ABM-mode tests of Soviet
SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 Surface-to
Air Missiles and radars are "highly proba-
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S 1418
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29, 1987
ble" violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty.
(8) Two high Soviet officials have even ad-
mitted that their SAMs have been tested
and deployed with a prohibited ABM capa-
bility. The JCS state that the SAM-5, SAM-
10, and SAM-12 have an ABM capability.
3. The Soviets "may be developing" and
deploying a territorial, nationwide ABM de-
fense, which violates the SALT I ban on de-
veloping even a "base" for the "nationwide
defense." President Reagan has stated that
"this is a serious cause for concern." The
Secretary of Defense has testified that the
"Soviets have some nationwide ABM capa-
bility" already.
4. The mobility of the ABM-3 system is a
violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.
5. Soviet rapid relocation without prior
notification of an ABM radar, creating the
Kamchatka ABM test range, and mobility
of the ABM-3 radar, were "violations" of
the ABM Treaty.
6. Continuing development of mobile
"Flat Twin" ABM radars, from 1975 to the
present, is a violation of the prohibition on
developing and testing mobile ABMs. The
Soviets are now mass producing the mobile
ABM-3 system for rapid nationwide deploy-
ment.
7. Soviet ABM rapid reload capability for
ABM launchers is a "serious cause for con-
cern." The State and Defense Departments
state that the Soviets "may" have a prohib-
ited reloadable ABM system.
8. Soviet deliberate Camouflage, Conceal-
ment, and Deception activity impedes verifi-
cation.
9. Confirmed Soviet falsification of the de-
activation of ABM test range luanchers is a
violation of the ABM Treaty Dismantling
Procedures.
As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated
on December 11, 1986, there has been: "The
recent discovery of three new Soviet large
phased-array radars of this type [i.e. The
Pechora-Krasnoyarsk class]-a 50% increase
in the number of such radars. These radars
are essential components of any large ABM
deployment ... The deployment of such a
large number of radars, and the pattern of
their deployment, together with other
Soviet ABM-related activities, suggest that
the Soviet Union may be preparing a na-
tionwide ABM defense in violation of the
ABM Treaty. Such a development would
have the gravest implications on the US-
Soviet strategic balance. Nothing could be
more dangerous to the security of the West
and global stability than a unilateral Soviet
deployment of a nationwide ABM system
combined with its massive offensive missile
capabilities.. .
D. Presidentially confirmed expanding pat-
tern of Soviet violations of nuclear test
bans-Over 70 violations
1. About 40 atmospheric nuclear weapons
tests, August through September 1961, in
violation of the 1958 Mutual Test Ban Mor-
atorium, including a 58 megaton shot.
2. Over 30 conclusively confirmed cases of
Soviet venting of nuclear radioactive debris
beyond their borders from underground nu-
clear weapons tests, in violation of the 1963
Limited (or Atmospheric) Test Ban Treaty.
(9)
3. Over 20 cases of Soviet underground nu-
clear weapons tests over the 150 kiloton
threshold in "probable violation" of the
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (10) (See
section L. to this annex for more detail.)
E. Presidentially confirmed expanding pat-
tern of Soviet violations of biological and
chemical weapons bans
1. "The Soviets have maintained an off en-
sive bilogical warfare program and capabil-
ity in direct violation of the 1972 Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention." The US
has no defenses against this capability. The
Sverdlovsk Anthrax Explosion of April 1979,
killing several thousand Soviets, is direct
evidence fo this military capability.
There is also evidence of Soviet deception
regardIng the BW Convention. The Soviet
Military Dictionary of 1978 stated: "Bacteri-
ological Warfare is forbidden by interna-
tional law and is condemned by all progres-
sive mankind. " But in the Soviet Military
Encyclopedia of 1982, the Soviets admitted
that: "Achievements in biology and related
sciences ... have led to an increase in the
effectiveness of biological agents as a means
of conducting warfare, and to a qualitative
re-examination of the very concept of 'bio-
logical weapons.'"
2. "Soviet involvement in the production,
transfer, and use of chemical and toxic sub-
stances for hostile purposes in Southeast
Asia and Afghanistan are direct violations
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol." Tens of thou-
sand of innocent men, women, and children
suffered horrible deaths from these Soviet
atrocities, which are also violations of the
Genocide Convention.
F. Soviet violation of the Kennedy-
Khrushehev Agreement
The Soviets are violating the 1962 Kenne-
dy-Khrushchev Agreement prohibiting
Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, because
of the reported presence of 4 or more TU-95
Bear intercontinental bombers, more than
40 nuclear delivery capable Mig-27 Flogger
Fighter-bombers, several types of strategic
submarines, over 200 nuclear delivery capa-
ble Mig-21 fighter-bombers, and the Soviet
Combat"Brigade. President Reagan, the CIA
Director, the JCS Chairman, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy have all
charged that the Soviets are violating the
Agreement.
G. U.S. verification helps Soviet deception
SALT I and II prohibit "deliberate con-
cealment, measures which impede verifica-
tion by National Technical Means."
CIA has stated the following new judg-
ment about Soviet strategic Camouflage,
Concealment, and Deception: "Since the
SALT I Agreement of 1972, Soviet encryp-
tion and concealment activities have become
more extensive and disturbing .. The
Soviet program [of strategic Camouflage,
Concealment, and Deception-Maskirovkal
is extensive and pervasive ... it makes de-
tection of noncompliance considerably more
difficult . . . much of the ambiguity [in US
Intelligence about further Soviet SALT via
latiops] is a direct result of data denial ...
them two Soviet activities [i.e. concealment
and encryption, and deception] impede our
ability to verify the Soviet Union's compli-
ance with its political commitments to
SALT II ... Soviet deliberate (Camouflage,
Concealment, and Deception] could also
make it more difficult for the US to assess
accurately the critical parameters of any
future missile." (CIA unclassified memo
"Overview of Soviet Data Denial," June 17,
1986.)
The 1968 Soviet Dictionary of Definitions
of Military Terms defines "Maskirovka" as
including the "creating of deliberate inter-
ference with technical means of reconnais-
sance." Thus Soviet Maskirovka is deliber-
ate, and CIA admits that it impedes US Na-
tional Technical means of verification. It is
therefore a SALT violation.
And as the noted intelligence expert, Dr.
Angelo Codevilla, has correctly pointed out
recently in Global Affairs (Summer, 1986):
"They (the Soviets] have tested some of
their high powered radars in a way that
would damage our satellites, and are the
world's leaders in electronic jamming that
can render satellites useless." (11)
The purpose of Soviet Maskirovka, Itself a
SALT violation, Is to cover and conceal fur-
ther Soviet SALT violations. Thus Soviet
Maskirovka SALT violations have been used
for improving Soviet ability to use US verifi-
cation mechanisms in order to cover per-
haps even more serious but undetected
Soviet SALT violations.
The US SALT verification process by Na-
tional Technical Means has actually aided
the Soviet strategic Maskirovka program, by
assuring predictability of intelligence collec-
tion by the US, and more importantly, by
providing US incentives for feedback to the
Soviets that aides Soviet deception plan-
ners. Thus the Soviets use the US verifica-
tion process to find out how much we know
about their violations, when we know it,
how accurately we know it, and most impor-
tantly, how strong our political will is to
challenge their violations and try to enforce
their compliance. When they can obtain
this kind of feedback from the US on the
success of their Maskirovka CCD program,
Soviet deception planners are then able to
devise even more effective Maskirovka
measures to hide even more serious SALT
violations. Indeed, the US verification proc-
ess has effectively aided Soviet Maskirovka
through the provision of feedback. The
Soviet Maskirovka program plus US feed-
back on its successes has allowed the Soviets
to plan programs effectively countering US
national Technical Means of verification. As
the President's arms control General Advi-
sory Committee Report of October 10, 1984,
correctly stated: "The expanding Soviet na-
tional concealment and deception program
may have been a preparation or a cover for
more extensive violations taking place now."
H. Realistic estimate of military effects of
Soviet SALT II violations, based on Presi-
dential reports and data (1)
SNDV S War-
heads
SS-25 mobile ICBM deployment (5) .........................-..-..._...' 400 ..............
1 200 ..............
SS-25 covert 3 MIRV (2) .................................................................... 1,400
Confirmed SS-16 deployment (3) ................ _...._------ ......-.. 200 200
SS-25's at Plesetsk ............................................. _.... __......... 50 150
1U-95 Bear H ............................................. ............. _.......... 50 600
Intercontinental Backfire ........................................................... 399 900
Extra Backfires ............................................................. ........... 12 36
Excess SS-18 fractionation (4) ........................................ .... _......... 1,232
SS-20 as covert ICBM (launcher used to launch SS-16)...... 200 200
Covert soft launch of o ICBM's stockpiled ............................ 820 820
Total ........................ .............................. -.............. ..... 2,232 5,538
SNDV'S June 1979 SALT II signing Current warheads (2
more subs) .......................................................... -....._...... 2,504 ..............
. ............... 10,984
Total military effects .................................... _.._........ 4,736 16,522
- 100 current, 200 by 1987, doubling by rapid refire.
2 Plus equal number of non-SALT I dismantled SS-11's.
Note: Totals do not include 5 Soviet Black-,
Jack bombers which could carry as many as
100 ALCMs (US had to count 4 B-lA bomb-
ers in SALT II in 1979.) Totals also do not
count probably excess fractionation estimat-
ed on new SS-N-23 SLBM. (12)
The US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency has made the following new, unclas-
sified verification judgment: "We cannot ex-
clude the possibility, in the context of the
SALT II Treaty, that several launchers for
the SS-X-24, a rail mobile MIRVed ICBM,
may have left their place of final assembly
and may therefore be accountable under
SALT II."
Thus the Soviets may now also be over
the most important sublimit of SALT II, the
sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBMs. The De-
fense Department has stated that SS-24 de-
ployment is expected "soon", and has
stated: "The SS-X-24 deployment in a rail
mobile mode could begin as early as late
1986 ... Early preparations for the deploy-
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January 29, 1987 CONASSIONAL RECORD - SENATE IP S 1419
ment of the SS-X-24 are already under- effects of Soviet Maskirovka and reconnais- ICBM" was estimated to be MIRVed, but
way." The Soviets will probably deploy an sance crisis. He wrote recently that given only with 3 MIRVs. This conversion and de-
initial increment of about 100 heavily cam- the extensive concealment associated with ployment would have been within the provi-
ouflaged and concealed rail mobile SS-24s the SS-25 and SS-24 ICBM programs, and sions of SALT I. Only US Air Force Intelli-
by 1987, which will carry 1,000 first strike the inherent mobility and transportability gence estimated that the "new small silos"
warheads. The above totals do not count of these systems, there is a probability that would receive a new heavy, highly fraction-
this SS-24 deployment. Soviet Leader Gor- the Soviets will try to deploy additional ated ICBM, which would also be retrofitted
bachev reportedly confirmed on October 11, launchers more covertly than we are aware into converted SS-11 light ICBM silos.
1986 at the Iceland Summit, that at least 2 of today. They thereby could avoid compen- USAF Intelligence was right. The new SS-
of the railmobile SS-24s were operational. satory dismantlement of their MIRVed 19 ICBM turned out to have 3 times the
US Intelligence has reportedly detected as ICBMs. This potential is particularly signifi- throw-weight of the SS-11; in fact, the SS-
many as five SS-24 MIRVed railmobile cant with regard to the 10-warhead SS-24. 19's throw-weight was the same as the
ICBM launchers already operationally de- but with the exception of USAF Intelli- heavy SS-8 ICBM's.
ployed. gence, US Intelligence has an unbroken, The SS-19 also turned out to have 6
ACDA and CIA have also recently made scandalous 23-year record of significantly MIRVs. compared to the 3 estimated by
the following additional unclassified verifi- underestimating the quantity, quality, and most of US Intelligence, and compared to
cation judgment: "Prior to the sinking of budget of Soviet strategic forces. the single warhead SS-11. The somewhat
the Soviet Yankee Class SSBN on October (2) SS-25 RV to Throw-Weight ratio is a smaller SS-17 ICBM and twice the throw-
6, 1986, the number of Soviet Strategic Nu- conclusive violation of SALT II. The pur- weight of the SS-11, and carred 4 MIRVed
clear Delivery Vehicles that are SALT II-ac- pose of the constraint violated is to prevent warheads. In sum, deployment of the heavy
countable was larger than it was when the covert MIRVing. It is therefore reasonable SS-19 and SS-17 ICBMs in circumvention of
President, in 1984 and 1985, found the Sovi- to infer probable covert MIRVing of the SS- SALT I represented a growth of over five
ets to be in violation of their obligation to 25. Moreover, the SS-25's throw-weight is fold in the number of Soviet warheads in
abide by the numerical limits of SALT II. It twice that of the old, single warhead SS-13. the SS-11 light ICBM force prior to SALT I:
was also larger than it was on May 27, 1986, The best explanation for this throw-weight 2,760 accurate, high yield counterforce SS-
when the President announced his new doubling is also covert MIRVing. Finally, 19 and SS-17 warheads replaced 510 inaccu-
policy abandoning US unilateral compliance US Intelligence believes that the SS-25 will rate SS-11 soft target warheads. (17)
with SALT II, and larger then it was on eventually be MIRVed anyway, projecting a The military effect of this massive circum-
August 5, 1986, when Senator McClure MIRVed SS-25 follow-on which could al- vention of SALT I is calculated simply by
argued on the Senate floor against US uni- ready be covertly deployed. The current Na- subtracting from the actual SS-19/SS-17
lateral SALT II compliance. Even when the tional Intelligence Estimate reportedly pre- warhead deployment of 2,760, the number
16 SLBMs carried on the Yankee Class sub- dicts that the Soviets will deploy ICBMs of warheads estimated in May, 1972 on 510 3
marine that recently sank are removed from and SLBMs with more warheads than they MIRV "new small ICBM" replacements for
the number of SALT II-accountable Soviet have been tested with.(14)
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, the (3) SS-16s disappeared from Plesetsk, light result is that within the terms ve SALT I.
number remains , but The result is that Soviet circumvention of
greater than the 2,504 were not destroyed. We must assume that SALT I yielded them 1,230 more MIRVed
SNDVs recognized as permitted by SALT they are covertly deployed with SS-20 warheads than the US anticipated. This was
II." forces. the benefit of their deceptive circumven-
The precise estimated number of Soviet (4) The current National Intelligence Esti- tion.
SNDVs is difficult to determine due to mate reportedly states that the SS-18 is de-
Soviet CCD, and it is classified, but it is well ployed with 14 warheads each.(15) SOVIET SALT I AND II VIOLATIONS ARE
above and increasingly above 2,504. Senator (5) The precise number of SS-25 mobile MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
McClure estimated publicly on October 17, ICBM launchers is never known, due to Dr. Angelo Codevilla has succinctly cap-
1986, that the Soviets are 75 to 225 SNDVs Soviet concealment of all SS-25 mobile tured the essence of the contemporary prob-
over their allotted 2,504. Total Soviet launchers and of the relationship between lem with arms control today: "Under cur-
SNDVs range between 2,579 and 2,729 or the SS-25 missile and its launcher, and is rent agreements, the Soviet have achieved
even 3,100. In contrast, the US SALT II-ac- ever growing. A reasonable first increment precisely the objectives that we had sought
countable SNDV total is only 1,753, accord- of SS-25s deployed is 200 launchers, based to prevent by entering into the agreements
ing to official Defense Department sources on evidence of SS-16 mobile ICBM deploy- in the first place ... no one can seriously
during 1986. This is the lowest total since ment. Many more than 200 SS-25s are argue that the Soviets will willingly aban-
SALT began in 1969. The Soviets have de- likely. don the capability to disarm and blackmail
ployed from 13,000 to 17,000 strategic nucle- As noted, the SS-24 rail mobile ICBM will the United States." The Soviets achieved
ar intercontinental warheads, compared to be operational soon during 1986. About 100 their offensive first strike capability and
only 9,200 for the US. of these launchers are likely as a first incre- their emerging nationwide ABM capability
FOOTNOTES ment by 1987, but the US will never know under the guise of SALT I and SALT II and
(1) Soviet Maskirovka-Camouflage, Con- how many SS-24s are deployed rail mobile, the ongoing arms control process. Their ne-
cealment, Deception-causes many US In- due to Soviet camouflage, concealment, and gotiating deception, camouflage, conceal-
telligence uncertainties, which in turn re- deception. A total of 700 SS-25s and SS-24s ment, and deception, and their SALT viola-
quire realistic and conservative estimates of mobile ICBM launchers are projected by tions all combined to enable the Soviets to
Soviet strategic forces. the current NIE to be deployed by about achieve overall strategic superiority even
Moreover, there is reason to believe that 1990. All of these mobile launchers have a with and despite arms control.
Soviet Maskirovka is made even more effec- rapid reload and refire capability, doubling J. Realistic estimate of how Soviets are over
tive by the partial blinding of US Intelli- the force.(16) Indeed, the FY 1988 Defense the SALT III 820/1200/1320 MIRV/ALCM
gence caused by the space-launch stand- Posture Statement confirms on page 55 that ceilings
down. The 1980 Reagan Administration CIA the Soviets have "the ability to refire many Soviet MIRVed ICBM level ................. 818
Transition Team Report reportly stated: of their missiles (ICBMs) and that reloading 5 rail mobile MIRVed SS-24's ............. 5
"The failure of a single launch in the early exercises and procurement of spares to sup- Probable covertly MIRVed SS-25's.... 100
to mid-1980s could negate all of our capabil- port them" mean that the Soviets have a MIRVed SLBM's .................................... 352
ity for a particular type of collector for a massive strategic reserve force. 1 Delta IV and 1 Typhoon about to
protracted period of time. A failure of the 1. Quantitative analysis of military effects go on sea trials ..................... ....... 36
space shuttle could be a disastrous for the of Soviet circumvention of SALT I interim Blackjacks with long range ALCM's.. 5
entire technical collection effort . any agreement TU-95 Bear H with long range
problem in the space shuttle could prevent Replacement of light SS-11 ICBM with ALCM's ...................
the launch of the improved system on heavy SS-19 and SS-17 ICBMs occurred be- Backfires capable of carrying AS-3 50
schedule, and since there is no back-up tween 1970 and 1983, but the SALT I Inter- (650 kms) or AS-15 ............................. 300
whatsoever, the US could be completely im Agreement's Article II prohibits replace- TU-95G Bears equipped with long
blinded with no overhead photoreconnais- ment of light ICBMs with heavy ICBMs. range AS-3's ......................................... 100
sance capability at all in the mid-1980s." This was a circumvention of SALT I which
(13) There is good reason to believe that defeated its object and purpose. A strong Total .................................................. 1,716
there is currently a US verification and re- element of Soviet negotiating deception and According to the Washington Times of
connaissance crisis which is unprecedented, operational deception was involved in this January 19, 1987, the sea trials for the 4th
thereby blinding US Intelligence. Soviet circumvention. Delta IV Submarine and the 5th Typhoon
Maskirovka and this reconnaissance crisis When SALT I was signed on May 26, 1972, submarine could begin as early as March or
should cause the US to err on the high side the bestUS Intelligence estimate was that a April, 1987. These subs were reportedly
in estimating Soviet forces, as a measure of "new small ICBM" would be deployed in launched in December, 1986. Their sea trials
caution. President Reagan reportedly in- converted SS-11 light ICBM silos and in commencement will clearly put the Soviets
formed Congress of his concern about the "new small ICBM silos". The "new small over the SALT II sublimit of 1200 MIRVed/
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S 1420 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ENATE
ICBM's/SLBM's. As noted, Soviet arms ne-
gotiators in late 1983 told us that the Sovi-
ets intended to exceed the SALT II subli-
mits of 820 MIRVed ICBM's, 1200 MIRVed
ICBM's/SLBM's, and 1320 MIRVED/
ICBM's/SLBM's/heavy intercontinental
bombers equiped with long range ALCM's.
This is exactly what the Soviets are doing.
K. Soviet SALT 1 and SALTTr deactivations
and' comments
SALT 1:
209 SS-7 and SS-8 ICMB-s, 1972-1982-So-
viets doubly replaced old ICMB's with equal
number of modern SLBM's plus 200 covert
mobile SS-16 ICBM's; Soviets also have
used old SS-7 support facilities to support
new SS-25 mobile ICBM's, which is prohib-
ited by SALT I Dismantling Procedures.,
192 SLBM's on 12 Yankee Class SSBN's-
Many of these Soviet submarines were con-
verted to more lethal cruise missile carrier
submarines.
SALT II:
72 SS-11 silos-The silos were not com-
pletely destroyed? as, is required by SALT I
ICBM Dismantling Procedures. This may be
in preparation for the retrofit of the SS-24
MIRVed ICBM, which would further violate
SALT II's MIRV ICBM ceiling of 820. (18)
21 Bison bombers-Some of these Soviet
bombers are unflyable, but there are no
agreed bomber dismantling procedures, so
the Soviets should not get credit for the dis-
mantling. (19)
As of July, 1986, Soviet SALT compensa-
tion dismantling has reportedly stopped.
24 SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY
(By Senator James A. McClure)
The attached Defense Department chart
indicates clearly that the Soviet Union has
violated the 150 kiloton threshold on under-
ground nuclear weapons testing of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT.)
[Chart not reproducible for-the RECORD.]
SOVIETLEGAL OBLIGATION
Even though the TTBT, signed in July,
1974, has not been ratified on either the US
or the Soviet side, under international law
both the US and the USSR are required to_
do nothing which would defeat its object
and purpose, during the period when ratifi-
cation is still pending. Moreover, in March,
1976, by US-Soviet mutual agreement the
150 kiloton threshold was put into effect as
.binding on each side. The Soviets have a
clear legal obligation to complywith the 150
kiloton threshold. Thus even one Soviet test
exceeding the 150 kiloton threshold would
defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT,
would violate it, and would be militarily ir-
reversible.
THE SOVIET TTBT VIOLATIONS
Both this chart and this analysis, which
have recently been updated, are unclassi-
fied, according to the Department of De-
fense and. the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency. This is the most complete un-
classified description of the official US Gov-
ernment verification assessment of Soviet
TTBT violations. It was published in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and in another offi-
cial US Senate document.
My distinguished colleague, Senator Jesse
Helms, requested that the earlier version of
this chart be briefed by David Sullivan to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
open session in October; 1983, when the
Committee was at that time considering
whether to report. out the TTBT to the full
Senate. After this briefing, the motion to
report the TTBT to the Senate Floor was
defeated.
The chart shows that there have been:24
Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests
since 1978 which are estimated to be above
the 150 kiloton threshold, and therefore are
violations of the TTBT. There is 95 percent
confidence that several Soviet, TTBT viola-
tions have occurred. Ten Soviet tests report-
edly have been at 250 kilotons or above.
In June, 1983, Secretary of State Shultz
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the Soviets had recently
tested a nuclear weapon about "double" the
150 kiloton threshold-at about 300 kilo-
tons. The Defense Department chart indi-
cates that since 1978, the Soviet Union has
conducted 6 tests at the 300 kiloton level or
higher-at a yield twice that allowed by the
TTBT. ,
Indeed, one Soviet test was reportedly es-
timated to be over 315 kilotons, and It could
have been over 600 kilotons. There is 100
percent confidence, which means certainly,
that this test was a TTBT violation.
US METHODOLOGY CHANGES GIVE SOVIETS
BENEFITS OF EVERY DOUBT
The US has for 12 years given the Soviet
Union the benefit of every doubt or uncer-
tainly in TTBT compliance. We have even
gone so far as to change our estimating
methodology four times since 1974, each
time to favor the Soviets by reducing our es-
timates of their test yields, thereby making
their violations under the previous method
disappear. Despite this elasticity in US
methodology, the Soviets have nevertheless
continued to violate the TTBT. This chart
shows only one methodology change, which
occurred in early July 1977 and which was
the most important, and the analysis de-
scribes a recent attempt, to make a fifth
change in Soviet favor. -
THE CHART'S VERTICAL AXIS
The vertical axis of the chart is labeled
"The Sliding Rulers," showing how the US
changed its methodology. in early July 1977
to favor the Soviets by making 2 violations
disappear. The vertical axis measures "Body
Waves" (Mb) from Soviet underground nu-
clear weapons tests at Shagan River (Semi-
palatinsk), in Central Asia. Body Waves are
.seismic shock waves which travel on a con-
stant path through the earth's core. This
axis is basically a Richter scale.
THE CHART'S HORIZONTAL AXIS.
The horizontal axis is time-March 1976,
when the TTBT 150 kiloton threshold went
into effect, through 1985. The. key point in
time is.late July.1977; when the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee first had hearings
on the TTBT. The. most important method-
ology change occurred in early July 1977, in
order to make 2 Soviet TTBT violations dis-
appear before the hearings began.
THE HORIZONTAL BANDS ARE 150 XT
THRESHOLDS
The horizontal bands represent US esti-
mates of 150 kiloton thresholds, based upon
various assumptions about he geological
characteristics of the Soviet and US testing
sites. The upper two bands represent Soviet
150 kiloton thresholds.. The center band was
the US-estimated Soviet 150 kiloton thresh-
old until 2 Soviet violations began to appear
in late 1976 and early 1977. The top band
was the new Soviet 150 kiloton threshold,
revised upwards in early July 1977 by the
US to benefit the Soviets by making the 2
violations disappear. The higher band
allows the Soviets ever larger test yields.
This band is still the current Soviet thresh-
old using our established methodology. The
lowest band is provided merely to illustrate
another benefit of the doubt resolved in
Soviet favor. It is the US 150 kiloton thresh-
old. It is based upon. the known geological
characteristics of the US Nevada Test Site.
January 29, 1987
We have allowed the Soviets progressively
higher thresholds by making progressively
more generous assumptions about the geo-
logical progressively more generous assump-
tions about the geological characteristics of
the Soviet Shagan River-Semipalatinsk test
site.
THE SOVIET NUCLEAR. TEST PLOTS
Each black dot on the chart represents a
Soviet underground nuclear weapon test at
Shagan-Semipalatinsk. This unclassified
data was provided by the US National
Earthquake Information Service; expressed
in Body Waves. (Not all Soviet tests are
plotted, In order, to avoid cluttering the
chart.)
THE EARLY JULY 1977 METHODOLOGY CHANGE'
Note that according to the Pre-July 1977
Soviet 150 Kiloton Threshold band, there
had been two Soviet tests higher than this
threshold in late 1976-early 1977. These 2
Soviet violations necessitated the changed
estimative methodology resulting in the
raising of the threshold to the Post-July
1977 Soviet 150 Kiloton Threshold. Accord-
ingly, after raising the threshold in Soviet
favor to make these 2 violations disappear
in early July, the CIA was then able to testi-
fy to the Senate Foreign Relations. Commit-
tee later in July and August, 1977 that there
had been no Soviet violations of the TTBT
150 kiloton threshold.
But in late 1978 and 1979, the Soviets
again began exceeding even this raised
threshold. Moreover, their new excesses
were very large. -
THE DOTTED LINE-DOUBLING OF SOVIET YIELDS
The dotted line on the chart differentiates
tests which have twice the yield of each
other. Tests above the dotted line are about
twice the yield of tests below the dotted
line. Because there are no anomalies except
magnitude among Body Waves traveling
along the same path through the earth's
core, we know with high certainty that tests
above the dotted line are twice the yield of
tests below the dotted line. This relation-
ship- is sound, even though we have uncer-
tainties about the absolute-yields of tests.
Thus according to the. dotted line, the So-
viets doubled the yield of-some of their tests
in 1979 and thereafter, as compared to 1977.
Therefore, if the two highest yields in the
1976-early -1977- period are now estimated to
be about 150 kilotons in order for them to,
be In compliance with the TTBT, then the
tests along- the dotted line in 1979 and later
have to be about 300 kilotons or more, twice
No credence should be placed in the by-.
pothesis that the Soviets may have cau-
tiously tested at only one half the allowed
yield, or at 75 kilotons, between July 1974,
when the TTBT was signed,: and March
1976, when the 150 kiloton threshold was
mutually put into effect. This is because the
US itself tested 12 times above 150 kilotons,
during this period, and the Soviets almost,
certainly knew this. Moreover, Soviet arms
control compliance behavior has always,
been to exploit all loopholes to their fullest,
and to go to the limits of allowed activities
and beyond. They have never shown such
presumed caution.
CIA ATTEMPTING NEW METHODOLOGY CHANGE TO
AGAIN COVER-UP SOVIET VIOLATIONS
Just as the CIA made the 2 1976-early
1977 Soviet violations disappear by raising
the Soviet threshold in early July 1977, the
CIA is reportedly once again trying to make
Soviet TTBT violations disappear. The CIA
has reportedly been using 'a new estimative'
methodology since January 1986 which
makes all but the 12 highest Soviet high
yield tests disappear as violations, once
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January 29, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
again trying to raise the threshold in Soviet
favor, for a fifth time.
REAFFIRMATION OF PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS OF
TTBT VIOLATIONS
But the new CIA methodology is incon-
sistent with other established methodolo-
gies and is not accepted by a majority of the
Executive Branch components. The early
July 1977 methodolgy remains the current
one. While additional studies have been un-
dertaken, their conclusions are incomplete
and have not been agreed upon. President
Reagan's February and December 1985 Re-
ports to Congress that there have been 21 to
24 Soviet underground nuclear weapons
tests which are likely to have violated the
150 kiloton limit of the TTBT have been
reaffirmed.
ALL-SOURCE EVIDENCE CONFIRMS SOVIET TTBT
VIOLATIONS
Soviet TTBT compliance is not solely a
technical problem of analysis of teleseismic
data. It is an all-source intelligence and veri-
fication problem. Far too much attention
has been focused over the years upon the
narrowly technical teleseismic evidence of
Soviet tests. But other, non-seismic evidence
and verification judgments about this evi-
dence may be even more important. For ex-
ample, one method using direct evidence
from non-seismic National Technical Means
of verification strongly supports the conclu-
sion that there have been multiple Soviet
TTBT violations at high yields. Another ex-
ample is reported Soviet attempts to deceive
US National Technical Means of TTBT veri-
fication into underestimating Soviet yields.
This phenomenon also offers persuasive evi-
dence of Soviet violations. Finally, even de-
spite Soviet efforts at deception, on two
widely separate occasions the Soviets have
reportedly made statements which had the
effect of confirming their violations, both as
to yield magnitude and number of viola-
tions. This diplomatic evidence is the most
persuasive.
MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET TTBT
VIOLATIONS
Why are the Soviets violating the TTBT?
They have good reasons. The TTBT 150 kil-
oton threshold is militarily significant be-
cause it restricts testing the full yields and
reliability of new Soviet MIRV warheads
which could be used for a first strike capa-
bility. According to open sources, most new
Soviet ICBM MIRV warheads are estimated
to have yields in the 200 to 600 kiloton
range. The ten Soviet tests over 250 kilotons
therefore could have been scaled or even
half yield tests of new warheads for the new
5th and 6th generation Soviet MIRVed
ICBMs, such as the SS-24 and SS-X-26
follow-on for the SS-18, both of which are
reportedly now being deployed.
The SS-X-26, in flight testing since
Spring 1986, before SALT II dissolved, was
reportedly recently successfully flight
tested. SS-18 silos for it are already report-
edly being converted. SALT II had an abso-
lute ceiling on SS-18 follow-on ICBM
Throw-Weight. The SS-X-26 follow-on to
the SS-18 has even more Throw-Weight
than the SS-18. The SS-X-26 reportedly
will therefore carry even more warheads
than the 14 carried on the super heavy SS-
18, already in violation of SALT II: There
may even have been several full yield tests
at 500 or 600 kilotons of these new MIRV
warheads for the new Soviet ICBMs.
In contrast, the US was severely handi-
capped in designing and testing warheads
for the MX, Trident II, and ALCM by strict
compliance with the 150 kiloton threshold.
These warheads reportedly have never been
tested for reliability at their full yields.
RATIFICATION OF TTBT-PNET IS APPEASEMENT
In sum, it would be an unprecedented ex-
ercise in appeasement of the Soviet Union
for the US Senate to give its advice and con-
sent for the President to ratify a TTBT
which the Soviets are likely to be violating.
Moreover, the TTBT is integrally linked
to its companion treaty, the Peaceful Nucle-
ar Explosions Treaty (PNET). The PNET
preamble contains language that the US
and the USSR reaffirm "their adherance"
to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
(LTBT), and they reaffirm "their determi-
nation to observe strictly the provisions of
these [TTBT and LTBTI international
agreements." Beyond his reports of Soviet
TTBT violations, President Reagan also re-
ported in February and again in December
1985 that there have been over 30 unambig-
uous, conclusively confirmed cases of Soviet
venting of nuclear radioactive debris beyond
their borders from underground nuclear
weapons tests, in clear violation of the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty. Indeed, reportedly
over 50 percent of all Soviet underground
nuclear weapons tests have either clearly,
probably, or possibly vented radioactive
debris beyond Soviet borders in violation of
the LTBT.
Thus Senate advice and consent for Presi-
dential ratification of the TTBT and PNET,
with its false reaffirmation of Soviet compli-
ance with the TTBT and LTBT, would be
totally inconsistent with the likely viola-
tions of the TTBT and the conclusively
known violations of the LTBT. Such Senate
advice and consent would be completely
hypocritical. It would also be a grave and
dangerous act of American appeasement of
the Soviet Union, completely undermining
the integrity of the arms control process,
and international stability and peace.
The TTBT has been verifiable since 1976.
We have verified Soviet violations with high
confidence. The problem is not verification,
but enforcing Soviet compliance. While the
CORRTEX method of direct yield measure-
ment would be a more effective verification
method, it will not be a panacea and even it
would have uncertainties. Even if the Sovi-
ets agree to some form of CORRTEX on
site direct measurement verification in the
future, their past violations give them irre-
versible military advantages. These Soviet
advantages can not be "grand fathered"
away, made to disappear, or ignored.
Instead of asking for Senate advice and
consent for his ratification of these two
treaties, albeit with a reservation to be ne-
gotiated with the Soviets on more effective
verification, President Reagan should with-
draw these two treaties from the Senate so
that he can completely renegotiate the veri-
fication and compliance provisions with the
Soviets.
The Author, David S. Sullivan works for
the United States Senate as principal na-
tional security advisor to several Republican
Senators in leadership positions.
After a lengthy career at the Central In-
telligence Agency where he analyzed Soviet
strategy, nuclear force modernization, and
foreign policy, Mr. Sullivan resigned from
the Agency in 1978 to join the staff of a US
Senator. In 1981, he accepted an appoint-
ment in the Reagan Administration as a
senior official of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, but later returned to his
present position on Capitol Hill to help im-
plement the President's defense and foreign
policies in Congress.
Mr. Sullivan was educated at Harvard Uni-
versity (BA cum laude 1965) and at Colum-
bia University where he received a Masters
Degree in International Affairs.
He is a Lt. Colonel in the United States
Marine Corps Reserve and saw active service
S1421
in the Vietnam War in Marine Combat In-
telligence.
His previously published works number
more than twenty six articles and books on
national security and US foreign policy, and
include Soviet Military Supremacy, The
Bitter Fruit of SALT: A Record of Soviet
Duplicity and The Fatal Flaws of SALT II.
He has been attacked 5 times by name in
the Soviet press, and has been described in
the US press as a "brilliant CIA Soviet ana-
lyst", as a "one man CIA," and as a "heroic
freedom fighter."
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES AND FOOTNOTES
1. National Security Record, The Heritage
Foundation, July, 1986, page 6; The Bitter
Fruit of SALT. A Record of Soviet Duplicity,
by David S. Sullivan, Texas Policy Institute,
Houston, Texas, April, 1982, page 59; Con-
gressional Record, August 8, 1986; Congres-
sional Record, March 4, 1986, page S-1960.
2. Soviet Military Power, March 1986,
pages 23, 26, 28, 32; Soviet Noncompliance,
ACDA White Paper, February, 1986; unclas-
sified arithemetic; Congressional Record,
March 18, 1986.
3. Various press; Congressional Record,
March 4, 1986, page 5-1959; author's esti-
mate.
3A. Various press, 1979-1980; Bitter Fruit
of SALT, pages 59, 60.
4. Various press; Congressional Record,
March 4, 1986, page S-1959; author's esti-
mate.
5. Various press; Soviet Military Power,
March, 1986; Congressional Record, March
4, 1986, page S-1959; author's estimate; Con-
gressional Record, March 18, 1986, page S-
2897 to S-2905; Congressional Record,
March 6, 1986, page S-2185; Letter to the
President, May 6, 1986, signed by Senators
East, Helms, Quayle, Hollings, and Hatch.
6. Evans and Novak column, The Washing-
ton Post November 6, 1985; various press,
June, 1985; Congressional Record, March 4,
1986, page S-1959; author's estimate.
7. Soviet Military Power, March, 1986,
page 36; various press; Congressional
Record, March 4, 1986, page S-1960.
8. SALT II Violations, Hearing before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appro-
priations, United States Senate, 98th Con-
gress, Second Session, March 28, 1984, page
68; various press; Congressional Record,
March 4, 1986, page S-1959.
9. Same as No. 1.
10. Same as No. 1.
11. Global Affairs, Summer Issue, 1986,
page 30.
12. SALT II Treaty; Soviet Military Power,
March 1986, page 29; author's estimate.
13. The Agency, The Rise and Fall of The
CIA, by John Rayleigh, pages 659-671.
14. Evans and Novak column, The Wash-
ington Post, November 6, 1986. Soviet Stra-
tegic Force Developments, Testimony before
a Joint Session of the Subcommittee on
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, and the
Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985, by
Robert M. Gates, CIA, page 5.
15. Same as No. 14; Congressional Record,
March 4, 1986, page S-1959.
16. Various press; Congressional Record,
March 4, 1986, page S-1959; Gates Testimo-
ny.
17. Soviet SALT Deception, Coalition for
Peace Through Strength, Boston, Virginia,
October, 1979, by David S. Sullivan, page 2;
author's analysis.
18. The New York Times, January, 1986;
Soviet Military Power, March, 1986, page 26;
unclassified cable from US Embassy,
Moscow, 231439Z, May, 1986.
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a
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030027-5
S 1422 4P CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -!NATE January 29, 1987
19. Same as No. 18; Soviet Military Power,
March, 1986, page 31; JCS Military Posture
Statement FY1987, page 19.?
L.- NO TO RAISE TAXES
o Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, one
of the great accomplishments of the
99th Congress was enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. In fact, it was
one of the greatest legislative achieve-
ments to emerge from Congress in its
200-year history. It was a victory for
Congress, it was a victory for the
President, and, especially, it was a vic-
tory for the American people.
Thus, it seems a little odd to this
Senator that, only months after enact-
ment of the Tax Reform Act, it has
become necessary to rise in its defense.
What happened since last October?
Tax reform is still in its infancy and
already rumors are afloat that, if en-
acted, would turn tax reform on its
head. What was a rare victory for Con-
gress would turn to defeat, and the
American people, in whose name we
presumably act, would be the ultimate
losers.
I rise today to dispel the rumors sug-
gesting that we will increase taxes. I
have heard that increasing taxes
would somehow reduce the Federal
deficit, or would do this, that, and
other things. Wrong. Increasing taxes
now not only would reverse the eco-
nomic recovery of the past 6 years,
but, above all, would raise serious
questions about Congress' ability to
hold to a promise. Consistency is es-
sential to effective government. The
American people have the right to
expect Congress to hold to its promise
to reduce taxes without delay.
I commend the distinguished Repub-
lican leader for his introduction of a
resolution, Senate Resolution 46, ex-
pressing the sense of the Senate that
the tax rates reduced by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 should not be in-
creased. I urge my colleagues to do
what is right for the country, to help
us keep our word, to think of the
American people: to lend your support
to this legislation.?
THE WORLD COURT AND AID TO
THE CONTRAS
? Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I note
that the Independent Commission on
Respect for International Law, which
I believe is connected in some way
with the Institute for Policy Studies,
issued a statement on July 15, regard-
ing the World Court and aid to the
Contras.
I just recently came across that
statement. While the issue is no longer
on the front pages-and, unfortunate-
ly, never was on the front pages long-
it remains a fundamental error of U.S.
policy.
The commission is chaired by Prof.
Burns H. Weston of the College of
Law at the University of Iowa, and the
vice chairman is Dean Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., of the School of Law at
Washington and Lee University.
Another member of the commission
is a former colleague of mine in the
House, Father Robert F. Drinan, now
a professor of law at Georgetown Uni-
versity. The other members are:
Richard J. Barnet, Senior Fellow, Insti-
tute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC.
Richard B. Bilder, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Madison, WI.
Roger S. Clark, Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Miami, Coral Gables, FL.
Richard A. Falk, Professor of Law, Prince-
ton University Center of International Stud-
ies, Princeton, NJ.
Thomas J. Parer, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM.
Michael J. Glennon, Professor of Law,
University of Southern California, Davis,
CA.
Richard B. Lillich, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
Ved P. Nanda, Professor of Law, Universi-
ty of Denver, Denver, CO.
Jordan J. Paust, Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Houston, Houston, TX.
Edith Brown Wiess, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, Wash-
ington, DC.
The United States has made a fun-
damental error in moving away from
respect for the World Court. What
this Nation and the world needs, clear-
ly, is greater cooperation between na-
tions, not less cooperation; greater re-
spect for international law, not less re-
spect. Yet, we're moving in the oppo-
site direction.
I ask that the International Commis-
sion on Respect for International Law
statement be inserted in the RECORD.
The statement follows:
STATEMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON RESPECT FOR INTERNATION-
AL LAW ON THE WORLD COURT AND AID TO
THE CONTRAS
On June 27, the International Court of
Justice issued its decision in the case of
Nicaragua v. United States. The World
Court found a number of U.S. actions
against Nicaragua, in particular the mining
of Nicaraguan harbors and support of the
"Contras," to be in violation of internation-
al law.
The Court decided most of the issues in
the case by a very substantial 12-to-3 major-
ity, with only the judges from Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States dis-
senting (a Soviet judge did not participate).
Indeed, the judges from Japan and the
United Kingdom dissented primarily on
technical grounds.
Suggestions that the Court's judgment
was the result of political bias against the
United States have little to no basis in fact.
The World Court is comprised of some of
the most distinguished jurists in the world,
jurists whose personal integrity and profes-
sional commitment are generally beyond re-
Court found overwhelmingly in favor of the
United States in the Iranian Hostages case
only six years ago.
Thus, while it is possible to disagree with
the outcome of any judicial decision, the
Court's decision in the Nicaragua case is re-
sponsible and credible. Indeed, the Court
reaffirmed the right of collective self-de-
fense in the event of an armed attack by
one country against another. In addition it
ruled in favor of the United States in cer-
tain key instances.
As a party to the United Nations Charter
and the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, the United States is legally
bound to comply with the Court's decision.
It is true that the United States might at-
tempt to block a direct move to enforce the
Court's judgment against it, since the
formal enforcement mechanism is through
the - U.N. Security Council where the U.S.
has a veto. But such an attempt would not
make the judgment less legally binding. A
failure by the United States to comply with
the Court's decision would constitute a. vio-
lation of its solemn treaty obligations to
uphold it.
A United States failure to honor the
World Court's decision also would damage
U.S. short- and long-term foreign policy in-
terests. Almost certainly, it would expose
the United States to severe international
criticism for failing to adhere to its treaty
commitments, making the U.S. appear no
different than other countries it has criti-
cized on the same grounds. Additionally, it
would risk diminishing respect among all
nations for the International Court of Jus-
tice itself, an institution the United States
has historically supported and used to its
advantage. Perhaps most importantly, how-
ever, it would subvert the Administration's
efforts to ensure in other settings (for ex-
ample, when dealing with arms control,
human rights, terrorism, or claims against
American foreign investment) that other
governments, including the Soviet Union,
fulfill their obligations under international
law. The legal principles affirmed by the
Court-including condemnation of the ag-
gressive use of force, coercive intervention,
and violations of the humanitarian rules of
armed conflict-clearly apply not only to
the United States but to the Soviet Union
and every other nation in the world as well.
In short, however much the Administra-
tion may wish to ignore the World Court's
decision, this decision will not go away. It
must be recognized as a serious matter with
which our government must conscientiously
deal.
This issue is raised immediately by legisla-
tion now pending before Congress that
would authorize the administration to assist
the "Contras" militarily, in clear violation
of the court's judgment. In considering this
legislation, it is incumbent upon Congress-
and particularly the Senate, which has. a
special constitutional role with regard to
treaties-to take the Court's judgment, and
the solemn U.S. obligations arising from it,
seriously into account. The treaty obliga-
tions requiring the U.S. to . respect the
World Court's judgment are binding as
international law.
It would be most unfortunate if any deci-
sion on aid to the Contras were reached
without a full discussion by both Congress
and the public of the costs of such a deci-
sion both to our national honor and to our
interest in respecting treaty commitments,
judicial judgments and the rule of law. In a
world that is every day menaced by terror-
ism and the threat of nuclear war, it is im-
perative that objective rules of internation-
al law shape State conduct. Adherence to
the rule of law, a strong U.S. tradition, must
not be forsaken.*
AFGHANISTAN: LETTERS FROM
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
? Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President,
last month the brutal Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan entered its eighth
year. The horrible condition of human
rights in Afghanistan was recently de-
scribed in a United Nations report as:
"A Situation Approaching Genocide."
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