EXECUTIVE SESSION-TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES (THE INF TREATY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 17, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
On,
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
pound their task. They realize that it will be
difficult to effect deep strategic penetra-
tions against prepared defenses. Although
there has been a considerable effort to find
a solution to this problem, if anything, the
Soviets appear to be moving closer to a
strategy of attrition. This is reflected in
their growing reliance on artillery and dis-
mounted infanty. There is no evidence that
the Soviets have made a conscious decison
to fight a war of attrition. Instead, it ap-
pears that they are being inexorably drawn
in this direction by their efforts to neutral-
ize the growing firepower, both ground-
based and air-delivered, available to NATO.
SOVIET TRAINING AND INITIATIVE
Finally, there is the question of whether
the Soviet army has the necessary raw
skills. Any army that intends to implement
a blitzkrieg must have a highly flexible com-
mand structure as well as officers and NCOs
at every level of the chain of command who
are capable of exercising initiative. A blitz-
krieg is not a steamroller: success is ulti-
mately a consequence of able commanders
making rapid-fire decisions in the "fog of
battle" which enable the attacking forces to
make the crucial deep strategic penetra-
tions. Should the Soviets attack NATO,
there is a chance that the Soviets will open
a hole or holes in the NATO front. Natural-
ly, NATO will try to close those holes and
seal off any penetrations as quicky as possi-
ble. The key question is: can the Soviets ex-
ploit such opportunities before NATO,
which is well prepared for such an eventual-
ity, shuts the door? In this battle, the ern-
cial determinant will not be how much fire-
power the Soviets have amassed for the
breakthrough; succeess will be largely the
result of highly skilled officers and NCOs
making the decisions that will enable the ar-
mored spearheads to ,outrun NATO's de-
fenses. A blitzkrieg depends on split-second
timing since opportunity on the battlefield
is so fleeting.
There its substantial evidence that Soviet
officers and NCOs are sadly lacking in indi-
vidual initiative, and furthermore, that the
Soviet command structure is rigid.
Their absence is largely the result of pow-
erful historical forces. Fundamental struc-
tural change in Soviet society and the
Soviet military would be necessary before
there would be any significant increase in
flexibility and initiative.
Other deficiencies in the Soviet Army cast
doubt on the Soviets' capacity to launch a
successful blitzkrieg. For example, the Sovi-
ets have significant problems with training.
Overreliance on training aids and simulators
is a factor often cited, and there is wide-
spread feeling that the training process does-
not satisfactorily approximate actual
combat conditions. Training is of special im-
portance for the Soviets since their army is
comprised largely of conscripts who serve a
mere two years. Moreover, since new con-
scripts are trained in actual combat units,
more than half of the troops in the 19
Soviet divisions in East Germany are sol-
diers with less than two years of experience.
At any one time, a significant number of
those troops is either untrained or partially
trained. It should also be noted that Soviet
soldiers are deficient in map reading, a skill
which is of much importance for an army
attempting to launch a blitzkrieg.
Finally, one must consider the capabilities
of the non-Soviet divisions, which comprise
approximately half of the Pact's 571/2 stand-
ing divisions. Although the Soviet divisions
will certainly perform the critical tasks in
any offensive, the non-Soviet divisions will
have to play a role in the operation. Other-
wise, the size of the offensive would have to
be scaled down significantly. One cannot say
with any degree of certainty that the East
Europeans would be militarily incapable of
performing their assigned task or that they
would not commit themselves politically to
supporting a Soviet-led offensive. The Sovi-
ets, however, would have to give serious con-
sideration to the reliability of the East Eu-
ropeans.
CONCLUSION
Even if one were to discount these weak-
nesses of the Soviet Army, the task of quick-
ly overrunning NATO's defenses would be
very formidable one. A Pact offensive would
have to traverse the obstacle-ridden terrain
which covers almost all of Germany and re-
stricts the movement of large armored
units. Moreover, there is good reason to be-
lieve that NATO has the wherewithal to
thwart such an offensive. In short, NATO is
in relatively good shape at the conventional
level.
Two very important caveats, however, are
in order. First, NATO must provide for the
continuation of ongoing improvements in its
force structure. There is no evidence that
the Soviet effort to modernize her forces in
Central Europe is slowing down. Therefore,
NATO must continue to make improve-
ments if it is to maintain the present bal-
ance. It is absolutely essential, for example,
that deployment of the American Corps in
NORTHAG be completed. It is also impera-
tive that the Belgians, the British, and the
Dutch continue to modernize and upgrade
their conventional forces. More specifically,
these forces, especially the British, must in-
crease the firepower of their individual bri-
gades. And, the Allies need to place more
emphasis on improving the sustainability of
their forces.
Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is
wrong; NATO presently has the capability
to thwart a Soviet attack. Unfortunately,
too few people recognize this. The second
caveat concerns warning time and mobiliza-
tion. Given NATO's present intelligence ca-
pabilities and the Pact's force structure,
there is little doubt that NATO would
detect a full-scale? Pact mobilization almost
immediately. Obviously, NATO must ensure
that it maintains this capability. Problems
arise, however, in circumstances where the
Pact pursues a limited mobilization which- is
somewhat difficult to gauge. Although
there are real limits as to how much mobili-
zation the Soviets can achieve before tip-
ping their hand, NATO needs to be especial-
ly sensitive to such an eventuality. More-
over, NATO must be prepared to respond to
a limited mobilization, even if the evidence
of such a mobilization is somewhat ambigu-
ous. This leads to the critical problem o
mobilization.
This article highlights how important it is
that NATO mobilize its forces immediately
after the Pact begins its mobilization. A fa-
vorable balance of forces in a crisis will be a
function of political as well as military fac-
tors.
The real danger is that NATO's leaders
will not agree to mobilize in a crisis for fear
that ,such a move might provoke a Soviet
attack. The risk of pushing the Soviets to
preempt can be reduced, however, by avoid-
ing certain provocative moves and by clearly
communicating one's intentions to the other
side. Nevertheless, the risk of provoking a
Soviet attack by Initiating NATO mobiliza-
tion can never be completely erased. That
risk, however, must be weighed against the
far greater danger that if NATO does not
mobilize, the capability to defend against a
Pact attack will be lost. Moreover, once,the
Pact achieves a decisive superiority because
of NATO's failure to mobilize, it would be
not only difficult, but very dangerous for
NATO to attempt to redress the balance
S 6009
with a tardy mobilization. Seeing that proc-
ess set into motion, the Pact would have a
very strong incentive to attack before
NATO erased its advantage. In short, it is
essential that NATO plan for ways to mobi-
lize that do not 'Provoke a Soviet attack, but,
at the same time, ensure that NATO does
not lose its present capability to defend
itself effectively against a t oviet offensive.
DEATH TO DRUG RING PINS
Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. President, I
want to get the drug dealers and the
drugs out of our homes, our schools,
and our communities. I voted to table
the amendment that would have im-
posed a Federal death penalty for cer-
tain drug related murders because I do
not think it would do the job that
must be done.
I want to get the people who carry
out the vile and viscious sale of drugs
off our streets. I want them caught,
convicted, and incarcerated. I'm tired
of the havoc that drugs and the drug
trade are causing.
However, Maryland law enforcement
officials have advised me that with a
death penalty in effect they would
have additional problems obtaining
convictions. I do not want to do any-
thing that makes convictions harder
to obtain, so I supported tabling the
amendment that added a Federal
death penalty for drug related mur-
ders.
Mr. President, I support the death
penalty in cases of extraordinary or
heinous crimes such as treason, terror-
ism or the murder of a law enforce-
ment officer. If I thought it would
help the drug fight, I would consider
supporting this amendment. But the
people in Maryland who are on the
front lines of this fight have told me
this sort of proposal will hurt their ef-
forts.
uld support life without parole
ug related murders. We must do
ry hing we can to make sure the
rs of the drug trade is lifted.
EXECUTIVE SESSION?TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUB-
LICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF
THEIR, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
AND SHORTER-RANGE MIS-
SILES (THE INF TREATY)
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of Calen-
dar Order No. 9, Treaty Document No.
100-11, Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics ' on the
Eliminations of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
(the INF Treaty), on the understand-
ing that the reading of the treaty pro-
ceed through section 17, down to the
signatures of the President and the
leader of the Soviet Union, at which
time there be a temporary dispensa-
tion of the reading of the treaty.
That will allow the Senate to get
back to a discussion concerning the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6010 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
D'Amato amendment on the DOD au-
thorization bill, and we will see where
we go from there. That will not waive
any Senator's right to insist on the
full reading of the treaty, which every
Senator has a right at Ur's moment to
insist upon. I shall not insist upon
going beyond the 17th section. Every
Senator has that right. Any Senator
who wishes to object to calling off the
reading of the treaty can do it. That
goes, however, beyond the 17 sections.
This, it seems to me, would allow the
Senate to utilize the time to good ad-
vantage in both respects.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object?and I am not
going to object?I just want to nail
down that there is no waiver of the
point of order implied in this unani-
mous consent request.
Mr. BYRD. No, there is not.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The Senate will go into executive
session.
The clerk will report the treaty.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIAL-
IST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF
THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-
RANGE-MISSILES
The United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-
after referred to as the Parties,
Conscious that nuclear war would have?
devastating consequences for all mankind.
Guided by the objective of strengthening
strategic stability,
Convinced that the measures set forth in
this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of
outbreak of war nd strengthen international
peace and security, and
Mindful of their obligations under Article
VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
In accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty which includes the Memorandum of
Understanding and Protocols which form an
integral part thereof, each Party shall elimi-
nate its intermediate-range and shorter-
range missiles, not have such systems there-
after, and carry out the other obligations
set forth in this Treaty.
ARTICLE II
For the purposes of this Treaty:
1. The term "ballistic missile" means a
missile that has a ballistic trajectory over
most of its flight path. The term "ground-
launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a
ground-launched ballistic missile that is a
weapon-delivery vehicle.
2. The term "cruise missile" means an un-
manned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains
flight through the use of aerodynamic lift
over most of its flight path. The term
"ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)"
means a ground-launched cruise missile that
is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a
fixed launcher or a mobile land-based trans-
porter-erector-launcher mechanism for
launching a GLBM. '
4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a
fixed launcher or a mobile land-based trans-
porter-erector-launcher mechanism for
launching a GLCM.
5. The term "intermediate-range missile"
means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range
capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but
not in excess of 5500 kilometers.
6. The term "shorter-range missile"
means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range
capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilo-
meters but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.
7. The term "deployment area" means a
designated area within which intermediate-
range missiles and launchers of such mis-
siles may operate and within which one or
more missile operating bases are located.
8. The term "missile operating base"
means:
(a) in the case of intermediate-range mis-
siles, a complex of facilities, located within a
deployment area, at which intermediate-
range missiles and launchers of such mis-
siles normally operate, in which support
structures associates with such missiles and
launchers are also located and in which sup-
port equipment associated with such mis-
siles and launchers is normally located; and
(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a
complex of facilities, located any place, at
which shorter-range missiles and launchers
of such missiles normally operate and in
which support equipment associated with
such missiles and launchers is normally lo-
cated.
9. The term "missile support facility," as
regards intermediate-range or shorter-range
missiles and launchers of such missiles,
means a missile production facility or a
launcher production facility, a missile repair
facility or a launcher repair facility, a train-
ing facility, a missile storage facility or a
launcher storage facility, a test range, or an
elimination facility as those terms are de-
fined in the Memorandum of Understand-
ing.
10. The term "transit" means movement,
notified in accordance with paragraph 5(1)
of Article IX of this Treaty, of an interme-
diate-range missile or a launcher of such a
missile between missile support facilities,
between such a facility and a deployment
area or between deployment areas, or of a
shorter-range missile or a launcher of such
a missile from a missile support facility or a
artsile operating base to an elimination fa-
cility.
11. The term "deployed missile" means an
intermediate-range missile located within a
deployment area or a shorter-range missile
located at a missile operating base.
12. The term "non-deployed missile"
means an intermediate-range missile located
outside a deployment area or a sh9rter-
range missile located outside a missile oper-
ating base.
13. The term "deployed launeher" means
a launcher of an intermediate-range missile
located within a deployment area or a
launcher of a shorter-range missile located
at a missile operating base.
14. The term "non-deployed launcher"
means a launcher of an intermediate-range
missile located outside a deployment area or
a launcher of a shorter-range missile located
outside a missile operating base.
15. The term "basing country" - means a
country other than the United States of
America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on whose territory intermediate-
range or shorter-range missiles of the Par-
ties, launchers of such missiles or support
structures associated with such missiles and
launchers were located at any time after No-
vember 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in
transit are not considered to be "located."
ARTICLE III
1. For the purposes of this Treaty, exist-
ing types of intermediate-range missiles are:
(a) for the United States of America, mis-
siles of the types designated by the United
May 17, 1988
States of America as the Pershing II and
the BGM-109G, which are known to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the
same designations; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, missiles of the types designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which
are known to the United States of America
as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respec-
tively.
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, exist-
ing types of shorter-range missiles are:
(a) for the United States of America, mis-
siles of the type designated by the United
States of America as the Pershing IA, which
is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics by the same designation; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, missiles of the types designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are
known to the United States of America as
the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.
ARTICLE IV
1. Each Party shall eliminate all its inter-
mediate-range missiles and launchers of
such missiles, and all support structures and
support equipment of-the categories listed
in the Memorandum of Understanding asso-
ciated with such missiles and launchers, so
that no later than three years after entry
into force of this Treaty and thereafter no
such missiles, launchers, support structures
or support equipment shall be possessed by
either Party.
2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle, upon entry into force of this Treaty,
both Parties shall begin and continue
throughout the duration of each phase, the
reduction of all types of Chair deployed and
non-deployed intermediate-range missiles
and deployed and non-deployed launchers
of such missiles and support structures and
support equipment associated with such
missiles and launchers in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty. These reduc-
tions shall be implemented into two phases
so that:
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is,
no later than 20 months after entry into
force of this Treaty:
(i) the number of deploSTed launchers of
intermediate-range missiles for each Party
shall not exceed the number of launchers
that-are capable of carrying or containing at
one time missiles considered by the Parties
to carry 171 warheads:
(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-
range missiles for each Party shall not
exceed the number of such missiles consid-
ered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;
(iii) the aggregate number of deployed
and non-deployed launchers of intermedi-
ate-range missiles for each Party shall not
exceed the number of launchers that are ca-
pable of carrying or containing at one time
missiles considered by the Parties to carry
200 warheads:
(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and
non-deployed intermediate-range missiles
for each Party shall not exceed the number
of such missiles considered by the Parties to
carry 200 warheads; and
(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of
deployed and non-deployed intermediate-
range GLBMs of existing types for each
Party to the aggregate number of deployed
and non-deployed intermediate-range mis-
siles of existing types possessed by that
Party shall not exceed the ratio of such in-
termediate-range GLBMs to such intermedi-
ate-range missiles for that Party as of No-
vember 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memo-
randum of Understanding; and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is,
no later than three years after entry into
force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range
missiles of each Party, launchers of such
missiles and all support structures and sup-
port equipment of the categories listed in
the Memorandum of Understanding associ-
ated with such missiles and launchers, shall
be eliminated.
ARTICLE V
1. Each Party shall eliminate all its short-
er-range missiles and launchers of such mis-
siles, and all support equipment of the cate-
gories listed in the Memorandum of Under-
standing associated with such missiles and
launchers, so that no later than 18 months
after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter no such missiles, launchers or
support equipment shall be possessed by
either Party.
2. No later than 90 days after entry into
force of this Treaty, each Party shall com-
plete the removal of all its deployed shorter.
range missiles and deployed and non-de-
ployed launchers of such missiles to elimina-
tion facilities and shall retain them at those
locations until they are eliminated in ac-
cordance with the procedures set forth in
the Protocol on Elimination. No later than
12 months after entry into force of this
Treaty, each Party shall complete the re-
moval of all its non-deployed shorter-range
missiles to elimination facilities and shall
retain them at those locations until they are
eliminated in accordance with the proce-
dures set forth in the Protocol on Elimina-
tion.
3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of
such missiles shall not be located at the
same elimination facility. Such facilities
shall be separated by no less than 1,000 kilo-
meters.
ARTICLE VI
1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty
and thereafter, neither Party shall:
(a) produce or flight-test any intermedi-
ate-range missiles or produce any stages of
such missiles or any launchers of such mis-
siles; or
(b) produce, flight-test or launch any
shorter-range missiles or produce any stages
of such missiles or any launchers of such
missiles.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this
Article, each Party shall have the right to
produce a type of GLBM not limited by this
Treaty which uses a stage which is outward-
ly similar to, but not interchangeable with,
a stage of an existing type of intermediate-
range GLBM having more than one stage,
providing that that Party does not produce
any other stage which is outwardly similar
to, but not interchangeable with, any other
stage of an existing type of intermediate-
range GLBM.
ARTICLE VII
For the purposes of this Treaty:
1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile
has been flight-tested or deployed for
weapon delivery, all missiles of that type
shall be considered to be weapon-delivery
vehicles.
2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermedi-
ate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of
that type shall be considered to be interme-
diate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is
. a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or
GLCMs of that type shall be considered to
be shorter-range missiles.
3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and
tested solely to intercept and counter ob-
jects not located on the surface of the
earth, it shall not be considered to be a mis-
sile to which the limitations of this Treaty
apply.
4. The range capability of a GLBM not
listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be
considered to be the maximum range to
which it has been tested. The range capabil-
ity of a GLCM not listed in Article III of
this Treaty shall be considered to be the
maximum distance which can be covered by
the missile in its standard design mode
flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by
projecting its flight path onto the earth's
sphere from the point of launch to the
point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that
have a range capability equal to or in excess
of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000
kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-
range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have
a range capability, in excess of 1,000 kilome-
ters but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers
shall be considered to be intermediate-range
missiles.
5. The maximum number of warheads an
existing type of intermediate-range missile
or shorter-range missile carries shall be con-
sidered to be the number listed for missiles
of that type in the Memorandum of Under-
standing.
6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be consid-
ered to carry the maximum number of war-
heads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that
type in the Memorandum of Understanding.
7. If a launcher has been tested for
launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launch-
ers of that type shall be considered to have
been tested for launching GLBMs or
GLCMs.
8. If a launcher has contained or launched
a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all
launchers of that type shall be considered
to be launchers of that type of GLBM or
GLCM.
9. The number of missiles each launcher
of an existing type of intermediate-range
missile or shorter-range missile shall be con-
sidered to be capable of carrying or contain-
ing at one time is the number listed for
launchers of missiles of that type in the
Memorandum of Understanding.
10. Except in the case of elimination in ac-
cordance with the procedures set forth in
the Protocol on Elimination, the following
shall apply:
(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved
in separate stages, the longest stage of an
intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM
shall be counted as a complete missile;
(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or
moved in separate stages, a canister of the
type used hi the launch of an intermediate-
range GLBM, Unless a Party proves to the
satisfaction of the other Party that it does
not contain such a missile', or an assembled
intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM,
shall be counted as a complete missile; and
(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an inter-
mediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall
be counted as a complete missile.
11. A ballistic missile which is not a mis-
sile to be used in a ground-based mode shall
not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-
launched at a test site from a fixed land-
based launcher which is used solely for test
purposes and which is distinguished from
GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is
not a missile to be used in a ground-based
mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM
If it is test-launched at a test site from a
fixed land-based launcher which is used
solely for test purposes and which is distin-
guishable from GLCM launchers.
12. Each Party shall have the right to
produce and use for booster systems, which
might otherwise be considered to be inter-
mediate-range or shorter-range missiles,
only existing types of booster stages for
such booster systems. Launchers of such
booster systems shall not be considered to
be flight-testing of intermediate-range or
shorter-range missiles provided that:
S 6011
(a) stages used in such booster systems are
different from stages used in those missiles
listed as existing types of intermediate-
range or shorter-range missiles in Article III
of this Treaty;
(b) such booster systems are used only for
research and development purposes to test
objects other than the booster systems
themselves;
(c) the aggregate number of launchers for
such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for
each Party at any one time; and
(d) the launchers for such booster systems
are fixed, emplaced above ground and locat-
ed only at research and development launch
sites which are specified in the Memoran-
dum of Understanding.
Research and development launch sites
shall not be subject to inspection pursuant
to Article XI of this Treaty.
ARTICLE VIII
1. All intermediate-range missiles and
launchers of such missiles shall be located
in deployment areas, at missile support fa-
cilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-
range missiles or launchers of such missiles
shall not be located elsewhere.
2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles
shall be located in deployment areas, at mis-
sile support facilities or moving between de-
ployment areas, between missile support fa-
cilities or between missile support facilities
and deployment areas.
3. Until their removal to elimination facili-
ties as required by paragraph 2 of Article V
of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and
launchers of such missiles shall be located
at missile operating bases, at missile support
facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-
range missiles or launchers, of such missiles
shall not be located elsewhere.
4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject
to the provisions of this Treaty shall be
completed within 25 days.
5. All deployment areas, missile operating
bases and missile support facilities are speci-
fied in the Memorandum of Understanding
or in subsequent updates of data pursuant
to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of
this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase
the number of, or change the location or
boundaries of, deployment areas, missile op-
erating bases or missile support facilities,
except for elimination facilities, from those
set forth in the Memorandum of Under-
standing. A missile support facility shall not
be considered to be part of a deployment
area even though it may be located within
the geographic boundaries of the deploy-
ment area.
6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force
of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate in-
termediate-range or shorter-range missiles,
including stages of such missiles, or launch-
ers of such missiles at missile production fa-
cilities, launcher production facilities or test
ranges listed in the Memorandum of Under-
standing.
7. Neither Party shall locate any interme-
diate-range or shorter-range missiles at train-
ing facilities.
8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or
shorter-range missile shall not be carried on
or contained within a launcher of such a
type of missile, except as required for main-
tenance conducted at repair facilities or for
elimination by means of launching conduct,
ed at elimination facilities.
9. Training missiles and training launch-
ers for intermediate-range or shorter-range
missiles shall be subject to the same loca-
tional restrictions as are set forth for inter-
mediate-range and shorter-range missiles
and launchers of such missiles in para-
graphs 1 and 3 of this Article.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6012 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 17, 1988
ARTICLE IX
1. The Memorandum of Understanding
contains categories of data relevant to obli-
gations undertaken with regard to this
Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles, launchers of such
missiles, and support structures and support
equipment associated with such missiles and
launchers, possessed by the Parties as of NO-
vember 1, 1987. Updates of that data and
notification required by this Article shall be
provided according to the categories of data
contained in the Memorandum of Under-
standing.
2. The Parties shall update that data and
provide the notifications required by this
Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction
Centers, established pursuant to the Agree-
ment Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Re-
duction Centers of September 15, 1987.
3. No later than 30 days after entry into
force of this Treaty, each Party shall pro-
vide the other Party with updated data, as
of the date of entry into force of this
Treaty, for all categories of data contained
in the Memorandum of Understanding.
4. No later than 30 days after the end of
each six-month interval following the entry
into force of this Treaty, each Party shall
provide updated data for all categories of
data contained in the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding by informing the other Party of
all changes, completed and in process, in
that data, which have occurred during the
six-month interval since the preceding data
exchange, and the net effect of those
changes.
5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty
and thereafter. each Party shall provide the
following notifications to the other Party:
(a) notification, no less than 30 days in ad-
vance, of the schedule date of the elimina-
tion of a specific deployment area, missile
operating base or missile support facility;
(b) notification, no less than 30 days in ad-
vance, of changes in the number or location
of elimination facilities, including the loca-
tion and scheduled date of each change;
(c) notification, except with respect to
launchers of intermediate-range missiles for
the purpose of their elimination, no less
than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled
date of the initiation of the elimination of
intermediate-range and shorter-range mis-
siles, and stages of such missiles, and
launchers of such missiles and support
structures and support equipment associat-
ed with such missiles and launchers, includ-
ing:
(i) the number and type of Items of missile
systems to be eliminated;
(ii) the elimination site:
(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the
location from which such missiles, launch-
ers of such missiles and support equipment
associated with such missiles and launchers
are moved to the elimination facility; and
(iv) except in the case of support struc-
tures, the point of entry to be used by an in-
spection team conducting an inspection pur-
suant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this
treaty and the estimated time of departure
of an inspection team from the point of
entry to the elimination facility;
(d) notification, no less than ten days in
advance, of the scheduled date of the
launch, or the scheduled date of the initi-
ation of a series of launches, of intermedi-
ate-range missiles for the purpose of their
elimination, including:
(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;
(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimi-
nation is by a series of launches, the loca-
tion of such launches and the number of
launches in the series;
(iii) the point of entry to be used by an in-
spection team conducting an inspection pur-
suant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this
treaty; and
(iv) the estimated time of departure of an
inspection team from the point of entry to
the elimination facility;
(e) notification, no later than 48 hours
after they occur, of changes in the number
of intermediate-range and shorter-range
missiles, launchers of such missiles and sup-
port structures and support equipment asso-
ciated with such missiles and launchers re-
sulting from elimination as described in the
Protocol on Elimination, including:
(i) the number and type of items of a mis-
sile system which were eliminated; and
(ii) the date and location of such elimina-
tion; and
(f) notification of transit of intermediate-
range or shorter-range missiles or launchers
of such missiles, or the movement of train-
ing missiles or training launchers for such
intermediate-range and shorter-range mis-
siles, no later than 48 hours after it has
been completed, including:
(I) the number of missiles or launchers;
(ii) the points, dates and times of depar-
ture and arrival;
(iii) the mode of transport; and
(iv) the location and time at that location
at least once every four days during the
period of transit.
6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty
and? thereafter, each Party shall notify the
other Party, no less than ten days in ad-
vance, of the scheduled date and location of
the launch of a research and development
booster system as described in paragraph 12
of Article VII of this Treaty.
ARTICLE X
1. Each Party shall eliminate its interme-
diate-range and shorter-range missiles and
launchers of such missiles and support
structures and support equipment associat-
ed with such missiles and launchers in ac-
cordance with the procedures set forth in
the Protocol on Elimination.
2. Verification by on-site inspection of the
elimination of items of missiles systems
specified in the Protocol on Elimination
shall be carried out in accordance with Arti-
cle XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimi-
nation and the Protocol on Inspection.
3. When a Party removes its intermediate-
range missiles, launchers of such missiles
and support equipment associated with such
missiles and launchers from deployment
areas to elimination facilities for the pur-
pose of their elimination, it shall do so in
complete deployed organizational units. For
the United States of America, these units
shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-
109G flights. For the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20
regiments composed of two or three battal-
ions.
4. Elimination of intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles and launchers of such
missiles and support equipment associated
with such missiles and launchers shall be
carried out at the facilities that are speci-
fied in the Memorandum of Understanding
or notified in accordance with paragraph
5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless
eliminated in accordance with Section IV or
V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support
structures, associated with the missiles and
launchers subject to this Treaty, that are
subject to elimination shall be eliminated in
situ.
5. Each Party shall have the right, during
the first six months after entry into force of
this Treaty, to eliminate by means of
launching no more than 100 of its interme-
diate-range missiles.
6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range
missiles which have been tested prior to
entry into force of this Treaty, but never de-
ployed, and which are not existing types of
intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles
listed in Article III of this Treaty, and
launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminat-
ed within six months after entry into force
of this Treaty in accordance with the proce-
dures set forth in the Protocol on Elimina-
tion. Such missiles are:
(a) for the United States of America, mis-
siles of the type designated by the United
States of America as the Pershing IB, which
Is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics by the same designation; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, missiles of the type designated by
-the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
the RK-55, which is known to the United
States of America as the SSC-X-4.
7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range
missiles and launchers of such missiles and
support structures and support equipment
associated with such missiles and launchers
shall be considered to be eliminated after
completion of the procedures set forth in
the Protocol on Elimination and upon the
notification provided for in paragraph 5(e)
of Article IX of this Treaty.
8. Each Party shall eliminate its deploy-
ment areas, missiles operating bases and
missile support facilities. A Party shall
notify the other Party pursuant to para-
graph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once
the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:
(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-
range missiles, launchers of such missiles
and support .equipment associated with such
missiles and launchers located there have
been removed;
(b) all support structures associated with
such missiles and launchers located there
have been eliminated; and
(c) all activity related to production,
flight-testing, training, repair, storage or de-
ployment of such missiles and launchers has
ceased there.
Such deployment areas, missile operating
bases and missile support facilities shall be
considered to be eliminated either when
they have been inspected pursuant to para-
graph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when
60 days have elapsed since the date of the
scheduled elimination which was notified
pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of
this Treaty. A deployment area, missile op-
erating base or missile support facility listed
in the Memorandum of Understanding that
met the above conditions prior to entry into
force of this Treaty, and is not included in
the initial data exchange pursuant to para-
graph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be
considered to be eliminated.
9. If a Party intends to convert a missile
operating base listed in the Memorandum of
Understanding for use as a base associated
with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject
to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify
the other Party, no less than 30 days in ad-
vance of the scheduled date of the initiation
of conversion, of the scheduled date and the
purpose for which the base will be convert-
ed.
ARTICLE XI
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification
of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to
conduct on-site inspections. The Parties
shall implement on-site inspections in ac-
cordance with this Article, the Protocol on
Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.
2. Each Party shall have the right to con-
duct inspections provided for by this Article
both within the territory of the other Party
, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
and within the territories of basing coun-
tries.
3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force
of this Treaty, each Party shall have the
right to conduct inspections at all missile
operating bases and missile support facili-
ties specified in the Memorandum of Under-
standing other than missile production fa-
cilities, and at all elimination facilities in-
cluded in the initial data update required by
paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.
These inspections shall be completed no
later than 90 days after entry into force of
this Treaty. The purpose of these inspec-
tions shall be to verify the number of mis-
siles, launchers, support structures and sup-
port equipment and other data, as of the
date of entry into force of this Treaty, pro-
vided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX
of this Treaty.
4. Each Party shall have the right to con-
duct inspections to verify the elimination,
notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Arti-
cle IX of this Treaty, of missile operating
bases and missile support facilities other
than missile production facilities, which are
thus no longer subject to inspections pursu-
ant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such
an inspection shall be carried out within 60
days after the scheduled date of the elimi-
nation of that facility. If a Party conducts
an inspection at a particular facility pursu-
ant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the
scheduled date of the elimination of that fa-
cility, then no additional inspection of that
facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be
permitted.
5. Each Party shall have the right to con-
duct inspections pursuant to this paragraph
for 13 years after entry into force of this
Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to
conduct 20 such inspections per calendar
year during the first three years after entry
into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspec-
tions per calendar year during the subse-
quent five years, and ten such inspections
per calendar year during the last five years.
Neither Party shall use more than half of
its total number of these inspections per cal-
endar year within the territory of any one
basing country. Each Party shall have the
right to conduct:
(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after
entry into force of this Treaty, of missile op-
erating bases and missile support facilities
other than elimination facilities and missile
production facilities, to ascertain, according
to the categories of data specified in the
Memorandum of Understanding, the num-
bers of missiles, launchers, support sturuc-
tures and support equipment located at
each missile operating base or missile sup-
port facility at the time of the inspection;
and
(b) inspections of former missile operating
bases and former missile support facilities
eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Arti-
cle X of this Treaty other than former mis-
sile production facilities.
6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force
of this Treaty, each Party shall have the
right, for 13 years after entry into force of
this Treaty, to inspect by means of continu-
ous monitoring:
(a) the portals of any facility of the other
Party at which the final assembly of a
GLBM using stages, any of which is out-
wardly similar to a stage of a solid-propel-
lant GLBM listed in Article III of this
Treaty, is accomplished; or
(b) if a Party has no such facility, the por-
tals of an agreed former missile production
facility at which existing types of intermedi-
ate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were
produced.
The Party whose facility is to be inspected
pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure
that the other Party is able to extablish a
permanent continuous monitoring system at
that facility within six months after entry
into force of this Treaty or within six
months of initiation of the process of final
assembly described in subparagraph (a). If,
after the end of the second year after entry
into force of this Treaty, neither Party con-
ducts the process of final assembly de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) for a period of
12 consecutive months, then neither Party
shall have the right to inspect by means of
continuous monitoring any missile produc-
tion facility for the other Party unless the
process of final assembly as described in
subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon
entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities
to be inspected by continuous monitoring
shall be: in accordance with subparagraph
(b), for the United States of America, Her-
cules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah: in
accordance with subparagraph (a), for the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Vot-
kinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Au-
tonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of
the process of elimination, including elimi-
nation of intermediate-range missiles by
means of launching, of intermediate-range
and shorter-range missiles and launchers of
such missiles and support equipment associ-
ated with such missiles and launchers car-
ried out at elimination facilities in accord-
ance with Article X of this Treaty and the
Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors con-
ducting inspections provided for the elimi-
nation of the missiles, launchers and sup-
port equipment has been completed.
8. Each Party shall have the right to con-
duct inspections to confirm the completion
of the process of elimination of intermedi-
ate-range and shorter-range missiles and
launchers of such missiles and support
equipment associated with such missiles and
launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V
of the Protocol on Elimination, and of train-
ing missiles, training missile stages, training
launch canisters and training launchers
eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V
of the Protocol on Elimination.
ARTICLE XI/
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification
compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national tech-
nical means of verification at its disposal in
a manner consistent with generally recog-
nized principles of international law,
2. Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical
means of verification of the other Party op-
erating in accordance with paragraph 1 of
this Article; or
(b) use concealment measures which
impede verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty by national techni-
cal means of verification carried out in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
This obligation does not apply to cover or
concealment practices, within a deployment
-area, associated with normal training, main-
tenance and operations, including the use of
environmental shelters to protect missiles
and launchers.
3. To enhance observation by national
technical means of verification, each Party
shall have the right until a treaty between
the Parties reducing and limiting strategic
offensive arms enters into force, but in any
event for no more than three years after
entry into force of this Treaty, to request
the implementation of cooperative measures
at deployment bases for road-mobile
GLBMs with a range capability in excess of
5500 kilometers, which are not former mis-
sile operating bases eliminated pursuant to
paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The
S 6013
Party making such a request shall inform
the other Party of the deployment base at
which cooperative measures shall be imple-
mented. The Party whose base is to be ob-
served shall carry out the following coopera-
tive measures:
(a) no later than six hours after such a re-
quest, the Party shall have opened the roofs
of all fixed structures for launchers located
at the base, removed completely all missiles
on launchers from such fixed structures for
launchers and displayed such missiles on
launchers in the open without using con-
cealment measures; and
(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open
and the missiles on launchers in place until
twelve hours have elapsed from the time of
the receipt of a request for such an observa-
tion.
Each Party shall have the right to make six
such requests per calendar year. Only one
deployment base shall be subject to these
cooperative measures at any one time.
ARTICLE XIII
1. To promote the objectives and imple-
mentation of the provisions of this Treaty,
the Parties hereby establish the Special
Verification Commission. The Parties agree
that, if either Party so requests, they shall
meet within the framework of the Special
Verification Commission to:
(a) resolve questions relating to compli-
ance with the obligations assumed; and
(h) agree upon such measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and effec-
tiveness of this Treaty.
2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers, which provide for con-
tinuous communication between the Par-
ties, to:
(a) exchange data and provide notifica-
tions as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6
of Article IX of this Treaty and the Proto-
col on Elinination;
(b) provide and receive the information re-
quired by paragraph 9 of Article X of this
Treaty;
(c) provide and receive notifications of in-
spections as required by Article XI of this
Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and
(d) provide and receive requests for coop-
erative measures as provided for in para-
graph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.
ARTICLE XIV
The Parties shall comply with the Treaty
and shall not assume any international obli-
gations or undertakings which would con-
flict with its provisions.
ARTICLE XV
1. This Treaty shall be unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its na-
tional sovereignty, have the right to with-
draw from the Treaty if it decides that ex-
traordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests. It shall give notice of its
decision to withdraw to the other Party six
months prior to withdrawal from this
Treaty. Such notice shall include a state-
ment of the extraordinary events the noti-
fying Party regards as having jeopardizing
its supreme interests.
ARTICLE XV/
Each Party may propose amendments to
this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter
into force in accordance with the procedures
set forth in Article XVII governing the
entry into force of this Treaty.
ARTICLE XVII
1. This Treaty, including the Memoran-
dum of Understanding and Protocols, which
form an integral part thereof, shall be sub-
ject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23 : CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6014 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
This Treaty shall enter into force on the
date of the exchange of instruments of rati-
fication.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursu-
ant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
Done at Washington on December 8, 1987,
In two copies, each in the English and Rus-
sian languages, both texts being equally au-
thentic.
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, under the
agreement that was entered, there will
be a momentary temporary dispensa-
tion of the further reading of the
treaty with no rights of Senators
waived, and I take the floor at this
time to suggest the absence of a
quorum, with the approval of the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, in the hope that
we can get some understanding as to
where the negotiations are at this
point on the D'Amato amendment to
the DOD authorization bill. I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
FOWLER). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the agree-
ment was that the first 17 articles of
the treaty would be read down to the
signatories, at which time the reading
of the treaty would be temporarily
held in abeyance with all rights re-
served to Senators in the hopes that
during that time of reading the first
17 articles, Senators who were working
on an agreement anent the D'Amato
amendment might be able to reach
such an agreement so that the Senate
then could dispose of the Department
of Defense authorization bill.
Senators are still working on such an
agreement and will not be able to con-
clude that agreement until tomorrow
morning at a time when Senator KEN-
NEDY will be here. He is very much in-
volved in that amendment and he
cannot come to the Chamber this
afternoon.
So we are at the point now where we
either have to continue with the read-
ing of the protocols, which will take
several hours, or we dispense with fur-
ther reading of the protocols and per-
haps get on with our opening state-
ments.
The Senator from North Carolina is
on the floor. He did not raise an objec-
tion, but he was in a position to raise
an objection, to the calling off of the
reading of the treaty at the end of the
1 hour, or such time as was required to
read the 17 sections. So I would like to
proceed now, if we could, to dispense
with the further reading of the proto-
cols.
I will inquire of the distinguished
Senator if he has any objection. As a
matter of fact, I will ask unanimous
consent for the record, that further
reading of the treaty be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to
object, and I shall not object, because
I am confident the majority leader
and the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee and I
have an understanding. I have no
desire to keep the Senate here tonight
to read the protocols. On top of that, I
talked to the clerk. He is getting a
little raspy in his delivery and his Rus-
sian is not all that good, and a lot of
this is in Russian.
But I would inquire of the majority
leader if he would include in his unan-
imous-consent request that all rights
are protected. I may have a couple
points of order which I will want to
raise at the appropriate time. The
unanimous-consent request suits me
fine, if I may be protected on that
score.
Mr. BYRD. All right. As I under-
stand it, the distinguished Senator
would not object to calling off the fur-
ther reading of the?we will use the
word "treaty"?further reading of the
treaty and its attending protocols, pro-
vided no rights are waived thereby.
Mr. HELMS. Correct.
Mr. BYRD. Which leaves with every
Senator any points of order that he
otherwise might wish to raise at this
particular point.
Mr. HELMS. Well, it is a little bit
ticklish about the timing of this, ac-
cording to my understanding of the
rules. But the distinguished majority
leader would know more about that.
In any case, just so my rights are
protected in that regard, that is fine.
Mr. BYRD. Let me word the request
like this and see if it meets with the
approval of the Senator.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that further reading of the treaty
be dispensed with, provided that the
rights of all Senators are preserved;
that no points of order are waived for
the remainder of today and up to the
point of tomorrow's beginning on the
treaty by virtue of this consent re-
quest.
This would mean that whatever
rights the Senator has or any Senator
has at this point would still be pre-
served to that Senator or any Senator
up to and including the moment that
the Senate resumes consideration of
the treaty tomorrow. So he is in the
same position tomorrow morning as he
is right now. But this would allow us
to dispense with the further reading
of the treaty and get on with it. Some
of us want to make opening state-
ments today.
And if the Senator wanted in the
morning to insist upon further reading
of the protocols, he could do that. He
could do it right now. This preserves
his right for the next several hours
until the Senate resumes consider-
ation of the treaty on tomorrow.
May 17, 1988
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield, it seems to me that
the majority leader has made it abun-
dantly clear and I have no objection
whatsoever.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hear-
ing no objection, the unanimous-con-
sent request is agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator from North
Carolina.
Now, I will make this proposal to the
distinguished Republican leader that
for the remainder of the day?and we
will not be able to settle the situation
concerning the D'Amato amendment
until tomorrow morning. The only
thing we can accomplish the rest of
the day is to get some opening state-
ments out of the way on the treaty. I
would suggest that we equally divide
the time for the remainder of this day
and that we let the distinguished Re-
publican leader and the majority
leader control the time, or their desig-
nees. I will yield most of the time to
Mr. PELL for the remainder of the day.
This would preclude any amendment
from being called up today. We might
proceed on that basis for the rest of
the day.
Mr. EXON. Would the majority
leader yield for a question?
Mr. BYRD. Yes, I would be happy
to.
Mr. EXON. Does the majority leader
anticipate rollcall votes this after-
noon? Or have you mentioned that?
For the rest of the day?
Mr. BYRD. That is a very good ques-
tion. I know of no reason why there
should be any rollcall votes during the
remainder of this day.
Mr. EXON. I thank the majority
leader.
Mr. BYRD. I know no reason why
there should be and I do not foresee
any.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Ms.
Mumma). The Senator from Rhode
Island.
Mr. PELL. Madam President, I yield
myself such time as I need.
Madam President, I am very pleased
that the Senate is now in position to
begin consideration of the treaty be-
tween the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the elimination of their in-
termediate-range and shorter range
missiles.
This treaty, known as the INF
Treaty, was signed by President
Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail
Gorbachev, on December 8, 1987, here
in Washington. The treaty, together
with two protocols and a memoran-
dum of understanding was transmitted
to the Senate on January 25, 1988.
The Committee on Foreign Relations
held a comprehensive series of 29
hearings in January, February, and
early March, and heard testimony
from more than 50 witnesses. On
March 30, 1988, the committee ordered
the resolution of ratification, as
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
amended by a condition, reported fa-
vorably by a 17-to-2 vote.
Prior to its markup, the Committee
on Foreign Relations received a report
from the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices concerning the treaty's effect on
NATO defense and from the Select
Committee on Intelligence on the U.S.
ability to monitor and verify treaty
compliance. The reports were helpful
to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions in reaching its overall judgment
that the treaty would serve the na-
tional interests of the United States
and should be ratified.
After the treaty was reported, cer-
tain issues related to paricular rights
and obligations of the parties arose
during U.S.-Soviet talks on treaty im-
plementation. Administration officials
worked with the Senate in determin-
ing how best to resolve these issues
and consulted on numerous occasions
with the Soviet side. Secretary of
State Shultz met with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze on May 11 and
12 in Geneva to gain final clarifica-
tions before the full Senate took up
the treaty. The Secretary reported to
the Committee on Foreign Relations
on May 16, and I am happy to report
that the issues appear to have been re-
solved in a manner satisfactory to the
United States. Thus, it is appropriate
that the Senate now proceed.
Madam President, the INF Treaty
requires that the United States and
the Soviet Union:
Eliminate all ground-launched inter-
mediate-range (1,000-5,000 kilometers)
missiles and launchers in phases over
three years;
Eliminate all shorter-range (500-
1,000 kilometers) ground-launched
missiles and launchers within 18
months; and
Not produce, flight-test, or possess
such systems for the indefinite dura-
tion of the treaty.
Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States will eliminate 120 de-
ployed and 127 non-deployed Pershing
H ballistic missiles, for a total of 247.
The United States will eliminate 309
deployed ground-launched cruise mis-
siles and 133 non-deployed GLCM's,
for a total of 442. Taking both types
together, the United States will elimi-
nate 689 intermediate-range missiles.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union will
eliminate a somewhat greater number
of intermediate-range missiles, as fol-
lows: 405 deployed SS-20's, 245 non-de-
ployed SS-20's, 65 deployed SS-4's, 105
non-deployed SS-4's and six SS-5 mis-
siles, for a total of 826.
In the shorter-range category, the
United States will eliminate 170 Per-
shing lA missiles now in storage. The
Soviet Union will eliminate 220 de-
ployed and 506 non-deployed SS-12's
and 22's, and 167 deployed and 33 non-
deployed SS-23's, for a total of 926.
In terms of deployed warheads, the
asymmetry is even greater. The United
States will take out ?a warhead for
each deployed missile for a total of
429, and the Soviet Union will take out
three warheads for each deployed SS-
20 and one warhead for each of its
other deployed intermediate-range
and shorter-range missiles for a total
of 1,667. This constitutes a four-to-one
disparity in favor of the United States
in terms of deployed nuclear war-
heads.
Under the terms of the treaty and
the protocol on eliminations, the
elimination process will be tightly con-
trolled. Allowable locations of missiles
and launchers to be eliminated are
carefully specified, and systems must
be eliminated in complete units, sup-
port structures must be eliminated
where they stand, and destruction
must occur only to agreed facilities.
During the first 6 months a maximum
of 100 intermediate-range missiles may
be eliminated by launching. The two
sides made an extensive and unprece-
dented data exchange as of November
1, 1987, and updated information is to
be provided within 30 days of entry
into force and at 6-month intervals
thereafter.
In monitoring compliance, national
technical means, which includes satel-
lite and other collection assets, will be
crucial. The parties have not only
agreed not to interfere with each
other's NTM but also to take specific
steps to enhance each side's ability to
monitor compliance by NTM. In addi-
tion, there is provision for on-site in-
spections, including base-line, close-
out, elimination, and short-notice in-
spections, as well as portal monitoring
of a missile assembly plant on each
side.
I find the strong verification provi-
sions are reassuring. Clearly, we would
be able to detect and .react in time to
any militarily significant violations,
and there is reason for confidence that
any such violations would be detected
through our national technical means.
At the same time, the committee was
alert to the danger that excessive veri-
fication requirements might have led
to a treaty which fell short of its po-
tential. We concluded that a good bal-
ance was struck and that the treaty is
a solid accord with effective verifica-
tion.
Having reached these judgments,
the committee concluded that the
treaty warranted approval without
change. At the same time, the commit-
tee -judged it crucially important that
one formal condition be adopted. This
condition affirms certain constitution-
al principles related to the treaty
power and requires that these princi-
ples govern U.S. interpretation of the
INF Treaty. The purpose of the condi-
tion is to reaffirm the long-standing
practice and long-standing principle
that the current "shared understand-
ing" of the Executive and the Senate,
as reflected in the Executive's formal
representations, is defining in terms of
the President's future latitude in in-
terpreting and implementing the
treaty. Given recent administration as-
sertions to the contrary, the commit-
tee judged that, in the absence of such
S 6015
a condition, the Senate would face the
alternative of considering countless
other conditions designed to formalize
the Senate's understanding of various
INF Treaty provisions.
Madam President, the Committee on
Foreign Relations questioned adminis-
tration and other witnesses closely on
this treaty. We weighed the merits
carefully, and we looked for flaws as
well. We would not have supported
this treaty if it jeopardized U.S. securi-
ty in any way.
Madam President, the INF Treaty
comes to the Senate after more than 7
years in which there have been no
formal accomplishments in the arms
control arena. Of course, that alone is
not sufficient justification for approv-
al of the treaty. But the treaty's sub-
stantive merits do provide such justifi-
cation. With the Foreign Relations
Committee having studied the treaty
carefully, I welcome the opportunity
to state that the committee has given
its imprimatur to this arms control
achievement.
I hope that the Senate will move to
approve the INF Treaty promptly and
that we will not become bogged down
in the consideration of unnecessary
conditions and amendments. If we un-
derstand that the INF Treaty is a
modest achievement in military terms
and a more important success in politi-
cal terms, I believe we will be able to
put the treaty in the right perspective.
The treaty, in my view, is most impor-
tant as the beginning of a new contin-
uum in arms control that could lead us
to further and quite significant
achievements. The treaty could be fol-
lowed by verification agreements
which opened the way to ratification
of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban
Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty. It could help open
the way to success in Geneva in nego-
tiating a solid, comprehensive START
treaty, which would be of great mili-
tary significance by requiring deep
cuts in the strategic weapons pos-
sessed by the United States and the
Soviet Union. With regard to Europe,
the treaty could set the stage for suc-
cess in reaching agreement to sharply
reduce the threat posed by the
Warsaw Pact's conventional forces.
Such successes could be enhanced by
an early agreement on a chemical
weapons ban.
We should bear in mind that the
INF Treaty is of little military signifi-
cance. Only 5 percent or 1/20th of the
total number of deployed nuclear
weapons is being removed. And every
targeted military or civilian site that is
no longer targeted as a result of the
removal of the nuclear weapons cov-
ered by the treaty may, if the oppos-
ing side wishes, be retargeted by sea or
air-based missiles, as well as land-
based intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles not covered by the treaty.
The importance of this treaty is po-
litical and psychological?to signal a
stop to the nuclear arms race, a halt to
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6016 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
the present continuous upward escala-
tion of Soviet and American nuclear
weapons. It would start a momentum
downward, not upward.
When that is accomplished, it would
be time to consider the next stage of
negotiations, which should be partici-
pated in by all nuclear weapons na-
tions. To reach that stage, we must be
serious and dedicated now.
The INF Treaty represents a small,
but vitally important step toward suc-
cesses which could get us back on
track in the search for far more sub-
stantial arms reductions. I urge that
the Senate proceed expeditiously to
approve the INF Treaty.
I invite to the attention of my col-
leagues that this treaty is of immense
psychological and political impor-
tance, a good forward step; as Bob
Kennedy once put it, "The journey of
a thousand miles starts with a simple
step." And this step could hopefully
reverse the present flow of escalation
and increasing numbers of nuclear
weapons.
I yield the floor. ?
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, will
the Senator yield me some time?
Mr. PELL. Certainly. I yield such
time as he may need to the majority
leader:
Mr. BYRD. I thank my distin-
guished friend.
Madam President, I ask unanimous
consent that the time for debate today
on the treaty be limited to 2 hours to
be equally divided between the minori-
ty leader and myself. The, distin-
gedshed Republican leader and I have
discussed lust a few moments ago the
amount of time we would proceed for
the rest of the day with the under-
standing that the time can be ex-
tended but for now that we might
have a backdrop an the amount of
time that we expect to take we begin
with 2 hours. Is that agreeable? I
make that request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Without abjection, it
is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, the
treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics is before the Senate,
and it has to do, with the elimination
of the intermediate-range and shelter-
range missiles, together with the
memorandum of understanding and
two protocols thereto, collectively re-
ferred to as the INF Treaty.
This is the subject matter before the
Senate as of now. It is a treaty of great
importance to our Nation and to this
body for a number of reasons. It is the
result of a long difficult confrontation
with our primary adversary since the
end of World War II?the Soviet
Union?which took the form of a mili-
tary challenge' to the NATO alliance
in the 1910's, in a provocative deploy-
ment of Soviet, medium-range ballistic
missiles targeted at European capitals.
The deployment was a form of intimi-
dation designed to break the will of
the Atlantic alliance, to divide and
conquer European countries. This
treaty, first and foremost, is proof
positive that the Soviet strategy has
not worked. It is proof positive that
American leadership of a strong
united alliance has worked over the
span of two administrations, one
Democratic and one Republican.
This treaty is, to a large extent, a
E'uropean treaty, since none of the
weapons which will be eliminated by
the treaty are capable of reaching the
continental United States, with the ex-
ception of those Asian-based SS-20's
capable of reaching portions of Alaska.
Therefore, it was important that it be
satisfactory to the Europeans, and
that they be consulted as it was being
negotiated. I commend the administra-
tion for a successful effort in this
regard. I led a bipartisan delegation of
Senators to five NATO capitals in Feb-
ruary?a delegation composed of the
three committee chairmen who thor-
oughly investigated and explored the
provisions of this treaty, and who are
to be commended, along with Mr.
WARNER, who is not only ranking on
the Armed Services Committee but
also sits an the Intelligence Commit-
tee and has had a very important and
responsible role in this process.
I refer, of course, to those chair-
men?Senator PELL. Senator NUNN,
and Senator Boa:EN?of the Commit-
tees on Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and Intelligence, respective-
ly.
I then testified before the Foreign
Relations Committee on the results of
our trip on February 24, 1988, and
have submitted, on behalf of the dele-
gation a comprehensive report on our
trip to the Senate on March 12, 2988.
I include a copy of that report in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
We found that there was widespread
support for the treaty among our
NATO partners, and as the report con-
cludes, "On the narrow question of
ratification on the INF Treaty, opin-
ion was virtually unanimous that it
should be approved by the Senate for
ratification, and that failure to ratify
could create a grave crisis in Western
Europe and NATO."
Nevertheless, there was also a con-
sensus that only sound agreements
should be concluded by the United
States with the Soviets. There was a
consensus that we have to be careful
that the momentum of good publicity
surrounding signing ceremonies, por-
trayed in the sophisticated publicity
campaigns of the new Soviet leader-
ship does not create a false momen-
tum toward agreements that are not
carefully negotiated and concluded
with our security interests uppermost
in our consideration: The report con-
chided that, in NATO, there was a
"clear consensus that arms control
agreements, including a START agree-
ment, should be concluded when issues
in dispute have been satisfactorily ne-
gotiated, and should not be negotiated
May 17, 1988
under the pressure of artificial dead-
lines.
"Likewise, when and if a sound
agreement is in sight, there should be
no delay in concluding it, since to do
so is in our common interest. But the
important thing is that it be a good
agreement?not dictated by calendar
deadlines or election year politics."
We have seen in connection with
this treaty, which is rather minor in
comparison with the START agree-
ment, that there have been problems,
there have been loose ends, there have
been matters that have not been thor-
oughly, gone into, some of which were
not even discussed or brought up by
our negotiators. And because of the in-
sistence of this Senate on a thorough
understanding of what we were doing
and where we were going before we
jumped, the insistence of this Senate
on the part of its committees, it led
the way that our negotiators go back
and resolve these differences and dis-
putes and disagreements with the So-
viets before the Senate began debating
on the floor the full treaty.
As a result of the position that the
Senate has, taken in that regard, of
course, General Powell has indicated
that in his opinion the process greatly
enhanced and advanced the security
interests of the United States.
So with that lessen in mind before
them, I hope that our negotiators,
when they sit down with the Soviets
to discuss the START agreement, will
clearly remember that this is no push-
over, this Senate, and that it is an in-
stitution that under the Constitution
has a role, an important role, one that
is not a symbolic role, one that is not a
rubberstamp role to any President, but
one which is a role that protects the
interests of the American people. And
this Senate has demonstrated in this
case that it will not be an institution
that will just roll over and play dead,
but it means to have its say and it
means to take a good look at any
agreement. And we also keep in mind
that we are dealing with the Soviet
Union.
So it might also be a good lesson to
the Soviets that under this system,
under the American system, there is
no single individual in this society or
in this Government who has all power,
and that this is a system of tripartite
powers and equal and separate
branches.
So, it may be a good civics lesson for
our friends in Moscow as well as they
look toward possibly discussions that
might at some point ultimately lead to
another agreenient, START agree-
ment.
It might also be a matter of consid-
erable solace and comfort to our allies
to know that there is a Senate, that
there really is a Senate, and that it is
just not an institution in name. It is an
institution that takes very seriously
those words that were Written into the
Constitution by our forefathers and
believes that those words were just not
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23 CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSION AL RECORD ? SENATE
put in to fill out sentences or pages in
the Constitution.
So our allies can depend on this
Senate as well in protecting their in-
terests, the allies' interests, as long as
treaties are entered into that involve
the security of the allies.
The important thing is, as we see it,
that this be a good agreement, not dic-
tated by calendar deadlines or election
year politics.
Mr. President, this conclusion ap-
plies to the way in which this Senate
conducts its review of treaties. I Would
point out that recent history is very
mixed, and rather disappointing on
the question of arms control treaties.
We have not considered a major arms
control treaty on this floor since the
ABM Treaty was approved in 1972.
Less than 20 percent of the Senators
now sitting in this body have partici-
pated in such an important exercise.
In fact, the distinguished minority
leader and I were so concerned about
the history of arms control and the
Senate's role in arms control that we
created a special Senate body, the
arms control observer group, as the
major item of Senate business on the
first day of the last Congress, the 99th
Congress, on January 3, 1985.
As we said in our report to the
Senate at that \ time, "We seek to avoid
a recurrence of the problems of the
1970's, when three successive arms
control treaties, signed by three Presi-
dents, were never approved for ratifi-
cation by the Senate?including two
nuclear testing treaties and the SALT
II Treaty." I believe the functioning
and existence of that group has been
of value to this Senate, and to the
three committees, and I commend the
work of the leadership of that group,
Senators PELL, NUNN, LUGAR, and STE-
VENS.
Overall, we must be thorough. We
ave already learned that lesson in
pades on this INF Treaty. Both the
ed Services and Intelligence Corn-
ittees found gaps, loopholes, and am-
? iguities in this treaty which had to be
leared up?which had to be clarified
'th the Soviet Union. This was the
ase most notably on the issue of
uture weapons systems and whether
hey are clearly banned by the treaty.
t was also the case on the matter of
ome problems which arose on the
ovel, unique, on-site verification
ystem which is being created by this
reaty.
The Foreign Relations Committee
eported this treaty favorably on April
4, 1988. In the days since that report,
ubstantial improvements have been
ade, including negotiations with the
oviet Union on the verification proce-
ures of the treaty. The thoroughness
f the Senate regarding this treaty has
lready paid dividends to the Nation.
t is my hope and my expectation that
he careful consideration of the full
? enate on this floor will enhance the
alue of this treaty further for our
ation.
Madam President, the result of
these efforts throughout the Senate is
that we are now prepared to move to
the important and critical final step of
Senate action: debate on the treaty
and the resolution of ratification on
the floor of the Senate.
I expect the debate here on the floor
will be thorough, and there will un-
doubtedly be amendments, offered, de-
bated, and voted upon. These are im-
portant matters and they deserve the
careful attention of the Senate. I hope
that all Senators will devote time and
energy to be here to participate in this
important debate. I hope that the
quality of the debate will serve to
inform the American people and to re-
assure them about the thoroughness
of the procedure by which this Senate
approaches this extremely important,
and why not say critical matter. I
intend to, and at the moment it is my
intention to support consent to the
ratification of the INF Treaty. I be-
lieve it passes the critical test which is
that it enhances the security of the
United States, and it is a list, and that
it is in- the interest of NATO to ratify
the treaty. Several issues are likely to
attract considerable attention in
coming days. The Foreign Relations
Committee has reported a resolution
of ratification with a suggested condi-
tion on treaty interpretation.
Such a condition is necessary, in my
view, in light of our experience over
the past 2 years with the issue of
treaty interpretation. In light of the
insistence by parts of the administra-
tion that testimony by administration
officials is not authoritative in the in-
terpretation of provisions of a treaty,
and that only the classified negotiat-
ing record is authoritative, we had to
arrange for the administration to pro-
vide us with the entire negotiating
record. We established a separate
office, the Arms Control Treaty
Review Support Office, which has ex-
haustively evaluated that record, de-
veloped a sophisticated computer pro-
gram to evaluate that record, so that
comparisons could be made by the
committees of that record with the
testimony being provided by adminis-
tration officials. The system has
worked well, and sets an important
precedent for consideration of future
treaties.
I also believe it will be necessary to
attach a binding condition concerning
the issue of future technologies. ,As a
result of the exchange of notes in
Geneva last week, the two sides have
now clearly stated their, common un-
derstanding that the INF Treaty bans
all intermediate-range and shorter-
range missiles, regardless of the type
of weapons they carry. This under-
standing should have equal status
with the other elements of the treaty,
in my opinion, and I will support a
condition on the resolution of ratifica-
tion which binds the two sides to this
statement.
I believe this is an important treaty,
dealing with important issues which
S 6017
critically affect the security of our-
selves and our allies. It is not, in my
opinion, militarily insignificant or a
minor matter. The treaty breaks new
ground by requiring the complete
elimination of classes of weapons, by
requiring an intrusive inspection and
verification system, and in the degree
of cooperation required from basing
countries and allies in implementing
the treaty.
Madam President, I hope the treaty
can be approved without attaching ad-
ditional conditions on policy and on
United States-Soviet relations which
are not directly related to the treaty
itself and the matters it covers.
Like other Senators, I have a
number of concerns about Soviet be-
havior in various parts of the world.
We all know that their invasion of Af-
ghanistan and the bloody 8-year war
in that country was devastating to the
last arms control treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union
and, as a matter of fact, was a deciding
factor that prevented that treaty from
being called up by the then majority
leader, myself, for debate and action
on this floor.
When the Soviets went into Afghan-
istan in the summer of 1979, that, of
course, was the straw that broke the
treaty's back, and I never called up
that treaty.
As I indicated to Mr. Gorbachev
when he was in this city a few weeks
back, in the presence of other Sena-
tors, it would be very helpful when we
consider this treaty if we could have a
timetable on the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan.
It was my intention at that time to
have several days of debate on Af-
ghanistan during consideration of this
treaty and to attach some reservation
or declaration or understanding or
statement of some kind that would put
the Senate in a strong position with
respect to advocating the withdrawal
of the Soviets from Afghanistan. The
Soviets have now established and pub-
licized a timetable for their removal,
and I commend the administration,
and in particular I commend Secretary
of State Shultz. Because of the fact
that that timetable has now been pub-
licly established, the debate on this
treaty will be much shorter than it
otherwise would have been.
I do not have in mind anything by
way of any reservation that I will seek
to attach to the treaty, and I do not
have in mind any long debate, so far as
I am concerned, in that regard. But
that was certainly a very forward step
taken by Mr. Gorbachev, and it saved
a lot of the Senate's time in the delib-
, erations on this treaty.
So it is a hopeful sign that as we
take up this INF Treaty, the Soviets
have decided to acknowledge their fail-
ure to subjugate that brave country
and those brave people who believe in
freedom, who put freedom above their
lives, and the Soviets are beginning to
withdraw.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23 CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6018 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
I encourage the Senate to thorough-
ly examine and debate the treaty
itself, and not go too far afield into
other policy areas that can be debated
on other vehicles, because we must re-
Member that, after all, we are debat-
ing an arms control treaty. r hope we
will try to stay as close as we can to
that subject matter.
I want to commend the Republican
leader for the support he has, given to
the imperative that the Senate fulfill
its proper role in connection with the
approval and ratification of treaties.
I also commend, once again, the
chairmen of the Committees on For-
eign Relations, Armed Services, and
Intelligence, and the ranking members
thereof.
I know that perhaps one ranking
member of those three committees is
not wholly supportive- of the treaty.
Nevertheless, he it fulfilling his re-
sponsibility as he sees it. That is his
right and that is his duty?to fulfill
his responsibility as he sees it.
Having said that, Madam President,
I close by asking unanimous consent
to have printed in the RECORD certain
excerpts from the report to which I al-
luded and certain excerpts from the
report creating the Soviet arms con-
trol observer group delegation.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
Tire INF TREATY AND. THE FUTURE OF THE
ALLIANCE
(Report by Majority Leader Romer C.
Etyma
FOREWORD
May- 11, 1988.
From February 6-14, 1988, I led a biparti-
san Senate delegation to five NATO capitals
to investigate and discuss matters related to
the INF Treaty. Accompanying me on the
delegation were, the leaders of the three
committees with responsibilities for aspects
of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INFI Treaty: Senator Claiborne Pelle
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
the committee with jurisdiction over the
Treaty; Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services; Senator
John W. Warner, Ranking Member, Com-
mittee on Armed Services; and Senator
David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence.
The purpose of the trip was to head con-
sultations and discussions with government
leaders, opposition politicians, and leading
figures from academia and the media in key
NATO countries, focusing on the INF
Treaty and its significance for the future of
the NATO Alliance. At the time of the trip,
all three committees were in the process of
holding, hearings on aspects and implica-
tions of the Treaty. President Reagan
signed the Treaty with the Soviet leader,
Mikhail Gorbachev, on December 8, 1987, in
Washington. D.C., and submitted it to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratifica-
tion on January 25, In& Since the United
States, in essence, negotiated this- Treaty
with the, Soviet Union on behalf of the
NATO Alliance, the Senate leadership
deemed It important to seek directly Euro-
pean leaders,' views and advice as an integral
part of, the process of reviewing the Treaty.
At the outset of the trip, the delegation
attended the 25th annual International
Wehrkunde Meeting in Munich, Federal Re-
public of Germany, the theme of which was
"The American-Russian Disarmament Nego-
tiations anti their Consequences." At this
conference, a sizable representation of offi-
cials from all NATO countries, as well as
opinion-makers and outside experts, were
gathered. Both Senator Nunn and I deliv-
ered addresses to that gathering, which are
included in this report as Appendices A and
B. The delegation had an opportunity to
hear a variety of informed opinions as to
the future security needs of and challenges
for the Alliance. Following that conference,
the delegation traveled to London, Bonn,
Paris, Ankara, and Rome. In each capital, it
met the head of state or of government. Ad-
ditionally, it met with the defense and for-
eign ministers at each stop, opposition lead-
ers, and opinion-makers, as well as with
both foreign and American press represent-
atives. A full listing of those individuals fol-
lows:
OFFICIAL DEL rGATION MEETINGS
Munich
Senators Byrd and Norm addressed Wehr-
kunde Conference
Luncheon meeting with Dr. Willem Van Ee-
. keen,. Minister of Defense of the Neth-
erlands and Chairman of the Eurogrorip
Defense Ministers
London
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Defense Minister George Younger
Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs David Mellor
Former leader of the Social Democratic
Party David Owen
Luncheon hosted by Ambassador Price,
guests included Labour Party Leader,
Mr. Neil Kinnock
Bonn
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Defense Minister Manfred Woerner
Minister of State Helmut Schaefer, Foreign
Office
Mr. Karsten D. Voight, SPD, Bundestag
Deputy.' SPD Spokesman, Foreign Af-
fairs Committee
Mr. Wolfgang Boetsch, CSU, Bundestag
Deputy
Dr. Gerhart Baum, FDP, Bundestag Deputy
Paris
President Francois Mitterrand
President of the National Assembly Jacques
Chaban-Delmas
Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimand
Defense Minster Andre Giraud
Chairman of Military Committee of French
National Assembly, M. Francois Fillon
Turkey
President Kenan Eden
Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz
Defense Minister Evran Vuralhan
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Necip Torum-
- tay
President of Turkish Grand National As-
sembly Yiklirins Akhulut
Italy
Prime Minister Giovanni Goria
President of National Assembly Giovanni
Spadolini
Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti
Defense Minister Valerio Zanone
Transcripts of various round table discus-
sions and meetings the delegation had with
the press are reproduced in the appendices.
The Alliance is currently enjoying the
fruits of its steadfastness in pursuing a ne-
gotiated agreement on land-based interme-
diate-range nuclear forces. By following
through on the 1979 dual track decision to
deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and
May 17, 1.988
Pershing II ballistic missiles while, at the
same time, pursuing discussions et limits on
those missiles, the Alliance has achieved a
great victory. This victory was not achieved
without considerable ,courage and the ex-
penditure of political capital by leaders in
each of the NATO countries. Through cour-
age and farsightedness, NATO was able to
reaffirm the principles that the Alliance
will take whatever steps are necessary for
Its own security, and that its members will
stand together in pursuit of these common
objectives,
Inevitably, the attainment of the Alliance
objective of total elimination of these sys-
tems through, asymmetrical reductions
opens the agenda for the next set of deci-
sions which must be addressed. Therefore,
this delegation focused on the challenges
and decisions facing NATO -in the post-INF
era, rather than solely on the question of
treaty ratification. The Alliance as a. whole
is to be commended for the victory in at-
taining the treaty, but this is not a time for
excessive self-satisfaction or relaxation. In-
stead, a healthy period of reexamination,
assessment, and planning for the Alliance
future is in order. The leaders with whom
the delegation met shared this view.
This Congressional delegation visited
NATO capitals at a time of renewed debate
and discussion regarding the Alliance's pur-
poses and future directions. Although the
treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF) represents a victory for Alliance cohe-
sion and steadfastness in pursuing a
common policy, it also represents the end of
a ten-year phase during which INF was at
the core of Alliance efforts in arms control
and force modernization.
At this time, the full Senate is considering
the INF Treaty and it is hoped that this
report will provide useful perspectives on
the issues which form the larger interna-
tional context for the accord. Finally, the
delegation notes with appreciation the prep-
aration of this report by Richard D'Amato,
Scott Harris, and Wendy Deker.
ROBERT C. Been, Majority Leader,
Delegation Chairman,
INTRODUCTION
The delegation embarked on the visit with
three objectives. The first of these was to
receive firsthand the unfiltered views of the
leaders of the alliance regarding the INF
Treaty. Given the significance of this treaty
for European security and for the continued
unity of NATO, views of the European
Allies constitute an important factor to be
taken into account during the Senate's con-
sideration of this treaty_
A second objective was to discuss, not only
with government officials but with opposi-
tion leaders and private citizens as well, the
impact of the treaty on the future of
NATO. The Alliance will face crucial, and
potentially controversial, decisions in the
post-INF political and military environ-
ments. In the opinion of the delegation, it is
important to begin now to consider these
issues and to begin to formulate a common
course_ In particular, it is important that
NATO identify a common set of objectives
for the next round of arms control, particu-
larly in the area of conventional arms re-
ductions. Many useful suggestions in this
regard were identified during the course of
the delegation's discussions with European
leaders..
The third objective of the delegation's
visit was to explore with European counter-
parts their perceptions of the objectives and
style of Soviet policy toward the West, par-
ticularly the impact of Soviet diplomacy on
Western public opinion. Is there a general-
ized perception that the threat to Western
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
security has diminished, or that NATO's
strategy of deterrence based on the capabil-
ity for flexible response is no longer widely
supported?
In addition to the mission of listening to
European views and learning about the
trends of European public opinion, the dele-
gation also conveyed to interested European
audiences, in public as well as private ses-
sions, a message concerning the U.S. com-
mitment to NATO and the inherent stabili-
ty of the American political system. Particu-
larly in an election year, when the level of
political rhetoric and debate could convey
confused and conflicting images of the
United States to Europeans, the fact that
the Senate of the United States is a continu-
ing body is worth recalling and emphasizing.
Moreover, the members of the delegation
focused on the essential facts that the INF
Treaty is a victory for NATO unity and co-
? hesion, and that, regardless of the debate
over ratification which will ensue in the
coming weeks, it is highly likely that the
Senate will consent to the Treaty's ratifica-
tion. For that reason, it is important for
NATO to begin now to look beyond the spe-
cifics of the INF Treaty and to focus on
future challenges.
A. CONTEX': BACKGROUND THEMES OF THE
VISIT
Several developments related either to the
INF Treaty or to political trends in Europe
occurred during the time of the delegation's
visit. They provided important background
themes, the essential context in which the
discussions in Europe took place.
a. INF TREATY INTERPRETATION
Most visible of these background develop-
ments was the ongoing controversy over
future interpretation by the executive
branch of the INF Treaty, a controversy
which stems from the efforts of the Reagan
Administration to reinterpret the ABM
Treaty in a manner different from its tradi-
tional interpretation. The possibility of
delays in Senate consideration of the INF
Treaty as a result of the dispute between
the Senate and . the Administration over
whether Administration testimony as to the
meaning of the Treaty would 'be authorita-
tive and binding in the future received con-
siderable attention during the trip.
Senators Byrd, Pell, Nunn and Boren en-
gaged Secretary Shultz and Ambassadors
Kampelman and Nitze in an extensive dis-
cussion of this issue in the weeks leading up
to the delegation's departure, without
reaching a final agreement. Nevertheless,
the records of the negotiations on the
Treaty were delivered to the Senate on Feb-
ruary 5, 1988, and terms for access to the
records had been arranged. Senators Byrd
and Nunn alerted the Secretary in a letter
on February 5, 1988; that due to the Admin-
istration's failure to provide any assurances
with regard to future interpretation of the
INF Treaty, consideration of the Treaty in
the Senate could be delayed pending the
outcome of the interpretation dispute. This
letter was widely reported in the. press, and
the issue was frequently raised during the
delegation's first few days in Europe.
Senator Byrd and Senator Nunn took the
opportunity of the dispute to educate the
European audiences on the role of the
Senate in the treaty-making process in the
United States. As part of this effort, they
assured the European publics that this dis-
pute would be resolved, that it was a proce-
dural and Constitutional dispute which
probably would have little bearing on the
actual outcome (i.e., likely consent to ratifi-
cation) regarding the INF Treaty, but that
it was necessary to resolve the issue, espe-
cially as it relates to the instant treaty.
When, on February 10, 1988, the Secre-
tary of State responded with another letter
clarifying his position, Senators Byrd and
Nunn indicated at a news conference in
Paris that the response was generally satis-
factory and that the possibility of a delay in
consideration of the Treaty as a result of
this dispute appeared to have been eliminat-
ed. The dispute makes it highly likely, how-
ever, that the Senate will address the issue
during consideration of the Treaty, and Eu-
ropeans should expect such an outcome.
(For texts of the letters and the Senators'
statement, see Appendix N.)
Despite the favorable progress toward re-
solving this dispute, the debate over treaty
interpretation raises questions in the minds
of many Europeans about the stability of
the American system and the ability of the
United States to conclude treaties in good
faith. The delegation emphasived that this
issue was not the result of any actions initi-
ated by the Congress and that, moreover, it
was the Congress which had resisted at-
tempts by the Administration to reinterpret
the meaning of the ABM treaty. The delega-
tion also stressed that actions currently
being pursued in the Senate should lead to a
satisfactory resolution of this issue.
b. AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND THE
DANGER OF "DECOUPLING"
The prospect of the withdrawal of a class
of nuclear weapons from Europe has again
raised anxieties about "decoupling" and the
credibility of the American commitment to
European security. While the Pershings and
Cruise Missiles are often portrayed simply
as a response to the SS-20 deployments by
the Soviet Union, it is important to remem-
ber that they were also justified as part of
the continuum of NATO's deterrent capa-
bilities, a necessary rung on the ladder of es-
calatory options. Removal of this rung un-
derstandablY creates uncertainties. This
natural reaction is given increased impetus
by the fact that, within the NATO countries
themselves, significant political constituen-
cies remain opposed to nuclear weapons and
fearful of their continued deployment in
large quantities in Europe. The Soviets, of
course, seek to exploit these fears through a
skillful propaganda campaign and a diplo-
matic offensive aimed at highlighting these
fears. Soviet leaders seek to engage the Alli-
ance in discussions on the remaining short-
range nuclear weapons prior to addressing
issues such as the imbalances in convention-
al and chemical forces. Added to this vola-
tile mix of nuclear anxieties have been the
confusing signals sent by Washington
during the past few years concerning the
nuclear guarantee and the United States'
commitments to nuclear deterrence.
This concern has become more pro-
nounced since the U.S.-Soviet sammit at
Reykjavik hi 1986. The impression conveyed
from that summit was that the United
States'was uncertain about the value of nu-
clear deterrence in the European theater,
raising old fears of a "decoupling" of Amer-
ica and Europe, and fueling the arguments
of those who believe that Europe should
become a "nuclear-free zone." The denu-
clearization of Europe appears to be a high
priority for the Soviet Union, which will
miss no opportunity to exploit either divi-
sion in the West or confusion on the ques-
tion of nuclear deterrence.
The delegation took the opportunity to re-
affirm the commitment to the NATO strate-
gy of flexible response and to indicate that
there is broad support in the United States
and in the Senate for NATO and for the
current NATO strategy. As Chancellor Kohl
and others remarked during the visit, it has
been the credibility of the nuclear deterrent
which has been of central importance in
S 6019
breaking the cycle of wars on the European
continent for the last 43 years.
Related to the question of American stay-
ing power was the perception that the
United States may be considering the with-
drawal of troops from Europe. Secretary of
Defense Frank C. Carlucci delivered an ad-
dress at the Wehrkunde Conference with
could have been interpreted as making just
such a threat, resulting in newspaper head-
lines with an alarmist tone, such as "U.S.
Warns of Troop Pullout if Bonn Bars Nucle-
ar Arms," which appeared in the Interna-
tional Herald Tribune (see Appendix C).
While this characterization of the Secretary
of Defense's remarks may be stronger than
he intended, the theme of threatened U.S.
withdrawal of troops from Europe in the ab-
sence of continued commitments to nuclear
modernization continually reappeared
throughout the next several days. It con-
tributed more to European anxieties about
American presence and commitment that it
did to the rallying of opinion behind
common security objectives. Such state-r
ments contain the danger of undoing much
of the good that was done by Alliance soli-
darity throughout the INF negotiations.
Moreover, since the remarks could be seen
to be directed at particular factions within
the Federal Republic, German sensitivities
were somewhat aroused by this public brow-
beating of an ally. Such apparent or miscon-
strued threats should be avoided as they are
counterproductive, and the apparent use of
them by United States officials can do our
Allies a disservice.
Additional concerns in Europe could be
found regarding the shifting priorities of
the United States, particularly in light of
the report Discriminate Deterrence recently
issued by a Blue-Ribbon Department of De-
fense task force. The delegation pointed out
that although this report has received con-
siderable attention in Europe, it is not au-
thoritative or representative of a consensus
In the U.S. Senate.
C. MEETING THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN AN ERA
OF CONSTRAINED BUDGETS
Most of the major NATO countries, in-
cluding the United States, will not be able
to meet the goal of real increases in defense
spending of 3% in the coming year. The
United States has not met this goal for the
past two years. Only Italy will come close to
this goal. Turkey is making a positive effort
but the Turks face the greatest require-
ments for modernization and must rely on
security assistance from the United States
and West Germany to meet their minimum
security needs.
This fact is well understood in NATO, but
the regularity with which the goal of 3% in-
creases are missed suggests that this is no
longer a useful yardstick for measuring
Allied contributions to the common alefense.
It is unrealistic to expect Allied govern-
ments to increase dramatically the shares of
government spending devoted to defense.
This does not mean, however, that improve-
ments cannot be made in the ways in which
the money is/spent or in the efficiency of
expenditure. The delegation, and Senator
Num in particular, urged the Allies to coop-
erate more effectively in an effort to "think
smarter, not richer," in order to provide the
types of conventional forces which the Alli-
ance will require.
The importance of devoting sufficient re-
sources to defense lies in the critical rela-
tionship between credible conventional de-
fense forces and the nuclear, option which
backs up the conventional forces. NATO
does not have as a goal matching the
Warsaw Pact gun for gun or tank for tank.
There is no need for that on the part of a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6020 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
defensive alliance. On the other hand, reli-
ance on nuclear weapons as the exclusive
deterrent to aggression raises deep concerns
among publics in Allied countries and could
be seen as lacking credibility by potential
aggressors. NATO has established an offi-
cial goal of having sufficient stocks to
achieve the ability to defend NATO terri-
tory conventionally for thirty days, but only
the United States comes close to meeting
this objective among the NATO allies.
These issues of burden sharing, reduced
funds available for conventional forces, de-
clining or inadequate levels of assistance to
the Southern Region countries, and ineffi-
cient expenditure of resources among
NATO partners will confront the Alliance
with major challenges in the coming years.
They constitute an important backdrop to
the need for progress toward conventional
arms control and conventional force reduc-
tions in the coming months.
d. PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE
Considerable press attention was focused
on the delegation's visit. Press events and
public discussions with journalists and com-
mentators were held at each stop. This af-
forded the delegation the opportunity not
only to hear the views of knowledgeable ob-
servers of the European scene, but also to
convey to European publics, through the
media, messages concerning the role of the
Senate in the American Constitutional
system and the fact that the Senate is a
source of stability and continuity in Ameri-
can policy.
The following sections describe the princi-
pal themes discussed in each country visited
by the delegation, with a final section sum-
marizing the findings and observations of
the delegation.
B. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
The delegation spent a fruitful day in
Bonn on February 9, 1988, in discussions
with leading figures in the Federal Repub-
lic, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl, For-
eign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, De-
fense Minister Manfred Woerner, and other
officials. ?
There is widespread agreement in the Fed-
eral Republic that the INF Treaty should
be ratified without amendment. Despite ini-
tial doubts about the "second zero" of short-
range INF missiles and reluctance to scrap
the German Pershing I's, the Treaty has
widespread support in the German govern-
ment, in the opposition, and among the gen-
eral public.
The issues foremost on the agenda in the
Federal Republic concern the nature and
scope of future arms control negotiations,
the timetable for decisions concerning mod-
ernization, and bilateral relations between
the Federal Republic and other NATO
allies, particularly France. These issues are,
of course, overlaid by the dynamics of
German domestic politics, where the opposi-
tion Social Democratic Party is showing in-
creased strength at the Land level and
where tensions on these issues within the
ruling coalition can be discerned.
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON SHORT-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES
The themes which were examined during
the meetings in Bonn were previewed in the
speeches by Chancellor Kohl and opposition
Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Hans-
Jochen Vogel at the Wehrkunde Confer-
ence. Vogel, although carefully couching his
words in terms of overall support for the Al-
liance, nevertheless raised a number of
issues which clearly run counter to the con-
sensus among NATO governments today
and could presage future controversies in
NATO. He indicated, for example, the
SPD's support for Simultaneous pursuit of
negotiations to reduce the conventional
force imbalance and further efforts to nego-
tiate limits on short-range nuclear forces.
This view is also shared by many in the'
ruling coalition.
In contrast to the apparent position of Dr.
Vogel, officials in the Federal Republic ex-
pressed their opposition to the "Third Zero"
of short-range land-based ballistic missile
reductions. But a significant cleavage, not
only within German opinion but also be-
tween Germany and the rest of the NATO
Alliance, may be developing concerning the
timing of discussions concerning the short-
range systems. Both Chancellor Kohl and
Foreign Minister Genscher appear to favor
'beginning discussions on reducing the short-
range nuclear systems deployed in Europe
(most of which, of course, are deployed by
NATO in West Germany and by the
Warsaw Pact in East Germany) at the same
time discussions on limiting conventional
forces are undertaken, a position which ap-
pears to be in line with that outlined by Dr.
Vogel at Wehrkunde. West German officials
argue that the communique of the NATO
ministerial meeting at Reykjavik endorses
this concept. This view is not shared by the
other NATO Allies. Even within Germany,
the fear was expressed that undertaking
such discussions could result in NATO
facing a Soviet proposal for a third zero
which would be hard to resist. It is likely
that disagreements over the. timing of dis-
cussions on further efforts to reduce short-
range nuclear arms in Europe will charac-
terize Alliance discussions in coming
months. This issue could become one of sig-
nificant dispute within the NATO alliance
unless handled skillfully and carefully.
OVERALL SECURITY CONCEPT
The German officials with whom the Con-
gressional delegation met placed a great
deal of emphasis on the need for an overall
concept of security to guide the Alliance in
its force modernization decisions and in its
arms control approach to the Warsaw Pact.
While it would be possible to see this as an
effort to delay tough decisions or to revisit
decisions which the Alliance has already
made, it can also be seen as a legitimate con-
cern and one which the Alliance should take
seriously. The Federal Republic can be ex-
pected to press this view in coming month's.
As the Alliance struggles to define a
common position for new talks on conven-
tional stability in Europe, talks which may
start later this year, it will be important for
the Alliance to be guided by a common set
of objectives and a shared vision as to the
desired outcomes of the negotiations. It goes
without saying that asymmetrical reduc-
tions in Warsaw Pact troops will be re-
quired, but in the absence of a common set
of goals and a vision of the final outcome of
the talks, the Alliance runs the risk that
Soviet proposals which appear good on the
surface could be used to great public rela-
tions effects in the West without an effec-
tive counter by NATO governments. This
must be avoided, and, to that extent, the
German emphasis on a strategic concept
should be welcomed. Focus on the concept
could have the additional benefit of provid-
ing the means by which the French can be
truly brought on board an Alliance-wide po-
sition in the talks.
Officials in Germany, and Chancellor
Kohl in particular, emphasized that NATO
is about to enter into a contest of "religion"
and-psychology with the Soviet Union over
the question of conventional force reduc-
tions, and that it is very important for
NATO to seize the psychological initiative
on these issues in the coming year. NATO
should take advantage of the momentum
generated by the INF agreement to formu-
May 17, 1.988
late a proposal on conventional arms control
which unites the West and challenges the
Soviets.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
The question of modernization of short-
range nuclear weapons was one which arose
at every session with German officials.
Chancellor Kohl carefully skirted the issue
of modernization in his address at the
Wehrkunde gathering, artfully avoiding the
use of the term. While the Congressional
delegation strongly supports the Montebello
approach to these issues and believes that
all NATO Allies should fulfill their respon-
sibilities within the NATO context, the dele-
gation shared the view in Germany that
modernization of short-range forces and the
INF Treaty are separate issues which are
not and should not be directly linked. The
delegation shares the view of Defense Minis-
ter Woerner and others that the issues of
nuclear modernization and the nature of
the specific systems to be modernized are
decisions which should be handled in due
course as part of the Alliance's routine nu-
clear planning process. There is no need for
a bruising public debate on these issues at
the present time.
BILATERAL INITIATIVES
Concerning the initiatives with France
and the formation of the Franco-German
Defense Council and the jointly-manned
brigade, the German government argues
forcefully that bilateral initiatives with
France are designed to bring France more
fully into cooperation with NATO, and are
not part of the creation of a rival force to
NATO. German officials also express strong
support for the efforts of the Action Com-
mittee for Europe and the strengthening of
the European Pillar?and contend that
France must be brought into these efforts.
It is unlikely that the scope and extent of
the bilateral cooperation will extend beyond
the recently established single brigade in
the near future, but it could be expanded in
principle. The Germans, of course, wish to
use the brigade as a device to draw the
French more firmly into the forward de-
fense concept of NATO as well. The delega-
tion expressed, in general, its support for
improved bilateral initiatives, emphasizing
the importance of avoiding the creation of
organizations competitive with NATO.
German officials carefully noted that the
forces committed to the joint brigade in no
way would reduce the numbers of German
forces committed to NATO.
SOVIET POLICY
The diplomatic efforts of the Soviet
Union and the dynamic public relations of-
fensive which Mr. Gorbachev is capable of
mounting will doubtless be directed at the
Federal -Republic with special force in the
coming months. Chancellor Kohl, in recall-
ing the extensive efforts to block develop-
ments of the INF, which the Soviets encour-
aged in direct and indirect ways, noted that
he has seen no deviation in the Soviet objec-
tive of isolating Germany and splitting it
from the ret of NATO under the Gorba-
chev regime. While we are unlikely to see in
the near future the spectacle of 300,000
demonstrators gathered on the lawn outside
the Chancellor's office, as was the case prior
to INF deployments, it is worth recalling
that great political obstacles were overcome
in successfully implementing the INF deci-
sion, and that future decisions may require
commensurate efforts.
C. BRITAIN
The delegation met with British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, Defense Min-
ister George Younger, Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1.988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mellor, and with the former leader of the
Social Democratic Party (and former
Shadow Labour Defense Spokesman) David
Owen. In addition, a luncheon with Neil
Kinnock and other leaders of the opposi-
tion, Labour Party was hosted by the Am-
bassador.
The discussions in Britain centered on the
security issues facing the Alliance in the
post-INF environment, with attention to the
themes which characterized discussions in
all countries: maintaining the unity and co-
hesion of NATO; responding to the chal-
lenges of Soviet initiatives in all spheres,
but especially in conventional arms control;
pursuit of cooperative ventures with Francg
without, at. the same time, undermining the
unity and cohesiveness of NATO; and mod-
ernization of remaining nuclear systems in
NATO.
Strong support exists among officials in
the British government for the ratification
of the INF treaty without substantial
amendments or reservations which would
alter its fundamental character. Officials
expressed satisfication with the manner in
which consultations on INF had been con-
ducted by the United States before the
summit. The British, not unlike other
NATO allies, had been concerned following
the Reykjavik summit about comments
made by President Reagan questioning the
utility of nuclear deterrence and favoring a
nuclear-free world, but, on the whole, these
concerns appear to have been mollified. At
bottom, the view was expressed that it
would be a disaster if the INF Treaty were
not ratified, if the word of the U.S. Presi-
dent in these matters could not be taken se-
riously.
Mrs. Thatcher, in particular, went to con-
siderable lengths to express her own view
that the nuclear genie could not be put back
into the bottle, and that efforts to try to do
so would be in vain. She stated that her
preference is for a world free from war, not
a world free from nuclear weapons. Indeed,
it is nuclear weapons and NATO's doctrine
of deterrence through flexible response that
has preserved the peace in Europe.
Getting the French to act in support of
the NATO Alliance, even if they refuse to
rejoin the integrated military command, is
an objective of British policy. The skepti-
cism regarding the French-German brigade,
which had been voiced earlier by Mrs.
Thatcher, seemed to have been toned down
during the visit of the delegation. Instead,
Mrs. Thatcher and others emphasized that
they welcomed French activities which
could be seen as supportive of NATO's ob-
jectives. The British are opposed to the cre-
ation of multilateral organizations which
could be seen to compete with NATO. For
these reasons they did not support the in-
clusion of forces from other countries in the
French-German brigade, and they also be-
lieved that the institutions of the Western
European Union should be co-located in
Brussels. Finally, the British expressed sup-
port for cooperative development of a stand-
off missile by the United States, United
Kingdom, and France rather than solely a
bilateral British-French project. Again, the
objective is to bring the French more closely
into cooperation with NATO.
Mr. Gorbachev is viewed by the British
government with skepticism and caution.
While he can be seen aa a reformer in the
Soviet domestic sense, his foreign policy re-
mains based on the military power of the
Soviet Union and on efforts to drive a wedge
between members of NATO, particularly be-
tween the United States and Europe and be-
tween the West Germans and the rest of
NATO. Soviet arms control proposals will be
couched in terms designed to have the maxi-
mum psychological impact on Western pub-
^
lies. It will be important to prepare appro-
priate responses, and to develop our own
proposals which seize the initiative.
The British government is emphatic in
stating its belief that discussions on limiting
NATO's short-range nuclear forces should
not begin until pi oat ess has been made on
more pressing issues of chemical weapons
and the conventional forces imbalance. The
British also argue that modernization of
short-range forces should proceed with no
delays. It is possible to proceed in two sepa-
rate boxes, one focusing on the agreements
made at Montebello, and the other focusing
on the current work of NATO's Nuclear
Planning Group, which is considering spe-
cific proposals which might be seen as im-
plementing the Montebello and Reykjavik
agreements by NATO. The British are un-
abashed in their willingness to press the
Germans on the point of nuclear moderniza-
tion, rejecting the German argument that,
negotiations on short-range nuclear forces
can occur simultaneously with negotiations
on conventional forces. The British govern-
ment is also skeptical about the position of
FRG officials that, once begun, the discus-
sions on shorter-range systems can be limit-
ed to proposals for equal ceilings on each
side rather than the Third Zero. In the Brit-
ish view, the entire Soviet approach is
aimed at reducing the nuclear deterrent in
Europe, and discussions on short-range sys-
tems are subject to manipulation for public
impact. Therefore, they should be avoided.
While supportive of a START agreement
at the earliest time feasible, the British are
adamantly opposed to the inclusion of any
third country systems under START ceil-
ings until well after superpower arsenals
have been reduced by fifty percent. They
are also concerned that START counting
rules for Trident missiles not have an ad-
verse impact on the British Trident system.
D. FRANCE
During a two-day stop in Paris, the delega-
tion met for an hour and a half with French
President Francois Mitterrand, and had ex-
tensive discussions with Foreign Minister
Jean-Bernard Raimond, Defense Minister
Andre Giraud, President of the National As-
sembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Chair-
man of the National Defense and Armed
Forces Committee of the National Assembly
Francois Fillon. In addition, the delegation
rnet for two hours in a round table discus-
sion with French intellectuals and journal-
ists on'the range of issues confronting the
Alliance. The transcript of that round table
discussion is included in Appendix J. It pro-
vides important insights into the range of
French views on the security issue.
..The visit to Paris came at a time of impor-
tant reassessment by the French of the
state of the Atlantic relationship, and the
delegation was given an articulate exposi-
tion of the various risks which the Alliance
currently faces. The visit also occurred at a
time when the French have undertaken his-
toric initiatives with the Germans in cooper-
ative arrangements in the military field. On
January 22, 1988, President Mitterrand and
Chancellor Kohl strengthened their ties by
forming a high-level military commission to
coordinate Franco-German policies on de-
fense and arms control matters. Second, the
French responded enthusiastically to Chan-
cellor Kohl's offer to form a Franco-
German military brigade, composed of
3,000-4,000 troops. At the time of the dele-
gation's visit, the planning for the brigade
was proceeding smoothly. Despite initial
reservations by other European NATO part-
ners (primarily Italy and Great Britain), a
growing. consensus on the acceptability of
the arrangement can now be discerned. The
delegation repeated its view, expressed in
S 6021
Germany as well, that this is a generally
positive development.
ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS SUPPORTED
President Mitterrand was emphatic in his
support for the INF Treaty, and noted that
he wasn't merely paying "lip service." He
outlined his opposition in principle to the
development of intermediate-range nuclear
weapons,. based on his belief that they
weaken deterrence because they could lead
an adversary to question one's resolve to use
strategic weapons in response to aggression.
He gave a spirited exposition on the need
for a high level of, deterrence?that is, un-
questioned certainty in the mind of the ad-
versary that any attack would meet with im-
mediate and overwhelming response?and of
the need for the adversary to fear such a re-
sponse. Thus, his approval of the INF agree-
ment, which he indicated he believed to be
stronger than that of most European lead-
ers, was based in part on his lack of enthusi-
asm for the doctrine of flexible response.
A corollary to the President's view in this
regard in his relative lack of enthusiasm for
modernization of short-range nuclear mis-
siles and artillery. Mitterrand is thus more
supportive of what appears to be the
German government's position on this issue
than are most other European officials.
Mitterrand favored a START agreement,
but did not feel it made much of a differ-
ence, given the overwhelming size of the su-
perpower's arsenals. On the other hand, he
emphasized his conviction that the "most
urgent priority" in arms control was to
move forward on negotiations on conven-
tional arms reductions, both to reassure
Western publics and to indicate to the Sovi-
ets that we are watching them and will not
let them go any further to tilt the balance
in this area. Mitterrand said that, while "re-
ductions of 50 percent (START) is a good
thing, it doesn't diminish the risk, especially
for Europe. It would be more important,
more significant to see an agreement
reached. in the fields of conventional and
chemical weapons." He emphasized that the
Senate should be aware that the conven-
tional arms reductions negotiations are the
most important negotiations that can reas-
sure America's European partners. And, like
other French officials, he contended that
short-range nuclear weapons should be sep-
arated from the conventional talks.
Foreign Minister Raimond observed that
the major risk that must be understood is
that of iirecipitous" negotiations with the
Soviets which further advance the Soviet
goal of denucleaxizing Europe. A specific
manifestation of this problem'could include
being swept into negotiations which put ir-
resistable pressure on the West to eliminate
all ground-launched short-range nuclear
missiles, i.e., the "third zero."
In Raimond's view, the very fact of having
negotiated the zero agreement in the INF
Treaty fits into the Soviet goal of denu-
clearizing Europe, a goal which is clearly a
central objective of Soviet policies toward
Europe. Thus, it is clear that Gorbachev's
next focus will be to push for a third zero
on the remaining nuclear missiles as the
further expression of this policy.
Pressure for negotiations toward a third
zero fits into the fundamental objective of
dividing NATO, because the Soviets recog-
nize the potential of the third zero to cause
strains between Germany and the United
States. (Indeed, the French noted that the
"second zero" on shorter-range missiles em-
bodied in the INF Treaty has already begun
to produce tensions between Germany and
the rest of NATO over modernization
issues.) This does not mean, of course, that
the INF Treaty is not valuable. Achieve-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6022 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ments such as asymmetrical reductions and
verification breakthroughs are duly noted.
The real question concerns the priorities of
the United States subsequent to the INF
accord. Minister Raimond listed convention-
al and chemical arms reduction talks, along
with START, as the proper focus of the
U.S. and the West for the present time.
Raimond identified a second risk which
the West faces in the post-INF ? environ-
ment, and that is to confuse nuclear and
conventional negotiations. The Soviets need
a large conventional force to maintain their
hold over Eastern Europe, and will try to
mix conventional talks with those involving
Western short range nuclear systems. The
West must not permit such mixing.
A third risk is to negotiate with the Sovi-
ets against the pressure of deadlines. For in-
stance, a good agreement on START, in-
cluding subceilings, verification and other
matters would be acceptable if reached this
year, but it appears unlikely that such an
agreement could be achieved. In no event
should time deadlines force the West to
agree to something which is not consistent
with security requirements.
FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS
On the subject of French-German rela-
tions, President Mitterrand made several
important observations. First, he stated that
he has revised the De Gaulle Doctrine
whereby French forces should not be east of
the Hamburg-Munich line to avoid getting
mixed up with NATO forces. Now, instead,
French forces will be anywhere that there is
a threat of war or a war. President Mitter-
rand stated, "I . . . don't like French forces
integrated into the allied command but, if
we ? see soldiers of a neighboring country
threatened, France could not face dishonor
and pull its forces out?the only possible
course of action is to intervene." Thus,
while France will not reevaluate its decision
to avoid military reintegration into NATO,
primarily because it does not want to be a
prisoner of the decisions of the collective Al-
liance, these statements on French willing-
ness to consider French security as linked
inextricably to that of its neighbors repre-
sent a significant step in France's strategic
thinking.
Mitterrand recalled that, as a young
deputy only three years after the end of
World War II, he had participated in sym-
posia oriented at the integration of Europe
and the importance of bringing Germany
back into the European community. He felt
that that challenge had been won. French-
men today, in opinion polls, rank Germany
most popular, only behind a few French-
speaking countries. He praised the Franco-
German brigade and its importance in his-
toric terms, and reassured the delegation
that there was no intent on the part of
France to use it to weaken Germany's place
in NATO.
ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY
President Mitterrand praised Gorbachev's
broad-mindedness and frankness, which had
been demonstrated during his extensive per-
sonal dialogues with the Soviet leader. Mit-
terrand observed that it is irrelevant wheth-
er Gorbachev is "sincere." That is not the
question. The question is whether a politi-
cian is behaving as if he were sincere. We
have to create the conditions such that
what is stated by a leader actually happens,
to make it to his advantage to do as he says.
Mitterrand evaluated Gorbachev as the
manager of a revolution, not a revolution-
ary; a Leninist, not a Stalinist; and of the
Andropov type, not a Brezhnev or Chernen-
ko type. He is a realist. The challenge to the
West is not to do those things which are in
Gorbachev's interest only, but to work on
areas where his interests and the West's
converge.
While confident that adroit diplomacy
and careful management of the public
debate could easily counter the challenges
presented by Gorbachev, French officials
nevertheless counseled caution in dealing
with the Soviets and expressed respect for
Gorbachev's public relations skills. The key
is not to pursue either extreme in interpret-
ing Gorbachev: (1) assuming that he is
simply a Machiavellian manipulator, and
that nothing has changed, or (2) assuming
that he is a genuine reformer and that ev-
erything has changed. The West must en-
courage the changes being undertaken in
the Soviet Union, but keep a clear' eye fo-
-cused on Western security interests in nego-
tiating with the Soviet leadership.
Finally, the underlying French concern is
the effect that Gorbachev's seductive style
.is having on the West. Western leaders must
be prepared to "go against public opinion,
and convince the people" of where their real
interests lie.
Foreign Minister Raimond observed that
Gorbachev is an astute and dangerous ma-
nipulator of Western public opinion. He re-
iterated the French view that the period im-
mediately ahead would be difficult and
would present a number of risks and chal-
lenges to the West, in part due to the non-
confrontational style employed by Gorba-
chev in pursuit of traditional Soviet foreign
policy objectives.
FRENCH CONSENSUS
French Defense Minister Giraud reiterat-
ed many of the same themes expressed by
other officials. Indeed, there is broad agree-
ment in France on many questions related
to security and to nuclear weapons. Of spe-
cific interest were Minister Giraud's com-
ments that, with the march of technology,
there was enhanced need for greater coop-
eration on a wider range of technical mili-
tary matters among members of the Alli-
ance. He specifically cited both French-Brit-
ish and French-American cooperation, in ad-
dition to the initiatives that the French
were engaged in with the Germans. In Gir-
aud's view, all of this must be pursued under
the condition that such European coopera-
tion not weaken, -or appear to weaken,
NATO. The effect of the INF Treaty on Eu-
ropean security must be coldly analyzed,
from a military perspective, arid Minister
Giraud reiterated the priorities outlined by
Foreign Minister Raimond, i.e., support the
efforts on START while avoiding the trap
of discussions leading to a third nuclear zero
prior to settling the serious imbalances
which exist with the Warsaw Pact on con-
ventional and chemical weapons.
The delegation was impressed with the
creativity and seriousness of French think-
ing on security issues, and feels that the ob-
servations made in discussions in France
added greatly to the delegation's overall un-
derstanding. Efforts to strengthen the Euro-
pean Pillar of western security, in which the
French role will be critical, should be en-
couraged. The Recommendations and Decla-
ration of the Action Committee for Europe
(See Appendix 0), the significance of which
was emphasized by President of the Nation-
al Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas and by
Francois Fillon, merit careful attention in
regard to these issues.
E. TURKEY
As a NATO ally which could be subjected
to missile attacks from SS-20s based in the
Asian part of the Soviet Union, Turkey has
a special interest in the global elimination
of long-range INF missiles and, like other
NATO Allies, is supportive of the INF
agreement as negotiated. Turkey has not
had intermediate-range surface-to-surface
May 17, 1988
missiles capable of reaching the Soviet
Union based in Turkey since the Jupiters
were withdrawn in the early 1960s. Removal
of the INF missiles places all of NATO once
again in this category.
Turkey shares an extensive border with
the Soviet Union and Soviet ships must pass
through the Bosphorus as they enter and
exit the Black Sea. The geographical loca-
tion of Turkey affords it a key role in the
defense of NATO's Southern Region, and its
contribution to the conventional defense of
NATO is especially important. Therefore,
while Turkey generally welcomes the INF
agreement, the treaty will have relatively
little impact on the Turkish strategic situa-
tion. From that standpoint, the need to
modernize the Turkish conventional forces
and to present the Soviet Union with a cred-
ible conventional deterrent remain high pri-
orities, virtually unaffected by the INF
agreement.
The high priority accorded conventional
force modernization is understandable in
view of the overwhelming Soviet advantage
in the force balance opposite Turkey and in
view of the extreme needs faced by the
Turkish forces. In this context, the fact
that security assistance to Turkey has, in
the past two years, amounted to approxi-
mately half of what would be required to
implement fully the conventional force
modernization program identified by NATO
as meeting Turkey's requirements has been
a disappointment to the Turks.
The Codel met with a broad range of
Turkish officials during its brief visit to
Ankara. Despite the short duration of the
visit, a full exchange of views was held on a
variety of security issues, including but not
limited to the INF Treaty and its impact on
NATO.
As noted above, Turkish officials were
unanimous in their support for the treaty,
hailing it as a big step forward for the Alli-
ance. At the same time, as was noted in
other countries visited by the Codel, the
treaty also removes one component of the
Alliance's flexible response strategy. This
means that it will be necessary to pay con-
tinued attention to the issues of moderniza-
tion of the remaining conventional and nu-
clear forces. In Turkey, there is strong sup-
port for modernization initiatives in NATO,
and the Turkish government can be expect-
ed to participate to the limits of its ability
in these common efforts.
The Codel emphasized in its discussions
with Turkish officials, including Chief of
the Turkish General Staff General Necip
Torumtay, an appreciation of the unique ge-
ographic situation of Turkey and of the ef-
forts of the Turkish military to maintain its
capability in the face of severe resource con-
straints. The military and intelligence-gath-
ering functions which Turkey performs are
important contributions to overall Alliance
security.
Two issues which have been the sources of
some problems were discussed in this
regard: the continued deadlock on Cyprus
and the continued presence of Turkish
troops on the island, and the fact that the
Side Letters to the Defense and Economic
Cooperation Agreement (DECA) which had
been signed in March of 1987 had not yet
been fully implemented by Turkey.
With regard to Cyprus. Turkish officials
were hopeful that progress could be made in
the further reduction of Turkish presence
on the island and in achieving a diplomatic
solution to the conflict. Citing the recent
meeting in Davos, Switzerland, between
Prime Minister Ozal and Greek Prime Min-
ister Papandreou, the Codel expressed its
hope that the "spirit of Davos" could be ex-
tended in dealing with the situation on
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Cyprus. While reiterating the Turkish gov-
ernment's position that the proposals of the
United Nations Secretary General should be
accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, Turkish
officials also expressed a willingness to
pursue new avenues towards an accord, es-
pecially in light of the recent elections on
Cyprus and the fact that the Greek Cypri-
ots have elected a new leader. The Codel
strongly encouraged further steps in the di-
rection of a negotiated solution to the
Cyprus problem.
The Codel also urged Turkey to end the
delay in ratifying the DECA side letters,
noting that nearly one year had passed
since their signing. The Codel argued that
ratification of the side letters would be in
Turkey's interest and would send a positive
signal to the United States about the con-
tinued close cooperation between the two
countries. Prime Minister Ozal stated that
he would, in fact, ratify the two side letters
in the near future, as a symbol of his desire
to continue to build upon and improve the
extensive military and security cooperation
between the United States and Turkey.
(Note: Subsequently, on February 26, 1988,
the Turkish government ratified the side
letters.]
Immediately following the departure of
the Codel, the incident in the Black Sea in-
volving two U.S. warships and a Soviet
vessel occurred. This incident points up the
strategic importance of the Turkish Straits
and the continued potential for conflict in
this area. It reinforces the points made by
the Turkish General Staff in briefing the
Codel immediately prior to its departure.
F. ITALY
The Delegation arrived in Italy in the
midst of a governmental "crisis" over the
budget. Prime Minister Goria had resigned,
and it was not clear that he would be asked
to form a new government. Of course, these
"crises" occur in Italian politics with some
frequency, and they do not often result in
major changes of direction in the basic
course of Italian policy. (During the Delega-
tion's stay in Rome, Goria was asked to
form a new government by Italian President
Cossiga, but that government was also
short-lived.) In addition to its own govern-
mental dilemmas, Italy also attended the
European Community Economic Summit on
February 12, 1988, which, after thirty hours
of extremely difficult bargaining, produced
an important agreement on the future eco-
nomic structure of the Community. Despite
these distractions, Italian officials were gen-
erous with their time and with their in-
sights on the issues of concern to the Dele-
gation.
The Delegation was able to draw some
preliminary observations based on its visits
to four NATO capitals prior to Rome and to
share those observations with Italian jour-
nalists and academic experts at a meeting
on February 12, 1988. The transcript of that
session is printed in Appendix L.
The Delegation emphasized to Italian offi-
cials with whom it met that Italy's contribu-
tions to the NATO Alliance were not only
recognized but deeply appreciated. Italy was
the first country on the continent of Europe
to accept the deployments of the INF mis-
siles, thus relieving the Federal Republic of
Germany of its fears of "singularity" in de-
ployments and paving the way for the Neth-
erlands and Belgium to accept deployments
as well. At the same time, Italy has been
strongly supportive of the efforts to negoti-
ate the zero option, and is unreserved in its
support of ratification of the Treaty.
At the same time, Italian officials recog-
nized that NATO is at a moment when new
challenges must be confronted and when
NATO's cohesion will be tested. Foreign
Minister Andreotti, who has served in the
Italian government virtually throughout
the entire history of NATO, argued strongly
that NATO must formulate new approaches
for the new contingencies which lie ahead,
emphasizing at all times the unity and cohe-
sion of NATO.
The theme of the need to focus on NATO
unity and the security of the West as a
whole was a constant theme in the remarks
of Italian officials. For example, while not
unduly concerned about the French-
German brigade and efforts at improved bi-
lateral relations, the Italians warned that
such approaches could divert NATO mem-
bers from the central task, which is common
security. The Western European Union or
NATO should be the focus of most efforts.
Creating zones of "differentiated security"
in NATO must definitely be avoided.
The Delegation members shared this view,
and assured Italian officials that the United
States was committed to a strong NATO
and a unified Alliance. Senators Byrd and
Boren, in particular, praised Italy for its
willingness to step up to important Alliance
decisions, citing not only the INF deploy-
ments but also areas not strictly related to
NATO, such as the deployments to Leba-
non, the Persian Gulf, and intelligence co-
operation.
Widespread consensus was noted among
Italian officials regarding the priorities for
arms control negotiations and the next
steps which NATO should take in this
regard. The START talks were accorded a
high priority, to be followed by talks on
chemical and conventional weapons. There
was little support for beginning talks on
short-range nuclear forces before the other
talks had achieved results.
Italian officials were optimistic about the
implications of the INF Treaty for future
arms control negotiations, an attitude which
in some ways paralleled the German views.
They were pleased at the opinion expressed
by members of the Delegation that the INF
Treaty was likely to receive a favorable vote
in the Senate. They regard the principles of
asymmetrical reductions and reductions
rather than ceilings as important mile-
stones in the history of arms control,
achievements which, in the words of For-
eign Minister Andreotti, constitute a great
landmark. The hope was widely shared that
these principles could be applied in conven-
tional forces talks as well.
The Italian officials also took a pragmatic
approach to the question of nuclear mod-
ernization, Rather than press for any public
or immediate decision at the present time,
they counseled that modernization decisions
should be taken when required and pursued
in a businesslike fashion. There is no need,
according to this line of thinking, for there
to be a public crisis in the Alliance over
these issues.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The delegation encountered a widespread
consensus in the capitals visited on the es-
sential course of Alliance policy. The need
for continued unity and close cooperation
was recognized and was evident in virtually
every meeting with key officials. The dele-
gation found general agreement on: (1) the
need to explain effectively and persuasively
to Western publics the goals and purposes
of the Alliance, in order to maintain a uni-
fied front in the face of new and aggressive
propaganda challenges from the Soviet
Union; (2) the need to develop an agreed set
of priorities and to take the initiative in
dealing with Gorbachev and the new style
of Soviet leadership; and (3) the need to in-
crease cooperation and consultation, using
the model of the INF Treaty as a good ex-
ample for future efforts. At the same time,
S 6023
there was general recognition that the Alli-
ance will confront new challenges in the
coming years, and that difficult choices lie
ahead.
a. FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST
The delegation was impressed with the
sensitivity of NATO leaders to the need to
Inform and educate our respective constitu-
encies in a comprehensive and persuasive
fashion on the Alliance's priorities and
strategies. It was felt that the efforts of the
delegation in this regard would have a bene-
ficial effect on public opinion in Europe.
Although it is too early to ascertain fully
the impact of the new style of Gorbachev's
diplomacy on public opinion in Europe,
NATO leaders agree that this new style pre-
sents the West with a vigorous challenge. In
the words of a French official:
"We are entering a difficult period. West-
ern public opinion is susceptible to Gorba-
chev's charm and cleverness. We should not
be afraid of going against public opinion.
We must explain to the generally unin-
formed public where its interests lie."
A German official echoed this thought:
"The present East-West discussions are
narrowed down to the issues of disarma-
ment which, though important, are only
part of the spectrum. We will deviate from
the right course if we don't have a cool head
about it. We should make good use of the
time available, so we should make a
common conception for the West; we should
stabilize and strengthen NATO whenever
possible."
Regarding Mr. Gorbachev, another
German official commented:
"We should talk to him and base our read-
iness on the principles of concessions and
counter-concessions, and not act like mani-
acs. Our policies must be right and we have
to explain them to our people. We should
make good use of the present year to launch
a psychological offensive vis-a-vis the Gor-
bachev regime on the conventional side."
The delegation strongly believes that
NATO's efforts in the field of public expla-
nation and persuasion must be coordinated
fully and pursued in conjunction with new
initiatives in the fields of arms control and
weapons modernization. The effort at public
education and explanation particularly as it
relates to the continued importance of nu-
clear deterrence should be afforded a high
priority, and should be fully and carefully
discussed at NATO's regular meetings.
b. RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY
On the narrow question of ratification of
the INF Treaty, opinion was virtually unan-
imous that it should be approved by the
Senate for ratification, and that failure of
the United States to ratify could create a
grave crisis in Western Europe and NATO.
This view, shared broadly across the politi-
cal spectrum and in virtually every country,
prevailed despite a recognition that the
Treaty creates new uncertainties and does
not resolve many fundamental issues facing
NATO.
Opinions varied on the handling of the ne-
gotiations by the United States and the ade-
quacy of consultations with the Allies, but
the overall assessment was that consulta-
tions between the United States and Euro-
pean leaders has been excellent. Potential
criticisms of details of the treaty or of as-
pects of the inspection system were out-
weighed by the generally favorable view of
the Treaty.
The final assessment was that, having per-
suaded public opinion to accept the deploy-
ment of nuclear systems in part as a re-
sponse to the Soviet deployment of SS-20's,
and having pursued the objective of elimi-
nation of those missiles in negotiations for
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6024 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
over six years, it would be virtually impossi-
ble to convince the public that, at this
point, those systems should remain in place
and that the Treaty should be rejected.
Leaders also expressed some concern over
the political momentum generated by the
INF Treaty. In line with the concerns that
the Alliance's objectives and policies be
clearly communicated to the public, leaders
felt that the underlying security interests of
the Alliance must be clearly articulated, and
not lost sight of in the enthusiasm for nego-
tiated arms reductions. In this regard, there
was a clear consensus that arms control
agreements, including a START agreement,
should be concluded when issues in dispute
have been satisfactorily negotiated, and
should not be negotiated under the pressure
of artificial deadlines. Likewise, when and if
a sound agreement is in sight, there should
be no delay in concluding it, since to do so is
In our common interest. But the important
thing is that it be a good agreement?not
dictated by calendar deadlines or election
year politics. -
C. MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR
SYSTEMS
The modernization issues which the Alli-
ance faces have been under examination
since the 1979 INF decision and have been
intensively investigated since the Monte-
bello meeting. The Montebello framework
of reductions in total numbers of deployed
weapons accompanied by modernization of
those weapons remaining, continues to be
operative. Specific choices concerning which
systems to modernize and their precise num-
? bers are not required at the present time.
The military authorities of NATO are ex-
amining the required modernizations and
will make their recommendations at the ap-
propriate time.
There is no need to link modernization of
short-range nuclear systems with the INF
Treaty. The delegation believes that it will
be necessary to modernize certain systems
not prohibited by the Treaty, but these de-
cisions are some months in the future and
should not be at the center of our discus-
sions of the Treaty at this time.
The delegation believes, based on its dis-
cussions throughout Europe, that those sys-
tems not covered by the INF Treaty which
have longer ranges should receive priority
consideration for modernization, rather
than battlefield systems (such as artillery).
d. ARMS CONTROL PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES
- WITHIN NATO
NATO leaders must proceed carefully and
resolutely in setting priorities for arms con-
trol initiatives in the Alliance. It cannot be
overemphasized how important it will be for
NATO to coordinate its positions in such a
way that fears of "singularization" (in, for
example, the Federal Republic), or zones of
"differentiated security" (in countries not in
the Central Region) do not become serious
problems for the Alliance.
The top priority for NATO at the present
time should be to formulate a comprehen-
sive and detailed proposal on conventional
arms reductions for presentation to the
Warsaw Pact later this year. A consensus
must be built in the Alliance, and the task
will be formidable. But the attempt must be
made. The delegation believes that Europe
would welcome thoughtful, vigorous Ameri-
can leadership on these issues.
The delegation also believes that negotia-
tions on a chemical weapons ban must be
pursued with renewed energy. The delega-
tion was impressed by the seriousness with
which the European Allies view the threats
posed by the existing imbalances in chemi-
cal weapons favoring the Warsaw Pact, and
agrees that this problem demands careful
and thorough attention by the Alliance.
The delegation also believes that negotia-
tions on further tactical nuclear weapons
arms control should not be entered into
until negotiations on conventional and
chemical arms have shown results.
Progress toward a START agreement is
broadly supported but, as was pointed out
on several occasions, the issue of START is
less immediately relevant to European secu-
rity than are other arms control issues. Eu-
ropean leaders would welcome a solid
START agreement, but there is no urgent
pressure emanating from Europe to reach
one. Appropriate subceilings (an issue which
could affect the British strategic forces) and
verification procedures which are satisfac-
tory are, of course, strongly supported.
e. BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
The general assessment in the Alliance is
that bilateral arrangements such as those
between France and Germany concerning
the joint brigade are positive developments.
This arrangement could help to place long-
standing historical frictions in Europe fur-
ther behind us. Such arrangements can
complement rather than compete with
NATO if pursued properly. A widespread
consensus exists that military organizations
competing with NATO are not helpful.
At the same time, efforts to strengthen
the European Pillar of Western defense are
being reinvigorated at the present time, and
this must be viewed as a positive develop-
ment. The delegation feels that mechanisms
which could strengthen and enhance the
Allied contributions to European defense
must be encouraged wherever possible.
f. UNITED STATES POLICIES IN THE PRESENT
PERIOD
In the months ahead, the United States
must act with purpose and strength in
facing the next round of challenges. The
INF Treaty is a victory for Alliance solidari-
ty, but it represents the beginning rather
than the end of the effort to achieve lasting
stability in Europe through negotiated arms
reduction agreements.
In addition to the recommendations out-
lined above, the delegation feels that it
would not be prudent at the present time to
reassess the size of the American troop com-
mitment in Europe.
The advent of talks on conventional forces
and the post-INF political environment are
likely to draw increased attention to the im-
portance of the Southern Region in NATO's
collective defense. Italy and Turkey, along
with the other NATO members in the
Southern Region, play a vital role in Alli-
ance defense. Too often, their contributions
have been underappreciated. The delegation
welcomes the far-sighted action of the gov-
ernment of Turkey in ratifying the side let-
ters to the Defense and Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement and the actions of Spain in
renewing the basing arrangements in that
country (while noting the regrettable deci-
sion to require removal of the F-16s from
Torrejon.) It urges the administration to
pursue vigorously the current negotiations
with Greece on renewing the basing agree-
ment with that country. Similarly, the dele-
gation believes that the 401st Tactical
Fighter Wing should remain deployed in
Europe, and welcomes the Italian govern-
ment's willingness to consider basing op-
tions. NATO should strive to achieve a coop-
erative solution to this matter as soon as
possible.
ORIGIN AND SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES
ms SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP
Background
On March 12, 1985, arms control negotia-
tions between the United States and the
Soviet Union resumed after a hiatus of some
May 17, 1988
15 months, a hiatus which had resulted
from the breaking off of negotiations on In-
termediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and
START by the Soviet Union in, respectively,
November and December 1983. Because of
the importance of these new negotiations,
at the initiative of the Majority and Minori-
ty leaders, the Senate created a new Senate
body, the Senate Arms Control Observer
Group, to monitor them. This was the
major item of Senate business on the first
day of the 99th Congress, January 3, 1985,
(S. Res. 19).3
The Observer Group is a bipartisan body
of five Senators from each party, as well as
the Majority and Minority leaders as ex of-
ficio members. In addition to the ex officio
members, the group consists of Senators
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Sam Nunn (D-
Georgia), Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), and
Claiborne Pell (1)-Rhode Island) as co-chair-
men, and Senators Al Gore (0-Tennessee),
Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), Pat Moy-
nihan (D-New York), Don Nickles (R-Okla-
homa), John Warner (R-Virginia), and Mal-
colm Wallop (R-Wyoming). A delegation
consisting of eight of the ten Senators in
the Arras Control Observer Group, and
headed by the two leaders, attended the
opening sessions of these negotiations from
March 9-12 in Geneva.*
The United States Senate has the consti-
tutional responsibility of providing advice
and consent in the making of treaties. This
responsibility imposes upon Senators the
obligation to become as knowledgeable as
possible concerning the salient issues which
are being addressed in the context of the
negotiating process. Any accord with the
Soviet Union to control or reduce our strate-
gic weapons carries considerable weight for
our nation. It will vitally affect our national
security, the security of all our constituents
and the security of our allies. Such an
agreement, or agreements, must be support-
ed by a substantial national consensus to
stand the test of time. Such a consensus
best achieved through the traditional
treaty-making process which has been fol
lowed in the field of strategic arms contro
agreements entered into by the Un
States.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions has jurisdictional and oversight re
sponsibility with regard to arms control ne
gotiations and agreements. It is the purpos
of the Senate Arms Control Observer Grou
to supplement the activities of the Forel:
Relations Committee by providing a mor
regular and systematic involvement of th
full Senate in the negotiations, without i
any sense assuming the role of participan
or negotiators in these talks. While the For
eign Relations Committee oversees arm
control negotiations on a continuing basis
the full Senate has focused its attention i
the past only sporadically on the vital as
pacts of arms control negotiations, usuall
developing a knowledge and understandin
of the issues being negotiated after th
fact?that is, after a draft treaty has beer
signed by the Executive branch. The resul
of this fitful process has been generally un
satisfactory in recent years. We seek t
avoid a recurrence of the problems of th
1970's, when three successive arms contro
treaties, signed by three Presidents, wer
never approved for ratification by th
Senate. These include the SALT H Treat
of 1979, the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty o
3 The resolution and supporting statements ar
Included at the conclusion of this report at Appe
dix C.
4 Senators Moynihan and Wallop were unable
attend due to other pressing Senate business.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23 : CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6025
1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty of 1976.
In fulfillment of our constitutional re-
sponsibility in providing advice and consent
in the making of treaties, we believe it is
necessary to become completely conversant
concerning the particular issues under nego-
tiation. We believe that such knowledge is
critical to the understanding by the Senate
of the issues involved, and that an intimate
knowledge of the evolving issues will permit
our negotiators to have the benefit of our
advice and counsel, when appropriate, on a
continuing basis during the course of the
negotiations. We believe that the Senate
will be in a far better position to evaluate
any agreement which may be reached and
that such agreement might benefit from the
reactions of the Senate as it is being formu-
lated. We also firmly believe that the inter-
play of ideas that has occurred and will con-
tinue to occur with the members of our ob-
server team will be of assistance to our ne-
gotiators.
In the event that the negotiations fail, the
Senate will be in a better position to under-
stand and to make comprehensible to the
American people just why that failure oc-
curred. This is particularly important in
light of the staggering complexity, of the
issues now being negotiated in Geneva.
Chronology and Functioning of the Observer
Group
The philosophy underlying the creation
of the Observer Group, and the mechanisms
of coordination with the Executive branch
necessary for its effective operation, were
the subject of a series of resolutions, letters,
and meetings from December 1984 to April
1985. In December 1984, Senate Majority
Leader-elect Dole decided to introduce a res-
olution in the 99th Congress aimed at un-
derscoring the strong support in the Senate
for the President's arms control efforts. To
emphasize the importance of this issue, Sen-
ator Dole planned to make this resolution
the first substantive act of his leadership
and to seek affirmative action on it the first
day of the new Congress, January 3, 1985.
Further, to demonstrate the bipartisan
nature of the support which he believed ex-
isted in the Senate, Senator Dole early on
sought the participation and cooperation in
the effort of Senate Minority Leader Robert
C. Byrd.
Simultaneously, Senator Byrd was already
pursuing the possibility of creating a Senate
arms control observer group. His initial pro-
posal in this regard was made by telephone
to President Reagan on December 9, 1984.
Senator Byrd suggested that a small, bipar-
tisan group of Senators, recommended by
the Senate leadership, be appointed as offi-
cial observers on our delegation to any arms
control negotiations which might result
rom the meetings to be held in Geneva be-
tween Secretary of State George Shultz and
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in
eneva on January 7-8, 1985. The reaction
y the President was enthusiastic and posi-
tive, and Senator Byrd followed up this ini-
tial discussion with a letter to the President
utlining his proposal on December 13,
1984.
In follow-up discussions, Senators Dole
nd Byrd agreed to meld their approaches
a single resolution, including the concept
an observer group. Senator Dole
roached this idea with the Administration
nd, on January 2, 1985, Acting Secretary of
tate Kenneth Dam wrote to Senator Dole
roviding a positive Administration reaction
the proposal. He indicated that an Ob-
erver Group would be welcomed by the Ad-
' istration and that the Group would be
rovided full briefings by our negotiators to
fly arms control talks which might emerge.
Further, he indicated that the Administra-
tion would seek to have the Senators meet
on an informal basis with the Soviet dele-
gates as well.
On the basis of this dialogue, the Senate
passed S. Res. 19, sponsored jointly by Sena-
tors Dole and Byrd, on January 3, 1985, the
first day of the 99th Congress.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, as
we all know by now, the official line?
more delicately put, the official U.S.
claim?is that this INF Treaty re-
moves from Europe an entire class of
nuclear weapons; that is to say, those
with a range between 500 and 5,500
kilometers.
There used to be a song a long time
ago intitled "But It Ain't Necessarily
So," that song fits, because the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, for those
who will take the time to analyzeand
assess this treaty, demonstates clearly
that this claim by the State Depart-
ment and others is far from accurate.
A more nearly accurate assessment
is that nuclear weapons will not?and I
repeat, for the purpose of emphasis,
will not?be reduced under the terms
of this treaty. Indeed, this treaty per-
mits the Soviets to remove aging deliv-
ery vehicles from their stockpile, to
take the delivery vehicles out and bolt
new and updated delivery systems
onto existing warheads. That is not
arms reduction.
The nuclear devices, of course, are
the most expensive and difficult com-
ponents to produce; and I emphasize
that by the time this treaty is fully im-
plemented, all of the U.S.-NATO stra-
tegic weapons in Europe will have
been removed, and the Soviet Union
nuclear forces targeted on Europe will
have been fully modernize. Regardless
of all the snake-oil claims made, that
is a fact. The Soviet Union will be at
least as powerful and, in fact, more
formidable than ever.
The Soviet Union can defeat the
purpose of the INF Treaty in two
ways:
One, the Soviets can defeat the
treaty by following its terms to the
letter. The Soviets knew what they
were doing when they negotiated this
treaty. Will Rogers said a long time
ago that the United States has never
lost a war nor won a treaty.
Second, the Soviets can defeat this
treaty by cheating, and they have de-
veloped that to a fine art, as all of us
should know. ,But in this case, the So-
viets probably will do both, at virtual-
ly no risk of being caught at it. Let me
elaborate.
The Soviets can defeat the treaty's
purpose simply by following its terms
carefully. That is why the Soviets
have been so eager to have this treaty
ratified. The missiles to be eliminated
are defined so restrictively that the
old missile, the SS-20, is prohibited.
But a new, enhanced version of ver-
tually the same Soviet missile, known
as the SS-25, is not prohibited. The
point is that the SS-25 can do every-
thing that the Prohibited SS-20 can
do, and then some. Because the treaty
exempts missiles tested, even ones at a
longer range than 5,500 kilometers,
the SS-25 is left untouched by this
treaty. That is an acknowledged fact.
It was brought up repeatedly during
the consideration of the treaty by the
Foreign Relations Committee and by
the Armed Services Committee, and
the proponents of the committee said,
"So what?"
My response was, "So, a lot," be-
cause as already pointed out, the Sovi-
ets can even use the same nuclear
weapons, and I am now talking about
the warheads, removed from the SS-
20's that are to be destroyed under the
terms of this treaty.
The Soviets can also defeat the trea-
ty's purposes by cheating. And who in
this Senate will deny the long record
of the Soviet Union at duplicity and
cheating?
The Soviets have cheated massively
on every previous arms control agree-
ment, and no less than Ronald Reagan
himself has said this repeatedly. I
have a hunch that if Ronald Reagan
were running for President this year,
instead of finishing up his 8 years in
the White House, he would be out on
the hustings demanding that this
treaty be rejected by the Senate.
In fact, the SS-25?and that is the
missile that is not covered by this
treaty?the SS-25 itself is a violation
of the constraints of SALT IL It was
established clearly in the committee
hearings that we do not know how
many SS-20's the Soviets have pro-
duced. We never will.
The astonishingly wide variation of
estimates by our nine intelligence
agencies on this question about the
number of SS-20's produced by the
Soviet Union makes it certain that we
will never know when, or if, all of the
SS-20 delivery vehicles have been de-
stroyed. And bear in mind that no
matter how many tubes are destroyed,
if you want to describe them that way,
the warheads will be removed, and
they can be bolted on the SS-25's.
Now the warhead is the weapon.
The variation in our intelligence es-
timates, reportedly ranging from as
low as 550 to at least 1,250, is far too
wide to be accepted by a reasonable
mind.
Under the treaty, the Soviets prom-
ise to destroy 650 SS-20 delivery vehi-
cles. Yet if they do so, they could still
have another 300 to 600 hidden as a
covert force, according to evaluations
reportedly emanating from the majori-
ty of our nine intelligence agencies.
I do not think many Americans un-
derstand that yet. Maybe not many
Senators do.
But the notion that a covert missile
force of that size would not be mili-
tarily significant represents, I think,
the triumphant of hope over common
sense.
Although some administration wit-
nesses attempted to maintain that
such a covert force would be militarily
useless without the chance to test fire
the missiles regularly to test reliabil-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23 : CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6026 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ity?tests supposedly, but only sup-
posedly, detectable?no one has refut-
ed President Reagan's own report that
the Soviets had kept a similar covert
force of more than 100 SS-16's for 8
years without the United States de-
tecting either a test or the missiles
themselves.
If the majority of our intelligence
agencies are right about the numbers,
I think we can be sure that the Soviets
would not keep a covert missile force
unless they had figured out not only
how to keep it, but also how to keep it
in readiness.
For this reason, the verification
process in the treaty is virtually use-
less. The treaty contains only quanti-
tative criteria for the missiles to be de-
stroyed, with no qualitative criteria at
all. Thus the Soviet missiles to be de-
stroyed could be factory rejects or
even dummies, as well as those old
aging delivery vehicles that we expect
them to destroy, delivery vehicles, not
the weapons, because, remember, the
warhead that will be removed from
each of them can be bolted onto the
SS-25 which is not covered by this
treaty.
Furthermore, all of us talk about
the onsite inspection that takes place
under this treaty only at specific
places chosen by the Soviet Union and
which they have identified before-
hand.
Now, I hardly think that any reason-
able person would expect the Soviets
to keep its covert missiles at a place
they were going to tell us we could
look.
Now, it is highly significant that the
Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, in its report to the Foreign Re-
lations Committee, was extremely
guarded in its assessment of the verifi-
ability of this INF Treaty. The Intelli-
gence Committee stated that the
treaty was verifiable only with regard
to those declared sites, but bear in
mind that the Soviets are the ones
doing the declaring.
This means that we can verify the
treaty only at sites where there is
scant possibility of a Soviet violation.
It is the old shell game and the Soviets
are good at it.
Other testimony showed that our
chances of detecting a violation out-
side of those declared sites were about
1 to 10. We would have to be astonish-
ingly lucky, or the Soviets would have
to be incredibly careless, for us to
detect a violation under those circum-
stances.
Finally, even if a violation were de-
tected, the Soviets would suffer no
consequences. No major arms control
violation of the Soviets in the past has
ever been corrected, not one time.
For example, the Soviets have de-
ployed a prohibited nationwide ABM
system including the capability to
hand over incoming information to
battle-management radars and inter-
ceptors. Yet our own State Depart-
ment has declined for more than 7
months to implement the 5-year cora-
pliance review mandated by the ABM
Treaty because we would have to de-
clare, do you not know, that the Soviet
Union is engaged in a material breach
of the ABM Treaty. And it is a credit
to this Senate and to the distinguished
chairman and ranking member of the
Armed Services Committee that my
amendment yesterday was readily ac-
cepted and agreed to by them and ap-
proved by the Senate to require our
Government to live up to the ABM
Treaty in that regard.
So, that is what we run into with the
State Department, the doubletalk, the
reluctance.
Arms control without compliance is
nothing more than an illusion. Yet
this treaty contains no compliance
regime whatsoever, except perhaps an-
other useless commission where we
could go and express a strong protest,
and the Soviets say "ha, ha ha," and
they have been saying "ha, ha, ha"
every time we have gotten around to
protesting their previous violations on
previous treaties.
The Soviets' only obligation is that
they come to the Commission meeting
and they sit there and listen and we
protest, and they go home and smile
at each other and say, "We did it to
them again."
The point is this: The Soviets have
cheated and we have known it. They
are cheating now and we know it. And
they will continue to cheat. This
treaty can have no other result. Yet
the lack of a true compliance regime
signals to the Soviets that we do not
intend to take their violations serious-
ly. Even if we did, there is nothing we
could do about it.
The net effect then of the INF
Treaty is to make both conventional
and nuclear war more likely, not less
likely. Even the threat of a conven-
tional attack on Europe will have a
profound effect on the social, political,
and religious freedoms of Europe. The
documented lack of freedom in East-
ern Europe points to what could well
happen in a Western Europe that is
neutralized and intimidated by the
elimination of the major NATO deter-
rents called for in the INF Treaty.
In the end, the treaty invites either
global nuclear war or acquiescence to a
future not worth looking forward to.
So that is why I have contended all
along, having sat down right at the be-
ginning when the treaty text was de-
livered to me in December, I concluded
then that it is fatally flawed and I
have not changed my opinion. And
those flaws fall into two categories.
The first category consists of flaws
which, on their face, defeat the princi-
pal object and purpose of the treaty.
The second category consists of those
which raise the potential for action
which could defeat the object and pur-
pose of the treaty. And, finally, there
are issues of constitutional and inter-
national law which the Senate must
consider, including something that has
been absolutely obscured, and that is
May 17, 1988
the cost?the cost?to the American
taxpayers of implementing this treaty.
Madam President, the fatal flaws
which defeat the principal object and
purpose of the treaty include the fol-
lowing:
First, the treaty permits the Soviets
to modernize the delivery vehicles for
the SS-20 warheads?thereby retain-
ing the same nuclear capability
against Europe?while eliminating the
only assured nuclear deterrent pos-
sessed by NATO.
Second, the verification procedures
of the treaty provide no certainty of
discovering Soviet cheating, while?
based on past Soviet performance and
present evidence?the Soviets may
indeed have up to twice as many SS-
20's as they declare in the treaty. I
have filed a top secret code word level
annex to the Senate Foreign Relations
report which is available to Senators
and appropriately cleared staff in S-
407 of the Capitol.
Third, the treaty is overbroad in
that it blocks not only future develop-
ments in nuclear weapons technology
but in conventional technology as well,
a circumstance scarcely, if at all, con-
sidered by the negotiators, despite the
fact that inventive technology is a
major advantage of the United States.
And that is what the Soviet Union was
concerned about. Moreover, the treaty
needlessly surrenders nonnuclear
weapons technology based on ground-
launched cruise missiles, in an illusory
pursuit of verifiability?thereby giv'
up a relatively cheap and highly effec-
tive conventional deterrent weapon fo
the defense of Europe.
Fourth, the final data upon which
the treaty is based will not be mad
available until 30 days after the treat
Is ratified, thereby making it possibl
for the Soviets to make radic
changes in the numbers of missiles
be destroyed, and defeating the al
ready weak verification scheme.
Faith, the very concept of the I
Treaty alone is untenable so long
the Soviets maintain large inventori
of ICBM delivery vehicles and war
heads that can substitute for the mis
siles to be eliminated. And bear
mind that the Soviets and the Unite
States will destroy only the deliver
system and not the warhead.
Until the START negotiations ar
completed and implemented, Weste
Europe will still be targeted by Sovie
nuclear weapons, but will have nonnu
clear deterrent for its own security. T
maintain balanced reductions, I th
that we should consider that the IN
Treaty should not be ratified unt
START likewise is ratified.
Madam President, the cost of th
treaty has not even been discussed ?
the debate thus far and scarcel
touched upon, if at all, by the majo
news media of this country.
Now, I am going to offer an amen
ment to this treaty at some point, if i
is ratified, that we begin to remov
American servicemen and women an
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
their dependents from Eurdpe. The
European leaders profess to be enthu-
siastically in favor of this INF Treaty.
Arid I might add at the very time their
subordinates and their defense people
were coming to us and saying, "Boy,
it's a terrible treaty." But they en-
dorsed it because they are fearful of
the protest movements in Europe. So
they have endorsed it. Fine.
But I think it is about time for
Europe to defend itself and to pay for
it. Let us start bringing our men and
women home and their dependents.
Now, I wonder how many Americans
know how much the taxpayers of this
country are paying to defend Europe.
The figure is $477 million a day; 60
percent, 60 percent of the Defense
budget. So, we must consider that this
treaty creates U.S. hostages in Europe
at a cost of $477 million per day.
There are only two good reasons to
sign any arms control treaty. First, to
reduce the risk of war and, second, to
enhance the security of our country.
Tragically, this treaty accomplishes
neither purpose.
The Soviets enjoy a decisive 5-to-1
margin of superiority over our forces
in Europe, on the basis of their
strength in chemical and conventional
warfare forces?five to one.
Winston Churchill once said,
"Strength helps prevent war. Weak-
ness invites aggression."
So I think it is self-evident that the
danger of war is enhanced if the totali-
tarians in the Kremlin see an opportu-
nity to dominate Western Europe at
minimal military risk for themselves.
With the removal and destruction of
our Pershing II missiles, we will sur-
render our ability to retaliate effec-
tively against Soviet aggression. We
will no longer be able to hold at risk
2.5 million Communist troops, 40,000
Communist tanks, and 6,000 Commu-
nist fighter aircraft.
So with the elimination of our non-
nuclear ground-launch cruise missiles,
or GLCM's, as we call them, we will no
longer be able to disrupt Soviet supply
lines as a way of neutralizing the
enemy's "blitzkrieg" strategy.
The Washington Times has pointed
out that:
Warsaw Pact supply routes in Eastern
Europe contain thousands of choke points,
most or all of which could be disrupted with
on-nuclear cruise missiles. Without those
upply routes, Communist-bloc forces
imply would be stranded in the field.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies already
have created the basic structure?bridges,
oads, storage depots, airfields and fuel sup-
lies?necessary to mount a European inva-
ion.
Mr. President, ratification of this
reaty will not promote peace nor will
t enhance our security, or that of our
llies. Quite the contrary, it will re-
uire West Germany to deal with the
ew reality of Soviet dominance in
estern Europe, 3 years from now, in
1991, when our deterrent force has
?een dismantled.
Today in 1988, 325,000 American
ilitary personnel and 300,000 of their
I.
dependents are on the frontiers of
freedom in West Germany. Today
these men and women have a clearly
defined mission?to deter and, if neces-
sary, to defeat a Soviet-initiated attack
on Western Europe. In 3 years, howev-
er, if the INF Treaty is ratified and
implemented, those 625,000 Americans
will have replaced our missiles as the
main barrier to Soviet intimidation
and aggression.
Instead of using Pershings and
GLCM's, we will be required to ward
off the Soviets with human hostages.
Mr. President, twice in this century
our troops have been sent to fight "no
win" wars, in Korea and in Vietnam.
In both places, our Government's goal
was not victory, but stalemate. Tens of
thousands of our sons were sacrificed
for the sake of State Department
theories and diplomatic negotiations.
Now in Western Europe we are once
again about to sacrifice our children
on the altar of arms control, d?nte,
and so-called "limited war" to test
those theories.
Instead of trusting in Almighty God
and in our own strength, like Samson
we will be shorn of that strength in
order that we may embrace the new
Delilah in the Kremlin.
Despite an unbroken record of
Soviet cheating on every treaty we
have ever signed with our Communist
enemy, the United States Senate may
be about to entrust the lives of our
children and the security of our coun-
try to yet another worthless piece of
paper signed by an adversary who uses
arms control to disarm us, and to
strengthen his own position.
Throughout my Senate career,
which began 15 years ago in 1973, I
have consistently voted for every pro-
posal put before me to strengthen
America's defenses and to protect our
vital interests throughout the world.
Yet NATO has not responded in kind.
While the countries of Western
Europe were spending only 5.1 percent
and less of their gross national prod-
uct on their own defense compared to
our 6.6 percent, the Senate was voting
to assure that American would do
more?not for their sakes, but for
Ours.
In 1986, every American was taxed
on the average $1,155 to pay for de-
fense while West Germans were
paying $453 apiece, citizens of Spain
$113, the British $488, the Portuguese
$90 apiece. We should pay to defend
America, but we should not have to
pay more to defend their countries
than they are willing to pay to defend
themselves.
President Eisenhower wrote in 1963,
"I believe the time has come when we
should start withdrawing some of the
U.S. troops. One American division in
Europe can show the flag as definitive-
ly as can several." In 1951, Eisenhower
said if, in 10 years "all American
troops stationed in Europe have not
been returned to the United States,
then this whole project (i.e., NATO)
will have failed."
S 6027
So long as Europe could not afford
to defend itself, U.S. troops in Europe
made sense, and NATO played a posi-
tive role in securing the West. But the
troops were not intended to be perma-
nently stationed in Europe. They were
viewed as an emergency measure that
would remain in force only until
Europe recovered from World War II.
Twenty-five years later, we have not
one division in Europe, but four.
I have always been willing to do
what was necessary for NATO as long
as it made sense for America. But it
will no longer make sense for America
to keep our troops and their depend-
ents in Europe 40 years after the end
of World War II at a cost of
$477,000,000 per day, if we are unpre-
pared to defend those troops, and if
they are not in a position to carry out
successfully the mission to which they
were originally assigned.
It would be unconscionable to leave
our young people as hostages in
Europe, knowing full well that if war
breaks out, there is nothing America
will or can do?and knowing full well
that the Europeans will do nothing
more than they have done in the past
to provide for their own defense.
There is no question that the Euro-
peans are economically equipped to
provide for their own defense. They
have more than ample people, money,
and technology. But they have pre-
ferred to rely on the pocketbooks of
American workers and the good will of
the Soviet Union.
What is most amazing is the Europe-
an political leaders have permitted
themselves to be led like lambs to the
slaughter, publicly supporting the INF
Treaty while privately condemning it.
But the lack of forthrightness on an-
other continent is no excuse for the
sacrifice of our children in another
battle of Dunkirk in which the world
watches as the surviving troops of the
free world are hauled away in fishing
boats.
There is no question, Madam Presi-
dent, that the Europeans are economi-
cally equipped to provide for their own
defense. So I say let them do it. And
remove from the backs of the Ameri-
can taxpayers the $477 million a day
that it costs us to provide them with
their defense. The Europeans have
more than ample people. They have
more than ample money and technolo-
gy. But they have preferred to rely on
the pocketbooks of the American
workers and the good will of the
Soviet Union.
The decision by the United States
Senate to ratify the INF Treaty will
be a decision to abandon Western
Europe to the strategic hegemony of
our Soviet enemy and I, am going to
vote against ratification, even if I am
the only Senator to do so.
I thank the Chair and I yield the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time? The Senator from Rhode
? Island.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6028 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. PELL. Madam President, I yield
10 minutes to the Senator from Cali-
fornia.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the distin-
guished chairman of the committee
very much.
Madam President, today we embark
on the Senate's first serious consider-
ation of an arms control treaty in s
good many years.
Efforts in the past decade to make
progress in this area have been de-
railed or derided by arms control crit-
ics. But I see real signs of progress. A
bipartisan spirit and approach to arms
control and an improved climate in
United States-Soviet relations give me
cause for hope?hope for a world more
free of tension, hope for a world free
from the threat of nuclear war.
I believe we will, at long last, take a
step in the right direction and ratify
the INF Treaty?I trust before the
forthcoming United States-Soviet
summit.
The Senate?thanks in large part to
the determination of the majority
leader?has performed a service of his-
toric dimension by withholding Senate
consideration of the treaty until now.
He and Senators Num, BOREN, and
others demanded that a number of
problems had to be cleared up first.
They have been cleared up.
I agree with the majority leader that
the Senate must not be held to an ar-
bitrary deadline for ratification. But
we must face reality. The reality is
that on May 29, President Reagan will
meet with Soviet leader Gorbachev in
Moscow.
The President should not go to that
meeting empty handed. There is no
longer any justification for even con-
sidering that he go empty handed.
Now is the time for action. We should
approve this treaty. And we should ap-
prove it without delay.
This treaty is a historic agreement.
Not in its direct effort, which is a
modest reduction of the superpowers'
bloated nuclear arsenals, but in the
hopeful signal and valuable experience
it provides us for future arms control
agreements.
The INF Treaty is precedent-setting
in several respects. The inspection and
verification provisions of this treaty
are the most intrusive, detailed, and
thorough that we have ever negotiat-
ed. This is a genuine breakthrough.
And the most concete example of glas-
nost I have seen. Opening the Soviet
Union to on-site inspection eliminates
a major obstacle to arms limitations
and paves the way for dealing with the
more difficult problems of monitoring
deep reductions in strategic arms.
That is why it is so important to ap-
prove this treaty before the President
goes to Moscow so that he will be able
there to build on this foundation and
move on to far more significant mat-
ters relating to arms and relating to
the American-Soviet relationship. The
possibility of greatly improving this
relationship and turning it to peaceful
and constructive channels is now
within reach.
The treaty is historic in other ways,
too. It affects an entire class of nucle-
ar weapons, eliminating a threat that
has been in existence for decades.
And most importantly, this is the
first agreement that does more than
just slow the increase of weapons. It
will require that the Soviet Union and
the United States destroy a part of
their arsenals.
Three Senate committees, compris-
ing nearly half the Members of the
Senate, have heard thousands of pages
of testimony from dozens of expert
witnesses on the ramifications of the
INF Treaty.
I want to pay tribute to the chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, the Senator now managing this
measure, this treaty on the floor, for
his patience and diligence and hard
and diplomatic work in guiding this
treaty through not only the Foreign
Relations Committee, but through the
other difficulties and pitfalls that
stood in its way before we finally ar-
rived here on the floor. I welcome the
opportunity to work with them.
The members of the Foreign Rela-
tions Intelligence, and Armed Services
Committees have worked together to
clarify ambiguities, to pin down defini-
tions, and to urge the executive
branch to remedy any potential dis-
crepancies. We have poked and pried
and dissected and questioned this
treaty like no other. It is perhaps the
most closely scrutinized treaty ever
submitted for Senate consideration.
Given the complexity of this treaty
and the accompanying protocols, it is
remarkable there has been so little dis-
pute over its specific substantive provi-
sions. Those issues that have been
raised, like recent clarifications on im-
plementing the inspection procedures,
have been resolved quickly and to our
satisfaction. We have had a very capa-
ble negotiating team in Geneva, and a
very capable Secretary of State at the
helm.
I believe the language of this treaty
is as clear as human language will
allow. There can be no dispute about
the essential facts: The Soviets will
disable four times as many warheads
as the United States. The treaty will
establish the precedent of aysemmetri-
cal reductions. And our confidence in
our ability to verify Soviet compliance
is very high.
Even after this treaty is fully imple-
mented, there will continue to be
many, many areas for superpower
competition. We have a long 'road to
walk if we are to bring any semblance
of control to the nuclear weapons com-
petition.
But, if we are fortunate, the imple-
mentation of this agreement will mark
the beginning of the end of this mind-
less race to build better, more efficient
and more numerous methods of de-
struction. Perhaps we can soon begin
to think of increasing our national se-
curity in terms of decreasing our arse-
May 17, 1988
nals, rather than adding ever more to
the stockpile.
Some have said that the INF Treaty
will help the Soviet Union. Of course
it will. I've never heard of any nation
that knowingly and without duress
signs a treaty that is contrary to its
own self-interest. I think we must pull
ourselves out of the mindset that
holds that anything good for the
Soviet Union is necessarily bad for the
United States. Increasing internation-
al security, even increasing the Sovi-
ets' sense of security, can indeed make
America more secure as well.
It so happens that the treaty will
help the United States as well as the
Soviet Union. The fact is that the im-
plementation of the treaty is over-
whelmingly in our national interest. It
is strongly supported by the citizens of
this country.
It is also in the interest of our
allies?not just in Europe but in Asia
and the Pacific as well. It received the
unanimous endorsement of NATO
leaders and high praise from NATO
defense ministers.
This treaty is a significant bipartisan
achievement. I urge the Senate to
ratify it without delay.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Republican leader.
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, first I
would urge all Senators who would
like to make opening statements: This
is a good time to do it. We would like
to get into the meat of the process on
tomorrow. I am certain the manager,
the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, and others, would like to
move ahead.,
We have been calling people on our
side because today we enter the home
stretch. We are finally on this treaty.
There have been good reasons why we
have not started before, and I think
everybody has a right to be proud of a
job well done. As I have said before,
the Senate has played a constructive
role.
We had a constitutional role to play.
We played that role, as most recently
demonstrated in testimony just yester-
day before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Senator PELL's committee, by
Secretary Shultz. He had been back to
Geneva negotiating with the Soviets,
clarifying some areas that had been
raised by who? By Members of the
Senate. And now we have a better
treaty than we had a week ago.
I would guess others will find mis-
takes. And I guess over the next 10 or
15 years there are going to be techni-
cal corrections and adjustments and
understandings and resolutions of dif-
ferences between Soviets and Ameri-
cans.
I do not quarrel with anyone who
wants to vote against consenting to
ratification. They have a perfect right
to do that. I know some will do that.
Obviously, some will want to offer..
amendments to the text of the treaty,
or others will want to offer reserva-
tions or amendments or statements or
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
declarations to the Resolution of Rati-
fication: As far as I know, no one quar-
rels with that. But the point is we
ought to do it, and do it as quickly as
we can.
I know of no one in this body who
wants to deny the President a hard-
earned right to take the Instruments
of Ratification to Moscow with him. I
do nqt know of anybody on the Demo-
cratic side or anyone on the Republi-
can side who has not-had enough time
to understand the treaty. There have
been thousands of detailed questions,
hundreds of witnesses, scores of hear-
ings in three different committees.
Senators and staff from both sides of
the aisle have worked long and hard.
I would guess there has never been a
treaty that has been more closely scru-
tinized than the one before the Senate
right now.
So I am going to stand here in a very
positive way and predict that we are
going to do this for the President?but
not just for the President, for the
country, for Democrats, Republicans,
nd Independents and all those people
out there who may not be interested
n politics, but who are concerned
bout their future, their children's
uture, and their grandchildren's
uture.
We are not doing this because it is in
he Soviets' interests. We are doing it
ecause it is in our national interests. I
lune they have made the same
udgMent. They would not do it if it
as not in their national interest.
We don't have to trust the Soviets,
r trust Gorbachev, or trust anyone
Ise. We have made a judgment. We
lave a lot of experts in this field who
ay that this is a good treaty, and it is
our interests. That is the bottom
ne.
NEGOTIATING RECORD VALUABLE
Senators and staff on both sides
ave spent countless hours studying
e negotiating record. I recall that
hen Senator Numv first proposed
enate access to the negotiating
ecord many were skeptical. In retro-
ct I believe this was a positive de-
elopment which should be repeated
r all major treaties because with the
enefit of the record the Senate has
een able to develop its own clear idea
what obligations the two parties
oposed to undertake in the INF
reaty.
CONCRETE RESULTS
All the work was worth it. When I
Id President Reagan I would support
e treaty and make an effort to lead
e effort for ratification, I also told
im that I believed the Senate could
prove upon an already good prod-
t. As I have said a few moments ago,
e did that just this past week, and we
ave done it in hearings, we have done
with statements, and we will contin-
e to work in this constructive way.
Senators NUNN and WARNER, and
UAYLE, and their Armed Services
ommittee colleagues led the way to
efend and resolve the so-called fu-
res issue. The -result is a diplomatic
note signed by the United States and
Soviet representatives which is going
to be part of the treaty.
With Intelligence Committee insist-
ence as backing, the administration
was able to press the Soviets for quick
resolution on the nine onsite inspec-
tion issues. Perhaps these were just
some predictable glitches; perhaps not.
But one way or the other the Soviets
have been reminded that verification
is of paramount importance to us. We
want to be able to verify the terms and
conditions of this treaty.
Again, we have a signed paper in
hand. Chairman BOREN and Vice
Chairman COHEN, and their colleagues
are to be thanked for this.
Certainly the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, under the leadership
of Senator PELL, Senator HELMS, Sena-
tor LUGAR, and others, has contributed
to making a record.
THE BIG PICTURE
So the Senate has made a difference
but we have not reached the bottom
line. I think the bottom line is to get
this treaty behind us. It deserves our
advice and consent. It ought to be
backed by a big bipartisan majority.
I know there are already some
saying, "Well, now, this is 1988; this is
a political year; we don't want to do
this or that because some party might
benefit." The beneficiaries will be the
American people. I think that is how it
is going to be perceived.
This is a historic treaty, the first
ever to reduce existing nuclear weap-
ons. In fact, it eliminates two entire
classes of them. Its verification provi-
sions are unprecedented, with onsite
inspection, and they are also effective.
The Soviets have finally agreed to
asymmetrical reductions. And finally,
the treaty is a triumph for NATO co-
hesion.
I must say, when I was trying to
make a judgment on the treaty, I
called Margaret Thatcher. I did not
know if she would take my call, but at
that time I was ahead in Iowa and she
took my call. We talked about the
treaty because I wanted to hear it
from her firsthand that she supported
it, and she did.
I also talked to Chancellor Helmut
Kohl, who had the same response?en-
thusiastic support for the treaty. And
I later talked to Prime Minister Goria
of Italy, who was visiting the United
States?and he was in support of the
treaty.
SUMMIT RATIFICATION DESIRABLE
So we have to work carefully and we
have to work independently. We
cannot be caught up by any artificial
deadlines. We have worked carefully
for nearly 4 months.
So as I have said, we have had Sena-
tors on three committees look at this
carefully. Now there are other Mem-
bers. They want to be here; they want
to ask questions; they want to make
statements; they want to offer what-
ever they are going to offer; they want
to make their points. In fact, I have a
few points of my own I hope' to make,
S 6029
and we will have the opportunity
starting right now.
On the other hand, we do not live in
a vacuum. This is not just some aca-
demic exercise. This is a real world
issue of huge importance and the
world is watching what we do. One of
INF's biggest pluses is the boost it
gives to the U.S. leaderhsip and the
NATO alliance, and that plus will be
doubled with ratification at the up-
coming summit.
Now, if this were incompatible with
Senate responsibility, I would be the
first to say, "slow down," but this is
not the case. Next Wednesday will
make 4 months since the treaty was
transmitted to the Senate, and I
cannot think of a better target date
for advice and consent. That gives us 7
or 8 solid working days. We should
work quickly but thoroughly through
the amendments to the treaty text be-
cause I am certain most of my col-
leagues agree that such amendments,
in most cases, are going to be unwar-
ranted.
DROP TREATY INTERPRETATION CONDITION
Then, in accordance with Senate
procedure, we will turn to the treaty
interpretation condition proposed by
the Foreign Relations Committee as
the first order of business on the Reso-
lution of Ratification. I hope the au-
thors of this provision agree that all
the recent Senate good work on this
point makes this exercise unnecessary.
Indeed, Senate action on the "fu-
tures" and onsite inspection issues in-
volved looking behind administration
testimony, studying the negotiating
record, and insisting upon written
clarifications agreed with the Soviets.
We cannot now credibly assert that
the treaty's meaning is based only on
its text and executive testimony. This
notion derives neither from the Con-
stitution, nor from practical experi-
ence. In reality, it is rooted only in our
disagreement over another treaty, an-
other treaty not even before us, but in-
sistence upon it will certainly delay
this treaty.
I do not believe that such delay is
fitting to end the solid work we have
done. So I think we have to put the
other differences aside and spend our
time on the INF issues.
LET'S GET TO WORK
It is time to roll up our sleeves and
finish our work, and, as other speakers
have said, there is absolutely no
reason, unless something pops up that
nobody has thought of?and there
have been a lot of pretty good minds,
men and women, people in this coun-
try and outside this country that have
looked at this treaty, looked at it with
an eagle eye?there is no good reason
why the President should not have
this treaty to ratify in Moscow.
When Ronald Reagan steps off Air
Force One and onto Russian soil, I
want Mr. Gorbachev to know that he
is facing a man with a solid backing of
Congress and the American people.
That is what this is all about.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6030 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
So I am going to be working closely
with the majority leader, who I think
has done an outstanding job, in
making certain that we resolved some
of these issues before coming to the
floor. We have saved time this past
week.
And I know that some of my col-
leagues, as I have said, have differ-
ences. That is fine. Some will raise
valid points, just as valid points were
raised on futures and on inspection
and on other things. Maybe someone
will find a real area that should be cor-
rected. But I hope what we can do is
to do what we have a reputation of
doing around here, and that is being
very constructive and not delaying.
This is a Senate responsibility, but it is
, an issue that transcends this Cham-
ber.
Oh, it is important to the President.
But it is important to the American
people. It is important to free people
around the world. It is important to
those who look to us for leadership all
around the world. I think we will have
ample time.
So in the next few days when we get
into the nitty-gritty of this, we are
going to have- to stand up and be
counted and move this treaty along. I
pledge the President of the United
States my support, and I am going to
do what I can in the next several days
to make certain that when he leaves
the United States, he has what he
needs in his pocket.
I will be happy to yield whatever
time he may consume to the Senator
from Idaho, but before I do, I also
want to say, there is an excellent work
on the Republican desks, which I am
certain we can make available to the
other side. It is a very objective, non-
partisan analysis of the reports from
the Foreign Relations, Armed Serv-
ices, and Intelligence Committees on
the treaty. It is a good summary, and I
want to congratulate Rob &rifler who
is a staffer of the Republican Policy
Committee. I am certain we will be
happy to make copies available to
either side. It is a good summary that
puts it all in perspective.
Mr. SYMMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. SYMMS. I thank the distin-
guished Republican leader for not
only his remarks but his long service
in this body and the other body and
his prior service to his country that is
a record matched by very few people
who have served in this Senate.
I must say that it has been a privi-
lege for me to be one of his supporters
in his recent political endeavors and
still one of his supporters. I hope to be
on his team here in the Senate, even
though on this particular issue when I
take the floor, I am not coming down
on the same side of the issue as our
distinguished Republican leader.
Mr. President, in getting into my re-
marks, it is not the intention of this
Senator to in any way delay the delib-
erations that the Senate must do in its
responsibilities to advise and consent
and to eventually ratify this treaty.
My point is I wish to make my case
to my colleagues in the best fashion I
know how. Ultimately, we will have a
vote, and I think there is much to do
about the fact that the President
should have this treaty with him, if it
Is going to be ratified, prior to the
time he makes his journey to the
Soviet Union.
I suppose that one might take the
rather philosophical approach to it,
whether you are for or against this
treaty, that probably there will not be
many votes changed by what is said
here in this Chamber in the next 2
weeks.
I do think, historically looking at
this, that in the course of history, it is
rather irrelevant President Reagan
has the treaty in his pocket to take to
Moscow with him to meet the dictator
of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev,
or whether he does not. But I think
also that it is probably not too signifi-
cant in the course of history whether
we vote on the treaty prior to his
gOing or after he goes, unless there is
something else that may come but, al-
though I said all along I thought the
time eventually was on the side of
those people who are in opposition to
this treaty.
But I think in many ways, it might
be said that this was a fait accompli
when the treaty was originally signed
last December.
I might say one thing about Presi-
dent Reagan and his administration,
who successfully negotiated this
treaty: President Reagan demonstrat-
ed that it takes more than just rheto-
ric to have the confidence and credibil-
ity not Only of our allies, but the re-
spect of our adversaries; that it takes a
strong political will.
That is probably the most important
factor in negotiating with authoritari-
an governments for those of us who
come from free societies, from the
democratic process, from countries
which aspire to democratic capitalism,
personal freedom, human rights and
human dignities. What we must re-
member is that the one single thing
that is key and most important in ne-
gotiating with the dictatorships and
the authoritarians and those people
who-stay in power by using oppression
and tyranny and fear, such as the
Soviet Union, that the best way to ne-
gotiate with them is from a position of
strength.
So I think this President deserves
the praise and admiration of all Amer-
icans because he negotiated from a po-
sition of strength.
I have to say that it was not the lef t-
wing politicians in Europe from more
liberal parties who made it possible for
the Pershing II's and the cruise mis-
siles to be deployed. It was not. the
more liberal politicians here in this
body and in the other body who made
it possible. It was the conservatives in
-America and people who knew that we
had to deal from a position of strength
May 17, 1988
who gave the Preeldent the political
will to use the political chips in West-
ern Europe, to make those early de-
ployments in his administration of the
Pershing II and the cruise missile,
that made it possible to get to the
point where the Soviets would come to
the table to sign an agreement to get
weapons systems out of Europe that
they felt were a deterrent to Soviet
hegemony and to the ultimate Soviet
goal of breaking Up the NATO alliance
and pealing West Germany off from
the alliance if they could do it.
Strength is the key. It takes political
will, it takes economic strength, and it
also takes a commitment to military
strength to back it up. It is common
sense.
My basic political philosophy with
respect to foreign policy is that you
should support your friends and
oppose your enemies. Pretty easy to
understand, pretty simple to under-
stand, and I think that the problem I
have found with this entire process
since this big rush toward arms con-
trol in this administration is that
probably the most significant thing
that has happened in the signing of
the INF Treaty is the fact that we got
away from that policy of supporting
our friends and opposing our enemies.
We have strengthened the political
parties that are more socialistic, more
sympathetic to the Communist bloc
nations, less sympathetic to personal
freedom, less sympathetic to economic
freedom, less sympathetic to demo-
cratic capitalism and have weakened-
the position of the political leaders in
Europe who have been in support of
President Reagan's general philosophy
that has been growing around the
world.
I think when one looks at the eco-
nomic growth that we have enjoyed in
this country in the past 6 years of un-
interrupted recovery; that that also
has had a sustaining effect as part of
the political will, the military
strength, and the economic strength
that we have been able to enjoy in the
West under the leadership of the
President.
So I say to President Reagan that I
have the highest respect for his ability
to get to the point that we signed the
INF Treaty and that the Soviets were
willing to deal with them, Mr. Presi-
dent. But I do think that the future
now is more uncertain because I think
that the United States of America has,
by taking this action, emboldened the
political parties who were viewed as
our adversaries and have weakened
those people who we viewed as our
friends in the long haul in politics in
Europe.
But having said that, I said last De-
cember that I would lay aside my pre-
conceptions and doubts that I had
about the treaty, and approach the
treaty's ratification with an open
mind. Even though I had great skepti-
cism, as my colleagues know, I had
great skepticism of all of the love in
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
May 17, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
that took place here in Washington.
And I might just say with respect to
that that I hope after this summit
when President Reagan goes to
Moscow that we in the United States,
no matter who our President is,
whether it is GEORGE BUSH, Michael
Dukakis, or whoever, will encourage
the administrations of the future to
not have home and home series sum-
mits where great expectations are
billed to the American people, that
somehow, something must be accom-
plished every year.
I would much prefer to see the
leader of the United States, the Presi-
dent of the United States of America,
the leader of the free world, an elected
official, meet with the leader of the
'Soviet Union, an oppressive society, in
a neutral court so we do not have this
opportunity for the Soviets?who are
masters of using the free press that
they could not give to their people in
their country?but that we do not give
them just a free ride to paint them-
selves in the picture that somehow ev-
erything has changed in the Soviet
Union, and now that Gorbachev is in
power they now have stopped state-
supported terrorism, which they have
not; that they have withdrawn from
Afghanistan, which we pray that they
ill, but they have not; .that they
topped funding Communist revolu-
tionary governments in Central Amer-
'ea, all across Africa, and creating he-
emony and terrorism against inno-
ent civilians in places like Pakistan
nd many other places in the world,
hich they are still doing.
I think in many ways we allow our-
elves, because Americans in general
ove to think that everything is going
o be all right because we are optimis-
e, we are goal oriented. So what hap-
ens is that election time is rolling
round, the administration therefore
ecides that it is time to get a treaty
ecause after all the President is going
o be leaving town, and we will push
or this. It happens with every admin-
stration no matter whether they are
epublicans, Democrats or what.
here is always a time constraint built
to our constitutional system because
e know under the Constitution how
ng a President will be in office, or
ow long at least he has to go back
nd face reelection.
There is a pressure on those of us
om the West to make a deal just like
ere is a pressure on the Senate. Let
o one make a mistake. There is a
ressure on this Senate to allow the
esident the privilege to go to
oscow with that treaty, ratified or
ot ratified. But there is a pressure on
e Senate to get out of the way, let
e thing happen because otherwise
here would be all kinds of stories
ritten in the newspapers and in the
levision, in the radios and so forth,
at somehow everything was going to
ot at River City because the Senate
ould not ratify the treaty on time.
So we do have this pressure. The So-
ets do not have the same problem be-
cause if people start objecting too
much in that country, they ship them
off to Siberia. I would say to my col-
leagues the ultimate test, of course, of
a free country, or a country that is
really opening up, is that they stop
killing people at the border if they
choose to leave. And the ultimate test
of a free society is you can liquidate
your assets, get your money, get your
passport and leave. As long as you live
in a country that will allow that privi-
lege, you are very, very lucky human
beings. I think we should all count our
blessings that we are blessed to live in
this great land.
But anyway, Mr. President, I tried
my best to be true to the promise that
I would face this with an open mind. I
listened carefully to a multitude of
witnesses who testified before the
Armed Services Committee, both pro
and con. And I read and considered in-
numerable articles and reports con-
cerning the treaty and the effects that
it will have. But first and foremost I
wanted to be convinced that the INF
Treaty enhanced our national securi-
ty, and was in the best interests of this
Nation. I wanted to be convinced that
we had reached a point in our relation-
ship with the Soviet Union where we
had achieved a mutual understanding
based on openness, candor, and a point
where the balance of terror was no ?
longer considered a meaningful
phrase.
I wanted to be convinced that the
loss of more than 6% billion dollars
worth of American taxpayers' dollars
had been spent on intermediate nucle-
ar forces was equal to the gain and se-
curity represented by the treaty.
Finally. I wanted to be convinced
that as a result of the treaty our
future, the future of our alliances and
our allies' future, indeed the future of
the world as a whole, would be bright-
er and more secure.
Unfortunately, Mr. President, I am
not convinced that is what has hap-
pened. All I have seen and heard from
the proponents of the treaty can prob-
ably be summed up in the following
manner. First, it will support our over-
all strategy by reducing risks. Second,
it will strengthen our alliances. Third,
it will decrease the Soviet military ad-
vantage. Finally, it will do all of this in
a manner which provides assurances
of verification.
All of us I think agree that the re-
duction of risk is a very, very impor-
tant goal, a goal worthy of our best ef-
forts. However, I have a difficult time
with the treaty that purports to
reduce the risks but lowers the point
where a nuclear exchange is likely to
take place, and also fails to address
the overwhelming Soviet conventional
superiority in Europe.
Mr. President, I filed minority views
in the Armed Services Committee
report. They are probably too lengthy.
There is so much to say. I apologize to
my colleagues because they are so
lengthy. But at this point I just want
to read one brief little page 82 from
S 6031
that report about the conventional
forces that the Soviets and the
Warsaw Pact have over NATO.
The Soviet Warsaw Pact has a 2-to-1
advantage in main battle tanks; 2.3-to-
1 advantage in heavy artillery; 1.3-to-1
advantage in armored personnel carri-
ers; 1.2-to-1 advantage in tactical air-
craft; 2.4-to-1 advantage in interceptor
aircraft; 6-to-1 advantage in the inter-
mediate range bombers; and a 25-to-1
advantage in chemical decontamina-
tion equipment. And get this, Mr.
President, the Soviet Warsaw Pact has
700,000 tons to zero in modern deliver-
able chemical munitions.
I think we have some 10 or 11 air
bases with the flexible reponse air-
craft deployed in Europe that will
have to take up part of the slack, for
the lack of the Pershing H's and the
Cruise missiles.
That is a tremendous burden that it
puts on our tactical and our non-nucle-
ar deterrrence in Western Europe.
In my opinion, that means it in itself
will increase the potential for a disas-
trous strategic exchange with the
Soviet Union. It is not a reduction of
the risk. It is a grievous miscalcula-
tion.
Why are we willing to accept a situa-
tion which permits our adversaries to
retain their capability to engage the
intermediate targets with their SS-24
and SS-25 mobile missile forces while
we surrender only our own ground-
based nuclear capability?
Many of my colleagues would cite
our strategic missile force and our
dual capable aircraft or even our sea-
launched Cruise missiles as a way to
offset our INF losses. But they do not
acknowledge the inherent vulnerabili-
ties of each of those systems which in
my mind creates a serious question re-
garding the usefulness in the INF role.
Are we not being really less than
candid when we suggest the use of
strategic weapons to counter a Warsaw
Pact attack against NATO without
also admitting the tremendous risk of
a follow-on strategic nuclear ex-
change?
Let us be honest about it. Do you be-
lieve we will fire an MX missile from
the continental United States to retar-
get targets that now Pershing II mis-
siles are capable of hitting? If you flip
this on the other side of the coin, the
Soviets can replace the SS-20's with
SS-24's and SS-25's which they are
going to retarget the same targets in
Europe. So we do not have any targets
in Europe that still are not under the
same threat. But they still are firing
those from the homeland of the Soviet
Union into European targets, but not
into United States targets. So we
should think about that.
I want to point out another ques-
tion. I visited Europe in January, vis-
ited with many of our military leaders,
and asked them many questions about
it. Of course, the party line there is
that they can live with the INF if we
modernize all our tactical and other
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3
S 6032 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
weapons and keep our position strong
enough to have a flexible response.
It is interesting to note, however,
that Spain is trying to throw out 72 of
our dual capable F-16 aircraft from
there, and we will have to look for an-
other home for them.
It is also interesting to note that
when we state the case that we can
use dual capable aircraft, I say to my
colleagues, and particularly those who
may not have thought through what a
dual capable aircraft is, it is one that
is used in a tactical battle but which
still has the capability of the nuclear
delivery system to use if all else fails.
If we have to withhold those aircraft
from an ensuing land battle because
we are fearful that we will lose them
and we might have to have them, we
only weaken the hands of our com-
manders who will need everything
they can to stop the armored columns.
So if aircraft are withheld from the
initial land battle in order to be able
to be held in reserve to conduct a nu-
clear strike, in my view we have com-
plicated our ability to deal with that
land battle as well as our need to
achieve and maintain air superiority,
and consequently increased the possi-
bility of an early tactical nuclear ex-
change.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the
Senator will suspend, the Chair points
out that the time available to the Re-
publican leader has expired.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I make
an inquiry: Are we not on the debate
of the INF Treaty?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct.
Mr. SYMMS. Are we under con-
trolled time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are
under controlled time.
Mr. SYMMS. Is there more time
available for the Republican leader?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Republican leader's time has expired.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry: Are we starting on
the same debate in the morning?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will return to this matter in
the morning, without controlled time.
The Chair points out to the Senator
from Idaho that there is time avail-
able on the majority side. The Chair
does not know whether the majority
will yield time. There is none remain-
ing on the republican side.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, are we
not really overstating the case to sug-
gest the use of dual capable aircraft to
redress the INF problem. Afterall, if
those aircraft are withheld from the
initial land battle in order to conduct a
nuclear strike, haven't we just compli-
cated both our ability to deal with
that land battle, as well as our need to
achieve and maintain air superiority
and consequently, increased the possi-
bility of an early tactical nuclear ex-
change? Where then is the reduction
in risk. I, for one, can't find it.
With regard to the premise that the
treaty will serve to strengthen our alli-
ances, I think it is very disturbing to
note that many Europeans view the
treaty as an unwelcome return to the
insecurity of the seventies, when the
only response available to NATO, in
the event of a massive Soviet invasion
of Europe, was a United States strate-
gic nuclear attack on the Soviet home-
land; an all or nothing response which
most Europeans felt was a sham.
Except, in the current case, the situa-
tion is even worse due to the tremen-
dous increases in the quality and
quantity of Soviet forces targeted
against Western Europe.
In fact, the treaty not only dislo-
cates the strategy of flexible response
which has served NATO well for so
many years, but it fails to address the
massive Soviet land force advantage in
cental Europe. In my view, the only
thing the treaty accomplishes in this
area is the magnification of the Soviet
Union's threat to Europe, while simul-
taneously diminishing NATO's ability
to deter that threat.
Already voices in Western Europe
can be heard hailing the treaty as the
first step in the drive toward a Europe-
an nuclear free zone. Political pressure
has started to build in Germany to
slow down, reevaluate, and possibly do
away with the Montebello moderniza-
tion program. Have not Gennescher,
Shevarnahdze, Hornecker, and others
already met and begun discussion of
eliminating all remaining nuclear
weapons in both East and West Ger-
many. Where then is the strengthen-
ing, the solidifying, the reinforcing
nature of the treaty. I, for one, cannot
find it. On the contrary, I believe the
treaty calls into question the credibil-
ity of both our political and military
commitments to Western Europe. As
Mr. Benoist and many other promi-
nent Europeans have recently conclud-
ed:
Far from enhancing Western security, we
believe the INF Agreement would shift the
military balance in favor of the Warsaw
Pact and assist the Soviet Union in seeking
to include political changes in the West fa-
vorable to its interests. At the same time,
the proposed accord would diminish any in-
centive for the Soviet Union to make funda-
mental changes in its domestic and foreign
policies. We are also fearful that it would
weaken the credibility of the United States
nuclear gurantee to Europe, sow discord
within the alliance, and seriously erode the
reputation and influence of the United
States, upon which free societies remain
critically dependent.
Now let us turn our attention to the
proposition that the treaty decreases
the Soviet's military advantage. Over
the course of the last 40 years, we
May 17, 1,9
have successfully deterred the Sovie
from attempting a military conque
of Western Europe. That deterren
was the direct result of the Soviet
perception of our strength and o
willingness to use that strength
behalf of our NATO allies. Our wi
ingness to develop an INF force a
deploy, it forward in Europe and o
allies' willingness to base those wea
ons on their soil only served to furth
strengthen NATO, while reinforc
the credibility of our deterrent. W
the adoption of the INF Treaty o
"equalizer" is gone. Remember th
General Rogers, in his testimo
before the Armed Services Committe
cautioned "keep in mind that f
NATO's deterrent to be credible
must conjure up in the Soviet mind
perception of greater pain than ga
from pact aggression" ? * and th
we went on to state that "what the S
viets are eliminating comprises o
about 3 percent of their stockpile
nuclear warheads. Nearly all of the
maining 97 percent can be target
against installations in NATO's re
areas, thereby keeping the risk hi
and on the backs of the West Euro
an people. And what does NATO gi
up? The very weapon system the So
ets fear most?the Pershing II?wh'
puts the Soviet homeland and peo
in a similar posture of vulnerabil
and keeps high the credibility
NATO's deterrent." Where then is t
decrease in the Soviet's military
vantage? I, for one, cannot find it.
Any overlaying all of these issues
the real .centerpiece of the
Treaty; the verification clause. Pie
excuse me Mr. President, I misspok
did not mean to say verification. W
I meant to say was trust, the tr
clause, for that is what it means. L
many of my colleagues, I too was c
cerned with the meaning of verifi
tion so I went to what I considered
be the most authoritative source av
able?Webster's third new internati
al dictionary. Webster's defines
word "verification" as?and I quo
"The act or process of verifying or
state of being verified: the authenti
tion of truth or accuracy by s
means as facts, statements, citatio
measurements, or attendant circ
stances."
Using that definition as a basis, I
viewed the report of the Select C
mittee on Intelligence entitled "M
toring and Verification Capabiliti
where I found the following admiss
"with respect to assessing the accur
of the numbers and locations of for
and systems declared by the Sovie
the treaty's memorandum of und
standing, the intelligence conunun
has not resolved significant dif
ences of view over the possibility t
the Soviets may not have disclo
their entire inventory of nondeplo
SS-20 missiles * ? * their poten
military significance would, howe
be short-lived. This is because
operational reliability and milit
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030010-3