EXECUTIVE SESSION-TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES (THE INF TREATY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030007-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 27, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000100030007-7
S 6876 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. CRANSTON. Reserving the
right to object, I have a question of
the majority leader. Does this pre-
clude further amendments and close
out the possibility of any further
amendments?
Mr. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. CRANSTON. I would like to re-
serve the right to offer one amend-
ment with an hour time limit on it
only if the Helms amendment is adopt-
ed. In case it is adopted and in case I
still see problems with it, I would like
to have the right to come up with an-
other amendment.
Mr. BYRD. That will be opening up
the agreement of yesterday, and that
agreement cannot be reopened wheth-
er we agree to this one or not.
Mr. CRANSTON. What agreement
of yesterday?
Mr. BYRD. The agreement of enu-
merating the amendments that re-
mained that could be called up.
Mr. CRANSTON. That is closed
down because of that process?
Mr. BYRD. Yes, because if we open
it up?
Mr. CRANSTON. I understand.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the distin-
guished majority whip.
Mr. President, has that agreement
been agreed to?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The unanimous-consent request
propounded by the majority leader
has been agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair and I
thank all Senators.
I ask unanimous consent that the
Helms amendment No. 2317 continue
to be laid aside at the sufferance of
the Senator from North Carolina be-
cause he is entitled, if there is an ob-
jection, to have it come back before
the Senate upon the disposition of the
Wallop amendment. I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment by Mr.
HELMS continue to be laid aside tempo-
rarily as of now.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Is there objection? Without ob-
jection it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the
Senators can restrain themselves and
yield back some of the time, although
I must compliment them, they are not
asking for a great deal of time, it
would help the Senate to dispose of
the amendments and hopefully ap-
prove the ratification of the treaty at
a reasonably early hour this after-
noon. It would be most welcomed in
Moscow, I think, by our President if it
were done by 3 o'clock.
One might not expect me to have
said that the way I did, but I think we
have closed all loopholes we know
about in this treaty, and it is a much
better treaty than it was when he sent
it to the Hill. So I will be happy to try
to accommodate the President as
much as I can.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on an-
other matter, if I can inform the ma-
jority leader, Senator WARNER from
Virginia has been working diligently. I
-have been assisting him in respect to
getting an agreement worked out on
the DOD bill so that the D'Amato
amendment would not be an impedi-
ment to the final passage of the DOD
bill. I think a good deal of progress
has been made ;between Senator
D'AmATo, Senator LEVIN, and Senator
WARNER. We have, at least, a prospect
of getting a unanimous consent so
can finish the DOD bill today.
If we do not get that unanimous co
sent worked out by the completion
the INF Treaty, I would ask the m
jority leader consider going into legis
lative session to bring up the DO
bill, at which time I would at least try
to get the D'Amato amendment
tabled.
I hope that would not be necessary.
I would feel an obligation to at least
try to pass that Department of De-
fense bill. It contains so many ele-
ments that are so important, including
pay raises for the military, including
trying to avoid as much as possible the
deferment of civilian employees.
The longer we delay it, the more the
deferment and layoff of civilian em-
ployees is going to be. I would like to
at least feel obligated to try to 'move
that this afternoon. It should not take
long. We will either get a unanimous
consent or we will not. We will either
get it tabled or not. It might necessi-
tate or would necessitate, in the ab-
sence of a unanimous consent, one
rollcall vote. If we get a unanimous
consent, I do not have any need to
have a rollcall vote on final passage,
but someone else may ask for that.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator from Geor-
gia for his observations. It is most
helpful.
Let me respond to my friend from
Maine. I hope that the Senate can go
to the DOD authorization bill this
afternoon and dispose of it, and I hope
that a unanimous-consent request can
be developed which would entertain
the separation of the D'Amato amend-
ment from the bill.
There is one caveat; that the Senate
cannot go into legislative session to
take up the DOD authorization bill
without unanimous consent for the
reason that once the Senate goes into
legislative session, the veto message
from the President will be read to the
Senate, and immediately upon the
reading of that, it will be attached to
the Journal, following which the veto
message is before the Senate for dispo-
sition. That has precedence over any-
thing else, even over rule XXII, if
there has not been a vote, and would
have precedence over the War Powers
Resolution, which has been triggered
by the Senator from Washington [Mr.
ADAMS).
We do face that problem getting to
the DOD authorization bill this after-
noon. I hope the distinguished Repub-
lican leader and I and the Senator
from Virginia and the Senator from
Georgia and other Senators may be
able to collaborate in bringing 'about
May 27, 1988
that desired result, put there are those
obstacles.
_ Mr. President, I thank the distin-
guished Republican leader for the out-
standing cooperation that he has
given in advancing this treaty to this
point. The daylight is really at the end
f the tunnel. I yield the floor.
EXECUTIVE SESSION?TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUB-
LICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF
THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
AND SHORTER-RANGE MIS-
SILES (THE INF TREATY)
The Senate resumed with the con-
sideration of the treaty.
Pending:
Helms Amendment No. 2317 (to the reso-
lution of ratification), to include in the in-
struments of ratification a unilateral decla-
ration of the United States that, as an inte-
gral factor in its decision to adhere to the
Treaty, it intends to continue to negotiate
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
a treaty effecting reductions in strategic nu-
clear forces of the parties and, in conjunc-
tion with its NATO allies, to negotiate a
treaty effecting reductions in the conven-
tional forces of NATO -and the Warsaw
Pact; and in so doing, that it -shall be guided
by certain enumerated principles and con-
siderations.
Wallop Amendment No. 2324, to provide
for a United States response to possible vio-
lations of the INF Treaty.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The vote now occurs on the
motion to table the Wallop amend-
ment and the yeas and nays have been
ordered.
Mr. McCLURE addressed the Chair.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The gentleman from Idaho.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I Ilse
as a cosponsor of the compliance con-
dition before the Senate, and to urge
Its adoption.
Mr. President, 27 years ago, Fred
Ikle wrote a seminal and prophetic ar-
ticle entitled "After Detection, What?"
The article addressed the difficulty of
enforcing compliance with arms con-
trol agreements once violations have
been detected.
When I say prophetic, I mean both
foresightful and, also, little honored in
his own land. For it is not until today,
27 years later, that we in the Senate
are ' acting to address the problems
Fred Ikle outlined in 1961. I hope the
Senate will see fit today to honor this
prophet, who recently retired, after a
career of distinguished service, as
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
We are all aware of the unprecedent-
ed strides that have been made in the
verification regime of the INF Treaty.
We have the right to inspect Soviet
missile assembly and deployment sites
deep within the country Churchill
once described as "a riddle, wrapped in
a mystery, inside an enigma." We have
Soviet agreement on extensive cooper-
ative measures to enhance the ability
of our national technical means to
monitor Soviet compliance.
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-May 27 1988
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE.
ful that we will complete work on this
matter today. That will enable the
President to carry forward with the
pl that had previously been laid in
terms f including INF Treaty ratifica-
tion at e summit.
Mr. Pr ident, I thank the majority
leader for ielding.
ORDER E i ENDING THE MA-
JORITY LEPER'S TIME FOR 10
MINUTES
Mr. BYRD.
unanimous conse
extended for not to
President, I ask
that my time be
xceed 10 minutes.
The ACTING PR IDENT pro tern-
pore. Without object in, it is so or-
dered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. Presi ent, I have a
parliamentary inquiry.
The ACTING PRESIDE T pro tern-
pore. The majority leader 1 state it.
Mr. BYRD. Is the first v e that is
pending on the motion to ble the
amendment by Mr. WALLOP?
The ACTING PRESIDENT p o tern-
pore. That would be the first or. r.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, was ere
a time limit earlier on the W lop
amendment which has expired?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro te
pore. There had been a time agre
ment of 80 minutes on the amendmen
offered by the Senator from Wyo-
ming.
Mr. BYRD. And that 80 minutes has
expired or has been yielded back?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. That time has expired.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT
AGREEMENT
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, immediately
upon the disposition of the amend-
ment by Mr. WALLOP, and without fur-
ther debate or motion, the Senate pro-
ceed to an amendment by Mr. PRES-
SLER, the subject matter of which is
the Helsinki compliance certification,
and that there be a 30-minute time
limitation on the amendment, to be
equally divided and controlled in ac-
cordance with the usual form; and,
that, upon the expiration of the time
or its having been yielded back, a vote
occur in relation ' to the Pressler
amendment; provided further, that,
immediately upon the disposition of
that amendment, without further
debate or action, the Senate proceed
to the consideration of an amendment
by Mr. SYMMS dealing with end
strength, and that there be a time lim-
itation on that amendment by Mr.
SYMMS of?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. Leader, I believe
we can handle this in 15 minutes.
Mr. DOLE. Total?
Mr. NUNN. Sixteen minutes, equally
divided.
Mr. BYRD. That there be a time
limitation on that amendment, equally
divided in accordance with the usual
form.
And that, upon the expiration or the
yielding back of that time, the Senate
proceed immediately to a vote in rela-
tion thereto?that the Senate then
proceed Immediately and without fur-
ther action or debate to an amend-
ment by Mr. DOLE Which is the double
negative amendment on which there
be a time limitation of 20 minutes to
be equally divided and controlled in
accordance with the usual form; and
that upon the expiration or yielding
back of that time a vote occur on the
amendment; that upon the disposition
of the Dole amendment, without fur-
ther action or debate the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of an amend-
ment by Mr. SPECTER having to do
with treaty interpretation, that there
be a 40-minute time limit on that
amendment to be equally divided and
controlled in accordance with the
usual form and that, upon the disposi-
tion of that on the expiration or yield-
ing back of that time, the Senate pro-
ceed without further action or debate
to a vote in relation to that amend-
ment;
That upon the disposition of that
amendment without any further
action or debate the Senate proceed
Immediately to the consideration of
the second amendment by Mr. SPEC-
TER, which is, likewise, on the subject
matter of treaty interpretation and
there be a 30-minute time limitation to
e equally divided and controlled in
cordance with the usual form; that
u . ? n the expiration or yielding back
of 1 at time a vote occur without any
inte ening action in relation?a vote
occur in relation to that amendment;
that u on the disposition of the Spec-
ter ame i dments, the Senate then pro-
ceed to amendment by Mr. HELMS
dealing th troop withdrawal, that
there be 1 minutes on a side on that
amendment, d that upon the expira-
tion or yield g back of that time the
Senate procee without further action
to a vote in r : ation to that amend-
ment;
That upon the disposition of that
amendment witho t further action or
debate the majorit leader be recog-
nized and the clotur motion be vitiat-
ed but that the majo 'ty leader be rec-
ognized at that point.
The ACTING PRESI ENT pro tern-
pore. Is there objection to the unani-
mous-consent request?
Mr. COHEN. Reserving he right to
object, may I inquire of t e majority
leader upon the dispositio of these
amendments and any ot rs that
might come up in the inrvening
time, do you intend to go to the DOD
bill after that?
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, \i,n re-
sponse to the question by the distin-
guished Senator from Maine, Mr.
COHEN, the amendments that lve
been enumerated here and include in
the time agreement that has just be
promulgated, upon the disposition
those amendments there is only on
amendment that would remain, if that
should be in the form of an amend-
a
S 6875
ment. That would be the amendment
by Mr. QUAYLE. And, so we cannot
agree to a time limit on it. As I under-
stand it, that may turn out to be a col-
loquy.
So I think that every amendment
that has been protected by the agree-
ment of yesterday dealing with enu-
merated amendments has been ac-
counted for in this discussion today.
May I make one further parliamen-
tary inquiry before I respond to the
distinguished Senator from Maine?
Mr. President, I am told that the
time as set forth in the agreement,
which I hope to be executed shortly,
would amount to something like 4, 41/2
hours, if all the time is taken and if no
more than four rollcall votes occur,
may I say to the distinguished Senator
from Maine, Mr. COHEN, that takes us
up to about 2:30.
That does not set a time limit on the
Quayle amendment or the Quayle col-
loquy, whichever he elects to utilize.
Nor does it include any time for
speeches anent the treaty.
I include in this unanimous-consent
request any Senators who may wish to
include statements in the RECORD may
have until 5 p.m. today to do so, and
that those speeches may appear as
though read in their entirety. That is
part of the request.
Will the Senator allow us to get this
agreement and then allow him to re-
spond?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there objection to the unani-
mous-consent request?
Mr. EXON. Reserving the right to
object, and I shall not, one matter I
did not hear the majority leader refer
to and maybe he did, last evening on
the amendment offered by the Sena-
tor from North Carolina, to which the
Senator from California had an
amendment and withdrew that amend-
ment, that amendment was never laid
on the table. Has the majority leader
discussed that amendment and has
that been disposed of?
Mr. BYRD. That has not been dis-
posed of. It has been included?
Mr. EXON. It has been included in
the list you just read?
Mr. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. EXON. I thank the majority
leader.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Is there objection to the unani-
mous-con:sent request? Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
Mr. CRANSTON. Reserving the
right to object.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will
amend my response to the question by
Mr. Exort. I had included it only by
reference. I had forgotten there has
been no time agreement on that
amendment. I think if we could get
the rest of this agreement, it will not
prejudice either Mr. HELMS or any
other Senator, insofar as debate on
that amendment is concerned. I hope
that we can proceed with the request.
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May 27, 1988
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6877
But critical though verification is, it
is only half the problem. "After Detec-
tion, What?" That is the question we
seek to answer today.
For it is not enough to detect viola-
tions. What counts is the political will
to impose a political and military price
to ensure that arms control scofflaws
do not gain from their violations. If we
cannot do that, all the onsite inspec-
tions, satellites, and monitoring sites
In the world are useless.
The condition before us creates a
mechanism to deter the Soviets from
violating the INF Treaty, and to re-
spond if they do. It does so before the
fact of a Soviet violation, and as an es-
sential part of the Senate'sgown under-
standings regarding the treaty.
The condition is straightforward. It
establishes that the United States will
consider any Soviet violation as
grounds for a? proportionate response
or for withdrawal from the treaty, in
accordance with generally recognized
principles of international law. It es-
tablishes a procedure to ensure that
the State is kept informed of Soviet
compliance, or intelligence informa-
tion indicating noncompliance, includ-
ing the reliability of the evidence for,
and the military significance of, any
Soviet violations.
If the President reports to Congress
that the Soviet Union is no longer in
compliance with the treaty, and the
President decides not to exercise the
right to withdraw from the treaty, the
President should certify to Congress
that either:
The United States is undertaking ap-
propriate responses, or
The Soviet Union has returned to
compliance.
The Senate may reject the Presiden-
tial certification, in which case the
treaty should no longer remain in
force. However, this is not binding. It
is a statement of how the Senate in-
tends the United States to respond.
Mr. President, some may ask, why is
this condition necessary? It is neces-
sary because, to date, the United
States record in making the Soviet
Union pay for its violations of existing
treaties has been abysmal. The House
and Senate have voted unanimously to
recognize the Krasnoyarsk radar site
as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. But they then turned
around and voted to force the United
States to comply with the narrowest
interpretation of that treaty, forestall-
ing our ability to respond to a Soviet
violation of potentially enormous mili-
tary significance.
Our track record on the SALT II
Treaty sends the same message. In
1979, as many of my colleagues recall,
President Carter said that encryption,
or scrambling, of missile telemetry
would be just as significant a violation
as exceeding the limits on strategic
weapons. Such a violation, the Carter
administration told us, could be con-
sidered grounds for abrogation of the
treaty. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee endorsed this position. The
committee also said, in its report, that
any significant Soviet violation would
"be countered by a timely response
upon detection." On another issue,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance touted
the ban on new types?the ban violat-
ed by the SS-25?as one of the corner-
stones of the treaty.
As we all know, the Soviets went
ahead and violated both those provi-
sions, the ban on encryption and the
ban on a new type. And after 5 years
of voluntary U.S. compliance with
SALT II, the Reagan administration
finally moved to abandon the SALT II
limits. Yet Congress is still trying?it
Is taking another shot on this year's
defense authorization bills?to force
the United States back into compli-
ance with a treaty which the Soviets
are violating and which, even had it
been ratified, would have long since
expired.
Mr. President, the arms control
lobby blames the Reagan administra-
tion for the breakdown in Soviet com-
pliance. The administration, they say,
Is being too confrontational, blowing
Soviet violations out of proportion. In-
stead, we are told, the United States
should use the Standing Consultative
Commission for a quite resolution of
disagreements.
But the SCC, which was established
by the ABM Treaty to serve as a
forum for compliance disputes, has
been useless, an "Orwellian memory
hole" as Cap Weinberger described it.
As of March of last year, the SCC had
spent 224 hours discussing Kras-
noyarsk?with absolutely no effect on
Soviet actions. The committee had
also spent 270 hours on the SS-25, and
385 hours on the Soviet encryption of
telemetry. Meanwhile the SS-25 has
gone from the development stage to-
deployment, and the Soviets continue
to encrypt their telemetry.
I know there is a son of SCC estab-
lished by the INF Treat, called the
Special Verification Commission. I
hope that body is more successful
than its predecessor. And I hope the
Senate will take action today to give
our SVC people some leverage.
Mr. President, what we have done
through our refusal to respond to
Soviet violations is to send a danger-
ous message. In one breath, we have
said that we believe the Soviets are in
violation of treaties. But through our
legislative actions, we have said that
violations do not matter, and the Sovi-
ets can continue to cheat with impuni-
ty.
Today, the Senate has a chance to
reverse that message. And let me make
it clear to any of my colleagues, who
think this condition somehow hurts
the INF Treaty, that passing the com-
pliance reservation is the best thing
we can do for this treaty. In fact, I
would go so far as to call this a "re-
verse-killer amendment." What's that?
That is an amendment that kills the
treaty if it does not pass. Because if
the Senate rejects this amendment,
that action could eventually -kill this
treaty. If we reject this amendment,
we will be telling the Soviets: "Go
ahead. Cheat. Keep cheating. We
aren't going to do anything." And the
Soviets can take a hint. If they believe
they can gain from cheating, they will.
Mr. President, when he signed this
treaty, President Reagan cited an old
Russian proverb. "Doveryai, no pro-
veryai." Trust, but verify. I would like
to add a word to that. Doveryai, pro-
veryai, i prinuzhdai. Trust, verify, and
enforce.
I urge the adoption of the reserva-
tion.
VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 2324
THE ACTING PRESIDENT pro
tempore. The question is on agreeing
to the motion to table the amendment
of the Senator from Wyoming. The
yeas and nays have, been ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON; I announce that
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. MATSU-
NAGA] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr.
METZENBAIIM] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio [Mr. GLENN] is absent due
to death in family.
I also announce that the Senator
from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] is absent
because of illness.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced?yeas 66,
nays 30, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 161 Ex.]
YEAS-66
Adams
Baucus
Bentsen
Bingaman
Bond
Boren
Boschwitz
Bradley
Breaux
Bumpers
Burdick
Byrd
Chafee
Chiles
Cohen
Conrad
Cranston
Danforth
Daschle
DeConcini
Dixon
Dodd
Arnistrong
Cochran
D'Amato
Dole
Domenicl
Garn
Granun
Grassley
Hatch
Hecht
Biden
Glenn
Durenberger
Evans
Exon
Ford
Fowler
Gore
Graham
Harkin
Hatfield
Heinz
Hollings
Inouye
Johnston
Kennedy
Kerry
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lugar
Melcher
Mikulski
Mitchell
NAYS-30
Heflin
Helms
Humphrey
Karnes
Kassebaum
Kasten
McCain
McClure
McConnell
Murkowskl
Moynihan
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Proxmire
Pryor
Quayle
Reid
Riegle
Rockefeller
Roth
Rudman
Sanford
Sarbanes
Sasser
Simon
Specter
Stafford
Stennis
Stevens
Weicker
Wirth
Nickles
Pressler
Shelby
Simpson
Synuns
Thurmond
Trible
Wallop
Warner
Wilson
NOT VOTING-4
Matsunaga
Metzenbaum
So the motion to lay on the table
the amendment (No. 2324) was agreed
to.
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S 6878 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. LUGAR,. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
motion to table was agreed to.
Mr. EXON. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern.-
pore. The Senate will be 'in order. Sen-
ators will please take their seats. The
Senate will be in order.
AMENDMENT NO. 2101
(Purpose: To condition ratification on the
certification whether the Soviet Union is
In compliance with the Helsinki Final Act)
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the unanimous-consent
agreement, the Senator from South
Dakota is recognized for 15 minutes.
The opposition is recognized for 15
minutes.
The Senator from South Dakota is
recognized.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I
send an amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The Clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
PRESSLER] proposes an amendment num-
bered 2101.
At the appropriate place in the resolution,
insert the following condition: "Subject,
however, to the condition that neither the
President nor any other agent of the Execu-
tive Department is authorized to sign or ex-
change instruments of ratificaiton unless
and until the President, without delegation,
shall have certified to the United States
Senate whether the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics is faithfully meeting its obliga-
tions under and is in full compliance with
all provisions of the Final Act of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe".
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senate will be in order.
The Senator from South Dakota is'
recognized.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I
thank you for your efforts to establish
order.
Mr. President, the key word in this
amendment is "whether." It does not
ask the President to certify "that" the
Soviets are in compliance with the
Helsinki Final Act on security, coop-
eration, and human rights. In fact, the
Soviets, in my judgement, are not in
compliance. Therefore, it would be a
very simple matter for the President
to issue a statement to that effect
whereupon he would then be author-
ized to sign and exchange the instru-
ments of ratification.
So the point of this amendment, is
to highlight the Helsinki Final Act
and human rights in the Soviet Union.
The Soviets are not in full compliance.
I believe the President should certify
whether they are or are not, before
entering into final ratification of this
treaty. I think it should not take the
President and his many advisers more
than a half-hour to complete this task.
In doing so, they would reiterate the
obvious?that the Soviets are not in
full compliance with the Helsinki ac-
cords on security, cooperation, and
human rights.
Some might ask, "What is the point
of doing this on the eve of the summit
In Moscow?" Many of us in the Senate
have been signing letters to the Presi-
dent and Secretary Gorbachev in
recent weeks, asking that the various
human rights and emigration cases be
favorably resolved by the Soviet
Union. There have been dozens of
these letters this year, and I have
signed marry of them. 'They are good
letters, and all produced desirable re-
sults in this era of glasnost and peres-
troika.
However, we should go beyond send-
ing letters, to draw attention to the
persistent problems of Soviet violation
of the Helsinki accords.
The INF Treaty is a historic agree-
ment in several respects. It is the first
time the superpowers have agreed to
mutually reduce nuclear armed mis-
siles, and it makes a leap forward in
the area of onsite inspection of nucle-
ar facilities by human beings. But the
Helsinki Act also was a historic agree-
ment. It codified the idea that true se-
curity requires cooperation between
nations and respect for certain basic
human rights within nations.
The Helsinki Final Act has been the
foundation for many effective efforts
to advance the cause of human rights
in Europe, especially in Eastern
Europe. Unfortunately, there is a long
way to go before we can rest, assured
that the Helsinki principles are re-
spected in the Soviet Union, let alone
fully observed. The Soviet Union
signed this solemn agreement.
On this occasion of the imminent
ratification of the INF Treaty, I urge
the Senate to reaffirm the principles
and ideals of the Helsinki Final Act by
supporting my amendment. In doing
so, we will be saying to the Soviet Union
that we regard progress toward com-
pliance with the Helsinki principles to
be as important?as this INF Treaty.
The INF Treaty is an extension of
the Helsinki principles. The Helsinki
Final Act may be regarded as an um-
brella under which arms control agree-
ments fall. It is the parent agreement,
in a real sense, and has earned the re-
spect and appreciation of millions of
Europeans. Therefore, we can accom-
plish two historic feats: Ratification of
the INF Treaty and reaffirmation of
the Helsinki principles.
Mr. President, there are many mi-
nority groups in the Soviet Union, and
their friends in the United States are
very interested in this amendment.
For example, there is the Soviet Ar-
menian minority. The Armenians want
respect for their basic rights in the
Soviet Union, and they have been
demonstrating to make known to the
world that they feel they are not
being treated fairly. The Helsinki ac-
cords are not being respected by the
Soviet Union regarding the ? Armeni-
ans.
Recently, it was my pleasure to
travel to Turkey where I discussed
May 27, 1988
with the leaders of that country some
of the issues regarding the Ottoman
Empire's genocide against the Armeni-
ans. They pointed out that most Ar-
menians live acroks the border in the
Soviet Union, and that they have re-
cently been demonstrating very
strongly. This amendment would very
much highlight the Armenians in the
Soviet Union. It would highlight their
plight..
Also, the Baltic States?Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania?have been
struggling for greater autonomy, the
freedom to practice religion, and re-
spect for their unique cultural herit-
age and customs.
Last nigat, on television, it was
pointed out that in the Soviet Union it
Is illegal to have a meeting to study
the Bible. Certainly, the Christians
and others who wish to practice reli-
gion, except where there are television
cameras, are not being accorded the
protection of the Helsinki principles.
Discrimination against Ukrainians has
been widespread. That is something
that this amendment would address?
not to mention the Soviet Jews who
have suffered so much. Although the
Soviets have permitted a higher level
of Jewish emigration during the past
year, the number of those permitted
to emigrate to Israel remains far below
the level of several years ago.
Mr. President, I think it is very im-
portant to make this statement on
human rights. There are many citizens
of the United States who welcome
glasnost but who, at the same time,
see continuing patterns of violations
of the Helsinki accords.
This amendment would not require
the Soviet Union to satisfy the re-
quirements-of the Helsinki accords. It
would require that the President certi-
fy whether or not the Soviets are com-
plying fully with Helsinki accords.
This exercise on the eve of the summit
would highlight the cause of human
rights in many ;areas of the world.
-Mr. President, we are on the verge of
a historic act in the Senate. What we
do here today will affect future gen-
erations. I have expressed great con-
cern about the conventional defense
forces in Europe and the imbalances
that exist between NATO and Warsaw
Pact nations. In some ways, I feel that
we are giving up, our INF missiles
trump card while they are keeping
their trump card, their superiority in
conventional forces.
I am concerned that, next year, the
administration?be it Republican or
Democrat?will seek increases in mili-
tary spending to increase our conven-
tional forces in Europe; and I will raise
questions About that, because I think
there should be a more equitable de-
fense burden sharing by our allies.
However, let us not go forward with
this treaty without considering the
issue of human rights. I know that
this body has adopted, by unanimous
consent, -another Helsinki amendment,
but that amendment has no teeth in
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
it. It does not require any action by
the President. I think that on the eve
of the summit, the President could
make the proposed certification in a
half hour, and it will not hold up the
treaty. It would not force renegoti-
ation of the INF Treaty. It will not
hurt the treaty. In fact, it will
strengthen it.
There are literally millions of people
who are crying out for human rights
and religious freedom, and many of us
have worked on this. It seems strange
that we should enter into this agree-
ment with the Soviet Union without
having this certification by the Presi-
dent on the eve of the summit. That is
the purpose of my amendment.
Mr. President, I have offered many
amendments in the Foreign Relations
Committee on verification and other
issues. I think that the efforts we
made in the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee helped to bring about a strong-
er United States-Soviet agreement on
verification procedures; as a result of
our committee efforts, and the efforts
of many of my colleagues, there was
another meeting between the Secre-
tary of State and the Soviet Foreign
Minister, and additional verification
procedures were clarified.
Also, I raised many questions and of-
fered an amendment in the committee
on conventional forces, which was de-
feated. I feel very strdngly that any
START agreement the President
might initiate in Moscow should be
tied ,to a reduction of Soviet/Warsaw
Pact conventional forces in Europe, es-
pecially the Soviet combat-ready divi-
sions that are located in Poland, Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germa-
ny, not to mention the Soviet Union
itself. They clearly have a 2-to-1 supe-
riority at least, and maybe a 4-to-1 su-
periority in troops, tanks, artillery and
other coventional weapons. So long as
this exists, there cannot be a relaxing
of the West's defense efforts.
Mr. President, the long debate we
have had on this treaty has illustrated
the concerns of many Senators.
Amendments such as mine in commit-
tee and here on the floor have sent a
signal to the White House to be very
careful on the START Treaty. Most of
our amendments have been defeated;
but, as a result of offering these
amendments and as a result of this
fight, we have a stronger assurance
that the verification procedures will
work. We have clarified important
treaty provisions, but I wish we would
clarify the area of human rights
before going forward.
My amendment would not require a
renegotiation. It would not hold up
the treaty. It merely says, on the eve
of the summit?and the President and
his advisors could do it in 30 minutes?
that the President must issue a certifi-
cation on whether or not the Soviets
are complying with the Helsinki Final
Act. It would not hurt the treaty one
way or another, but it would highlight
the issue of human rights and would
show that Americans care about the
Armenians in the Soviet Union, who
are crying out; that we care a great
deal about the Christians in the Soviet
Union who want to read the Bible;
that we care a great deal about the
Jewish people who wish to emigrate or
are struggling for greater freedom; it
would show that we care about the
Ukranians who for so long have had
their freedoms denied. But most im-
portantly it will show that we care
about the human rights provisions of
the Helsinki Final Act, and I think
that is very important.
In my various travels about the
world I have come very much to re-
spect the efforts of the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator PELL, to look into conditions
In prisons when he is traveling abroad.
I made a trip to Argentina with him
years ago when he nudged the con-
science of the entire country regarding
the disappeared.
I also had the honor of traveling
with him in Central America where he
guided us to raise questions about
prison conditions in Nicaragua.
So, as we move toward giving our
consent to this treaty, I offer this
amendment in all sincerity?not to
hold up the treaty, not to in any way
detract from it?but to put an excla-
mation point to this, summit that we
care a great deal about human rights.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, but I
reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CONRAD). Who yields time?
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield
myself 5 minutes.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator
from South Dakota for his kind words
and commend him for his interest in
this whole subject of human rights.
As a founding member and once
upon a time a cochairman of the Hel-
sinki Commission, I have, as he knows,
shared this interest over the years.
I recognize that it is in the spirit of
trying to improve human rights that
this commendable amendment is
brought forward. However, I do not
believe that the language that is pro-
posed should be adopted by the Senate
at this time because it could delay the
ratification process in the eleventh
hour. Moreover, through the adoption
of the DeConcini-Lautenberg amend-
ment, the Senate has put the Soviet
Union on notice that the United
States will continue to seek improve-
ments in human rights. Certainly
arms control is not the be all and end
all of our relationship with the Soviet
Union. I agree we must press the Sovi-
ets for progress in the area of human
rights. But I question whether this
condition is an effective way of doing
it. It moves us down the road toward a
formal linkage between arms control
and human rights. Most of the wit-
nesses who testified before the For-
eign Relations Committee rejected the
idea of linkage.
myself, asked Secretary Shultz
what his views were with regard to at-
taching various provisions relating to
S 6879
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghani-
stan or improvement of human rights
to the INF Treaty. Secretary Shultz
replied "I see no purpose to be served
by burdening this treaty with other
matters. It seems to me it stands on its
own feet."
I believe that the administration is
not supportive of this condition. In my
view, timely ratification of the INF
Treaty would contribute to a positive
atmosphere in which progress can be
better made on the human rights
front.
So when the appropriate time comes
I do intend, I hope in collaboration
and in cooperation with the Senator
from Indiana, to move to table.
I yield 5 minutes to Senator DECoN-
CINI.
Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr.
President. I thank the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
I thank the Senator from South
Dakota. I understand his motivation
here to make sure that human rights
are clearly articulated in terms of Hel-
sinki compliance in the Soviet Union. I
appreciate that effort.
What concerns me here is that in my
best judgment there is no way this
President or any President could certi-
fy today that the Soviet Union is in
compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act and to make that part of this ,
treaty would in my judgment really
make the treaty inoperative, which
the good Senator from South Dakota
says is not his intent, but in my judg-
ment that is exactly what would
happen here.
So I think we are moving down a
road here that would really be a killer
amendment. We addressed this in
what I thought was a constructive way
a couple nights ago, about 10 o'clock
when we did pass the DeConcini-Lau-
tenberg-Grassley and others human
rights amendment which was really a
declaration and an understanding that
the President should and would when
he hands over the ratification instru-
ments, ask Gorbachev, request Gorba-
chev, and extol Gorbachev to comply
with the Helsinki Final Act and with
the Madrid concluding document, that
was consummated in 1985 and any
other international instruments and
agreements that have been made as
they relate to human rights.
That, to me, is a very strong, force-
ful statement by this body as to our
position on human rights and our
desire to bring them to the attention
of the Soviet Union.
But here we are making a condition
that a President in all honesty could
not certify.
If that is the intent of the Senator
from South Dakota, I respect that. If
It is the intent to make this treaty not
be able to come into effect, I respect
anybody who disagrees with my view
that this treaty should be ratified.
But my best judgment is this amend-
ment really makes it impossible to
ratify the treaty. How could anyone
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S 6880 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
certify that the Soviet Union is in
compliance? Some might even ques-
tion whether the United States is in
full compliance of the Helsinki Final
Act. But we know for a fact the Soviet
Union is not just by their emigration
laws. They have still failed to pass
emigration laws guaranteeing emigra-
tion. For example, their linkage of rel-
atives' invitations, close relatives living
outside the Soviet Union, in order for
Soviet citizens to get a visa to travel
outside the country is in total viola-
tion of the Helsinki Final Act.
So, Mr. President, I hope that we
will table this amendment and believe
that if we do not and if it passes it
would indeed be a killer amendment
and make this treaty inoperative and
something that the Soviets could not
accept nor could President Reagan
accept a treaty with this type of
amendment on it because in no god's
way could he certify or anyone welse
that the Soviet Union is in compliance.
I thank the Senator from Rhode
Island.
The PRESIDING OrTICER. Who
' yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, will the
distinguished Senator yield 5 minutes?
Mr, PELL. I yield 5 minutes to the
Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, as I have listened to
the debate, the distinguished Senator
from South Dakota in describing his
amendment read the first lines which
I suppose are the most important. He
said "The purpose of the amendment
is to condition ratification on the cer-
tification whether the Soviet Union is
in compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act."
I will point out initially, when the
distinguished Senator's amendment
was offered in the Foreign Relations
Committee and likewise published
here as amendment 2101 in the
Senate, the first line read "to condi-
tion ratification on the certification
that the Soviet Union is in compli-
ance." "That" has been changed to
"whether."
Now I make that point because the
Senator has tried to cure a defect that
the Foreign Relations Committee
found regrettable; namely, that the
entirety of this treaty might lie as the
distinguished Senator from Arizona
has pointed out on whether or not the
Soviets are in compliance.
Frequently, the President has
spoken out and said they are not.
There is no secret as to his judgment
about that.
So the distinguished Senator has
eliminated the word "that" and said
the President has to certify now
"whether" the Soviet Union is in com-
pliance or not.
As I read the amendment, the Presi-
dent could say, yes, no, or maybe. He
is required to say something about it.
I would simply point out the Presi-
dent, ,as early as this morning had a
lot to say about it in Helsinki. He
pointed out that be believes the Soviet
Union has made some progress. He
commended the Soviets on a number
of actions. But he pointed out very
clearly they have a long way to go.
That was as definitive a judgment in
response to the request of the Senator
from South Dakota as I think we will
get, and it came this morning. It was
on worldwide television. The whole
world knows our President's views on
the human rights condition and the
Helsinki accords, and the President
commended the Helsinki accords
which indeed was an anniversary cele-
bration of them.
Therefore, Mr. President, I question
the advisability of attaching this
amendment to the treaty at this point.
With full regard for the distinguished
Senator from South Dakota, I am not
certain it is useful to add questions of
this variety that are answered really
In public dialog as this one has been.
The treaty ought not to be a question-
naire literally of the President, wheth-
er he feels that the Soviets are making
headway or not, and the Senator has
pointed out "whether" is the impor-
tant word.
I ask Senators to reject this amend-
ment and to keep it off the treaty.
I would agree with the distinguished
Senator from Arizona that he and the
distinguished Senator from Iowa and
the distinguished Senator from New
Jersey addressed this. They put the
Soviets on notice that we care, a very
important part of this treaty.
For these reasons, I am hopeful that
the amendment will not be adopted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 4
minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I join
the Senator from South Dakota in his
concerns, but I join the chairman and
the ranking member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee?the
former chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee?in their
concerns about where we are going on
this.
I believe one of the things that we
should keep in mind is the Helsinki ac-
cords is precisely that. It is an accord.
It is not a treaty. It does not have the
binding force of law and there is a
very marked distinction, a distinction
that we were very much aware of in
1975 when we signed the Helsinki ac-
cords.
There is no question the Soviets are
in violation of human rights, one facet
of the three facets of the Helsinki ac-
cords that deals in this. I believe our
amendment that I was pleased to add
my name as a cosponsor of, sponsored
by Senator DECoNctru, Senator LAU-
TENBERG, and Senator GRASSLEY, that
deals with that sends a clear, strong
message that we are concerned. I
would add that we also have to keep in
mind that the Helsinki accords is not
simply human rights. We have focused
primarily on that. It is also a number
of other things.
May 27, 1988
Part of the Helsinki accords also is
that the signatory powers agree to
promote the teaching of foreign lan-
guages. Has the United States of
America lived up to this part of the
Helsinki accords? I think you could
make a very strong case that we have
not. We are the only nation on the
face of the Earth where you go
through grade school, high school, col-
lege, get a Ph.D., and never have a
year of a foreign language.
I do not suggest that the Soviets
ought to have a quiz on us on all the
aspects of the Helsinki accords and we
should not in reverse. We ought to re-
examine where we are deficient and
the Soviets ought to reexamine. There
is no question they are deficient in
these very questions the Senator from
South Dakota has brought up this
morning in human rights, in emigra-
tion, in these areas.
I am pleased, as has been mentioned
by both Senator PELL and Senator
LUGAR, that there does appear to be
some modest change in this area of
human rights in the Soviet Union. We
hope there will be more.
But I do not think this is the instru-
mentality through which we achieve
greater human rights in the Soviet
Union. I shall join in the motion to
table. With all due respect to the aim
of my colleague from South Dakota, I
do not think this is the means by
which we achieve that
I yield back the remainder of my
time.
The PRESIDING 'OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Dakota has 3 min-
utes and 26 seconds remaining. The
Senator from Rhode Island has 2 min-
utes and 11 seconds remaining.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I
yield myself, the remainder of my.
time.
Mr. President, let me respond to
some of the arguments from my fine
-colleagues. I commend each of them
because they have all been leaders in
the area of human rights.
First of all, my distinguished col-
league from Rhode Island and chair-
man of the committee, who has done
so much in this area, argues that this
is not timely on this particular treaty.
I would argue that it is very timely.
The time could not be better, in terms
of making a determination whether or
not the Soviet Union is in compliance,
because it would highlight these con-
cerns at the summit in Moscow next
week.
I know the President has talked
about this issue, and I believe it would
be a great declaration at this hour for
him to formally certify Soviet non-
compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act.
Now, my distinguished colleague
from. Indiana pointeti out that the
word "whether" was the key to this
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
condition, which is true. We changed
it in the Foreign Relations Committee
to "whether" so that the President
could go ahead and ratify this treaty
after issuing the certification regard-
ing Helsinki compliance. As a result,
the human rights issue, the Helsinki
Final Act issues, would be highlighted.
My colleague from Arizona spoke
about the amendment that has al-
ready been adopted, but that is merely
a declaration. Mine requires some spe-
cific action. My distinguished friend
from Illinois who has done a great
deal in this area, made the same point.
Mr. President, I would conclude by
saying that this is an historic agree-
ment that we are entering into. I think
it is very important that we regard re-
spect for human rights to be as impor-
tant as arms control. In the future, we
must be very vigilant in verifying com-
pliance with this treaty. We must be
vigilant on what the President does in
the area of START. I come from a
State that has many long-range mis-
siles. South Dakota has many of these
missiles, so we are concerned about
what happens in the START agree-
ment that may follow the INF Treaty.
But we also must be vigilant on what
the Soviet Union does in other areas.
It appears that the glasnost policy has
introduced some changes but, in fact,
there are still too many regional con-
flicts. The activities of the Soviets in
Central America and their activities in
Vietnam?where I visited recently?all
of these indicate to me that we have a
long way to go in achieving peaceful
resolution of international differences.
I do commend President Ronald
Reagan. His initiatives on arms control
and summit meetings with the Soviet
leader can lead to more exchanges and
the opportunity for greater United
States and world security.
But, through all this, our theme
should be that we are very concerned
with human rights.
Again, I repeat, ? this is not a killer
amendment. It cannot hold the treaty
up. It would not in any way hurt the
treaty, but it would highlight our basic
values and the values put forth in the
Helsinki accords.
Mr. President, if a-tabling motion is
made, I will ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield the
remainder of my time to the Senator
from Colorado, Mr. Writ.
The PRESIDING OFFICalti. The
Senator from Colorado is recognized
for 2 minutes and 6 seconds.
Mr. WIRTH. I thank the distin-
guished chairman for yielding.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator
from South Dakota for raising this
issue and once again reminding us of
the importance of human rights. I am
sure, in referencing Helsinki, he would
also, by implication, outline the impor-
tance of us to be thinking about other
areas of the Helsinki agreement relat-
ing to Third World conflicts, trade and
other exchanges, and so forth.
But I think we should table this
amendment. It is very clear in the Hel-
sinki agreement that Helsinki does not
speak to any formal linkage, as in this
amendment. It does not speak to any
formal linkage, but, rather, to a rela-
tionship between arms control and
human rights, that those should run
concurrently. And they are running
concurrently in Vienna as we right
now are in the process of finishing off
the CSCE discussions there and get-
ting the Soviets to commit, we hope,
to next steps.
We are also, under Ambassador Le-
dogar's direction, ? focusing on next
steps in the CST process and also on
further steps in CDE, confidence and
security building measures.
In any event, congressional control
and human rights are running as envi-
sioned in the Helsinki process concur-
rently.
So I think the Senator has done a
service in again reminding us of the
,importance of this issue. But we cer-
tainly should go along with the tabling
motion and not agree to this killer
amendment at this point. It is inappro-
priate.
I hope our colleagues join with the
Senator from Rhode Island in tabling
the amendment offered by the Sena-
tor from South Dakota.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, what is the
time situation?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island has 20 sec-
onds remaining.
Mr. PELL. I yield back the remain-
der of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time has been yielded back. ,
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the point
before us now is the amendment and,
on behalf of myself and the Senator
from Indiana, Mr. LUGAR, I move to
table the amendment.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFIEkt. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion
of the Senator from Rhode Island
[Mr. PELL] to table the amendment of
the Senator from South Dakota [Mr.
PRESSLER]. The yeas and nays have
been ordered and the clerk will call
the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. MATSU-
NAGA] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr.
METZENBAUM] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio [Mr. GLENN] is absent due
to death in the family.
I also announce that the Senator
from Delaware [Mr. BIDER] is absent
because of illness.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote?
The result was announced?yeas 86,
nays 10, as follows:
S6881
[Rollcall Vote No. 162 Ex.]
YEAS-86
Ford
Fowler
Garn
Gore
Graham
Gramm
Grassley
Harkin
Hatfield
Heflin
Heinz
Hollings
Inouye
Johnston
Karnes
Kassebaum
Kasten
Kennedy
Kerry
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Melcher
Mikulski
Mitchell
Moynihan
Adam's
Baucus
Bentsen
Bingaman
Bond
Boren
Boschwitz
Bradley
Breaux
Bumpers
Burdick
Byrd
Chafee
Chiles
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Cranston
D'Amato
Danforth
Daschle
DeConcini
Dixon
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Durenberger
Evans
Exon
Armstrong
Hatch
Hecht
Helms
NAYS-10
Humphrey
McClure
Pressler
Symms
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Proxnare
Pryor
Quayle
Reid
Riegle
Rockefeller
Roth
Rudman
Sanford
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Specter
Stafford
Stennis
Stevens
Trible
Warner
Weicker
Wilson
Wirth
Thurmond
Wallop
NOT VOTING-4
Biden Matsunaga
Glenn Metzenbaum
So the motion to lay on the table
amendment No. 2101 was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We
must have order in the Chamber in
order for Senators to be heard. Please,
if we can hold down conversations and
take discussions to the cloakrooms so
Senators can be heard. The Senate
cannot proceed until the Chamber is
in order.
The motion to reconsider has been
made.
Mr. PELL. I move to lay that motion
on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Symms amend-
ment is now before the Senate.
AMENDMENT NO. 2326
(Purpose: To encourage the adjustment of
the end strength of military departments
to take account of certain military person-
nel assigned to on-site inspection activities
under the Treaty)
Mr. SYIVIMS. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for
Its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Idaho (Mr. SYPOL(Sl pro-
poses an amendment numbered 2326.
At the appropriate place in the following:
( ) Declaration: In authorizing the
strength for military and civilian personnel
of the Department of Defense for any fiscal
year in which personnel of the Department
of Defense are to be assigned to on-site in-
spection activities provided for In the
Treaty, account should be taken of the
number of such personnel that will be as-
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S 6882 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?.SENATE
signed to such activities during such .fiscal
year.
Strike out "( ) Condition" and all that
follows through the end of the condition
and insert in lieu thereof the following:
( ) Declaration: In authorizing the
strength for military and civilian personnel
of the Department of Defense for any fiscal
year in which personnel of the Department
of Defense are to be assigned to on-site in-
spection activities and support of such ac-
tivities provided for in the Treaty, account
should be taken of the number of such per-
sonnel that will be assigned to such activi-
ties during such fiscal year.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the
Senator will suspend for one moment,
the Senate will be in order so the Sen-
ator can be heard.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, the pur-
pose of this amendment is very simple
and very straightforward. We all know
preparing a DOD budget, a personnel
chart of where everybody is to make
productive use of the resources, is a
very difficult task.
All this amendment states is that
the strength of the respective services
and support agencies that are set by
Congress and set by the administra-
tion in our DOD bills will not be inter-
fered with, and that these personnel
will be assigned to this function with-
out deleting people from the strength
of the other services.
I say to my colleagues, it is estimat-
ed that it may be somewhere between
100 and 250 people that will be en-
gaged in this activity.
To put this in perspective, 100
people would be a tank company; 250
people could be a reinforced rifle com-
pany.
It is not a great deal of people now,
but looking down the road--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the
Senator will suspend for one moment,
let us have order in the Chamber so
the Senator can be heard.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, there
are two amendments that I wanted to
offer. One I am not going to offer and
wait until next year on the defense au-
thorization bill and the budget proc-
ess, and that is to isolate how much
money it takes for on-site inspection
and verification personnelwise, to the
best of our ability. I offer this amend-
ment of end strengths so that we are
not sending a message to the GI's in
the field and the respective services
that we are going to expect them to do
more with less again and that we get
engaged in these treaty arrangements
and then just expect the Defense De-
partment to take it out of operation
and maintenance budgets.
It is not a big, big issue at the
present time. If you look down the
road at verification under these proce-
dures in the START Treaty or other
treaties that may come up, it could
become a much more important and
significant point.
The treaty cost over the next 5
years, in terms of on-site verification,
is going to be somewhere between $800
million and $1 billion and require
somewhere between 100. and 250
people. Simply put, this amendment
recognizes the potential impact of a
loss of those personnel and resources
on DOD and that account should be
taken of the loss of those personnel
devoted to treaty implementation
from the personnel end strengths of
DOD. I do not believe that it is the in-
tention of my colleagues to make DOD
absorb the costs for personnel support
of the on-site inspection agency. Con-
sequently, this amendment states that
DOD should not be held accountable
for end strength of military and DOD-
civilian personnel assigned to the on-
site inspection agency.
Given the smaller defense budgets
and reduced force structure that we
all see coming down the road, Mr.
President, I just do not think it makes
sense to further cut DOD personnel
authorizations and complicate the in-
tensity of the debate over the defense
budget.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues
to support the amendment. It is my
understanding that this amendment
will be accepted.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL. What is the time situa-
tion?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
is 20 minutes equally divided. The Sen-
ator from Idaho retains 6 minutes and
57 seconds, the Senator from Rhode
Island has 10 minutes under his con-
trol.
Mr. PELL. I thank the Chair.
This amendment serves to identify
the number of people attached to the
on-site inspection agency. It would be
more appropriate I would think as an
amendment to the defense authoriza-
tion bill, so I am very interested in the
reaction of the Armed Services Com-
mittee.
-
Mr. .WARNER addressed the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that a letter to
President Reagan as Europe's message
to the President with respect to INF
which was printed in the Wall Street
Journal be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9,
19871
EUROPE'S INF ilESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
Mr. President:
As longstanding admirers of your great
personal contribution to the cause of free-
dom we wish to draw your attention, and
that of the Senate, to the risks inherent in
the agreement now signed to eliminate in-
termediate-range nuclear forces from
Europe. Although we would like to convince
ourselves otherwise, we believe that the
accord will seriously and adversely change
the balance of military and political forces
Within Europe in favor of the Soviet Union.
We are also fearful that unless NATO de-
fenses are buttressed by a range of compen-
satory measures the agreement may set in
train a course of events that will progres-
May 27, 1988
sively undermine the fragile cohesion of the
Western Alliance.
Ours is not, we think, a Euro-centric view.
We fear that the accord will damage the in-
fluence and reputation of the United States.
upon which all free, democratic societies
remain dependent. It also will damage the
vital interests of the U.S. itself.- We must
therefore decline to join in the summit eu-
phoria that has gripped- so many and that
brings to mind unfortunate historical prece-
dents. Rather, we would respectfully ask
you?and by means of this open letter,
members Of the Senate who will soon be
asked to ratify the accord?to consider the
following:
The zero-zero option will remove a vital
part of the architecture of deterrence that
cannot be replaced soon. The cruise and
Pershing II missiles serve a combination of
functions that are essential to NATO strate-
gy in an age of growing Soviet military supe-
riority. The missiles make a general contri-
bution to deterrence through their ability to
reach targets deep within the Soviet
Union?a capability not matched by any
other U.S. land-based missile in Europe. The
missiles link the European pillar of the alli-
ance to the American pillar. They provide a
crucial element between the level of tactical
missiles and the strategic level. Take away
that vital rung in the escalatory ladder and
you immediately throw into question the
mutual transatlantic involvement and soli-
darity that have preserved the peace in
Europe for 40 years.
It is also important to bear in mind that
the Soviet SS-20s no longer present the
same threat to Western Europe they once
did: the strategic and political value of their
removal may therefore be exaggerated. This
is partly because, by the latest standards,
the SS-20 lacks accuracy and sophistication.
Indeed, it will soon be obsolete.
Meanwhile, the Soviets are modernizing
their nuclear arsenals by the inclusion of
such weapons as the SS-24 that are outside
the scope of the agreement. Thus, although
the Soviets will give up many more war-
heads than the U.S., there is no balance or
symmetry in this exchange. Even in the
short term the accord will not exclude the
possibility of an intermediate-range nuclear
strike against Eruope: The Warsaw Pact
may simply re-target a proportion of its
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles against
Europe.
It should also be remembered that if the
Soviets break the agreement?as they have
violated earlier deals?or find ways of avoid-
ing its provision, it is unkilely that any
American president. will be able to put the
missiles back. It is doubtful, too, whether it
would be possible to create a European con-
sensus in favor of the missiles' re-deploy-
ment. At a later date some European na-
tions may have been effectively neutralized.
We regret that you have not followed the
advice of European political leaders who
urged that what was needed to preserve' de-
terrence in Europe was not the zero-zero
option but a balanced reduction of INF
forces. Perhaps the Europeans did not speak
sufficiently clearly and consistently. We
fully understand that Americans must be ir-
ritated by Europeans who appear ambiva-
lent or hostile to the U.S. position when so
many of their fellow Europeans have
pushed you relentlessly in the direction of
the negotiating table.
These comments, however, come from
those who have publicly supported both the
case for INF deployment throughout and
the case for SDI program. We are not parti-
sans of the arms race for its own sake and
we emphatically are not opposed to arms re-
duction in principle. Indeed, we are sad-
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May 27, 1988
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
dened to read that you recently dismissed
Informed criticism of the INF deal as
coming from those who believed nuclear con-
flict was in any case inevitable.
SDI, the British and French strategic nu-
clear deterrents, Pershing II, cruise missiles,
shorter-range intermediate nuclear weap-
ons, the N-bomb and conventional weapon-
ry?all these interdependent assets compli-
cate the calculations of the Soviet military
planner and so deter attack. This may not
be the case if the Soviet Union comes to be-
lieve that a conventional land battle waged
In Europe can be successfully fought with-
out risk of a nuclear response. Clearly, the
Soviet political leadership already believes
the new agreement brings it closer to secur-
ing its related objectives of achieving a nu-
clear-free Europe and of dividing that conti-
nent from its Atlantic partner.
All this we have explained at length to
our countrymen. Our frineds will be baffled
and our adversaries delighted if the great
political and strategic victory represented
by the INF deployment is now to be can-
celed. Such an eventuality would provide
the most unexpected and welcome encour-
agement to neutralists and ' unilateralists
who in Holland, Belgium, West Germany
and Britain lost the gathe and were proved
wrong.
Americanism scarcely provides evidence of
brilliant statecraft. Whatever show of unity
Western politicans may now feel obliged to
provide, the inescapable truth is that the
West has been comprehensively outplayed.
We run the risk of a denuclearized, neutral-
ist West Germany, which in our view would
be fatal to the alliance. Europe generally
may be plunged into a worse state of doubt
than that which existed prior to INF de-
ployment. All this because in our haste for
an agreement the arms-control process
became an end in itself.
As Prank Barnett has written: "We have
played at the arms-limitation table now for
more than 60 years, first against Nazi Ger-
Many and Japan, then against the Soviet
Empire. For the most part we gained little
more than the euphoria of being seen at the
Peace Casino while our adversaries went
home to convert 'lawful' winnings into
larger stockpiles of more advanced weap-
ons."
It is one thing to strike a spectacular arms
deal with one's advisory. It is another to
preserve the conditions of peace and free-
dom. We remember the president who once
denounced the "empire of evil" and who
courageously scorned fashionable opinion in
order to build up Western defenses. To that
president we wish renewed courage, resolve
and good fortune. We extend no less to the
members of the United States Senate to
whom the burden of a historic responsibility
now passes.
Mr. PELL. I yield time to the Sena-
tor from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I concur in the ob-
servations of the distinguished chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. Indeed, this type of legislation,
? while on its merits I think has consid-
erable value, should more appropriate-
ly be attached to the defense authori-
zation bill. Nevertheless, we are at this
juncture on the treaty. The amend-
ment is the pending business before
the Senate. In terms of the Armed
Services Committee, we have exam-
ined it. We are prepared to recom-
mend that the Senate accept it.
I think I can speak for the distin-
guished chairman, Mr. Numr, of Geor-
gia. I spoke with him earlier today. It
would be our hope, however, that per-
haps we could persuade our distin-
guished colleague we could incorpo-
rate it in the conference which is
pending, as you know, between the
House and the Senate on the armed
services authorization bill.
Might I ask my colleague if we could
pledge to do that, would he be willing
to withdraw his amendment?
Mr. S'YMMS. If I understand cor-
rectly, if the Senator will yield, he is
pledging that this amendment will be
part of the armed services authoriza-
tion bill which is still pending?
Mr. WARNER. Well, that bill by
procedure in the Senate is closed to
further amendment. So in the event
the Senate acts on the pending armed
services bill, we could not inCorporate
it, but at the time we come to confer-
ence between the House and the
Senate I give the Senator my personal
assurance that we can get it incorpo-
rated.
Mr. SYMMS. I think I need to coun-
sel with my cosponsor, the minority
leader, on this amendment.
Mr. President, with the assurances
of the Senator from Virginia and
others, I withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment was withdrawn.
Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator from
Idaho. I will ask the Chair what the
pending business is.
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING 01010ICER. The
majority leader.
Mr. BYRD. I have no objection. The
Senator would have to have unani-
mous consent to withdraw his amend-
ment because of the time agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair did state that it was without ob-
jection that the amendment was with-
drawn.
Mr. BYRD. I beg the Chair's pardon.
AMENDMENT NO. 2327
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Republican
leader has an amendment with a 20-
minute time agreement.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send an
amendment to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING? OFFICER. The
clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kansas [Mr.
DoLE] for himself, Mr. WALLOP, Mr.
McCAIN, and Mr. WARNER, proposes an
amendment numbered 2327.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask that
further reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
Mr. SANFORD. Mr. President, I
object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objec-
tion is heard.
The bill clerk read as follows:
Before the period at the end of the Reso-
lution of Ratification, insert a comma and
add the following condition: "that prior to
the exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty,
the President shall certify that it is the
S sgi;
common understanding of the United States
and the Soviet Union that if either Party
produces a type of ground-launched ballistic
missile (GLBM) not limited by the Treaty
using a stage which is outwardly similar to,
but not interchangeable with, a stage of an
existing type of intermediate-range GLBM
having more than one stage, it may not
produce any other, stage which is outwardly
similar to, whether or not it is interchange-
able with, any other stage of an existing
type of intermediate-range GLBM."
Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Republican leader.
Mr. DOLE. Our 4-month scrutiny of
the INF Treaty has confirmed the ini-
tial reaction which many of us shared.
The INF Treaty is a good treaty. I
would say to all the people who
worked so hard on this treaty and who
have been following our deliberation
on this treaty closely, do not be dis-
heartened. We are going to get it done.
We have focused on potential prob-
lems and overall I believe our negotia-
tors have done a superb job in drafting
a very complex document. As I think
everyone understands, the Senate has
also fulfilled its constitutional role in
identifying some of the problems. Ev-
eryone who has examined the so-
called double negative in article VI,
paragraph 2, agrees that there is clear-
ly a common understanding between
the United States and the Soviet
Union about what can and cannot be
done with certain stages of intermedi-
ate range ballistic missiles.
We had a good debate on the floor
about a week ago, the Senator from
Indiana, the Senator from Rhode
Island, the Senator from Wyoming,
and others, and I believe we should
formalize that understanding. I am
doing this with what we call a catego-
ry 1 amendment. I see no reason to be-
labor the point with anything more
than a category 1 condition. This con-
dition requires absolutely nothing
more from the Soviets, but it does re-
quire something from our President.
I particularly want to thank the
Senator from Wyoming, Senator
WALLOP, for his hard work and pa-
tience ,on this matter. With his help
' we have now developed language
which is acceptable to the administra-
tion and to both sides of the Armed
Services Committee where the poten-
tial problem was originally identified.
I believe the amendment has been
cleared on both sides and I am pre-
pared to yield back the remainder of
my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. The committee has been
assured by Ambassador Glitman that
in no case can the Soviet Union
produce a stage of the SS-25 inter-
changeable with a stage of the SS-20
contained in the provisions of para-
graph 2 of article VI, and I think also
an examination of the negotiating his-
tory of this provision confirms the ad-
ministration's assertion that the
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S 6884 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Soviet Union shares the same under-
standing of this provision as do we.
Accordingly, a meeting of the minds
has been reached. I do not believe the
amendment by the Senator from
Kansas is absolutely necessary. How-
ever, no harm would be done by
having the President certify to the
common understanding, and I am pre-
pared to yield back my time.
Mr. LUGAR. Will the Senator yield
2 minutes?
Mr. PELL. Certainly. I yield 2 min-
utes to the Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distin-
guished chairman.
Mr. President, I commend the mi-
nority leader for this amendment and
Senator WALLOP for discussion which
we had during the debate on the
treaty. I believe their efforts have
been constructive. On our side we are
prepared to accept and vote for the
amendment. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there further debate? If not, the ques-
tion is on agreeing to the. amendment.
The amendment (No. 2327) was
agreed to.
Mr. DOLE. I move to reconsider the
vote by which the amendment was
agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
AMENDMENT NO. 2328
(Purpose: To clarify the meaning of
"common understanding" in treaty inter-
pretation)
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SHELBY). Under the previous order,
the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr.
SPECTER, has an amendment.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
SPECTER) proposes an amendment numbered
2328.
At the appropriate place insert the follow-
ing:
"Such common understanding means a
shared interpretation which is both authori-
tatively communicated to the Senate by the
Executive and clearly intended, generally
understood and relied upon by the State in
its advice and consent to ratification."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I
offer this amendment as a means of
clarifying the Biden condition as
amended yesterday by the Byrd condi-
tion.
I think it necessary at the outset to
respond to some of the comments of
the distinguished majority leader yes-
terday, when he, referred to certain
"Mickey Mouse" amendments. I do
not know whether the distinguished
majority leader was referring to the
amendments which this Senator in-
tended to offer. But I believe that the
Senate made a very bad decision lost
night in rejecting the amendment of-
fered by the distinguished Senator
from California, Senator WILSON,
which requires mutuality; that if the
United States is to be bound by a
treaty; that the same obligations must
be imposed upon the Soviet Union.
When this body rejeeted that amend-
ment very late last night, I believe it
tried to establish a principle that is
very destructive to the interesti of the
United States of America.
I said "tried to establish a principle"
because I do not believe that the
action of the Senate last night estab-
lished that principle. I do not believe
that by our unilateral declarations
here in the U.S. Senate attached to
this treaty are in the form so designed
that you can wipe out decades, centur-
ies of international law on what a
treaty means. But it obscures the
issue, it obfuscates the issue, and I
think it is very bad.
As I said earlier, what this Senator
has attempted to do is to create a
record that the Senate will look to in
calmer days in the future. And when
the distinguished majority leader said
earlier that the procedures and princi-
ples on treaty ratification were more
important than any one treaty, I
agreed with the distinguished majority
leader on that point. And that is
saying something because I believe the
INF Treaty is very, very important,
and this Senator intends to -vote for
the INF Treaty when that vote comes
up. But to the extent this Senator can
do so, it will be my effort on two
amendments which I will offer today,
this morning?we are now a little after
noon?to try to clarify the record.
I must say that I think to refer to
any amendments as "Mickey Mouse"
amendments is not constructive for
the work of this body. I want to em-
phasize that point as this Senator re-
sponds. What the distinguished major-
ity leader said late last night, "warn-
ing" the Senators on undertaking
votes of that sort, I must take excep-
tion to as well.
This Senator, and I think other Sen-
ators, recognize their responsibilities
under the Constitution, representing
the people of our States. It is a solemn
obligation to uphold the Constitution.
When we offer amendments, we do so
with the utmost seriousness. This Sen-
ator does so with the utmost serious-
ness, against a lifetime of study of U.S.
Constitution and a lifetime of concern
about United States-Soviet relations. I
wrote a college thesis in 1951 on the
subject.
One of the first things I did in the
Senate was to propose a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution calling for some
meetings between President Reagan
and the Soviet leader and I have con-
stantly urged arms control and arms
reduction. It is with some sense of mis-
giving that I see a conflict between the
very excellent provisions of the INF
and conditions attached to this treaty
which violate long-standing principles
of international law, treaty interpreta-
May 27, .1988
tion, and constitutional law on ratifil
cation.
So this Senator does not need any
warnings or any notice as to what his
duties are, and this Senator takes ex-
ception to any appellation of a
"Mickey Mouse" amendment.
I have proposed this amendment,
Mr. President, for consideration be-
cause I believe it to be a very impor-
tant amendment. It essentially tracks,
really directly tracks, the language of
the Culvahouse letter which was re-
ferred to in testimony by the distin-
guished Senator from Georgia, Sena-'
tor Num% before the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. I discussed this on
the record with Senator Numr yester-
day afternoon. It is a long sequence.
I ask unanimous consent that the
full text of Senator Nuim's response
be included in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I would like to
point out that this is a very extraordinary
case that came to the court on three occa-
sions. Without going into it in great length,
as summarized by Judge Green on page 13
of the slip opinion, that the Navy hearing
was adding to its pattern of false represen-
tations which I think is a very terrible
factor in delimiting the treaty interpreta-
tion issue.
I would now like to direct a question to
the distinguished Senator from Georgia,
Senator NUNN, and that relates to the crite-
ria reaching common understandings be-
cause this is important in light of what we
are doing here today and referring to page
90 of the committee report. The Sof aer doc-
trine is quoted as saying that there will be
an understanding where first, "generally un-
derstood" by the Senate; second, "clearly in-
tended" by the Senate; and third, "relied
upon" by the Senate.
I now refer to testimony Senator Numsi
gave according to the record before the For-
eign Relations Committee, page 144, where
he said, referring the Culvahouse letter, "As
a matter of domestic law; however, the
President is bound by shared interpreta-
tions which were both authoritatively com-
municated to the Senate by the Executive,
clearly intended, generally understood, and
relied upon by the Senate in its advice and
consent to ratification."
Then the Senator makes the statement,
"That sentence I agree with completely."
And my question is: Does the Senator
concur that those criteria are indispensible
In order to have the application of an under-
standing of the Senate?
Mr. Numr. I will say to the Senator it de-
pends on how one interprets those words. I
would certainly not interpret them the way
I am afraid the Senator from Pennsylvania
interpreted those words.
When the administration comes up and
testifies before a committee of the Senate,
the Senate has received that information
and has relied on that information. I do not
think the Senator has to jump up and down
in the Foreign Relations Committee and
say, "Oh, I relied on that, you told us that
and I rely on that."
No; I do not think that. I think when the
testimbny comes in. Senators can sit there
calmly and even snooze off if they like to?
and not many of our colleagues do that?
they can even snooze off and if the Secre-
tary of State, or another authoritative wit-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6885
ness, makes a statement, then the Senate,
through its committee, has relied-- ?
Mr. SPECTER. I ask the Senator to be as
brief as he can be. I am not suggesting
jumping up and down here. I am talking
about criteria as a legal matter and there
are three conditions. Generally understood,
clearly intended, and relied upon. And it is a
matter of what the facts show.
But I take it the Senator does agree that
those are the three criteria which establish
the Senate's understanding if they are met.
Mr. Nurnt I do not agree, with that be-
cause I know where the Senator is coming
from. He is coming from the point of view
the Senate has to understand, we have to
prove that we understood, we have to show
that we relied on. I do not agree that you
have to demonstrate that we relied on testi-
mony, other than by showing that we re-
ceived authoritative testimony. If you had
to prove that we came out here on the floor
with _ everything the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee received, with everything
the Armed Services Committee received,
and everything the Intelligence Committee
received, that we put it in the record, and
that we said we relied on it and understood
it, that would be an exercise in absolute ab-
surdity, and I think it would render the
process unworkable.
So I would not agree that those words
should be added to simply the words "au-
thoritative testimony."
I am glad the Senator has given me the
opportunity to make that perfectly clear. ?
Mr. SPECTER. This Senator is not coming
from anywhere. I understand the answer of
the distinguished Senator from Georgia. He
is now saying he disavows what he testified
to before the Foreign Relations Committee,
where he said that sentence there, "I agree
with completely." He is now saying he does
not agree with it at all.
Mr. Nur. If the Senator would go right
down the page on that same transcript, he
will find that I went on and say, and I quote
from that statement:
We have always thought that it [the un-
derstanding of the executive branch testi-
mony relied upon by the Senate] was
through the committee process. If we can
simply declare that the U.S. Senate works
through its committees, which we all know
we'do, and that matters that have been re-
ceived, authoritative testimony received
before the committees is deemed to have
been received by the entire Senate and
deemed to have been focused on by the
whole Senate, then it seems to me that we
could go a long way.
If the Senator has the whole page of that
transcript instead of one part of it then he
will see there was a qualification and I made
it clear in that hearing what I was talking
about.
Mr. SPECTER. Well, I have looked at the
entire page. But the three references which
track Sofaer directly are "clearly intended,
generally understood, and relied upon by
the Senate in its advice and consent to rati-
fication." The Senator from Georgia said
that he agreed with that sentence there and
I -agree with him completely.
Mr. Num. I would say, if the Senator
would yield, I do agree with that complete-
ly, provided it is understood when an au-
thoritative witness comes from the adminis-
tration and testifies before a committee, the
Senate should be deemed to have relied on
that testimony in its deliberations.
Mr. SPECTER. Well, I thank the Senator.
When he says he agrees with it completely,
under that proviso. I accept that.
I had earlier asked the distinguished ma-
jority leader the question which I have
since privately discussed with the Senator
from Georgia relating to what. the Senator
from Georgia said at a committee hearing?
that the Soviets were bound by what they
heard in ratification proceedings, where the
Senator from Georgia was quoted as saying
that:
If the Soviets remain silent on points of
interpretation presented by executive
branch witnesses, then I believe the U.S.
Senate, as well as our Government, can rea-
sonably believe and contend that silence
connotes consent to those interpretations.
It seems to this Senator that this is where
the Biden, now the Byrd, condition is going,
and it is a remarkable change in interna-
tional law treaty interpretation, in light of
the statements by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Societe versus U.S. District
Court, decided on June 15 of last year, refer-
ring to the negotiations and the practical
construction adopted by the parties, and the
decision back in 1942 on the Choctaw
Nation case, and as those principles are
picked up in Copeland versus United States,
which says this:
Most important, foreign governments
dealing with us must rely upon the official
instruments of ratification as an expression
of the full intent of the Government of the
United States, precisely as we expect from
foreign governments.
Now, my question to the Senator from
Georgia is: Do you have any authority at all
that there is any weight at all to be at-
tached to bind a foreign nation from what
goes on in a domestic ratification proceed-
ings?
Mr. Mum. I would say to the Senator?I
do not have my exact words and I would like
to get those?but what I intended to convey
was?
Mr. SPECTER. Let me make them available
to you. I have them right here.
Mr. Num.'. If we have an open and public
hearing in which statements relating to a
treaty are made by the executive branch of
Government, and if the Soviet Union dis-
agrees with those statements, then I think
they have some duty to come forward and
let the executive branch know that they do
not agree with that interpretation.
Now, I would not go so far as to say they
are bound. I think that would be overstating
it. If I stated it as the Senator said, then I
would say that was going too far.
I do believe there is %strong argument to
be made that when one party publicly and
openly cites their interpretation of a treaty
in a way that is fundamentally different
from the other party's understanding, the
other party, knowing of that, if they know
of it, has some affirmative duty to make
that known. I would not go so far as to say
they are bound, though. I am told that I did
not say that.
Mr. SPECTER. I read what the Senator said.
Mr. NuNx. If I did, I went too far.
Mr. SPECTER. Do you have any authority
at all for the proposition that a foreign gov-
ernment has to pay any attention at all to
what goes on in a ratification proceedings
and has any duty at all to make any re-
sponse at all; any authority for that?
Mr. NUN. I think basic contract law
would tell you that when one party, before
a contract has been completely entered into
by the ratification thereof or formal proce-
dure, hears the other party misinterpret it;
there is some obligation for that party to
correct it, and that silence does have some
evidentiary effect on the interpretation of
that contract. That is basic contract law and
basic common sense.
Mr. SPECTER. No court opinion, no judicial
opinion, just general interpretation.
Mr. Nmor. Does the Senator have any
court opinion that says that is not?
Mr. SPECTER. Yes, I do. I would be glad to
yield for a question on that.
The Copeland versus United States case
says that; Societe says it is negotiations
which govern, as does the Choctaw Indian
case.
Mr. President, I inquire how much time I
have remaining. ?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and
45 seconds.
Mr. SPECTER. I have quite a few more ques-
tions, Mr. President. I will seek to have an
amendment which I will add to bring these
issues up in a time sequence when we have
more than the limited time. On the ques-
tions which I propounded, we did not have a
time for discussion with the distinguished
majority leader.
Mr. President, in conclusion, in the
minute that I have left, I think the argu-
ments here have disclosed conclusively that
the Byrd condition makes major modifica-
tions in international law and treaty inter-
pretation by disregarding the negotiating
record deemed immaterial under the com-
mittee report?
Mr. SPECTER. I refer now to page
144 of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee record to this testimony by Sena-
tor NuriN. And he cites the Culvahouse
letter:
As a matter of domestic law, however, the
President is bound by shared interpreta-
tions which were both authoritatively com-
municated to the Senate by the executive
and clearly intended generally under and
relie upon by the Senate in its advice and
consent to ratification.
That refers to the Culvahouse letter
and then Senator Num/ goes on to say
"That sentence there I agree with
completely."
Mr. President, we had a discussion
and Senator Numi said that was accu-
rate providing the balance of his state-
ment was included. As I see it, the bal-
ance of his statement will be in the
RECORD but it does not really go to the
heart of this particular issue.
Mr. President, the amendment
which I am offering based upon the
Culvahouse letter is firmly established
In international law. I refer to section
314 of the Restatement?Third?of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law section 2
referring to the Senate's understand-
ing, and referring to advice and con-
sent of the treaty on the basis of a
particular understanding which is lan-
guage of reliance.
I refer to the Chevron case, by the
U.S. Supreme Court, recorded in 467
United States at page 836, which con-
tains the language of "* ? * if the
intent of Congress is clearly ? " "
which Is: part of the essence of my
amendment, and the definition of the
Supreme Court in the Japan Whaling
Association case.
These provisions are forcefully ar-
ticulated in the law as it exists today;
that is what the Senate's understand-
ing means. Mr. President, I believe it is
important to focus on the factor that
we are talking about, the intent of the
Senate as opposed to any intent of any
specific Senator or the intent of any
specific committee or the testimony of
any specific witness. And that princi-
ple of law is firmly established in
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S 6886 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
many .court decisions. I refer to the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in McCaughn versus
Hershey Chocolate Co., reported at
page 488 of volume 283 of the U.S. re-
ports. I refer to the opinion of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in
New York Indians versus United
States (1897) and to an opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in Austasia Inter-
modal Lines v. Federal Maritime Com-
mission, 580 F.2d, at page 645: "The
views expressed by witnesses in con-
gressional hearings are not necessarily
the same as those of the legislators ul-
timately voting on the bill." Also, an
opinion of the Court of Claims in
Coplin versus United States, which
makes an important distinction be-
tween what a legislative committee
? does and what the full Senate does.
Mr. President, it may be that, at
bottom, there may not be a great deal
of difference between this Senator's
views and the views expressed by the
distinguished Senator from Delaware
[Mr. BmEN]. I congratulate him for
having offered the Biden condition
and for his extraordinary work in this
important field and chairing the joint
hearings of the Judiciary Committee,
together with the distinguished Sena-
tor from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL), in
the Foreign Relations Committee.
It may be that we are not too far
apart, if you are looking for a common
understanding that is really a common
understanding, as opposed to a few
scattered references to testimony and
a few scattered statements in a very
long record of ratification.
A comment has been made that we
want to avoid chicanery or incompe-
tence by the executive branch, and I
agree with that. I do not think that is
really the issue. The issue is what hap-
pened at ABM, with a few scattered
bits of testimony, where there is a fac-
tual dispute about what the intent of
the Senate was.
So that if you articulate the doctrine
which is present in the law, in the re-
statement and by the Supreme Court
of the United States?that the
common understanding has to be both
authoritatively communicated to the
Senate by the executive and, first,
clearly intended; second, generally un-
derstood; third, relied upon by the
Senate?then I think you have a
standard where there will not be con-
fusion. But if you adopt the language
of the Foreign Relations Committee
report about implicit understandings,
whatever that means, then we are
going to be in a morass on a continu-
ous basis.
Mr. President, how much time do I
have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania has 8 min-
utes and 15 seconds remaining.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, yes-
terday afternoon, the distinguished
Senator from Michigan (Mr. LEvni)
raised a question concerning the possi-
bility of two treaties that he said
would be present under the Culva-
house letter. I did not have a chance
to cliseuss this issue with him at that
time, because the time was limited,
and I had filed this amendment be-
cause time was limited, to give us time
to consider these issues; and, upon re-
flection, I decided to put this matter
to the Senate for a vote.
The Senator from Michigan raised
the issue about two treaties even
under the Culvahouse doctrine. I
think that is true. I think it is possible
to have two treaties when you have
the executive negotiating with the
Soviet Union, when you have the exec-
utive then reporting to the Senate,
looking to the Senate's consent. But if
a standard is established which does
not lend itself to a few scattered bits
of testimony and perhaps only the un-
derstanding of the committee, but
have really some rigid standards, such
as "clearly intended," such as "gener-
ally understood," such as "relied upon
by the Senate," then I think you have
a standard where we will not have the
two-treaty problem.
I believe we should do everything
within our power to avoid having that
kind of problem, which will hold the
United States to a tougher standard
than the Soviet Union, which will
result in having this body impose re-
strictions on the United States which
the Soviet Union does not have. I do
not think anybody wants that to
occur.
What has happened in ABM and
what has happened in these debates, I
think, has sensitized the administra-
tion substantially, but we cannot rely
on that alone. We should have stand-
ards as clearly articulated as possible.
I think this accomplishes that result.
Parenthetically, Mr. President, I put
this matter to a vote by the Senate be-
cause if the Senate chooses to reject
this language as -to defining and ampli-
fying what "common understanding"
means in the iden condition, as
amended by the Byrd condition, I
think it will be underscoring the irra-
tionality and inappropriateness of the
Biden condition.
I yield the floor, and I reserve the
remainder of my time.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise in
opposition to the amendment offered
by Senator SPECTER. The Senate has
just passed by an overwhelming
margin a bipartisan approach to the
treaty interpretation issue. The Biden
amendment, as amended by Senator
BYRD, was supported by Senators from
both sides of the aisle.
The amendment offered by Senator
SPECTER would re-open and undermine
the action just taken by the Senate.
This amendment is essentially the
Sofaer doctrine.
The Sofaer doctrine asserts that, re-
gardless of what the administration
may have said in presenting a treaty
to the Senate, the President is consti-
tutionally bound to adhere to a par-
ticular treaty interpretation only if
the Senate has "generally understood,
May 27, 1988
clearly intended, and relied upon" that
interpretation.
The fact is that the Senate almost
never meets these criteria:
How many Senators must speak on a
matter in order to demonstrate conclu-
sively that the Senate "generally un-
derstood" that interpretation?
How can the Senate demonstrate
that it "clearly intended" a particular
interpretation unless it acts to approve
or disapprove a formal condition relat-
ing to that interpretation?
And, the most difficult criterion,
how can it be proven that the Senate
"relied upon" a particular interpreta-
tion as being crucial to its consent?
Mr. President, I oppose this amend-
ment because it would reestablish the
Sofaer doctrine and force the Senate
to go to extraordinary lengths in order
to prevent the President from reinter-
preting a treaty.
The Senate has already spoken by
adopting the Biden amendment as
amended by Senator BYRD, and I be-
lieve the Senate should not change
that amendment. I urge my colleagues
to oppose the amendment offered by
Senator SPECTER.
I think this amendment would
simply reopen and undermine the
action taken by the Senate.
I know that many of my colleagues
want to speak on this matter.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield me 4 minutes?
Mr. PELL. I yield 4 minutes to the
Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Maryland is recognized
for 4 minutes.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I
rise in strong opposition to this
amendment. It will, in effect, nullify
the Senate's treaty power. I do not be-
lieve the amendment is consistent
with existing law and existing practice
over the history of the Republic.
Let me quote, very quickly, an edito-
rial from the New York Times of May
5. I ask unanimous consent that the
full editorial be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the edito-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
THE DOCTRINE OR THE TREATY?
The Reagan Administration negotiated an
Important treaty with the Soviet Union that
would eliminate Euromissiles. Now it jeop-
ardizes that accomplishment by insisting on
a novel and absurd Presidential doctrine
that few senators will or should swallow.
The Administration created the problem
by asserting the right to reinterpret treaties
unilaterally, and then doing just that with
the Antiballistic Missile Treaty to suit Presi-
dent Reagan's Star Wars programs. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee right-
ly responded by attaching a condition to the
new Euromissile treaty: Neither Mr. Reagan
nor future Presidents would be permitted to
disregard understandings of a treaty's
meaning at the time of ratification.
If President Reagan wishes to see his new
Euromissile treaty ratified, he will have to
accept the committee's assertion of good
sense and sound constitutional procedure.
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
The treaty comes to the Senate floor this
week, in plenty of time to debate, approve
and send it with President Reagan to
Moscow on May 29. Three last-minute
glitches have sprung up, none likely to
block ratification.
Senate leaders vow to work furiously with
the Administration on these three problems
before floor debate begins. The Russians
have been edging off commitment on on-site
inspections; the Administration is confident
Moscow will reaffirm earlier understand-
ings. The treaty ignored futuristic technol-
ogies; now language is being worked out.
There are concerns about U.S. long-range
monitoring capability; the Senate and the
White House will have to provide for this.
The serious obstacle to ratification, how-
ever, is the so-called Sofaer Doctrine.
Named for Abraham Sofaer, the State De-
partment's legal adviser, it holds that offi-
cial testimony on the meaning of a treaty is
binding only if it is "generally understood,
clearly intended, and relied upon" by the
Senate. Since it's hard to know what this
inumbo-jumbo means, Presidents would be
free to do with treaties as they wish.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hopes to solve the problem, simply and sen-
sibly, by making executive branch testimo-
ny binding. Yet the Administration has per-
suaded some loyalist senators to oppose it, a
move that could well sink the treaty.
If the Senate does not approve the treaty
before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meet-
ing, it's likely not to happen under Presi-
dent Reagan?and then perhaps never. Pres-
idential campaigns and the first year of a
new Administration are not conducive to
ratifying arms agreements. The choice of
doctrine or treaty rests with ?the White
House.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President,
read from the editorial:
The Reagan Administration negotiated an
important treaty with the Soviet Union that
would eliminate Euromissiles. Now it jeop-
ardizes that accomplishment by insisting on
a novel and absurd Presidential doctrine
that few senators will or should swallow.
It then goes on to say:
The serious obstacle to ratification, how-
ever, is the so-called Sofaer Doctrine.
Named for Abraham Sofaer, the State De-
partment's legal adviser, it holds that offi-
cial testimony on the meaning of a treaty is
binding only if it is "generally understood,
clearly intended, and relied upon" by the
Senate. Since it's hard to know what this
mumbo-jumbo means, Presidents would be
free to do with treaties as they wish.
And my question is: Does the Senator
concur that those criteria are indispensable
in order to have the application of an under-
standing of the Senate?
Mr. Nunn. I will say to the Senator it de-
pends on how one interprets those words. I
would certainly not interpret them the way
I am afraid the Senator from Pennsylvania
interpreted those words.
When the administration comes up and
testifies before a committee of the Senate,
the Senate has received that information
and has relied on that information. I do not
think the Senator has to jump up and down
in the Foreign Relations Committee and
say, "Oh, I relied on that, you told us that
and I rely on that."
No; I do not think that. I think when the
testimony comes in, Senators can sit there
calmly and even snooze off if they like to?
and not many of our colleagues do that?
they can even snooze off and if the Secre-
tary of State, or another authoritative wit-
ness, makes a statement, then the Senate,
through its committee, has relied?
Mr. SPECTER. I ask the Senator to be as
brief as he can be. I am not suggesting
jumping up and down here. I am talking
about criteria as a legal matter and there
are three conditions. Generally understood,
clearly intended, and relied upon. And it is a
matter of what the facts show.
But I take it the Senator does agree that
those are the three criteria which establish
the Senate's understanding if they are met.
Mr. NIINN. I do not agree with that be-
cause I know where the Senator is coming
from. He is coming from the point of view
the Senate has to understand, we have to
prove that we understood, we have to show
that we relied on. I do not agree that you
have to demonstrate that we relied on testi-
mony, other than by showing that we re-
ceived authoritative testimony. If you had
to prove that we came out here on the floor
with everything the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee received, with everything
the Armed Services Committee received,
and everything the Intelligence Committee
received, that we put it in the record, and
that we said we relied on it and understood
It, that would be an exercise in absolute ab-
surdity, and I think it would render the
process unworkable.
So I would not agree that those words
should be added to simply the words "au-
thoritative testimony."
I am glad the Senator has given me the
opportunity to make that perfectly clear.
To try to impose those tests upon
the Senate is to shift the burden in
treaty making as the distinguished
Senator from Michigan pointed out
yesterday, in a way that would nullify
the Senate's power.
, The Senator has quoted the remarks
of the Senator from Georgia?who is
on the floor and of course will answer
for himself?but I want to include at
this point in the RECORD the exchange
that appears in the RECORD for yester-
day's debate on pages S6778 and
S6779, when the Senator from Georgia
rejects these three criteria.
The Senator from Pennsylvania said
to him:
Mr. President, I think that the ad-
ministration can send a treaty to the
Senate?
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SARBANES (continuing]. Have
the text laid before the committee.
Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. SARBANES. The Secretary of
State can come and say this is what
the treaty means. The committee can
receive that testimony, decide for one
reason or another they have no ques-
tions to ask, that it is clear on the
record from the text of the treaty and
the representations of the administra-
tion what the treaty means, and ad-
journ the hearing.
Neither that administration nor a
subsequent administration can then
come along and try to give the treaty a
different meaning, a reinterpretation
from what they said that text meant
at the time that they presented it to
the Senate committee.
The Senator has tried here to allow
for such a reinterpretation. And I
gather he may try in another amend-
ment, which will deal with implicit un-
derstandings, to assert that the negoti-
S 6887
ating record could be used after con-
sent has been given by the Senate to
contradict an authoritative represen-
tation made to the Senate by the ad-
ministration in the course of ruling
Senate approval.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Maryland has used 4
minutes.
Mr. SARBANES. The Byrd amend-
ment has precluded that kind of ap-
proach, and I strongly oppose the
effort in this amendment to undo the
Byrd amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I
asked the Senator from Maryland to
yield because in looking at the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD he did not read the
whole RECORD. The Senator from
Georgia and I did have an exchange.
He is on the floor now, and he can
comment for himself. But at page
S6779 this comment is made by me:
"Well, I have looked at the entire
page."
-
Well, never mind my comment?it
appears there?in the interest of time.
Mr. Nuzor. I would say, if the Senator
would yield, I do agree with that complete-
ly, provided it is understood when an au-
thoritative witness comes from the adminis-
tration and testifies before a committee, the
Senate should be deemed to have relied on
that testimony in its deliberations.
So when I make the representation
that Senator Norm agreed to it subject
to that proviso I was making an accu-
rate representation.
When the Senator from Maryland
makes a comment that these three
conditions are "mumbo-jumbo," he
flies in the face of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States
which this Senator has cited and flies
in the face of the statement of law
when he makes his bland, unsubstanti-
ated, nonauthoritative assertions of
law.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor
and ask how much time I have remain-
ing?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania has 4 min-
utes and 10 seconds.
Mr. SARBANES. Will the manager
yield my 1 minute?
Mr. FELL. I yield 1 minute.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I
make only two observations. First of
all, the reference to "mumbo-jumbo"
was quoting the New York Times edi-
torial. I do not disagree with that edi-
torial, but I simply want to make it
clear that phrase was not my original
product.
Second, let me simply say on the
Nunn exchange, and that is why I
wanted to put it in the RECORD, the
Senator from Pennsylvania has tried
very hard throughout this debate to
put this side on the hook of those
three criterias. That has been rejected
clearly. It was rejected by the Senator
from Georgia. It is rejected by this
Senator. That is not the test. Those
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S 6888 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
criteria are not what has to be applied,
in arriving at the Senate's common un-
derstanding?it is the text of the
treaty and the authoritative represen-
tation of the President which were
provided by the President and his rep-
resentatives to the Senate and its
Committee. To impose those criteria
in the way the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania would try to do so shifts the
burden with respect to the treatymak-
ing as to really render the Senate a
nullity. We reject that approach. It
should be clear it is rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Maryland has used up
the 1 minute. Who yield? time?
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 4
minutes to the Senator from Michi-
gan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The,
Senator from Michigan is recognized
for 4 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, not only has this for-
mulation that is being offered this
morning by the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania been rejected by Senator NUNN
as was pointed out by Senator NUNN
yesterday, by the Senator from Mary-
land, and others, it has been rejected
by the Senate. This amendment today
will void the action that we took yes-
terday.
The action, that we took yesterday
was to define what is meant by the
words "common understanding." We
said that it was based on the text of
the treaty, the provisions of the reso-
lution of ratification, and by authori-
tative representations provided by the
President to the Senate and its com-
mittees. We defined it yesterday. We
had this debate yesterday.
The Culvahouse formulation was
brought in yesterday as an argument
not to adopt the Byrd version. We re-
jected the Culvahouse version yester-
day by adopting Byrd.
Today we are asked again to go into
this issue. And I would say but three
things. No. 1, the Culvahouse formula-
tion puts the burden on the wrong
party. It says that the Senate must
show not just what was authoritative-
ly communicated to us but that we
must show that we clearly intend that
understanding or that interpretation,
we generally understood that interpre-
tation, and that we relied on that in-
terpretation. That burden becomes
ours under Culvahouse and under the
Specter amendment this morning.
That burden is on precisely the
wrong party. We did not negotiate the
treaty. We do not possess the negotiat-
ing history, although we are given
part of it. All of that is in the hands of
the executive branch. They- are the
ones that should have the burden, not
us, and if they make clear authorita-
tive representations to the Senate of
the United States, they ought to be
bound by them and the burden should
not shift to us to prove that we gener-
ally understood that interpretation
and that we relied on that interpreta-
tion.
As my friend from Pennsylvania
knows, there is only one real way to
prove it and that is to load every
single one of these representations
made by the executive branch during
this ratification proceeding onto the
resolution of ratification. There is no
other sure way that we can prove what
we clearly intended, generally under-
stood, and relied on.
And that is going to burden this
process. It is going to load it down and
it is going to kill the treatymaking
process because we are going to have
to incorporate all of these representa-
tions that are important into that res-
olution of ratification in order to meet
the Culvahouse test.
No. 1, you are putting the burden on
the wrong party, the party that is re-
ceiving those representations rather
than the party that is making them.
You are loading down the treatymak-
ing process. And for what?
My friend I think has conceded this
morning that he no longer can main-
tain the principle that there is only
one treaty because if we went through,
those hoops and loaded down that res-
olution of ratification, to incorporate
all the representations which were
made to us by the executive branch at
that point, under Culvahouse when
you read the Culvahouse letter you no
longer can consider the negotiating
record and you no longer can consider
subsequent practice.
We were told yesterday by the Sena-
tor from Pennsylvania that the Con-
stitution and international law require
that we be able to look at the negotiat-
ing record and that we be required to
look at subsequent practice. But under
the,Culvahouse formulation if we
mak those recommendations to us an
explicit part of the resolution of ratifi-
cation at that point there can be a dif-
ferent understanding here between us
and the executive than there is be-
tween the executive and the other
country. So you open up the door.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired.
Mr. LEVIN. May I have 1 more
minute?
Mr. PELL. I yield an additional
minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from.Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from
Rhode Island. I thank the Chair.
So what you have done is you have
put the burden on the wrong party.
You have loaded down the ratification
process and you have not maintained
the principle which yesterday the Sen-
ator offered as an essential principle.
It is no longer there because if we
went through those hoops which we
should not go through we then come
up with the same situation which the
Senator from Pennsylvania yesterday
said should not be allowed to happen
under principles of international law.
So you do not even protect your
principle. You do not protect it in any
pristine form, that is for sure, and I do
not think you protect it at all because,
May 27, 1.988
as a matter of fact, the only way the
Senate could ever protect itself would
be to put every single one of those rep-
resentations into that resolution of
ratification at which point there will
be as much conflict under the Sena-
tor's approach between what is repre-
sented to us and what is negotiated
with the other country than there is
under the Byrd approach.
This amendment completely under-
cuts, obviates and voids what this
Senate yesterday adopted by a vote of
72 to 27. I hope we will reject it.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Michigan
is just wrong when he says there is
any burden of proof on the Senate to
do anything. It is just not true, if you
read the simple language of my
amendment.
When the distinguished Senator
from Michigan talks about burdening
the record, it is no more so than any
other legislation or any, other treaty
where there is an interpretation. You
do not have to burden the record at
all.
When he talks about pristine, I
agree, there is no such thing as pris-
tine here or anywhere. But if you have
this kind of a standard, absent malice
or total incompetence, you have the
best chance of not having two treaties.
That is why the language of the Biden
condition ought to be specified with
these three important tests.
I yield the floor and ask how much
time I have remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three
minutes and 12 seconds.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
Mr. SARBANES. How much time re-
mains on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven
minutes and 26 seconds.
Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from
Maryland yield me 4 minutes?
Mr. SARBANES. I yield 4 minutes to
the Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, The Sena-
tor from Pennsylvania and I have been
discussing this now for 11/2 years. I am
not under any illusion that either of us
is going to change each other's mind at
this stage.
But I do congratulate the Senator
from Pennsylvania for getting into
this subject at great depth, because it
is complex and complicated and he has
worked on it long and hard.
I must say that I fundamentally dis-
agree with this amendment. I agree
with the comments made by the Sena-
tor from Maryland and the Senator
from Michigan. The Senator from
West Virginia's amendment yesterday
was adopted overwhelmingly. If we
adopt this amendment today, we will
be undermining the Byrd amendment.
Mr. President, there is a difference
between saying that testimony is
clearly understood, clearly intended,
generally Understood and relied upon
by the Senate; that that is certainly
testimony that has been received and
saying that only if that testimony is
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
clearly intended, generally understood,
and relied upon will it be deemed to be
authoritative.
That is what the Senator is doing
with this amendment. _He is saying
only if it was clearly 'intended, only if
it is generally understood, only if it is
relied upon by the Senate in its advice
and consent. So he is saying these are
three roadblocks and burden is all on
the Senate to demonstrate that. If
they do not, any President can go for-
ward, no matter what his Secretary of
State has said, no matter what his Am-
bassadors have said, and reinterpret a
treaty according to his own liking.
That is what we are deciding here
today.
I would say that if we had had that
procedure in this deliberation, there
would be no hope whatsoever that we
would be ratifying this treaty by this
afternoon. There would be no hope we
would be ratifying it by next Friday or
even in 2 or 3 weeks or a month.
We would be here for at least the rest
of the summer, the reason being be-
cause the only way the Senate could
maintain that burden and fulfill its re-
sponsibility that the Senator from
Pennsylvania would place on the
Senate is to take every bit of testimo-
ny that came before the Senate, and
anything that we deemed to be im-
portant to our deliberations we would
have to specify that it was important.
We would have to read it out, sentence
by sentence.
The Armed Services Committee had
33 hearings. It would take us probably
a month to read into the record all of
those hearings. That does not even
count the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and the Intelligence Committee.
Now, if we really want to fulfill the
intent of the Senator's amendment, we
would have to have amendments out
here so that the Senate as a whole
"could have focused and been able to
establish later that we had clearly in-
tended and we had general under-
standing and it was relied upon by the
Senate.
I guess we could also have to, if you
take it to the logical conclusion, every
time a statement was made in commit-
tee or every time at least a paragraph,
maybe each sentence, we would have
to stop the witness and say, "Yes, Mr.
Secretary, we believe that that was
clearly intended, we generally under-
stand it, and we rely on it."
It would get into one of those
"amen, brother" situations. After each
sentence, we would say, "amen, broth-
er, we generally understand, we clearly
intend, and we rely on it. Amen."
What kind of sense does that make?
It makes no sense at all. It makes no
sense at all. That is a burden the U.S.
Senate should not have to bear.
I would say also to the Senator from
Pennsylvania that there is a great deal
of difference in legislation and a
treaty. When the administration
comes up and testifies on legislation,
that is their opinion. The Congress
can either regard or disregard it. The
Senate can say we believe that is cor-
rect or we can say we disagree.
Now, what happens after that? We
pass a law. That law goes though the
committee process. We have a markup.
We go over every word of it. Then it
comes to the Senate, where we debate
it. Then it goes to the House. They
debate it in committee. Then it goes to
a conference committee after the
House passes it. It goes through that
process.
That is not the case with a treaty. A
treaty is the law of the land. But it is a
unique way in which we make that
law. The way we make that law is
through the executive branch negoti-
ating the treaty and then presenting it
to the Senate for our advice to the
ratification thereof. The Senate does
not make that law in the same sense it
makes legislation. It is a jointmaker in
the treaty context, but we do not have
the negotiations. The executive
branch does that.
So there is a fundamental difference
in having law made by treaty, which is
a unique executive kind of negotiation,
and having a piece of legislation
passed by the House and Senate. In
fact, there may be another instance
where the executive branch can make
the law.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from Georgia has
expired.
Mr. NUNN. I ask for 1 more minute.
Mr. SARBANES. I yield another 2
minutes to the Senator.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is
rather unique. When the Founding
Fathers debated this, they wanted,
first, the U.S. Senate to have some
part of the debate, where the Senate
of the United States should be the ne-
gotiators of treaties. They finally com-
promised and said both the Senate
and the executive branch would be the
jointmakers through the ratification
process. So this is a unique kind of
method of making law that both the
executive and the Senate share in.
But it is not like legislation, where
the Senator cites case after case relat-
ing to the making of law by legislation.
There is a fundamental difference. In
one case, the treaty is totally different
from the way we have it in the other
case.
Mr. President, I hope the Senate will
reject this amendment, because it
would, as has already been said, com-
pletely undermine the Byrd amend-
ment, which has been carefully
worked out in a bipartisan fashion.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, con-
trary to the assertions of the distin-
guished Senator from Georgia, the
case law is clear and the commentators
are clear on the Chevron case,
McCauglm, Schwegman Bros., and
New York Indians, and the restate-
ment?third?of foreign relation law,?
that the effort to find the intent of
the Senate follows the same principles
in treaties as in legislation.
But I would ask the Senator from
Georgia one question, even on my
S 6889
time: Where do you find in my amend-
ment any burden on the Senate to
prove the common understanding?
Mr. NUNN. Your amendment clearly
Intends to say only if it is clearly in-
tended to be a shared interpretation,
only if it is generally understood to be
a shared interpretation, and only if it
relied upon the statement in its advice
and consent.
So the Senate would have to, in ful-
filling its responsibilities, make sure
each of those conditions existed. Oth-
erwise, the testimony ? given to the
Senate by the executive branch would
not fulfill those conditions and, there-
fore, would not be generally under-
stood and would not be a common or
shared view.
Mr. SPECTER. Well, what you say
simply does not respond to my ques-
tion, because it does not respond to
the burden of proof. If the executive
branch seeks to establish some under-
standing different from what the
Senate has said, why, then, would not
the executive branch have the burden
of proof? And what you have said and
what the distinguished Senator from
Michigan has said relating to burden
of proof simply is not present. There is
nothing that establishes the burden
on the Senate any more than on the
executive branch. Whoever has some-
thing to say, only has to look at the
record and show that the standards
are met. If the President wants to
come in and, as you say, change the in-
terpretation of ABM, then the Presi-
dent would have the burden of proof.
Where is there anything -in this lan-
guage relating to your arguments that
the Senate has the burden of proof to
concoct this "chamber of horrors"
which you have articulated here about
all these witnesses and all these
amendments? I rather got lost in that
line of argument.
Mr. NUNN. Well, I thank my friend
for yielding for the answer.
The real answer is the executive
branch, in most cases, implements
treaties. So if there is going to be a
construction of a treaty and the imple-
mentation is affected thereby, and the
executive branch asserts that it was
not clearly intended testimony, it was
not generally understood, it was not
relied on by the Senate, then they
would go out and begin to implement,
and the burden would be on the
Senate of the United States to find
some way to stop that, either through
the appropriations process, or through
going to court. The burden would have
to be on the Senate because the execu-
tive branch implemented it. If the
Senate implemented the treaty, then
you could say, well, the Senate could
mareh off and do whatever it wanted
to do and the executive would have
the burden.
So the Senator's amendment has the
clear implication, based on common
sense. and the way Government works,
of putting the burden on theSenate.
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S 6890 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. SPECTER.. You are talking
about implementation to stop the ex-
ecutive from making a mistake or a
false interpretation. But in terms of
the executive's--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. Will the Senator
from Rhode Island yield 1 minute to
me?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island has 1
minute, 37 seconds.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may have 1
minute to finish the sentence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Hearing none, it is so
ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, just
to finish the sentence, and this will
conclude my argument; and I think
this shows the fallacy of claiming
there is a burden of proof. The distin-
guished Senator from Georgia then
starts to talk about how the Senate
implements a cutoff of funds and so
forth. But if it is a matter of interpre-
tation, as he postulates it, even if the
executive changes it, the executive has
the burden and not the Senate.
I thank the Chair and I yield the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. I yield the remaining
minute and 37 seconds to the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I am
just staggered that we are revisiting
an issue that the Senate, in what I
thought was one of the its finest
hours, put a very fundamental consti-
tutional issue to bed. -
This amendment is so mischevious it
really is not in keeping with the com-
mitment of the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania to the Constitution. I look at
this and I think, "authoritatively com-
municated"; does that put a burden on
all the committees of the Congress to
ask every witness: Is this authorita-
tive? Could you provide a letter from
the President, now, that says this is
authoritative as compared to some
other witness who does not deliver au-
thoritative testimony?
? And "clearly intended"; can you
promise us that this is what the Presi-
dent clearly intends? And, even if it
does, and the Senate clearly infers
from testimony a certain viewpoint,
shared understanding, later on the
President can say you may have in-
ferred it and you may have thought it
was clearly intended but it is not what
I really intended and therefore your
understanding is wrong. I did not
mean futuristic weapons, I meant ul-
traf uturistic weapons.
That is the kind of nonsense all of
this leads to. There is no end to the
prerogative the President has to do
mischief to the treatymaking process
and to subordinate the understanding
of all 100 Senators here to some,thing
he may think about later on.
I will just close by saying it is a
happy thought that when Ronald
Reagan is gone you will never hear
broad versus narrow interpretation
again. Nobody else could ever think of
such a cockamamie thing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time has expired.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to
table the amendment. I ask for the
yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this
Senator does not seek the yeas and
nays. I have no objection to having
the yeas and nays, but I do not seek
them.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
yeas' and nays have been ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Ohio [Mr. MErz-
ENBAUM] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio [Mr. GLENN] is absent due
to death in the family.
I also announce that the Senator
from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] is absent
because of illness.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote?
The result was announced?yeas 67,
nays 30, as follows:
IRollcall Vote No. 163 Ex.)
YEAS-67
Adams Ford Murkowski
Baucus Fowler Nunn
Bentsen Gore Packwood
Bingaman Graham Pell
Boren Harkin Proxmire
Bradley Hatfield Pryor
Breaux Heflin Reid
Bumpers Helms Riegle
Burdick Hollings Rockefeller
Byrd Inouye Roth
Chafee Johnston Sanford
Chiles Kassebaurn Sarbanes
Cochran Kennedy Sasser
Cohen Kerry ? Shelby
Conrad Lautenberg Simon
Cranston Leahy Stafford
Daschle Levin Stennis
DeConcini Lugar Stevens
Dixon Matsunaga Warner
Dodd Melcher Weicker
Dole Mikulski Wirth
Durenberger Mitchell
Exon Moynihan
Armstrong
Bond
Boschwitz
D'Amato
Danforth
Domenici
Evans
Garn
Gramm
Grassley
NAYS-30
Hatch
Hecht
Heinz
Humphrey
Karnes
Kasten
McCain
McClure
McConnell
Nickles
Pressler
Quayle
Rudman
Simpson
Specter
Symms
Thurmond
Trible
Wallop
Wilson
NOT VOTING-3
Eiden Glenn Metzenbaum
So the motion to lay on the table
amendment No. 2328 was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
motion was agreed to.
Mr. ADAMS. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
May 27, 1988
? The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Pennsylvania is recognized to offer an
amendment on which there shall be 30
minutes of debate equally divided and
controlled in the usual form.
The Senator from Pennsylvania.
AMENDMENT NO. 2329
Mr. SPECtER. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
The Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
SPECTER) proposes an amendment numbered
2329.
At the appropriate place insert the follow-
ing:
"Notwithstanding any provision in the
Resolution of Ratification, or the Biden
Condition as amended by the Byrd Condi-
tion, or any statement in the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee Report on the
INF Treaty, there is no intent by the Senate
to change the heretofore accepted constitu-
tional law of the United States on treaty
ratification as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the hereto-
fore accepted international law on treaties
as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
United States."
Mr. ADAMS. Parliamentary inquiry,
Mr. President. Is this the amendment
that was filed? It is different than the
amendment we have before us.
Mr. SPECTER. I have modified the
amendment, Mr. President.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this
amendment provides, as read by the
clerk, that action heretofore taken by
this body is not intended to change
the Supreme Court of the United
States interpretation of constitutional
ratification or of international treaty
Interpretation. If the Senate votes this
amendment down, I submit, Mr. Presi-
dent, that the Senate will have fully
executed the coup de grace to the an-
nihilation of existing law, Constitution
of United States law on treaty ratifica-
tion and international law on treaty
Interpretation.
The intent of the sponsor of this
amendment plainly stated at the
outset is to undercut what has been
said about making the negotiating
record immaterial, inferentially
making the practices of the parties im-
material on deciding what is the intent
of the parties, to undercut the ap-
proach that the treaty does not re-
quire mutuality in order to be ,binding,
and to establish new standards for as-
certaining what is the intent of the
Senate realistically by casual, few, in-
consistent references in the ratifica-
tion record.
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May 27, 1988 ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. President, there have been some
amazing things said on the floor of
this Senate. The distinguished Senator
from Arkansas, Senator BUMPERS,
charged that my last amendment was
"not in keeping with the Senator from
Pennsylvania's commitment to the
Constitution." That is a rather star-
tling statement when we are debating
the Constitution, especially consider-
ing the authority offered by this Sena-
tor on the last amendment. It may be
that this debate is reaching the
quick?a lot of comments which are
really surprising, if not totally out of
order.
But, Mr. President, I would suggest
that what has occurred here is really
surprising and really farfetched. ?
The proposition has been advanced
that the Soviet Union has an .obliga-
tion to attend Senate ratification pro-
ceedings and that the Soviet Union
might be bound by what they have
heard. When pressed, a little retreat:
"Well, they are under a duty to speak
up." When pressed, "Well, it is evident
as to what was intended."
The proposition has been advanced
on this floor that it is not necessarily
the intent of the Senate but only the
intent of a committee of the Senate,
which is a radical departure from
clearcut case law as to what the intent
of the Senate is, not just of a Senator
or two, not just of a committee, but
what happens on the floor with the
managers and the determination of
intent of the Senate if there is not an
explicit reservation.
Mr. President, this amendment is
like apple pie, motherhood, and milk.
It says that the laws on constitutional
ratification interpreted by the Su-
preme Court still stand after what the
Senate has done, that the law on
international treaty interpretation
still stands after what the Senate has
done here.
Mr. President, not to be in deroga-
tion of my responsibilities under the
Constitution, which I think I under-
stand as well as the distinguished Sen-
ator from Arkansas [Mr. BUMPERS]. I
shall now read from the Constitution.
The Constitution says this in article 3,
section 2?it may be out of order to
read the Constitution pn the floor of
the Senate?but it says:
The judicial power shall extend to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which may be made,
under their authority.
Now, what this amendment seeks to
do, Mr. President, is to insert in cate-
gorical terms that it is the Supreme
Court of the United States which es-
tablishes the law on treaties that ap-
plies to the intent of the parties, the
meaning of the treaties, as the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly interpret-
ed the international law on treaties,
and it is meant to say that, notwith-
standing what this body has done on
this process, the Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the constitutional ratifi-
cation stands.
I yield the floor and reserve the re-
mainder of my time. I ask how much
time I have remaining, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 9 minutes remaining.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Washington.
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I rise in
opposition to this amendment offered
by Senator SPECTER. This amendment
would reopen the debate that we have
completed on the Sofaer doctrine. We
have worked long and hard to produce
an acceptable amendment, which was
the Biden amendment, as amended by
Senator BYRD, which was adopted by
an overwhelming margin. I see no pur-
pose in reopening this issue, which has
been a factor in bogging down consid-
eration of the INF Treaty.
The amendment offered by Senator
SPECTER is another attempt to change
what has already been established by
this body by an overwhelming vote,
and I urge my colleagues to oppose
this amendment and uphold the Sen-
ate's Constitutional role which has
been established by the vote of this
body and by the discussion which has
gone forth both on the preceding
amendment and on the amendments -
that were offered earlier and were es-
tablished.
Does the Senator from Maryland
seek time at this point?
-Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator
yield me 3 minutes?
Mr. ADAMS. I yield 5 minutes to the
Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. Three minutes will
do.
Mr. President, I strongly oppose the
amendment offered by the Senator
from Pennsylvania. The Senator from
Pennsylvania throughout this debate
has tried to establish a proposition
that there is one treaty between the
executive and the foreign country and
another treaty between the executive
and the Senate of the United States.
And then he asserts that they could in
fact differ, a proposition with which I
have great difficulty.
'However, even if they do differ, I
flatly disagree with his proposition
that then the President can make ref-
erence to the treaty arrived at with
the other country rather than the
treaty as understood by the Senate on
the -basis of the text and authorita-
tive representation by the President
and his representatives. There are
rules of international law for inter-
preting treaties. And those are the
general ivies that apply to all coun-
tries regardless of their internal form
,of government. And, therefore, when
International law with respect to trea-
ties is set out, it does not have to ad-
dress the question of what is necessary
within a country in terms of its inter-
nal processes in order to actually put a
treaty in place.
Those international principles in my
judgment cannot, in the instance of
the United States, take precedence
over, or provide the basis for a view of
S 6891
the treaty different from the common
understanding of the treaty shared by
the President and the Senate at the
time the Senate gave its advice and
consent to ratification.
The Sofaer doctrine has consistently
tried to assert that, and this amend-
ment in the language in the last clause
referring to "accepted international
law on treaties," does the same thing
once again. The body of law that takes
precedence is based on the treatymak-
ing clause of the Constitution.
It has been argued here by the Sena-
tor from Pennsylvania and others who
support him that if the President has
this arrangement with the other coun-
try, he can in fact reinterpret his ar-
rangement with the Senate in order to
satisfy his arrangement with the other
country. I submit that our position is
directly counter to that. The arrange-
ment that makes the treaty possible is
reaching a shared understanding with
the Senate and obtaining, as the exec-
utive is now seeking to do, the advice
and consent of the Senate. Absent
that consent, you have no treaty.
Therefore, the common understanding
that is shared by the President and
the Senate at the time the Senate
gives its advice and consent to ratifica-
tion constitutes the meaning of the
treaty and is the basis on which it is
interpreted.
You cannot come along later and
refer to a body of international law
and principles that guide treaty inter-
pretation between two nations and use
those principles to support a different
view, a different interpretation fhan
the one that was at the basis of the
common understanding between the
President and the Senate in the course
of the advice and consent profess.
So I see the last clause of this
amendment of the Senator from Penn-
sylvania as laying the basis?because
of its references to international law,
and the assertions by Judge Sofaer, by
the Senator from Pennsylvania, and
by others as to international law?
?
whereby the President can give an in-
terpretation to a treaty contrary to or
at variance with what constituted the
common understanding in the course
of the Senate's advice and consent
process.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
DASCHLE). The Senator's 5 minutes has
expired.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President,
before yielding to my friend, the dis-
tinguished Senator from California,
Senator WILSON, I want to reply to
what the distinguished Senator from
Maryland said. He says he finds a
problem with the last clause because
there might be an international law to
support the Sofaer doctrine. The last
clause says "heretofore accepted inter-
national law on treaties as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United
States."
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S 6892 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
So when the distinguished Senator
from Maryland talks about some inter-
pretation of international, law at vari-
ance with the Constitution, constitu-
tional ratification a the Constitution
generally, he is totally wrong because
It is international law on treaties that
is interpreted by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The distin-
guished Senator from Maryland is
saying the Supreme Court of the
United States- does not consider the
U.S. Constitution when it interprets
International law, which is obviously
an absurdity.
When the distinguished Senator
from Washington?I did nat have a
chance to reply before, when the dis-
tinguished Senator from Maryland
spoke?Senator ADAMS said that this
amendment changes what has been es-
tablished?well, he is right. It changes
what has been established by the
Senate in the last few days in terms of
elevating the Senate's role above the
intent of the parties, in terms of
changing the way you find the under-
standing of the Senate from the Su-
preme Court decision, but then the
distinguished Senator from. Washing-
ton says we cannot have this amend-
ment because we have to uphold the
Senate's constitutional role.
Is the Senate's constitutional role
what the Byrd amendment says it is?
Or is the Senate's constitutional role
what the Supreme Court of the
United States has said it is for the past
200 years? Who makes the law of this
country on the role of the Senate?
Senator BYRD or the Supreme Court
of the United States? And vote against
this amendment, if' you are for Senator
BYIU) and vote, for this amendment if
you are for the Supreme Court of the
United States.
I yield.
Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator
yield me 2 minutes?
.Mr. SPECTER. No.
I yield 3 minutes to the distin-
guished Senator from California, Sen-
ator WILSON.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from California is recognized,
Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I thank
my friend from Pennsylvania not only
for yielding me some time but also for
doing the yeoman's service that he has
done providing a. clear legal perspec-
tive in this debate.
I find it no less remarkable that the
partisans of the Byrd condition would
oppose this than that it was remarka-
ble last night they could not find it
within themselves to support the cen-
tral proposition that the United States
should not be disadvantaged by adher-
ing to a more stringent standard of
treaty interpretation than that bind-
ing the Soviet Union.
But what he is saying here is also a
very difficult, thing to understand in
that what he is proposing is that the
Senate not usurp the function of the
'courts, not seek to overturn estab-
lished law and precedent by which we
have been governed in the interpreta-
tion of treaties.
And apparently those who are parti-
sans of the Byrd condition think that
this must be resisted precisely because
If it is followed, if we agree that we
will make no change, then the Byrd
condition is in peril.
Even, at the time that I was arguing
against the Byrd condition, it really
did not seem to me to be too perni-
cious, that we take special steps to an-
nounce clearly that in fact we would
not try to upset constitutional prece-
dent.
Let me just say that more important
than any question about Senate pre-
rogatives really is a question of the
Senate's duty to do its job, that job
imposed by the Constitution, to rec-
ommend for or against ratification.
But what this makes plain is that the
partisans of the Byrd condition obvi-
ously are fearful of anything that will
shed light on the very obvious possibil-
ity, indeed perhaps almost the proba-
bility, that by following the Byrd con-
dition the Senate will be in a pbsition
to put before the United States differ-
ent obligations imposed on the one
hand by domestic law and on the
other by our treaty obligations.
Well, I will only say this: I think it is
in a sorry day when Senators are
unable to vote for this amendment. It
is not a killer amendment. Happily,
the Byrd condition will not be a killer
amendment either. It is bad law. But I
must say that in time it will be I think
revealed for what it is, unconstitution-
al as well as bad law. It will not, happi-
ly, prevent conscientious Senators
from doing their job.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired. The' Sena-
tor from Pennsylvania has 3 minutes
remaining; the Senator from Washing-
ton has 8 minutes remaining.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield me 2 minutes?
Mr. ADAMS. I yield 2 minutes to the
Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the
absolutely pernicious nature of this
amendment is revealed if one focuses
on the fact that it is framed in the dis-
junctive.
What the Senator from Pennsylva-
nia has advanced in his amendment is
the concept of accepted constitutional
law on treaty ratification on the. one
hand or?and the word is his?accept-
ed international law on treaties on the
other.
That has been at the root of this
whole issue, because it is an effort to
use accepted international law on trea-
ties between the parties as a justifica-
tion for ignoring what is accepted con-
stitutional law and practice with re-
spect to how the United States goes
about making a treaty and the Sen-
ate's role in that process.
The Senator has framed his amend-
ment in the disjunctive, and he has
put the constitutional law of the
United States in one clause and has
put international law on treaties in
May 27, 1988
the other clause. They are set out as
alternatives.
That is exactly the Sofaer doctrine?
the effort to use international* law and
the concepts governing there, as be-
tween States, as a way to provide a
means for the President to ignore the
understanding reached with the
Senate and to proceed down a differ-
ent path. It would enable the Presi-
dent to reinterpret a treaty?a treaty
which only took place, only went into
effect, because the Senate gave advice
and consent to it?by using the princi-
ples of international law as a way, to
support a reinterpretation different
from the shared understanding reached
with the Senate in the course of the
advice and consent function. The Sen-
ator has framed his amendment that
way. He has put the constitutional law
of the United States on treaty ratifica-
tion, in one clause and the internation-
al law on treaties in another, thereby
opening up that Sofaer loophole
again.
This amendment should be defeated.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. ADAMS. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I agree
with the argument the Senator from
Maryland has made persuasively.
If we vote for this amendment, are
we not saying, in effect, that we in the
U.S. Senate are saying, basically, that
International law as interpreted by the
executive branch can override the re-
lationship under the U.S. Constitution
between the U.S. Senate and the exec-
utive branch?
Mr. SARBANES. I think we are.
Mr. NUNN. Basically, we are putting
International law, if so interpreted by
the executive branch, on a higher
plane than the Constitution provides.
Mr. SARBANES. This amendment is
framed in the disjunctive. It says con-
stitutional law in one clause or inter-
national law in the other, which opens
up the loophole to use international
law to nullify or negate constitutional
law.
Mr. NUNN. It is basically saying to
the executive 1i-ranch: "Mr. President,
or, Judge Sofaer, take your choice. If
international law is better for you, use
that. If constitutional law is better for
you, use that. But don't worry about
the relationship between the Execu-
tive and the Senate, and don't worry
about what you say before the Senate
when you tell us what a treaty means.
If you want to negotiate a treaty, tell
us anything you want to, and then
find some international law, getting
the negotiating history out of the safe,
that the Senate never saw, change the
treaty, and then say, 'Too bad, folks.
That's they way it is.'"
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, how
much time do I have?
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May 27, 1988
? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
? Senator from Pennsylvania has 3 min-
utes. The Senator from Washington
has 4 minutes.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Georgia respond to
two questions?
Mr. NUNN. I would be delighted.
Mr. SPECTER. Has the Senator
read the amendment?
Mr. NUNN. I have.
Mr. SPECTER. Since the Senator
has read the amendment, how can he
? say that the amendment proposes
international law as interpreted by the
executive branch, when the amend-
ment specifically says international
law on -treaties as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. NUNN. I will answer the Sena-
tor.
Does he remember the Taiwan case,
where President Carter terminated
the Taiwan treaty? That case went to
court. Senator Goldwater brought the
position to court, and a number of
people on that side of the aisle joined
in, as well as a couple on this side. Ba-
sically, it said that the President could
not terminate the treaty.
The Supreme Court of the United
States said: "That is a political ques-
tion. It has to be adjudicated between
the Executive and the Senate of the
United States. It is not a case that we
are going to decide."
So, by delegating it to the Supreme
Court of the United States you are in
effect, giving the executive branch the
right to interpret international law.
When someone tries to go to the Su-
preme Court to stop that interpreta-
tion by the executive branch, then the
Supreme Court is very likely to say:
"It is a political question, folks. You
decide it."
So it is a clever way of giving the ex-
ecutive branch the right to take any
principle of international law it wants
and hang its hat on and that basically
overrides everything that has been said
in the U.S. Senate.
I have a hard time believing that
people who serve in this body really
want to undermine the institution of
the U.S. Senate as much as these
amendments reflect.
I wonder what will happen if we
have a different President in the
White House, whether we will get the
same. kind of thrust at that stage.
That will be an interesting question
for history.
Mr. SPECTER. It is hard for this
Senator to understand how the distin-
guished Senator from Georgia says
that this amendment delegates the in-
terpreting power from the Supreme
Court of the United States, when it is
the Constitution?article III, section
2?which gives the interpretive power
on treaties to the Supreme Court of
the United States, not the Specter
.amendment.
Mr. President, how much time do I
have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 30 seconds.
Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. \ ADAMS. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is
not much I can add to what Senators
SARBANES and NUNN have said on the
key point of this amendment; but let
me quote the words of the Senator
from Pennsylvania, because he says it
all.
He said that this amendment
changes what was established in the
Byrd amendment. That is his intent;
the intent is clear. It is to reverse the
amendment, and that is what we are
voting on.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that
is true, because the Byrd amendment
changes the law of the United States
of America, constitutional law on rati-
fication and law on interpretation of
treaties, under the Supreme Court de-
cisions. That is why it is wrong.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Does the Senator yield the floor?
Mr. SPECTER. How much time do I
have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has all of 15 seconds remain-
ing.
Mr. ADAMS. Does the Senator yield
back the remainder of his time, or
does he wish to continue?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Time will be taken from both sides.
Mr. SARBANES. Let it pe taken.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on my
final 15 seconds: I have earlier argued
that if you vote against this amend-
ment, you vote to follow Senator
BYRD. If you vote for it, you vote to
follow the Constitution.
Senator GRASSLEY approached me
and said: "You made it clear, ARLEN,
because my oath is to uphold the Con;
stitution, not Senator BYRD."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. ADAMS. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I
want to be absolutely clear. The
person who is seeking to uphold the
Constitution of the United States in
this debate is the able and distin-
guished majority leader Senator BYRD.
It is the Senator from West Virginia
who has stood as the champion of our
Constitution. I commend and thank
him for his leadership.
The phrasing of the Specter amend-
ment makes it clear, because it is in
the disjunctive, as between constitu-
tional law and international law that
it in fact does not fully uphold the
Constitution in that regard. Other-
wise, this amendment would not have
been put in the disjunctive, and the
Senator would not have set up in his
ATE S. 6893
amendment two paths?one path fol-
lowing the Constitution, accepted con-
stitutional law, and another path, sep-
arate and apart, on the basis of the
word "or," which follows "internation-
al law on treaties."
This opens up the possibility of fol-
lowing the. path of international law
on treaties in order to negate accepted
constitutional law. It is this possibility
which the distinguished Senator from
West Virginia sought to preclude in
his amendment, and that is why it
commanded the overwhelming support
it has received in this body.
This amendment ought to be reject-
ed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Washington has 2
minutes and 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, in con-
clusion on the debate, the Senator
from Maryland has stated it very well.
The majority leader, Senator BYRD, by
the amendment that was overwhelm-
ingly adopted, established the consti-
tutional power and the constitutional
right, the shared power of the Senate
of the United Stateg with the execu-
tive in creating a treaty.
This is another attempt to circum-
vent the Constitution of the United
States by stating that you would use,
as the Senator from Maryland has so
well stated, a separate path around it.
I hope this amendment will not be
adopted. I yield back the remainder of
the time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time has now been yielded back.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to
table the amendment, and I ask for
the yeas and nays on the motion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion
of the Senator from West Virginia to
lay on the table the amendment of the
Senator from Pennsylvania.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Ohio [Mr. METZ-
ENBAUM] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio [Mt. GLENN] is absent due
to death in the family.
I also announce that the Senator
from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] is absent
because of illness.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote?
The result was announced?yeas 64,
nays 33, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 164 Ex.]
Adams
Baucus
Bentsen
Bingaman
Boren
YEAS-64
Bradley
Breaux
Bumpers
Burdick
Byrd
Chafee
Chiles
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
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S 6894 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 27, 1988
Cranston
Daschle
DeConcini
Dixon
Dodd
Dole
Durenberger
Exon
Ford
Fowler
Gore
Graham
Harkin
Hatfield'
Reflin
Helms
Hollings
Armstrong
Bond
Boschwitz
D'Amatcr
Danforth
Domenic!
Evans
Garn
Gramm
GrassleY
Hatch
Biden
Inouye
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerry
Lautenb erg
Leahy
Levin
Lugar
Matsunaga
MeIcher
Mikulski
Mitchell
Moynihan
Nunn
Pell
Proxmire.
. ,
NAYS-33
Hecht
Heinz
Humphrey
Karnes
Kasten
McCain
McClure
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Packwood
Pryor
-Reid
Riegle
Rockefeller
Roth
Sanford
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon .
Stafford
Stennis
Stevens
Weicker.
Wirth
Pressler
Quayle
Rudman
Simpson
Specter
Symms
Thurmond
Trible
Wallop
Warner
Wilson
NOT VOTING-3
Glenn IvIetzen b au in
So the motion to lay on the table
the amendment No. 2329 was agreed
to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
motion was agreed to.
Mr. PELL. I move to lay that motion
on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I wonder
? if the distinguished Republican leader
and I now could discuss further the re-
maining items and perhaps arrive at a
time for our final vote on the resolu-
tion of ratification.
Mr. President, as I understand it,
there will be a colloquy between Mr.
QUAYLE and Mr. Nue. There remains
the amendment by Mr. HELMS on
troop withdrawal.
Mr. DOLE. Fifteen minutes, equally
divided.
Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent
that there be 15 minutes, equally di-
vided, in accordance with. the, usual
form on the Helms troop withdrawal
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. And that there be no
more amendments other than these
amendments.
Mr. DOLE. And the pending Helms
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Hearing no objection,
It is sa ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the final vote
on approval of the resolution of ratifi-
cation occur no later than 3:15 p.m.
today and that the time?may I in-
quire of the Chair how much time is
there to be on the colloquy?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
Is no time set for colloquy at this
point.
Mr. BYRD. I thought that was en-
tered this morning as 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair has no official advice to that
effect.
Mr. BYRD. Ten minutes equally di-
vided; I ask unanimous consent, on the
colloquy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Is
there objection? Hearing none, it is so
ordered.
Mr. BYRD. All right. That means we
have 10 minutes on the colloquy and
15 minutes equally divided on the
amendment by Mr. HELMS; that is 25
minutes. That would end at 2:15 p.m.
today.
Mr. DOLE. Then there is 30 minutes
on the declaration, the pending Helms
amendment, and I hope there will be
no rollcall. Maybe there is. That will
be another 15 minutes. So it looks
about, just about, maybe, 3:30 will get
It, 3:05 or 3:10.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is there a
30-minute time limit already ordered
on the pending amendment by Mr.
Himms?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
is no time agreement on the pending
amendment that has been set aside.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be a 30-
minute time limitation on the pending
amendment by Mr. limas to be equal-
ly divided and controlled in accordance
with the usual form.
The PRESIDING OFFICM-L. Is
there objection?
Mr. CRANSTON. Reserving the
right to object, it is not the pending
amendment. It is a revised version of
the pending amendment.
Mr. BYRD. Well, it is in the pending
place because we have continued it
temporarily-1-set it aside.
I ask unanimous consent that the
amendment may be modified in ac-
cordance with the understanding of
the two Senators, Mr. Hriags and Mr.
CRANSTON.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that no amend-
ments be in order, other than those
amendments which are contained in
this most recent order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Not counting rollcalls,
that would put the Senate to 2:45 or
2:50 p.m. today.
Could we agree on a 3 o'clock vote?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the vote on the approval of
ratification for the INF Treaty occur
today at 3 o'clock p.m. or no later than
3 o'clock p.m. today. No later than.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Hearing none, it is so
ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
all Senators and I particularly thank
the distinguished Republican leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order the Senator from
North Carolina is recognized to call up
his amendment upon which there
shall be 15 minutes of debate divided
and controlled in the usual form.
The Senator from North Carolina is
recognized.
Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that that amend-
ment be set aside so Senator Nurtiq and
I can agree in our colloquy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there abjection? Hearing pone, it is so
ordered.
The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NIJNN. Mr. President, this will
only take a few minutes but it is an
Important subject.
Mr. President, I would like to engage
the Senator from Indiana, Senator
QUAYLE, in a brief discussion about the
meaning of the May 12 United States/
Soviet agreement on future INF weap-
ons as it applies to permitted types of
drones, remotely piloted vehicles
IRPV'sl and other categories of non-
weapons-delivery vehicles.
In my ' remarks yesterday on the
Nunn-Warner-Boren-Cohen-Helms
Category III Understanding, I said:
After the administration determined its
position on the definitional issue, executive
branch witnesses discussed the implications
of the definition with reference to specific
types of future weapons which would and
would not be covered by this definition.
Based on this testimony and additional con-
sultations with the administration, it is the
understanding and intent of the sponsors of
the amendment that the following repre-
sents an illustrative list of potential RPV/
drone missions areas which the United
States regards as "non-weapons-delivery"
missions for purposes of treaty interpreta-
tion:
I emphasize this list is an illustration. It is
not intended to envision every possibility of
excluded weapons, but it is illustrative of
those missions that we believe are not
weapon delivery missions:
Surveillance, reconnaissance, target simu-
lation, communications relay, signals intelli-
gence, such as electronics eavesdropping, de-
coying, psychological warfare activities,
such as leaflet dropping, weather data gath-
ering, bomb damage assessment, target des-
ignation, electronic countermeasures fEC/VIl
and other electronic warfare activitipA, such
as radar jamming and chaff dispensing.
I would ask my colleague if he
agrees with that list of permitted
RPV's and drones, recognizing that it
Is only illustrative and not all-inclu-
sive?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana.
Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, I do
agree with that statement. Let me also
observe that electronic warfare or
combat includes all "electromagnetic
actions required to support military
operations" including but not limited
to military:
Deception; jamming, suppression of
enemy air defenses, electronic counter-
measures, and C3 countermeasures.
Those electromagnetic devices that
are not designed to damage or destroy
a target but only disrupt its normal
operation temporarily are not consid-
ered to be weapons.
The electromagnetic spectrum in-
cludes laser and microwave emitters,
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
and it is clear that any devices de-
signed to provide missile guidance,
military intelligence, or communica-
tion that use laser or radio energy are
not weapons payloads.
Finally, all delivery vehicles that are
not cruise or ballistic missiles as de-
fined in the treaty but of INF range
are permitted no matter what their
payload because they are not weapons
delivery vehicles as defined by the
treaty.
I would ask the Senator from Geor-
gia if he agrees with that elaboration?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. I do agree with the Sen-
ator's statements and commend him
for the important contribution he has
made to the Senate's review of this
treaty by first raising and then con-
tinuing to diligently pursue the mean-
ing and effect of the treaty's provi-
sions in this area.
On another matter, Mr. President,
with regard to the Murkowski-Quayle
amendment passed Wednesday night,
I would ask your confirmation that
you did not mean by the phrase "no
restrictions should be placed on cur-
rent or future non-nuclear sea- or air-
launched ?cruise missiles," to restrict
our ability to, for example, mark a
cruise missile so as to be able to distin-
guish between a conventional and nu-
clear cruise missile?
Mr. QUAYLE. I answer my friend
from Georgia: No, our intent was to
make it clear that the Senate opposes
any START treaty which would in-
clude non-nuclear ALCMS, SLCMS, or
even ground-launched cruise missiles
outside of INF ranges. We recognize
that there could be requirements
under a START treaty to distinguish-
non-nuclear ALCMS, SLCMS, or even
ground-launched cruise missiles out-
side of INF ranges from nuclear var-
iants for arms control purposes but
not to do so in any way that might fa-
cilitate enemy military counter meas-
ures.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator
? from Indiana.
Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, I also
thank my friend from Georgia for get-
ting into this.
I had originally intended to offer
this as an amendment. I conversed
with him and now I think this is a far
preferable way.
? After I make a unanimous-consent
request I am just going to put in a
couple of definitions as I found in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's military diction-
ary. That does not relate to our collo-
quy but relates to a previous state-
ment I had made.
I do at this time, Mr. President, ask
unanimous consent to make a techni-
cal correction, that has been cleared,
in the Murkowski-Quayle amendment
2279 agreed on Wednesday evening. In
paragraph 2 strike the last occurrence
of the word "or".
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Hearing none, it is so
ordered.
Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, finally
as I said I am not going to offer an
amendment. There were some con-
cerns about some of the words that I
had put in the amendment lacked any
definitions. Some of these concerns
came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the military. I am just going to
put into the RECORD a couple of the
definitions of some of the words as
provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
own dictionary of military and associ-
ated terms and the -Air Force's "Elec-
tronic Combat-Principles," so in case
they had missed it somewhere along
the line they might want to read the
RECORD and find out what the amend-
ment really meant, other than some of
the concerns that we got back. I think
they happened to forget to consult
their own military dictionaries over
there. I ask unanimous consent to
have this printed in the RECORD after
my remarks.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, and I will not
object, as I understand the.statement
of the Senator this does not relate to
the amendment that we were discuss-
ing, the Murkowski-Quayle amend-
ment, but rather an amendment the
Senator did not present to the Senate
for its consideration but had intended
at one time? -
Mr. QUAYLE. The Senator is abso-
lutely correct. This has no relation-
ship to the Murkowski-Quayle amend-
ment. It does relate to an amendment
that I had intended to offer but did
not after conferring with the distin-
guished chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
I think this is a far preferable way.
My desire was to try to get some feel-
ing of what a nonweapon delivery ve-
hicle is. I think this probably ade-
quately explains it. On May 19 I made
a speech, an opening statement in
which I listed several specific types of
clearly permitted nonweapons sys-
tems; things that did not directly
damage or destroy their targets. Later,
I filed an amendment that generally
described what at the very least would
be allowed. There were concerns, how-
ever, which the JCS raised, that the
amendment used words, such as
"spoof," "electromagnetic," "dazzle,"
"deceive," "interfere," "disrupt," that
lacked any definitions that were as
clear as the Treaty definition for
"weapon"?a device designed to
damage or destroy its intended target.
In fact, the military's own dictionaries
define the terms used in my amend-
ment but they do not define the words
"damage," "destroy," or "designed." I
ask unanimous consent to place in the
RECORD the military's definitions for
those who may have concerns about
some of the definitions along with my
original amendment.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was/were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
S 6895
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS
SCOPE. Terms and definitions identified
with NATO represent terms standardized
and agreed for use within the NATO com-
munity. Entries identified with IADB repre-
sent terms standardized and agreed for use
between member countries of the Inter-
Anierican Defense Board. The symbol I
means that the entry has United States
Government interdepartmental approval for
national usage. The symbol DOD marks the
entry as official for DOD Components,
which will use the terms and definitions so
designated without alteration unless a dis-
tinctly different context or application is in-
tended. To provide a common interpretation
of terminology at home and abroad, US offi-
cials participating in either NATO or IADB
activities will use the terms and definitions
designated for that organization. When an
agreed organizational term does not exist,
the DOD term and definition will take prec-
edence. ?
Electronic warfare?(DOD) Military
action involving the use of electromagnetic
energy to determine, exploit, reduce or pre-
vent hostile use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum and action which retains friendly use
of electromagnetic spectrum. Also called
EW. There are three divisions within elec-
tronic warfare:
a. Electronic countermeasures?That divi-
sion of electronic warfare involving actions
taken to prevent orreduce an enemy's effec-
tive use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Also called ECM. Electronic countermeas-
ures include:
(1) Electronic jamming?The deliberate
radiation, reradiation, or reflection of elec-
tromagnetic energy for the purpose of dis-
rupting enemy use of electronic devices,
equipment, or systems. See also jamming.
(2) Electronic deception?The deliberate
radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppres-
sion, absorption, denial, enhancement, or re-
flection of electromagnetic energy in a
manner intended to convey misleading in-
formation and to deny valid information to
an enemy or to enemy electronics-depend-
ent weapons. Among the types of electronic
deception are:
(a) Manipulative electronic deception?Ac-
tions to eliminate revealing, or convey mis-
leading, telltale indicators that may be used
by hostile forces.
(b) Simulative electronic deception?Ac-
tions to represent friendly notional or
actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.
(c) Imitative electronic deception?The in-
troduction of electromagnetic energy into
enemy systems that imitates enemy emis-
sions.
b. Electronic counter-countermeasures?
That division of electronic warfare involving
actions taken to ensure friendly effective
use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite
the enemy's use of electronic warfare. Also
called ECCM.
c. Electronic warfare support measures?
That division of electronic warfare involving
actions taken under direct control of an
operational commander to search for, inter-
cept, identify, and locate sources of radiated
electromagnetic energy for the purpose of
immediate threat recognition. Thus, elec-
tronic warfare support measures (ESM) pro-
vide a source of information required for im-
mediate decisions involving electronic coun-
termeasures (ECM), electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM), avoidance, tar-
geting, and other tactical employment of
forces. Also called ESM. Electronic warfare
support measures data can be used to
produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both
communications intelligence (COMINT) and
electronics intelligence (ELINT).
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S 6896 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Electronic warfare?(NATO) Military
action involving the use of electromagnetic
energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or pre-
vent hostile use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum and action to retain its effective use by
friendly forces. See also electronic counter-
countermeasures; electronic countermeas-
ures; electronic warfare support measures.
Electronic warfare?(DIDB) Military
action involving the use of electromagnetic
energy to determine, exploit, reduce or pre-
vent hostile use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum and action that retains friendly use of
the electromagnetic spectrum.
Barrage jamming?(DOD, NATO, IADB)
Simultaneous electronic jamming over a
broad band of frequencies. See also jam-
ming.
Deception?(DOD, NATO, JADE) Those
measures designed to mislead' the enemy by
manipulation, distortion, or falsification of
evidence to induce him to react in a manner
_prejudicial to his interests. See also counter-
deception; military deception.
Deception means?(DOD) Methods, re-
sources, and techniques that can be used to
convey information to a foreign power.
There are three categories of deception
means:
a. Physical means?Activities and re-
sources used to convey or deny selected in-
formation to a foreign power. (Examples:
military operations, including exercises, re-
connaissance, training activities, and move-
ment of forces; the use of dummy equip-
ment and devices; tactics; bases, logistic ac-
tions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and
test and evaluation activities).
b. Technical means?Military materiel re-
sources and their associated operating tech-
niques used to convey or deny selected in-
formation to a foreign power through the
deliberate .radiation, reradiation, alteration
absorption, or reflection of energy; the
emission or suppression of chemical or bio-
logical odors; and the emission or suppres-
sion of nuclear particles.
c. Administrative means?Resources,
methods, and techniques designed to convey
or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or
other physical evidence to a foreign power.
Dazzle?MOD, IADB) Temporary loss of
vision or a temporary reduction in visual
acuity. See also flash blindness.
Electromagnetic interference?(DOD) Any
electromagnetic disturbance that interrupts,
obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits
the effective performance of electronics/
electrical equipment. It can be induced in-
tentionally, as in some forms of electronic
warfare, or unintentionally, as a result of
spurious emissions and responses, intermod-
ulation products, and the like. Also called
EMI.
Electromagnetic intrusion?(DOD) The in-
tentional insertion of electromagnetic
energy into transmission paths in any
manner, with the objective of deceiving op-
erators or of causing confusion. See also
electronic warfare.
Electromagnetic pulse?(DOD) The elec-
tromagnetic radiation from a nuclear explo-
sion caused by Compton-recoil electrons and
photoelectrons from photons scattered in
the materials of the nuclear device or in a
surrounding medium. The resulting electric
and magnetic fields may couple with electri-
cal/electronic systems to produce damaging
current and voltage surges. May also be
caused by nonnuclear means. Also called
EMP.
Electromagnetic radiation?(DOD, IADB)
Radiation made up of oscillating 'electric
and magnetic fields and propagated with
the speed of light. Includes gamma radi-
ation, X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, and infra-
red radiation, and radar and radio waves.
Electronic simulative deception?(NA TO).
The creation of electromagnetic, emissions
to represent friendly notional or actual ca-
pabilities to mislead hostile forces.
Electromagnetic spectrum?(DOD) The
range of frequencies of electromagnetic ra-
diation from zero to infinity. It is divided
into 26 alphabetically designed bands. See
also electronic warfare.
Electromagnetic spectrum?(IADB) The
frequencies (or wave lengths) present in a
given electromagnetic radiation. A particu-
lar spectrum could include a single frequen-
cy or a wide range of frequencies.
Electromagnetic vulnerability?(DOD)
The characteristics of a system that cause it
to suffer a definite degradation (incapability
to perform the designated mission) as a
result of having been subjected to a certain
level of electromagnetic environmental ef-
fects. Also called EMV.
Electronic counter-countermeasures?See
electronic warfare.
Electronic countermeasures?See electron-
ic warfare.
Electronic deception?See electronic war-
fare.
Electronic deception?(NATO) Deliberate
activity designed to mislead an enemy in the
interpretation or use of information re-
ceived by his electronic systems. See also
electronic imitiative deception; electronic
manipulative deception; electronic simula-
tive deception.
Electronic imitative deception?(NATO)
The introduction into the enemy electronic
systems of radiations imitating the enemy's
own emissions.
Electronic jamming?See electronic war-
fare; jamming.
Electronic line of sight?(DOD, IADB)
The path traversed by electromagnetic
waves that is not subject to reflection or re-
fraction by the atmosphere.
Electronic manipulative deception?
(NATO) The alteration of friendly electro-
magnetic emission characteristics, patterns,
or procedures to eliminate revealing, or
convey misleading, tell-tale indicators that
may be used by hostile forces.
Electronic reconnaissance?(DOD, IADB)
The detection, identification, evaluation,
and location of foreign electromagnetic radi-
ations emanating from other than nuclear
detonations or radioactive sources.
Electronics intelligence?(DOD, IADB)
Technical and intelligence information de-
rived from foreign non-communications
electromagnetic radiations emanating from
other than nuclear detonations or radioac-
tive sources. Also called ELINT. See also in-
telligence; signals intelligence; telemetry in-
telligence.
Electronic warfare support measures?
(NATO) That division of electronic warfare
involving action taken to search for, inter-
cept, identify and locate radiated electro-
magnetic energy for the purpose of immedi-
ate threat recognition. It provides a source
of information required for immediate deci-
sions involving electronic countermeasures,
electronic counter-countermeasures and
other tactical actions such as avoidance, tar-
geting and homing.
Electronic warfare support measures?See
electronic warfare.
Electro-optical intelligence?(DOD) Intel-
ligence information other than signals intel-
ligence derived from the optical monitoring
of the electromagnetic spectrum from ultra-
violet (0.01 micrometers) through far infra-
red (1,000 micrometers). Also called ELEC-
TROOPTINT.
Electro-optics?(DOD, NATO) The tech-
nology associated with those components,
devices and systems which are designed to
interact between the electromagnetic (opti-
cal) and the electric (electronic) state.
May 27, 1988
Flash blindness-- DOD, NATO, IADB)
Impairment of vision resulting from an in-
tense flash of light. It includes temporary or
permanent loss of visual functions and may
be associated with retinal burns. See also
dazzle.
Jamming?See barrage jamming; electron-
ic countermeasures; electronic jamming; se-
lective jamming; spot jamming.
Spoofer?(DOD) In air intercept, a code
meaning, "A contact employing electronic
or tactical deception measures."
Spot jamming?(DOD, NATO, IADB) The
jamming of a specific channel or frequency.
See also barrage jamming; electronic war-
fare; jamming.
Spotting?(DOD, NATO, IADB) A process
of determining by visual or electronic obser-
vation, deviations of artillery or naval gun-
fire from the target in relation to a spotting
line for the purpose of supplying necessary
information for the adjustment or analysis
of fire.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ELECTRONIC
COMBAT PRINCIPLES
Finally, destructive and disruptive meas-
ures describe the dimensions of operations
In the electromagnetic spectrum. A destruc-
tive measure seeks the termination of the
target system, its operating personnel, or
both. A disruptive measure is anything that
does not directly seek destruction, and its
effects are reversible.
. EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT No. 2248
At the end of the resolution of ratifica-
tion, add the following:
The Senate's advice and consent to ratifi-
cation of the Treaty is further subject to
the following, which the President shall
communicate to the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, in connection with the ex-
change of the instruments of ratification of
the Treaty:
( ) UNDERSTANDING.?The United States
understands that the Treaty does not cover
nonweapons delivery vehicles including?
(1) any ground-launched ballistic missiles
or ground-launched cruise missiles having a
range capability of more than 500 kilome-
ters but less than 5,500 kilometers and that
has not been flight-tested or deployed to
carry or be used as a weapon, including any
warhead, mechanism, or device, which when
directed against any target, is designed to
damage or destroy it; and
(2) ground-launched ballistic missiles or
ground-launched cruise missiles having a
range capability of more than 500 kilome-
ters but less than 5,500 kilometers and car-
rying devices designed to spoof, upset, jam,
deceive, or disrupt enemy electromagnetic
devices, or to dazzle, disrupt, or interfere
with the normal operation of enemy optical
or electro-optical capabilities, disable or in-
capacitate enemy assets or troops temporar-
ily, or provide military intelligence, surveil-
lance, communication, missile guidance,
target designation, or range-finding infor-
mation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BREAUX). Under the unanimous-con-
sent agreement and the previous
order, the Senator from North Caroli-
na is now recognized to offer an
amendment upon which there shall be
15 minutes of debate equally divided
and controlled in the usual form.
The Senator from North "Carolina is
recognized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if the
managers of the bill or any other Sen-
ator have no objection, I should like to
reserve the order and proceed with the
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
declaration. I ask unanimous consent
that I may do so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection to the request of the
Senator? -
Without objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 2317, AS MODIFIED
(Purpose: To include in the resolution of
ratification a unilateral declaration of the
United States regarding Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks)
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send a
modification amendment of declara-
tion to the desk and ask for its imme-
diate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
The Senator from North Carolina [Mr.
HELMS] for himself, Mr. BYRD, Mr. DOLE,
and Mr. SIMPSON, proposes an amendment
numbered 2317, as modified.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the resolution of ratifica-
tion, insert the following before the period:
"Provided that the Senate's advice and con-
sent to ratification of the INF Treaty is sub-
ject to the condition: Declaration. It shall
be the declared policy of the United States
of America that, as an integral factor in its
decision to adhere to this Treaty, the
United States intends to continue to negoti-
ate with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics a treaty effecting reductions in stra-
tegic nuclear forces of the Parties and, in
conjunction with its NATO Allies, to negoti-
ate a treaty establishing conventional stabil-
ity in Europe. In so doing, it shall be guided
by the following principles and consider-
ations:
(a) A main object of such future treaties
shall be international stability and reduc-
tion of the risk of war by obtaining general
equivalence in the resultant strategic forces
of the Parties; -
(b) During any negotiations contemplated
by this declaration, the United States shall
act in close consultation with its Allies who
are member states of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and with such other
states as appropriate;
(c) Negotiations contemplated by this dec-
laration shall also be conducted with close
and detailed consideration of the advice of
the United States Senate, and the Senate
should be kept fully apprised of all signifi-
cant proposals made to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and, with respect to such
negotiations, the judgments and recommen-
dations of the United States Senate shall be
given full and highest consideration and due
regard;
(d) The negotiations contemplated by this
declaration shall also seek to secure regimes
of effective verification and mechanisms for
full compliance which build upon the verifi-
cation regime and compliance mechanisms
of the present Treaty, strengthening them
appropriately for any subsequent treaty;
(e) In accordance with the Constitutional
process of the United States, the United
States shall, consistent with correctly con-
strued principles of international law, not
be bound to adhere to or observe any treaty
contemplated by this declaration until rati-
fication thereof pursuant to the advice and
consent of the Senate. However, nothing in
this declaration shall imply that the United
States will take an action of such nature as
to make impossible the performance of any
future treaty contemplated by this declara-
tion after the signing of such treaty and
during the period in which there is a clear
prospect of timely ratification thereof;
(f) The United States considers full and
exact compliance with the present treaty
and with all other existing arms control
agreements between the Parties to be a
major issue affecting (i) the proposals and
attitudes of the United States with respect
to the future treaties contemplated hereby
and (ii) proportionate and appropriate re-
sponses with respect to such existing agree-
ments;
(g) Pursuant to this declaration, any joint
statement by the United States of America
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of a framework for the negotiation of stra-
tegic arms treaties contemplated hereby,
and such framework itself, shall serve for
the purpose only of guiding the conduct of
the negotiations which the United States
herein has declared its desire to pursue ex-
peditiously, and shall not constrain any
military programs of the United States
unless otherwise provided for in accordance
with Section 33 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act; and
(h) The capability of the United States of
America to monitor any future treaty con-
templated by this declaration shall be
strengthened in order to increase the ability
of the United States to detect violations
thereof.'."
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this is
the amendment that caused a little bit
of brouhaha last night, and I want to
say to all Senators that I was not of-
fended in the least by anythink that
occurred. Everybody was tired. None-
theless, the declaration was recognized
as significant and binding and of a
good precaution in advance of the
Moscow summit so the effort to table
it failed by a wide margin.
In any case, as the Senate functions
and should function, we worked fur-
ther on the declaration, made a few
not major but strengthening changes,
and I am now ready to proceed.
It is a straightforward declaration,
Mr. President. It is cosponsored by the
distinguished majority leader, Mr.
BYRD; and the Republican leader, Mr.
DOLE; and the assistant Republican
leader, Mr. SIMPSON.
Specifically, it creates a binding
legal duty on this and future Presi-
dents to adhere to a declared U.S.
policy with respect to future treaties
involving conventional and strategic
arms.
We worked much of the night in for-
mulating revise language in the decla-
ration because of its permanent status.
The work was conducted with Ambas-
sador Glitman and other representa-
tives of the White House and Depart-
ment of State, including eventually
the President's Chief of Staff, our
former colleague, Senator Baker.
I ask unanimous consent that a
letter attesting to the negotiations and
the most important conclusion thereof
be entered in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows:
S 6897
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
May 27:1988. -
Hon. JESSE HELMS
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR HELMS: The Declaration
you have proposed states principles and con-
siderations by which the present Adminis-
tration and future Administrations would
have a duty to be guided, since it would be
adopted as a valid condition and would con-
stitute the basis on which the Senate grants
its advice and consent.
This undertaking does not constitute a
legal precedent for other purposes, or for
any other declaration.
Sincerely,
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER,
Legal Adviser.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the dec-
laration emphasizes close coordination
with the Senate as a body as contem-
plated by the Constitution and with
our NATO allies with respect to future
arms negotiations. It also emphasizes
that any agreement on such issues
would not be binding on the United
States without Senate advice and con-
sent, as provided for in the U.S. Con-
stitution, but, perhaps even more im-
portantly, also that no framework or
unratified treaty will in any way what-
soever constrain any arms program of
this country.
There has been a great deal of dis-
cussion in this body about the signifi-
cance of the INF Treaty. Some have
contended, "well it's not really that
big a deal, so we might as well ratify it
forthwith." I do not share that view
either as to the treaty's significance or
the Senate's position on it. It seems to
me the treaty is significant?not only
politically, but more important, mili-
tarily.
Regardless of the degree of impor-
tance attributed to the INF Treaty, I
do not believe I have heard any Sena-
tor disagree?not one Senator, Mr.
President?disagree with the assess-
ment that any START Treaty, dealing
with proposed reduction in strategic?
that is long-range?nuclear weapons
will be far more significant.
For this reason, Mr. President, I -
have concluded that it is imperative
that the administration coordinate
every stage of negotiations?every step
of the way and extensively?with the
Senate well in advance of the formula-
tion of any START Treaty, and even
In the formulation of some less formal
framework or other outline of a
START Treaty or for that matter any
other arms treaty of whatever nature.
That is what the declaration provides
in legally binding terms. No more faith
accomplis.
The declaration puts the United
States on record by codifying as na-
tional policy that a main object of
future treaties, such as START, shall
be international stability and reduc-
tion of the risk of war by obtaining at
least general equivalence?as is al-
ready provided in Federal law by the
Jackson amendment, which is familiar
to all of us.
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S 6898 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
? The amendment also declares the in-
tention of the United States to coordi-
nate with the Senate?not a select
group but the Senate?in advance of
any START framework or outline, and
certainly before the initiation of any
further START negotiations pursuant
to any such framework or joint com-
munique.
- Mr. President, there have been press
reports suggesting that some sort of
framework for a START agreement
will in fact, be announced in Moscow
during the summit. The declaration
also makes clear that any such frame-
work shall be viewed by the U.S. Gov-
ernment as advisory only with respect
to negotiations only and will not con-
stitute a commitment nor contrain any
military program of the United States
unless specifically provided for in ac-
cordance with section 33 of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act. In
other words, Mr. President, a clear-cut
statute enacted subsequent to the dec-
laration, or a ratified?a ratified?
treaty.
The declaration also notes another
factor with which I have heard few, if
any disagreements?that is, that the
verification and compliance regimes
for a START Treaty will need to build
upon the verification and compliance
regimes of the present treaty,
strengthening them appropriately for
any subsequent treaty. It requires im-
provement because improvement is
badly needed, both in this proposed
treaty and any future treaty.
Many have pointed to what they
regard as the unprecedented verifica-
tion procedures provided in the INF
Treaty. The onsite inspection proce-
dures, in particular, have received
widespread attention and acclaim. I,
for one, believe that the accolades are
greatly overdone. Under the provisions
of the treaty, the United States is
given permission to inspect sites that
the Soviets so designate, not other
sites where covert activity might be
taking place, even if we have good
reason to suspect such covert activity.
That is just one of the many flaws
which I consider to be fatal in the INF
Treaty, but which others have chosen
to overlook.
Nonetheless, regardless of my own
reservations about the widely pre-
sumed achievements in verification in
the INF Treaty, Mr. President, almost
all witnesses before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, including the ad-
ministration witnesses, have noted
that a START verfication regime, in
particular?and compliance mecha-
nism?will have to be far more exten-
sive than that provided in the case of
the INF Treaty.
Even in public sessions, Mr. Presi-
dent, we have had unclassified discus-
sion to the need for significant im-
provements in our national technical
means for intelligence gathering in
order to monitor the much more com-
plex procedures of any START
Treaty.
The declaration puts the United
States, as a nation, on record in sup-
port of a much more extensive verifi-
cation and compliance regime for any
proposed START Treaty.
Similarly, Mr. President, the decla-
ration notes that the United States
will consider the Soviet Union's "full
and exact" compliance with the INF
Treaty and other existing arms con-
trol agreements to be a major issue af-
fecting the proposals and attitudes of
the United States with respect to any
envisioned START or other arms
treaty. -
I have noted on previous occasions
that the Soviets have an extensive his-
tory of cheating. It would be this Sen-
ator's hope that we will learn our
lesson before it is too late for the
safety of our country and that if the
Soviets persist in this consistent pat-
tern of cheating, we must call a halt to
further treaties with the Soviets until
they come into compliance. I believe
that principle should have been ap-
plied to the INF Treaty. While others
disagreed, I am pleased that there is
much broader support for such a posi-
tion with respect to any proposed
START Treaty. ?
Mr. President, former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger recently laid
out some of the pitfalls in negotiating
a START Treaty and the need for full
consultation with our allies. Now, I do
not always agree with Dr. Kissinger,
? although I tend to agree with him
more often now that he is no longer
Secretary of State, but the distin-
guished former Secretary of State is
absolutely correct, in my judgment, in
his analysis this time, so I ask unani-
mous consent, Mr. President, that the
article on the subject by Dr. Kissinger,
published in the Washington Post and
perhaps elsewhere on April 24, be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, a.s follows:
[From the Washington Post, Apr. 24, 1988]
START: A DANGEROUS RUSH FOR AGREEMENT
(By Henry Kissinger)
President Reagan has stated that he
hopes the START agreement to reduce U.S.
and Soviet strategic forces by 50 percent
will be completed in time for the summit at
the end of May. There has been astonish-
ingly little debate about the impact of such
an agreement on strategy, verifiability and
foreign policy. A pause in the rush to agree-
ment is needed to permit a national debate
while the treaty can still be reshaped. It is
essential also to insure that Congress will
fund the measures that will be necessary to
ensure the survivability and strategic effec-
tiveness of America's nuclear deterrent
under START conditions. Before America
makes another arms control deal with the
Soviet Union, it must make a deal with
itself.
For START is being negotiated in a con-
ceptual vacuum. The United States has not
yet decided?or at least has not put for-
ward?what strategic forces it proposes to
deploy under the START ceiling of 4,900
warheads in 1,600 missiles and 1,100 nuclear
weapons on aircraft. Or how it plans to
verify Soviet observance of these limits. Yet
May 27, 1988
the relative capability of U.S. strategic
forces?or the perception of it?has been
the key element in Western security policy
for the entire postwar period.
Still, common sense permits certain pro-
jections. The United States will almost cer-
tainly opt to retain 18 submarines out of the
current 36, down from 41 in the 1970s. Since
each Trident submarine has 24 missiles
counted as having eight warheads each, this
would place 3,456 warheads on submarines
and leave 1,444 warheads to be distributed
among land-based missiles.
When-the number of submarines is cut so
drastically while the agreement leaves
Soviet antisubmarine forces free to grow
and modernize, the vulnerability of the U.S.
residual submarine force must inevitably in-
crease. This would be especially true were a
technological breakthrough to occur in anti-
submarine warfare.
The situation with respect to land-based
missiles is more precarious still. The Wash-
ington summit agreement reduces Soviet
heavy missile warheads from 3,080 to 1,540.
Though this is lauded as a great achieve-
ment, any serious analysis shows that the
survivability of the U.S. land-based force
after the proposed reductions can be main-
tained at present levels only by a major?
and expensive?modernization program.
And the present level of vulnerability al-
ready is considered dangerous by most ex- ,
perts.
U.S. land-based missiles now consist of
2,000 warheads on three types of missiles:
500 highly accurate warheads on 50 MX
missiles; 1,500 reasonably accurate warheads
on 500 Minuteman III missiles and 500 inac-
curate large warheads on Minuteman H
single-warhead missiles?the oldest in the
U.S. arsenal.
Retaining the most accurate and modern
weapons?the MX and Minuteman III?and
scrapping the' Minuteman II would be most
cost effective and most consistent with a
strategy of sparing civilian populations and
concentrating on military targets. However,
it would also produce the most vulnerable
U.S. deployment. Indeed, such a START
scheme would actually worsen the vulner-
ability of American silos. Today the Soviet
Union has 3,080 SS-18 warheads aimed at
1,000 U.S. silos. After START, assuming the
United States retains its most effective
weapons, the Soviets would have 1,540 war-
heads aimed at 364 silos, thereby raising the
ratio of warheads to silos from 3.08:1 to
4.2:1. It is hard to argue that such a result
would be a contribution to "stability."
The cheapest way to maintain the existing
ratio of Soviet warheads to U.S. missiles
would be to disperse U.S. targets by replac-
ing a number of Minuteman Ills with three
warheads for a three times larger number of
Minuteman Hs with single warheads. The
disadvantage is that Minuteman Hs have
relatively poor accuracies. They are most
useful for a strategy of civilian devastation
and least suitable for a strategy concentrat-
ing on military targets.
The wisest course would be to develop a
new single-warhead missile to combine the
advantages for discriminating targeting and
dispersal for survivability. It could be placed
into a silo or preferably be made mobile or
both. But the best course -is also the most
expensive.
But no agreement on the composition of
the strategic forces exists either within the
executive branch or between the adminis-
tration and Congress. For budgetary reasons
the administration has all but shelved the
Midgetman, the proposed single-warhead
mobile missile. The Senate Armed Services
Committee has approved a mobile Minute-
man III; the House Armed Services Cormroi--
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?
May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tee has opted for the Midgetman in princi-
ple but allocated insufficient funds. There
are drawing board schemes to reduce the
number of misiles on Trident submarines
from 24 to 16, thus increasing the number
of submarines by a third and complicating
the tasks of Soviet antisubmarine warfare.
But nobody has advanced a concept for how
to pay for the additional submarines.
The administration therefore needs to
make sure that Congress will in fact fund
the necessary programs. At a minimum,
there should be an executive-legislative
summit in which the administration out-
lines how is proposes to compose post-
START U.S. strategic forces and congres-
sional leaders agree to fund the programs
needed to improve their survivability.
A pause in the rush to agreement also
would permit closer examination of verifica-
tion in the crucible of the realities that
would be created by the new agreement.
A verification system would have to be
able to determine whether the permitted
numbers of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 mis-
siles have been exceeded.
I know of no expert who believes that the
margin of error with respect to counting the
number of mobile intercontinental missiles
can be smaller than 25 percent.-.Yet the two
newest Soviet missiles are mobile; the SS-25
Is land mobile and the SS-24 is rail mobile.
The problem of counting Soviet missiles
produced but never deployed is even more
intractable. In the negotiations for the re-
cently concluded INF agreement, the Soviet
Union revealed that it had produced 50 per-
cent more medium-range weapons than it
had deployed. In START, unlike INF, the
production lines for strategic weapons
would remain open.
If verification of the total number of mis-
siles is difficult, determining the number of
warheads could turn into a nightmare. Since
it is impossible to establish from a satellite
how many reentry vehicles a missile carries,
certain mechanical "counting rules" have
been established over the years. Every mul-
tiple-warhead missile was assumed to have
the maximum number of reentry vehicles
that had been tested on that missile even if
it carried fewer reentry vehicles when actu-
ally deployed.
The Washington summit jettisoned that
principle. America's new submarine-
launched missile, the D-5 has been tested
with 10 warheads. Nevertheless, to maintain
a minimum number of submarines the
United States chose to equip each D-5 mis-
sile with eight reentry vehicles. In return
the Soviets were permitted ot count the re-
entry vehicles on their submarine-launched
missile, the SSN-23, at four, even though it
had been tested in an 8-to-10-warhead ver-
sion. Similar discrepancies exist with re-
spict to the Soviet heavy ICBM, the SS-18.
The number of reentry vehicles assigned to
missiles has become a subject of negotia-
tion, not of verifiable testing data.
Complex schemes?probably too complex
for day-to-day use?for the on-site inspec-
tion of deployed warheads are being dis-
cussed, but no arrangement could prevent
the Soviet Union from producing warheads
with the largest number of reentry vehicles
already tested, stockpiling them and install-
ing them in time of crisis or perhaps even
between inspections. We must take care lest
on-site inspection works more to tranquilize
than to reasssure.
Before an agreement is signed, the public
and Congress need to understand precisely
the scope and limits of verification. A
number of questions must be answered,
such as:
(a) What confidence do we have in the
verification scheme for limitation subject to
the START agreement?
(b) What is the cumulative risk if the veri-
fication system is under stress and not car-
ried out under ideal laboratory conditions?
(c) By how much and in what ways does
on-site inspection improve on national tech-
nical means, such as satellites?
(d) How will the verification system be in-
tegrated into- American decision-making at
the highest levels? - ?
(e) What is the United States prepared to
do in case of violations?
(f) What level of violation would threaten
free-world security and why?
In the end the START process will mark
another major step away from the deterrent
strategy pursued for the entire postwar
period. It will be another step toward strip-
ping away the legitimacy of nuclear weap-
ons without linking that process to the vital
need to reduce the conventional arms threat
either by building conventional forces or via
conventional arms ? control. The growth of
Soviet strategic forces in the mid-'70s coin-
cided with making nuclear strategy a domes-
tic issue in most democracies. As a result
Western nuclear strategy has progressively
become separated from rational objectives.
Accurate warheads and missile defenses
have all been vilified; mass destruction of ci-
vilian targets has been emphasized as if only
the prospect of a holocaust would preserve
peace. These evasions leave the democracies
increasingly suspended between Armaged-
don and surrender. The prospective START
agreement will inevitably exacerbate this in-
coherence, accelerating abdication from the
weaponson which Western strategy is based
without producing an alternative.
It is self-evident that the dismantling of
American medium-range weapons in
Europe, followed by a 50 percent cut in the
strategic forces of the United States, must
have some impact on Western strategy.
What targets that once were covered will be
left unattended under the new agreement?
What happens to the four submarines "as-
signed" to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization when the total number of subma-
rines on station in the Atlantic has shrunk
to around six? How does NATO visualize the
relationship between nuclear and conven-
tional defense in both strategy and arms
control? How do we propose to link these
processes?
One way to improve the survivability of
strategic forces would be to build a strategic
defense at least for missile sites. Yet in
()icier to achieve START the administration
has agreed to a nine-year deployment ban
extending into a third presidential term
after the Reagan administration. It is in the
process of agreeing to unspecified restric-
tions on testing. If history is any guide,
these restrictions are likely to atrophy the
program, since no deployment bgh or test-
ing restrictions have ever been abandoned
by the United States. If the administration
is willing to accept that outcome, it should
obtain a higher price, for example, scrap-
ping all the Soviet heavy missiles. If, howev-
er, the administration seriously intends to
proceed with the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive, it should put before an executive-legis-
lative summit a strategic rationale and a
program and budget levels for the next
decade. If it fudges the issue, it will inhert
the disadvantages of every course of action:
de facto abandonment of SDI for no equiva-
lent concession.
"Reductions" and "ending the nuclear
threat" have become catchwords in the do-
mestic debate of all NATO countries. But
the Western alliance requires a strategy, not
a slogan. START should not proceed fur-
ther until the American people and our
allies have been told with some precision
where this process is leading.
S 6899
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
yeas and nays are requested. Is there a
sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I reserve
the remainder of my time.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. HELMS. Certainly.
Mr. COHEN. I commend the Sena-
tor from North Carolina for making
the changes that were suggested yes-
terday. I think he has worked in abso-
lute good faith in trying to clarify the
exact intention of this particular
amendment, and I think the amend-
ment reflects a broad bipartisan con-
sensus on what the objective should
be.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
And may I say to him that he has
been exceedingly helpful in formulat-
ing this binding declaration and voting
yesterday to prevent the effort that
Senator BRADLEY made to table the
proposal.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator reserves the remainder of his
time.
The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 6
minutes to the Senator from Califor-
nia (Mr. CRANSTON] who was the indi-
vidual who first blew the whistle on
this amendment and saw its pitfalls.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from California is recognized.
Mr.,CRANSTON. I thank the distin-
guished chairman for the time and for
the comment.
Mr. President, yesterday in the in-
terest of comity and more importantly
in the interest of moving this impor-
tant INF Treaty forward, I withdraw
my second-degree Cranston-Leahy
amendment to the Helms "Start Prin-
ciples" amendment. There was a lot of
confusion, as one Republican Senator
noted, over what kind of an agreement
had been reached by? the majority
leader and the minority leader and a
few other Senators with the Senator
from North Carolina.
I want to be clear that I and many
others in this Chamber were not a
party to any deals cut with the Sena-
tor from North Carolina. It was ac-
knowledged by all concerned that I
was clearly within my rights in offer-
ing my second-degree amendment. I
walked through the front door. I was
not attempting a sneak attack through
a side door or the back door.
Frankly, I was somewhat startled
then when the majority leader and the
Senator from North Carolina both ac-
knowledged that they had never given
any thought to the possibility that
some Senator might come up with a
second-degree amendment.
i have served in this body with the
Senator from West Virginia for 20
years and with the Senator from
North Carolina for 16 years and never
before in my memory has either Sena-
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S 6900 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tor forgotten about the possibility
that somebody might offer an amend-
ment or, indeed, failed to take into ac-
count any potential use of Senate
rules, Senate traditions, Senate proce-
dures, Senate habits and mores, or
anything else.
I guess what this proves is that
nobody is perfect, neither the Senator
from West Virginia, the Senator from
North Carolina, or anybody on the
face of this Earth.
Anyhow, in the interest of comity, I
withdrew my amendment.
Mr. President, I welcome the numer-
ous substantive changes which have
now been made in the Helms proposals
in order to make it acceptable to all
parties. In fact, all of the major reme-
dies in the Cranston-Leahy second-
degree amendment offered last night
have been accepted. Specifically, the
watered-down hortatory language in
the Helms amendment now before us
no longer requires prenotification of
the Senate for "all significant START
proposals." It no longer requires the
United States to convene a Geneva
plenary every time the Senate has rec-
ommendations. It no longer requires
conveyance to the Soviets, nor does it
make a binding declaration exclusively
by the Senate of the U.S. policy. It no
longer sets general equivalence or
force symmetry as a goal for conven-
tional force reduction talks. It no
longer rejects the U.S. obligation to
avoid undermining the terms of
emerging treaties pending verification.
It no longer sets possible standards for
verification or compliance, not does it
cast aspersions on the effect of verifi-
cation procedures established in the
INF Treaty.
And, finally, and more importantly,
it no longer, as did the previous objec-
tionable Helms draft, prevents Presi-
dent Reagan from discussing START
in Moscow next week.
By taking the guts out of the Helms
proposal, we have ensured that nei-
ther this President, nor any future
President will have his options fore-
closed by this amendment.
The amendment before us will have
no meaningful effect on future
START negotiations?deleterious or
beneficial.
It is utterly harmless.
In a spirit of accommodation, and
with the hope that we can soon vote
for final passage of the INF resolution
of ratification, I sin prepared to
permit this harmless verbiage to pass.
We will not send President Reagan
to Moscow muzzled and handcuffed.
He will arrive there Sunday unshack-
led. He will be able to explore with the
Soviet leadership steps toward START
and any and all prudent steps designed
to deliver all of us from the nuclear
brink. There is now no reason for any
controversy over the pending amend-
ment. I will vote for it. I urge all other
Senators to do likewise.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island controls
time.
Mr. PELL. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Tennessee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Tennessee, Mr. GORE, S
recognized.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I thank
the chairman of the committee for
yielding this time. I will not take the
full 3 minutes.
My purpose in rising is, first of all,
to express my thanks to the Senator
from North Carolina for his willing-
ness to make such significant and
sweeping changes in the amendment
as it was originally presented to the
Senate.
As one who expressed concern yes-
terday, I have appreciated the oppor-
tunity to work with the Senator from
North Carolina, the Senator from
California, and the Senatof from
Maine, in fashioning some changes in
the amendment as it was originally in-
troduced.
My concern has been completely al-
leviated. I feel that one of the bases
for hope that Americans feel with
regard to the summit meeting about to
begin is not only that we will have the
formal exchange of ratified docu-
ments, not only that there will be a
general improvement in the atmos-
phere of the relationship between our
Nation and the Soviet Union, but a
very specific hope that the success of
the INF negotiations as embodied in
this treaty, hopefully a treaty that
will be ratified shortly, will give a pow-
erful impetus to the ongoing negotia-
tions with respect to the far more im-
portant subject of strategic arms re-
ductions.
If the amendment as it was original-
ly presented had been adopted, it
might well have had a Chilling effect
on some of the potential agreements
that might have come toward the end
of the current President's term. This
changed version avoids those problems
In my view, and I want it clear that
those of us who opposed the original
amendment did so in a bipartisan
spirit, working with the principal ne-
gotiator of the INF Treaty.
And I wish at this time to again com-
pliment Ambassador Glitman for his
outstanding work in negotiating the
treaty in Geneva and in his work on
this particular matter. Again in thank-
ing the Senator from North Carolina I
want to pay my respects particularly
to the Senator from California, Sena-
tor CRANSTON, who has played such
leadership in this and other matters.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL: I yield myself 4 minutes.
The amendment offered by the Sen-
ator from North Carolina is being sub-
stantially revised, and I think meets
the objections that many had to the
original one. The new version does
away with the more onerous aspects of
the previous one.
I am pleased that paragraph (c) of
the declaration dealing with Senate
oversight of negotiations affirms that
May 27, 1988
there shall be close and detailed con-
sideration of the Senate's advice as ne-
gotiations proceed and that the Sen-
ate's judgments and recommendations
will be given proper consideration,
while not placing the Senate in a too-
intrusive position.
Paragraph (e) deals with the obliga-
tions of the United States in the
period between the signing of new
treaties on conventional forces and
strategic arms and their ratification
pursuant to the consent of the Senate.
Nothing in this section would be in-
consistent with our obligation under
customary international law to refrain
from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of such treaties.
As Senator HELMS said himself
during the committee's last INF hear-
ing with Secretary Shultz, our hear-
ings, "I think you will find that inter--
national law requires the signatories
to take no steps to defeat the object
apd purpose of the treaty before it is
ratified."
Paragraph (g) contemplates that
this President or the next President
may agree with the Soviet leader on
the framework to guide further nego-
tiations. I would agree that any such
framework should not obligate the
President to disarm or to reduce or to
limit our Armed Forces. At the same
time, the President should remain
free, as he is under this formulation,
to take unilateral actions regarding
our forces pursuant to his authority as
Commander in Chief.
So I question whether the declara-
tion is necessary. It has been much im-
proved, and since it does not have
legal force, I will not oppose it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
The Senator from Rhode Island has
5 minutes and 28 seconds remaining,
and the Senator from North Carolina
has 4Y2 minutes remaining.
Mr. PELL. I yield 2 minutes to the
Senator from Washington, Mr. ADAMS.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Washington is , recog-
nized.
Mr. ADAMS. I thank the chairman.
I want to compliment those who have
worked on this particular amendment
and the changes that have occurred. I
think it is terribly important, Mr.
President, that we send a strong mes-
sage with this treaty, which I believe
now that this amendment does, that
the United States is looking forward to
a regime in the future, for future gen-
erations where we reduce the total
number of nuclear weapons signifi-
cantly. If we had not changed this, it ?
might have had, as the Senator from
Tennessee so well stated, a chilling
effect. We do not want a chilling
effect. We hope that the President of
the United States and the General
Secretary of the Soviet Union join to-
gether in the beginning of a movement
toward reducing the 25,000 nuclear
warheads that face one another.
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
I think as we have worked on this
treaty, Mr. President, a great many
Senators have spent a great deal of
time trying to be certain that this
treaty was truly a step toward a new
set of relations in the world where the
superpowers begin to build their* eco-
nomic strength again, and not simply
be involved in an endless arms race.
I think the Senator from North
Carolina is to be complimented for his
strong'views that he has had, and his
understanding in this particular case
that it is the future that we are talk-
ing about. And it is the hope and
intent of all of the Senators, and I
think it is now expressed in this
treaty, that we will move toward a
total reduction in arms. I hope the
treaty will be voted for, Mr. President.
I will vote for this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired. Who
yields time? The Senator from Rhode
Island has 3 minutes, 45 seconds; the
Senator from North Carolina has 41/2
minutes remaining. Who yields time?
Mr. PELL. I suggest the absence of a
411110/11/11.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, will the
Chairman withhold?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I believe the distin-
guished Senator from Indiana, Mr.
LUGAR, has a couple of questions, after
which I shall address the unusual and
bemusing comments made by the Sen-
ator from California and others who
must now realize that their position of
yesterday, had then, and does not now
have majority support.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank you very much.
I have two questions, Mr. President.
With regard to paragraph A in the
declaration, is it to be understood that
the phrase "general equivalence"
should be construed to mean that a
strategic arms treaty need not require
identical force structures?
Mr. HELMS. I say to the Senator
that is absolutely correct.,
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator.
With regard to paragraph (g) in this
declaration is it understood that this ?
paragraph has no application to sepa-
rate policy decisions of the President?
For example, the President will not be
precluded from using existing author-
ity to reduce or increase arms for rea-
sons other than complying with the
terms of a framework agreement?
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is correct.
There is a separation. It would not
have clear sense otherwise. I say the
Senator is correct.
Mr. LUGAR. If I may have the in-
dulgence of the Senator for a few sec-
onds, let me respond to a question
raised as to how we came to this decla-
ration, that in a general meeting of
leadership Senator HELMS indicated a
very strong interest which members of
that leadership group share. As one
who sat around the table with the dis-
tinguished Senator, we pledged to
work with him on that repatriation.
There was no pledge. It is specific
wording. There certainly was a 'good-
faith intent on the part of all parties. I
am pleased to support the declaration
the Senator has brought forward.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
. Mr. PELL. Mr. President, how much
time do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 3 minutes and 40 seconds.
Mr. PELL. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator from New Jersey.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, let
me compliment all Members who have
been a part of this negotiation. This is
a dramatically different amendment
than the one that was moved to be
tabled last night. I think that has
changed in the way that all parties
can accept. I want to thank all Sena-
tors for taking those steps. I believe if
it passes, the President will not be
shackled in his discussions with Mr.
Gorbachev at the summit. And I
thank all Senators for their persist-
ence. I hope we will accept this amend-
ment.
I thank the distinguished Senator
from North Carolina for making the
modifications.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island has 2 min-
utes 40 seconds remaining. The Sena-
tor from North Carolina has 2 minutes
48 seconds remaining.
Mr. PELL. I am prepared to yield
back my time.
Mr. HELMS. I am not quite, I say to
my friend, because in facing defeat of
their position, it appears to me that
some Senators, who had no part in
writing this declaration are trying to
rewrite it now with rhetoric rather
than with binding terms.
In fact, Mr. President, as I listened
to some of the earlier comments I
wondered if the Senators who are talk-
ing about this declaration being wa-
tered down had read it. I am satisfied
with it. I would have liked one particu-
lar section to be a little bit stronger,
but in any case I certainly? appreciate
the support of my distinguished col-
leagues from California, Tennessee,
and other States?although in some
cases I must say that in candor that I
am somewhat baffled by it.
I thank the distinguished majority
leader, the distinguished minority
leader; and the distinguished assistant
minority leader for cosponsoring this
amendment. I have no pride of author-
ship. We have to start from some-
where. You have to realize that beauty
Is in the eye of the beholder. I hope
the beholders who attempt through
debate to create an impression that we
have given away the* store on this
matter will at least read it and see
what has been done. They may wish to
change their position based on what I
S 6901
know of the past views. But perhaps
they have had a revelation over night.
At least the legal adviser for the De-
partment of State understands pre-
cisely where this amendment is
coming from and what it accom-
plishes. I inserted his letter in the
RECORD at the outset of my remarks
just a few moments ago. He said:
DEAR SENATOR HELMS: The Declaration
you have proposed states principles and con-
siderations by which the present Adminis-
tration and future Administrations would
have a duty to be guided, since it' would be
adopted as a valid condition and would con-
stitute the basis on which the Senate grants
its advice and consent.
This undertaking does not constitute a
legal precedent for other purposes, or for
any other declaration.
Of course I did not intend that it
would affect other declarations._ It is
this declaration which must be clearly
binding. It is signed Abraham Sofaer,
legal adviser to the State Department.
This declaration sets forth the posi-
tion of the United States of America?
not the Senate?but the entire Nation
with respect to any potential strategic
arms limitation treaty, or any other
arms treaty. It is a binding declaration
of instructions to this and all?all?
future Presidents on the need for full
coordination with this Senate, for due
regard for the advice of the Senate
during negotiations?and for consulta-
tions with our NATO allies. I referred
earlier to the letter from the adminis-
tration. So I will not repeat that. The
declaration places the Senate where
the framers of the Constitution in-
tended it to be: squarely in the middle -
of treaty negotiations through advice
to the President based on coordination
of information from and to him. It
gets the Senate back where it was
meant to be: at the takeoff and not
just the landing.
As I said, I have discussed this
matter with the Chief of Stan' at the
White House, the former majority
leader of the Senate, Mr. Baker, this
morning, and Mr. Culvahouse, legal
counsel at the White House. I am per-
fectly satisfied that this amendment
accomplishes precisely what I wanted
to do. I am particularly satisfied that
it eliminates the concept that asserted
concepts of international custom can
suspersede the Constitution.
I regret the suggestion that we had
to back down or that it was watered
down. It is particularly peculiar in
that neither those making the sugges-
tions nor their staffs had any part
whatsoever in the strengthening revi-
sions' made in discussions with the ad-
ministration. In any case, I am delight-
ed to have the support of all Members
on the matter, even those whose posi-
tion was defeated yesterday and who
now seek to claim victory while in the
awaiting jaws of their defeat.
I yield back the remainder of my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island has 2%
minutes.
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S 6902 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I point out
that the administration, which op-
posed the amendment originally of-
fered by Senator HELMS, is now in sup-
port of it. I congratulate Senator
HELMS and the administration.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I re-
claim some of my time.
They agree with us now. We sat
around the table about 4 or 5 hours. I
would state to the Senator that the
extent of disagreement was not signifi-
cant?nor particularly substantive?
but that the wordsmithing was ardu-
ous because all recognized that we
were creating in perpetuity binding ob-
ligations.
I say again that this amendment ac-
complishes what I set out to accom-
plish, that it does so in very precise
fashion, and that I am delighted that
we have such a clear understanding
with the executive about its legal duty
to observe its requirements and to im-
plement its provisions completely and
faithfully.
I suggest that the news media read
the amendment and see what they
think of it, rather than accept the sug-
gestion that it was watered down. It
speaks for itself and does not need the
gratuitous characterizations of those
who now?I suspect with great but su-
pressed reluctance?now profess sup-
port.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment. On this question, the yeas and
nays have been ordered, and the clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Delaware [Mr.
BIDEN], is absent due to illness.
I also announce that the Senator
from Ohio [Mr. GLENN], is absent be-
cause of death in the family.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber who desire to vote?
The result was announced?yeas 94,
nays 4, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 165 Ex.]
YEAS-94
Adams Exon McConnell
Armstrong Ford Melcher
Baucus Fowler Metzenbaum
Bentsen Garn Mikulski
Bingaman Gore Mitchell
Bond Graham Moynihan
Boren Gramm Murkowski
Boschwitz GraESley Nickles
Bradley Harkin Nunn '
Breaux Hatch Packwood
Burdick Hecht Pell
Byrd Heflin Pressler
Chafee Heinz Proxmire
Chiles Helms Pryor
Cochran Humphrey Quayle
Cohen Inouye . Reid
Conrad Karnes Riegle
Cranston Kassebaum Rockefeller
D'Amato Kasten Roth
Danforth Kennedy Rudman
Daschle Kerry Sanford
DeConcini Lautenberg Sarbanes
Dixon Leahy Sasser
Dodd Levin Shelby
Dole Lugar Simon
Domenic! Matsunaga Simpson
Durenberger McCain Specter
Evans McClure Stafford
Stennis Trible
Stevens Wallop
Symms Warner
Thurmond Weicker
? Wilson
Wirth
NAYS-4
Bumpers Hollings
Hatfield Johnston
NOT VOTING-2
Biden Glenn
So the amendment (No. 2317), as
modified, was agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HELMS. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
. AMENDMENT NO. 2330
(Purpose: To provide for the phased with-
drawal of the dependents of all United
States military personnel stationed in
Europe during the first 29 months after
the entry into force of the Treaty, to pro-
vide that all military personnel who shall,
after the entry into force of the Treaty,
be newly assigned to duty on the conti-
nent of Europe be so assigned for any tour
of duty in excess of 12 months and that
such tour shall be unaccompanied, and to
provide for the phased withdrawal of all
United States military personnel from the
continent of Europe beginning after the
completion of the withdrawal of depend-
ents and ending not later than the third
year after the entry into force of this
Treaty)
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask
that it be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator form North Carolina [Mr.
Timms] proposes an amendment numbered
2330.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further read-
ing of the amendment be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. ?
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion, insert the following before the period:
provided further, however that the fol-
lowing text shall be included in any instru-
ments of ratification exchanged between
the parties:
"DECLARATION. It IS the policy of the United
States that:
"1. By the end of the first phase, that is,
no later than 29 months after entry into
force of this Treaty, all dependents of all
United States military personnel on the con-
tinent of Europe shall have been withdrawn
from that continent pursuant to such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Congress of the United States;
"2. After the entry into force of this
Treaty, no United States military personnel
(exclusive of such personnel not in excess of
1,000 as may be assigned to diplomatic mis-
sions) shall be newly assigned to duty on the
continent of Europe for any tour of duty in
excess of 12 months and having served such
tour shall not thereafter be reassigned to
that continent except in case of war de-
clared by the Congress of the United States;
provided, further, that no tour of duty lim-
ited in duration by this subparagraph shall
ben tour accompanied by dependents; and
May 27, 1988
"3. By the end of the second phase, that
is, no later than three years after entry into
force of this Treaty, all United States mili-
tary personnel (exclusive of such personnel
not in excess of 1,000 as may be assigned to
diplomatic missions) shall have been with-
drawn from the continent of Europe pursu-
ant to such rules and regulations as the
Congress of the United States may prescribe
for such purpose; provided, further, that
thereafter, subject to the exclusion herein-
before specified, no United States military
personnel shall be stationed on the conti-
nent of Europe except after a declaration of
war by the Congress of the United States
expressly so providing."
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, it is im-
portant to look at the INF Treaty
from the standpoint of Soviet strate-
gy. When we are trying to predict
Soviet behavior, including compliance
with the INF Treaty, we have to try to
recreate in our minds the motivating
factors that underlie Soviet military
structures and deployments.
I have heard it said, over and over
again on this floor, that there is little
military significance to this treaty. It
has been stated that the original
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 didn't
make much sense from a military
standpoint?that, indeed, these de-
ployments were only intended to have
a political impact. It has been said
that this treaty cannot create a mili-
tary threat because it only removes 3
percent, or some say 5 percent of the
warheads in Europe. It has been re-
peated, almost like a ritual incanta-
tion, that NATO forces in Europe will
still have 4,000 nuclear warheads left
as a presumed deterrent against Soviet
forces.
The Senator from North Carolina
has listened to these statements with
growing amazement. It is almost a self-
evident fact that massive military de-
ployments do indeed have important
military significance; they give. such
overwhelming military power that no
conventional military force could hope
- to withstand them?and that in turn
results in massive intimidation.
Most of the 4,000 nuclear warheads
In Europe are of types that were there
at the time of the deployment of the
SS-20's, and their lack of deterrent ca-
pability was the reason NATO agreed
to deploy the Pershing 11's. Most of
those so-called warheads are on zero-
range or short-range weapons useful
on a battlefield, but not capable of
threatening retaliation against com-
mand and control centers in the Soviet
Union. General Rogers, former com-
mander of NATO, has given positive
testimony that these warheads are not
capable of deterrence.
There are only two good reasons to
sign any arms control treaty. First, to
reduce the risk of war. Second, to en-
hance the security of our country.
Tragically, the INF treaty accom-
plishes neither purpose.
The Soviets enjoy a decisive 5-to-1
margin of superiority over our forces
In Europe, on the basis of their
strength in chemical and conventional
warfare forces. As Winston Churchill
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
has reminded us, "Strength helps pre-
vent war. Weakness invites aggres-
sion."
The danger of war is enhanced if the
totalitarians in the Kremlin see an op-
portunity to dominate Western
Europe at minimal military risk. With
the removal and destruction of our
Pershing- II missiles, we will surrender
our ability to retaliate effectively
against Soviet aggression. We will no
longer be able to hold at risk 21/2 mil-
lion Communist troops, 40,000 Com-
munist tanks, and 6,000 Communist
fighter aircraft.
With the elimination of our nonnu-
clear ground-launced cruised missiles,
we will no longer be able to disrupt
Soviet supply lines as a way of neutral-
izing the enemy's "blitzkrieg" strate-
gy.
Warsaw Pact supply routes in East-
ern Europe contain thousands of
choke- points, most or all of which
could be disrupted with nonnuclear
cruise missiles. Without those supply
routes, Communist-bloc forces simply
would be stranded in the field.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies al-
ready have created the basic struc-
ture?bridges, roads, storage depots,
airfields, and fuel supplies?necessary
to mount a European invasion.
Mr. President, why has the Soviet
Union arid the Warsaw Pact created
such a tremendous force structure in
Eastern Europe? Why have they built
the infrastructure for an invasion of
the West when the West has never
shown the slightest inclination to pre-
pare for an invasion of the East?
Mr. President, the Soviet Union has
made these massive deployments be-
cause, from the Soviet standpoint,
they follow eminent strategic and mili-
tary logic. We must remember that
the Soviet Union has always consid-
ered an invasion from Europe. to be a
strong threat to its national security,
from the time of Napoleon's campaign.
In the United States, we look upon
strategic threats as threats which
could deal an overwhelming blow to
the American homeland. In our view,
these could come only from the Soviet
Union, so we have a tendency to in-
clude only intercontinental striking
forces as "strategic."
But the Soviets look at it differently.
Any strike, from whatever place of
origin, is considered strategic when it
Is capable of striking deep within the
Soviet Union. A prime object of their
strategy, therefore, has always been to
protect a- a Inst an attack coming from
Europe. There has been an inbred as-
sumption in Soviet thinking that. the
Soviet Union cannot rest easy until all-
the countries of Europe are "peace-
loving"?that is, governed by Commu-
nist governments controlled by the
Soviet Union. The key aim, therefore,
is to nullify any military power in
Western Europe capable of striking
the Soviet Union, destabilize, existing
governments, and replace them. with
_governments friendly toward commu-
nism.
Mr. President, the INF Treaty helps
the Soviets to accomplish the objec-
tive of nullifying Western military
power in Western Europe. The remov-
al of the Pershing II's cuts the heart
out of any deterrent to Soviet inva-
sion. The Senate has received testimo-
ny that NATO could fight for less
than a week against the massive
Soviet/Warsaw pact military deploy-
ment. Moreover, the INF Treaty does-
not remove the Soviet nuclear threat
against Western 'Europe. Testimony
received by the Foreign Relations
Committee showed clearly that the
Soviets can remove the SS-20 delivery
vehicles from the warheads, and bolt-
new SS-25 delivery vehicles onto the
old warheads. We heard talk about all
the declarations about warheads being
destroyed. Finally that misrepresenta-
tion, was abolished. In short, the INF
Treaty gives the Soviets a way to
modernize their won nuclear weapons,
while eliminating the NATO nuclear
capability completely.
Thus Soviet armies can move into
Europe and take it over in a few days,
and NATO has no way to stop them.
Moreover, the inherent threat provid-
ed by this Soviet capability is enough
to demoralize and destabilize Western
politics, inducing gradual accommoda-
tion and "cooperation" with Russia.
Moreover, the INF Treaty will deliv-
er over 600,000 U.S. hostages into the
power of the Soviet Union. Today, in
1988, 325,000 American military per-
sonnel and 300,000 of their dependents
are on the frontiers of freedom in
West Germany. Today, these men and
women have a clearly defined mis-
sion?to deter and, if necessary, to
defeat a Soviet-initiated attack on
Western Europe. In 3 years, however,
if the INF Treaty is ratified, those
625,000 American will have replaced
our missiles as the main barrier to
Soviet intimidation and aggression.
Instead of using Pershing II's and
GLCM's to ward off a Soviet attack,
our .soldiers and their dependents will
be standing, completedly exposed, in
the breach. Our troops are good, but
their equipment is no match for the
Soviet/Warsaw pact armies backed up
with SS-25's and other nuclear weap-
ons.
Twice in this century out troops
have been sent to fight "no-win" war,
in Korea and in Vietnam. In both
places, our Government's goal was not
victory, but stalemate. Tens of thou-
sands a our sons were sacrificed for
the sake of State Department theories
and diplomatic negotiations. Now in
Western Europe we are once again
about to sacrifice our children on the
altar of arms control, detente, and so-
called "limited war" theories.
Despite an unbroken record of
Soviet cheating on every treaty we
have ever signed with the Soviet
Union, the Senate, undoubtedly, in
just a few minutes, will entrust the
lives of our young people and the secu-
rity of our country to yet another
treaty.
S 6903
I believe it would be unconscionable
to leave our young people as hostages
In Europe, knowing full well that if
war breaks out?and I am tempted to-
say "when," instead of "if"?that
there is nothing the United States can
do or will do?knowing that the Euro-
peans will do scarcely anything more
themselves, as has been the case in the
past couple of decades, to provide- for
their own defense.
Specifically, this amendment pro-
vides for the phased withdrawal of the
dependents of all United States mili-
tary personnel stationed in Europe
during the first 29 months after the.
entry into force of the treaty, to pro-
vide that all military p.?onnelr who
shall, after the entry into force of the
treaty, be newly assigned to duty on
the continent of Europe be so assigned
for any tour of duty in excess of 12
months and that such tour shall be
unaccompanied, and to provide for the
phased withdrawal of all U.S. military
personnel from the continent of'
Europe beginning after the completion
of the withdrawal of dependents and
ending not later than the third year
'after the entry into force of this
Treaty.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Europe is inherent in the meaning of
the INF Treaty. If we are voluntarily
removing the only deterrent to Soviet
aggression in Europe, we will be leav-
ing our young men and women com-
pletely exposed to that same Soviet
aggression. U.S. forces in Europe
cannot hope to hold back a Soviet
attack when the deterrent weapons to
back them up have been removed.
The amendment I am proposing
therefore provides for the phased
withdrawal of U.S. troops and their
dependents in conjunction with the-
withdrawal of our Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missile force
as scheduled in the INF Treaty.
Specifically, it provides that by the
end of the first phase of missile with-
drawals-29 months after entry into
force?all dependents of the all Ameri-
can military personnel shall have been
withdrawn from Europe.
In addition, it provides that by the
end of the second, and final phase of
missile withdrawals-3 years after
entry into force?all American mili-
tary personnel, except those necessary
for protection of diplomatic missions,
shall have been withdrawn from
Europe.
Therefore, by the time that all of
our missiles have been withdrawn, so-
will all of our troops and dependents.
This is a minimum step that we can
pass for the safety of these young men
and women.
One final note, and I do not think
many Americans are aware of this
even yet. It costs the American tax-
payers $447 million every day to
defend Europe. I think it is high time
that Europe defend itself and pay for
It, certainly under the circumstances,
when there is a great possibility and-
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S 6904 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
probability that these young people,
our fighting personnel, will be left
hostage to that superior onslaught of
conventional forces by the Soviet
Union. ?
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. BUMPERS. Parliamentary in-
quiry. Who controls the time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island controls
the time in opposition to the amend-
ment.
Mr. BUMPERS. Will the Senator
from Rhode Island yield me 2 min-
utes?
Mr. PELL. I have a summation state-
ment here. Let me speak for a minute.
if I may.
Mr. President, I just wanted to tell
my colleagues that I received a letter
from JOE BIDER, who wants his thanks
to go to all of those who supported
him and helped him in the effective
advocacy of his original matter and
said that he hoped to be back joining
us before long.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the letter to me from Sena-
tor BIDER be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, May 27, 1988.
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR CLAIBORNE: I would be very grateful
if you could take just a moment of the Sen-
ate's time to express my regard for those
Senators who worked so ably to uphold the
condition on treaty interpretation adopted
by the Foreign Relations Conunittee. I was
proud of the Senate's action yesterday?not
in expanding its power but in upholding the
balance of power on which our Constitu-
tional government depends.
I was particularly gratified by the effec-
tive advocacy of Senators Sarbanes, Nunn,
Dodd, Levin, Cranston, and Kerry in sup-
port of the Majority Leader, without whose
clear priorities and determination this cru-
cial result would not have been obtained. I
would also add a word of praise to Senator
Cohen, whose integrity is a special asset for
the Senate.
With -the Senate's share of the Treaty
Power now reaffirmed, I look forward to re-
turning soon to work with my colleagues on
the thorough review of the War Power that
the Foreign Relations Committee will now
commence.
Sincerely,
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr..
U.S. Senator.
Mr. BUMPERS. Will the Senator
yield me 2 minutes?
Mr. PELL. There are only 2 minutes
remaining.
Mr. BUMPERS. One minute?
Mr. PELL. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I
want to say that the Senator from
North Carolina is onto a really serious
problem. His amendment is entirely
too precipitous to be taken seriously
when you talk about withdrawing
troops from Western Europe.
But, just for the edification of this
body, the United States spends twice
as much per capita to defend Western
Europe as any other nation. As a
matter of fact, it is the Scandinavian
nations who make the biggest personal
sacrifice for defense.
Paul Kennedy, in his book called
"The Rise and Decline of a Great
Power," says very simply that if we
continue to spend 7 percent of our
gross national product per year, which
we are doing, to defend countries like
Japan, who spend 1 percent of theirs,
we are going to remain in decline.
The Soviet Union is spending some-
where between 15 and 25 percent and
they are in a much greater state of de-
cline than we are for the same reason.
So I want to say to the Senator from
North Carolina that I will not support
-his amendment because, as I say, I
think it ought to be negotiated and
done in a timely way. But what he is
trying to do is right on target. The
United States has been a patsy entire-
ly too long.
It is their defense, it is their coun-
tries, and we are spending twice as
much, making twice as big a sacrifice
as they are.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. I thank the Senator
from Rhode Island for yielding.
Mr. PELL. I yield back the remain-
der of my time.
-The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time for the opponents has been yield-
ed back.
Mr. HELMS. Do I have time remain-
ing?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 3 minutes and 21 seconds
remaining.
Mr. HELMS. I yield such time as the
Senator from Texas may require.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I will
be brief. I did not know we were in de-
cline. We have created, since 1982,
more jobs than all of trading partners
combined. If that is in decline, I lAppe
It continues and I hope it spreads to
Texas.
I yield back the remainder of my
time.
Mr. BUMPERS. Will the Senator
yield 10 seconds?
I just want to say, you let me write a
$200 billion check to you and I will
show you a good time, too, Senator.
Mr. HELMS. I yield back the re-
mainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from North Caro-
lina (Mr. HELms].
The amendment (No. 2330) was re-
jected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order the Senate will now
vote on the question on the adoption
of the Resolution of Ratification of
Calendar No. 9, treaty document No.
100-11.
The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask to
proceed for 30 seconds.
May 27, 1,988
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that all Senators
may submit their statements for the
RECORD until 5 o'clock p.m. today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it.is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this will
probably not be the last rollcall vote
today. So stick around.
INF: A FLAWED TREATY THAT WILL WEAKEN
EUROPE'S DEFENSE
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President,
today's vote on the INF Treaty is an
act of retreat. We have begun the
march back down the hill. Seven years
ago we and our NATO allies charged
up that hill with courage and resolu-
tion. In the face of Brezhnev's crude
attempt at intimidation?his deploy-
ment of SS-20's targeted at Western
Europe?we jointly deployed Pershing
II and cruise missiles in Europe.
Brezhnev's bluster was defeated, and
the NATO alliance stood strong.
However, what the Soviets could not
win through bombast and intimida-
tion, they are winning today through
public relations and finesse. chairman
Gorbachev is attractive, smart, and
savvy?and therefore dangerous. He
seeks hegemony, not through the
sledgehammer of SS-20's, but through
the low-key, insidious influence of
overwhelming conventional superiori-
ty in Europe.
Sixteen years ago, when SALT I was
being negotiated and ratified, the
fervor and fetish of the day was for
"bargaining chips." Today, in the ne-
gotiation and ratification of the INF
Treaty, the fetish is "verification." We
have had some 27 amendments pro-
posed to this treaty, and the over-
whelming majority have focused on
issues of verification. The shame is
that this obsession with verification
has distracted the Senate from the
central issue?the critical flaw?of this
treaty, which is that, though it pur-
ports to be a nuclear arms treaty, it is
also the most significant conventional
arms treaty in history.
For misguided reasons 'related to ver-
ification, the INF Treaty bans conven-
tional ground-launch cruise missiles
(GLCM's], a weapon which could be of
incalculable value in the defense of
Western Europe from Soviet ground
attack. Yet, as we have discovered in
the ratification hearings, this ban was
a unilateral concession by U.S. nego-
tiators. We received no concession in
return. What is more, the impact of
this ban will be strictly to the disad-
vantage of the West. The Soviets have
no GLCM's; they have no need for
GLCM's, because they have already
covered all important West European
military targets with their short-range
missiles permitted by the INF Treaty.
Meanwhile, NATO is sacrificing the
most potent weapon in its convention-
al arsenal, a weapon we have already
deployed and one which the highest
Pentagon advisory boards have identi-
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May 27, 1,988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
lied as critical to the long-term con-
ventional defense of Europe.
Of course, this is all the more ironic
because everyone agrees that the INF
Treaty will make it imperative for
NATO to boost its conventional capa-
bilities; and no weapon is more ideally
suited?in terms of affordability and
military value?than the conventional
GLCM. A NATO, defense premised on,
say, 3,000 conventional GLCM's would
raise the nuclear threshold and bring
real credibility to our defense. What is
more, it would promote cohesion
within NATO, because it would re-
quire a collective alliance 'decision to
launch the GLCM arsenal in response
to a Soviet attack. Instead, with the
elimination of this conventional, all-al-
liance defense based on GLCM's, we
are forced to revert to defense based
on the threat of massive nuclear retal-
iation by the United States. This nu-
clear defense posture excludes the Eu-
ropeans from the decision process?
the United States must act unilateral-
ly. And it is manifestly lacking in
credibility: No one seriously believes
we will let loose a barrage of MX's
from the American Midwest in re-
sponse to a Soviet incursion into West
Berlin.
This is the box we are painted into
by the INF Treaty. It is a giant step
backward. It returns us to a fatalistic,
noncredible reliance on massive nucle-
ar retaliation. It lowers the nuclear
threshold. It denies NATO its best bet
for an effective, credible, conventional
defense.
In our misguided zeal for abstract
verification, we have been distracted
from the crux of this treaty. The INF
Treaty sacrifices NATO's security. I
believe we should reject it.
INF TREATY RATIFICATION
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise
In strong support of the INF Treaty.
President Reagan is to be congratu-
lated for persevering on the so-called
zero option.
Mr. Gorbachev is also to be con-
gratulated for agreeing to a treaty
that calls for the Soviet Union to de-
stroy twice the number of missiles,
carrying four times the number of
warheads with eight times the mega-
tonnage. Can you imagine the uproar
here in the Senate if we were asked to
ratify a treaty which forced the
United States. to give up two or eight
times the power of the Soviet Union?
Fortunately, Mr. Gorbachev has
learned the lesson of the nuclear age:
Nuclear superiority has no meaning.
Nuclear weapons have become our
common enemy. The nuclear arms
race is consuming resources in both
countries that are needed to expand
our economics and to solve our imme-
diate societal problems, including the
environment, crime, drugs, deteriorat-
ing bridges, and cities.
We are bleeding our economies to
expand our nuclear arsenals, increas-
ing the chances of a nuclear holocaust
in the process. What foolishness!
A few hundred nuclear explosions
would destroy either civilization.
Today we each have over 10,000 strate-
tic or long-range nuclear weapons. In
addition, even after the INF nuclear
weapons are removed, we will have
over 4,000 tactical or battlefield nucle-
ar warheads or bombs left in Europe,
and the French and English have over
800 nuclear warheads, twice the
number the United States will remove
under the treaty.
Under these conditions, does it
really make any difference if the Sovi-
ets have to remove 1,600 INF war-
heads while the United States has to
remove only 400? Fortunately, Mr.
Gorbachev recognized that starting
the process of nuclear arms reductions
was much more important than hag-
gling over asymetries in the numbers.
THE PERSHING II
Some treaty detractors have made
the claim that our Pershing II missiles
are much more important than the So-
viet's SS-20. By this line of reasoning,
the Soviets will gain militarily by
giving up 405 of the triple-warhead
SS-20's to remove 120 of our single-
warhead Pershing II's. Frankly, I
would have a hard time explaining to
the Politburo how removing 120 Per-
shing II nuclear warheads justifies
eliminating 1,215 SS-20 warheads.
This argument is based on the claim
that only the Pershing II can threaten
Soviet strategic forces with rapid re-
taliation, whereas the SS-20 targets in
Western Europe can be covered by the
long-range Soviet SS-24's or SS-25's
that are not covered by the INF
Treaty.
In place of our weapons removed by
the. INF Treaty, we could use our stra-
tegic weapons based in the United
States? to aim at the Warsaw Pact tar-
gets, but, according to this reasoning,
we would not risk attack on the United
States to respond to an attack on
Europe ? ? * a plausible supposition.
We could use aircraft to deliver an
estimated 1,700 tactical nuclear
bombs. However, they are slow, and
they would have to fly through Soviet
air defenses.
We could use submarine-based mis-
siles, including the Poseidon subma-
rines assigned to NATO. Each Posei-
don carries 16 missiles with 10 to 14
warheads each; thus each Poseidon
carries more warheads than we have
deployed on all the Pershing II mis-
siles.
But, the detractors say, the Poseidon
does not have the accuracy to destroy
Soviet buried silos or command and
control bunkers. These Poseidon war-
heads could, however, attack almost
all other Warsaw Pact military targets
including airfields, ports, radar instal-
lations, supply depots, fuel tank farms,
barracks, antiaircraft installations,
and so forth.
The bottom line, then, is the Per-
shing II serves one purpose and one
purpose only, compared to the other
nuclear retaliatory forces assigned to
Europe: The Pershing II has "prompt,
S 6905
hard-target kill capability." It could
attack Soviet command and control
and underground silos. In a crisis, this
capability would be
destabilizing ? * ? it would give the
Soviets strong incentive to use nuclear
weapons early ? ? ? to use them or
lose them.
Do we really want to give the Soviets
incentive to use nuclear weapons in a
crisis?
Mr. President, it seems to me that
the European nuclear balance will be
much more stable without the Per-
shing II. I argued against deploying
the Pershing II in the first place for
this Very reason. The INF Treaty now
allows us to remove not only this de-
stabilizing weapon, but also all 405 de-
ployed SS-20 missiles as well as all
stored missiles. This is a -bargain we
cannot refuse.
This treaty is clearly in the best in-
terests of the United States and the
Soviet Union. This is not a zero sum
game. We both win.
- In the nuclear age, there is no Amer-
ican security without Soviet security.
There is only common security.
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
- Another argument against this
treaty is that it removes one rung on
the ladder of flexible response. With-
out the INF weapons, so the argument
goes, we would have to escalate quick-
ly from using tactical nuclear weapons
to strategic weapons. This would de-
prive us with one major opportunity
to control and limit a nuclear war.
There are?at least?two major falla-
cies with this supposition: First, that
the Soviets would not be deterred by
4,000 tactical nuclear weapons, by 800
French and English nuclear weapons,
and by 11,000 strategic nuclear weap-
ons, and, second, that, we could control
and limit a nuclear war even with INF
weapons.
Are we to believe that the Soviets
are deterred by 16,200 nuclear war-
heads, but they would not be. deterred
if we only had 15,800 warheads? Did
we not deter nuclear war for 40 years
prior to the introduction of these INF
weapons just 4 or 5 years ago?
We forget that we got along fine for
decades without these INF weapons.
They were installed to counter the SS-
20's, or at least so we were told. Now
that the SS-20's will all be removed,
we have lost our original reason for
the Pershing II and the ground-
launched cruise missiles.
-?k DECOUPLING
Detractors of this INF Treaty also
claim that the United States would be
decoupled from the defense of Europe.
Without the INF weapons, so they
say, the United States would not come
to the aid of our NATO allies in the
remote event that the Soviet Union
should ever attack Western Europe.
Are we to believe that the United
States would not become involved
when we have over 200,000 ground
troops stationed in Central Europe?
Would we do nothing as our young
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? 6906 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
men were directly engaged in this hy-
pothetical battle? This is preposterous.
No one questioned that we would
defend NATO in 1980, before these
few extra INF weapons were placed in
Europe. Why would we behave any
differently now, with the withdraw of
a few percent of our vast nuclear arse-
nals?
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREEZE
Finally, I would like to comment on
claims by some that the success of the
"zero option" proposal, which led to,
this INF Treaty, proves once and for
all that the nuclear weapons freeze
concept is a bad idea. I agree that, in
the case of INF weapons, we did gain a
net reduction in Soviet SS-20 missiles
by introducing our own INF weapons.
However, we should also note that
the United States has no deployed
weapons in the shorter range (500 to
1,000 km), and yet the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev still agreed to
remove all 387 of their existing SS-12
and SS-23 missiles. At least in this
case, we did not need to build up our
weapons to induce the Soviets to elimi-
nate their missiles in this range. We
do have 178 of the old Pershing I mis-
siles stored in Colorado. But even here
the Soviets have many more stored
missiles of the shorter range category:
539.
More importantly, the success of the
INF Treaty in getting the Soviets -to
remove the SS-20's does not automati-
cally extend to the strategic arena.
And, after all, it is the massive strate-
gic nuclear arsenals on both sides that
most threaten the future of our world.
The intermediate range nuclear
weapons form a unique situation: The
Soviets had weapons in this range, and
we did not.
This is not the case with strategic
weapons: We both have massive strate-
gic nuclear arsenals. There is no need
to build more strategic weapons to
convince the Soviets to reduce. We
have plenty of weapons to negotiate,
thanks to 40 years of building these
weapons of mass destruction.
Detractors of the freeze fail to ac-
count for Soviet advances in deployed
strategic forces since 1980. Between
1980 and 1986, the Soviet Union in
fact added 2,500 more strategic nucle-
ar warheads and 885 nuclear bombs or
cruise missiles, or a total of 3,385 more
strategic nuclear weapons. Had we
agreed to a nuclear weapons freeze in
1980, there would be 3,385 fewer stra-
tegic nuclear weapons in the Soviet ar-
senal today.
As a matter of fact, a nuclear weap-
ons freeze in 1980 would have estab-
lished about the same quantity of
Soviet warheads now considered under
the START negotiations: about 6,000
warheads.
In other words, since 1980, the Sovi-
ets have added the very warheads that
would be removed under START,
should the START negotiations suc-
ceed. However, in 1980, the United
States had about 7,000 deployed war-
heads on land-based and submarine-
based missiles. Thus we would have
been in a slightly better position with
a nuclear weapons freeze in 1980 than
with the proposed 6,000 warhead limit
suggested under START.
The INF Treaty requires the Soviets
to remove missiles carrying 1,667 war-
heads. A nuclear weapons freeze in
1980 would have prevented them from
adding 3,385 strategic nuclear weapons
the freeze would have given us a
net gain of 1,718 warheads.
Furthermore, a nuclear weapons
freeze did not and does not preclude
large reductions in nuclear weapons.
In fact, the original freeze declaration
in the 1979-80 time period stated
clearly that the freeze was merely the
first step, to be followed by reductions.
Had we and the Soviets agreed to a
freeze in 1980, then we could have
moved to lower levels yet, starting
from the level of 6,000 warheads in-
stead of today's 10,000 warhead levels.
A nuclear weapons freeze today on
strategic nuclear weapons would still
be in the best interests of the United
States and the world. If we proceed
with current research and develop-
ment of the next generation of nucle-
ar weapons, we will degrade our future
security when the Soviet Union devel-
ops these new weapons, as they always
do.
For example, we are now developing
Earth penetrating warheads, precision
guided maneuvering reentry vehicles,
and weapons designed to track down
and kill mobile targets in the Soviet
Union. These weapons, if developed
and deployed, would degrade our secu-
rity, because they would be used-to de-
stroy Soviet command and control
bunkers and retaliatory missiles. In a
crisis, these new weapons would create
incentive for the Soviets to strike first,
to "use them or lose them." These new
weapons would lower the nuclear
threshold.
We are also experimenting with nu-
clear-pumped directed energy weapons
at the Nevada test site. These weapons
would focus some form of energy such
as x rays or microwaves over long dis-
tances. We would no longer have to
explode a nuclear weapon near its in-
tended target, thereby reducing the
chances of "collateral damage"?
meaning fewer civilians killed. With
reduced collateral damage, future mili-
tary or civilian leaders might be more
inclined to use nuclear weapons. Esca-
lation to nuclear war would be more
likely in the future.
In addition, when the Soviets caught
up to us and developed their own nu-
clear pumped directed energy weap-
ons, our military assets, particularly
those in outer space, would be placed
In grave jeopardy. Ironically, these
third generation weapons would be the
death knell of star wars: Soviet nucle-
ar pumped x rays or microwaves could
destroy our space-based star wars
battlestations.
We can stop the Soviet Union from
developing these dangerous new weap-
ons with a ban on nuclear weapons ex-
May 27, 1988
plosions, a ban on flight tests, a ban
on all weapons in space, and a halt to
the deployment of new weapons?that
is, a nuclear weapons freeze.
That is why Senator HATFIELD and I,
along with eight of our colleagues
have introduced S. 2346, the "Outer
Space Protection Act of 1988," which
calls for a ban on all weapons in space
and the testing of all weapons de-
signed to destroy objects in space, pro-
vided that the Soviet Union also re-
frains from these two activities.
There are no weapons in space
today; 'the space weapons genie is still
in the bottle. We can keep it there. If
you agree that our national security
would be protected by banning all
weapons in outer space, I urge you to
cosponsor S. 2346.
Deep reductions in nuclear weapons
such as those discussed now in the
START negotiations without a freeze
on improvements in technology could
lead to a less stable nuclear environ-
ment. Focusing exclusively on num-
bers of weapons would ignore destabi-
lizing new weapons developments that
threaten our security in the future.
Even if 50 percent reductions were
agreed to in START, returning us to
1980 levels of nuclear weapons, the So-
viets could continue to develop third
generation weapons.
The nuclear weapons freeze on stra-
tegic nuclear weapons was a good idea
In 1980 and remains the best hope to
stop the qualitative, technological
arms race in 1983. Combining a freeze
on qualitative advances in nuclear
weapons with deep reductions in the
quantity of weapons offers the best
hope for an enduring and stable peace.
In conclusion, Mr. President, the
INF Treaty is a small but significant
step toward stopping and reversing the
nuclear arms race. It resumes the mo-
mentum of arms control after 7 years
of nuclear weapon escalation by this
administration. It paves the way for
deep reductions and movement toward
more stable nuclear arsenals, provided
that the next administration backs
away from the quest for nuclear supe-
riority in offensive and defensive
weapons. A freeze on the qualitative
advances in nuclear technology com-
bined with deep reductions in offen-
sive forces would dramatically improve
our common security as we enter the
21st century.
Mr. President, I enthusiastically sup-
port the INF Treaty. This treaty
marks the first time in 16 years that
there has been an overwhelming, bi-
partisan consensus that arms control
Is a necessary and vital part of our na-
tional security.
Now we must continue and expand
the momentum of arms control. The
INF Treaty begins to reduce the
threat of a nuclear holocaust in
Europe. Now we need to reduce the
threat of nuclear war in the United
States by jointly reducing our much
larger strategic nuclear forces.
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
There are those who are counseling
to "go slow." Mr. President, we have
heard these words of caution for over
40 years ? ? ? "Go slow" on arms con-
trol while the arms makers go full
speed ahead. We must reverse the pri-
orities: stop the qualitative arms race
and move full speed ahead with arms
reductions. Otherwise the meager
gains of the INF Treaty will soon be
overcome by new advances in strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons.
The arms control process must con-
tinue and expand in the years ahead.
We have taken but the first step.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, the
Senate has essentially concluded with
its floor consideration on the treaty
between the United? States and the
U.S.S.R. on the elimination of their in-
termediate-range and shorter range
missiles?the INF Treaty. In the 4
months since the treaty was formally
transmitted to this body, the Senate,
acting through its committees, has
been engaged in an extremely produc-
tive review of the treaty, its meaning,
and its implications for the security of
the United States and our allies.
As the vice chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence and a
member of the Committee on Armed
Services, I have had the opportunity
to participate in the deliberations of
those committees on the treaty and re-
lated matters. Both committees held
numerous hearings on treaty-related
matters on which they have special ex-
pertise and issued reports setting forth
their findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations.
As a result of this review, the mean-
ing and the implications of the treaty
are much better understood both by
Members of the Senate and, I believe,
by administration officials. This
review has led me to the conclusion
that the INF Treaty would serve the
security interests of the United States
and our allies. Accordingly, I vigorous-
ly support the Senate giving its advice
and consent to ratification.
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS
From last September to March of
this year, when it submitted its report,
the Intelligence Committee conducted
15 closed hearings and 17 on-the-
record staff briefings on INF monitor-
ing, in addition to many informal staff
briefings. On March 21, the committee
unanimously adopted a report which
addressed not only the immediate in-
telligence issues raised by the treaty,
but also the longer term implications
of the treaty, including its relationship
to further requirements that may be
levied against our intelligence capabili-
ties. The unclassified committee
report, which was included in the
report of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, addresses the issues involved in
the monitoring and verification proc-
ess and describes the role which moni-
toring and verification plays in the
overall assessment of the INF Treaty.
Each of these issues is addressed in
detail in the classified report, which is
available to each of the Members of
the Senate.
The committee's unclassified report,
"The INF Treaty: Monitoring and Ver-
ification Capabilities," noted that
"since no verification and monitoring
regime can be absolutely perfect, a
central focus for the committee has
been to determine whether any possi-
ble infractions would be of sufficient
military significance to constitute a
threat to our national security inter-
ests." The committee found that while
some of the treaty's provisions will be
difficult to monitor, the limited mili-
tary utility, high cost, or operational
difficulties associated ,with potential
cheating scenarios made such cheating
unlikely. The committee noted, howev-
er, that if a START Treaty on long-
range, strategic arms is achieved, the
incentives for and military significance
of Soviet violations of the INF Treaty
would increase. Moreover, the need to
monitor START limits in addition to
the INF limits could strain our intelli-
gence capabilities. For these reasons,
the committee recommended support
for a long-term program to modernize
and improve upon current plans for in-
telligence collection, specifically those
that would be most helpful in verify-
ing a START Treaty.
Last week, the chairman of the In-
telligence Committee, Senator BOREN,
and I had the opportunity to meet
with the President to discuss these
matters. I am pleased to report that
after our meeting, the President issued
a statement that he supports the initi-
ation this year of a multi-year pro-
gram to improve our intelligence capa-
bilities and that he will include fund-
ing for the second year of this pro-
gram in next year's budget. Mr. Presi-
dent, I will ask that the full statement
issued by the President be included in
the RECORD at the end of my state-
ment.
As Senators are aware, subsequent
to the issuance of the Intelligence
Committee's March 21 report, addi-
tional matters arose related to the
treaty. The Intelligence Committee
held a number of additional hearings
and meetings, including a joint meet-
ing with the Foreign Relations and
Armed Services Committee, to address
these additional matters and a report
regarding the so-called futuristic
weapons question was adopted by the
committee earlier this month. I will
summarize these issues in a moment.
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS
As part of its inquiry into treaty-re-
lated matters, the Armed Services
Committee held 29 hearings between
January and March. This included a
review of NATO defense issues and an
extensive article-by-article review of
the treaty text. The latter included 4
days of hearings with the chief U.S.
negotiator of the treaty, Ambassador
Maynard Glitman, to receive detailed
answers to a lengthy list of questions
in order to clarify potential ambigu-
ities in the treaty text.
S 6907
On March 28, the committee adopt-
ed, by a vote of 18 to 2, its report on
"NATO Defense and the INF Treaty."
In its report, the committee identified
15 issues which it believes warranted
particular attention and offered rec-
ommendations on these issues. The
committee's fundamental conclusion
was that, on balance, the positive fea-
tures of the treaty outweikh its weak-
nesses. Moreover, the committee con-
cluded that if the Senate were to
reject the treaty, the adverse political
repercussions in Europe and elsewhere
would be very significant.
"FUTURISTICS" AND THE DEFINITION OF
"WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLE"
Among the 15 issues identified by
the Armed Services Committee was
the question of so-called "futuristic"
weapon systems and, in particular, the
definition of the term "weapon-deliv-
ery vehicle." The article-by-artiole
analysis submitted by the Secretary of
State defines this term as "those types
of ground-launched cruise missiles
that have been ? * * flight tested or
deployed with any type of warhead
device or simulation thereof." As the ?
Armed Services Committee's report
noted, this suggests that the treaty
might not cover ground-launched bal-
listic missiles or ground-launched
cruise missiles that destroyed their
targets through other, perhaps more
futuristic or exotic, means such as
lasers, microwave pulse generators, or
direct impact. The committee recom-
mended "that the Senate insist that
the administration tell it authorita-
tively first, what they think the defini-
tion of weapon-delivery vehicle and
second, whether this definition was
clearly agreed to by the Soviet Union."
The committee also raised the possibil-
ity of the need to adopt an appropri-
ate understanding on this matter.
The committee concluded, and I
fully concurred in this evaluation, that
this issue is critical. The INF Treaty is
intended to last in perpetuity. Accord-
ingly, the treaty must be very clear in
defining what types of future weapons
of INF range will and will not be al-
lowed.
Following close consultations on this
matter among the Senate leadership,
the three committees, and the execu-
tive branch, the United States raised
this matter with the U.S.S.R. On May
12, during the ministerial meeting in
Geneva, Ambassador Kampelman and
Soviet Ambassador Karpov concluded
a diplomatic note on the application of
the treaty to intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles flight-tested or
deployed to carry or be used as weap-
ons based on either current or future
technologies and on the related ques-
tion of the definition of the term
"weapon-delivery vehicle" as used in
the treaty. I believe that this diplo-
matic note represents full agreement
on these very important matters.
INSPECTION PROTOCOL ISSUES
After the three committees issued
their reports, it also became clear that
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S 6908 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
problems had arisen regarding the lin-
_
plementation of the protocol on in-
spections. During the technical discus-
sions between United States and
Soviet representatives on implementa-
tion of the inspection provisions of the
treaty, it became apparent that, in ad-
dition to differences over the details of
implementation, the Soviet side was
seeking to repudiate certain obliga-
tions that are clearly spelled out in
the actual text of the treaty. These
issues included such fundamental mat-
ters as the smallest size objects which
are subject to inspection, where in-
spectors can conduct inspections, the
equipment which will be used in in-
spections, and so on.
Unable to satisfactorily resolve these
problems at the technical level, the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow raised them
with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials.
The Soviet response was delivered by
Ambassador Dubinin on May 8. The
following day, the Intelligence Com-
mittee received a briefing on the ex-
change of views with the Soviets.
Based on that briefing, it was quite
clear that the issues had not been re-
solved.
Accordingly, on May 9, the Senate
leadership decided to postpone consid-
eration of the INF Treaty until these
problems were fully resolved. This de-
cision represented the clear consensus
of the majority and minority leaders,
the leadership of the relevant commit-
tees, including the Intelligence Com-
mittee, and the Reagan administra-
tion.
On May 12, during the ministerial
meeting in Geneva, the two sides also
reached agreement resolving the in-
spection dispute. An agreed minute
was signed by Ambassador Glitman
and Colonel General Chervov on the
tispection matters. The agreed minute
reaffirms those provisions of the
treaty text that the Soviet side was ap-
parently seeking to renounce:- It also
sets forth additional details to ensure
that the implementation of the inspec-
tions is consistent with the intent of
the treaty. Additionally, in the agreed
minute, there is an additional Soviet
assurance that they will n6t send out'
of their Votkinsk facility objects of
certain sizes, and, in that context, we
will not be inspecting such objects
since they will not exist. I am satisfied
that this agreed minute represents full
agreement on the issues involved.
The treaty was brought up only
after we were convinced that the
agreed minute reached at the Geneva
ministerial meeting did, in fact, com-
pletely resolve these matters. In short,
the Senate's consideration, and there-
fore its approval, of this treaty was
made contingent upon the agreed
minute which resolved the inspection
dispute.
CATEGORY In AMENDMENT ON FUTURISTICS AND
INSPECTIONS
Mr. President, I am pleased that,
yesterday, the Senate unanimously
agreed to adopt a category III amend-
ment to the resolution of ratification
offered by Senators NUNN, WARNER,
BOREN, and myself addressing the
status of the diplomatic notes on fu-
turistic weapons and the agreed
minute on inspections. I would note
that the portion of the amendment
crafted by Senators Num./ and
WARNER, the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, addresses the diplo-
matic notes on futuristic weapons and
the definition of the term "weapon-de-
livery vehicle." The portion crafted by
Senator BOREN and me, in our role as
chairman and Vice chairman of the In-
telligence Committee, addresses the
agreed minute regarding on-site in-
spections.
This amendment makes the advice
and consent of the Senate to the rati-
fication of the INF Treaty subject to
the condition that in connection with
the exchange of instruments of ratifi-
cation, the President shall obtain the
agreement of the Soviet Union that
the agreement concluded by the ex-
change of the diplomatic notes and
the agreed minute are of the same
force and effect as the treaty.
Since the Soviets have already
agreed to be bound by the exchange of
the diplomatic notes and the agreed
minute, the Senate was confident that
this reservation would pose no risk to
the treaty's being implemented. The
amendment simply addresses the
status of the agreement reached in the
diplomatic notes and the agreed
minute, it does not alter the content of
that agreement.
With regard to the agreed minute,
this amendment emphasizes the im-
portance the Senate places on both
the inspection issues involved and the
Soviet's abiding in good faith to their
treaty obligations. Moreover, while the
agreed minute may have a legally
binding character, it could appear to
some to be subordinate to the treaty,
in either a legal or political sense. A
category III understanding ensures
that there are no questions that the
agreed minute has the same political
stature and legal force and effect as
the treaty.
From the perspective of domestic
law and the relationship between the
Senate and the Executive, it is also es-
sential to ensure that the agreed
minute is of the same force and effect
as the treaty. An agreed minute can be
terminated or altered by the executive
branch without the advice and consent
of the Senate. Thus, we could conceiv-
ably face the situation in which the
Senate's decision to give advice and
consent to ratification was contingent
upon this agreed minute, only to find
that subsequent to ratification the
agreed minute is altered. A category
III understanding ensures that sub-
stantive? changes could not be made in
the agreed minute without the advice
and consent of the Senate.
Likewise, this amendment ensures
that there will be no question that the
agreement on the critical matters of
futuristic weapons and the definition
May 27, 1988
of the term "weapon-delivery vehicle"
contained in the May 12 exchange of
diplomatic notes is of the same force.
and effect as the treaty. The treaty is
designed to cover certain weapon sys-
tems. It is not designed to cover non-
weapon systems; in fact, I would say
that it is designed to not cover non-
weapon systems. Accordingly, the defi-
nition of such a fundamental term as
"weapon-delivery vehicle" is essential,
as is a clear agreement on the applica-
tion of the treaty to weapons based on
future technologies.
Finally, Mr. President, I would note
that our amendment was amended to
Include the agreements signed on May
21, 1988, in Vienna and Moscow cor-
recting the site diagrams and certain
technical errors in the treaty. Senator
WARNER and I engaged in a colloquy in
which it was made clear that the ac-
ceptance of the second degree amend-
ment was subject to the condition that
future technical changes will not re-
quire the advice and consent of the
Senate, nor will the regular data up-
dates. Senator HELMS joined us in col-
loquy, and I refer my colleagues to
yesterday's RECORD for the complete
text of our colloquy.
NATO SECURITY AND THE INF TREATY
Mr. President, in recent weeks, much
attention has been focussed on these
very complicated and arcane issues of
futuristic weapons and inspection
rights. I believe that "details" such as
these are critical in determining
whether the Treaty will serve our in-
terests, fulfill its purposes, and remain
viable over time. At the same time, Mr.
President, this focus on treaty details
should not overshadow the significant
attention we have accorded to the
broader implications of the Treaty for
the security of the United States,
NATO, and our Asian allies.
As I mentioned earlier, the Armed
Services Committee report was enti-
tled "NATO Defense and the INF
Treaty." The relationship between the
treaty and NATO's security was,
Indeed, the central focus of the com-
mittee's deliberations. 19 of the com-
mittee's 29 hearings on the treaty ex-
plicitly dealt with NATO security
issues, including one meeting with Dr.
Willen van Eekelen, the defense minis-
ter of the Netherlands and chairman
of the Eurogroup Defense Ministers.
In addition to these formal meetings, I
and many members of the committee
held numerous meetings with Europe-
an political and military officials.
The committee examined NATO'S
-present ability to successfully imple-
ment its strategy of flexible response,
including forward defense, and the
impadt the INF Treaty would have on
NATO's ability to do so. Flexible re-
sponse requires that NATO have suffi-
cient forces to respond to any level of
aggression and a full spectrum of
forces?conventional, theater nuclear,
and strategic nuclear?so that it can
counter any act of aggression with an
appropriate response. In our view,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6909
there are serious deficiencies in
NATO's ability to implement its strat-
egy.
Of particular concern is the failure
of NATO to develop an adequate con-
ventional force posture. Not only has
the alliance permitted the nuclear
threshold to remain unacceptably
low, conventional deficiencies call into
question whether NATO's convention-
al defense forces would hold out long
enough to enable political authorities
to make a carefully deliberated deci-
sion to turn to a nuclear response to
aggression.
There is also concern regarding our
theater nuclear force posture. Over
the last decade, there has been a sig-
nificant increase in Soviet theater nu-
clear forces. During the same period,
NATO has decided to retire some 2,400
older theater nuclear weapons in con-
junction with a commitment to pursue
theater nuclear modernization. I be-
lieve it is very important ?that we
adhere to this commitment. In doing
so, I believe that we can address cer-
tain concerns expressed by European,
particularly German, officials. In this
regard, of particular importance is
proceeding with a tactical air-to-sur-
face missile which can reach beyond
German territory and is compatible
with both United States and allied air-
craft.
I would urge my colleagues to take
the time to read the Armed Services
Committee's evaluation of NATO's de-
fense posture and how it will be affect-
ed by the INF Treaty.
As I indicated earlier, I have had the
opportunity to discuss these issues
with a number of European officials.
The large majority of them expressed
support for the INF Treaty. At the
same time, many had concerns about
what 'would follow once the treaty is
in place. Such concerns involved the
relative priority among future arms
control efforts, modernization of re-
maining theater nuclear forces, the vi-
ability of and U.S. commitment to ex-
tended deterrence, and efforts to en-
hance NATO's conventional deterrent.
Such concerns were particularly pro-
nounced among West Germans. .
An articulate expression of such con-
cerns was made by Dr. Alfred Dregger
in a recent speech in Washington,
which I will ask be inserted in the
RECORD at the end of my statement.
Dr. Dregger is the chairman of the
ruling party parliamentary group in
the Bundestag of the Federal Republic
of Germany. I should point out that I
disagree with Dr. Dregger on many
counts, both in terms of fact and judg-
ment. However, I believe it is critical
that we understand views that are
commonly held in allied countries. Dr.
Dregger's speech is representative of a
perspective which I have heard repeat-
edly from a number of German offi-
cials, and I would commend it to my
colleagues' attention.
Among the concerns frequently ex-
pressed are that the strategic unity of
Alliance territory from North America
to the Federal Republic of German is
being called into question; that the
credibility of extended deterrence is
rapidly weakening; that the elimina-
tion of ground-launched INF missiles
will leave the alliance with no interme-
diate-range nuclear forces, opening a
gap in the spectrum of deterrent
forces and making German territory
uniquely exposed to nuclear weapons;
that the intermediate-range nuclear
forces that do, in fact, remain might
be negotiated away.
These concerns, sincerely held by
many responsible individuals in Ger-
many and even some in this country,
have been extensively examined by
the Armed Services and Foreign Rela-
tions committees and individual Sena-
tors. I understand the origins of such
concerns and, frankly, must acknowl-
edge that the sometimes imprudent
actions by officials in the United
States have contributed to these con-
cerns.
Perhaps the single event which best
captures the complexities and contra-
dictions displayed in the Reagan years
was the summit in Reykjavik, where
the President seemed prepared to give
up all ballistic missiles, and possibly
even all nuclear weapons. The admin-
istration was accused of, at best, plac-
ing higher priority on public relations
than on policy and, at worst, of funda-
mentally misunderstanding the role of
nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.
Those concerns were, in my view, justi-
fied. And while the administration has
largely recanted, some in Europe con-
tinue to have gnawing doubts.
More recently, a January 1988
report entitled "Discriminate Deter-
rence," authored by former Under Sec-
retary of Defense Ikle and other
prominent individuals, was read by
some as suggesting that the American
nuclear umbrella might no longer
cover Western Europe. This exacerbat-
ed the concern raised by the INF
Treaty, itself, that the removal of U.S.
Pershing II and ground-launched
cruise missiles would lead to the de-
coupling of the U.S. strategic deter-
rent from the defense of Europe.
Given the emphasis on the need to
strengthen this coupling that accom-
panied the INF deployment decision,
this concern is understandable. But
the response to dual-track decision in-
dicates that this original rationale was
given more credence by its authors
than by the two audiences at which it
was primarily aimed.
First, large minorities of Western
European publics quickly came to the
conclusion that far from strengthen-
ing coupling, the INF deployments
were in fact decoupling. According to
this view, the INF deployments were
foisted by the United States on
Europe so as to allow the United
States to fight a nuclear war in
Europe while American soil remained
a sanctuary. As Senator Nun and
many others have noted, when we
deploy many Europeans cry "decou-
pling" and when we withdraw many
Europeans cry "decoupling."
Equally important, the Soviet reac-
ton was to clearly state that any
United States nuclear weapon landing
on Soviet soil would be considered a
"strategic weapon" regardless of its
launching point, and that retaliation
would be directed at United States
soil. Perhaps this was mere propagan-
da, but I think that our German
friends would be the first to say that
differentiating between "strategic"
and "tactical" nuclear we'apons means
little when the explosions are occur-
ring on one's homeland. Thus, one
could argue that the INF missiles were
perfectly coupling?but that raises the
question of whether they were really
essential in the first place if, in Soviet
eyes, they were no difference from
strategic missiles. If that were the
case, the credibility of using INF mis-
siles would be little more than the
credibility of using strategic missiles.
There are no simple or clearcut an-
swers to such questions. Perhaps the
INF missiles enhanced coupling some-
what, and their removal will reduce
coupling somewhat. However, as
former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger noted in his testimony to
the Armed Services and Foreign Rela-
tions Committees, it is European paro-
chialism to believe that the Soviet
Union has been deterred primarily by
a relative handful of weapons based in
Europe, none of which were deployed
before December 1983. I would note
that former Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown expressed essentially
the same opinion in his testimony.
There are also concerns about
German "singularization." While I ap-
preciate these concerns and under-
stand their origin, I find them exag-
gerated. Air- and sea-based intermedi-
ate-range forces remain. Moreover, as
I already indicated, the alliance's ex-
isting commitment to modernization,
particularly with the tactical air-to-
surface missile, can ameliorate such
concerns. And, of course, other alli-
ance nations that remain targeted by
Soviet nuclear weapons, including tac-
tical nuclear weapons, find it difficult
to accept that Germany has been sin-
gled out.
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
Mr. President, in considering this
treaty, the Senate has also addressed
the Senate's role in treatymaking and
how treaties are to be interpreted. We
were forced to address this, of course,
because the administration has put
forth a novel and disturbing theory of
treaty interpretation in its effort to
shed some of the constraints of the
ABM Treaty.
Under this theory set forth by the
State Department's legal adviser,
Abraham Sofaer, the executive branch
is not bound by its explanation of a
treaty to the Senate unless the Senate
satisfies a set of criteria arbitrarily de-
fined by Mr. Sofaer. These arbitrary
criteria are, not surprisingly, of such a
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S 6910 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 27, 1988
nature that the Senate, as a practical
matter, would rarely meet them and
an effort to do so would result in virtu-
al paralysis of the treatymaking proc-
ess. In a vote earlier today, the Senate
rejected these criteria by a .vote of 60
to 30.
The Foreign Relations Committee in
its consideration of the INF Treaty at-
tached a condition to the resolution of
ratification to reaffirm the constitu-
tional role of the Senate in treatymak-
ing. This condition was altered by an
amendment offered by Senator BYRD
which contained a provision I suggest-
ed in an effort to promote bipartisan
consensus. I am pleased that we were
successful in achieving such consensus
and that the Senate approved this
condition on a vote of 72 to 27.
The condition approved by the
Senate states that the Senate's advice
and consent to ratification of the INF
Treaty is subject to the condition,
based on the treaty clauses of the Con-
stitution, that the United States shall
interpret the treaty in accordance
with the common understanding
shared by the President and the
Senate at the time the Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification.
The condition states that such
common understanding is based on,
first, the text of the treaty and the
provisions of this resolution of ratifi-
cation; and, second, the authoritative
representations which were provided
by the President and his representa-
tives to the Senate and its committees,
in seeking Senate consent to ratifica-
tion, insofar as such representations
were directed to the meaning and legal
effect of the text of the treaty.
The condition also states that the
United States shall not agree to or
adopt an interpretation different from
that common understanding except
pursuant to Senate advice and consent
to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or
the enactment of a statute.
Finally, in the provision which I sug-
gested in order to address the concerns
of some Senators, the condition states
that if, subsequent to ratification of
the treaty, a -question arises as to the
interpretation of a provision of the
treaty on which no common under-
standing was reached in accordance
with the above, that provision shall be
interpreted in accordance with appli-
cable U.S. law.
Mr. President, I would note that the
condition does not question the au-
thority of the President to interpret
treaties. Rather, it prevents him from
reinterpreting them. Without such a
bar on Presidential reinterpretation,
the Senate's role in treatymaking
would be essentially nullified. This
condition reaffirms that when a
common understanding has been
reached between the Senate and the
executive, that is binding. If the same
administration or a future administra-
tion wants to alter that common un-
derstanding, it is 'required to come
back to the Senate and seek the Sen-
ate's advice and consent.
Finally, Mr. President, I would note
that this condition does not directly
address the ABM Treaty. In my view,
this condition ought to allow some op-
portunity for those who disagree with
the so-called narrow interpretation of
the ABM Treaty to fight that battle at
another time.
CONCLUSION
Mr. President, the Senate's review of
the INF Treaty has been thorciugh,
perhaps more thorough than the
review of any comparable treaty in the
Senate's history. The 4 months which
has been required to conduct this
review has been a very valuable and
productive investment of time which
has served the interests of the Senate
and the United States well. I would
argue that the treaty to which the
Senate will give its advice and consent
to ratification is a better treaty than
that which was submitted to the
Senate in January.
Mr. President, as other Senators
have correctly noted, our objective has
been to deal with this treaty responsi-
bly, not to meet a deadline. At the
same time, I am pleased that we have
been able to conclude our consider-
ation in a responsible manner in time
to allow the President to exchange the
instruments of ratification with Gen-
eral Secretary Gorbachev during the
Moscow summit, thus bringing the
INF Treaty into force.
?Once again, Mr. President, let me ex-
press my strongly held view that this
treaty will serve the security interests
of the United States and our allies. Ac-
cordingly, I urge my colleagues to sup-
port it.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the statement of President
Reagan and the remarks of Dr. Dreg-
ger, to which I referred, be printed in
the RECORD.
There-being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
I strongly support bipartisan efforts by
the Senate Committees on Intelligence and
Arrood Services to work with the Adminis-
tration to modernize and upgrade our intel-
ligence capabilities. It is important as we
work toward future arms reduction agree-
ments that our country have all of the
means necessary to assure compliance with
these agreements. With or without future
arms control agreements, it is important for
our national security interests that we keep
pace with changes in technologies in other
nations. For that reason, I welcome biparti-
san support to start this year on a multi-
year program to improve these systems. I
will-also include funding for the second year
of this program in the final budget which I
submit to the Congress, and I will urge the
next administration to assure continuity of
this vital effort. After 1989, the funding for
the program should be additive to the 2-per-
cent real growth objective for national secu-
rity spending.
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: CONSEQUENCES FOR
THE ALLIANCE?PERSPECTIVES FOR GERMANY
AND EUROPE
(Address by Dr. Alfred Dregger)
INTRODUCTION
Since 1945 the hegemony of the East is
present already in peacetime?if that is how
we want to describe Europe's existing
state?in the middle of Germany. Its pres-
sure is directed straight at Western Europe.
This is an unprecedented situation in histo-
rY.
1. In an east-westerly direction our coun-
try is only 250 km deep. In its north-south
direction, however, it encompasses the
entire front in central Europe, from the
North Sea to the Alps.- In this situation we
are and will continue to be dependent upon
the Alliance. It is and will remain essential
that allied forces are stationed on West
German territory. It is and will continue to
be important, indeed crucial, for our coun-
try to be part of the risk- and deterrence-
sharing alliance which creates North Amer-
ica and Western Europe and strategic
whole.
Only in this way has it been possible to
build up in what is now a narrow Western
Europe a risk which a potential aggressor
cannot take. Thus in a world fraught with
war the Alliance's territory, including its ex-
posed parts, has been an area of peace and
security.
There are schools thougfit in the United
States, who, following the INF agreement,
would substitute this strategic whole by a
more regionalized defense strategy. This
would have serious implications for the Alli-
ance, and in the first part of my address I
shall try to analyze them.
2. Alongside the Atlantic Alliance the Eu-
ropean solidarity is of great importance to
us West Germans. Together with others, we
are striving to merge the European mem-
bers of the Alliance, with the full participa-
tion of France, into a European security
union which will enable Europe to exercise
greater influence and assume greater re-
sponsibility within the Alliance. This point I
shall be dwelling on in the second part of
my address.
3. And finally I shall turn to a problem
that is still unsolved, the division of Germa-
ny and Europe. Here, too, it is a question of
the security of all concerned, but also of the
human and civil rights of the people of
Eastern central Europe who, after 1945,
were subjected to communist rule against
their will.
A.
My starting point is the INF agreement.
We Germans assume that it will be ratified.
My Government and my parliamentary
group have expressed their approval, so
today I will merely try to analyze the agree-
ment's implications for Europe's security
and the consequences to be drawn from
them.
1. The INF agreement has relieved the
Soviet Union of the risk of a possible strike
by US land-based systems in Europe. The
Pershing II, the weapon system which com-
manded most respect from the Soviet
Union, is to be removed from Europe.
2. True, Europe will be freed from the
threat posed by the Soviet SS-20s, but the
Soviet Union will still have, in addition to
its other tremendous nuclear potential,
1,365 land-based nuclear systems with
ranges below 500 km which cover every
point in the Federal Republic of Germany.
It makes no difference to us whether we are
destroyed by medium-range or short-range
weapons.
3. However one assesses Mr. Gorbachev's
policy, how great its chances and what the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
results are likely to be, there has so far been
nothing to justify the assumption that the
Soviet Union has finally abandoned its
Czarist legacy of expansion to the East,
West and South, or its communist aim of
the revolutionary change of the world.
Western Europe is the part of the world
on which the Soviet Union still focuses most
of its interest and energy. The "common Eu-
ropean house" is a metaphor regularly used
by Mr. Gorbachev. In its Western territories
the Soviet Union has the largest concentra-
tion of resources, infrastructure and armed
forces. The Federal Republic of Germany is
only a narrow barrier to the Soviet Union's
western route to the Atlantic.
4. Situated .along the dividing border be-
tween East and West, we Germans recognize
that we cannot sustain ourselves on our
own. To do so we need the help of the Euro-
peans acting in unison within the Atlantic
Alliance. We, the CDU/CSU, led the Feder-
al Republic of Germany into the Alliance in
the face of stiff opposition from the SPD.
We secured a parliamentary majority in
favor of the NATO decision to modernize
nuclear weapons in Europe which had been
championed by chancellor Helmut Schmidt
,who, however, had been abandoned by his.
own party because of that very decision. We
know that we depend on the United States
if we want to preserve freedom, security and
democracy?and this is our aim.
5. But we also know that the United
States and the free nations. of Europe
depend on the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny if, with the Eastern half of Europe al-
ready gone, they do not want Western
Europe, too, to become part of the Soviet
Union's sphere of influence. ? ? ?
Without us, without the territory of the
Federal Republic of Germany, and without
the military contribution of the Federal
Armed Forces, Western Europe can neither
?
be defended nor protected from blackmail.
If the Soviet Union succeeded in bringing
the Federal Republic of Germany and other
West European countries into its power
orbit it would have under its control a Euro-
Asian bloc which not even the United States
would be able to cope with. Thus the United
States, through its miltiary presence in
Europe, is defending not only us but itself.
8. The Alliance has a moral foundation. It
lies in the conviction that its members are
defending common values and in the cer-
tainty that none of them wittingly or unwit-
tingly disregards the vital interests of the
others. To prevent any doubt arising or in-
creasing in Germany as a result of the disar-
mament process, it is in our allies' own in-
terest that we Germans should make our se-
curity aims unmistakably clear to them.
This is my intention.
B.
1. Germany's primary aim is to prevent
our country being destroyed by war. We
Germans, 14 million of whom were expelled
from their native regions in East Germany,
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after
World War II?and two million of them
died?today live in one of the most densely
populated countries on earth. It is a country
which can be destroyed but not defended by
nuclear weapons. We therefore expect our
allies to target their?nuclear deterrents,
whenever possible, not on our country but
on the territory of the potential aggressor.
This explains our aversion to short-range
nuclear systems, which in either direction
can only carry from Germany to Germany,
and our even greater aversion to nuclear ar-
tillery. Anyone who ignores this basic fact
resulting from the geography and division
of our country cannot expect to gain any
lasting political success in Germany. We
Germans are glad that our French allies ap-
preciate our position on these issues.
2. Preventing a non-nuclear war is likewise
vital to the Germans. Our country would be
the main theater in a European war, by
virtue not only of its division but of the fact
that the East pursues an offensive and the
West a defensive military strategy. What it
means to be the main theater of war we
know only too well from our own experi-
ence, particularly during the last war. Dres-
den was no less terrifying than Hiroshima.
3. Since 1945 the Alliance has prevented
war in Europe and kept it free from black-
mail. We Germans appreciate this. We are a
reliable ally and our armed forces represent
an important contribution to the Alliance.
Of course, the deterrent effect of nuclear
weapons has helped preserve peace in
Europe, though only within the framework
of the Alliance's overall strategy. The cru-
cial factor has not been the weapons, not
even the nuclear variety, but the shared risk
and the shared deterrence which makes the
Alliance's territory, that is to say North
American and Western Europe, a strategic
whole.
This strategic unity implies that if the
Soviet Union were to attack Germany it
would not only be confronted with the con-
ventional and nuclear forces of the United
States, Canada and Europe stationed in our
country?which are still greatly outnum-
bered by those of the Soviet Union but with
an alliance which, by virtue of its risk-shar-
ing and deterrence-sharing, spans the geo-
graphical distance between Europe and
North America; an alliance whose philoso-
phy does not tolerate zones with different
degrees of security; an alliance which for
this reason would not shrink from, any
means of repulsing an aggressor, repulsing
him?and this is what matters?on his own
territory with devastating consequences for
himself.
4. The strategic unity of the alliance's ter-
ritory, the unreserved commitment of North
America and Western Europe to risk-shar-
ing and deterrence-sharing, has enabled the
Federal Republic of Germany to place its
forces completely under NATO command,
to forgo nuclear weapons, and to link its
destiny to that of the Alliance.
Will this philosophy, and with it the strat-
egy of war prevention through deterrence,
If necessary using the ultimate means, be
maintained or is the United States in the
act of drafting a completely different strate-
gy?
The Ikle report contains the following key'
sentence: "To help our allies and to defend
our interests abroad we cannot rely on
threats expected to provoke our own annihi-
lation if carried out.".
This sentence is remarkable becauie it
does not refer to the defense of the Alli-
ance's territory by the Alliance but to the
help which the United States will afford to
those who defend their territory. This help
would exclude those weapon systems which,
If used, could lead to the destruction of the
United States. Obviously these are the US
strategic systems, whose deterrent capabil-
ity would no longer be used for the defense
of Europe.
This sentence is all the more remarkable
as it comes at a time when the United
States is eliminating its land-based interme-
diate-range systems. What remains are
chiefly the short-range systems which
would not affect the United States or the
Soviet Union but could not lead to the anni-
hilation of Germany in particular.
The ime report following this line of rea-
soning when it implies that the American
nuclear weapons in Europe should not be
seen primarily as a means of escalation but
as means with which the Alliance can, with
S6911
selective and controlled measures, defeat at-
tacking Soviet forces without any escaratory
effect. Paul Nitze has apparently even pro-
posed the elimination of all air- and sea-
based intermediate-range systems. This
would imply complete intermediate-range
denuelearization.
On such a vital question as this I must-
state unequivocally that a strategy that
would be tantamount to the regionalization
of a European war would deprive the Alli-
ance of the basis for its existence in Europe,
especially in Germany. We Germans cannot
make our small and densely populated coun-
try available for a nuclear war strategy
which, if implemented, would mean the end
for us.
Our only option is a war-preventing strat-
egy which in a divided Europe must be
based on the strategic unity of the whole
territory of the Alliance, that is to say the
unqualified commitment of North America
and Western Europe to risk-sharing and de-
terrence-sharing. Such a strategy, too, has
its risks, for America as well as for Europe.
But it has served its purpose. It has kept
the Alliance's territory free from war and
blackmail and bolstered America's world-
power status. In this respect NATO is the
most successful alliance in history. All of us
should do, everything possible to preserve it.
This includes not questioning the Alli-
ance's risk-sharing arrangement. Referring
to this at a CDU congress on security held
in Bonn on 13 April, Ambassador Richard
Burt said that to the United States risk-
sharing means rejecting the idea of limiting
a nuclear war to European territory. To the
Federal Republic it means rejecting the
denuclearization of its territory.
That is true. The two are interrelated.
This fact has to be allowed for in disarma-
ment negotiations. Those who, following
the removal of land-based systems, would
also eliminate the air- and sea-based inter-
mediate-range systems and instead increase
the short-range variety, must realize that
they are thereby rejecting the risk-sharing
principle and hence NATO's present philos-
ophy and strategy.
With respect.to the INF agreement's Im-
plications, I should like to say the following:
1. We reject proposals for compensating
for the loss of intermediate-range systems
with short-range systems. This would mean
that the intermediate category, which can
reach the territory of the potential aggres-
sor, would no longer be available, whereas
the short-range category, most of which
could in Central Europe reach only Germa-
ny on both sides of the dividing line, in
other words the potential victim, would be
increased. Such a switch from longer to
short range systems would be in contraven-
tion of the general political guidelines
which the Alliance had good reason to
adopt.
2. We reject all so-called "firebreak." con-
cepts. Disarmament in the intermediate-
range sector has made disarmament in the
short-range sector not superfluous but more
?urgent. We cannot agree to an avoidable nu-
clear threat being added to the special, un-
avoidable conventional threat to which our
country is already exposed on account of its
geographical position. Consequently, in view
of the elimination of intermediate-range
systems, short-range systems must follow
suit. This depends not only on what hap-
pens, following the INF agreement, with
regard to short-range weapons but particu-
larly with regard to air- and sea-based inter-
mediate-range weapons. The more interme-
diate-range systems are eliminated, the
more short-range systems will have to be
eliminated as well.
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S 6912 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
3. The 1,365 short-range systems of the
Soviet Union, compared with only 88 on the
Western side, pose a threat to our country's
existence. That would also apply to Western
systems if they were no longer part and
parcel of a war-preventing, risk-sharing and
deterrence-sharing alliance but became in-
struments of a strategy for waging war.
On numerous occasions, we have called
upon Mr. Gorbachev to unilaterally reduce
his overwhelming superiority in terms of
short-range missiles for the sake of confi-
dence building. We have had no reply. As re-
gards these weapons too we want negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union on the basis of a
NATO disarmament and security concept.
4. So long as risk-sharing and deterrence-
sharing with respect to intermediate-range
weapons is maintained we, the CDU/CSU,
will reject a third zero solution, because the
denuclearization of Europe would give full
effect to the Soviet Union's huge conven-
tional and chemical superiority.
This is a factual argument which is not
easy to assert because it contradicts the phi-
losophy of the first two zero solutions. I
have never concealed my view .that it would
have been better to start the nuclear disar-
mament process with weapons of ranges
below 500 km than with the intermediater-
ange categories. But it didn't work out that
way. We therefore have to face the facts
and we will do so.
But before any decisions are taken with
regard to the modernization of short-range
systems we want clarification within NATO
as to what would be the strategic purpose of
the nuclear weapons with ranges below 500
km, how many of them would be needed,
and what their ranges would be. In our view
the purpose can only be a limited one, that
is to say, to prevent the concentration of
conventional assault forces, especially tank
armies. In this connection it is clear that
the greater the range of a modernited ver-
sion of the Lance the fewer will be needed.
5. We would like above all to know wheth-
er and with which air- and sea-based sys-
tems the United States is prepared to main-
tain the intermediate-range deterrence once
the land-based variety has been scrapped.
The credibility of the flexible-response
strategy depends on this. ?
6. At their meetings in Brussels on June
12, 1987 and March 2/3, 1988 respectively,
NATO's Foreign Ministers and Heads of
State and Government decided to develop a
comprehensive concept (Gesamtkonzept)
for disarmament which will embrace sys-
tems with ranges below 500 km. This con-
cept is intended as the basis for decisions on
modernization and for negotiation proposals
to the Soviet Union. There will be no more
decisions restricted to specific weapon sys-
tems as in the case of the two zero options.
That is a good thing. We Germans expect
all allies to follow this line.
7. We Germans also want the Alliance's
comprehensive concept to consider whether
the nuclear artillery is necessary and expe-
dient. If our allies say these weapons are
needed in order to protect their forces then
I must point out that protection of the civil-
ian population is-just as important?at least
to us?as the protection of our own and
allied forces. The fighting spirit of the Fed-
eral Armed Forces does not depend solely
on its equipment but more so on the convic-
tion of our servicemen that NATO's strate-
gy is necessary to ensure the survival of the
German people. In any case, we must seri-
ously doubt the value of such protection for
the Alliance forces as well if their own lead-
ers were to expose them to the effects of nu-
clear weapons on the battlefield. Chernobyl
gave us an idea of what this would mean.
8. Allies who depend on one another
should appreciate one another's situation
even though their situations differ in the
extreme. My country's situation can be de-
scribed in three short sentences: Germany
rand its capital Berlin are divided. On both
sides of the dividing line there are huge con-
centrations of forces of opposing alliances.
The people east of the dividing line are
forced to live under a communist regime.
These are our burdens.
With the Bundeswehr, a conscript army,
we have placed the strongest and most up-
to-date conventional force in Europe at
NATO's disposal. We have recently in-
creased the period of conscription from 15
to 18 months. The sons of the Federal chan-
cellor and my own sons are officers of the
reserve. They will be called up for periods of
reserve training and will be liable to compul-
sory military service up to the age of 60. No
member of the Alliance demands anything
like so much of its ablebodied men.
Americans who are aware of this will not
say that the German burden and the
German contribution to the Alliance is too
small. We do not expect gratitude for what
we do because we are doing it for our coun-
try. But because we are doing it for the Alli-
ance as well we expect our allies to show
consideration for our special geographical
situation and our vital interests.
9. The Warsaw Pact's capability for sur-
prise attack and large-scale offensive action
and for force generation from deep within
its own territory will remain the key prob-
lem of European security until the Soviet
superiority has been removed by means of
asymmetric reductions. Whether the
Warsaw Pact is prepared to make such re-
ductions will be seen when the West have
tabled their disarmament concept, which
will hold General-Secretary Gorbatchev to
his word. We Germans urge that it do so.
-10. We Germans call for a global ban on
and global elimination of chemical weapons.
Both sides can manage without them. It
should be possible to solve the verification
problem. The superpowers can also manage
without a very large proportion of their
strategic nuclear systems, which are to be
reduced by 50%. We welcome this intention
on the part of the United States and the
Soviet Union.
D.
1. In 1963 McGeorge Bundy, President
Kennedy's National Security Adviser, told
Konrad Adenauer that in the next ten to
fifteen years neither France nor England
would be the leading power in Europe but
the United States of America. His forecast
was correct. It is in neither America's nor
Europe's interest that this should remain
so.
Europe needs to have more confidence in
Its oivri abilities and to develop its own iden-
tity in matters of defense as well. Only in
this way can one European voice which will
be taken seriously emerge from the babble
of European voices that crosses the Atlantic
and also reaches the Kremlin. Europe itself
must become America's ally and conduct a
dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Euro-
peans must emerge from their present role
In which they are at best consulted but have
no say in decisions concerning their own
fate.
2. We already have a European security
union, Western European Union, whose
members have pledged to afford each other
"all the military and other aid and assist-
ance", over and above the requirements of
the NATO Treaty. This WEU, which em-
braces Germany, France, the United King-
dom, Italy and the Benelux countries, must
be activated. It needs all those institutions
which today enable NATO to function as an
alliance: a council of ministers, a permanent
council, and a military committee. Western
May 27, 1,988
European Union must be open to all Euro-
pean countries who are prepared to accept
its mutual assistance obligation.
? The fact that we have a European securi-
ty union does not mean we reject our Ameri-
can ally, on the contrary. In a changing
world in which the United States is no
longer the sole dominating power, the
Americans want, I expect, not weak but
strong allies. NATO can only stay strong if
Europe becomes strong. This presupposes
the political and military integration of the
free States of Europe.
3. Europe's two nuclear-weapon States,
France and the Unite'd Kingdom, have a
special responsibility for Europe's security.
They must coordinate their nuclear systems
and place them in the service of their Euro-
pean allies too. So long as the superpowers
have not reduced their nuclear systems to
the level of those of the two European nu-
clear powers added together there is no
reason, in the German view, to call for nu-
clear disarmament on the part of France or
the United Kingdom.
4. A European security union that is able
to act would enable Europe to participate in
all negotiations which directly concern Eu-
rope's security. This must apply in particu-
lar to negotiations on nuclear arms control.
It is not the Americans but the Europeans
themselves who are to blame for not having
been a party to the Reagan-Gorbachev talks
In Reykjavik.
5. The .European Community aims to es-
tablish the internal European market by
1992. A European economic and monetary
union is envisaged. Together with a Europe-
an security union it would form the political
union of Europe. That union would be a
strong and valuable ally to the United
States. The creation of a political union of
the free States of Europe has been the
CDU/CSU's aim since the days of Konrad
Adenauer. Helmut Kohl has moved a good
way towards that goal, particularly in co-op-
eration with France. It is my hope that
after the French presidential elections?re-
gardless of the result?France and Germany
will be able to launch the initiatives that
are needed to achieve this goal.
E.
1. While to many people the political uni-
fication of Europe today seems possible,
indeed probable, there are many who feel
that it is unrealistic to seek the termination
of the division of Germany and Europe. But
the nations of Europe want an end to divi-
sion. It is the totalitarian regimes in the
communist countries that prevent this from
happening. We cannot ignore these regimes
but neither can we accept them. We should
therefore,adhere to our aim of German and
European unity.
2. The principles established by the Atlan-
tic Alliance in the 1967 Harmel Report are
therefore still as valid today as they were
then. Let me quote paragraph 8 of that
report: ". . . No fihal and stable settlement
In Europe is possible without a solution of
the German question which lies at the
heart of the present tensions in Europe.
Any such settlement must end the unnatu-
ral barriers between Eastern and Western
Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly
manifested in the division of Germany."
3. The border that was drawn right
through the middle of Europe over forty
years ago is neither a historical nor a cultur-
al border. It is a demarcation line drawn by
the victorious powers, a remnant of rigid
military rule which violates Europe's digni-
ty and the right of its peoples to enjoy free-
dom and self-determination.
Terminating the division of Germany and
Europe is an objective which can only be
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May 27, 19$8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
achieved in close co-operation with both su-
perpowers, taking into account their inter-
ests, including their security interests.
Whether and when the Soviet Union will be
amenable to such a policy is just as uncer-
tain as the process of change initiated by
Mr. Gorbachev. '
But the Soviet Union, too, must ask itself
what will be better for itself in the long run:
a reunited Europe with whom it will be able
to develop close co-operation, or the mainte-
nance of its domination over the nations of
eastern central Europe, forcibly allied to it a
domination the economic, political and mili-
tary burdens of which are not diminishing
but growing from year to year.
The faster the process of West European
integration, the sooner the Soviet Union
will ask itself this crucial question. When
the European Community, which already
represents part of that peaceful order for
the whole of Europe which must be the
West's objective, develops via an economic
and monetary union and a security union
into a political union, then we shall have an
outstanding model for a united Europe
based on freedom and justice, reconciliation
and harmony.
4. On June 12, 1987, President Reagan, in
his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in
Berlin, called upon General Secretary Gor-
bachev to open the Wall. He coupled this
demand with proposals for providing oppor-
tunities for Berlin, the divided German cap-
ital. All this strengthens our hope that the
United States will remain our valuable and
reliable partner, not only in defense matters
but in European matters are well:
THE INF TREATY
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, this is
a political treaty, not a strategic or
military effort. If nothing else demon-
strates this, consider for a moment
that most of the debate has centered
on Congress' relations with the Presi-
dent, and not America's relations with
the Soviet Union. Virtually every so-
called expert from the left through
the center to the right have found
fault with the treaty, though many
argue that the politics of it in Europe
override its military inadequacies.
-In the Biden-Pell amendment the
Senate stated explicitly that while it
has refused the role the Constitution
contemplated, it would postpone its
judgement to some later, less visible
time when perhaps the public would
be less able to understand and witness
our decisons. The Senate has slinked
away from a close examination, let
alone effect any changes upon the
text of the treaty or on the resolution.
Yet it says it will share a common un-
derstanding with some future adminis-
tration.
Take for example my amendment on
the double negative in article 6, para-
graph 2, which could authorize the
construction of both stages of the pro-
hibited SS-20 missile. The amendment
tracked the specific recommendation
of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee. No one argued against the amend-
ments in substance, but only against
doing it. To be sure, the Republican
leader later addressed the problem
with an amendment to the resolution
of ratification?but this amendment is
strictly unilateral and nonbinding on
the Soviet Union. Indeed it does not
even get read to them.
- Politics not strategy? To be sure.
The President, who only last May said
he would not even present a treaty to
the Senate until the Soviets were in
compliance with all previous treaty ob-
ligation, had his administration
oppose any mention?any mention at
all?of Soviet compliance in our reso-
lution of ratification. My amendment
only set forth a framework for dealing
with Soviet violations, but despite the
proud boast that this treaty requires
stringent verification, there is abso-
lutely no intention to require compli-
ance. If a violation occurs?it occurs.
Under these circumstances, heavy new
expenditures for personnel and equip-
ment to verify are a waste of re-
sources.
Senator WILSON'S amendment to re-
state the Scoop Jackson amendment
to SALT I that the United States
should be no more tightly bound by
the provisions of the treaty than the
Soviets was rejected. The conclusion?
Once again, it is the internal relations
of the United States between Congress
and executive that ruled the day. We
now may be more constrained than
the Soviet Union. Again the arms con-
trol process has become the means by
which some Americans control the
arms in the hands of other Americans,
and the Soviets are not expected to be
treated with equal diligence.
On the issue of futuristic weapons,
an administration that had not even
contemplated them as an issue sought
unilaterally to constrain them once
the issue was raised. The dedsion was
to safeguard the summit, not the in-
tegrity of the treaty. The reputation
of the negotiators was placed above
the national interest. Politics once
again ruled military reason.
The decision to ban conventional
cruise missiles in a treaty banning nu-
clear weapons was taken solely be-
cause it was thought the argument,
was politically difficult to make even
though it was militarily sounder to
maintain our technological advanatage
in the areas of greatest strength.
Europe's defense is now basically de-
pendent on weapons we cannot use,
solely because we state that they
cannot be. They thus become no deter-
rent at all and the face of NATO is
today forever changed.
Make no mistake, the Soviet ability
to deliver nuclear weapons to targets
throughout Europe remains undimin-
ished. The SS-25 is both the principal
violation of the SALT II agreement
and a much more sophisticated version
of the now banned SS-20. Its range,
power, mobility, and accuracy all
exceed the capabilities of its predeces-
sor. So it is clear that a whole class of
nuclear weapons has not been banned,
only a whole class of Western capabil-
ity has been abolished. I question the
wisdom ,of this militarily and warn of
its consequences politically in Europe.
Mr. President, while a large majority
of my, colleagues is going to vote for
this treaty, I am confident that I will
sleep better tonight than many of
S 6913
them will. That is because most of my
colleagues who are going to vote for
the treaty know that they are doing
something that will harm this country
in the not-so-long run.
They also sense that in the not too
distant future there will have to be an
answer for the vote today. They hope
against hope that this treaty's ill ef-
fects on this country's principal alli-
ance will be smaller rather than
larger, and above all that they will ma-
terialize later rather than sooner.
They hope to prolong the interval
before they will have to deal with the
next phase of that crazy Reykjavik
package of which this treaty is but the
first installment. Nevertheless, 4 ma-
jority of my colleagues will not be able
to say no to the short term boost they
hope to receive from this act. It must
be troubling for the more thoughtful
among them to reflect that we are en-
gaging in political self-gratification
while neglecting long-term conse-
quences that are bad for great nations.
It is the very definition of the under-
class as Senator MOYNIFIAN well
knows.
I believe that the majority of those
who vote for this treaty are painfully
aware that they do so without a shred
of intellectual ? justification. Sixteen
years ago, when the SALT I package
came before this body, those eager to
posture as peacemakers could point to
a plausible theory of how that ar-
rangement would make us all safer by
stopping the development of counter-
weapon weapons so that we would all
live happily ever after under Damo-
cles' sword. It was a silly theory, as the
Soviets showed by building a missile
force far more fearsome than the one
that the treaty was supposed to stop.
Nevertheless, those who voted for it
can still point to a coherent explana-
tion for what they did. But there is no
theory whatever that justifies what
this treaty does.
This is what Henry Kissinger, the
architect of SALT I testified about the
INF Treaty:
On the one hand, INP shifts the nuclear
defense of Europe to weapons based in the
United States or at sea, and now at the same
time we are cutting these weapons by 50
percent and shifting the ratios with respect
to land-based weapons to an even more un-
favorable direction to the United States, so
that the practical result will be, as soon as
people start doing the figures, to raise even
more doubts about the American willingness
to initiate general nuclear war in the de-
fense of Europe.
Is there any theory according to
which these considerations ought to
be set aside? None. And yet most Sena-
tors are setting them aside. Why?
Many have been asked, but they won't
say.
Perhaps the answer was given by
Brent Scowcroft and James Woolsey,
hardly conservatives, in the Washing-
ton Post, December 3, 1987 "? ? ? to
implement a slogan, to flatter the ego
of an outgoing administration ? ?
But surely this is no good reason for
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S 6914 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
pulling our Pershings and cruise mis-
siles out of Europe.
Scowcroft and Woolsey also write:
Since NATO's nuclear weapons were de-
ployed in Europe principally to compensate
for NATO's conventional inferiority, the re-
moval of the INF force would accentuate
NATO conventional weakness as well.
The treaty they say "would be a sig-
nificant step toward denuclearizing
Europe, a long-time Soviet objective.
Such an eventual step would wholly
undercut NATO strategy, leaving no
counter to Soviet conventional superi-
ority except the use of U.S. strategic
nuclear forces."
Are Scowcroft and Woolsey mistak-
en? Or perhaps it would be a good idea
to irrevocably commit U.S. nuclear
forces to firing on targets in Europe. I
and others have asked such questions
of Senator NUNN and Sentor LUGAR.
But they have not answered. They
wish to put off such questions as long
as possible 'because all the answers say
the same thing: This treaty is a mis-
take. They know it, yet they want it.
This is what James Schlesinger has
said, "The movement toward the
treaty was a mistake."
How else can one characterize the
attempts to eliminate midrange mis-
siles? As Scowcroft and many others
have asked, why should these be first?
A cogent argument can be made that
short range weapons, the ones that
blow up on our allies, should go. An-
other cogent argument is that the
longest range weapons should go be-
cause they can only be used for United
States-Soviet armageddon. But why
single out the weapons that can only
be launched to protect Europe? Why is
It supposed to be a coup to get rid of
the Soviet SS-20 only to have it re-
placed by the SS-25? This makes sense
for the Soviets. Not for us. Note that
nobody has argued otherwise.
But the bottom line was stated in
testimony by Ambassador Robert
Blackwell?an ardent arms controller
if there ever was. He supports it, he
says, "But I do so holding my nose."
- For something that old-line arms
controllers openly say stinks, and you
know that is not good, you are willing
to roll our opposition. More important,
you, a majority of my colleagues are
willing to endorse this intellectual
bankruptcy.
What else can one call Secretary of
Defense Carlucci's statement that
"what we do militarily in Europe
should not be affected by the political
atmosphere engendered by the
treaty?" This is a bit like saying that
what happens in the hotel room
should not be influenced by the cham-
pagne and flowers. Or how about Sec-
retary Shultz's statement to us on
Tuesday, that he does not understand
the notion that a treaty on weapons in
Europe will have political conse-
quences in Europe? How about
Shultz's other statement in defense of
the treaty, that what we do about the
nuclear balance should have no con-
nection with what the conventional
balance happens to be? Make no mis-
take about it. This is the level of polit-
ical-military understanding that has
brought us this treaty, and this is
what you are endorsing.
How ironic it is that so many of my
colleagues will be voting for this be-
cause voting for this kind of thing has
come to be a test of acceptability to
the foreign policy establishment.
But this foreign policy, establish-
ment is bankrupt. And associating
with it is a guarantee of embarrass-
ment.
If anyone has any doubts, let hini
look at a tape of Mr. Shultz's news
conference of Wednesday, May 25, on
General Noriega. Shultz and the
entire foreign policy establishment
were played for fools and incompe-
tents by a petty caribbean tyrant.
These are the people whose lead you
are following when dealing with the
biggest league. Tyrant of them all, Mr.
Gorbachev. Do you feel confident?
The United States' embarrassment
in Panama is only just beginning.
Recall that we voted to ratify a treaty
giving our canal to whomever rules
that country. And it will come out
that every Member of the Senate who
voted for that treaty knew at the time
that Manuel Noriega was the real
power in that country, and that he
was deeply involved with drugs, and
that he was deeply involved with
Castro. So why did my colleagues vote
for that treaty? I look forward to the
attempts .to evade an explanation. I
guess many voted for it for the same
reason many are voting for the INF
Treaty. It may be bad for our country,
but that will be later. Meanwhile,
those who vote "no" will be called
names. Well, I'll take the long view.
The long view regarding the INF
Treaty is pretty sobering. What are
my colleagues who will vote for the
treaty today going to say when Ger-
many's refusal to modernize the Lance
system can't be hidden anymore?
What will you do when Germany
agrees to denuclearize itself but begs
us to keep our troops there as hos-
tages? Will you wring your hands and
claim you were not at the briefings
where it was mentioned that this
would be the likely consequence of the
INF Treaty? Will you vote to keep our
troops there as hostages, or will you
vote to withdraw or redeploy them?
Will you be able to hide the fact that
the United States' forward defenses
will have collapsed? Will you be able
to hide your personal responsibility
for what will happen? What will you
do about START, the part of that
crazy Reykjavik package? How will
you be able to resist that, after having
done this? Would it not have been
easier to just say no to this entire den-
uclearization campaign to begin with?
When will be a good time to stand up
and grapple with the real responsibil-
ities for which we were elected?
Today those who really wanted this
treaty have won a victory. But it is a
victory of obscurantism over reason
May 27, 1988
and of posturing over responsibility.
Events are coming that will make you
wish you had lost this contest.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President: the Inter-
mediate Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF)
that is now before the Senate is the
first arms control agreement that has
been reached in 10 years. It is long
overdue. One of the highest priorities
of any administration must be the pur-
suit of an end to the deadly and costly
nuclear arms race in which we are en-
gaged with the Soviet Union. Al-
though the INF Treaty comes at the
end of the 'Reagan administration, it is
nonetheless welcome and it brings
with it promise of better things to
come.
Modest in scope?the treaty speaks
to only 4 percent of the world's arse-
nal, its unprecedented on-site verifica-
tion procedures lay important ground-
work for further arms control agree-
ments, notably the strategic arms re-
duction talks, and also to verify any
agreement on conventional arms. It is
unique in the history of arms control
in that, for the first time ever, it re-
quires actual destruction of pasting
nuclear delivery systems. Previous
agreements have imposed ceilings on
categories of weapons; the INF Treaty
calls for the destruction of all missiles
with a range between 300 and 3,400
miles. Even more unusual is the assy-
metry of the mandated reduction?the
Soviet Union must give up a 2-to-1 ad-
vantage in intermedicate range mis-
siles.
A word on verification is in order.
Soviet compliance with the INF treaty
may not be 100, percent. The verifica-
tion procedures set forth in the treaty
are not perfect as they do not allow
for on-site inspection anywhere at any
time. The Administration considered
and rejected this idea because it would
have given Soviet inspectors unlimited
access to our own most secure facili-
ties. It is possible that the Soviets
could hide an INF missile somewhere
on their territory and that it would go
undetected. But, I submit, they could
not test such missiles, or train troops
to operate or maintain them in their
proper basing structures without de-
tection. Absent such preparations, the
Soviet Union could not maintain a mi-
litarilly significant capability in these
theater weapons. That is the mark of
effective verification.
The INF Treaty has been studied at
great length by our own experts on
the Senate Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and Intelligence Committees
and, of course, the majority leader. We
owe our colleagues a vote of thanks
for the many, many hours they have
dedicated to the issue. -
In the course of these deliberations,
three key areas have been identified as
being in need of further clarification?
future interpretation, futuristic weap-
ons, and verification. Although a flur-
ried exchange Of diplomatic notes has
taken care of some of the concerns
raised, there are still several serious
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
amendments to the resolution of rati-
fication that must be considered by
this body.
It is the Senate's constitutional right
and duty to give a treaty?any treaty,
but particularly one of such import as
the one before us, the closest scrutiny
and to modify any provision or aspect
we find inconsistent with the national
good?even if that change requires the
explicit agreement of the other party
or parties. So we will do in the days
ahead and I encourage the process.
It is obvious that the overwhelming
majority of the Senate will give its
consent to the resolution of ratifica-
tion. It is testimony to the wholeness
of the treaty, to the good and, I might
add, ongoing efforts of the Reagan ad-
ministration, and to the hope that one
day the treaty will be used as a build-
ing block for continuing an arms con-
trol process many of us had thought
was no longer alive.
I rise in support of the INF Treaty.
Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, the
U.S. Senate stands at the threshold of
what posterity may well come to know
as the beginning of the end of the age
of nuclear weapons. As my colleagues
know, the treaty on the elimination of
intermediate-range and shorter range
missiles?better known as the INF
Treaty?is unique in that it would
eliminate two entire classes of nuclear
weapons. It provides for highly intru-
sive verification measures, including
onsite inspections. The agreement
mandates the destruction of all inter-
mediate and shorter range missiles
and launchers. Furthermore, it bans
the production, flight testing, or pos-
session of these missiles for the unlim-
ited duration of the treaty. The agree-
ment would eliminate U.S. Pershing
II, BGM-109G ground-launched cruise
missiles, the Pershing 1A, and the Per-
shing 1B and Soviet SS-20's, SS-5's,
SSC-X-4's, SS-12's and SS-23's. Both
deployed and undeployed ground-
launched ballistic and cruise missiles
carrying nuclear or conventional war-
heads are included in the agreement.
Elimination of intermediate-range and
shorter range missiles capable of
reaching targets from 300 miles to
3,400 miles away is a considerable step
forward in the effort to free the world
from the threat of nuclear war. I
think the vast majority of my col-
leagues would agree that, although
this agreement eliminates only a
minute percentage of United States
and Soviet warheads?about 3 or 4 per-
cent?this is a small but extremely im-
portant step forward. I am pleased
that the INF Treaty is before the
Senate for consideration.
The agreement includes an unprece-
dented verification regime which in-
cludes onsite inspections. For years,
U.S. negotiators have stressed the im-
portance of onsite inspections to effec-
tive verification. Within its scope, the
treaty provides for comprehensive
monitoring and specific measures to be
taken to verify data and to verify the
destruction of missiles and delivery
systems. U.S. inspectors have the right
to conduct short-notice inspections
and portal monitoring of designated
missile operating bases or missile sup-
port facilities for 13 years after the
treaty enters into force. This will
ensure that the Soviets are complying
with the terms of the treaty. The
treaty establishes a special verification
commission to help resolve any dis-
putes over compliance which may
arise. Recognizing that while such a
commission is a good safety valve, so
to speak, the agreement accommo-
dates the realities of the international
political system and the imperatives of
protecting national security: the
agreement also provides that each side
may, in "exercising its national sover-
eignty," have the right to withdraw
from the treaty if it judges that "ex-
traordinary events related to the sub-
ject matter of this treaty have jeop-
ardized its supreme national interest."
In short, Mr. President, the agree-
ment contains a system of monitoring
and verification measures designed to
deter and detect cheating. It also con-
tains a mechanism for resolving any
compliance disputes which may arise,
and an escape clause should the Presi-
dent determine that the treaty has
ceased to serve and protect the nation-
al interest. Mr. President, there are
those who object to the INF Treaty
because the Soviets are not trustwor-
thy?because they are historically and
notoriously duplicitous.
I certainly understand those very le-
gitimate concerns. Those who cite the
Soviet's poor record on treaty compli-
ance should find some comfort in the
verification regime. The ban on testing
missiles which are covered by the
treaty and the high confidence in our
ability to detect violations of the test-
ing ban on intermediate-range missiles
and the decreasing performance? reli-
ability of untested weapons are mutu-
ally reinforcing disincentives to cheat.
There is much cause for optimism that
the Soviets- will not commit militarily
significant violations. The military
benefits of cheating are relatively low
while the political costs are extremely
high.
I believe that the backbone of any
arms control agreement is its verifica-
tion regime. The Intelligence Commit-
tee undertook the crucial task of as-
sessing the capacity of our intelligence
community, our national technical
means, such as photo-reconnaissance
satellites, and our onsite inspectors to
meet the additional demands on re-
sources which the INF Treaty would
place on them. In looking to the
future, the committee noted that, in
addition to the current responsibilities
of verifying compliance with the terms
of the antiballistic missile treaty and
other arms control agreements?par-
ticularly in view of a prospective start
agreement. The new demands of the
INF Treaty and current efforts to ne-
gotiate a strategic arms reduction
treaty should be considered.
S 6915
The s uecesful negotiation and sub-
sequent ratification of a treaty which
would substantially reduce nuclear
strategic arsenals would place even
more demands on these resources. Ver-
ification of compliance with the agree-
ments and closer monitoring of tech-
nological advances and of certain mili-
tary activities, which, although not
prohibited by the treaties, would
greatly increase in importance under
the restrictions of the arms control
agreements. The committee recom-
mended that ? the Congress authorize
and appropriate additional funds to
beef up monitoring capabilities. I un-
derstand that the President Will in-
clude additional funds in next year's
budget request.
Mr. President, there is hardly a Sen-
ator more keenly aware than I that
this country is in urgent need of re-
ducing its Federal deficit. Increased
fiscal responsibility is a must if we are
to recover our economic equilibrium.
But this request for additional funds
for the verification is one request
which the Congress should grant?and
I feel confident that the Congress will
grant it. I will certainly do what I can
to ensure that adequate funds for ef-
fective monitoring and intelligence
gathering for arms control treaty veri-
fication are appropriated.
Mr. President, with a matter as im-
portant as national security, we
cannot afford to make mistakes. The
Senate has the constitutional role of
providing its advice and consent for
ratification of treaties negotiated by
the executive. I have the highest
regard for my Senate colleagues who
have labored long and hard in the For-
eign Relations, Armed Services, and
Intelligence Committees to lay the
ground work for the ratification proc-
ess and to ensure that the Senate is
presented with the best possible treaty
to consider.
After nearly completing committee
work on the treaty, it was necessary to
double back for further discussion of
some important outstanding issues rel-
ative to futuristic weapons and techni-
cal compliance issues with regard to
verification. Administration officials
returned to Geneva to fine tune the
agreement with regard to these issues.
Committee members held more hear-
ings this week and approached the
task of examining administration re-
ports on these matters with the same
vigor and critical analysis that charac-
terized their examination of the treaty
in previous hearings. I understand
that these issues have been satisfacto-
rily resolved.
The strong spirit of bipartisanism
and the exemplary cooperation be-
tween the Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and Intelligence Committees
is indeed commendable. I congratulate
the members of those committees for
a job well done.
Mr. President, I believe that the INF
Treaty would greatly enhance U.S. na-
tional security. As welcome as the
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S 6916 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
prospect of ratification of the INF
Treaty is to the overwhelming majori-
ty of my colleagues here however,
complying with the treaty would raise
many new defense policy questions.
For example, the Armed Services
Committee took a detailed look into
the implications for the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization of the loss of
the weapons to be destroyed under the
agreement. Overall, the treaty is
found to enhance NATO and U.S. se-
curity.
I do not believe that any of the Sen-
ators who support this treaty and who
plan to vote for its ratification believe
that the INF agreement is perfect or
that it alone will end the nuclear arms
race. I do believe that Senators who
support this treaty and who plan to
vote for it believe that it is a good, ver-
ifiable, treaty and that it is a land-
mark contribution toward arms con-
trol. I support the INF Treaty and ,I
urge my colleagues to vote for its rati-
fication.
Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, there
can be no greater or more significant
achievement in this generation than
the ratification of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, because
It starts us down the path of, first, lim-
itation, and, then, elimination of nu-
clear weapons. By our vote, we speak
not just for Americans, but also on
behalf of all mankind.
What we unleashed in awesome, de-
structive power upon Hiroshima and
Nagasaki has since then by immense
technological changes wrought even
more terrible powers of destruction.
There could be no small nuclear war
because, when either side uses nuclear
weapons of any size, the opposing side
would use larger and larger nuclear
weapons. What was not destroyed by
initial blasts would eventually be
plagued by fallout anywhere and ev-
erywhere on the planet. Air currents
would circumvent the globe, eventual-
ly delivering radioactive particles to all
parts of the globe and all creatures,
great and small, would eventually
perish while mankind, whoever and
wherever, peasant or Pope, serf or
king, could await and anticipate their
demise and death.
What mankind has wrought in har-
nessing the nuclear powers of destruc-
tion, mankind has to control to avoid
destruction of all man.
So, make no mistake. This nuclear
arms limitation involves only a small
fraction of the nuclear warheads on
Earth and only a limited area of the
Earth, but it is the most significant
achievement of this, generation be-
cause it is a first step in controlling
the destiny of the world toward limit-
ing and then eliminating the threat of
the world's destruction.
As in the Chinese proverb, in a jour-
ney of a thousand miles, the most Im-
portant step is the first step.
This treaty ratification is that most
important first step.
MINUTIA, MYTH, AND MACHINATION
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
have spent the better part of these
last 2 weeks watching this debate. Let
me say at the outset that it was a
relief to finally have the opportunity
to cast a vote for a treaty, any treaty,
that moves forward the cause of arms
control. I did so in good conscience. I
did so without ambivalence.
I wish I could also say that I did so
knowing that the positive benefits of
this treaty will negate the cumulative
damage done to arms control and stra-
tegic stability over the last decade. But
I cannot. It is difficult to estimate how
many steps backward we took before
deciding to take this one small step
forward.
And so I am troubled, Mr. President.
I am troubled because while the con-
tent of this treaty offers some hope
for the future, the content of this
debate offers little hope. I am troubled
because the principle concerns with
which this Chamber has obsessed
itself for almost 2 weeks, can be
summed up in three words: minutia,
myth, and machination.
Let me turn first to the minutia. I
contend that when an is said and done
and the smoke has cleared, history will
note the significance of this treaty for
one reason and one reason only: that
reason is onsite verification. By all
logic, onsite verification should have
been as nonnegotiable for Soviet Gen-
eral Secretary Gorbachev as it would
have been for a Rugsian tsar.
I dare say, however, that those of us
who have a record of support for
mutual and verifiable arms control
were less taken aback by the recent
change in the Soviet position than
were the resident arms control sabo-
teurs of the Reagan administration.
There have been two types of individ-
uals dealing with arms control in this
administration?the saboteurs and the
hard bargainers. Fortunately, the
latter?like the tortoise and the hare?
outlasted and outendured the former.
It is unfortunate that the true
meaning of this historic moment, the
fact that we have shattered a barrier
of immeasurable significance to the
promise of peace, has been obscured
by the obsession with minutia which
has characterized this debate. I submit
that this treaty should have been
named the "On Site Verification
Treaty of 1988."
So much for the minutia, Mr. Presi-
dent. Now for the myth. One of the
amazing things about all myths is
that if you tell them often enough, ev-
eryone begins to believe that they are
true. If you say something, anything,
over and over again with enough con-
viction?no matter what it is?it be-
comes virtually impossible to distin-
guish fiction from fact, rhetoric from
reality.
So it is with what my colleagues
have been calling our grave conven-
tional vulnerability in Western
Europe.
May 27, 1988
Mr. President, we have been hearing
about the overwhelming superiority of
Warsaw Pact forces for so long now
that hardly anybody questions it any-
more.
Mark my words: The "conventional
gap" is going to be the battle cry of
the 1990's. You would think the
NATO alliance will be left with noth-
ing more than a couple of sling shots.
Is that really the situation, Mr.
President? I suggest not.
If it were, technology would mean
nothing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff?
our Joint Chiefs of Staff?estimate
that out of 20 key military technol-
ogies the United States?and therefore
NATO?leads in 14, the two sides are
equal in 5 and the Soviets lead in 1.
If it were, all the money we have
spent over the years would mean noth-
ing. This overwhelming superiority ar-
gument implies that, although NATO
has outspent the Warsaw Pact on de-
fense since 1965, the Warsaw Pact is
somehow vastly more efficient and
more capable than NATO.
Let me also remind my colleagues
that we are not creating a nuclear free
zone in Europe. There will be 4,350 nu-
clear weapons in Western Europe after
the INF Treaty goes into force. Artil-
lery shells, depth charges, Lance mis-
siles?and that does not even take into
account the 400 submarine-based bal-
listic missiles included in NATO's gen-
eral strike plan.
I could go on and on, Mr. President,
about terrain and morale and training
and leadership, about our longstand-
ing, and I think sensible, commitment
to quality over quantity. But if sheer
numbers always translated into victo-
ry, battles from Fredericksburg to Bar-
barosa, from Korea to the Falklands,
would have turned out very different-
ly.
You do not add up numbers of
troops and tanks and hardware and
compare them to the capability of the
enemy to determine if the defensive
posture is (adequate, because the de-
fense relies on an entirely different
configuration of forces.
Before my colleagues buy into this
myth of a grave conventional gap, this
myth of a defenseless Western Europe,
I have a warning: We have heard
about these "gaps" before.
In the 1950's, it was the bomber gap.
The fear was the Russians would have
600 to '700 long-range bombers by 1960.
What they actually had by 1960 were
190 long-range bombers?at least 300
less than what we had.
In the 1960's, it was the missile gap.
The Soviets were expected to have be-
tween 500 and 1,000 intercontinental
ballistic missiles by 1961. What they
actually had in 1961 were 10 ICBM's,
while the United States had 200.
More recently, it was the spending
gap. The 1970's?when U.S. defense
outlays totaled $2 trillion?were la-
beled the "decade of neglect." The
truth is that defense outlays grew 38
percent more rapidly than the corre-
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May 27, 1988
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6917
sponding Soviet figure even during the
much-maligned Carter years, but that
did not stop us from approving what
had become a 69-percent increase by
1987. And now the conventional gap is
being stuffed down our institutional
throat. I would just suggest that
before we start lending our support to
immense appropriations to plug this
latest gap, we make sure it really
exists at all. I maintain that it does
not.
Now, Mr. President, let me address
the machinations.
I have heard Senators on this floor
talking about the lack of adequate ver-
ification to enforce the ban on ground-
launched cruise missiles. I do not re-
member any of my concerned col-
leagues raising an objection at that
critical moment when the technology
was becoming reality; and I do not re-
member any of these Senators urging
the President during the period prior
to the deployment of cruise missiles in
Europe to try to negotiate an escape.
In fact I am quite certain that they
were convinced that deployment was
the only language the Soviets under-
stand, and that serious negotiations
could only begin after deployment had
occurred. That it might be difficult to
verify a cruise missile ban somehow es-
caped their attention at the produc-
tion and deployment stages. But at the
removal stage?at the removal stage
they display the nervousness of an ex-
pectant father?pacing, wringing their
hands, tossing in their sleep.
But the ultimate irony is this, if veri-
fication is the primary concern and
peace truly is the objective, it is far
easier to verify all facets of nuclear
weapons activity?production and test-
ing and deployment?than it is to
verify one isolated component. Yet I
have not noticed any of the "peace
through mistrust" crowd advocating
the most verifiable course of all, which
is a comprehensive bilateral nuclear
freeze.
It is the technological dimension,
not numbers of weapons, which re-
mains the true lifeblood of this nucle-
ar arms race. We are becoming slaves
to nuclear technology and very soon
there will be no means of escape.
As the inheritor of this agreement,
the next President will assume a place
in history both surging with o'pportu-
nity and fraught with peril. Surging
with opportunity because we may be
facing a new dawn of superpower rela-
tions. Fraught with peril because
there are going to be a lot of people
around this town who will be out of a
job?virtually devoid of a justification
for existence?if peace were to break
out.
The most fraudulent enemy of arms
control has always been the charge
"You can't trust the Russians."
Yet all of the initiatives put forward
by responsible advocates of arms con-
trol have been firmly grounded on the
unequivocal principle that they must
be mutually verifiable. If you cannot
verify it, you do not do it. It is that
simple. In fact, the World "trust" does
not belong in any responsible debate
or discussion about arms control. We
should banish it from the official vo-
cabulary. Therein lies the true signifi-
cance of this treaty. More than any-
thing else, this treaty holds forth the
promise of a world devoid of the in-
credibly false contention that if only
we could trust the Russians, there
would be peace.
Let no one be fooled?least of all the
American people?about the meaning
of this moment. As my colleague Sena-
tor BUMPERS observed the other day,
we already have produced more war-
heads since that much hailed and his-
toric occasion when the leaders of the
superpowers signed this agreement
than will be reduced by the agreement
itself.
A few of us attended a play the
other night entitled "Walk in the
Woods." It is based on the famous
walk in the woods taken by Paul Nitze,
the American arms control negotiator
and his Soviet counterpart. A few of
the lines were very relevant to this
point. The American negotiator says
"But there is not a quest for peace
here." And his Soviet counterpart re-
sponds, "Ah, but there is a quest for
the appearance of the quest for
peace."
We could video tape, wiretap, and
employ electronic surveillance against
every Communist on the face of the
Earth and they would say: "The tech-
nology isn't good enough." We could
drain every last penny from the Feder-
al budget to build every conceivable
weapon the scientists can come up
with, and they would say: "We need
more money." And we could develop
such astonishing military might that
it would bring the Soviets to their
knees begging us to stop and they
would say: "Not just yet." And each
and every time they will justify it in
the name of peace.
So when I hear the so-called voices
of reason, as I have on this floor, join
in a chorus of caution to "go slow"
with START: I wonder what it would
take to get them to demand that we
move faster. When I hear the so-called
voices of reason call for "caution" on
this treaty: I wonder what it would
take to embolden them. And when I
hear the voices of doom weaving sce-
narios of imminent destruction result-
ing from this small step forward for
humankind: I wonder what they think
will happen if we wait another 16
years. It has been 16 years since we
voted on an arms control treaty. Do we
really want to wait until the year 2004
for the next one? Call it what you
want, but as far as I am concerned the
treaty I voted for is the "onsite verifi-
cation treaty." This Senate has been
locked in a cold war time capsule since
1945. This treaty unlocks the door.
Now it falls to us to decide whether we
want to evacuate the time capsule?or
to stay inside?in which case we will
surely plunge into the abyss. That
does not need to happen. Let us open
the door and let ourselves out.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President,
soon we will have to decide whether
we will approve the United States-
Soviet INF Treaty that is before this
body. The concept of removing an
entire class of nuclear weapons is a
goal that-all of us subscribe to, for its
own value and as a first step toward
further serious arms control.
I firmly support the effort toward a
reduction in nuclear arms.
Both sides, the United States and
the Soviet Union have sufficient nu-
clear weapons to destroy each other
and possibly the world. To diminish
this threat is something I wholeheart-
edly endorse.
In examining this treaty, it is obvi-
ous that it accomplishes some signifi-
cant breakthroughs and achievements
that might lead the way to further
and more comprehensive nuclear arms
reduction agreements. For this, the
administration and its negotiators de-
serve credit.
In evaluating this treaty, the main
criteria that I used to judge this or
any arms control agreement that
comes before ,this body is, does it en-
hance the ultimate security of this
country? By agreeing to these reduc-
tions in INF nuclear, weapons, as small
as they are?and we are really only
talking about a 3- to 4-percent reduc-
tion in our nuclear arsenals?are we
maintaining our ability to adequately
defend ourselves? I am not under the
Illusion that this treaty will seriously
threaten our national security, but
there are several issues that cause me
concern, concern for this particular
INF Treaty, and serious concern for
future arms control agreements.
The first concern that I have is over
verification. Numerous flaws and prob-
lems have arisen over the verification
procedures in this treaty. We recently
heard from Secretary Shultz that
these differences have been resolved
to our satisfaction.
This body should examine closely
these issues to make sure they are
Indeed resolved to our satisfaction and
that the ambiguities have been cleared
up and the verification procedures are
as we negotiated them.
Both the administration and-the in-
telligence community agree that this,
or any treaty is not 100 percent verifi-
able and that the Soviets could main-
tain a covert iorce of SS-20's without
being detected. They argue, however,
that the Soviets could not cheat in a
"militarily significant" way and that
training, deployment, and testing of a
covert force would certainly be detect-
ed.
This leads me to my second concern
that of a compliance policy.
These statements about Soviet
cheating concern me because it seems
to imply that we can expect some vio-
lations of the treaty on the Soviet's
part, violations that we might or
might not be able to detect. And quite
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S 6918 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
frankly, I do not put a great deal of
faith in the Soviets willingness to
adhere to treaties.
An examination of past arms control
agreements in general, does not give
one a good feeling about how well to-
talitarian states comply with arms re-
duction pacts. When these govern-
ments see an opportunity to gain mili-
tary or political advantage, they vio-
late or ignore the treaty with impuni-
ty. The experience the democratic gov-
ernments of pre-World War II had
?with the Axis Powers over naval arms
control pacts was one of violation after
violation with little or nothing done to
penalize the offending party.
The lesson to be learned from this
experience is that any verification
process, regardless of how accurate it
can be, will be meaningless if the will
to take specific and definite action
? against violations is lacking.
When one examines the record of
Soviet adherence to arms control
pacts, there is the feeling we are
watching history repeat itself.
We all know the litany of Soviet
arms control violations, and I am sure
we will hear them listed in great detail
before this debate is over.
What has been the U.S. Government
response to these violations? Basically,
nothing. President Reagan finally had
enough of Soviet noncompliance and
withdrew the United States from its
voluntary compliance with SALT II.
This has been the only real retaliatory
action taken by the United States.
None of the treaties had any type of
compliance policy that detailed what
the consequences of Soviet violations
would be. And we can clearly see the
results this has produced.
Yet with these lessons to draw upon,
how have we tried to remedy the prob-
lem? An examination of this treaty
provides no glimmer of a positive com-
pliance policy. We have set up another
commission?the Special Verification
Commission?to deal with compliance
questions.
This will probably be as ineffectual
as the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion set up to deal with SALT I and II
problems.
The Soviets have already tried to
evade and renege on verification pro-
cedures, before the treaty was even
ratified. What can we expect if the
treaty is and the threat of de-
laying action on it as this body did last
week is removed? The administration
must provide some indication of its, re-
sponse to potential Soviet violations.
If the administration refuses to do
this, then the Senate should in the
future do it for them. We need to put
the Soviets on notice that we will not
tolerate violations to the treaty.
I cosponsored an amendment with
Senators WALLOP, KARNES, GARN,
MCCAIN, NICKLES, MCCLURE, and
WILSON that will impose a compliance
policy on the treaty. It does not go as
far as I would have liked, but it -does
force the President to report to Con-
gress on Soviet compliance and. in the
absence of compliance, set up a mech-
anism for the President to initiate a
proportional response. The Senate will
then have the opportunity to approve
or disapprove by resolution the Presi-
dent's actions. Of course, the Wallop
amendment was defeated, but I have
hopes future administrations will
carry out its goals regardless.
In conclusion, Mr. President, let me
say, I applaud the spirit and intent of
this treaty. It is a first step towara se-
rious arms control reduction. And with
constructive and responsible action we
can make this a viable treaty and at
the same time send a message to the
Soviets that we are serious about a
workable START Treaty.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I sup-
port ratification of this treaty. It pro-
vides important limits on the Soviet
military threat to Western Europe and
unprecedented measures to protect us
against any secret Soviet cheating.
This agreement will force the Soviet
Union to withdraw and destroy some
1,836 intermediate and shorter range
missiles which are now targeted on us
and our allies. We will have to destroy
less than half that number. The 3,136
Soviet nuclear warheads associated
with these missiles must also be re-
moved. We will remove 859 such war-
heads, still leaving over 4,000 nuclear
weapons in NATO to help deter Soviet
aggression.
As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff testified, "The Soviets will
lose capability in both the European
and Asian theaters. They no longer
will have the capacity to hit with
ground-launched theater ballistic mis-
siles Great Britain, Spain, France,
Italy, and a large part of Turkey; or
strike with these weapons many of our
pre-positioned major equipment sites
and debarkation sea and airports in
Western Europe."
Admiral Crowe also noted that two
of the major shorter range delivery
systems which could be used for a
chemical weapons attack on NATO
Europe, the SS-12's and SS-23's,
would be removed from the Soviet
order of battle by this treaty.
While the military benefits are the
principal test of this agreement, it also
constitutes a major success for United
States and allied diplomacy. We decid-
ed to modernize our nuclear forces in
Europe and carried through with the
deployment of these systems in spite
of strong domestic opposition in some
countries. We called the Soviet bluff
when they walked out on the talks in
1983, and we eventually achieved
President Reagan's original zero
option?the elimination of all ballistic
and ground-launched cruise missiles
with ranges between 300 and 3,300
miles on both sides.
As a member of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, I was involved in
our comprehensive review of verifica-
tion issues. We concluded that the
United States should be able to moni-
tor the removal and elimination of the
May 27, 1,988
Soviet weaponry declared under the
treaty with certainty.
We also noted, however, that signifi-
cant improvements in our intelligence
capabilities are needed if we are to be
able to monitor and verify a strategic
weapons treaty?where the Soviet in-
centives to cheat would be much great-
er and the consequences of any such
cheating far more serious.
While Europe without the INF
weapons would not be denuclearized,
the remaining balance would still
show important Soviet ad#antages,
particularly in conventional forces. I
believe that NATO must take prompt
steps to redress that balance in order
to maintain the credibility of its strat-
egy.
The Soviet arsenal is too menacing
for us to rely on anything short of
countervailing power. We know from
history that Soviet smiles may vanish
overnight, and cooperation can turn
quickly into fierce antagonism. Ac-
cordingly, we need a defense force
that can deter or if necessary defeat
the Soviets, an American force tai-
lored to Soviet capabilities, regardless
of their intentions.
Mr. President, I do not have confi-
dence in the Russians. I believe that
they will do whatever they perceive to
be in their own best interests, regard-
less of treaties or international law or
world public opinion.
It so happens that this treaty seems
to be consistent with Soviet interests
as well as with our own. In addition to
the modest military benefits of remov-
ing certain missiles on each side, the
agreement allows the Russians to pro-
claim their peacefulness and to renew
their propaganda offensive in Western
Europe. But it also shows the world
that the United States is committed to
both peace and strength.
We have also obtained important
Soviet concessions in the INF Treaty
which I hope will be exploited in the
negotiations on strategic forces. For
example, the Russians agreed to dis-
proportionate reductions in their own
forces compared to ours, more than
twice as many missiles and nearly four
times as many nuclear warheads. They
also agreed to onsite inspection on an
unprecedented scale and to coopera-
tive measures to improve verification.
The Soviets will now be tested,
tested on whether they will accept
similarly tough provisions in future
arms control agreements and tested on
whether they will 'fulfill their other
International obligations, such as on
human rights. They also will be chal-
lenged to carry out their promises to
withdraw from Afghanistan and to
demonstrate cooperation on other
international problems, such as the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica.
As Soviet President Gromyko has
said, General Secretary Gorbachev
has a smile with iron teeth. He is
tough and smart. And we have to be
tough and smart in dealing with him.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6919
That is why we should use approval of
this INF treaty as part of the founda-
tion for broader cooperation?if the
Soviet Union is willing, and if the
terms are fair and equitable for us.
Mr. President, I know that many
proposals will be offered to alter or
impose conditions on this agreement. I
am sympathetic to several of them.
For example, I regret that the agree-
ment has forever precluded develop-
ment of a conventionally armed
ground-launched cruise missile, for I
believe that such a capability could be
very valuable in NATO.
I also regret that this administration
has not pushed the Russians harder
about past violations of arms control
agreements. For this and future agree-
ments to succeed, there must be a
much tougher standard of compliance,
and a much greater willingness to
raise complaints directly with the Rus-
sians.
Nevertheless, I do not want to sacri-
fice the positive achievements of this
agreement for the sake of preferable
"might-have-beens." I certainly do not
want the Senate to give aid and com-
fort to America's opponents by trying
to reopen settled questions, thus let-
ting our adversaries blame us for
delays in the ratification of the treaty
and perhaps even a stalemate in re-
negotiations that kills the treaty.
I do want the Senate to approve this
agreement, and do so in time to
strengthen President Reagan for his
Moscow summit meeting. It would un-
dercut his standing, and thus his abili-
ty to press the Soviet leader on so
many issues which we also consider
important in United States-Soviet rela-
tions, if we stall on the treaty or
burden our approval with conditions
that we know to be nonnegotiable.
Mr. President, my enthusiasm for
this agreement is tempered by my rec-
ognition of its limitations and of the
disappointing record of bilateral agree-
ments in bringing lasting changes in
Soviet behavior at home and abroad.
While the consequences of approving
the treaty are modest, those of rejec-
tion would be immediate and severe,
particularly among our allies. I also`
am willing to tilt toward my hopes and
away from my skepticism.
This treaty can lead to a safer world
for us and our children and grandchil-
dren. It can be the first step toward
much more significant measures that
enhance our security and reduce the
terrifiying danger of nuclear war. I
hope and pray that our actions this
week do lead in that direction.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, although
I am in my eighth year as a Member
of the U.S. Senate, this is the first
time that I have had an opportunity
to review and pass judgment on a new
arms control treaty.
This is also the first time, even for
the most senior members of the
Senate, that a treaty eliminating a
whole class of nuclear weapons is sub-
jected to the advice and consent of
this body. These two "firsts" indicate
the significance of this debate for =re,
as well as for the Senate, and the
whole Nation.
Having examined this treaty very
carefully during the past 5 months, I
want to commend the President, the
Secretary of State, and our superb ne-
gotiators, for their persistence in pur-
suing this agreement and the negotiat-
ing skill with which they accomplished
their task. They deserve full credit for
the success. I also want to point out
that President Reagan, and President
Carter before him, enjoyed solid bipar-
tisan congressional support on the
INF issue every step .of the way. We
backed the dual-track decision, we con-
sistently supported the deployment of
the Euromissiles, and when the Sovi-
ets walked out in Geneva, together
with most of my colleagues, I put the
blame squarely on the Soviet Union.
This treaty was negotiated against a
backdrop of solid bipartisan support,
and rightly so. Arms control negotia-
tions, where the security and survival
of our Nation is at stake, must be the
last place for partisan bickering.
Our support for this important na-
tional undertaking did not mean, of
course, that we went about our consti-
tutional role of advice and consent in a
perfunctory fashion. As a member of
the Foreign Relations Committee I
have experienced firsthand the very
thorough, responsible, and expert
manner our committees reviewed all
facets and implications of this treaty
and its annexes.
My first reading of this treaty last
December convinced me that it was a
good, solid accord. Nonetheless, to
make my final decision, I needed clari-
fications and teassurances on several
aspects, and I made full use of the
committee procedure to obtain those
clarifications and reassurances.
One major area of concern for me
was the continuing vitality, security,
and cohesion of the NATO alliance. I
was particularly disturbed by several
articles written by Henry Kissinger,
who is certainly one of the most pro-
found and original strategic thinkers
our country has ever had. While giving
lukewarn endorsement to eventual
ratification, Dr. Kissinger raised a
number of points that he deemed to be
shortcomings of this treaty and its
negative effects on NATO. Beyond en-
gaging Dr. Kissinger himself on these
points, I repeatedly quoted his arg-
ments to other witnesses, among them
Secretary Shultz, former Secretaries
Vance and Rogers, and Ambassadors
Burt, Keel, and Galbraith. From this
fascinating clash of expert views I con-
cluded that while Dr. Kissinger's argu-
ments are legitimate, the NATO alli-
ance will not be weakened by the im-
plementation of this agreement as
long as its members retain their dedi-
cation to its common objectives. The
dual track process, from its inception
to the conclusion of the INF Treaty,
was one of the best examples of con-
certed, coordinated, and decisive allied
action in recent memory.
I carefully questioned our witnesses
on the continuing modernization of
our NATO forces. I am a dedicated
supporter of further vigorous arms
control efforts. At the same time, I am
not blind to the fact that for almost 43
years nuclear weapons have insured
the peace in Europe by providng a cer-
tain stability and balance, albeit a bal-
ance of terror. Those of us who strive
to reduce nuclear weaponry must take
on, with equal vigor, the obligation to
Insure a new balance in a world with
reduced weaponry. Moreover, we must
maintain stability not only at the
starting point, and not only at the
finish line, but at every point along
the way. In my statement to the For-
eign Relations Committee I likened
this process to the precarious disas-
sembly of a house of cards. Card by
card it must be disengaged without
ever letting the house collapse, until
the last two aces, leaning against each
other, are removed. During my ex-
changes with Ambassadors Kampel-
man and Glitman I gained assurances
that article XIV of the treaty about
conflicting undertakings cannot be in-
terpreted as barring efforts to modern-
ize NATO weaponry as long as we do
not produce, test, or deploy weapons
specifically banned in this treaty.
We are all concerned about Soviet
violations of past treaties and about
prospective future violations. With our
able negotiators I explored the conse-
quences of such violations, and the
available remedies, including with-
drawal from the treaty. In the same
Issue area I also discussed the signifi-
cance of the Krasnoyarsk radar with
our verification panel.
The recent controversy about the
ABM Treaty made me keenly aware of
the importance of clarifying this trea-
ty's provisions to leave very little room
for potential confusions and disagree-
ments. I asked many questions to clari-
fy the meaning and legal effect of par-
ticular wordings in the treaty. It was
also due to the ill-effects of the ABM
controversy that I fully supported the
inclusion of a committee condition in
the resolution of ratification on consti-
tutional principles concerning treaty
interpretation. My suggestion to
narrow and focus the? suggested lan-
guage was accepted by the committee
and 'included in the reported condi-
tion. This condition is likely to become
subject of a separate debate and I will
address this particular question in
more detail at that point.
As for the technical details of verify-
ing the data base and the future im-
plementation of the treaty. I have
complete confidence in my colleagues
on the Intelligence Committee who
did a very thorough job ascertaining
that the verification regime is more
than adequate to prevent any militari-
ly significant violation from remaining
undetected. I also approved of the re-
quests of the Armed 'Services and the
Intelligence Committees to seek and
obtain supplemental agreements on
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S 6920 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
questions of futuristic systems and
verification details.
Mr. President, I have worked hard
during the past 4 months to reassure
myself, my colleagues, and the Ameri-
can people on the soundness of this
agreement and the rightness of our
agreeing to its ratification. This treaty
is not prefect, but it is as good as it
can be made under the circumstances.
There is no doubt left in my mind that
it is very much in our national interest
to consent to its ratification.
It is true that the military signifi-
cance of this treaty is small. It re-
moves but a fraction of the existing
nuclear arsenals. But the political sig-
nificance is enormous, not just by
what it accomplishes in the short
term, but more by what it achieves in
the long term. It restarts a process by
which we can continue to strive for a
less dangerous world; a world where
we can preserve and enhance our secu-
rity at a lower level of armaments,
with less risks, with no incentives to
strike first, and maybe ever with lower
expenses.
I am not among those who believe
that everything labeled "arms control"
is necessarily desirable. There can be
bad agreements, and there can be fa-
tally dangerQus agreements. But I be-
lieve fervently that good, comprehen-
sive, solid agreements are achievable.
We should spare no effort to work for
them while providing prudently for
the maintenance of our strength and
acting in concert with our allies.
Mr. President, this treaty fully de-
serves what, I hope, it will receive in
this Chamber, an overwhelming vote
of confidence.
LINKAGE ON THE INF TREATY TO PARITY IN THE
CONVENTIONAL BALANCE
Mr. WIRTH. Mr. President, during
the debate on this treaty, we have
heard considerable discussion of the
conventional balance in Europe. This
is an important issue, but for a variety
of reasons it should not be linked to
the INF Treaty. The issue will be dis-
cussed under the CDE framework, and
I hope we will come to agreement with
the Soviets on conventional arms con-
trol. But as I will outline at some
length, linkage with INF is neither ap-
propriate nor timely.
The effort to create a linkage be-
tween the INF Treaty and the
achievement of conventional force
parity in Europe is a dangerously mis-
guided exercise.
There is no inherent relationship be-
tween the two. The provisions of this
treaty and their impact on NATO's de-
fenses and security were thoroughly
studied by the Armed 'Services Com-
mittee during the course of its review
of- the INF Treaty. The committee's
conclusion was that the INF Treaty
did not increase or exacerbate unfa-
vorable aspects of the existing balance
between NATO and, Warsaw Pact con-
ventional forces. In fact, we found the
opposite to be true, as we stated in our
report, "in broad terms, the committee
believes the INF Treaty can make a
modest but useful contribution to
NATO security."
So to attempt to create an artificial,
negative linkage between the INF
Treaty and the conventional balance
in Europe is to do injustice to an
agreement which adds to NATO's se-
curity.
The second dangerous element in
this attempted linkage is the very con-
cept of parity in conventional forces in
Europe. Once the INF Treaty is rati-
fied, the focus of our attention will
turn to conventional arms control in
Europe. It is very important that we
begin this debate with a clear under-
standing of what the issues are. We
can take a significant step toward en-
suring an educated, accurate debate on
conventional arms control, if, at the
outset, we lay to rest obfuscating falla-
cies before they take hold. Today I
want to address what I fear may
become a central fallacy in the con-
ventional arms control debate.
I believe there exists a serious mis-
understanding about conventional
parity?what it means, and even more
importantly, what it does not mean.
"Conventional Parity"?it has a nice
ring to it if you say it fast enough,
Taken at face value, it would seem
there could be no argument over the
desirability of parity between adver-
saries who live in uneasy peace on op-
posite sides of a fortified border. It
would seem that the continuance of
this peace might depend on equal
numbers of forces and equipment on
each side, so that both sides would
view initiating aggression as fraught
with risks, and the outcome highly un-
certain.
However, simple parity is not just
simple, it is simplistic. It assumes that
the only variable that is important is a
simple numerical ratio: tank for tank;
artillery, tube for artillery tube; divi-
sion for division. This simple numeri-
cal logic is an illusion, but before ad-
dressing the factors that make it so,
let me ask two questions.
.First, are those who decry the con-
ventional balance in Europe, who
claim it is so unfavorable to NATO
that without the missiles removed by
the INF Treaty NATO is in imminent
danger of being overrun by Soviet
forces?are those critics ready to
transfer funding from the Strategic
Defense Initiative to the conventional
forces budget? If the conventional bal-
ance is really in such a criticial state,
we should do it without delay. But I
daresay if it were put to a vote these
critics would not support it.
Second, if such a conventional com-
parison is paramount, the proponents
of improving the conventional balance
should be leading a mad stampede to
transfer money from aircraft carriers
to tanks and artillery. In aircraft carri-
ers we have a 14 to 1 advantage over
the Soviet Union, and we're still build-
ing carriers. Following the logic of the
conventional balance doomsayers, in-
creasing this already great U.S. advan-
tage makes no sense. We should be
May 27, .1988
using these carrier funds to buy tanks.
But we're not, and I daresay there
would be considerable opposition were
it proposed.
The negative answers to these ques-
tions demonstrate a fundamental and
almost incomprehensible inconsistency
in our allocation of defense resources,
if, the conventional balance is as dan-
gerously unbalanced as those who call
for conventional parity claim. Let us
examine this apparent inconsistency,
and begin by reviewing a variety of
variables.
I. STRATEGY
Is NATO strategy the same as the
Warsaw Pact's? Or are there funda-
mental differences? Proponents of
conventional linkage assume our strat-
egies are the-same, and so assume that
the same weapons systems are re-
quired. But this is gravely wrong.
2. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON
The unspoken assumption of the
proponents of linkage is that it is a
straightforward matter of adding up
totals. It is not, any quantitative com-
parison involves a broad variety of
vexing variables. A bean count is not
enough.
3. QUALITATIVE COMPARISON
If quantity is hard to measure, so
much more so is quality. Factoring in
quality makes any quantitative assess-
ment much more difficult and com-
plex, and ultimately, uncertain. But to
ignore the qualitative factor is to
render any bean count even more shal-
low.
Finally, we should recognize that
the key to assessing the European bal-
ance is not simply to compare the size
of the opposing forces, but to focus on
the use each side would make of the
resources available. I intend to exam-
ine this issue now. I believe when I
have finished my colleagues will be
persuaded that the linkage drawn be-
tween the INF Treaty and convention-
al force ratios in Europe is not firmly
based in fact, but instead rests on very
weak, unstable ground.
Let us first look at strategy. Gen.
John Galvin, Commander in Chief,
'U.S. European Command, testified
this year before the Armed Services
Committee on the role and mission of
NATO:
NATO is a defensive alliance. Its members
are committed to use military force only in
response to aggression. Therefore the Alli-
ance does not maintain forces capable of
overwhelming its potential adversaries. Be-
cause our primary objective is to deter
attack we must be able to convey the mess-
sage that as an alliance we have both the
capability and will to protect our interests.
In the event that deterrence fails, NATO
forces must be able to preserve or restore
the territorial integrity of Alliance nations
and bring the war to a close on favorable
terms as soon as possible.
Any force comparison is incomplete with-
out considering what the forces are trying
to accomplish. The strategic doctrines of
'the two alliances are in sharp contrast.
NATO's strategy is entirely and exclusively
defensive, rejecting the advantages of initia-
tive that accrue to any attacker; that is,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE - S 6921
A ability to select the time, place, and nature
of an attack. ? ? * Every aspect of Soviet
military posture?weapons, force structure,
training, and doctrine?are all designed to
maximize the potential for rapid offensive
operations over long distance.
We do not need to match the Warsaw
Pact man for man or tank for tank. What
we do need is a conventional capability
strong enough to frustrate aggression and
increase the time before nuclear weapons
would have to be used. Such a capability
would preclude hasty decisions to use nucle-
ar weapons and enhance NATO's strategy of
flexible response. Deterrence would be more
credible because Soviet planners could not
be sure of gaining the objectives of aggres-
sion so swiftly that NATO would be unable
to consider the use of nuclear weapons.
As General Gavin has testified, the
strategies of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact are dramatically different, requir-
ing very different resources and align-
ments.
Let us now turn to a second vari-
able?the static quantitative compari-
son itself. Once again I shall quote
General Galvin:
In order to know what action needs to be
taken to maintain adequate conventional
forces, we must have a clear understanding
of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the two alliances. The NATO-Warsaw Pact
military balance is a measure of the relative
capability of military forces that results
from a complex combination of factors that
together form military power.
Even a quantitative comparison is not
simple. At Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe we have examined more
than 150 analyses of the East-West balance.
These reflected a great variation in analyti-
cal techniques?and a wide variety of con-
clusions.
Even the prestigious International
Institute of Strategic Studies is back-
ing off specific bean counts. The re-
cently published 1987-88 edition of the
Institute's The Military Balance notes
_ that its figures have been "much
quoted but also at times misrepresent-
ed", and that "political leaders, East
and West, sometimes use assessments
of the balance selectively to rally
public support for their foreign de-
fense policies."
Significantly, this year the Institute
includes an essay on the conventional
balance in Europe, going beyond quan-
tity alone:
Nd single approach is likely to prove
useful for all purposes. Indeed, it is a misno-
? mer to speak of a single, overall balance.
According to John Cross, who over-
sees the compilation of the report, the
' Institute has "started to spell out the
999 ways in which pure bean counting
doesn't give a sensible answer."
And even if quantity were the only
measure, would that be enough to
assure victory? History tells us it is
not. At Austerlitz in '1805, the smaller
force won; at Antietam and .Fredricks-
burg in 1862, and Chancellorsville in
1863, the smaller force won.
At the Battle of Frontiers in 1914; the fall
of France in 1940; the Nazi invasion of
Russia in 1941; the North Korean invasion
of South Korea in 1950; the Sinai in 1967;
the Golan Heights in 1967 and 1973; and in
the Falklands?The Smaller force won.
A reliance on static quantitative
comparisons alone to measure NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces does show
that NATO's is the smaller force. But
this is not the whole story. To quote
again from General Galvin,
If we look only at forces stationed in
Western or Eastern Europe, the Warsaw
Pact outnumbers NATO only slightly in
personnel and more than 3 to 1 in tanks, ar-
tillery, and combat aircraft. If we look at
both sides when fully mobilized and rein-
forced, the Soviet advantage declines.
Furthermore, "NATO has tradition-
ally sought to make up for its numeri-
cal disadvantages by maintaining an
edge in quality of its forces." Some
weapons are more equal than others.
The point can not be ignored?combat
capability is another crucial variable
in an estimate of a military balance.
One not taken into consideration by
the traditional bean count.
Neither is readiness. Again according
to General Galvin, "the readiness of
NATO forces is generally higher than
those of the Warsaw Pact." But the
General also said, "we have to improve
readiness throughout NATO with
better training." And NATO's inter-
operability problems are well-known.
All this simply demonstrates that
readiness is yet another complex vari-
able.
There is, in fact, a whole list of qual-
itative variables that make the static
quantitative analysis unrewarding by
itself. Josh Epstein of the Brookings
Institute has given 'a summary of this
issue:
? a ? bean counts?static side-by-side enu-
merations?of peacetime military invento-
ries of tanks, planes, and so forth do not
constitute assessment of the conventional
military balance in Europe or anywhere
else. A close accounting of each side's pre-
battle forces is obviously necessary to any
assessment of warfighting capability; but
such accounting alone is far from sufficient.
Warfare is a dynamic process in which the
opposed forces grind each other down, a
process whose pace and outcome depend
crucially upon factors that simply cannot be
captured in a bean count, no matter how
balanced. Some of these factors are obvious:
Technology (weapons' quality); Training
and troop skill; Command, control, commu-
nications and intelligence; Reconnaissance
and targeting capabilities; Relative conceal-
ment and exposure (use of terrain); Logis-
tics; -Force-to-space constraints; Reliability
of allies; Readiness; Warning and suprize;
the relative willingness to suffer attrition
and yield territory; asymmetries in goals
and tactics.
Finally, we cannot ignore the con-
text in which any comparison exists?
the respective economic, social and po-
litical environments. We are all aware
how very different these environments
are. We must also acknowledge that
they are never static.
Furthermore, not only are our re-
spective political and economic sys-
tems so different, but so too are the
challenges we face. In the West, a
number of factors on both sides of the
Atlantic have been working against
NATO's military posture; the public
diplomacy of Gorbachev, diminished
concern about -a Pact attack on the
West, euphoria on the arms control
front, a tangled web of economic un-
certainties, chronic Federal budget
deficits, and the allure of distant as
opposed to current military technol-
ogies.
But the Eastern bloc also has more
than its share of problems: a legacy of
economic and political stagnation
from the pre-Gorbachev era; continu-
ing structural economic difficulties; a
weak and limited technological base
far inferior to those of NATO nations;
demographic trends unfavorable to
the ruling ethnic Russians; and an un-
certain allegiance among the Warsaw
Pact countries.
Clearly, there is much mere to eval-
uating and determining the conven-
tional balance than a simple bean
count approach to parity. I would be
the first to admit that NATO's con-
ventional forces have their weakness-
es, and to acknowledge that a diligent
and determined commitment of re-
sources is required for NATO to retain
its deterrent capability. But NATO
has many strengths as well, strengths
poorly represented by a bean count.
Thus the call for conventional parity,
with or without the INF Treaty, is not
only unnecessary, but very much the
wrong approach to conventional arms
control. Consequently, linkage be-
tween the INF Treaty and convention-
al parity is inappropriate and unneces-
sary.
In conclusion, I direct my colleagues'
attention to the following statement
by Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, from his testi-
mony on the INF Treaty before the
Armed Services Committee:
The JCS have unanimously concluded
that on balance this Treaty is militarily suf-
ficient and also adequately verifiable. In
turn, they believe that this accord is in the
best interests of the United States and it
allies and strongly recommend its ratifica-
tion by the U.S. Senate.
Mr. HECHT. Mr. President, this dis-
cussion we have undertaken on the
INF Treaty has been a tough question
for me. One of the toughest I've faced
in the Senate. A President for whom I
have the greatest respect and affec-
tion urges us to trust that the leaders
of the Soviet Union are beginning to
change their behavior, to honor treaty
commitments, to behave responsibly in
the international community. This,
against a long history?some quite
recent?of Soviet, misconduct, attacks
on our interests, and violation of nu-
merous treaties and other agreements.
We're being asked to agree to elimina-
tion of a weapons system that just a
short time ago, we were told was vital
to the defense of Western Europe.
And, to make the matter still more
difficult, Mr. President, the technical
questions of arms control itself, and
the technological aspects of intelli-
gence support to the compliance verifi-
cation process, are almost beyond com-
prehension by anyone other than
arms control specialists, engineers, and
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S 6922 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
mathematician war garners. The com-
plexity and the incredible amount of
detailed information we've had to ex-
amine on the intelligence aspects of
the proposed treaty alone are mind
boggling. On this point, Mr. President,
as a member of the Intelligence Com-
mittee and one who has been intimate-
ly involved in this process, I want to
compliment Chairman BOREN and Vice
Chairman COHEN, for the quality and
the exceptionally efficient manage-
ment of our committee work on the
treaty. They have shown outstanding
balance, fairness, and understanding
of the very complex intelligence issues
involved and I applaud their high cali-
ber leadership.
Mr. President, most Americans,
when confronting a difficult decision
will normally examine the positive
side of a debate first. We're just adapt-
ed to the action oriented approach?
but?given the history of this issue,
and the possible consequences if we
make the wrong decision, I want to
begin with the basic arguments
against ratification.
-First, Mr. President, should the
Senate accept what we've seen so far
of glasnost and perestroika as solid
evidence that the leaders of the Soviet
Union are giving up a singularly bad
part of Marxist-Leninist political doc-
trine? Have they abandoned those con-
cepts which they claim give them a
philosophical right to lie, cheat, and
steal in international relations in pur-
suit of Soviet Communist expansion-
ism? I think not.
There's much intellectual debate
arOund the world on this question
these days, but we see no real renunci-
ation of the basic political philoso-
phies which stand behind Soviet Com-
munist expansionism. I have had a
number of opportunities to question
Soviet officials directly about this
point, and the responses have been at
best evasive and murky. In a previous
statement I made on this floor, I cited
the U.S.S.R.'s long history of treaty
violations and international miscon-
duct. That list, of course, is based on
proven Soviet action, all in the name
of Communist expansion and increases
In Russian nationalist power.
FTOM the intelligence viewpoint, Mr.
President, we cannot offer the Ameri-
can people complete assurance that we
will be able to detect and report accu-
rately?and in a timely manner?possi-
ble Soviet attempts to cheat on this
treaty. Senators should note the care-
ful and precise language of the Intelli-
gence Committee report on this point.
Ratification of this treaty is an im-
portant?if somewhat symbolic?step
toward denuclearization of our defense
of Western Europe. The ultimate
result could be for the United States
to drop what has been a successful
strategy, without a prior reduction in
superior Soviet/Warsaw Pact conven-
tional forces. The danger lies in at-
tempting to def end Western Europe
without either a significant reduction
in Warsaw Pact conventional forces or
a costly upgrade in NATO convention-
al forces strength.
There are early signs of a change in
the Soviet "closed society," and indica-
tions of a turn toward greater concern
for domestic economic development
and increased domestic flow of infor-
mation in pursuit of that development.
Nevertheless, they are a long way
from an open society in the way we in
the west understand and live that con-
cept. The implication for their ability
to cheat on treaty compliance are ob-
vious.
The final negative argument I wish
to cite is an internal budget issue?
that is, if this treaty is ratified, the ad-
ministration must find a way to pay
for special intelligence collection re-
sources to participate in the verifica-
tion process. A significant sum must
come from a nonincreasable national
defense budget figure. There has been
no proposal that elimination of the
nuclear IRBM will create amortization
funds to pay for the inspection/verifi-
cation process.
Now, Mr. President, what are the ar-
guments for ratification? For start-
ers?despite efforts from some sources
to depict Senate conservatives as the
bad guys, we, too, would like to see a
real lessening of military tensions with
the Soviet Union. But only if there's a
basis for belief that we can achieve
that decrease without serious risk to
our own freedom and independence.
As well as that of our allies. We are
told by the administration that we can
move in that direction with this treaty
without serious risk?and I would
remind my colleagues that we would
have to strain reason to accuse the
Reagan administration of seeing our
conflicts with the Soviet Union
through rose-colored glasses.
On a closely related question: is the
current Soviet shift in policy emphasis
for real?that is, toward domestic eco-
nomic improvement?with possible de-
crease in emphasis on international
expansionism? If it is, should we en- -
courage that shift? I believe the right
answer in both cases is "yes." I've con-
sulted some of the more suspicious
Russian watchers in the national intel-
ligence and foreign policy community,
and they generally agree that Gorba-
chev is serious about his domestic eco-
nomic focus. They also agree he has a
very difficult task, and that his
chances of success are not at all good.
My own views on this question are,
that the United States should encour-
age the U.S.S.R. to focus on its domes-
tic problems. But we should be very
cautious and wary?this leopard has a
long way to go before we can say it has
changed its spots.
With respect to absolute assurance
of timely detection of Soviet attempts
to violate the treaty?again I urge
each Member to review closely the In-
telligence Committee's assessments on
this question. I support the findings of
that report. Its bottom line is that
while absolute assurances are not pos-
sible, the risks involved w well within
May 27, 1988
reasonable limits. As a Nevadan from
Las Vegas, a former businessman, and
a former banker, I claim some under-
standing of calculating odds and risks.
And, finally, on this argument for rati-
fication, I call your attention to the fa-
vorable outcome of the last round of
clarification negotiations with the
Russians in Geneva.
Will the INF Treaty take us too far
down the denuclearization road in Eu-
ropean defense?without prior redress
of the conventional forces imbalance?
I think not?especially if we continue
to press the conventional forces bal-
ance issue. Our NATO alliance leaders
have said that the INF treaty is a rea-
sonable and desirable course, and they
have at least as much, if not more, at
stake on this point as we do.
On my last point for ratification,
Mr. President?based on our research
and evaluation in the Intelligence
Committee, I believe that the adminis-
tration can?through the "rob Peter to
pay Paul" process known formally as
adjustments in priorities and limited
recovery of the program costs for the
INF weapons and units?find the
funds to pay for the new intelligence
collection capabilities we must have.
So, Mr. President, after balancing
pros and cons?where are we? Like
most important questions in national
security, it's where you put the weight
in the values area?what's most impor-
tant? for me, I am inclined to accept
the judgment of the military men who
have to command our forces in war,
that the Pershing missile system is not
absolutely vital to the defense of
Western Europe. I believe we can
afford the limited risk involved, espe-
cially if we have some years of experi-
ence with this treaty, as a way of judg-
ing Soviet intentions and behavior
before?and I underscore before?the
United States undertakes to make
arms control agreements on the truly
critical weapons?the strategic mis-
siles.
In this context, Mr. President, bar-
ring the revelation of new informa-
tion, or vital arguments I have not yet
heard, I will vote to support this
treaty, and I therefore urge the rest of
the Senate to support ratification.
RATIFY THE INF TREATY
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I want
to state my support for Senate consent
to the ratification of the INF Treaty.
Its final signing _by President Reagan
and Secretary Gorbachev, will give
people around the world a glimmer of
hope for finally putting an end to the
global nuclear arms race.
While this accord is historic for a
number of reasons, its immediate mili-
tary impact will be modest. The mis-
siles that will be eliminated represent
only 4 percent of the world's nuclear
arsenal. But to the extent that it does
have a military impact, I believe it tips
the scales in favor of U.S. security in-
terests.
The treaty's greatest significance is
that it lays the groundwork for future
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
arms accords by creating a better envi-
ronment between ourselves and the
Soviets and by making two historic ad-
vances.
The first breakthrough is that this
is the only agreement in history to ac-
tually eliminate an entire class of nu-
clear weapons. With this accord, we
will eliminate all. United States and
Soviet nuclear missiles with a range of
300 to 3,000 miles. This will require
the Soviets to remove four times more
nuclear warheads than the United
States will remove.
And second, the INF accord estab-
lishes unprecedented methods to mini-
mize the possibility of either side
cheating on the agreement. Just a
short time ago, we thought that the
Soviets would never agree to the
onsite inspections of Soviet facilities
that we believe are necessary to verify
compliance. Yet, these intrusive
methods are included in the treaty
and its protocol regarding inspections.
Before going further, I want to com-
plement the leaders and members of
the Foreign Relations Committee, the
Armed Services Committee, and the
Select Intelligence Committee who
spent' over 4 months grappling with
every aspect of this agreement. The
thoroughness of their review was evi-
denced when the leaders held up con-
sideration of the treaty by the full
Senate until several problems regard-
ing verification and inspection condi-
tions could be cleared up with the ad-
ministration.
Much of the debate on the INF
Treaty has stemmed from by concern
about the agreements possible affect
on the conventional arms balance in
Europe. Some have charged that the
conventional forces leg of NATO's
flexible response triad will be exposed
by the removal of part of a nuclear leg
of the triad, the INF missiles.
Mr. President, I agree that there are
serious problems with NATO conven-
tional forces that need to be ad-
dressed. Legitimate concerns have
been raised about NATO firepower, sus-
tainability, and reinforcement rates.
This INF Treaty certainly will not
solve a NATO-Warsaw Pact conven-
tional arms imbalance. Nor is it accu-
rate, however, to portray the treaty as
laying bare NATO conventional vul-
nerability.
Mr. President, I would note that this
treaty eliminates only a small fraction
of either superpowers nuclear arsenal.
The United States will retain well over
4,000 nuclear warheads in Western
Europe, which could be supplemented
by nuclear weapons on U.S. subma-
rines, aircraft carriers, and other mari-
time assets available for use in the Eu-
ropean theater of operations.
It is a sobering fact that European
targets that will no longer be covered
by INF missiles, simply will be retar-
geted by the immense nuclear assets
remaining on both sides.
Furthermore, the INF Treaty will
take a heavier toll on Soviet nuclear
forces than on United States nuclear
forces. Specifically, it will require the
elimination of 859 United States mis-
siles versus 1,752 Soviet missiles and it
will reduce the number of deployed
United States nuclear warheads by 429
as compared to 1,687 for the Soviets.
I was impressed by the comments of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Crowe, on this subject
during treaty hearings this spring. He
said:
We are never going to negotiate a treaty
where we do not give up something. ? ? ? But
we believe that in this one the trade has been
favorable to the U.S. and that the balance we
are seeing with the implementation of the
INF Treaty is better than the one when it
started.
Mr. President, my point is that this
treaty is not going to create major new
vulnerabilities for NATO conventional
forces. The modernization of conven-
tional forces are necessary with or
without the treaty. Addressing conven-
tional shortcomings deserve our atten- ?
tion and, perhaps more importantly,
the increased attention of our NATO
allies.
As I mentioned earlier, I believe this
treaty has limited military signifi-
cance. Its greatest importance is that
it sets the stage for further serious
arms talks, such as the START negoti-
ations to limit strategic classes of nu-
clear weapons. In fact, without suc-
cessful negotiations on these weapons,
the Soviets will be free to simply fill
the small void left by the missile elimi-
nations in this treaty with the produc-
tion of other missiles.
We are unlikely to even approach
agreement in these important START
talks without the groundbreaking veri-
fication conditions established in this
INF Treaty:
Clearly, the Achilles heel of any
arms agreement is the ability to assure
each side that the other side is not
cheating.
I agree ?with Secretary of State
Shultz who testified this spring that,
"there is no such thing as absolute or
100 percent verification (of compli-
ance)." Our goal must be to assure
ourselves that the treaty provides a
high level of confidence that even a
low level of cheating is not occurring.
This spring, Defense Secretary Car-
lucci testified that the provisions of
the treaty do provide adequate and ef-
fective verification of compliance. He
said:
The prohibition of flight testing, the pro-
duction ban, and geographic constraints will
make it difficult for the Soviet Union to
deploy a militarily significant covert force
of the INF missiles. Should the Soviets still
elect to violate the Treaty, this will prove
costly, complicated, and?we believe?detect-
able before any significant military threat
to U.S. interests arise.
The verification procedures agreed
to in this treaty include onsite moni-
toring of specified production facilities
in both countries, open inspections of
missile deployment, storage, and elimi-
nation areas, the ability of either
S 6923
country to conduct challenge inspec-
tions for 13 years when violations are
suspected, and unprecedented data ex-
changes to support these efforts.
If implemented correctly, these pro-
cedures should provide the confidence
we need that the Soviets are in compli-
ance. They also set an important
precedent and foundation for the
START talks and other arms negotia-
tions.
Mr. President, I think that the
debate on this treaty has been
healthy. It has forced us to contem-
plate the unthinkable horrors of nu-
clear war, while daring us to envision a
world with less nuclear tension. I
think we all feel some shame that the
powerful nations of the world have
come to rely so heavily on the unsta-
ble protection of a nuclear umbrella.
When the Senate votes on this
treaty and when the President signs it,
the people of the United States and
the Soviet Union can be proud that
they have taken at least a small step
back from nuclear war. The INF
Treaty is probably not anyone's idea
of perfection, but it does open the
door to a safer world, while promoting
our Nation's security interests.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, at the
outset of hearings on the INF Treaty,
I set forth criteria that I believed the
Senate should focus on in deciding
whether the treaty merited our sup-
port:
First, and most importantly, would
the treaty increase stability on the
East-West border in Europe, reducing
the risk of a crisis turning into a war?
Second, would the INF Treaty im-
prove the overall military balance on
the East-West border, making it less
likely that if such a war took place,
the West would lose?
The testimony the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee received during the
hearings amply demonstrated that the
INF Treaty does meet this criteria: It
increases stability through eliminating
a class of weapons that placed Europe
within 8 minutes of nuclear destruc-
tion in a superpower crisis, and it does
so on terms that favor NATO.
It does so through the treaty's mili-
tary and political consequences. Let us
take the purely military situation
first.
As we know, the object and purpose
of the treaty is to eliminate weapons
that target Europe at distances of be-
tween 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or about
300 to 3,300 miles. Under it, the Sovi-
ets are destroying 857 deployed inter-
mediate-range missiles and shorter
range missiles and 895 nondeployed
missiles for a total of 1,752 missiles
with the potential of delivering about
3,052 Soviet warheads?almost four
times the number of warheads that
the United States and NATO will give
up under INF.
I asked Secretary of State Shultz
and Secretary of Defense Carlucci,
among others to define the military
significance of the treaty. The answers
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S 6924 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
given are worth citing. In the words of
Secretary Shultz:
As a result of the treaty, the Soviets will
lose considerable capability in both the Eu-
ropean and Asian theaters to strike our
allies. In addition, in Europe, they no longer
will have the capacity to strike with these
weapons many of our prepositioned major
equipment sites, and debarkation points,
both ports and airfields. Additionally, we
have long been concerned about Soviet ca-
pabilities to attack NATO Europe with
chemical weapons. We still are, but at least
two of the significant shorter-range delivery
systems for chemical and conventional
weapons?SS-12's and SS-23's?will be re-
moved from the Soviet order of battle as a
result of this treaty.
In the words of Secretary Carlucci:
The elimination of Soviet INF missiles
will reduce the number of Soviet missiles ca-
pable of threatening NATO's remaining sys-
tems with nuclear, chemical and conven-
tional weapons (leaving] the Soviet Union
with little confidence in its ability to pre-
empt successfully NATO's European based
forces and predict NATO's response.
Or to quote the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William J.
Crowe,
Successful implementation of this treaty
will reverse a 40-year buildup, during which
Western Europe has become the most mili-
tiarized region in the world, and eliminate
complete two classes of very destructive,
short warning nuclear weapons sys-
tems. ? * ? The Soviets will no longer have
the capacity to hit with ground-launched
theater ballistic missiles Great Britian,
Spain, Prance, Italy, and a large part of
Turkey.
In addition, Japan, Taiwan, the
northern Philippines, and a portion of
Alaska, now covered by the SS-20's
will no longer be subject to their possi-
ble use for chemical weapons attacks,
according to Admiral Crowe.
So from a military point of view, this
treaty is indeed a good one.
But equally important are the politi-
cal effects of the INF Treaty. We
know the attitUde of our allies to the
treaty?for them, it is an agreement
which gives profound relief from the
real anxieties of being targeted by
thousands of intermediate range nu-
clear missiles. Yet it is not merely Eu-
ropean anxieties that will be lowered
with the implementation of this
treaty?it is the anxieties of our mili-
tary and of the Soviet military. Reduc-
ing these tensions itself reduces the
risk of war. It moves us away further
away from the crisis atmosphere en-
gendered by the aftermath of World
Wax II, by the fate of Eastern Europe,
and the invasions of Hungary and
Czechslovakia, the Berlin, crisis, and
the other Soviet actions that have
made the West legitimately fear for its
security. The INF Treaty gives -us a
chance to see if the glasnost and per-
estroika of Mikhail Gorbachev can
translate into coexistence at a reduced
level of tension. The INF Treaty is
thus potentially a seminal political
document?a sign that we are not
frozen forever in the patterns and re-
lationships defined by Stalinism and
the cold war.
This is not a matter of wishful
thinking, but is inherent in'the proce-
dures for cooperative verification set
forth and required by the treaty,
which for the first time since the
dawn of the cold war lets each side in-
spect the destruction of weapons by
the other. These inspections, with all
of their detailed procedures, have the
potential to increase the confidence of
each side's military that the other is
acting in good faith in carrying out
the terms of the treaty. Each side will
see that its national security has not
been weakened by the fact that it has
given up some of its nuclear weapons.
To the contrary, it will see its security
strengthened by the knowledge that it
no longer has to worry how the other
side might use its intermediate range
nuclear weapons in a crisis.
At this point, I would like to address
some of the assertions made about this
treaty's verifiability, Soviet cheating,
.and other criticisms of the treaty.
Let me take verifiability first. I don't
think anyone contends that we will be
unable to verify whether or not the
Soviets are actually dismantling and
destroying the missiles and missile
support structure as set forth in the
memorandum of understanding. We
will be able to verify the fact that the
Soviets are destroying 857 deployed in-
termediate range missiles and shorter-
range missiles and 895 nondeployed
missiles for a total of 1,752 missiles
with the potential of delivering about
3,052 Soviet warheads.
Instead, the debates have been over
whether or not we can certify if the So-
viets were to have secretly deployed a
small number of hidden SS-20's that
the United States does not know
about. This suggests that our intelli-
gence community does not know what
it is doing, that national technical
means has failed, and that the Soviets
would blithely take an enormous risk
of being discovered to have cheated on
this treaty when they could accom-
plish the same military goals legally
by simply deploying new SS-25's in-
stead.
I have yet to hear any Member of
this body, or any critic of this treaty
describe what possible military benefit
the Soviets could gain out of a secret
force of SS-20's that they could not
gain out of the deployment of a simi-
lar number of legal SS-25's. The limit-
ed coverage of this treaty?a coverage
which could have been easily broad-
ened by the United States if it had
wished through a commitment to in-
terim restraint according to the terms
of SALT II while START remained
under negotiation?eliminate any in-
centive to cheat. The political impact
of such cheating would be substantial.
The military utility of such cheating is
hard to fathom. The argument about
hidden SS-20's fails to pass the funda-
mental test of common sense.
In the words of Admiral Crowe,
"The measures in this treaty has
taken together create major disincen-
tives to Soviet cheating by raising sig-
May 27, 1988
nificantly the cost that the Soviet
Union would have to incur in order to
covertly deploy a significant force of
banned missiles, while raising the
probability of getting caught if they
do cheat. This is particularly true be-
cause of the flight testing and produc-
tion bans which, over time, would
impair the military utility and viabili-
ty of any covert force."
In other words, according to the
head of the Joint Chiefs, this treaty
makes it very difficult if not impossi-
ble for the Soviets to covertly test SS-
20's. If they can't test them, they can't
rely on them in the already unlikely
event that they have somehow secret-
ed them away somewhere.
If the Soviets did decide to cheat, I
personally believe we could catch
them, and catch them early. The testi-
mony the Senate has received on that
point is pretty clear, as the unclassi-
fied record reflects. For example, Ad-
miral Crowe has testified, "the total
web of all intelligence sources, includ-
ing our national technical means and
onsite inspection procedures, provides
high confidence that the. United
States Government can detect
breaches of treaty provisions by the
Soviet Union before such violations
become militarily significant. *
Thus, the JCS have unanimously con-
cluded that on balance this treaty is
militarily sufficient and also adequate-
ly verifiable.
As Gen. Larry D. Welch, the Air
Force Chief of staff told the Foreign
Relations Committee February 4,
1988, "it is not practical for the Sovi-
ets to hide significant numbers in any
useful state of readiness for a signifi-
cant period of time. ? We think the
treaty has an effective verification
scheme that makes it difficult, costly
\ and unprofitable for the Soviets to
cheat on any significant scale."
For the record, one should note that
it was the United States which aban-
doned negotiations aimed at achieving
"anytime, anywhere" inspections to
ensure Verification, because our mili-
tary didn't want to give the Soviets
that much access to our military tech-
nology. In response to*one of my ques-
tions on this issue, Secretary of De-
fense Carlucci noted, "we concluded
that `anytime, anywhere' inspections
were not essential given the extensive
and unprecedented nature of our veri-
fication procedures as a whole."
Then there is the argument that the
treaty was not sufficiently clear about
futuristic systems, that the Soviets
might be intending to use future weap-
ons other than conventional or nucle-
ar explosives in lieu of the weapons
banned under INF.
As far as I am concerned, this argu-
ment was one that could have been
avoided if the United States has been
willing to ban reconnaissance drones,
because such drones are basically the
only kind of intermediate range
GLCM's permitted under the treaty.
The concern has been that the Soviets
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
would test and deploy GLCM's that
*looked like reconnaissance drones, but
which might really be futuristic weap-
ons. The administration argued, and I
believe definitively, that* the term
"weapon" obviously applies to any
device that can "damage or destroy" a
target, regardless of the principle in-
volved. But the treaty itself was silent
on the issue.
As a result, several Senators pushed
for specific, clear language confirming
the understanding of both parties to
the treaty that futuristics were cov-
ered. Because of congressional con-
cern, the administration went beyond
this and exchanged diplomatic notes
with the Soviet Union on this issue on
May 12, 1988, agreeing that "weapon
delivery vehicles" include all devices
designed to damage or destroy any
target. This definition would appear to
solve the question of whether futurists
are or are not covered. The verifica-
tion procedures that apply to all other
GLCM's will apply to these GLCM's as
well. The precise means of differenti-
ating a reconnaissance drone which is
permitted from a futuristic weapon
which is banned is classified, and avail-
able in an addendum to the Intelli-
gence Committee's verification report.
In testifying before the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on these matters
May 13, Secretary of State Shultz con-
firmed, in answering one of my ques-
tions, that any action by the Soviets
inconsistent with the terms of this
note would be considered a violation of
the treaty by the United States. So I
think controversy should be behind us.
But the treaty is only a first step,
and its political impact in the long run
depends much on what steps we take
to follow it up. As I suggested at the
start of the hearings, the treaty's
Impact will be reduced if the Soviets
replace the eliminated weapons with
new weapons of other types, retarget-
ing Europe, ensuring that NATO too
will move to undertake the deploy-
ment of new systems, not covered by
the treaty, that compensate for the
systems eliminated. I asked adminis-
tration witnesses if we would be better
off if both sides did not replace the
banned INF weapons with other weap-
ons.
The administration took the position
that no such constraints were advisa-
ble. The Soviets do have the right to
replace the INF systems with strategic
weapons such as the SS-25, and to do
so will not violate the treaty. Similar-
ly, the United States can replace its
Pershings and GLCM's by deploying
additional sea-launched cruise missiles
or air-launched cruise missiles. I be-
lieve this is unwise, and that the politi-
cal meaning of the treaty will be
eroded if both sides add new strategic
weapons targeted at Europe. I hope
that instead, a more conservative ap-
proach will prevail, and each side will
exercise restraint in deploying addi-
tional strategic weapons while strate-
gic arms reduction talks continue.
Without such restraint, the military
implications of the new deployments
could overwhelm the INF Treaty
before the ink dries upon ratification.
It is clear that we do not need to re-
place the INF weapons with strategic
weapons in order for the treaty to be
in the interests of the United States.
In response to questions I asked them,
Secretary Carlucci and Secretary
Shultz agreed that no "compensatory
measures" need be taken by NATO to
replace the INF missiles we are remov-
ing under the treaty. In Secretary Car-
lucci's words, "'compensatory meas-
ures'" is a misleading term, since the
treaty enhances NATO's security."
Replacement of the INF weapons
with other weapons by both sides
would ultimately undermine and make
meaningless the real gains the INF
Treaty has brought us. Furthermore,
in the long run, the failure to achieve
real cuts in strategic forces such as dis-
cussed in the START Treaty will rel-
egate the INF Treaty to little more
than a historical footnote. This treaty
is important?but it will not remain so
if we fail to achieve a workable reduc-
tion in strategic forces soon to halt the
spiraling forward of the nuclear arms
race that has continued for 40 years.
During consideration of ,the INF
Treaty, I asked a number of witnesses
about the structure of the START
Treaty in its current form, a structure
which would leave the United States
with about .330 land-based targets
against as many as 3,300 Soviet land-
based ICBM's, if we deploy 100 MX
missiles and do not move toward a
single warhead land-based system. Ad-
ministration witnesses refused to
answer questions about START on the
ground that it was still being negotiat-
ed. Secretary Carlucci, for example,
took the position that "until the nego-
tiations are completed ? ? ? it would
be premature and indeed unwise to
speculate on what the makeup of
these forces might look like."
I have to disagree with the Secretary
of Defense. We cannot negotiate a
START Treaty without a very clear
idea of what kind of force structure we
want to have after it is ratified.
As former Secretary of Defense
James_ Schlesinger stated in response
to my questions on this issue, "the
greatest potential danger in a START
agreement [is] that it would not
achieve greater 'Stability, but, by con-
trast ? * ? would increase the number
of Soviet RV's, or accurate counter-
force RV's, in relation to United States
aim points." As former Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara. noted,
"perceptions are important ? ? ? we
are not and would not be vulnerable,
but the force structure ? ? ? referred
to could lead the public to a percep-
tion of vulnerability."
Supporters of arms control need to
recognize that perception problem
now, and be prepared to respond to it
properly. As Dr. Schlesinger suggest-
ed, there are obvious fixes to the per-
ception problem. If the United States
and Soviet Union begin to de-MIRV?
S 6925
even if the United States were to shift
to fewer warheads per delivery system
unilaterally?the argument that we
are vulnerable will be less and less ap-
pealing.
By contrast, rail garrison MX makes
even less sense under a START regime
than it does today. Rail garrison MX
would not alleviate the problem of the
perception of vulnerability to a sur-
prise first strike, because the delays
involved in moving the missiles from
their garrisons would put a premium
on surprise attack, potentially increas-
ing U.S. anxieties. At the same time,
deployment of MX under a treaty that
limits the total number of land-based
warheads would reduce the total
number of our land-based targets, ex-
aggerating rather than decreasing
anxities about a possible first strike.
Instead of rail garrison, we need to be
prepared to move, in the context of a
strategic arms reduction agreement, to
a single warhead missile. Deployment
of such weapons by both sides could
allow us to move beyond START to
deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of
the superpowers, in which both forces
might go down to not just 35 or 50 per-
cent, but 90 percent or more.
In the meantime, I would hope the
Joint Chiefs would not recommend a
submarine force structure under
START that would take submarines
out of the water and reduce their
number to as few as 17 targets, as has
been under consideration by the Joint
Chiefs. I hope we would instead move
under START to reduce the number
of launchers in each submarine, per-
haps by sealing launch tubes.
These kinds of solutions are funda-
mentally more affordable and less
risky that any form of strategic missile
defense options, including the so-
called accidental launch protection
system of ALPS.
ALPS has been suggested by some as
the one ABM option that might make
sense, because it would not be used to
stave off a determined Soviet nuclear
attack, but merely to prevent an acci-
dental nuclear weapon from destroy-
ing an American city. The net techni-
cal assessment for many years has
been that the threat of accidental
launch is not high. But if that assess-
ment has now changed within the ad-
ministration, the cheaper solution is
for the United States to press the So-
viets to implant permissive action links
or PAL's which enable missiles that
are accidentally launched to be dis-
abled before they reach the unintend-
ed target.
Much has been said about the treaty
interpretation issue and I see no
reason to go into it indepth here. I
would note however that the Byrd
amendment was added to the treaty as
the direct consequence of the adminis-
tration's decision to unilaterally rein-
terpret the AMB Treaty to permit
testing of star wars components other-
wise prohibited. The reinterpretation
turned the traditional interpretation
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S 6926 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
of the ABM Treaty on its head, and
was rejected by all persons associated
with its negotiation other than Paul
Nitze, who, of course, continues to
_serve in this administration. The rein-
terpretation effectively eliminated the
congressional role in treaty making. If
the Executive can choose to reinter-
pret a treaty at will, regardless of
what statements are made by the ex-
ecutive branch to the Congress prior
to the approval of the treaty, he has
effectively eliminated the Congress'
constitutional role in the making of
treaties.
The Byrd amendment merely reas-
serts Congress' traditional role and in-
sures that on this treaty, we have the
right to rely on statements made by
the executive branch, and the Execu-
tive may not reinterpret a treaty in
light of such statements without the
Congress' permission. That is not a
radical position, but a deeply conserva-
tive one, that protects the historic per-
ogatives of this body.
I would also like to say a few words
about the road from here. As I have
suggested, DTP will soon become
meaningless without strategic reduc-
tions. Press accounts suggest that the
biggest hangup to a START Treaty
has been the President's insistence
that the Soviets agree to permit star
wars tests and United States right to
withdraw from the treaty in five years.
It would be too bad for President
Reagan to miss the opportunity for an
Immediate, real and significant im-
provement in our national security in
pursuit of the chimera of star wars.
I urge President Reagan to shift this
position and thus make it possible to
get closer to a. START agreement.
Second, I urge him to move forward
with negotiations on space weaponry,
with a view to outlawing the deploy-
ment or testing of weapons in space.
As part of those negotiations, we
should propose limitations on antisat-
ellite testing. I would hope also that
the President would begin to consider
a series of challenges to Mr. Gorba-
chev to effect further reductions in
tensions between our countries. One
such challenge would be to take up
Gorbachev's offer of a nuclear testing
moratorium as a means of stopping
the development of new kinds of new
nuclear weapons. Two generations
remain more than enough?we need
not add a third to terrorize the world.
Another challenge, would be to chal-
lenge Gorbachev to reduce the tanks
and other ground-based forces de-
ployed in Eastern Europe?and per-
haps to offer Gorbachev a real and ap-
propriate United States response in
return that would not injure 'United
States security, but which might lead
to further Soviet actions to reduce its
forces.
The Soviets need to move away from ?
a strategy in which NATO can legiti-
mately be concerned about the poten-
tial of a deep strike into NATO terri-
tory. They can do this by restructur-
ing their forces further back from the
borders in a reinforced defense. Such a
strategy would meet their legitimate
security concerns while reducing the
threat to NATO, paving the way for
an alternative to the fear that has
dominated the European East-West
border for more than 40 years. Per-
haps Gorbachev will not or cannot do
this, but I believe such actions would
ultimately prove to be in the Soviets'
interest, as well as NATO's. Addition-
ally, the majority of Warsaw Pact divi-
sions are not combat-ready divisions
but reserve divisions. Many of them
could be demobilized.
At the same time, the United States
and NATO can independently take
some actions to improve our security,
while reducing the risk of war, regard-
less of Soviet actions.
For a generation, NATO has defined
its strategy in terms of forward de-
fense, for political reasons as much as
military ones. But forward defenses
are shallow and perhaps inherently
unconvincing. As a result, NATO has
moved more toward a strategy of
"follow on forces attack," a strategy
involving the use of airpower and high
levels of explosive power to wipe out
Soviet and Warsaw Pact followon
forces before they reach the front.
One problem with this approach is
that to the other side it suspiciously
may resemble a deep-strike or offen-
sive strategy. I believe NATO needs to
begin to consider proposals to move
toward "defense in depth" instead of
merely forward defense. Defense in
depth is the orthodox military answer
to the desire to have a defense posture
that is both effective and visibly de-
fensive in nature. Such a move by
NATO might well strengthen NATO
defenses, while simultaneously encour-
age the Soviet Union to demobilize of-
fensive forces near the border that
NATO justifiably finds deeply disturb-
ing.
A move toward defense in depth
might combat the general belief that
'successful conventional defense of
Western Europe over an extended
period of war is improbable and that
therefore the West needs to retain a
strategy of possible early use of nucle-
ar weapons. NATO remains prepared
to use nuclear weapons in a war with
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
Yet many experts believe there is no
clear bright line that would guarantee
that a limited nuclear war could be
fought and won by anyone, and that
such a war would not spread to demol-
ish everything we believe in. If a move
by NATO toward defense in depth
would reduce the risk of use of nuclear
weapons by anyone, that in and of
itself would be a very positive develop-
ment.
Less ambitious than defense-in-
depth would be a decision by NATO to
move ahead with constructing light
field fortifications and tank barriers at
the most vulnerable points of the di-
viding line between the two German
states. Stocks of remote-controlled
scatter mines could be built up near
May 27, 1988
the border. Plastic pipes could be laid
at vulnerable points to be filled with
slurry exploside from tank trucks in
mobilization and detonated if conflict
seemed certain. NATO has done rela-
tively little with this kind of nonpro-
vocative defense. In the wake of INF,
as an alternative to other more expen-
sive and less stabilizing options, it
should begin to do far more with these
kind of relatively low-technology bar-
riers. This is not to suggest a new kind
of Maginot Line; rather, it is to create
real obstacles in Germany to a possi-
ble forward land thrust identified by
NATO experts as one of the greatest
threats NATO faces.
Finally, I believe that the United
States and NATO should seriously
consider the negotiation of a restricted
armament zone along the German and
Czech borders, under which mobile
heavy weapons such as tanks and self-
propelled artillery and helicopters, as
well as all nuclear delivery and dual
capable systems are prohibited from
within 50 or more kilometers from the
border. This would not be a move to
triple zero as has been proposed by
Secretary Gorbachev, but it would
provide a safety zone making a short-
warning blitzkrieg less likely, and
giving both sides an added measure of
security.
While the President is in Moscow for
the summit with Mr. Gorbachev, I
hope he will intensify discussions on
conventional force reductions, focus-
ing Soviet attention on NATO's legiti-
mate concerns about the tanks and ar-
tillery amassed facing the West.
As he conducts such discussions, as
well as the discussions on START, on
space weaponry, on human rights and
other issues central to our relationship
with the Soviet Union, there is no
action we could take that would help
him more than to swiftly ratify this
treaty today.
I urge the swift approval of this
treaty.
Mr. DOMENIC'. Mr. President, I
support the treaty to eliminate inter-
mediate range nuclear weapons.
The Senate's consideration of the
Treaty is a major event in America's
defense policy. Since President
Reagan signed the Treaty last Decem-
ber, it has received very careful review
by the Senate. Three Senate commit-
tees held extensive hearings on the
Treaty. We have been debating the
Treaty on the floor for 1 week.
This debate, as well as the Treaty,
will serve our Nation well.
The Treaty has received broad sup-
port in this country and abroad. While
I share that support, I do so for rea-
sons which have less to do with the
weapons we are eliminating than with
the prospects for further actions to
control arms.
There are four points I wish to make
regarding the Treaty, four points
about what the INF Treaty is likely to
mean for the future.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6927
Before stating those points, I want
to put this treaty in perspective, to
describe what it does and what it fails
to do.
While it does eliminate an entire
class of nuclear weapons, we must re-
member that the missiles involved
make up less than 5 percent of the nu-
clear arsenals of the superpowers.
None of the Soviet missiles to be de-
stroyed under the treaty are targeted
on United States soil.
Reductions in our own stockpile of
nuclear weapons through moderniza-
tion more than outnumber the cut in
Soviet warheads as a result of this
Treaty and the 50-percent reductions
being negotiated at the START talks.
With that background, let us look at
the four lessons we can learn from this
important Treaty.
First, in arms control as in most
other endeavors, you never get some-
thing for nothing. The negotiating his-
tory of the INF Treaty is testimony to
the fact that the free world must bar-
gain from strength, if we expect the
Soviets to agree to meaningful actions.
Until the United States and its
NATO allies made the difficult deci-
sion to build and deploy INF weapons,
the Soviets showed no interest in re-
moving theirs. Once our INF missiles
were deployed, the Soviets returned to
the negotiating table and a bargain
was struck.
In Churchill's phrase, we "armed to
parley" and it worked.
We cannot expect to succeed in
future arms control agreements by fol-
lowing some other course. We cannot
sit at the negotiating table with noth-
ing to offer and expect something in
return. Strength is the predicate of
success in arms control. Logic demands
it, the Soviets respect it.
Developing and maintaining
strength is difficult. The Soviets spent
$140 billion more on nuclear forces
than we did between 1966 and 1985.
Since 1975 they have produced and de-
ployed 840 new long-range missiles; we
have deployed 310. The Soviet advan-
tage in Europe in both conventional
and chemical weapons is similarly im-
posing.
The Strategic Modernization Pro-
gram initiated by the Reagan adminis-
tration has narrowed but not closed
this gap. Our deterrent must be
strengthened, both in its offensive and
its defense forces.
If we allow the Soviets a significant
military advantage, the Soviets will
have little or no incentive to negotiate
a more even-handed and stable strate-
gic relationship.
The second lesson to be learned
from the INF Treaty involves our
NATO allies. This treaty grew from of
a common understanding of objectives.
Euorpean governments took high po-
litical risks in their commitment to
INF deployment. The alliance was
tested in this policy. But the payoff
has been substantial.
The Soviet INF missiles are aimed at
Western European targets. The fact
that it was in the 'interest of our allies
to dismantle these missiles must not
diminish the Treaty's significance in
sharing the defense burden.
If our NATO allies desire to be rid of
Warsaw Pact tanks lined up on their
borders, the INF experience should
tell us how to respond.
Any threat needs to be met with
strength and persistence.
Prime Minister Thatcher was right
about Mr. Gorbachev. We can "do
business with him." But we always re-
member that behind his smile are col-
umns of tanks and artillery.
The third INF lesson involves the
Importance of counting.
Numbers of warheads and launch ye-
chides is critical. The ratio of Soviet
first strike warheads to strategic tar-
gets in the United States is. a number
with great public significance. We
know with certainty where we are at a
military disadvantage and what it will
take to reverse it and thereby lower
the risks.
In this Treaty, the Soviets were per-
suaded to eliminate nearly three times
as many launchers and twice as many
missiles as we were. The reason was
they had three times as many launch-
ers as we did and twice as many mis-
siles. A one-for-one cut would have left
us at a great disadvantage. We need to
determine with precision the level of
each weapon that makes us safer, then
pursue that level.
Because of the advantage the Sovi-
ets have in conventional forces, dispro-
portionate reductions must also be our
policy objective in this area. The
Warsaw Pact must be persuaded to cut
much more than NATO.
And in talks on long-range strategic
weapons, critical attention must also
be paid to the sublimits in specific sys-
tems.
Without disproportionate reduc-
tions, we and our NATO allies face in-
creased risks, or significant increases
in defense spending for conventional
arms. The point is this: We must avoid
being outnumbered where it really
matters. All arms control numbers are
not equal, and they need not be treat-
ed equally. With this points of back-
ground, now let me turn to the issue of
verification, which has received such
careful attention in this debate.
The on-site verification measures in
this treaty represent two kinds of
breakthroughs, one poltical, the other
technological.
The Soviets have accepted an un-
precedented level of instusion into
their military-industrial complex. As
important, new technologies have
been developed to fill this verification
demand.
While it is premature to conclude
that the INF verification regime is a
success, it seems clear that no treaty
could exist without it.
We must look forward to further de-
velopments in the science and technol-
ogy of verification.
It is imperative that we produce the
verification technology we need for
arms control. To achieve that, we need
an appropriate division of labor within
the arms control and defense bureauc-
racy.
A recent proliferation has occurred
in the Federal offices and agencies
dedicated to one aspect or another of
verification. The INF Treaty adds a
special verification commission, while
the Defense Department has created
its own on-site inspection agency to
implement the Treaty. The verifica-
tion technology, which the Pentagon
will deploy in the Soviet Union, was
designed by scientists and engineers at
the Department of Energy's Sandia
Laboratory.
Other involved in verification in-
clude the State Department, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency,
and the intelligence community.
These offices need to be integrated
into a coherent arms control regime.
The science of verification needs to
proceed in step with arms control
strategy. We need verification for cur-
rent arms control treaties as well as re-
search on verification for agreements
which our children may negotiate.
But verification cuts two ways. It
will not always be in our interest to
share the military information that
verification yields?or verification
technology itself?with the Soviets.
Verification experts must be in a posi-
tion to inform policymakers of the po-
tential losses, as well as the gains asso-
ciated, with any technology.
And I believe it is clear that as we in-
crease the ambitiousness of our arms
control agenda, we increase the verifi-
cation task. We have seen evidence
that we are in danger of overdriving
our headlights in the arms control and
verification area, trying to solve verifi-
cation problems only after we began
negotiating the agreements to be veri-
fied.
Innovation in verification, as in
other dynamic fields, will result from
the push of technology and the pull of
the demand. Strategists in the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency,
and the intelligence agencies need to
be in a position to tap existing verifi-
cation technology, and to direct re-
sources into verification research in
support of future arms control agree-
ments. The Pentagon should be re-
sponsible for the acquisition and oper-
ation of the verification systems se-
lected for any agreements we sign.
On the other hand, there will be a
push from those in the research,
design, and testing of verification
technology that is sound. Most of our
verification technology comes from
the Department of Energy laborato-
ries, the same laboratories that design
and manage our nuclear arsenal. In
the course of carrying out their re-
search to retirement responsibilities
for these weapons, they have produced?
an extraordinary change in our nucle-
ar stockpile. The explosive power to
today's nuclear weapons has been re-
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S 6928 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
duced by one quarter, as compared
with 1960. The average yield of today's
nuclear weapons has been reduced to
one-fifteenth of what it was in 1957.
The result is a more discriminating
and flexible deterrent. Smaller weap-
ons delivered by more accurate
launchers allows our military to tailor
its response to any level of Soviet
threat. The President would not have
to choose between an all out attack
and surrender.
Our national laboratories have been
as effective in fashioning plowshares
as they have been in forging swords.
They have been in the verification
research and development business for
nearly as long as they have been in
the weapons business. For that reason,
the responsibility for all scientific and
technological efforts in support of ver-
ification must be consolidated within
the DOE laboratories.
The next generation of arms control
will ask even more of the labs. The
verification requirements associated
with future arms control agreements?
most notably the START agreement
currently being negotiated?will be far
more challenging.
We will need to distinguish between
nuclear and conventional cruise mis-
siles. We will need to identify multiple
warhead systems from single warhead
systems, and to account for mobile
strategic missiles. We will need tech-
nology for on-site inspections that is
less intrusive, but just as accurate.
Verifying limits on chemical weap-
ons, as well as the industrial complex
on which they are based, or limits on
material placed in space, poses particu-
larly difficult problems for the science
of verification.
Before they signed the INF Treaty,
President Reagan and Secretary Gor-
bachev agreed that the future of arms
control lies in the ability to trust but
verify. If we are to enjoy the security
that verification makes possible, we
must insure that verification works.
As President Reagan departs for
what is likely to be his final summit
sessions with Secretary Gorbachev, I
wish him godspeed. I congratulate him
and Mr. Gorbachev on the historic
agreement we have debated this week.
It is only a beginning, but a begin-
ning with such great significance. In
the words of Secretary Gorbachev:
There are grounds to foresee a bloom in
Soviet-American relations ? ? ? which would
benefit the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and the world
community.
Mr. President, I am proud to stand
on the floor of the Senate during this
important time. I hope that a few
years from now we can look back and
-tell our grandchildren: We turned the
corner with INF.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, this
INF Treaty is an historic agreement,
and ratification seems to be imminent.
I hope so.
This treaty represents a real break-
through in super power relations. For
the first time:
First, entire classes of weapons will
be dismantled by agreement;
Second, more Soviet missiles than
American are destroyed under the
treaty; and
Third, onsite inspections within the
U.S.S.R. will be permitted to ,verify
their compliance with the treaty.
My hope is that we can build on this
new agreement and enter a new era of
less dangerous, and more cooperative,
relations, with the Soviets?realizing
that we must require them to earn our
trust through their actions and that
we cannot just rely on their words or
their promises.
The Soviets have broken their prom-
ises before. They have violated the
terms of other agreements in the past.
It will be very important for us to
monitor their actions closely so we will
know that their behavior matches
their assurances.
We must be prepared to protect our-
selves in the event the Soviets do not
keep their part of this bargain. We can
do that. We will do that in my opinion.
I don't think the American people
need to worry that we will let our
guard down or fail to provide for our
Nation's security or fail to fulfill out
obligations to NATO in reliance upon
the hope that this treaty makes us
safe from the Soviet military threat.
We will still be required, after this
treaty is approved, to defend ourselves
?and our interests against conventional
military threats and nuclear weapon
threats from other systems that aren't
covered by this treaty.
But, this agreement is important. It
is an encouraging 'development. It sets
new precedents. It makes more likely
agreements on conventional force re-
ductions in Europe and strategic arms
limitations. This treaty does not guar-
antee peace, but it makes a peaceful
relationship with the Soviets more
likely than was the case before it was
negotiated.
These are my personal conclusions. I
have read the treaty and the support-
ing documents given to the Senate by
the administration. I have reviewed
the reports of the Committees on For-
eign Relations, Armed Services and In-
telligence, and the briefing book pro-
vided to Senators by the State Depart-
ment. I have also read "The INF
Treaty: Pro and Con" of the Hudson
Institute, White House Issue Briefs,
The American Enterprise Institute Re-
views of .the INF Treaty dated Febru-
ary 3, 1988 and May 18, 1988, and the
reports of the INF Treaty by the Re-
publican Policy Committee of the
Senate.
Although this Senator did not have
the benefit of hearing the testimony
of the witnesses at the committee
hearings, I feel that we all have had a
good opportunity to become familiar
with the issues involved in the ratifica-
tion process.
On the basis of the entire record and
the debate on the floor of the Senate,
I am convinced this resolution of rati-
fication should be approved.
May 27, 1988
I will vote for it, and I congratulate
the President for a superb job of nego-
tiation and for his perseverance with
his policy of peace through strength.
He has led us to this point, and he de-
serves to be commended for his ef-
forts;and his success, in behalf of our
citizens and all mankind.
Mr. KARNES. Mr. President, I rise
to discuss my views on the INF Treaty
as we approach the vote providing con-
sent to the ratification of the agree-
ment. I believe the agreement before
the Senate can benefit the security of
the United States and its allies. By the
same token, we must be aware that
the treaty imposes many important re-
sponsibilities on the United States and
its NATO allies that must be met to
realize these security benefits. Thus,
there are several aspects of the treaty,
and the history behind it, that deserve
special attention. First, let me focus
on the opportunities presented by this
treaty and then I will turn to the ques-
tions related to our future responsibil-
ities.
First, it is important to take note of
the lessons that should be derived
from the history of the negotiation of
this agreement. The central lesson to
be learned is that successful arms con-
trol requires that we negotiate from
strength. This treaty is a monument
to the strength and resolve of the
United States and its allies. Many in
Europe and here in the United States
were arguing that what the adminis-
tration termed the zero option, which
serves as the foundation of this treaty,
was proof that the administration was
philosophically opposed to arms con-
trol. They were arguing that we
should not deploy the Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles. They
campaigned in favor of the nuclear
freeze. The events of the last several
years have proved that these people
were profoundly wrong. If these critics
had prevailed in 1982, the Soviets
would have retained a substantial por-
tion of their intermediate-range mis-
sile force. Under this treaty those mis-
siles will be dismantled. It is interest-
ing to point out that these critics of
the administration's original INF pro-
posal have suddenly reversed their
earlier position and are now support-
ing this treaty.
As my colleagues know, the agree-
ment requires both the Soviet Union
and the United States to eliminate all
intermediate-range and short-range
nuclear missiles currently in their pos-
session and never to possess such
weapons in the future. Based on the
memorandum of understanding, the
agreement will require the Soviets to
dismantle 1,836 missiles, which are ca-
pable of carrying 3,136 warheads. The
United States, on the other hand, will
be required to dismantle 859 missiles,
which are capable of carrying the
same number of warheads. -
Given the inventory of missiles re-
tained by the two sides, it is clear that
the agreement will require the Soviets
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6929
to destroy more missiles than the
United States. The Soviets will have to
destroy 1,836 missiles, more than
double the 859 the United States will
have to destroy. Also, the Soviet force
is capable of carrying 3,136 warheads,
compared to the United States force
that is capable of carrying only 859
warheads. Although the agreement
does not require the destruction of
warheads and not all the missiles
listed above contain warheads, it is im-
portant to keep the warhead numbers
in mind. This so-called asymmetrical
reduction of missiles is among the
most appealing elements of this agree-
ment. While there is much more to
successful arms control than simple
"bean counting," we should build upon
the principle of asymmetrical reduc-
tions in future arms controls treaties.
The verification regime established
in the treaty is the best we have ever
negotiated with the Soviets. The veri-
fication regime includes on-site inspec-
tions, as well as national technical
means. Again, many critics of the ad-
ministration argued that such strin-
gent verification requirements would
block the achievement of an agree-
ment. Again, the administration's per-
sistence paid off.
Mr. President, now let me turn to
the responsibilities imposed by this
treaty. Obviously, the detailed and
complete inspection and verification
regime established by this treaty also
must be considered a major break-
through that is achieved by this agree-
ment. One must keep in mind, howev-
er, that the Soviets will be tempted to
cut corners on procedures related to
inspection and verification. There is
plenty of room for Soviets to under-
take subtle forms of cheating in these
areas precisely because the provisions
are so detailed. The protocol on elimi-
nation, for example, sets very specific
means for eliminating specific kinds of
missiles, launchers, support facilities,
and support structures. The protocol
on inspections sets forth very specific
procedures for conducting several sets
of inspections. The Soviets may be
tempted to interfere with United
States inspectors or undertake limited
modifications of the elimination proce-
dures required under the agreement.
The United States should be prepared
to challenge the Soviets in an effective
fashion if they violate the agreement
with regard to these details.
The Soviet record on complying with
past arms control agreements is spotty
at best. The United States must be
prepared to challenge the Soviets if
they violate this agreement and take
substantive action in responding to
such violations. A reliable verification
system is of little value if we are not
prepared to take actions to redress dis-
covered violations. What is most dis-
turbing about past actions related to
this issue is that the United States
seems unable to reach a consensus
about what to do about violations. The
result has too frequently been an acri-
monious internal debate that crates an
Impasse that in turn results in no
action being taken in response to the
violation. Recent debates over the
Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty and the
SALT II Treaty are two examples of
failing to respond to Soviet violations.
It is my hope that we can break with
this unfortunate history. We should
make it very clear among ourselves
that we will respond to Soviet treaty
violations. We cannot afford to contin-
ue ignoring Soviet violations of arms
control treaties. It must be remember
that the contributions of successful
arms control are derived from the
actual implementation of agreements
and the elimination of weapons. The
signing of- an agreement is the start,
not the end, of successful arms con-
trol.
In this regard, I am disappointed
that the Senate chose not to accept an
amendment to the resolution of ratifi-
cation offered by Senator WALLOP and
me to establish a positive compliance
policy. The American people clearly
believe that the United States must be
prepared to deal with cheating by the
Soviet Union on arms control treaties.
I am prepared to continue to press the
Senate on this issue. It is my hope
that the Senate will undertake to es-
tablish a positive compliance policy in
the future.
As I stated earlier, there is more to
successful arms control than simple
"bean counting." While the numbers
are important, we should also be clear
that this treaty has important politi-
cal, military, and security implications.
The problems related to these broader
implications are real and must be ad-
dressed. Ignoring these problems will
only serve to undermine our security.
We must be aware that it has been a
long-sought Soviet goal to weaken
NATO. Our Western European allies
agreed to form the cooperative de-
fense structure that constitutes NATO
in large measure because they sought
the protection of the American nucle-
ar umbrella. The deployment of the
American intermediate-range missiles
in Europe during the early 1980's was
a powerful symbol of American resolve
to protect our Western European
allies. Removing these missiles now
may lead some Western Europeans to
question the willingness and ability of
the United States to protect them
against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack.
We must work very hard to see that
what may be a success in arms control
does not splinter NATO and become a
collective security failure.
Mr. President, many of my col-
leagues have discussed the superiority
of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact conven-
tional forces in Europe. This imbal-
ance in conventional forces is a serious
problem that his ? agreement makes
ever more pressing. We should be pre-
pared to give the question of address-
ing the superiority of Soviet/Warsaw
Pact conventional forces in Europe the
highest priority. A comprehensive
review should be undertaken that ad-
dresses the full range of options open
to the United States and NATO for re-
dressing this imbalance. These options
include increased funding for our own
conventional forces, reviewing our pro-
gram related to battlefield nuclear
weapons, reviewing our program for
nuclear-armed aircraft in Europe, re-
viewing the mission requirements of
our strategic nuclear weapons, and
moving aggressively to achieve an
agreement that would result in an
asymmetrical reduction f of convention-
al forces in Europe. Without taking
appropriate action, this agreement will
only further weaken the United
States' and NATO's military position
in an area where there are already
glaring vulnerabilities.
It is important that the Senate,
along with the House of Representa-
tives, focus on the future needs of our
defense forces, as this agreement is im-
plemented. Defense and arms control
are interrelated elements of our na-
tional security structure. We cannot
afford to have these two elements
become unrelated. This agreement will
require modifications in our defense
structure. Failure to make these re-
quired modifications will only serve to
undermine our national security.
Finally, there is a domestic element
to this essentially international under-
taking to eliminate intermediate-range
and short-range missiles. It concerns
our perceptions of the Soviet Union as
a nuclear power and a longstanding
adversary. It is related to what I have
called the euphoria factor, which
reached its heights during United
States-Soviet summits. We would be
making a serious error in judgment, an
error bordering on self-deception, if we
allowed the successful conclusion of
this agreement to alter our view of the
Soviet-American relationship in any
fundamental way. It is unrealistic to
expect the Soviets to change the basic
premise of their foreign policy, which
is expansionist in outlook and reliant
on military power.
In Soviet-American relations, arms
control is only one of four issues on
the agenda for discussion. The other
three areas are human rights, regional
conflicts, and bilateral issues. Many
times, little attention is paid to these
other issues, compared to the coverage
given to arms control. Regional con-
flicts such as Afghanistan, Angola,
Nicaragua, and Cambodia remain im-
portant obstacles to peace. The Soviet
Union, while taking token actions in
recent months to improve its image,
still abuses the rights of its people.
These problems, as well as continuing
problems related to military forces
and security, should make it clear that
we cannot expect a radical shift in
Soviet-American relations. Under no
circumstances should we come to base
our security requirements on the good
will and intentions of the Soviet
Union.
Thus, Mr. President, I am going to
vote to give consent to the ratification
of the INF Treaty. I do so with no illu-
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S 6930 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
sions. The Treaty in many ways is the
embodiment of our hopes for reducing
the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
reducing the risk of nuclear war. But
this treaty is also going to impose
many important responsibilities, as
well as offering many benefits. We
must recognize these responsibilities
and not shrug them off. Thus, it is im-
portant that the Senate pay very care-
ful attention to the implementaion of
this treaty, as well as giving special
consideration to the new military and
security requirements brought about
by the treaty. If the Senate is careful
to meet the responsibilities derived
from the INF Treaty, then this treaty
will indeed contribute to the long-
sought goals of peace and security
with reduced levels of armament.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President,
this is a historic moment.
For the first time since the begin-
ning of the postwar arms race between
the United States and the Soviet
Union, we have before us a treaty that
would not simply slow the rate of
growth of nuclear weapons, but would
eliminate an entire class of those
weapons.
This is a time of great hope and
great trepidation.
Great hope, because this treaty and
the ongoing negotiations in Geneva
seem to hold the hope of further re-
ductions of tactical and strategic nu-
clear weapons and chemical weapons.
And great trepidation because most
Americans and most Europeans have
lived their entire lives under a system
of nuclear deterrents which the great
powers now seem to be dismantling.
While the nuclear arms race has
been terrifying, it has been terror that
we have understood. The future is less
clear than the past.
I am proud to say that those of us,
here in the Senate, who have the re-
sponsibility to provide our .concur-
rence on this treaty have not been
caught up in the euphoria of the
summit process. We have given this
treaty one of the most careful analy-
ses that has ever been applied to any
treaty.
As one of five Senators who have
had the responsibility to sit on two of
the three committees which have con-
ducted hearings on this treaty, I can
bear witness that the issue has been
studied from every angle in Foreign
Relations Committees and Intelligence
Committees. We have learned the
strengths of the treaty, and its weak-
nesses.
We have sought to correct a key
weakness with respect to the elimina-
tion of conventionally armed ground-
launched cruise missiles.
We did not succeed in that effort,
but I must say that as a result of the
efforts of the Senator from South
Carolina, my friend, Senator HoLLINGs
we had in this Chamber one of the
most enlightening debates on the sig-
nificance of nuclear and nonnuclear
deterrence that I have heard since I
have been here.
I am happy to say that in passing
the resolution which I and my col-
league from Indiana, Senator QUAYLE
sponsored, that the Senate has put
itself firmly on record that nonnuclear
cruise missiles are not to be placed on
the table at the START talks.
As we reflect on the implications of
the advise and consent which this
body is about to give to this treaty, we
must consider whether a world, or
even a Europe, free of nuclear weap-
ons is in fact a safer place;
As we consider the realities of a
post-INF world, we must measure the
requirements for conventional forces
which will exist after these intermedi-
ate and short range weapons have
been destroyed; and we must consider
what requirements would exist with
the conclusion of additional treaties
between ourselves and the U.S.S.R.
Mr. President: this treaty may well
reduce the danger of nuclear war, but
It does not reduce our responsibilities
for national defense. In the absence of
these INF weapons, other weapons
systems will have to bear the burden
of deterrence. As we depend less on
nuclear weapons for our national secu-
rity we will have to depend more on
conventional weapons and forces. Con-
ventional weapons are expensive, in
some cases much more expensive than
nuclear-weapons. In many cases they
require more manpower.
More importantly, Mr. President,
the task of verifying this treaty will
require an extensive dedication of our
national, intelligence assets, not only
the collection resources but also the
time and talent of our intelligence an-
alysts.
If any of my colleagues, Mr. Presi-
dent, are going to vote for this treaty
because they believe it will necessarily
reduce our expense for 'national de-
fense. They need to consider again.
There is no question, Mr. President,
that this treaty will lower the risk of
war, but it will not necessarily save
money.
In this context, Mr. President, I
would like to quote from the report on
this treaty of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, of which I am a
member.
U.S. intelligence requirements should not
be dictated solely by arms control treaty
monitoring needs. The committee believes
that monitoring Soviet activities is neces-
sary not only to verify arms control agree-
ments, but also to provide timely warning of
possible threats that are not prohibited by
the treaty.
During the course of the hearings in
the various committees and in the
course of a long debate here on the
Senate floor, Senators have given
voice to a number of arguments pro
and con. There has been a full airing
of views.
That there are different opinions in
ths body, Mr. President, or indeed in
this Nation, on the ways and means of
national defense, is not a sign of na-
tional weakness. It is rather a sign of
the strength of our democracy. The
May 27, 1.988
issue has not been whether or not we
should have a national defense, nor
how strong that defense should be.
The issue has been rather how most
effectively to provide that defense.
It is essential, Mr. President, that
those who watch us in other nations
understand this point as well. Nothing
that we say or do here, no disagree-
ment that is aired, should be taken as
a sign that the United States is not
firmly committed to its own defense
and that of its allies. The fact that we
have given this vital treaty such con-
sidered analysis should not lead
anyone to, believe that the United
States is not capable of making quick
and clear judginents in the event of a
threat to Our security.
The United States entered in to the
treaty negotiation process from a posi-
tion of strength. This ratification
process is a further element of our
strength as a democracy.
This treaty is not the end of our
arms control agenda, it is rather the
beginning.
In a hearing in the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Secretary of Defense
Carlucci outlined for me an entire
menu of arms agreements which the
NATO leadership has agreed to
pursue.
Mr. President, according to the evi-
dence submitted by the Secretary of
Defense, the schedule is as follows:
A 50-percent reduction in the strate-
gic nuclear weapons.
The Global elimination of chemical
weapons, the establishment of a con-
ventional weapons balance, and finally
additional reductions of nuclear weap-
ons.
With respect to the START treaty,
Mr. President, I urge the administra-
tion to procede slowly and with great
care. It is more important that an
agreement which protects our security
be reached than that a START treaty
be signed this weekend or this year.
In its report on the INF Treaty, the
Intelligence Committee has called the
attention of the Senate to the very
grave, and very expensive verification
measures that will have to be taken to
guarantee such a treaty.
If we are prepared to undertake a
START treaty, we must also be pre-
pared to provide to our intelligence
community the resources which will
be required to verify it.
Further, Mr. President, it is vital
that in reaching nuclear arms treaties
that we not give away conventional
arms simply to solve negotiation or
verification problems. As we lower the
nuclear risk, we must not increase the
conventional risk.
We must maintain deterrence
whether nuclear or conventional. It
must always be clear to anyone who
would be our enemy that the price of
attacking us is greater than any sane
person would pay.
Mr. President, much has been said
here and in the various committee
hearings about the reduction of nude-
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ar arms. This is an important moment,
however, for us to focus on a threat
which is older and in some ways more
terrifying than nuclear weapons, that
is chemical weapons.
Mr. President, it is incredible that in
the late 20th century, we can witness
the barbarity of chemical weapons
being used in the Iran-Iraq war. It is
also incredible that civilized nations
must maintain chemical warfare arse-
nals at this late date.
I do not have to remind my col-
leagues of the horrors of chemical
warfare. The history of. the First
World War tells us that and our televi-
sions news 'broadcasts have reinforced
the lesson.
Much has been said of the possibili-
ties of nuclear weapons being em-
ployed by terrorists. We have read
that it is possible to develop a nuclear
bomb in a relatively unsophisticated
laboratory with relatively sophisticat-
ed materials.
It is much simpler, Mr. President to
develop and field chemical weapons.
Mr. President, as we reflect on this
step we are taking in arms control, I
urge the administration to place em-
phasis on the achievement of a ban on
chemical arms. I urge the other na-
tions of the world, friends and adver-
saries, to join in this effort The tale
of suffering which has been written
across the record of this century must
end.
We in the Congress must support
this effort, first of all by assuring.that
our own Armed Forces have adequate
defenses against chemical weapons
and then by urging our administration
to place a chemical weapons treaty on
the highest priority.
Mr. President, I would, however,
caution my colleagues and the Ameri-
can people not to be so swept up in
this treaty process that they lose sight
of other critical political and social
issues which remain unsettled between
the United States and the Soviet
Union.
True peace comes from understand-
ing, simply eliminating one class of
weapon does not advance peace. Peace-
ful cultural contacts between our peo-
ples are important building blocks to
true peace. It is essential that we con-
sider how this treaty process and the
summit meetings that accompany it
can advance these ideas as well.
In summary, Mr. President, this
treaty provides an excellent
frameword for the discussion on key
issues involving the United States-
Soviet relationship. The treaty prom-
ises that the strategic realities of the
next century will be different from
those that have been obtained during
the latter half of this century.
For that reason, it is my intention to
support granting advice and consent to
this treaty.
Mr. DURENBERGER., Mr. Presi-
dent, I rise today as the Senate com-
pletes action of the INF Treaty and
the resolution of ratification. It has
been a difficult?and at times frustrat-
ing?trip on the road to ratification. A
nearly unprecedented move to invoke
cloture was averted at the 11th hour.
Serious?and not so serious?issues
have been debated at length. The
Senate has passed judgment on a
number of issues. Before our final vote
on the resolution of ratification, we
voted 21 times on amendments, condi-
tions, and a point of order. And as we
prepare for the final vote, it is clear
that the resolution will be approved by
far more than the required two-tirds.
It is important to remember what
this treaty is designed to address?and
what it was never meant to address.
The INF negotiations were about in-
termediate range forces. They were
not about the conventional force im-
balance between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. They were not about
Soviet human rights violations. And
they were not about Soviet violations
of past arms control agreements. The
Senate considered these issues?and
many more?in the course of our work
on the treaty.
The negotiations on INF were a com-
plete and resounding success. It is ab-
solutely essential to remember that
for many years it seemed the chances
of success were small. For a decade
after the deployment of SS-20's, it ap-
peared the Soviet Union would suc-
ceed in its goal of fostering disunity in
NATO, and intimidating western
Europe. Many predicted the end of
NATO in the early 1980's over the INF
issue. Many. criticized President
Reagan for being not serious about
arms control because he strove to
eliminate?rather than merely limit?
an entire class of nuclear weapons.
And many urged a halt in deployment
of our ground-launched cruise missiles
[GLCM's] and Pershing. II's in 1983,
arguing that arms control would be ir-
reversably damaged if deployment pro-
ceeded.
The critics and the doomtayers have
been decisively proven wrong. This
treaty is evidence of the success of the
Reagan approach to arms control. Sec-
retary of State Shultz, on the first day
of hearings on the treaty, correctly
stated: "The way we and our allies met
the Soviet INF challenge shows that
tough-mindedness, clarity of purpose,
and resolve pay off."
,The INF Treaty is evidence of the
amazing triumph of NATO solidarity
over Soviet attempts to decouple
Western Europe from the United
States. The first sentence of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
report summarizes the point: "The
INF Treaty is a tribute to the collec-
tive resolve of the North Atlantic Alli-
ance." The Soviet decision to deploy
SS-20's was a political master stroke.
It raised the specter of decoupling
Europe from the United States be-
cause the modernized Soviet weapons
threatened to deprive NATO of escala-
tory options in a crisis. The SS-20's
were a huge advance over the anti-
quated SS-4's and SS-5's: They were
S 6931
mobile, carried three warheads, could
be reloaded, and were more accurate.
The deployment of SS-20's forced
NATO to face a vexing dilemma: Re-
spond with a comparable but political-
ly very difficult program of modern-
ization or ignore the new threat and
endanger the alliance. NATO respond-
ed with the 1979 dual-track decision
which stated that if arms control
could not address the SS-20 threat,
nuclear modernization would. Arms
control did address the threat?and in
a manner few obServers predicted?by
completely eliminating the SS-20's.
But arms control only worked after de-
ployment began. The INF Treaty is a
prime example of how arms control
and defense programs complement
each other.
The Soviets attempted to forestall
our modernization through a skillful
propaganda campaign. Threats were
alternated with inducements in an
effort to splinter the alliance. The So-
viets walked away from all arms con-
trol negotiations in 1983 when deploy-
ment began. In spite of the Soviet ef-
forts, President Reagan and NATO
perservered?and the INF Treaty is
the result.
Senate action on this treaty took
nine very busy legislative days. The
Senate conducted its work under a
deadline. It was not an artificial dead-
line as some have charged, but a very
imporant deadline: the beginning of
President Reagan's fourth summit
with his Soviet counterpart. I strongly
supported completing action on the
INF Treaty before this weekend. I
spoke on the floor in favor of invoking
cloture on the treaty if necessary. I
took this view because I believe the
President should be able to exchange
Instruments of ratification at the
Moscow summit. I found no reason?
none?for this body to delay its advice
and consent. Exchange of the instru-
ments of ratification at the summit
may not be crucial to progress in the
U.S. summit agenda. But final action
on INF would make it clear that our
President is able to deliver on arms
control with the strong support of the
U.S. Senate?and the American
people.
Consideration of the INF Treaty was
the first time this Senator has had the
privilege of speaking and voting on an
arms control agreement. The Senate
has not considered an arms control
agreement for ratification since the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.
The fact that the INF Treaty will be
the first arms control agreement to
come into force since 1972 illustrates a
truth about the reality of arms control
in the United States: the constitution-
al requirement for two-thirds of the
Senate to consent to ratification sets a
very high standard for any arms con-
trol agreement.
As I wrote in my 1984 book, "Neither
Madmen Nor Messiahs," "Like it or
not, arms control must ultimately be
shaped in the world of politics."- As
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S 6932 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
the last 2 weeks of debate illustrated,
the politics of ratification are very
contentious. Even the unique credibil-
ity and leadership of President
Reagan and a broad bipartisan consen-
sus in favor of the INF Treaty did not
prevent a serious campaign against
ratification. President Reagan unfor-
tunately could not mobilize all the
members of his party in support of the
treaty.
The lesson is, I believe, that any
future arms control agreement?
whether by this president or the
next?will face very difficult obstacles
on the road to ratification. The INF
Treaty was subject to closer scrutiny
than any treaty in the history of the
Senate. And it is clear that any future
treaty will face even more scrupulous
examination.
In the course of Senate consider-
ation of the INF Treaty, it is clear
that the treaty was improved. While
the killer amendments were over-
whelmingly rejected, a number of posi-
tive conditions were added to the reso-
lution of ratification. Two concerns, in
Particular, that were raised after the
treaty was transmitted to the Senate
were addressed. The fate of so-called
futuristic weapons?weapons that de-
stroy targets through nonnuclear and
nonexplosive means?was raised in
Senate committee hearings. The ad-
ministration argued that such weap-
ons were prohibited along with other
weapons with ranges between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. The Senate argued,
wisely, that clarification on this point
should be explicitly reached with? the
Soviet Union.
The issue of futures was raised by
the United States with Soviet repre-
sentatives. A diplomatic note was ex-
changed in Geneva which made the
United States understanding explicit. I
voted for a category 3 condition which
makes Senate consent of the INF
Treaty conditional on Soviet agree-
ment that the note has the same force
and effect as the treaty provisions.
The same amendment required Soviet
acceptance of the agreed minute clari-
fying a number of verification issues.
That minute, signed on May 12 by the
United States and Soviet Union, also
grew out of concerns raised during
Senate consideration of the treaty.
The issue that threatened to be most
contentious?the Biden condition on
treaty interpretation?was resolved in
a bipartisan compromise. Compromise
on this issue eluded the Senate for
months, but the pressure of a cloture
threat and diligent work by concerned
Senators resulted in a workable solu-
tion. Like all compromises, it does not
completely satisfy all participants.
Twenty-seven Senators opposed the
compromise, arguing that the Byrd
amendment language was too restric-
tive. I supported the amendment be-
cause it was a good resolution of a
complex constitutional issue. The
Senate must be able to rely upon the
authoritative testimony of administra-
tion officials concerning the meaning
and effect of the text of a treaty. That
is what the Byrd amendment states,
and that is why I supported it.
I also supported the Wilson amend-
ment which simply stated that the
United States would not be bound to a
treaty interpretation that was not
equally binding on the Soviet Union.
The Wilson amendment engendered
tremendous controversy and was even-
tually tabled.
This brief summary of the INF
Treaty as we approach the momentous
vote on approving the resolution of
ratification is by no means compre-
hensive. Prehaps the greatest impor-
tance of this treaty lies in the promise
it holds for United States relations
with the Soviet Union. The Soviet ac-
ceptance of the zero option, proposed
in 1981, is indicative .of the reevalua-
tion evident in the range of Soviet
policies. Our historic adversary is in
the midst of the most dynamic change
in Soviet history. A combination of
economic, political, and social factors
have pushed the Soviet Union toward
the promise embodied in glasnost and
perestroika.
President Reagan's policy of strong
defense and strong negotiation played
a major role in moving the Soviet
Union toward more accommodating at-
titudes on a range of foreign affairs
issues. Tough negotiating paid off in
the INF Treaty?and the Soviet Union
acceded to our position. Tremendous
progress has been made in the START
negotiations. There is great potential
for real advances in a number of re-
gional security.
It is too soon to tell what the even-
tual outcome of Gorbachev's policies
will be. But it is clear that United
States-Soviet relations stand at a his-
toric crossroads. The INF Treaty is
the first tangible evidence of change
In the Soviet Union. The horizon is
full of indication Of greater progress.
That is what President Reagan is ex-
ploring in Moscow?after he presents
Secretary Gorbachev with a ratified
INF Treaty.
Mr. President, I will cast my vote in
favor of the resolution of ratification,
and I urge my colleagues to do like-
wise. -
Mr. LEVIN. The INF Treaty has un-
dergone intense Senate scrutiny by
the Armed Services, Foreign Rela-
tions, and Intelligence Committees. As
a result of that scrutiny the adminis-
tration sought and received clarifica-
tion of the Soviet understanding of
certain treaty limits. There is no ques-
tion that the Senate has in its posses-
sion the information necessary to
decide whether to consent to ratifica-
tion. It is time to make that decision.
I support ratification of the " INF
Treaty because it establishes many
precedents which are in our national
security interest.
First, it completely eliminates an
entire class of nuclear weapons from
the arsenals of the two superpowers,
and it does so in a way that enhance
?
May 27,1.988
our security, and the security of our
allies.
Second, it asymmetrically reduces
those weapons it covers in a manner
which favors NATO.
Third, it includes new, unprecedent-
ed verification procedures which will
make it extremely difficult to violate
this treaty in a militarily significant
manner without detection.
These are important accomplish-
ments. But rather than directly ex-
pounding on them in more detail I
wish to respond to some of the allega-
tions against the treaty that have
been made on this floor during the
past 10 days of debate.
/S THE TREATY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT?
We all know that the INF Treaty is
only going to eliminate about 4 per-
cent of the nuclear weapons?launch-
ers missiles, and support facilities?on
both sides. And we know the treaty
does not provide for the destruction of
a single warhead. Critics therefore ask
how much good does it really do?
First of all, 4 percent of the super-
powers' nuclear stockpiles represents a
destructive power many thousand
times that of the Hiroshima bomb,
and its removal is a militarily signifi-
cant achievement.
But the same critics often go on to
complain that the withdrawal of our
Pershing 'II's and GLVM's would have
serious negative military significance,
because it would curtail NATO's capa-
bility to target military installations,
railway chokepoints, staging areas and
industrial facilities in the U.S.S.R. in
case of an attack. They also argue that
we will denude ourselves of our most
modern nuclear weapons, while the
Soviets could simply reassign their SS-
25 missiles to targets which they for-
merly covered with their SS-20's. The
Soviets may well do so, but NATO can
certainly do the same. The important
point, however, is there will be fewer
missiles on both sides to do that. Both
sides give up nuclear options. The
treaty significantly reduces Soviet ca-
pacity to strike NATO targets while
holding their strategic forces in re-
serve. For instance, if they reallocate
SS-25's to targets in Europe, they will
reduce their capability to attack tar-
gets in the United States.
At the same time, while the treaty
requires the elimination of U.S. inter-
mediate-range, ground-based systems,
It does not eliminate the United States
and allied nuclear deterrent.
Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, made both these
points in hearings on the treaty:
? ? the Soviets will lose capability in
both the European and Asian theaters.
They will no longer have the capacity to hit
with ground-launched ballistic missiles ? ?
our prepositioned major equipment sites
and debarkation sea and air ports in West-
ern Europe, thereby reducing our ability to
reinforce NATO.
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STAYS EFFECTIVE
Critics of the treaty have also con-
tended that the elimination of Per-
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
shing II's and GLCM's would open a
window of vulnerability because it will
force us to sacrifice an important part
of our nuclear deterrent. Without in-
termediate-range nuclear forces, we
could be forced to escalate to strategic
nuclear forces if our conventional de-
fenses in Europe prove to be inad-
equate. Flexible response, these critics
claim, has always meant that We could
escalate on each step of the ladder of
destruction and respond to a Soviet
attack at any level we choose.
Let me first say, Mr. President, that
this is a flawed understanding of the
flexible response doctrine. In develop-
ing that doctrine more than 20 years
ago, NATO planners wanted to leave a
potential attacker uncertain about the
level of response and the degree of es-
calation the Western alliance would
choose in defending itself. It is true
that the deployment of Pershings and
GLCM's in Europe gave us more oper-
ational choice. But getting rid of them
does not mean NATO is losing flexibil-
ity. An attacker would still be uncer-
tain how soon we would respond with
nuclear weapons, and with which of a
still vast array of such weapons we
might counterattack.
Admiral Crowe, in the course of our
hearings, also said that after the INF
Treaty takes effect:
? ? ? the U.S. will retain a spectrum of ca-
pabilities to selectively execute NATO's
strategy of flexible response.
The Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missiles eliminated by
the INF Treaty are but a part of
NATO's current nuclear deterrent.
Over 4,000 nuclear warheads will
remain in Western Europe after the
INF Treaty is implemented. 1,700 of
those 4,000 are aircraft bombs.
As Walter Slocombe told the For-
eign Relations Committee:
? ? ? it is simply false to suggest that
without them (i.e. the Pershing II's) NATO
will lack the means to attack Soviet forces
and Soviet territory with nuclear weapons.
And former Defense Secretary
Schlesinger testified:
It is a form of parochialism in Europe to
suggest that the Soviets have basically been
deterred by a relative handful of warheads
In Europe, none of which, were deployed
before 1983.
Even after INF ratification, we will
have the capability in Europe to strike
at targets in the Soviet Union. The
Foreign Relations Committee report
discusses NATO's remaining military
options in some detail:
Among the aircraft capable of striking
deep into Soviet territory are 150 F-111
bombers stationed in Britain. There are also
additional F-111's in the United States that
could be quickly transferred to NATO in a
crisis. In addition to these F-ill's, NATO
has an ongoing program to upgrade the ca-
pability, range, and survivability of its other
nuclear capable aircraft. As part of this pro-
gram, NATO continues to introduce upgrad-
ed F-16's and Tornado aircraft with greatly
enhanced range and penetration capability.
Finally, as Secretary Carlucci reported in
"Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's,"
NATO's planned deployment of the nuclear
capable F-15E Strike Eagle in the early
1990's "will significantly augment the capa-
bilities of NATO's dual-capable aircraft."
It is simply not true that we are de-
nuding our forces in Europe of the de-
terrent and protection nuclear forces
can provide. Certainly, both sides are
giving up part of their nuclear forces.
The Soviet intermediate nuclear mis-
siles covered by this treaty were pre-
cisely those in the late 1970's that
threatened the European theater the
most. How can getting rid of them
make us and our allies' security less
safe? And is the nuclear deterrent
after INF ratification less credible?
THE EFFECT OF THE INF TREATY ON THE
CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE
Another allegation made by those
Senators who intend to vote against
the treaty is that it will relegate our
325,000 soldiers in Europe to the role
of hostages in the face of overwhelm-
ing Warsaw Pact superiority in con-
ventional forces. Without adequate
nuclear protection, the saying goes,
our troops would be run over in . no
time at all, so let's bring them home
before that happens.
The INF Treaty does not make
Europe safe for conventional 'war. As
Secretary Carlucci recently wrote:
The key point is, in addition to eliminat-
ing a category of weapons in which the
Soviet Union has enjoyed a significant pre-
ponderance, will not impede NATO's ability
to maintain and modernize a credible mix of
nuclear and conventional forces.
Let me stress that a conventional
war in Europe would not be a particu-
larly safe enterprise for the Soviets.
As the latest edition of the Pentagon
publication "Soviet Military Power"
noted:
At the conventional level, the Soviets may
conclude that, despite their advantages,
they may not have sufficient forces to
assure them a high probability of success in
the event of war in Europe.
This is not to say that as we contin-
ue to reduce our reliance on nuclear
weapons our conventional forces
should not be improved. They should
be. In fact, improving our convention-
al forces and achievement of conven-
tional arms control would be the most-
effective means of reducing the risk of
nuclear war, because a nuclear war is
most likely to result from the con-
trolled or uncontrolled escalation of a
conventional conflict.
The INF Treaty highlights the ne-
cessity to modernize and improve our
conventional forces. Reliance on the
nuclear deterrent has always been po-
tentially devastating. By providing suf-
ficient logistical support, enough
modern weapons, ammunition and fuel
supplies to our combat forces, and by
keeping up the high level of our sol-
diers' training we can improve our con-
ventional deterrent.
THE NATO ALLIANCE WILL BE STRONGER
Some critics of the INF Treaty sug-
gest the alliance will break apart as a
result of the 'elimination of the inter-
mediate nuclear weapons.
S 6933
I don't see how NATO could possibly
break apart because of an action that
is supported by all its European gov-
ernments and welcomed by the over-
whelming majority of their people. Po-
litically and psychologically, the
treaty serves to strengthen the cohe-
sion of the Western alliance. For the
first time it could be shown in a palpa-
ble way that reductions of weapons
can be achieved if the alliance takes
and maintains' a unified position of
strength.
We face new demands on our and
the allies' defense budgets in order to
modernize remaining nuclear weapons
and improve our conventional capabili-
ties. How in the world will we muster
political support in our democracies
for these undertakings if we don't de-
liver on our promise to withdraw INF
missiles from Europe if the Soviets
agree to withdraw theirs?
Our political credibility and maneu-
vering room are at stake. Ratification
will enhance them, while rejection
would cause considerable political tur-
moil, and could actually result in the
unilateral withdrawal of our INF
forces.
In sum, all the evidence points to a
serious crisis in NATO if we do not
ratify the INF Treaty, not the other
way around.
INF VERIFICATION MEASURES ARE PRECEDENT
SETTING
Nobody doubts the extraordinary
achievement of having the Soviets
agree to onsite inspections for the first
time in the history of arms-control
agreements.
No verification regime can be made
absolutely foolproof. If the Salets
Intend to cheat, they will do so. If
they do it in any militarily significant
way, there is a high probability for de-
tection and our response to that is not
limited to diplomatic protest alone.
But the fact of the matter is, there
is little incentive for the Soviets to
cheat. If they are at all serious about
further reductions in nuclear arsenals,
they will have to prove to us that they
are willing to cooperate. Also, rather
than hiding some SS-20's or GLCM's
somewhere in the Siberian tundra,
where they would be militarily useless,
they could?and probably will?retar-
get some of their SS-25's to targets in
Western Europe. But that is not an ar-
gument against INF. It is an argument
for further, cautious negotiations on
the reduction of strategic nuclear
forces.
The verification scheme tested
under the INF Treaty will not be an
exact model for START. The START
agreement does not plan to abolish all
nuclear weapons of a particular type,
which is one of the things that makes
verification of the present treaty con-
siderably easier. But the experience
we will gain with onsite verification
from INF should prove helpful in ar-
riving at effective START verification.
Not only do we need experience in
monitoring Soviet weapons produc-
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S 6934 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tion, we also need to learn how to
handle a large number of Soviet in-
spectors in our own country. We must,
for example, develop sufficient coun-
terintelligence measures.
INF creatively mixes the prohibi-
tions in the agreement with specific
verification procedures to ensure that
no militarily significant violations will
go undetected. For example, the prohi-
bition on flight testing and production
of systems banned by the agreement,
combined with the onsite inspection,
facility monitoring, and challenge in-
spection provisions, make the mainte-
nance, production, or deployment of a
militarily significant covert INF force
next to impossible without detection.
Mr. President, the Senate has done
an excellent job of resolving the issue
of how this treaty and other treaties
are to be interpreted by future Presi-
dents by adopting the Byrd amend-
ment yesterday. This amendment was
absolutely essential to reaffirm the
Senate's constitutional role in treaty-
making.
Under the Constitution, the Senate
must give its advice and consent to the
ratification of a treaty which is negoti-
ated by the President and his repre-
sentatives in order for it to take legal
effect. Treatymaking is thus a cooper-
ative Undertaking, a power shared by
the Executive and the Senate, and in
order for this process to work, they
must also share a common under-
standing of what the treaty they are
making together means. The Byrd
amendment clearly establishes that
the text of a treaty and the resolution
of ratification have primary status as
to its meaning. The next binding
source for establishing a treaty's
meaning under domestic law is the ex-
planation provided to the Senate by
the President's authorized representa-
tives. These representatives form a
binding contract between the Presi-
dent and the Senate as to U.S. obliga-
tions under the treaty. The common
understanding of the treaty is thus es-
tablished by its text, the resolution of
ratification and the administration's
authoritative explanations. No admin-
istration may deviate from that under-
standing without the consent of the
Senate.
White House Counsel Arthur B. Cul-
vahouse, Jr., made clear in a letter to
Senator LUGAR last March that "all
INF testimony of executive branch
witnesses, within their authorized
scope, is authoritative." I ask unani-
mous consent that the full text of that
letter be printed at the close of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. LEVIN. Some Senators have
claimed that such a standard will es-
tablish two treaties, one between the
President and the U.S.S.R., another
between the President and the U.S.
Senate. They fear that the Soviets will
not be bound by the United States'
common or shared understanding.
However, it is the administration's re-
sponsibility to make sure that what
they explain the treaty to mean is con-
sistent with what the Soviets agreed it
would mean. In establishing a shared
understanding with the Executive the
Senate is simply establishing what the
negotiating partners both intended
the treaty to mean. As long as the ad-
ministration properly explains the
meaning of the treaty to the Senate,
the Soviets will be as much bound by
the administration's authoritative
statements as is the United States
itself.
Other Senators have claimed that
the Byrd amendment could prevent
clarification of future ambiguities
such as those we detected in the treaty
with respect to future technologies.
We solved that problem in part by
looking at the negotiating record, and
the Byrd amendment would clearly
allow such references to take place in
the future. But we have not and
should not establish a procedure in
which the Senate has to wade through
what negotiating history is provided to
It to ensure that the administration's
authoritative representations are not
In conflict with that record. Such a
procedure would completely bog down
the treatymaking process.
It was also critically important that
the Senate defeated the amendment
by the junior Senator from California
last night. His amendment would os-
tensibly have said that the United
States would not be bound to any in-
terpretation that didn't also bind the
Soviet Union. This sounds simple and
appealing, but this was nothing but an
effort to vitiate the Byrd amendment.
It would have, for instance, allowed a
future President to bow to Soviet pres-
sure and agree to a; new Soviet inter-
pretation of the treaty which might
allow the Soviets to conduct weapons
programs which President Reagan's
representatives swore to the Senate
would be prohibited. International law
would thereby override domestic U.S.
law, and the President would not be
bound by the representations made to
the Senate.
Let me be clear on this point, Mr.
President: The authoritative state-
ments made by the Executive are more
important to U.S. security in evaluat-
ing a treaty's meaning than the nego-
tiating history. Without being sure
that the administration means what it
says when it explains the treaty to us,
we cannot sensibly advise and consent
to it.
If the executive was not bound by its
statements, a subsequent administra-
tion could come back and say, "sorry
folks, the treaty means something
else. We found a paper here in the ne-
gotiating history that proves it means
something different than was repre-
sented to you during the hearings."
And what is even worse, the Soviets
could at some future date pressure our
administration to interpret a certain
section in the treaty a certain way?
May 27, 1.988
for example as a concession during an-
other treaty negotiation.
This is why the adoption of the Byrd
amendment and the defeat of the
Wilson and also the Specter amend-
ments today were so important.
Mr. President, we cannot allow this
opportunity to pass. There is a unique,
and propitious, convergence of events
today that we may not soon see again.
The President who negotiated this
treaty is known for his skepticism
about Soviet intentions, but he has ap-
proved the verification procedures in-
cluded in this treaty. The Soviet
leader is new, apparently determined
to pursue a new economic course at
home, and determined to achieve an
INF Treaty both to demonstrate his
adroitness and to begin a process that
could lead to reduced military spend-
ing. We don't know what the situation
will be a year from now. But we do
know what it is today. We have what
may be a unique opportunity.
I urge ratification of this treaty. I
don't claim that it is perfect. I don't
know of any treaty the Senate has
ever ratified that was. I think of the
proverb, "Even a journey of a thou-
sand miles begins with a single step."
This is that step. Our goal is nothing
less than the elimination of the threat
of nuclear annihilation that hangs
over us, our children, and our planet.
In pursuit of that goal, even a relative-
ly small step is of the greatest signifi-
cance. Let's take it. Now.
EXHIBIT 1
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 22, 1988.
Hon. RICHARD D. LUGAR,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR LT/GAR: Discussions concern-
ing my letter to you of March 17, 1988, have
raised a question about the Secretary of
State's identical letters of February 9, 1988,
to Senators Byrd and Nunn. To clear up any
misunderstanding that may exist, I should
like to assure you that no inconsistency was
intended or in fact exists between my letter
and Secretary Shultz' letters. Whereas Sec-
retary Shultz responded to the Senators' re-
quest for assurances regarding the "authori-
tativeness" of Executive branch testimony
on the INF Treaty and the Senate's ability
to rely on such testimony, my letter ad-
dressed a specific draft text setting forth
what we believe to be unconstitutional and
unworkable rules of treaty interpretation.
As the Secretary of State's February 9 let-
ters pointed out: (1) all INF testimony of
Executive branch witnesses, within their au-
thetrized scope, is authoritative; (2) Adminis-
tration testimony and materials for the
record /can be regarded as authoritative
without the need for ,the Senate to incorpo-
rate them in its Resolution of Advice and
Consent: and (3) the Reagan Administration
will in no way depart from the INF Treaty
as we are presenting it to the Senate. Those
letters remain an accurate statement of our
policy and intention with respect to the INF
Treaty.
My March 17 letter is consistent with Sec-
retary Shultz' statement of Administration
views.
Sincerely,
ARTHUR B. CITLVAHOUSE. Jr.,
Counsel to the President.
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I
would like to share with the Senate a
few thoughts that I have about what
brought us to this first significant step
In nuclear arms reduction which cul-
minated here in the U.S. Senate when
our constitutional ratification process-
es were completed.
Clearly, I need not go through a list
of congratulations. Others have done
It better than I and certainly know
more intimately the committee activi-
ties of staff than I do.
But I would like to congratulate
President Ronald Reagan, the Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev, our Secre-
tary of State and his counterpart in
the Soviet Union, the United States
Congress, and the U.S. Senate in par-
ticular.
Having said that, I would like to talk
for a minute about the people of the
world that I think caused this treaty
to happen, and the evolution of de-
mocracy and entrepreneurship in the
world that I think America started
after the Second World War that
brought us here. So before I give my
few observations, I would like to say a
very big thank you to the American
people for having consistently sup-
ported at critical times since the
Second World War a strong American
military.
But I would also like to congratulate
American leaders who at the end of
the Second World War had a kind of
foresight that, if you think about it
for a minute, is so farsighted that it is
almost frightening. Mr. President, the
Soviet Union decided to negotiate with
the United States of America and the
Free World, represented on the Free
World side by our President, Ronald
Reagan, as much because of economics
as because of military might.
Let me put this this way, Mr. Presi-
dent: The Soviet Union at the end of
the Second World War decided that
they were going to have a kind of
empire. It was an empire that was
going to be built on their kind of polit-
ical system and their kind of economic
system. What did the United States of
America do? The United States of
America did one of the most incredible
things that a superpower has done in
all of history. We decided that we
would not take 1 ounce of retribution
against our enemies, Japan and Ger-
many. Quite to the contrary, we wel-
comed them with open arms into a
new alliance of broad-based democracy
for their people, and a competitive or
entrepreneurial, noncentralized eco-
nomic system. And that decision was
so far-sighted that it probably reflects
the most important single quality of
our 200-year democracy. Because from
that decision has mushroomed an
evolving free industrial economic base
the likes of which the world has never
seen, from Japan to Germany, to
Europe with the Marshall Plan, to
Korea and new budding democracies
around the world.
Believe it or not, that one decision
fueled the concepts that caused the
world to produce five times as much
material wealth since the Second
World War as was produced in all of
previous history.
Now, I return to where I start. The
Soviet Union looks out a window at
prosperity and material wealth, tech-
nological advance, educational superi-
ority. It must now, with new younger
leaders in that country shake them to
the very bones to understand that, as
they look back at their kind of empire,
with its economy in decay, they are in-
capable of competing with the free
market system which our decision that
I have just described started.
It was sort of a freedom machine
that we think comes from the Consti-
tution and our people and probably
will never stop as long as people live
on this Earth. It has spread, and its
economic base is profound.
While we Americans look out at that
free world, we have from time to time
been burdened and bothered by the
successes of our partners, because
some of them learned from us and are
doing better than we are, be it the
Japanese or the Germans or others.
They learned from us in terms of
broad-based education, economics, and
the formation of wealth. They are, in
some respects, causing us to play catch
up in some areas. But when you look
at the big picture, it appears to this
Senator that we should say, "Thank
you" to our forefathers for their
wisdom in moving this kind of econom-
ic base out into the world?and to the
American people who work hard every
day to keep this economy robust, and
to our friends and partners in the free
world who are moving science, tech-
nology, and mankind ahead with us in
a manner that must frighten the
Soviet Union immensely.
Obviously, there is a long way to go.
But this step is a giant step and, hope-
fully, it will yield more and more re-
sults as time passes.
Clearly, we have to remain vigilant,
and we will have to keep this economic
production machine of the free world
the envy of those who have not joined
It. Collectively and collaboratively, we
have to spread the opportunity to
other parts of the world?the opportu-
nities of institutional democracy, cap-
ital formation, and the production of
wealth and jobs for people.
More on the parochial and back-
home front, I want to thank the na-
tional laboratories in my State?
Sandia, Los Alamos, and the laborato-
ry at Lawrence Livermore in Califor-
nia. They are our nuclear deterrent
laboratories run by the Department of
Energy. They are the greatest scien-
tists in the world. They house them-
selves there, and since the Second
World War they have operated under
a very loose charter. They have been
asked to maintain our nuclear deter-
rent, and they have.
They are the ones who produce the
science, the technology, and the evolu-
tion of nuclear weapons, such that the
Senate has finally decided to approve
S 6935
this treaty, along with the economic
reasons I stated here today and our
conventional expenditures on military
might. This is what has caused the
Soviet Union to begin to rethink the
enormous amount of money they are
putting into the military.
Those laboratories have played a
vital role in this treaty. It might be
Ironic to some?but not to this Sena-
tor?that the same scientists who pro-
duced the first atomic bomb and its
subsequent generations, and all the so-
phisticated technology that goes with
that, have also produced the verifica-
tion science that permitted us to enter
into this treaty.
As a matter of fact, one of those na-
tional laboratories, Sandia National
Laboratory, in Albuquerque, NM, was
asked to prepare the model for the
verification system we will put on the
ground in the Soviet Union. Since this
treaty is a zero option, none of these
weapons will be allowed. We are going
to man equipment in the Soviet Union
to do the monitoring to verify their
production facilities.
It is one of the same three laborato-
ries, with their scientific excellence,
that was called upon to produce the
scientific information and the basic
science and engineering that will be
used when we build in the Soviet
Union the facilities to verify their pro-
duction facilities.
I do not think that is ironic?some
may think so?because they are great
scientists, with great versatility, per-
haps the greatest in the world.
When we add those three to the
other Department of Energy laborato-
ries, we have the greatest scientific or-
ganization in the world. Because they
are so capable, so familiar with nucle-
ar activities, it seems to this Senator
that they are going to play a vital role
in putting the genie back in the bottle,
just as they played a vital role in the
genie getting out of the bottle.
Mr. President, I close by congratu-
lating all those men and women, the
scientists, and Congress, who all these
years have supported these great insti-
tutions.
I congratulate them for their ef-
forts, because they were working on
very short timeframes and were able
to assure American policymakers that
we could engineer, design, and deliver
the verification needed for us to feel
secure?our President, first, and then
us?in ratification, in delivering a com-
pleted package to President Ronald
Reagan so that he and Mikhail Gorba-
chev, the leader of the Soviet Union,
could meet and talk about further
problems between our two nations,
other problems, including perhaps fur-
ther arms reduction in the field of nu-
clear armaments, and many of the
other thorny problems that separate
us.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have lis-
tened with great interest to my friend
and colleague from New Mexico.
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S 6936 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
When we talk about he heroes of
peace and the heroes of war, I am
struck by the fact that all too often we
do not pay enough attention, as we
should, to those scientists, as has just
been done very eloquently by my
friend and colleague from New
Mexico. I thank him for making these
statements, because these are indeed
the people we are relying on to lead us
to proper verification, which is part
and parcel of the peace process we
hope will be moved ahead even further
with the summit meeting next week
between the leader of the Soviet
Union and the leader of the free
world, President Reagan.
TRIBUTE TO INF DELEGATION
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, at the
first of what became many hearings
with Ambassador Glitman, I made the
following statement about the review
process upon which we were about to
embark:
Ambassador Glitman, I thank you for you
patience and welcome you before the com-
mittee. At the outset. I want to emphasize
that however tedious, protracted or difficult
these proceedings may seem, we are guided
by a common goal: to ensure that the treaty
that has been presented ta the Senate for
Its advice and consent is both fully under-
stood and fully supportive of our national
security interests.
From our trips to Geneva with the Senate
Arms Control Observer Group, we know
how hard you and your team worked on this
treaty. Your hours were long and your pa-
tience was often tested. In the end you pre-
vailed and faithfully executed your negoti-
ating instructions as given to you by the
President. You did your duty and you did it
well. Now is the time for us to do ours with
your help.
As the long journey traveled by this
treaty now enters the final phase, I would
ask all of you to recall Winston Churchill's
famous observations to the House of Com-
mons in 1947 when he said, "Many forms of
government have been tried and will be
tried in this world of sin and woe. No one
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-
wise. Indeed, it has been said that democra-
cy is the worst form of government except
all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time."
So we will have to keep that in mind as we
go through this tedious journey.
Mr. President, as we now reach the
end of this long road toward ratifica-
tion of the INF Treaty, I would again
like to pay tribute to Ambassador Gun-
man and his able and professional ne-
gotiating team.
Through the months of Senate hear-
ings and 2 weeks of floor debate, Am-
bassador Glitman has demonstrated
the same diligence, expertise and calm
patience which he maintained through
the years of negotiating this treaty. I
commend him and his colleagues for
their hard work and their constant
willingness to respond to our questions
and assist us in our review of this
treaty.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to insert in the REcorta a list of
the members of the U.S. INF delega-
tion and commend them for their im-
portant contribution to making this
treaty a reality.
There being no objection, the list of
members was ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
INF DELEGATION AT SIGNATURE?DECEMBER
1987
Amb. Maynard W. Glitman.
Amb. John Woodworth?OSD.
Mr. Leo Reddy?Department of State.
Mr. David Jones?Department of State.
Ms. Karin Lawson?ACDA.
Mr. Robert Simmons?ACDA.
BGEN Frank A. Partlow?JCS.
Mr. Alan Foley?State.
LTC Jeffrey Ankley.
Mr. James Hurd.
Dr. Stan Fraley.
Mr. Ronald Bartek.
Mr. Timothy Tulenko.
Mr. David Sloss.
LTC Jerry Myers.
COL Ronald Forrest.
COL Thomas Kincaid.
LTC Joseph Grubb.
LTC-Ken Keating.
MAJ Timothy Hayes.
Ms. Paulette Grabulis.
Mr. Jerry Cady.
Mr. Michael Pecotte.
Ms. Susan Kosinski.
Ms. Jan Hughes.
Ms. Alexandra Miller.
Ms. Helen Moses.
Ms. Peggy Woosley.
Ms. Jo Reklis.
Ms. Dorothy Peratt.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, there is
a passage from Livy's "History of
Rome" which calls to mind what is
about to happen in the Senate today.
It reads as follows.
Until at last not only Rome's resources
but her spirit failed her also . . . and so the
Senate foregathered, and bade the generals
find some way of inducing the invader to
depart. . . and a treaty was made. . . that
they should deliver a thousand pounds
weight of gold to Brennus King of the
Gauls who should rule both nations thereaf-
ter. And upon this wicked and humiliating
settlement, the invader's insolence heaped
another injury: for when the gold was to be
weighed he would have it measured in his
own lying scales: and when the Roman gen-
eral refused, the Gaul flung his sword into
the false balance "that they might pay all
and the sword's weight, too." And they say a
voice was heard that the Romans could not
endure hearing, crying "Conquered! Woe to
thee, thou art Conquered!"
But Camillus (outside the City] bade
them recover their country with iron pot
gold, having before them the temples of
their gods, their wives, their children, and
the land where they were born. Livy, Histo-
ry of Rome, describing events of 390 B.C.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as the
Senate winds up its consideration of
the INF Treaty, I would like to make
some observations on the significance
of this treaty. Many of us have point-
ed out that the reductions mandated
by this treaty are marginal militarily
since they involve only 5 percent or so
of the two sides' deployed nuclear ar-
senals, but that the treaty is neverthe-
less important because it is a necessary
first step toward significant reductions
in strategic weapons and in other of-
fensive forces. I would like to expand a
bit on what we have accomplished by
approving this treaty.
For the first time, however modest-
ly, we are reducing nuclear weapons.
May 27, 1988
We are not just limiting the growth
for freezing the level of nuclear weap-
ons, we are lowering the level of such
weapons and establishing the basis for
further dramatic reductions. That is a
truly remarkable achievement.
For almost a decade and one-half, we
and the Soviets have been engaged in
a Euromissile arms race costing bil-
lions of dollars. The INF Treaty
means that both sides now implicitly
admit that they have wasted billions
of dollars in a fruitless effort to outbid
each other in theater nuclear arma-
ment. More importantly, a conceptual
breakthrough has been achieved in
Soviet thinking about what constitutes
sufficiency in its arsenal of deterrence.
The Soviets are prepared to sacrifice
the capacity to deliver four warheads
for every one that the United States
gives up, because?apparently?they
accept that the world can be destroyed
by a fraction of the nuclear weapons
that now exist. Therefore, there is an
apparent acceptance that fewer mis-
siles do not necessarily imply a de-
crease of security and since there can
be no victor in so-called nuclear war-
fighting, there is no point in piling up
nuclear armaments above the level
that would deter attack.
It is this change in mind-set that is
the important thing about the INF
Treaty, and it is this change in mind-
set that, once embodied in the INF
Treaty, makes it possible to reduce
even more superfluous nuclear weap-
ons. By approving this treaty we are
generating momentum for truly signif-
icant reductions that will make the
world safer for all of us, for our chil-
dren and for their children. I, for one,
am proud and privileged to be a part
of this historic beginning; and I hope
to be a part of the subsequent process
of deep reductions in nuclear weapons.
It took great political courage and
skill on both sides to open the way to
the INF Treaty and to the further
arms control agreements that are
almost sure to follow. More courage
and skill will be needed to achieve
these further agreements, but I am
confident that our efforts will be
crowned with success.
I wish to congratulate President
Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Ambassador
Kampelman and Ambassador Glitman
for what they have achieved in this
INF agreement. I also commend Sena-
tor BYRD, Senator DOLE, Senator
NuNN, Senator WARNER, Senator
BOREN, Senator COHEN, Senator LUGAR
and all of my colleagues on the For-
eign Relations Committee for the
leadership and support they have
given to this historic effort.
In addition, I would like to thank
the staff for its excellent work in
making this treaty possible. I would
like to commend in particular John
Ritch, Bill Ashworth, Dave Keaney,
Jamie Rubin, Chris Van Hollen, Nancy
Stetson, Hank Kenny, Kathi Taylor,
Steve Polansky, George Pickart, Mary
Jane Hatcher, Charlotte Ford, Betty
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Alonso, Jonathan -Litchman, David
Hill, Joanna Figueroa, and Jerry
Christianson, who, as Staff Director,
coordinated the work of the commit-
tee staff.
. Finally, although we were on oppo-
site sides of the fence on this issue, I
would like to pay tribute to Senator
HELMS, the ranking minority member
of the Foreign Relations Committee.
He fought a valiant, often lonely,
fight; but he is a man of patriotism
and conviction, and I respect him for
that. He fought for what he believed
was in America's best interest, and we
simply agreed to disagree. He has con-
ducted himself with considerable dig-
nity and civility, and I thank -him for
his cooperation in ensuring that this
treaty was brought to the floor with a
minimum of delay and, above all, with-
out any personal rancor whatsoever.
I would be remiss if I did not also
pay tribute to our absent colleague,
Senator BinEN, who contributed so
much to the success that the Senate
achieved in defending its prerogatives
in treaty making. I wish him a speedy
recovery, and I look forward to his
early return to the Senate.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and
nays.
, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
being no further debate, the question
Is on agreeing to the resolution of rati-
fication of Treaty Document No. 100-
11. The yeas and nays have been or-
dered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Ohio [Mr. GLENN] is
absent due to death in the family.
I also announce that the Senator
from Delaware [Mr. BIDEM is absent
because of illness.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Ohio
[Mr. GLENN] would vote "yea." -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted?yeas 93,
nays 5, as follows:
Mollnall Vote No. 166 Ex.]
YEAS-93
Adams Dixon Kassebaum
Armstrong Dodd Kasten
BaUCUS Dole Kennedy
Bentsen Domenici Kerry
Bingaman Durenberger Lautenberg
Bond Evans Leahy
Boren Exon Levin
Boschwitz Ford Lugar
Bradley Fowler Matsunaga
Breaux Garn McCain
Bumpers Gore McClure
Burdick Graham McConnell
Byrd Gramm Melcher
Chafee Grassley Metzenbaum
Chiles Harkin Mikulski
Cochran Hatch Mitchell
Cohen Hatfield Moynihan
Conrad Hecht Murkowski
Cranston Heflin Nickles
D'Amato Heinz Nunn
Danforth Inouye Packwood
Daschle Johnston Pell
DeConcini Karnes Pressler
Proxmire
Pryor
Quayle
Reid -
Riegle
Rockefeller
Roth
Rudman
Sanford
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Specter
Stafford
Stennis
Stevens
Thurmond
Trible
Warner
Weicker
Wilson
Wirth
NAYS-5
Helms Humphrey Wallop
Hollings Symms
NOT VOTING-2
Biden Glenn
So it was:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein), That the
Senate advise and consent to ratification of
the Treaty between the United States' of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their In-
termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Mis-
siles, together with the Memorandum of
Understanding and the two Protocols there-
to, collectively referred to as the INF
Treaty, all signed at Washington-on Decem-
ber 8, 1987 (Treaty Doc. 100-11), subject to
the following?
(a) CONDITIONS:
(1) Provided, that the Senate's advice and
consent to ratification of the INF Treaty is
subject' to the condition, based on the
Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, that?
(A) the United States shall interpret the
Treaty in accordance with the common un-
derstanding of the Treaty shared by the
President and the Senate at the time the
Senate gave its advice and consent to ratifi-
cation;
(B) such common understanding is based
on:
(i) first, the text of the Treaty and the
provisions of this resolution of ratification;
and
(ii) second, the authoritative representa-
tions which were provided by the President
and his representatives to the Senate and its
Committees, in seeking Senate consent to
ratification, insofar as such representations
were directed to the meaning and legal
effect of the text of the Treaty; and
(C) the United States shall not agree to or
adopt an interpretation different from that
common understanding except pursuant to
Senate advice and consent to a subsequent
treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a
statute; and
(D) if, subsequent to ratification of the
Treaty, a question arises as to the interpre-
tation of a provision of the Treaty on which
no common understanding was reached in
accordance with paragraph (2), that provi-
sion shall be interpreted in accordance with
applicable United States law.
(2) The advice and consent of the Senate
to the ratification of the INF Treaty is fur-
ther subject to the condition that in connec-
tion with the exchange of the instruments
of ratification pursuant to Article XVII of
the Treaty, the President shall obtain the
agreement of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics that the agreement concluded by
exchange of notes in Geneva on May 12,
1988 between the United States and the
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as to the
application of the Treaty to intermediate-
range and shorter-range missiles flight-
tested or deployed to carry or be used as
weapons based on either current or future
technologies and as to the related question
of the definition of the term "weapon-deliv-
ery vehicle" as used in the Treaty, the
agreed minute of May 12, 1988 signed by
Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman and Colo-
nel General N. Chervov reflecting the agree-
ment of the Parties regarding certain issues
related to the Treaty, and the agreements
signed on May 21, 1988 in Vienna and
S 6937
Moscow, respectively, correcting the site
diagrams and certain? technical errors in the
Treaty, are of the same force and effect as
the provisions of the Treaty.
(3) That prior to the exchange of the in-
struments of ratification pursuant to Article
XVII of the Treaty, the President shall cer-
tify that it is the common understanding of
the United States and the Soviet Union that
if either Party produces a type of ground-
launched ballistic missile (GLBM) not limit-
ed by the Treaty using a stage which is out-
wardly similar to, but not interchangeable
with, a stage of an existing type of interme-
diate-range GLBM having more than one
stage, it may not produce any other stage
which is outwardly similar to, whether or
not it is interchangeable with, any other
stage of an existing type of intermediate-
range GLBM.
(b) DECLARATIONS:
(1) The Senate's advice and consent to
ratification of the Treaty is further subject
to the following:
(A) because the incentive for Soviet non-
compliance, and the difficulty of monitoring
will be greater for any strategic arms reduc-
tion talks (START) agreement than for the
INF Treaty, the United States should rely
primarily on its own national technical
means of verification rather than any coop-
erative verification scheme, such as the on-
site inspection procedures agreed to in the
INF Treaty.
(B) because the United States enjoys a
comparative advantage in the development
of nonnuclear technologies that can in-
crease the nuclear threshold and reduce the
likelihood of war and because START and
the INF Treaty will increase the military
need to rely more heavily on such nonnucle-
ar capabilities, in any subsequent agreement
between the United States and the Soviet
Union regarding the reduction of Strategic
Weapons, it should be the position of the
United States that no restrictions should be
established on current or future nonnuclear
air- or sea-launched cruise missiles devel-
oped or deployed by the United States, or
on nonnuclear ground launched cruise mis-
siles of ranges not prohibited by the INF
Treaty; and
(C) because the reductions contemplated
under any START agreement would change
the character and optimal mix of strategic
nuclear forces that the United States will
need to maintain stability, the United
States Congress and the President should
agree on the character of, and funding for,
these forces before any START agreement,
framework or otherwise, signed or agreed
to.
(2) Provided, that the Senate's advice and
consent to ratification of the INF Treaty is
subject to the condition: Declaration.?It
shall he the declared policy of the United
States of America that, as an integral factor
in its decision to adhere to this Treaty, the
United States intends to continue to negoti-
ate with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics a treaty effecting reductions in stra-
tegic nuclear forces of the Parties and, in
conjunction with its NATO Allies, to negoti-
ate a treaty establishing conventional stabil-
ity in Europe. In so doing, it shall be guided
by the following principles and consider-
ations:
(A) A main object of such-future treaties
shall be international stability and reduc-
tion of the risk of war by obtaining general
equivalence in the resultant strategic forces
of the Parties;
(B) During any negotiations contemplated
by this declaration, the United States shall
act in close consultation with its Allies who
are member states of the North Atlantic
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S 6938
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 27, 1.98?8
Treaty Organization and with such other
states as appropriate;
(C) Negotiations contemplated by this
declaration shall also be conducted with
close and detailed consideration of the
advice of the United States Senate, and the
Senate should be kept fully apprised of all
significant proposals made to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and, with respect
to such negotiations, the judgments and rec-
ommendations of the United States Senate
shall be given full and highest consideration
and due regard;
(D) The negotiations contemplated by this
declaration shall also seek to secure regimes
of effective verification and mechanisms for
full compliance which build upon the verifi-
cation regime and compliance mechanisms
of the present Treaty, strengthening them
appropriately for any subsequent treaty;
(E) In accordance with the Constitutional
process of the United States, the United
States shall, consistant with correctly con-
strued principles of international law, not
be bound to adhere to or observe any treaty
contemplated by this declaration until rati-
fication thereof pursuant to the advice and
consent of the Senate. However, nothing in
this declaration shall imply that the United
States will take an action of such nature as
to make impossible the performance of any
future treaty contemplated by this declara-
tion after the signing of such treaty. and
during the period in which there is a, clear
prospect of timely ratification thereof;
(F) The United States considers full and
exact compliance with the present treaty
and with all other existing arms control
agreements between the Parties to be a
major issue affecting i) the proposals and
attitudes of the United States with respect
to the future treaties contemplated hereby
and ii) proportionate and appropriate re-
sponses with respect to such existing agree-
ments;
(G) Pursuant to this declaration, any joint
statement by the United States of America
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of a framework for the negotiation of stra-
tegic arms treaties contemplated hereby,
and such framework itself, shall serve for
the purpose only of guiding the conduct of
the negotiations which the United States
herein has declared its 'desire to pursue ex-
peditiously, and shall not constrain any
military programs of the United States
unless otherwise provided for in accordance
with Stction 33 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act; and
(H) The capability of the United States of
America to monitor any future treaty con-
templated by this declaration shall be
strenthened in order to increase the ability
of the United States to detect violations
thereof.'."
(C) DECLARATION AND UNDERSTANDINGS:
The advice and consent to ratification
given by the Senate under this resolution of
ratification is subject to the following decla-
ration and understandings, which the Presi-
dent, using existing authority, shall commu-
nicate to the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, in connection with the exchange of
the instruments of ratification of the
Treaty:
(1) the declaration that the Senate strong-
ly believes that respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms is an essential
factor to ensure the development of friendly
relations and cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union and
calls pon the President to use every oppor-
tunity to stress the inherent link between
respect for human rights and the achieve-
ment of lasting peace;
(21 the understanding that the President
shall seek sustained and demonstrable
progress by the Soviet Union in its imple-
mentation of the provisions of ?
(A) the Final Act of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter
referred to as the "Helsinki Final Act"),
(B) the Madrid Concluding Document of
the Commission on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, done September 9, 1983
(hereafter referred to as the "Madrid Con-
cluding Document"),
(C) the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (also known as the "Universal Decla-
ration"), and
(D) other international human rights
agreements to which the Soviet Union is a
signatory or party, including provisions re-
lating to?
(1) the freedom of thought, conscience, re-
ligion, and belief, without regard to race.
sex, language, religion, or national origin.
(ii) the recognition and respect for the
rights'of individuals, including those belong-
ing to national minorities, to enjoyment and
practice of thier cultures, heritage, history,
and national consciousness,
(iii) the right of freedom of movement for
individuals within the Soviet Union and the
right to leave the Soviet Union, without ar-
bitrary and capricious barriers, and
(iv) the right of individuals to know and
act upon their rights and duties in these
agreements; and
(3) the understanding that the United
States, through the Helsinki process, will
expect full compliance, as evidenced by spe-
cific action, by the Soviet Union with its
commitments in the field of human rights
and fundamental freedoms and will seek to
strengthen these commitments through
review meetings and a balanced number of
follow-up activities which will advance veri-
fiable implementation of the human rights
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Madrid Concluding Document.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
resolution was agreed to.
Mr. PELL. I move to lay that motion
on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader in recognized.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President
of the United States be immediately
notified that the Senate has given its
consent to the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion on the INF Treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(Applause, Senators rising.)
. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there will
be no more rollcall votes today. I
thank all Senators and hope they have -
a good rest.
.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, let me
thank the majority leader. I congratu-
late him again for his tremendous
work on the INF Treaty. That treaty
has now been given consent by the
Senate, ratification, and it is a better
treaty because of the majority leader's
insistence that we not have any arbi-
trary timeframe; we take our time and
do an expeditious but very thorough
job in bringing about that Senate rati-
fication.
We do have, I think, good evidence
that the constitutional process by
which the Senate and executive
branch jointly make treaties has
worked and worked very well. I think
most of the credit Is due to the majori-
ty leader for that process working so
well.
I would also want to add to that that
I think the Republican leader did a
superb job and, as the majority leader
said to the President of the United
States a few minutes ago on the tele-
phone, he has reason to be very, very
proud and grateful of the Republican
leader, Senator DOLE.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join
the distinguished chairman in praising
our majority and minority leaders.
Indeed, they were of invaluable assist-
ance to make the passage possible.
Mr. NUNN.. I think the way they
handled their telephones in talking to
the President, switching them back
and forth in talking to the President,
was truly remarkable. They had great
mental process and acumen.
Mr. BYRD. And they demonstrated
dexterity and they are both ambidex-
trous.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we
should also note both are members of
the Rules Committee, which approved
the phone system.
Mr. NUNN. As is the Senator from
Virginia. The Senator from Georgia is
not a member of that committee, but
would like to consult with the commit-
tee about that telephone system.
Mr. WARNER. We will look into it.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there
may be some Senators who would like
to speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will be in order. Senators will
please take their seats.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there
May be some Senators who would wish
to speak as in legislative session. I ask
unanimous consent that Senators may
speak as in legislative session for not
to exceed 5 minutes ;each and that the
period not extend beyond 4 p.m. today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous con-
sent, also, Mr. President, that the?
Chair not entertain any request that
would involve putting the Senate into
legislative session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HEINZ addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania is recog-
nized.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE INF TREATY
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD a statement issued by the
President following Senate action on
the INF Treaty today, issued by the
Office of the Press Secretary in Hel-
sinki, Finland.
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May 27, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows: -
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
I am very pleased with the action of
the United States Senate in consent-
ing to ratification of the INF Treaty.
In two days, I will arrive in the
Soviet Union to meet with General
Secretary Gorbachev to discuss our
four-part agenda. Today's action by
the Senate clearly shows support for
our arms reduction objectives.
I want to express my appreciation
for the leadership demonstrated by
Majority Leader Bob Byrd and Repub-
lican Leader Bob Dole in securing the
timely approval of this treaty. I have
invited them to join me for the ex-
change of ratification documents in
Moscow.
I continue to have concerns about
the constitutionality of some provi-
sions of the Resolution of Ratification,
particularly those dealing with inter-
pretation, and I will communicate
with the Senate on these matters in
due course.
? THE INF TREATY
Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, we have
just had a historic vote on the INF
Treaty. I believe we have advanced
this treaty and passed ratification for
two reasons. The first is that this
treaty has been all along in the United
States national security interest. It is
in our interest because it forces the
Soviets to dismantle twice as many de-
ployed missiles and four times as
many warheads as the United States.
It also is a treaty that sets several
useful precedents which are of key im-
portance to future progress in strate-
gic arms control, and those are worth
having as well.
But before I discuss these and other
points, I think we should all remember
why there have' been last-minute
delays in taking up the ratification of
this treaty.
At the 11th hour, the Soviet Union
showed once again that it is a tough
negotiating partner. Just as we were
.about to debate the treaty, the Soviets
tried to back out of key verification
provisions. But the Senate stood its
ground, and insisted on the tight veri-
fication rules that are one of this trea-
ty's contributions to the arms control
process.
This final chapter in the INF Trea-
ty's evolution underlined a key point:
it is indeed possible to deal with the
Russians, and to negotiate agreements
that are in our interest, but it must be
done with open eyes, and with a deter-
mination to be firm in sticking to our
positions on key issues.
In many respects this treaty repre-
sents a major accomplishment for the
United States. It is an accomplishment
made possible by one key factor?a bi-
partisan determination to stick to our
guns and settle for nothing less than a
verifiable elimination of the Soviet
medium-range nuclear threat to West-
ern Europe.
The INF saga began in 1979, when
the United States and its NATO Allies
decided to match the Soviet medium-
range missile threat with missiles of
our own. The decision had two
tracks?one the deployment of mis-
siles, the other the willingness to ne-
gotiate limitations on intermediate
range weapons. Under Republican and
Democratic Presidents, the United
States and its allie? pushed ahead de-
spite a fierce Soviet propaganda offen-
sive and strong public opposition to
deploy our intermediate nuclear
forces. After they failed with .propa-
ganda, the Soviets tried the bluff. In
1983, the Soviets walked out of the
INF talks.
But they came back to the table.
They came back to discuss the Reagan
administration plan to eliminate all
such missiles?the double zero?that
they had 'dismissed earlier as unac-
ceptable. And last December, General
Secretary Gorbachev signed a treaty
that embodied this plan.
The United States and the allies
were firm in their determination. And
because we were, we have a treaty that
makes real reductions in the nuclear
threat. And the Senate refused to be
prodded at the 11th hour as well. Be-
cause of that steadfastness the treaty
establishes verification principles we
have sought for decades.
Mr. President, the INF Treaty
before us eliminates an entire class of
nuclear weapons. It establishes princi-
ples of unequal reduction and strict
verification that show the way for
future advances in nuclear aims con-
trol. This treaty is in the national se-
curity interest of the United States
and our allies. I support it, and urge
my colleagues to do likewise.
The treaty serves the interests of
the United States and the NATO Alli-
ance by reducing the number of nucle-
ar weapons available to attack West-
ern Europe. This reduction is impor-
tant militarily because the Soviets will
be removing a far larger number of de-
ployed warheads than will we. They
will remove over 1,600 warheads, while
the United States will remove just
over 400. Nevertheless, as has been
widely noted, this treaty will eliminate
only a small percentage, about 4 per-
cent, of the total nuclear weapons ar-
senals of the two superpowers.
But the political contribution made
to NATO strength by the INF Treaty
may be even greater. That is because
the treaty is more than anything the
result of alliance unity in the face of
Soviet pressure and intimidation. In
1979 the NATO Alliance decided to
field intermediate range United States
nuclear missiles in Europe to counter
the alarming growth of Soviet SS-20
missiles.
In November 1983, after 4 years of
Soviet bluster, threats, intimidation,
and propaganda campaigns, at the
strong recommendation of the NATO
ministers, the first American interme-
diate missiles were deployed in
Europe. The Soviet delegation at the
S 6939
INF talks walked out, and the Kremlin
began an intense propaganda cam-
paign to block full deployment of the
United States missiles.
' But the United States and the allies
would not be intimidated by Soviet
pressure, and deployment proceeded.
After the failure of their gambit was
apparent, the Soviets returned to the
table, and in the end embraced the
zero-zero plan, which by then had
been expanded to cover the entire
globe, thereby eliminating Soviet mis-
siles in the Far East that threaten our
ally, Japan.
Under the INF Treaty, the Soviet
Union will have to destroy over 1,800
missiles, while the United States will
destroy around 800. The Soviets will
remove over 1,600 warheads from the
total available to strike Western
Europe and Japan. The United States
will remove just over 400 warheads
based in Europe. This unequal reduc-
tion in weapons is a very valuable ad-
vance in arms control. It may be a
guide to future reductions of conven-
tional arms in Europe, where we will
begin talks facing a significant Soviet
numerical advantage in most catego-
ries of weaponry. It is a clear prece-
dent for disproportionate Soviet cuts
in strategic weapons, where they hold
certain numerical advantages that are
the chief threat to deterrence and sta-
bility.
The INF Treaty will not, eliminate
the Soviet nuclear threat to NATO.
But it will reduce it substantially, and
will force the Soviets to divert their
strategic forces aimed at the United
States to European targets if they
wish to maintain their nuclear threat
agaisnt NATO. In short, the work and
determination that went into match-
ing Soviet intermediate-range deploy-
ments in Europe have borne fruit, and
that is the elimination of the Soviet
missile force that was created begin-
ning in the middle of the last decade.
Some critics of the treaty argue that
it will weaken NATO's deterrent, or
that it will denuclearize Europe. These
statements do not stand up to exami-
nation. First, the NATO Alliance de-
terred Soviet attack for over three dec-
ades before the United States INF mis-
siles were in place. We only started.
putting our INF missiles in Europe in
late 1983. Clearly, these missiles were
never the basis for our deterrence of
the Warsaw Pact. That' deterrence
rests primarily on the massive military
resources of NATO, which have
evolved over the history of the alli-
ance and continue to require modern-
ization.
Second, removal of the INF missiles,
while reducing the nuclear options of
both sides, hardly denticlearizes
Europe. The United States alone will
retain over 4,000 tactical nuclear weap-
ons for use in Europe. That does not
. count Poseidon missile supmarines
dedicated to NATO missions. Nor does
it include other American nuclear mis-
siles, such as submarine-based cruise
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S 6940 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
missiles, which can be used to support
our NATO operations. In addition, our
French and British allies maintain
their ownindependent nuclear forces.
In other words, Mr. President, even
after the removal of the INF missiles,
the United States and its NATO allies
will retain many nuclear weapons sys-
tems to help counterbalance tradition-
al Soviet strength in conventional
military terms.
Mr. President, I think the American
people are a trusting people. We main-
tain the most open form of govern-
ment in the world. We fear no idea, we
welcome debate on all issues of public
Importance. But the American people
also understand that trust is not
enough of a basis for international
agreements with the Soviet Union.
An old Russian saying is in vogue
these days: "Trust, but verify." The
new American version is shorter:
"Verify." This treaty does not rely on
trust. It establishes precedents of de-
tailed and intrusive onsite verification
to ensure the destruction of missiles
and the ban on production of missiles.
It is the sort of verification approach
many Americans have sought for
many years in our arms control deal-
ings with the Kremlin.
Under the INF agreement, the Sovi-
ets have provided us with unprece-
dented military information. This in-
cludes photos of all the missiles and
equipment concerned, photos and
maps of their missile bases, diagrams
of their missile production facilities.
We have the right to conduct onsite
inspections of these facilities. We will
witness the destruction of their mis-
siles and associated equipment. Wel
will continuously monitor their missile
factory to make sure banned syste
are not being produced.
The procedures established in the
INF Treaty are not the last word, but
they are a good start on creating veri-
fication arrangements that will allow
the United States to enter more im-
portant and, therefore, more risky
arms-control agreements with the
Soviet Union. The experience we gain
in implementing the INF Treaty, in
destroying missile arsenals under for-
eign supervision, cannot but help both
countries improve on the mechanism
already agreed to and will build confi-
dence in the verification process.
Mr. President, the INF Treaty is a
good treaty. It is a tribute to the bi-
partisan determination of the United
States and its allies to match or elimi-
nate the Soviet nuclear threat to
Europe. It is a milestone in setting a
precedent for unequal reductions and
in creating reliable verification mecha-
nisms that we need to make significant
progress in.strategic arms control with
the Soviet Union.
The American people have a mature
view of relations with the Soviet
Union. They now realize that our rela-
tionship, so long as the Soviet system
does not undergo fundamental change,
will of necesssity be one that mixes
both competition and cooperation.
This means that while we can,
indeed, we must, negotiate with the
Kremlin to stabilize the nuclear mili-
tary rivalry, we must keep the full
agenda of United States-Soviet issues
in mind as we define a relationship.
We can afford neither the infatuation
of detente nor the blind hostility of a
cold war. We must learn from these
past experiences and sustain a posture
that exploits potenEal for accommo-
dation while not abandoning funda-
mental values and principles.
As we do this, we must maintain a
vigorous and balanced defense posture
to defend our interests and meet our
alliance obligations. We must continue
to limit the flow of Western tech-
nology and credit to the Soviet Union
that might help them to offset some
of our key technological advantages.
We -must maintain pressure on the
Soviet Union to cease its meddling in
trouble spots throughout the Third
World. And we must continue to insist
that the Soviet Union live up to its
international obligations on human
rights.
At the same time, as the INF Treaty
demonstrates, we can secure agree-
ments with the Soviet Union that
serve our security interests and the
cause of peace. We can best reach
those agreements by presenting the
Kremlin with a unified determined ap-
proach that links the United States
and its allies in defense of key security
interests.
The INF Treaty is only a small step,
but an important one, in bringing the
nuclear arms competition under con-
trol. I applaud the President for secur-
ing this treaty, and look forward to
the next and more momentous step in
controlling the arms race.
THE RETIREE BENEFITS BANK-
RUPTCY PROTECTION ACT OF
1988
Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, 2 years
ago, we set out to protect the health
benefits of retirees when LTV Corp.
attempted to terminate its retirement
health plan upon filing for bankrupt-
cy. LTV's actions made it clear to the
Congress, for the first time, just how
fragile a company's promise of retiree
health benefits could be. One simple
decision, made on the advice of the
bankruptcy lawyers, was enough to
suddenly expose 78,00 LTV retirees to
the huge financial risk of a serious ill-
ness or injury. LTV's retirees, some
only moments from surgery, were
simply informed that their health in-
surance had been canceled by the com-
pany?with no forewarning, and no
offer of alternative coverage.
Cancellation of health insurance is a
serious matter for anyone. It is espe-
? cially serious for a retiree who is too
young for Medicare but too old to buy
affordable health coverage. While
healthy retirees may find a replace-
ment policy for a hefty monthly pre-
mium, sick retirees may be unable to
find one at any price. The thought
May 27, 1,988
that a company could enter bankrupt-
cy and renege on the promise of
health and life insurance without a
moment's hesitation or so much as a
word to the retirees was troubling to
the Congress.
The Congress was also concerned
over the treatment of retirees after a
company filed for bankruptcy. Once
the retirees lost their benefits they
were forced by the bankruptcy law to
go to the end of the line of creditors
and patiently wait for years to get a
small cash settlement. While chapter
11 reorganization seemed to work to
protect the interests of the major, and
usually secured, creditors, it left the
retirees totally exposed to catastroph-
ic medical losses while bankruptcy
lawyers bickered over the reorganiza-
tion plan. The retirees had no way to
make their concerns known to the
court during bankruptcy.
LTV's threatened termination
moved the Senate to action, and
within a short time we had passed leg-
islation to prevent the termination of
retiree health and life insurance plans
by bankrupt companies while Con-
gress considered reform legislation.
This temporary provision was contin-
ued for almost 2 years while we
worked on the bill that is before us
now.
Today, Mr. President, we are finally
at the point where we can pass the Re-
tiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection
Act of 1988. This legislation has been
carefully considered by the Judiciary
Committee in the House and Senate,
passed by the Senate on two previous
occa,ssions, and now finally accepted
by the House.
The bill will protect retirees from
unilateral termination of benefits by a
company filing a chapter 11 bankrupt-
cy petition. Health and life insurance
benefits would be continued through-
out the proceedings unless it was nec-
essary to discontinue them to keep the
company alive. This bill will also final-
ly give retirees adequate representa-
tion in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Mr. President, this is a great day for
retirees. No longer will companies be
able to surprise their retirees when
they file for chapter 11 bankruptcy.
No longer will retirees have to go to
the end of the line and wait for a cash
settlement. They will finally become
equal partners with the other credi-
tors in bankruptcy.
I would like to thank my colleague
from Ohio, Senator METZENBAIIM, for
his leadership on this legislation and
for his persistent efforts to develop
this compromise. He and his staff, par-
ticularly David Starr, have worked
tirelessly to push this legislation
through both sides of the Congress. I
urge my colleagues to join us in pass-
ing of H.R. 2969.
THE INF TREATY
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, sever-
al years ago I had the pleasure of
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