THE BIG ONES THAT GOT AWAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920016-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 29, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

TO AM inr% i- rrn Approved For Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89TOO142R000700920016-5
ti
The Big this
That Got Away
DAVID CORN
Shortly before he banged the gavel for the last time
and sent the Iran/contra Congressional hearings
into history, Senator Daniel Inouye, chair of the
Senate select committee, solemnly intoned, "The
story' has now been told." Perhaps he meant the Reader's
Digest version, for the hearings hardly offered a compre-
hensive account.
Those watching or listening to the hearings did not receive
the complete word on Lieut. Col. Oliver North's wide-
ranging operations aimed at Nicaragua, did not learn of the
possibility that funds other than those generated by the Iran
arms deals were diverted to the contras and were not told
about allegations that Justice Department. investigations
into, contra gunrunning were stalled or blocked. The com-
mittees were careful not to embarrass the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or to probe matters that might prompt ques-
tions about U.S. military alliances, including those with
El Salvador and Israel. Also off-limits was the Administra-
tion's special operations and counterterrorism infrastruc-
ture, which was intertwined with the Iran initiative and the
White House contra crusade.
Many of the obvious leftover questions-e.g., Was Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence William Casey the Mr. Big of
North's outfit?-as well as much of the conflicting
testimony should addressed in the select committees
report, due out in October. That will have to present in
coherent form the (voluminous information the commit-
tees, to their credit, did unearth. But the summation is
likely to contain the same gaps as the hearings, which
reflected the capitulation of the Democrats, who, after all,
controlled the committees and the terms of the proceedings.
Here is a list of some of the subjects the committees ignored,
glossed over or left dangling.
? The Secret War of Oliver North. The committees dog-
gedly pursued North's purchase of snow tires with contra
traveler's checks, then raised the white flag. Testimony and
documents offered glimpses of what North and his com-
rades were up to, but the hearings never developed a total
portrait of their war against the Sandinistas. The inquisitors
focused mainly on the resupply operation North ran, and all
but ignored his management of military and nonmilitary
operations within Nicaragua and recruitment of mercenaries
for the contras.
For- example, retired Maj. Gen. Richard Secord testified
than at an all-night meeting at the Miami Airport Hotel in
July 1985, he and North conferred with contra leaders on
"the need for [the rebels) to get into some of the urban
areas" inside Nicaragua. But Secord refused to discuss this
further in an open hearing, and he was asked no more about
it. In his testimony North admitted he had authorized David
Walker, a former British Special Air Service member, to
perform military operations "in Managua and elsewhere, in
C,
The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
IYATo-J P/Ss
Date &2 9 AU & 187
an effort to improve the perception that the Nicaraguan
resistance could operate anywhere." According to a staff
member of the committees, the joint panel discovered
evidence that Walker may have blown up a Nicaraguan
hospital by mistake. But no member or counsel made any
public inquiry about that.
In a December 1984 memorandum, North said Walker
was referred to him by John Lehman, then Secretary of
the Navy. North told national security adviser Robert
McFarlane he would finance Walker and set Walker up with
contra leader Adolfo Calero. What was Lehman's con---
tion to Walker? The committees did not ask. Nor did they
inquire
b
a
out a note North made indicating his interest in
signing up a mercenary fresh out of jail.
In questioning North, Representative ThoMas Foley
alluded to "policies of intimidation" conducted inside
Nicaragua, which North apparently mentioned ina closed
session. The specifics of that program went unexplained.
The committees also kept mum on the "nonmilitary ac-
tivities" North directed. But North noted during his public
testimony that he was involved in publishing "pamphlets"
in Managua, running radio broadcasts and supporting the
internal opposition in Nicaragua. He remarked that he had
an understanding with the committees not to discuss those
activities. That agreement was honored.
North's reported control over certain elite military units
apparently was also taboo. On July 26, The Philadelphia In-
quirer revealed that North and the National Security Coun-
cil "developed and controlled a network of secret military
units" that had directly fought Sandinista troops inside
Nicaragua [see Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the Devil," The
Nation, August 1S/22J. Only in the waning hours of the
hearings, when Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
was on the stand, did a committee member refer to this net-
work. Without explaining what had been reported, Senator
Sam Nunn asked Weinberger to comment on the article.
"Totally untrue," Weinberger replied.
But the committees released a February 1985 memoran-
dum in which North proposed seizing or sinking a ship
carrying weapons to Nicaragua. North noted the contras
were not able to undertake such a task and would have to
"be provided with the maritime assets." Attached to the
memo was a note from Rear Adm. John Poindexter, then
deputy national security adviser, saying that the Boland
amendment prohibited such assistance but that the mission
could be achieved "without any involvement of Calero and
Freedom Fighters." North's memo and Poindexter's com-
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ments indicate that the N.S.C. had sorr iilitary means at Nicaraguan Humat
its disposal. ~ian Assistance Office, Robert Duem-
ling, instructed him'~.u certify falsely that humanitarian aid
In reviewing North's Central American adventures. the.- had been received.
committees scrutinized the participation of the U.S. Am- The committees elected not to bring up at the hearings
bassador and C.I.A. station chief in Costa Rica but those portions of the memo, though they did release it to the
neglected the E1 Salvador connection. North's resupply public. Nor did they address its disclosure that a "prelim.
planes flew out of Ilopango Air Force Base, El Salvador's inary inquiry" gave "rise to reasonable suspicions that
main military airfield, with the blessing and assistance of North and other officials may have knowingly diverted [to
Col:. James Steele, the senior U.$. military adviser to the contras] funds other than the arms sale profits and the
El Salvador, and )en. Juan Rafael Bustillo, the base com- funds used to ship the arms." [Emphasis in the original.) In
mander. Edwin Corr, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, fact, shortly before the hearings began, Senators Inouye and
reportedly knew of the operation but has denied that Warren Rudman said they had evidence that U.S. funds ear-
charge. In February 1985 Gen. Paul Gorman, then had of marked for other purposes may have been used to aid the
the U.S. Southern Command, sent a cable apparently ad- rebels. Yet there was no mention of any diversion other than
dressed to Thomas Pickering, Corr's predecessor, regarding that of the Iran arms-sale profits.
Felix Rodriguez, the ex-C.I.A. agent who was involved in a When Poindexter was on the stand, Representative Les
so- counterterrorism campaign against the Salvadoran Aspin maintained that a review of the contras' finances con-
rebels and who served as North's liaison at Ilopango. Gen- vinced him that they had received support from sources
eral Gorman reported that Rodriguez "has been put into other than those covered by the hearings, though he was un-
play by Ollie North" and that although Rodriguez was based able to say what those were. Could it be from U.S. covert aid
in El-Salvador, his task concerned -"forces operating else- for the Afghan resistance-as some mujahedeen supporters
where" . in Central America. Will keep you informed," have long suspected-or from another secret program? Was
Gorman wrote.. . .. humanitarian aid converted into weaponry?
What did Ambassadors Pickering and Corr know of Department memo raises those possibilities. Did The the Justice campaign? What. role did Gorman and the U.S.. mittees not pursue those leads because athi8 Y co publicized
Southern Command play.in North's war? What was report- investigation into the misuse of nonlethal funds or other
ed back to theStatie Department and the Pentagon? Under diversions could discredit the notion of humanitarian aid"or
what agreement was.North able to station his resupply outfit call too much attention to other covert programs?
on an El-Salvador military. base? All of those questions went I The Ones Who Got Away. The list of Iran/contra af-
unasked. To have posed them, the committees would have fair figures not called before the hot lights and television
had to take up U.S. military activities and alliances within cameras is a long one. Two of the biggest fish who did ap-
the region. That evidently was sacred territory. pear but slipped the hook were Attorney General Edwin
I The Money Tr 'ail. During the hearings, the committees Meese 3d and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams.
extensively examined several segments of the intricate During Meese's two days on the stand, committee mem-
money pipeline. But certain
aspects escaped scrutiny. For bers probed in exhaustive detail the inquiry he conducted
example, the committees released arms merchant Albert into the Iran/contra affair is November 1986 and soundly
'lakim's bank records, which disclose all transfers in and criticized the Attorney General for running a shoddy in-
out of LakeResources and his other accounts. One of the vestigation. But Meese was not forced to answer on national
many listed transactions not covered shows that Hakim paid television charges first published in The Village Voice that he
more than SI.7 million to a Portuguese arms firm for a proj- tried to obstruct or delay a Miami-based Justice De
ect identified as "CIA" and apparently unrelated to the Iran Y partmese
weapons deal or the contra supply investigation into contra gunrunning. Instead, the House
operation. What was it? and Senate panels submitted written questions to the At-
Hakim 's ledger also, reveals direct payments to various torney General after he left the stand.
contra leaders. The committees declined to explore how the Thus the committees did not inquire publicly about a
money was used. In fact, they did not perform any public handwritten note attached to a March 20, 1986, secret
dissection of contra, finances. "A big nagging question," Justice Department memorandum concernin the
said a source who usd to work with the rebels, "is, With all 8 g"'~n'
~ Wing investigation. The message, from Associate Attorney
the money the contras got-from Saudi Arabia, indicted General Stephen Trott to Mark Richard, a
fund-raiser Carl 'Spitz' Channell and Lake Resources- Dad: "Assistant
who made the decisions (on] how it was dispersed?" Attorney General in the criminal division, read: "Please get
A draft of an internal on top of this. D.L.J. [D. Lowell Jensen, then Deputy At-
Department of Justice memoran- torney General] is giving a heads up to the N.S.C. He would
dum written in November 1986 by Ralph Martin, an attor- like us to watch over it. Call
eY up [Leon] ho l d find obt what
ney in the criminal division, and sent to Assistant Attorn
General William Weld head of the division, reported , and advise him that decisions should be run by you."
the r i "has that Kellner is the U.S. Attorney in Miami whose office handled
department's fraud division conclusively estab- the gunrunning case. The note, penned at a time when the
fished" that U.S. funds appropriated for so-called humani- White House was fighting for $100 million in contra aid,
tarian contra aid were "used to buy weapons, an act clearly shows that high-level Justice De
prohibited by the Boland amendment." That scam, the partment ~ officials were
memo said was "committed b 'unilatera assets' of the quite concerned with an investigation that threatened to tar-
CIA." One contra, according to the memo, had informed nish the rebels. (Meese is not clear yet; this whole episode is
the fraud division that the head of the State under investigation by the House subcommittee on crime.)
Department's
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According to Ralph Martin's draft to, an assistant
U.S. Attorney in San Diego claimed a high-level Customs
Service official interfered with another Justice Department
investigation involving the contras. In public the committees
had no questions for Meese about that, either.
Abrams also sneaked past the committees. When he ap-
peared, he was put through the wringer for having withheld
from Congress information concerning the Administra-
tion's solicitation of $10 milliotrfrdm the Sultan of Brunei.
But the committees failed to nail Abrams for knowing of
North's contra supply efforts. Abrams testified under oath
that he was utterly unaware of North's operation; North
maintained he had fully briefed Abrams on his contra-
aiding efforts. North recalled a meeting in the Pentagon, at-
tended by Abrams, in which North "went down, item by
item by item, the things that I was doing, and asked them
point blank whether or not I had to continue to do them."
North also mentioned that he thought he had given the com-
mittees contemporaneous notes of that meeting. (Texts of
two N.S.C. electronic messages also suggest Abrams
knew more than he claimed about North's activities.)
If North's testimony is true, Abrams committed per-
jury. But when Abrams's boss, Secretary of State George
Shultz, faced the committees maintaining that Abrams
should be forgiven his error in not notifying Congress, not a
single member inquired about the significance of North's
testimony and the possibility that Abrams lied under oath.
But the ones who truly got off scot-free were'the contras.
The committees gave little notice to testimony and docu-
ments they received showing contra involvement in narcotics
trafficking [see Jonathan- Kwitny, front cover]. Alle-
gations of contra corruption also breezed by at the hearings.
At a post-hearing dinner for reporters who covered the
proceedings, a group . ,bout a dozen journalists was asked
if any could recall a negative comment made about the contras
during the entire hearings. Heads were scratched; no one
could recollect a discouraging word.
From the start, the Republican committee members,
solidly for contra aid, tried to turn the hearings into a pro-
rebel forum. The Democrats, split on the question, em-
phasized process; they seemed most upset by the way the
White House bypassed Congress. Some Democratic mem-
bers, with characteristic overcaution, adopted a strat-
egy whereby they would not challenge contra aid directly,
convinced that the proceedings would reveal the rebels'
ugliness and do in the program.
The debate wasn't whether to conduct a black war in Cen-
tral America, but how to go about it. The committees' major-
ity did not want a bare-all examination of North's ventures-
or an unveiling of the C.I.A.'s hidden role. Consider the
cotaq'tittees' decision not to ask Robert Gates, deputy direc-
tor of the C.I.A., ro rake the Brand, for fear as Inouye ad-
mitted, that his testimony would embarrass the agency. The
Democrats, concerned that they look "responsible," held
back. This also caused them to agree to wrap up the hear-
ings by an arbitrary deadline, leading to an even more
restrained probe of the Iran/contra episode.
All of the subjects ignored by the committees during the
hearings can still be included in their final report. Represent-
ative Lee Hamilton, chair of the House panel, says that staff
investigators are still on the job. But even if the report
covers what the hearings missed, cold print cannot counter
the impact of the televised hearings, which millions of
Americans watched. How many will read the thick docu-
ment the committees produce? The ball has been dropped. As
Representative Peter Rodino said of Meese's inquiry, "Key
questions weren't asked. You have to wonder why." p
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