CIA MISLED CUSTOMS ON IRAN ARMS FLIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 23, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920015-6
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920015-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920015-6
Office of Current Production and Analytic Support
CIA Operations Center
title' B'
The Washington Post, Page E19
Wednesday, 23 September 1987
Item No. 1
JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA I
CIA Misled Customs on Iran Arms FliI,
A year before the Iran-contra scandal rocked
the Reagan administration, the U.S. Customs
Service developed information on one of the
early secret arms shipments to Iran by the White
House. But Customs did not pursue the matter
after it was assured by the Central Intelligence
Agency that the United States was not involved.
The near-exposure of the secret Iran arms
operation in the fall of 1985 was touched off by an
occurrence as trivial as the taped door latch of
Watergate: The plane that carried the weapons to
Iran flew over Turkish territory on its way back to
Israel, and peeved Turkish officials publicly
identified the DC8 and its secret route. But the
press never picked up on the Turks' disclosure.
This bizarre might-have-been element in the
Iran-contra scandal was gleaned from two
confidential Customs documents we have seen.
The first document was written on Sept. 20,
1985, by the chief of the Customs Service's office
of intelligence, George D. Heavey. It reported that
two days earlier, "the Office of Intelligence
received fragmentary information ... that a
U.S.-registered DC8 aircraft [with a crew of three]
had landed for emergency repairs in Israel directly
from Iran and was en route to an unknown
destin: tion."
The internal memo went on to say that even
though Customs had the tail number of the DC8,
the Israeli defense ministry maintained a "blackout
bn information on the aircraft." As a result, the
memo added, the U.S. ambassador to Bahrain could
say little when the Iraqi ambassador there "made
discreet inquiries about [this and other] flights and
arms smuggling to Iran." Customs had no way of
knowing it, but its puzzling intelligence information
involved the U.S.-approved Israeli shipment of 408
TOW antitank missiles to Iran on Sept. 14, 1985,
as part of an arms-for-hostages deal.
Customs intelligence analysts were able to
provide more details on the mystery flight in a
memo to Commissioner William von Raab written
on Oct. 30, 1985. The U.S.-registered DC8 had
"departed Tabriz, Iran, with a crew of three" on
Sept. 16, the memo noted, adding, "The plane
disappeared over Turkish air space, then arrived at
Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport for an 'emergency'
landing (due to an 'equipment malfunction.') The
plane remained in Tel Aviv for about 48 hours."
The memo said the incident first broke when
"Turkish authorities broadcast information
concerning the DC8, its origin and landing in
Israel." The memo added that the information
"probably was made public by the Turkish
government as officials were displeased by the
failure of the DC8's owners to pay the overflight
fees."
Finally, the memo stated, "a check with CIA
officials on U.S. involvement was negative."
Customs' dangerously suspicious intelligence
analysts were lied to.
In fact, von Raab was never let in on the secret
operation his intelligence people had almost figured
out. On July 11, 1986, Dale van Atta told vor. Raab
that the White House was smuggling arms to Iran.
Von Raab replied that van Atta's information was
wrong.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920015-6