SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00142R000500670007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 13, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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s:rENOGR"HIC MM-TES
Uarevieed and Unedited
Not for quotation or
Du ication
UNCbA1HEU
Committee Hearings
r
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Radially .Dec1a~sified-/Released oii -D IM
under provf$ion! of I=.O. 12356
ey B. Reger, Naiierial 6ecurUy Council.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Office of Official Reporters
HSITS 14
COPY Na a OF
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DINKEL
GILE
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran (CiA cJ//EF~
Deposition o
Monday, April 13, 1987
U.S. House of Representatives
G/ A CHIC
The deposition of ~~~~Mwas convened,
pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., Monday, April 13, 1987,
in Room H-128, The United States Capitol.
Present were:
Thomas R. Smeeton, Minority Counsel, Select Committee
to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, U.S.
House of Representatives.
Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, Select Committee
on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Opposition, U.S. Senate..
Assistant General Counsel, Office
of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency.
Legislative Liaison, Central Intelligence
Agency.
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Whereupon,
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was called as a witness, and after being duly sworn, testified
as follows:
MR. WOODCOCK: I am Tim Woodcock, Associate
Counsel with the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. This
deposition is being taken pursuant to the -request of the Senat
Select Committee. Present is a member of the House Select
Committee covering the same subject matter and no doubt the
House will be making use of the information that you will be
imparting in the course of this deposition.
This deposition, of course, is being taken pursuant to
an official inquiry of the Senate as well as an official
inquiry of the House.
Let me start off -- thank you. The House representative
is giving me a card noting he is'Thomas R. Smeeton. I
believe the reporter has that information already.
if we may, let me begin first by noting
for the record that I provided you and the legal represen-
tative from the CIA with a copy of the Senate rules and Senate
resolution that creates our committee. I very much appreciate
your willingness to come here on short notice for this
deposition; and we understand that in so doing, you are
accommodating us, and in a certain sense, we are accommodating
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you in preventing you from having to return for a deposition
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
later this month.
stance of this to just generally outline your career with
Q Let me ask you, sir, before we get into the sub-
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
the CIA.
A I came on board
Since then, I have served in various capacities in
C/A
A Yes.
Q You are currently chief
A I am currently chief
as chief
And could you describe for us information that
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you received in that period of time relating to a -- from your
headquarters relating to an NSC -- that is, National Security
Council -- endeavor?
A At 0300 hours on the 22d November, I received a
message from the? communicator, our communicator N
noting that there was a flash message that
a.m.; is
required my immediate presence
Q By 0300, you mean 3:00
A 0300, 3:00 a.m.
What is a flash message?
A It's the highest message.
that correct
Q What did you do after receiving that information?
arriving about
A I immediately went to
0400, 4:00 a.m. Read my message, noted there was a second
message, directed by deputy also to come in and assist me.
Q Who was your deputy at that time?
A
A
Could you spell that?
Q Then what happened?
A Both of us stood by for the message directing
me on special assignment. it arrived. It directed me to
stand by to assist a Mr. Richard Copp who -- alias Richard
Copp whose true name was Brigadier General Richard Secord.
Q Was that part of the latter communication you
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received?
A Yes.
Q So that you knew shortly after you arrived that
the individual, Mr. Copp, was in fact Richard Secord; is that
correct?
A That is correct.
Q Was that a name you recognized at all?
A No. -
Q What happened at that point?
A Well, the message told me to stand by and assist-
Mr. Secord, Copp -- I'll call him Secord from now on -- who
was on personal assignment for the National Security Council.
I was to contact him at a given telephone number and assist
him as required.
Q Were you given any instructions with respect to
holding this message close? -
A I was-told not to discuss it with the ambassador.
were receiving these messages?
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Yes. It was perfectly-,:,clear it was coming out
of the Chief of European division, Mr. Duane Clarridge.
Q He has the nickname of Dewey; is that_.correct?
A Dewey.
Q After receiving the message with respect to Mr.
Secord, what did you do?
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A I called the telephone number, turned out to be
a hotel. I asked for Mr. Copp's room, connected with it.
A female with an American accent answered the phone, told me
that Mr. Copp was not there, that he was at the office, and
gave me the phone number of the office.
Q Approximately what time is this?
A This would have been at 0430 hours.'
Q What did you then do?
A I called the office.
Q What happened? -
A I asked for Mr. Copp. Back up. A
female, or male -- I am not sure which, because at different
times it was a male or a female. I asked for Mr. Copp. They
called Mr. Copp to the phone. I identified myself, told him
I was with and had been directed to
contact him, and he was awaiting my call. He acknowledged
that. I gave him my phone number where I could be reached.
I asked what I could do at the time.
He said the only thing he needed at that time was to
verify the phone numbers of the prime minister and the foreign
minister. He said a very senior official will call them.
At that point he told me to stand by.
Q Let me stop you right there, if I may, for just
a moment.
You testified that this -- Mr. Secord wanted to confirm
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the numbers of these national officials; is that correct?
A Let me back off.
I made a mistake there. When I contacted Copp at 0430,
he said everything was under control and he would know better
by 0945 hours. He asked me to stand by, which I did.
At 9:00 o'clock, I called Copp and then the only
requirement was for him to give -- for me to assist him in
finding out the phone numbers bf" he prime minister and the
foreign minister. He said a very senior official will call
them. =`
I see.
That was at 0900.
At this point he didn't have those numbers; is
that correct?
A That is correct. He had some numbers, but
apparently they weren't able to get through to them.
When you called Mr. Second for the first time
and a voice answered on the other end of the phone, did it
identify itself as being any company or was it just a
"hello"?
' A Just "hello."
Q Did that condition obtain throughout your telephone
conversations with him?
A During the course of the conversations, it became
clear there was a gentleman by the name of and later
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and late So I reached the
conclusion it was an office or at least a room provided
by to Copp to accommodate. his activities.
Q Was that a name
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The files made it perfectly clear
The files made it perfectly clear was
an arms merchant and is the company he was working
for at that time.
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already known to you,
It wasn't at the time,. but I checked our files.
was clearly identifiable
Did mean anything to you?
Only from our files.
o upon review of your files you concluded
was an arms supplier; is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q Now following your conversation that you just
described with Mr. Secord where he asked your assistance
on the telephone numbers, what happened?
'A I stayed
until 1:00 o'clock. At
that time Copp called, Secord called. He advised that
previously the foreign minister had approved an El Al
charter flight before going to Brussels, but he had not signed
the paper.
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The
was busy
foreign ministry is refusing to issue flight clearances until
Now, the morning of the 22 November, the foreign minister
after the foreign minister signed the paper. Secord advised
that the plane's departure from Israel's window was 20 minutes
ointed out negotiations with the foreign
MMIMMMMMMMMM~
ministry would be best handled by the charge who could approac
the prime minister and guarantee confidentiality.
at the highest level, the foreign minister --
Q Did you have any information with respect to the
Secord face-to-face; is that correct?
A That is correct.
the 1:00 p.m. phone call you just described, you had not met
Q At this point, and I am speaking with respect to
operation's sensitivity.
A None was given. I assume it was because of the
What did Secord say when you suggested that?
He said he would recommend the same to-Washington.
I made the same recommendation in a cable to my head-
quarters but was=%advised not to involve the charge.
Q Was any explanation given at that point?
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nature of the NSC mission at this poi
A No, but in discussin
I asked Secord on what basis I could justify
the urgency of the flight; and he said I was authorized to
use the phrase "humanitarian mission."
Q Did he say where he got that phrase?
A He did not.
Q Was there any other discussion at this 1:00"p.m.
phone call?
A With Secord, no.
Q Then what happened?
A After having reported to Washington and gotten my
answer back not to involve the charge.
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him on the foregoing. He said that Washington had agreed to
bring in the charge. It turned out that Copp had some kind
of secure communication with Washington, and-it was perfectly
clear he was communicating in advance of my traffic.
I called Copp, and I updated
Let me stop you right there, if I may. How was
it that you knew that he had a secure communications system?
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A
He told me.
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talking
s anothe
Was --
I am=not sure where along the way, but he would
to an American voice in the background. There
r American back there with equipment, and that
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ey -- th
ere were messages going back and forth.
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So that in your phone conversations with Secor
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ou would
say something to him, and he would relay it
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ng
I couldn't hear him relay it. I heard him ta
e what
ll
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o someone
m
in the background; and later, he would te
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ashington
said.
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He was relaying to you what Washington was say
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Yes.
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?Q
All right. Sorry to interrupt there.
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Copp said the plane missed its window but was
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standing by in Israel.
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Q Then what happened?
A Nothing happened then until 4:00 o'clock in the
n CA 107'. 00'' - E I R',
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5:25 -- hours, same day.
and had reached the go/no-go point around 1725 -- that is
afternoon. Copp called again, said the plane was airborne,
and would recommend the opposition of the clearance, denial
to-the foreign minister.
political counsellor of the American Embassy
the day before visited the foreign ministry
and was -told there had been a request for an American urgent
flight to -- and that he stated he knew nothing
his channels.
that would justify the mission, because he had nothing in
Q That is to say gave this response; is that
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A ~~~~into the activity.
Q What happened then?
A At this point I received a telephone call on the
He-said he :would wall the
White House and request authority to bring who was
activity.
able to convey to me his approval to brin into the
Dewey Clarridge. It was a very bad connection, but he was
international circuit from the chief of the European division,
At that point, i uxu
him to stand by at the embassy, which he did.
I briefed him on the activity to date and
showed him all traffic to date.
Then what happened?
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called me; and I told him o
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A At 5:00 o'clock,
called
to get the foreign minister out of the
cabinet meeting. We stood by for the next hour waiting
for the foreign minister to come out of the cabinet
meeting. called the foreign ministry several times,
was standing by at the foreign ministry waiting
for the foreign minister to respond.
I informed Copp what we were doing. By this time, at
1800 hours -- 6:00 o'clock -- Copp said that the plane had had
to'abort and return to israel. I asked Copp what to do next.
He said he would stand by for instructions.
Also, it became clear that the foreign minister was
not going to come out of the cabinet meeting to respond to
our request
That is
ou
had no doubt about that at that point?
A didn't communicate it, but the foreign
minister's actions clearly indicated he was not going to
appear. He didn't.
Q Just not responsive; is that right?
? A Yes.
Q So then what happened?
A By 7:00 p.m., the foreign ministry still had made
no decision. Copp at one point, in the telephone conversation
noted that the National Security. Council was considering how
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to recycle the mission. At the very same time
advised that the White House requested the phone numbers of
the foreign minister and the prime minister.
Q What happened at that point?
A I should make one thing clear. On
request, I asked Washington -- my headquarters -- to find
out if the Secretary of State, Secretary of State Shultz,
was aware of the mission and if he approved involve-
ment. Messages came back during this period saying the
Secretary of State and Ambassador Oakley were the only two
State officials who were aware of the mission, that they
concurred, and that all traffic should be kept in my channels.
Q Let me stop you right there. You made that inquiry
and communication came back to the effect that Shultz and
Oakley were aware of what was happening; is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q Now --
A They were aware of the mission.
Q All right... Were aware of the mission. Now who was
it that responded to you?
? A It was coming from the office of Dewey Clarridge.
Q All right.
A Throughout this time, and I don't recall which
cables it was that it occurred, Poindexter's name was
frequently mentioned as the person who was in Washington
a .1w- AIRL[L
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responsible for heading up the activity.
Q Did you have an understanding as to who had apprise
Shultz and Oakley of this mission?
A No. If I recall correctly, the cables said,
"Poindexter advises that..."
So to the extent your belief would be that
Poindexter advised them, it would be based on that cable; is
that correct?
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Q
Yes.
All right.
What happened at that point?
A
About 8:53 p.m. Copp advised that McFarlane was
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trying to phone the foreign minister.
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That is Robert McFarlane?
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That is correct. McFarlane at that time was in
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Europe, had traveled from Brussels, where there had been a
NATO meeting, to Rome.
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Q
And did you learn whether McFarlane ever made that
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contact?
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Let me make a point just before we get to that.
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At 10:00 p.m.,
calle He noted
that the foreign ministry meeting had just concluded, but
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no decision had been reached. said the next
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step is for to send a formal diplomatic note to the
foreign ministry.
The note should include characteristics
of aircraft, routes to and from and cargo.
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rb"01, R-VT.-T.
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Upon receipt, said, the foreign ministry would
consider the request. promised to have the note by
I informed Copp. He said he would allow time for my
report to reach Washington. Then he would contact them to
discuss the options.
At 11:00 p.m., we received a message directin
to contact and to note that McFarlane had just
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he would be in his -office.
rs on 23 November ihands. said
100 h
talked with the foreign minister, who agreed to aircraft
clearance.
Q- Now receiving this information, what did you do?
A Since it was 11:00 p.m. in the evening, knowing
officialhood, and I decided it would be
advisable to wait until the next morning to relay that message
to the foreign ministry.
Q I gather that means they are not night owls?
Correct.
So I gather you did then wait; is that correct?
We did that.
Q Okay. Would you pick up again?
A At opening of business on 23 November,
and I were still in the embassy. -contacted the
the ministry of foreign affairs,
who was the only foreign
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ministry official available at that time -- a senior
official -- and conveyed the above McFarlane message; that
is, that he -- McFarlane had talked with the foreign minister
who had agreed to'aircraft clearance.
0 = was not aware of the telephone conversation,
and he opined that a diplomatic note would still be required
from the embassy.
then prepared the diplomatic note and went to
the.foreign ministry at 1130 hours on 23 November.
presented the note to and
Then what happened?
During this period, while 1was at the
foreign ministry, I was primarily serving as a liaison
role at that point between Copp and Copp called
to advise of a new plan tentatively. jnvolving three'-flights
by two planes to arrive in between 23 and 27 November.
Copp said he was having trouble arranging for the
planes for,-- for o Iran link. He said
that the president M a gentleman by the name of~
5~ -
0 =is national airline?
A Yes.
-- was stalling for some reason. He asked me to inter-
vene if I could. I said that I would try and get back to
him. Also, during that conversation, Copp asked me if I was
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knew what was going on, if I had been briefed. I said that
no, the charge and I were in the dark; but we could make some
guesses. He suggested that we meet immediately, and I
suggested a parking lot at a nearby hotel.
Copp and I immediately separately went there. I picked
him up at the front door of the hotel; and he and I sat in
my car and talked around 11:30 for 10 minutes.
Q Could you relate the substance of that conversation,
please?
A Yes. Copp said his mission was clearly one whereby
missiles are being provided for hostages. I asked what kind
of missiles. He identified Hawk missiles. He noted that the
Iranians with whom they were dealing didn't trust him, that
he was operating under a very tight timeframe, and that he
appreciated anything that we could do to assist.
Q Let me go back and see if I can parse that statemen
out a bit.
With respect to the Copp/Secord observation that this was
a deal involving Hawk missiles, did he tell you how he knew
that?
A He did not.
Q And the same question with respect to hostages?
A He did not.
Q Did he identify the hostages as being those in
Lebanon?
OK
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A He did not.
Now the information with respect to the Iranians,
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you said that Secord said that the Iranians didn't trust
him. Now who is it the Iranians didn't trust according to
Secord? Was it him personally?
A He did not expand on that. The impression was he
did not trust the Americans with whom he was dealing.
Q The Iranians did-not trust the Americans?
A Did not, yes.
Q And there was no distinction drawn between
Secord and some other Americans, NSC members, whatever?
A No. No.
Q Was there more to the conversation then?
A Only that I expressed certain views of my own on
the -- on my behalf about how we could better assist him. I
pointed out to him this was the first time we had a chance
to have a secure conversation, so I couldn't have expressed
my concerns earlier.
I felt tha , on whom he was obviously
relying, was a man whose reputation was such that I did not
think that the present government would respond to
him; and that based on what I knew about him, based on our
records, he would not have been one we would have selected
to deal with or through.
I also pointed out to him that in dealing with foreign
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ministries, and getting aircraft clearances, there is far more
effective and secure if you do it through the established
channels rather than trying to come at them in different ways.
Secord seemed open-minded about this and indicated that
if they got involved in such a thing again, he would contact
us much more in advance and see if we could do a better job
of helping him than we had.
That was the end of the conversation.
Could you recount how it was up to that point you
were determined that ?was involved?
A Yes. As I noted, his name was cited in different
stages during the course of our conversations.
Q By Secord?
A By Secord.
Q Did he --
A Calling him 'M
Q Did he tell you what it was tha was doing
for him?
A He did not.
Did he refer tWas being present with him
or how did you gather -- did you determine anything --
A -It was perfectly clea was present with him
in the office;-and in response to direct questions, Secord
said had driven him to the meeting with me.
Q Thank you. Following this meeting with Secord,
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what did you do?
A I returned directly to the embassy.
Q And upon arriving at the embassy, what happened?
A I stood by -- I briefed the charge on what Copp
had told me. He briefed me on his visit to the foreign
ministry, where he had left a note. Both of us then stood
by at the embassy, awaiting the response from the foreign
ministry.
By 4:30 p.m., we had received no response. Finally,
at 6:00 p.m., we received a call fro
tol a decision had been reached by the foreign
ministry; but before conveying the decision, the foreign
ministry would require a second note. It had to contain two
statements:
A. The operation had been undertaken for humanitarian
reasons; and
B. The operation is to free American hostages.
said if the note were delivered forthwith,
decision would follow immediately.
The implication was the decision would be positive.
What did you do?
A None of the three of us, after consultation with
Copp -- myself, and Copp -- had any difficulty with
the first point; but we all got hung up on, obviously,
the second point, putting it in writing in a diplomatic note.
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and hadn't taken -- taken
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A Copp said he had communicated the situation to
Washington;* and he at the same time advised that McFarlane
had been trying for the past two hours to reach the prime
minister but was not successful.
By 7:30 p.m., Copp advised Washington had responded and
that we could anticipate a negative response through my
channels to request. At this time M
sent a cable recommending an- alternate wording concerning the
Part B, concerning American hostages, because he believed
~~~~at. this point would accept virtually anything
on this point, and we received an answer to cable
that said -- simply said the charge should deliver a note to
But obviously the patience was running out in Washington
we recommended.
saying that we regret your government was unabl~
to fulfil the U.S. government request for this humanitarian
and the brevity of the response; but he regretted that
foreign minister, who was greatly troubled by the tone
A That was done. The charge delivered it to the
mission.
Q That was done, I take it?
d not been able to respond an
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the proper actions to guarantee that appropriate protocol
and sovereignity were met.
Q let me ask you to take an overview,
if you would, of your discussions with Secord and ask you if
at any point Secord advised you as to why it was tha
had been chosen as a landing point or a clearance point?
A The subject never came up.
Q Following your conversation with Mr. Secord in your
car, as you have already described, did you take any formal
action with respect to that information?
A I did two things. I immediately wrote a round-
up report on what had happened that morning, because given
the timeframe, it would have been the opening of business
Washington time, 22 November. I sent a cable describing the
developments on the morning of the 22d; and in
that cable, I referred to the conversation with Secord --
the meeting with Second.
I secondly then sent a cable devoted exclusively to the
Secord conversation reporting it in detail.
Q Let me back you up. You have, therefore, two
points at which you are recounting the Secord conversation;
is that correct?
A I only noted the first cable that the meeting
took place; and in the second cable, I recounted the
substance.
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Q When did the first cable go out?
A It would have been close to 12:30.
Q On 23 November?
A On 23 November.
And then the second cable?
By 1:00 o'clock.
By 1:00 o'clock. Same day?
Yes.
Who would those have been directed to?
A All traffic was handled on one channel. That was
the eyes only channel., the -chief of the European division.
Q Let me ask you just a little more generally, you
have served in Washington --
how do these cables express
themselves when they come in on the Washington side? Is there
a screen they appear on? Do they churn out on a teletype?
A No. This is a privacy channel. It is designed
CIA
to permit the exclusive communication between theechiet
and the chief of division. As I recall it, a copy --
one copy goes. to the chief of European division; two copies
go to the Office of - the DDO; and there is no further
distribution.
It is completely outside of the normal records keeping
procedure.
But how do these messages appear? Are they in
solid, hard copy? As the expression goes?
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A Yes. They would be hard copies delivered to the
office of the chief of European division or the DDO in
envelopes.
Does the DDO or the chief, say in this case of the
European division, have an officer who stands by and reads
these things as they come in?
A His secretary would open the envelope, see that it'
slugged for the chief of European division, and deliver it,
to him exclusively. If he wants to share it, he decided.
Q These two messages that you sent, I gather, were
sent to the chief of the European division and then office
of DDO; is that correct?
A All of this communication went to the chief of
European division with info copies to the DDO. Whether
the DDO ever sees it or not, I don't know. That would depend
on a screening procedure by his staff assistant.
Q You wouldn't necessarily know that unless
the DDO responded to y ou and referred to it?
A That's correct.
Q Having sent
any response to them?
off these two cables, did you receive
A I can recall no specific response that was required
in these two. No, I can't.
Q You received -- did you have subsequent communica-
tions with Duane Clarridge's office?
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A Yes. All this traffic was to and from. Anything
I received from Washington that was giving me my instructions
would be from Clarridge.
Q There was no response commenting on those particular
cables in particular -- those particular cables?
A I recall none dealing_,with my conversation with
Secord. I recall none dealing with what was contained in my
round-up report.
Q Now I gather that you also informed the charge,
that -- of your conversation with Mr. Secord?
A I did that. He and my deputy.
Q Did he also send any communications to your
knowledge out to the State Department in Washington?
A I have no knowledge whatsoever that he sent any
communications through his channels to the State Department.
I would doubt it very much, or he would have told me that he
had.
When the operation finished, what he did do is draft
a cable from himself, if I recall directly -- it was to
Poindexter. It was telegram. He expressed
his concerns about the way the entire operation had been
handled. I think that I concurred fully with everything that
he said, and it went to Washington.
I know nothing from him other than that that went through
our channels.
rtr~aa~ 11'
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Q That is through your communications
A That is correct.
Q In your communications with Duane Clarridge, did
you reach any understanding at any point as to whether
Clarridge was handling this alone or whether he was handling
it with someone else?
A We didn't discuss it.
Q You were aware that it was an NSC mission. Were
you told at any point who in the NSC was handling it?
The only name mentioned was Poindexter and, of
course, Secord on my end. And McFarlane, of course, was
in Europe.
Q Have you ever discussed this matter with Duane
Clarridge?
A No, I have not. I haven't seen him since the occa-
sion occurred.
I am not going to have this marked for the
record, but let me describe it for the record.
This is a cable dated December 4, 1986. It is addressed
to "Immediate Director." Subject is Msupport to
NSC Mission, 22-27 November 85."
The cable comprises four pages with a total of six
paragraphs.
you recognize that?
I show you that cable now and ask you if
`Q IV C-0 TIFFR
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A Yes. I drafted it.
Q What is it precisely?
A It is my response to .a query from the CIA's
inspector general for commentary on 1aMactivity in
connection with the NSC mission described.
Q Have you had an opportunity to review that cable?
A Yes, I have.
Q Is that cable an accurate description of your
involvement in the NSC mission?
A Yes, it is, with certain minor discrepancies.
Q If you can pick-out any of those minor discrepan-
cies, would you do so and note them for the record?
A Yes. The primary one is I identifie
as being an employee ofM He is not an employee of
M He is an officer of_. Both are arms firms.
That would be the major discrepancy.
Following this, did you ever have any other
dealings with Secord?
A No, I have not.
Q The two cables that you referred to that you issued
on 11/23 at 12:30 and 1:00 p.m., to your knowledge do they
exist in any form?
A The first cable containing the general round-up,
wind-up, round-up, does exist. I cannot find the second
cable.
nPrn'tV C!16 Pff b tiff n
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Q Do you know why that is?
A I have no idea. There are other cables missing.
We don't have a completely comprehensive file of all traffic;
but that's because of the nature of the channel used. It is
outside and is designed to be outside the records keeping
system.
Q And I gather that a record is not kept at your
is that correct?
A No. As I noted in that incoming round-up for the
inspector general, in December 1985, I destroyed all copies
4:41P_
of all traffic incluaing m
Does your information on' indicate whether it
has any connection to Adnan Khashoggi?
A No.
Q One way or the other?
A No. We have very limited information on
Q I also gather that Secord did not at any point
identify to you any of the individual persons on the Iranian
side of this transaction; is that correct?
A He.did not.
,Q Did he at all describe to you how it was he became
involved in this?
A He did not.
Q Did he tell you anything about how long he had been
involved in it?
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A He did not. I didn't even know he was not a
member of the National Security Council staff.
Q Did you assume that he was at that point?
A All I knew he was on special assignment to the
National Security Council. I assumed he was working for the
staff. I didn't know he wasn't.
Q Did he tell you that he wasn't?
A No, he didn't.
Q I gather he made no remarks about he had been called
.in on short notice or anything like that?
A Nothing.
Did he provide you with any information on who
might be his contacts in Israel?
A He did not.
MR. WOODCOCK: I guess that is all I have.
Tom, do you have any questions?
MR. SMEETON: Maybe just a couple. I haven't seen the
material you have there. If I am redundant, interrupt me.
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. SMEETON:
Q With respect to these cables that you sent back to
headquarters regarding the shipment, as I recall you indicated
that Mr. Secord told you that weapons were involved.
A When I talked with Secord, he told me explicitly
that it was Hawk missiles.
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That information was then reflected in one of
those two cables that were sent back to headquarters in
Washington?
A Yes.
Was there any suggestion of a cover story indicating
that you should tell
it was oil drilling
equipment rather than weapons at any time?
A
No. I was given no authorization to tel
what the equipment was. I was only told that it
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was -- just say it was for a humanitarian mission.
Q
Do you have any insights as to why oil drilling
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equipment might be mentioned as a possible cover story?
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No. I only heard of it from the media subsequently.
After the fact?
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Right.
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You never heard about it in the context of any
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of these discussions regarding the operation?
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That is correct.
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With respect tom or any other arms man-
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did the name Tom Clines ever come to
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A No.
MR. SMEETON: I think that's all I want to say.
MR. WOODCOCK: I have just one more question.
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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Q
other than Duane Clarridge, was
anybody else in his office involved in this, to your knowledge?
A I'-have no knowledge of that.
I gather then that yeti received no cables back
from anybody else with anything other than Clarridge's name
on it; would that be right?
A That would be correct. If anyone else sent it
in that channel, they would have to indicate to me that it was
someone acting in.his capacity; and I did not see that.
Q So all channels -coming from the Washington side
were coming under Clarridge's signature; is that--correct?
A Yes. Under the slug that indicates it's him
talking. Procedure would require if someone else was, it
would be -- they would put the slug and said, "From Acting
Chief Eur."
Q Now did your deputy chief become involve
in this to any great degree?
Only marginally. I,had him, if I recall, only writ
one cable. He may not even have read all the traffic; but
I did discuss some of the traffic with him.
Q Did he ever have any conversations with Secord?
A He did not. I handled all communications by
telephone, plus the one meeting.
Would that also apply t
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A That would be true.
Q So to your knowledge, you woulzl have been the only
U.S. government person dealing directly with
Secord on this matter?
A That is correct.
MR. WOODCOCK: Well, I think that concludes my questionins
MR. SMEETON: Just a followup regarding your mentioning
of the apprising of State Department, specifically Mr.
Shultz and Mr. Oakley.
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. SMEETON:
Q As I recall, at equest, you were
asked if you would determine who within the State Department
was so apprised; and you learned it was Mr. Shultz and Mr.
Oakley and nobody else in the Department of State?
A That is correct.
Q And did you get the impression that Mr. Shultz and
Mr. Oakley would okay such a transaction or just that they
were apprised?
A I think that my impression was the cable was
drafted in such a way as to indicate that they approved of
? ~Iactions, that they knew of the mission that was
happening.
MR. SMEETON: Okay.
I have a point to clarify, if I may.
T
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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BY
Q
if you would, since this has been
discussed on the record, you indicated that there was one
discrepancy which you corrected. Would you just take a quick
look
at this and tell me if you found any other discrepancies
that you could correct for the record right now.
A The only other
phrase is
should also read
used
fat
And you are satisfied that is accural ,t. looking
again at your cable?.
A Yes, I am.
That's all'.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the deposition was concluded.]
discrepancy I know, also the
the -second _placeti?-in here::: T
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Partially Declass m
under pro
by B. Reger,
EXECUTIVE SESSION
DEPOSITION O
Wednesday, May 27, 1987
House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with
Washington, D.C.
The committees met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m.,
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Neil
Eggleston (Deputy Chief Counsel of House Select Committee)
presiding.
Present: -W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel;
Tim Traylor, Investigator, House Select Committee; Robert W.
Genzman, Associate Minority Counsel, House Select Committee;
Terry Smiljanich, Associate Counsel, Senate Select Com-
mittee; Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, Senate Select
Committee; and George Taft, Counsel, Department of State.
/ieleased on
ion3 of E.O. 12356
ticnal Warily Counsif .
U WL
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1 Whereupon,
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was called as a witness by the Select Committees and, having
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
EXAMINATION BY...000NSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT
BY MR. EGGLESTON:.
Q for the record, my name is Neil
Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel for the House Select Com-
mittee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.
Also present are two representatives of the Senate Select
Committee. Both committees were established pursuant to
resolutions and have various enacting rules. The State
Department was provided with copies of both the resolutions
and rules. If you want copies for any reason, we can
certainly provide them to you.
The mandate of both the House and Senate Committees
which are now conducting joint hearings, is to investigate
the circumstances surrounding primarily the Iran affair,
but also the United States Government's involvement with the
contras. This is being conducted pursuant to those rules.
Let me just ask you at the outset to tell us a
little bit about your background in a very brief fashion.
If you could just tell me a little bit about your schooling
= M W 'Al' w s a ~= ~~
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A He was the ambassador, yes. During some of these
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days we'll talk about, .'he was out of the country, and I was
in charge.
You are the Deputy Chief of Mission?
A That is correct.
Pardon me, I have not done too much work in the
the functions of the mission. Therefore, he is prepared in
like the ambassador, has general responsibility for all of
Chief of Mission doesn't have a line responsibility. He,
the American Embassy, it is a little different. The Deputy
A That is right. The way the embassy is structured,
Q You are the ranking person in his absence?
A The ambassador is called Chief of Mission
of Mission?
State Departmer'. Others have done a lot. Is there a Chief
the ambassador's absence to take over.
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Let me ask you then -- now that I have established
some background, let me ask you, as I indicated a moment ago
off the record, the principal area I wanted to ask you
questions about is the time period primarily, say, November
20 through the end of your own involvement in this particular
operation. Could you just, without questions or promptings
from me, relay the best you can recall what:yur involvement
was when you arrived into the operation of the various
functions that you performed.
A Yes. There was, I suppose, one event prior to my
actual involveement that's worthy of note. On the 21 of
November, the political consular, who was the Acting
Deputy Chief of Mission since I was in charge at the time,
was called over to the Forei n---Ministry and was told that
there was an American who claimed to be a retired General
concurrence for transfer of
seekin
arms to Iran, and the was confused by
WM
this and wanted to know what our policy was since we had on
many occasions told them our policy was to discourage such
shipments.
The Acting DCM confirmed to the government that
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our policy was to
discourage shipment of arms to Iran.
reported that in a telegram, which I believe you have access
Q That occurred on November 21?
A Yes. And I think we sent the report out the 22.
Gi,g CHIEF
Now, on about noon on the 22, th
came to me, and he said that'he was involved
in a very difficult situation, it wasn't exactly how he
described it, and he needed my help and guidance, and he
said that he received instructions, I;.believe, the night
before or early in the morning to come i
open up his communications and act upon whatever communica-
tions were received. The first telegram that he received
instructed him not to inform the ambassador.
He came in, he was told to get in touch with some-
one acting under a pseudonym at a local hotel or at a
telephone number which he assumed was a hotel, and to help.,,,
him... The pseudonym was R. Copp.
He called him and -- this is as related to me,
and probably not in the precision that it was related,
because it's been a year and a half -- but essentially he
was asked to assist with
in gaining
authorization for the arrival of aircraft bearing arms for
Iran, which would be transshipped i to Iran. M
was not cooperating because they really
niri
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didn't know what was going on, they were confused. At least
that was the sense of
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said tha
the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister or someone
who worked in those offices to be helpful in this process.
didn't know how to go about it and didn't feel he would be
successful in any event.
said he had told Headquarters that-he would need
the help of the Charge to get these things done; if they
wanted=`it done, they should engage the Charge. I said to
him at that point that -- well, we both agreed it was an
astounding operation. But, beyond that, I said that I would
be prepared to cooperate, but first he needed authorization
to tell me what he had told me, and, second, I needed to know
that the Secretary of State knew about and approved the
operation.
Late that afternoon, I think about 5:00 o'clock or
so, he received -- all of this was in CIA channels -- he
received a telegram which was purportedly from John Poindexte
which asked that I be shown the communication and be asked to
pull out all the stops to get approval for the transit, and
he said the Secretary knew and approved of the operation and
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asked that State Department communications channels not be
used because only the Secretary and Assistant Secretary
Oakley were aware of the operation, given its obvious
sensitivity.
Based on that, I got in touch with
and
said I needed to talk to the Foreign Minister. He told me
the Foreign Minister was in a Cabinet meeting and was in-
accessible unless I could tell him that my request was coming
from the highest levels of the United States Government. I
said I could, based on the.assumption this was, in fact,
from John Poindexter, who was National Security Adviser to
the President at the time.
He then explained to me why they had been negative
to this point. He went back over the contact that they had
received from a so-called retired American General and why
they had summoned our political consul, Acting DCM, to ask
him about our policy; and based on our reiteration of our
policy that we were trying to stop shipment of arms to Iran,
they had decided not to cooperate. This is just by means of
explanation.
Q Is this now your first contact?
A This is my first contact with
the evening of the 22.
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Okay.
A I did not talk to the Foreign Minister that evening
My interest in getting the cooperation o
was passed on to him,ibut I did not actually talk
so at. night, I received a call fro
Late that evening, it was about 11:00 o'clock or
He had
received a telegram indicating that Robert McFarlane, who
was then in Rome I was told, I am not sure, but he was in
Europe in any event, had talked to the Foreign Minister on
the telephone and that the Foreign Minister had agreed to
facilitate the transshipment.
I was asked to get in touch with the Foreign-`
Minister's staff and confirm that. I was unable to do so
at that time.-
At 7:00 o'clock the next morning, the 23, I was
called again by Whoever was sending him the
telegrams back here was anxious that we get that confirmation
as soon as possible because they wanted to go ahead with the
operation. They asked I move as quickly as possible to get
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Anyway, he
received the note, complained to me about the way we had
handled it, the whole operation, and noted at the time the
note didn't look like it met their needs.
That afternoon we went back and forth several
times between the Foreign Ministry and myself, between IN
25 and Washington, about how we might embellish upon ~P4
rr,O-%" rrrnr+n'
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the confirmation.
;on r,
Finally, mid-morning I was able to talk to
the Foreign Ministry, who said he was
aware of a conversation but not aware of any commitment to
facilitate the shipment without a diplomatic note requesting
it and P,~plaining the reasons for it.
I subsequently talked to th
Foreign Minister who said the same thing, he said the
note needed to contain where the aircraft were coming from,
where they'were going, the reasons for the operation and the
cargo. I communicated all-of this, or did,
back to Washington. We were authorized to deliver a note,
which, as I recall, and I am sure you have the text of it, it
was rather skimpy, it did not give details about cargo or
reasons. I can't remember, but it was by it
didn't meet request.
I took that over and delivered it to
the Foreign Ministry,
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-The
meanwhile were meeting rather regularly, the Foreign
Minister meeting with the Prime Minister to decide whether or
not they would cooperate.
late afternoon, I had a good sense of what kind
of note would meet needs, it had to have
some information about cargo, but it didn't have to be
specific. It had to make some reference to humanitarian
purposes, and it had to have the origin and ultimate destina-
tion of the cargo.
At this point, the second effort to put this opera-
tion together was running up against a deadline, as I under-
stand it. That is, planes were in the area and on route M
and had-a turn-around time that was getting fairly
Sometime in the afternoon of Saturday, they turned
around-, and I guess whoever was running the operation back
here decided they would do it some other way, because I
received instructions to deliver a rather short and curt note
that essentially said "thanks for not helping this humanitarian
25 11 operation."
UNfliftS!FIED
MnD- -O'rP PT
4:; A
= }.1
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4-3
for that evening, Saturday evening, about 7:00 o'clock, 7:30.
I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister scheduled
meanwhile had been hard
requested.
prepared. -agree if we provided the information that they
at work, and they were at this point, as I understand it,
him. I showed him the note, and they were very upset because
it was in a sense impolite.
Also, we had turned them inside out for about 24
must say. Anyway, we met, there were
about five of us in the room. He had two staff members with
hours, and now' we-..were- simply saying "thanks , but no thanks.!.,,
we don't=-we are not--proceeding-;down-this track.
This has been previously marked ERC-1. Maybe, so the record
over the telegram that you sent or that was sent on the 21.'=
That's essentially it. I am sure there are gaps.
Maybe you can ask questions.
Q I will. There-are actually not that--many tgaps .
Let me start by asking you if you could just go
r t--t T CT- ' ~ t
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That is the reason I asked you the question earlier.
We were not under the best conditions to mee
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is clear, we should have it marked -=what are your full
initials?
A
4 1?
(The following document was marked a xhibit
No. 1 for Identification.)
COMMITTEE INSERT
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,,Y
1 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
2 Q Let me show you 1 and ask you, as best you can
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recall, if you can elaborate on this, the early conversation
of the 21 about the contact between the Acting Deputy'Chief
of mission with regard to this contact by the retired General.
A Yes. As I said earlier who was
Political Consular, was called over Ly the Deputy Political
Director and told that an official from dealing --
well, an arms dealer I guess ^~ who, as I understand,
by the way, is related to one of the officials in the Foreign
Ministry, and that's why that contact was made. He was a
brother-in-law. That's why the contact was made in that
fashion -- had said that he was working in cooperation with
a retired American General or a person who claimed to be a
retired American General and that they wanted to arrange
for the shipment of some arms to Iran.
knowing of our general policy
The Foreign Minist.ry
in this regard, was confused and they had asked
to come over and reiterate our policy essentially, which he
did. We reported back the following day.
I take it, as of this time, the Acting DeputyAChief
did not know the name of the supposed retired
American General?
A No.
Q Was
indication whether the retired General
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TT,,; +oA c+a f'PS Government operation?
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A My impression is yes, but I don't recall precisely.
Q Is this -1 a telegram that you sent back to the
State Department here in Washington? Is this your cable
essentially?
A Yes. It was actually written by i
saw it before it went out and approved it.
Q Let me just take a look at it and make sure_-thee
is nothing in it I wanted to ask you about.
You may or may not -know, based upon-whether you
read the Tower Commission or all sorts of things, there came
a time when General Secord receives a letter signed by Colonel
North with a signature indication of Mr. McFarlane indicating
that Mr. Secord's services are needed with regard to a
particular operation. Did you ever see that letter during
the course of this time period?
A No, I didn't.
Q So he never showed it to you or to your knowledge
did not show it to
A To my knowledge, he did not. He certainly didn't
show-it to me, because I have never met General Se cord.
' :_M/c
.
Q From your
.
conversations with= do you
know whether he ever showed it to him?
A I do not know. I don't think he did.
Q This cable suggests that the Acting Deputy Chief of
Rr
I
N W- Ism
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he doesn't know me.
Q You have never discussed these events with them?
A No.
Q Admiral.Poindexter or similarly Mr. McFarlane?
A No.
Q Have you discussed the'events of this week in
November, '85 with anyone else at the State Department?
It is kind of an open-ended question.
A Yes. The answer is yes, I have. I have discussed
it with, not in this detail, but with the Assistant Secretary
of State f
Was that a contemporaneous conversation?
No, it was not.
Q Do you recall when it was?
A Last summer. Nearly a year later.
Q But before all these events became public in
November, 1986?
A No, on the contrary. I do not believe I ever dis-
cussed it -- I am trying to think back. I assumed I had dis-
cussed this with U but I probably had not. I did not open
the subject up to any conversation with anybody in the State
Department. it was not public knowledge then, I simply didn't
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Department.
do it.
Q You were following instructions to only discuss it
with Oakley or --
A Exactly. The only other person I did discuss it
with was When he returned, I told him
what had. occurred, and besides saying, "Thank God, I wasn't
here," he really didn't have anything to add. I feel fairly
confident he didn't discuss it with anybody at the State
MR. EGGLESTON: I don't have any other questions.
BY MR. SMILJANICH:
r -1A citte F
Q Did ever put a name behind who at
Headquarters was giving instructions?
A Ever is a long time. He did afterwards. I am trying
to remember whether he did at the time. He explained the type
of channel he was receiving the instructions on, which was a
privacy channel, and it came from the operations side, but I
i''
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don't know that he mentioned Clarridge's name.
Q What about after the fact?
A After the fact, yes.
Q Anyone else?
A No. I mean, I know that Clarridge, Deputy Director
of operations, theoretically might have been involved, although
I also gather he may have been out of town at the time.
There are independent communication channels that
are available to you that run directly to the Secretary of
State, is that correct, as Charge?
A I could use State-Department channels and have a
highly restricted distribution on this end, but none that I
would feel confident using under the circumstances at the
time.
So there is, in fact, no way in which you could have
directly communicated only with the Secretary of State and
no one else?
A Not at the time. I have a telephone now. But at
that time, we didn't have.
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
IQ jI am Tim Woodcock with the Senate Com-
mittee. I am going to have to jump around a little bit, as
I was following these notes. The information that you first
received from I take i
received it first --
I AV%
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lounge, so it is second-hand information.
A That is my understanding. I was not in the VIP
early on, as well as the person waiting in the VIP lounge?
Q So that from your understanding was involved
A I believe that was
A That is correct.
Q That referred to a manager of the firm
n his pre-hearing remarks, General Secord said
that he personally had some reservations about the use of
because he sai M S was "not smooth". Do you
know enough about o know why he would be considered
not smooth?
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I have an impression tha is heavy-handed,
but that is an impression, not based on my knowledge. To my
knowledge, I haven't met the man.
When you say heavy-handed, what do you mean by that?
Too direct, rather blunt, given to bluster.
Q Do you
have knowledge at all of
A I have met
He is also a partner i, is that-correct?
t is correct. I think he an own equal
shares, perhaps. I am not sure. But he is partners with him.
Do you know of any involvement -- I am speaking
broadly here -- of Thomas Clines in I
returned from the- meeting with
him, which was sometime during the day of the 23rd.
Q
Did the name Secord mean anything to you?
4,
No, it didn't.
Q
When Ambassado
returned, you testified
you briefed him on the matter. Is it also true
participated in that briefing?
A I am certain he did at ont point. Whether -- I
I do not.
Do you know Thomas Clines?
No. - ~.
Do- - recall at what point you learned that Copp
fact, Richard Secord?
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I have very high regard for
On November 23,
Did he advise you that he had relayed to Headquarters
the information that General Secord had told him about the
nature of the airplane mission?
A Yes.
Did he advise you of that on November 23 or long
after the fact?
d although I did not see all of those, I
did see some of them. He told me what was in them. Normally
can't recall whether I briefed the ambassador independently
first or we did it altogether. I am not sure. The normal,
of course, event would have been that I would have given him
to go through it all. But I can't recall that's the way it
happened. It's a question of trust involved here.
a very brief summary of what happened and asked
honest person, as a person of integrity, and I think that's
probably reciprocated. I wouldn't want you to read into what
I have said anything that suggests I have cut him out or he'
is trying to cut me out of any conversation with the ambassador
That was not the case.
Q Thanks.
C !,4 ;L H
Did advise you that he was in regular
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I saw them, and he provided a running account of what was
going on to Headquarters.
Q Your understanding --
A Within that running account was the conversation
with Secord and the indication the aircraft would be carrying
Hawk missiles, yes.
You are referring to a running account, and I
gather that is the account has given you. Is
that correct?
A No, I mean that he--was giving Langley.
Q I want to divide-this into two parts. There are
actual communications going to Langley from is
that correct?
A Yes.
When you refer to a running account, that is what
you are referring to?
A Exactly.
Q With respect to the communication which
C,? ct/'E7
made to Langley recounting the substance of the Secord
conversation,-did he simply tell you about it, or did you
actually see it?
A I don't know.
Q You don't recall?
A No.
Q I gather some of the messages he sent out you
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actually saw, and others he told you about, is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q But I gather --
?
'
t T 'saw t}~at
an
recd
Z%
Q That specific one?
A That is correct.
Q Your memory is clear, I gather, on the point he did
tell you contemporaneously with sending the message he had
communicated with Headquarters on the substance of the Secord
conversation.
That's what I recall.
Q I gather -- you have already testified to this, just
to make it clear -- that conversation recounted the nature of
the cargo being Hawk missiles to the destination point being
Iran and the purpose being for the release of the hostages,
is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q Do you recall whether Ambassador com-
municated any dismay to CIA after the fact about the manner
in which this-whole operation had been handled?
,A My impression is that he did not. He intended to,
he said he was going to. My impression is that he did not.
Q Now, was that at your suggestion, or was that his
A Well, he was appalled by it, let's put it that way,
9JtN_
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so I can't recall whether it was my suggestion or his idea,
but it could have been either.
Q You were in accord with it, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Would that have gone -- if that communication had
been sent out, would that have gene to the Director of Central
Intelligence, Mr. Clarridge, or some other person?
A It would have gone to the Director of Central
Intelligence, because Ambassado and the Director
were personal friends, as you-probably know. Can I go off
the record for a second? -
MR. EGGLESTON: Sure.
(Discussion off the record.)
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
Q Have you heard now, subsequently, through all these
events, whether Thomas Clines was even present in
during these operations?
A I have read thathe was. But I don't know by my
own knowledge. I have not talked to anybody in that
says he was there. I never asked whether he was
there, who was one of those two partners I have met.
Q Have you ever sought to confirm through your con-
tacts in whether it was, in fact, General Secord who
went to the VIP lounge?
A No, I have not.
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1 is LYLU AA
38
i fonfirmed to you that this
attempted bribe, or whatever the attempted influence was, was
sought to be effected in the name of Robert McFarlane?
A No,?I have heard nothing along those lines. I am
only vaguely aware of this concern about a possible bribe,
and certainly not in terms of utilizing Robert McFarlane's
name.
Q Did this incident which occurre
have any lasting effect on
relations between the United States and
A That's a difficult assessment to make. It's
possible that it created some suspicion within the government
about how we deal with other governments. It also might have
had a concern this particular government h
complicated the relationship somewhat, but I can't be sure.
And I might add, if I can, for the record, that
that really accounts for why I did not seek further informa-
tion about who was really at the VIP lounge. As far as I
was concerned the event was over with, and we were better off
going ahead trying to build the relationship rather than
spend too much time worrying about what had happened.
Q I may have asked this question already, but let me
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t r
y t' r
ask again. Following this incident, did you come across,
through your sources i any association of either
General Secord or Thomas Clines wit in subsequent
dealings?
A No, I was not aware of General Secord or Tom Clines,
Thomas Clines, being in after that, until I read
about it in the press a few months ago.
Q Now, the same question only with respect to
association or involvement with bM efore the events of
November 22, 23 and 24, 1985-
A I am not sure what the question is.
Q The question being, did you come across information i
your contacts i of association of General Secord
or Thomas Clines with at any period before November 22,
23, or 24?
A No. At least none that I can recall, because I
wouldn't have recognized those names at the time, in any
event.
Q I am speaking -- this is after the fact, even up to
the present. Have you, through you contacts,
received confirmation of the involvement of these people with
M
A I haven't.
Q Let me ask you the same tandem of questions with
respect to Albert Hakim. Is that a name you are familiar
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with through your contacts in
A No.
MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is all I have. Thank
you, sir.
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q Regarding the curt note delivered t
was that at the instructions of Admiral Poindexter?
A It was my assumption it was at the instructions of
Admiral Poindexter. It came through the CIA channel, and it
was purportedly under his instructions, yes.
Q And was the wording of that note also from Admiral
Poindexter according to your information?
Yes, it was.
Was there any Department of State approval or
Secretary of State approval A. No, there was not.
Q -- of the note?
A Not that I knew of. Once again, going back to the
basic operating thesis, that is I was operating on the basis
of my understanding given to me through CIA communications
that the Secretary knew and approved; therefore, that was
just an extension of that.
I might, if I can, sort of expand here. You asked
or Mr. Eggleston asked if I had ever discussed this with the
Secretary of State or with Assistant Secretary Oakley after
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that event. First of all, I don't really have many occasions
to meet with either one of them, and I have only been back
to the United States once since then, and that was last summer,
or twice last summer, I am sorry, briefly. To that'point,
this had not become public knowledge, so I didn't discuss it
with anybody else.
My assumption still at that time was that they knew
and approved. I had no reason to believe otherwise, and,
therefore, I didn't seek an opportunity to raise it.
MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further. Thank you.
MR. SMILJANICH: One last question.
BY MR. SMILJANICH:
Q Physically, when you received the wording of the
diplomatic note via VIP channels, did you take that or re-do
A It is done on a standard diplomatic note format. It
was done by a secreta
Q Did you retain a copy of that?
A Yes, I have a copy.
Q Back, in'
Yes. I believe you have it. Do you not have the
context of it?
Q I don't know we have anything other than the CIA
cable itself.
MR. EGGLESTON: I don't know I have seen it in the
formal fashion.
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BY MR. SMILJANICH:
Was a copy of that ever sent to anyMffice here at
the Department of State?
A No.
MR. EGGLESTON: I don't have anythirg further.
MR. WOODCOCK: Let me ask a coupin questions.
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
When you received this terse note, would it be
fair to say you were concerned about the quality and tone
of the note?
A Yes. We appealed actually.
How was that done?"
As I recall, it was done in communications.
It is possible, however, and I don't know, it is possible
that -- because sometimes communications came via Secord.
He had his little'radio. So some of_the,appeal might have
gone through those channels, or might have talked
to Secord and said; "Look, we can probably get this done if
you do it this way" and -- but I don't really,Rrecall. We
did appeal, I appealed personally the tone of the note and
substance of the note. I thought we were throwing away an
opportunity to get it done if they really wanted it done.
Q You testified that you were instructed not to
communicate through State Department channelse at the outset,
is that correct?
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A That is correct.
Q So your personal appeal was directed, to the best
of your recollection, either through CIA channels or through
Secord's communication device, is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q Who would that have been directed to, CIA Headquart-
A Yes, CIA Headquarters. Whoever was -- actually,
it was to the NSC as far as we were concerned. The in-
structions that came out were this is a NSC
operation, or the NSC asks -that you or instructs that you do
the following, as I recall the opening telegram. So all of
this was we were working for Admiral Poindexter as far as
we were concerned.
Q So under those circumstances, I gather, it would
have been inappropriate for you-to have appealed to the
Secretary of State, is : theft= Correct?
A Yes My__assumption at-that point would haste been
the Secretary of State, although aware of the-.operation, was
not aware of the details'-at this point. Time was running
out.- It wouldn't have been a reasonable-thing to try to do.
Q Now, let me just ask a couple more questions. You
testified you never met,Secord, is that correct?---
A That is correct.
Q So, therefore, your knowledge of this communications
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device he had is coming fro
A That is right.
Z-r
Q I gather, then, you were relying upon his representa-
tion this was a Secord communications device; is that correct?
A That is correct. The only reason that -- I mean,
" ? _
VIP
we becPme aware, and I became aware almost inad-
vertently Secord had his own communications device because
he was able to get things out of Washington we subsequently
got through CIA channels. He would be on the telephone
saying such and such is happening.
Q I take it there were points in this operation
where Secord was, as they say in the CIA, waiting in advance
is that correct?
A I think that was the case most of the time. in
retrospect.
MR. WOODCOCK:. I think that is all I have. Thank
you, sir.
MR. EGGLESTON: Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 10:32 a.m., the committees were
adjourned subject to the call of the chair.)
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