THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE USSR: FERTILE GROUND FOR GORBACHEV'S NEW THINKING

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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict? and
the USSR: Fertile Ground for
Gorbachev's New Thinking
An Intelligence Assessment
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NESA 88-10075
December 1988
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The Arab-Israeli Conflict and
the USSR: Fertile Ground for
Gorbachev's New Thinking
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Issues and Applications Division, NESA,
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December 1988
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 19 December 1988
was used in this report.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict and
the USSR: Fertile Ground for
Gorbachev's New Thinking
Moderate Arabs and Israelis have responded favorably to Moscow's new,
more flexible approach to resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as
to Soviet concessions in substantive areas of bilateral relations. They have
upgraded and expanded contacts with the USSR and have accepted the
USSR as a major participant in efforts to reinvigorate Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations. Radical Arabs, although concerned about Moscow's shift in
emphasis, have not yet reacted negatively.
Regional perceptions of Soviet attitudes and objectives have shifted as a
result of the USSR's announced intention to withdraw from Afghanistan;
its new commitment to the peacekeeping role of the United Nations; the
modification of its position on an Arab-Israeli negotiating process; its move
to upgrade contacts with Israel and expand relations with Egypt, Jordan,
and the moderate Gulf states; and its willingness to openly petition its
clients, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to
moderate their policies.
Recognition by Arabs and Israelis that Moscow is a legitimate and credible
mediator in the Middle East is a significant gain for the Soviet Union,
whose previous ties to radical entities have kept it on the fringes of Middle
East politics. Greater US willingness to include Moscow in the peace
process and to endorse the concept of an international conference has
further reinforced Moscow's image.
King Hussein's disengagement in July 1988 from administration of the
West Bank has strengthened Moscow's position by bolstering its client, the
PLO, and undermining any framework for negotiations other than an
international conference?Moscow's preferred approach. Jordan and
Egypt have used Moscow's call for a conference to put pressure on the
United States and Israel to demonstrate commitment to the peace process.
The positive responses of Cairo and Amman to Soviet efforts to improve bi-
lateral relations reflects their desire to create more balance in relations
with the superpowers and to gain protection from radical Arab criticism.
Yitshak Shamir, Israel's Prime Minister and leader of the Likud Party,
opposes a peace conference and its underlying principle of exchanging
territory for peace. He has tried to minimize the importance of Soviet
flexibility and keep the onus for lack of progress in the peace process on the
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Arabs and their Soviet patron. Labor Party leader Peres, whose personal
political position was undermined by Labor's poor showing in Israel's
November 1988 election, has emphasized Moscow's flexibility in an effort
to demonstrate that peace negotiations are viable and that Israel must be
responsive.
Although the USSR's Syrian and PLO clients are concerned about the
implications of Moscow's new approach, they have not reacted strongly.
PLO leader Arafat has been mollified by renewed Soviet support for his
leadership, by Soviet efforts to move Syria toward rapprochement with the
PLO, and by Moscow's pressure on hardline Palestinian elements to
acquiesce in the moderate course adopted by the PLO in November and
December 1988. Damascus does not appear overly concerned that Moscow
will abandon Syrian claims to the Golan Heights and probably remains
confident that peace negotiations cannot proceed without its cooperation.
The positive US response to the PLO's new moderation has generated
optimism about the negotiating process and created new expectations of
movement. The Likud Party's domination of Israeli decisionmaking,
however, makes progress unlikely over the near term and moderate Arabs
will continue to use Soviet initiatives to underscore their desire for progress
and to press for an assertive US role.
Prolonged stagnation in the negotiating process will erode Washington's
image among moderate Arabs and enhance the appeal of closer ties to the
Soviet Union. This tendency will be reinforced if unrest and violence
continue in the occupied territories and if the end of the Iran-Iraq war per-
mits the diversion of Arab attention back to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
inability of Washington to provide all the weapon systems sought by its
moderate Arab friends also will redound to Moscow's advantage.
In the highly unlikely event that Israel adopts a more forthcoming position
with respect to negotiations, US credibility among moderate Arabs would
rise. Pressure would then shift to Moscow and its clients to make further
difficult choices about Palestinian negotiating positions, the modalities of
negotiations, and the outlines of a settlement.
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The Soviets have demonstrated their ability to implement "new think-
ing"?most dramatically in their decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.
It is very possible that Moscow would be willing to make the compromises
necessary to move toward a constructive solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Its ability to bring its clients (particularly Syria) to the negotiating
table, however, is more doubtful. If it could not, the utility of its
involvement in the peace process would again be called into question and
its new credibility undermined.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Gorbachev's "New Thinking" and the Middle East
1
New Realities
1
An International Conference
2
The Role of the PLO
2
An Eventual Settlement
3
Expanded Contacts With Israel and the Moderate Arabs
3
Pressure on Syria
3
Responses to Moscow's New Flexibility
5
Moderate Arab Support
5
Egypt
5
Jordan
5
A Divided Israel
6
Radical Arab Skepticism
6
The PLO
8
Syria
9
Prospects and Implications for the United States
9
Perpetuation of the Status Quo
9
Less Likely Scenarios
10
A New Soviet Initiative
10
Progress in the Peace Process
10
Appendix
Jordan's Disengagement From the West Bank
13
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The Arab-Israeli Conflict and
the USSR: Fertile Ground for
Gorbachev's New Thinking
Gorbachev's "New Thinking" and the Middle East
Since coming to power in March 1985, Soviet Secre-
tary General Gorbachev has made a series of interre-
lated moves designed to strengthen the USSR's politi-
cal position in the Middle East, secure its role in peace
negotiations, and enhance its image as a responsible
superpower. He has pursued considerably more flexi-
ble policies than his predecessors on a wide variety of
Middle Eastern issues, including Soviet relations with
Israel and the moderate Arab states and the resolu-
tion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas, in the past,
Moscow tended to defer to the rejectionist posture of
its radical Arab clients, Gorbachev has given in-
creased emphasis to the coincidence of Soviet and
moderate Arab views and new support to the need to
balance Arab goals and Israeli security needs.
New Realities
The Palestinian uprising (the intifada) in the territo-
ries occupied by Israel and Jordan's renunciation in
July 1988 of responsibility for the West Bank cata-
pulted the Arab-Israeli conflict back into the fore-
front of international concern and created new open-
ings for Moscow's flexible diplomacy. These
developments raised questions about the costs and
durability of the Israeli occupation, the relationship
between the Palestinians in the territories and those in
the diaspora, the role of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), and the urgency of finding a
political solution. They also challenged the strategies
and policies of all interested parties to the Arab-
Israeli struggle, including the Soviet Union.
Thus far, these developments have worked to Mos-
cow's advantage. They have undermined the long-held
Israeli position that the Palestinian issue could be
dealt with through Jordan; reinforced the central role
of the PLO, Moscow's client; and, at least for the
foreseeable future, made irrelevant any approach to
the peace process other than Moscow's preferred
choice of an international conference.
1
Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev
After an initial period of silence, presumably to assess
the impact of King Hussein's announcement, Soviet
commentary termed it a positive development. In an
Izvestiya article on 18 September 1988 correspondent
Konstantin Geyvandov argued that the decision was
the logical result of the Palestinian uprising on the
West Bank and Gaza and that it was intended both to
dispel the illusion of the "Jordanian version" of a
settlement and to demonstrate that the true partici-
pants in peace negotiations must be the Palestinians.
Further, he stated, the announcement opened the way
for the PLO to act as the sole legitimate representa-
tive of the Palestinian people and provided an oppor-
tunity for political and diplomatic initiatives to imple-
ment the Palestinians' right to self-determination.
By dramatically altering the environment, however,
the Hussein action also posed some problems for the
Soviets, forcing the development of new approaches
and strategies. In spite of their positive interpretation
of events, they reacted cautiously to the announce-
ment and were in no hurry to adopt positions with
respect to either action by the PLO or the next phase
of the negotiating process. Recognizing that their own
position was not threatened by the move and that they
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had little role to play in its immediate aftermath, the
Soviets focused their attention on trying to ensure that
subsequent developments complemented their objec-
tives in the region.
An International Conference
The Soviets have indicated flexibility on virtually
every issue having to do with a framework for peace
negotiations and an eventual settlement?except insis-
tence on their own involvement in the process. They
have long believed that an international conference
provides the best vehicle for ensuring their participa-
tion as well as for protecting the interests of their
clients.'
Under Gorbachev's leadership, Moscow has tried to
allay Israeli concerns that a conference involving all
parties would increase the leverage of the radical
Arabs. The Soviets have modified their previous
insistence that a conference must have full decision-
making authority, suggesting instead that a confer-
ence must simply provide the "proper environment"
for negotiations. They also have indicated that a
conference could have parallel frameworks in which
regional or bilateral committees could function along-
side an ongoing plenary.
In spite of this new flexibility on the modalities of a
conference, the Soviets have continued to defend the
centrality of their own role and the role of their clients
(particularly the Syrians) who are concerned about the
possibility of separate deals. In his press conference
following the Moscow summit meeting with President
Reagan in June 1988, for example, Secretary General
Gorbachev stated that an international conference
must not be simply an umbrella for separate talks but
must be a normal and effective forum interconnected
with other types of meetings.
In the aftermath of the Hussein announcement, the
Soviets have made an effort to maintain support for
an international conference. In their advice to the
PLO they have argued against action that might
' In July 1986, Gorbachev reissued the old Soviet call for an
international conference, adding the proposal that such a confer-
ence be preceded by a preparatory meeting of the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council. By providing a
UN framework, Moscow sought to increase the international
appeal of its proposal and thereby circumvent the US and Israeli
refusal to deal directly with the PLO.
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undermine the prospects for a conference. At the
same time, they apparently believe that there is little
prospect of a conference in the near term and thus
little incentive for them to make new compromises.
During their August 1988 meeting in Geneva, US
Assistant Secretary of State Murphy questioned Sovi-
et Deputy Foreign Minister Polyakov on possible
conference arrangements but received little substan-
tive response. Soviet Foreign Ministry official Tur-
diyev subsequently told a US Embassy official that
there were points of agreement between the US and
Soviet positions and that the remaining differences
could be overcome, but that a political decision to
convene an international conference must first be
made.
The Role of the PLO
Before the Hussein announcement on Jordan's disen-
gagement from the West Bank, there had been a
subtle shift in the Soviet position on Palestinian
representation at an international conference. Al-
though continuing to state that the PLO was the only
credible spokesman for the Palestinian people and
must determine how the Palestinians are to be repre-
sented, some Soviets had implied that they could
accept either a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation
or a unified Arab delegation.' After Hussein's an-
nouncement, the question of a joint delegation became
more remote, the central role of the PLO was accen-
tuated, and Moscow again emphasized the PLO's
involvement in the peace process as the "sole legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinian people."
Under Gorbachev, Moscow also has pursued a differ-
entiated approach toward other PLO issues. On the
one hand, it lobbied for reunification of the PLO
under Arafat's leadership and tried to foster a PLO-
Syrian rapprochement?to strengthen the PLO's ne-
gotiating position. On the other, it urged the PLO,
to move toward recogni-
tion of Israel and acceptance of UN Resolutions 242
and 338 as the legal basis for an international confer-
ence.'
'This position contrasted with their strong opposition to the
Hussein-Arafat accord of 1985 (which was backed by the United
States and was designed to produce a joint Palestinian-Jordanian
team to negotiate with Israel?without Soviet involvement).
The Soviets previously had urged Arafat to recognize
these resolutions (which include recognition of Israel) as well as the
existence of Israel.
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In the wake of the Hussein announcement, the Soviets
urged the PLO to take a more "realistic" position
based on recognition of Israel and a two-state solu-
tion and to make some conciliatory gestures in order
to reactivate the peace process and create a good
environment for an international conference. They
urged the radical Palestinian factions with which they
have close ties (the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine?the PFLP, led by George Habbash; and
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine?the DFLP, led by Naif Hawatmah) to maintain
PLO unity and acquiesce in the November decisions
of the Palestine National Council (PNC).5 The Soviets
will use the council resolutions and Arafat's subse-
quent statements to argue that the PLO has made
itself a viable negotiating partner and that the United
States must convince Israel to respond.
While wanting the PLO to take some conciliatory
steps, the Soviets had argued against dramatic action
such as establishment of a government-in-exile or a
provisional government. They were concerned that
such action would undermine the unity of the Arab
world and complicate the prospects of an international
conference. The Soviets also were concerned that the
PLO, anxious to take advantage of a perceived oppor-
tunity, would make concessions that played into the
hands of the West and again relegated Moscow to the
role of spectator. A Soviet official indicated that this
particular concern had been exacerbated by the meet-
ing of Egyptian President Mubarak, Hussein, and
Arafat in October 1988.
An Eventual Settlement
There has been a subtle shift in the Soviet posture on
the nature of an eventual settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Moscow now gives more attention to
Israeli concerns. In a June 1988 press conference,
Gorbachev emphasized that the Palestinian right to
'The Soviets have expressed support for a return to UN Resolution
181, which was passed in 1947 and provides the legal basis for the
creation of Israel as well as for the establishment of a Palestinian
state.
The PNC, meeting in Algiers in November 1988, gave qualified
endorsement of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, thereby implicitly
accepting the existence of Israel; declared an independent state in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with its capital in Jerusalem;
and called for a confederation of Jordan and Palestine. In his
address to the United Nations, meeting in Geneva on 13 December
1988, and in a subsequent press conference, Arafat also recognized
Israel's right to exist.
3
self-determination must be balanced by Israel's right
to security. Similarly, those Israeli spokesmen who
believe that there is new flexibility in Moscow's
position on Arab-Israeli issues cite changes in Soviet
treatment of the issue of Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories. They argue that, whereas Soviet
spokesmen previously demanded Israeli withdrawal
from all the territory occupied in 1967, including
Jerusalem, they now use a less comprehensive formula
which suggests recognition that Israeli security con-
cerns would preclude the return of all the territories.
Expanded Contacts With Israel and Moderate Arabs
Since breaking diplomatic relations with Israel in
1967, Moscow has been less well positioned than the
United States to mediate the Arab-Israeli dispute.
But, under Gorbachev, the Soviets have expanded
contacts with Tel Aviv, gaining both enhanced region-
al flexibility and international credibility
Similarly, Moscow's poor relations with Egypt (dating
from the 1970s) and its rejection of the Camp David
process had limited its credibility with the moderate
Arabs. Under Gorbachev, the Soviets have made
concessions to Egypt, resulting in improved bilateral
relations and in Cairo's endorsement of both a Soviet-
backed international conference and Soviet participa-
tion in the process
Pressure on Syria
The Soviets have indicated to Syria as well as to the
PLO that a military solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict is no longer practical. During Arafat's visit to
Moscow in April 1988, Gorbachev publicly empha-
sized the need to resolve the conflict by political
rather than military means and warned that the
avoidance of extremism strengthens the Palestinian
cause. He also publicly lectured Syrian President
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Egypt's Relations With the USSR
The Soviet expulsion from Egypt in the early 1970s
had many negative consequences for Moscow's posi-
tion in the Middle East. It lost a significant military
presence in the region; it was excluded from the
Arab-Israeli peace process; its efforts to organize a
unified, pro-Soviet, anti-US Arab position with re-
spect to the Arab-Israeli conflict were undermined; it
was isolated with the radical states in the region?
Syria, Libya, and South Yemen?and soon discov-
ered that it had virtually no control over the actions
of these clients.
Shortly after coming to power, the Gorbachev regime
signaled its desire to improve relations with Egypt,
whose concurrent move back into the Arab fold was
consistent with Moscow's efforts to encourage a
united Arab approach to the conflict with Israel. The
Soviets began making overtures to improve the cli-
mate of relations with Egypt in the fall of 1985 and,
during the next year, there were numerous exchanges
of visits and messages of good will.
In early 1987 the Soviets basically capitulated to
Egypt's conditions on the repayment of Cairo's $2.5
billion military debt to Moscow, which had posed the
major obstacle to improved relations. This concession
paved the way for a gradual improvement in political,
economic, and military-supply relations. Over the
past year, Egypt has allowed the reopening of Soviet
Consulates in Alexandria and Port Said and the
reopening of the Soviet Cultural Center and the
Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Society in Cairo. The two
nations have signed a three-year trade agreement?
their first multiyear protocol since the rupture in
relations. The Soviets have resumed deliveries of
spare parts for Soviet-built military equipment, a
primary Egyptian objective in improving ties to Mos-
cow. And,
Cairo and Moscow are discussing the reopening of
military attache offices in their respective capitals.
President Mubarak has allowed relations with Mos-
cow to improve gradually, but there remain signifi-
cant impediments to close bilateral ties.
Mu-
barak considers Egypt's interests best served by close
ties to the United States and is aware that a signifi-
cant improvement in relations with Moscow could
damage his Washington connection. In addition,
barak does not believe Moscow can help Egypt's
economy much because the USSR itself is in econom-
ic turmoil.
The Egyptians also remain suspicious of Soviet inten-
tions. In early 1988 an Egyptian official expressed
concern, for example, that the Soviets were using
Egypt's interest in obtaining spare parts as leverage in
the political realm
the Egyptian military, which has negative
memories of the era of close Soviet-Egyptian cooper-
ation, is particularly opposed to a significant im-
provement in relations.
Despite the limits to the relationship, Moscow has
made significant gains in Egypt. The improvement in
atmospherics and increased visits by high-level offi-
cials have given the Soviets the veneer of greater
involvement and acceptability. And Moscow does
provide a useful counter for Egypt in bargaining with
the United States. We believe that, when the peace
process stagnates, Egypt will use Soviet initiatives to
prod the United States into action. Similarly, when
Egyptian-US debt negotiations are going poorly,
Cairo can remind Washington that the USSR has
been more flexible.
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Assad, during the latter's visit to Moscow in April
1987, on the need for a peaceful resolution of the
conflict and support for an international conference.
Responses to Moscow's New Flexibility
The Soviet call for an international conference has
received widespread regional and international sup-
port. Most Arab states as well as the PLO have
endorsed it, as have the United Nations General
Assembly, the European Community, the Islamic
summit that met in Kuwait in early 1987, and Arab
summits meeting in Amman in November 1987 and
Algiers in June 1988. Israeli Labor leader Peres has
given modified approval, but Likud leader Shamir
remains adamantly opposed. Perhaps of greatest im-
portance to Moscow is the US acceptance of Soviet
participation and its indication of support for a con-
ference, although the US definition of a conference
differs from that of the Soviet Union.'
Moderate Arab Support
Egypt. As the only Arab state that has made peace
with Israel, Egypt hopes that progress toward a
resolution of the status of the occupied territories will
justify its own peace with Israel and lead to Cairo's
continuing reintegration into the Arab community.
Following the breakdown in early 1986 of the US-
encouraged Jordanian-PLO accord, President Mu-
barak became more receptive to Soviet efforts to
convene an international conference. As Soviet-Egyp-
tian bilateral relations began to improve, Cairo
The Soviets have long sought to regain a position of equality with
the United States in the mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
They had this status in 1973, when they cochaired the Geneva
Conference, but lost it (largely as a result of Syrian intransigence),
first to the Kissinger diplomatic effort and then to the Camp David
process that culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
Moscow originally rejected the latter but has gradually given
implicit acceptance to the treaty by stressing the need to move the
negotiating process forward with Egyptian participation. The Sovi-
ets were guarded in their response to the US peace initiative
undertaken by Secretary of State Shultz in early 1988, welcoming
US acceptance of the idea of an international conference and the
need for a US dialogue with Moscow on the subject, but criticizing
the initiative's support for an "umbrella" conference, its failure to
address the future of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, and its
exclusion of the PLO.
5
Egyptian President Mubarak
became increasingly supportive of the Soviet proposal
and of Soviet participation in the peace process.
In May 1988, Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid
became the first Egyptian foreign minister to visit
Moscow in 13 years. During his visit he emphasized
the USSR's "key, highly important role" in a Middle
Eastern settlement.
Jordan. Gorbachev's initiatives have had considerable
resonance in Jordan. Following the breakdown of his
accord with the PLO in 1986, Hussein felt the need to
regenerate movement in the peace process and to gain
broad international support for his efforts; he en-
dorsed the Soviet call for an international conference
and became a strong advocate of Moscow's right to
participate in the peace process. He also used closer
relations with Moscow to convey his displeasure with
US policies and put pressure on Washington to move
the peace process forward
In the wake of the West Bank announcement, Jorda-
nians have continued to praise Soviet efforts to further
the peace process and to emphasize that the era of
US-dominated peacemaking has ended. An editorial
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Jordan's King Hussein with
General Secretary Gorbachev
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in the Jordan Times on 31 August 1988, for example,
stated that a greater Soviet role in Arab-Israeli
peacemaking is imperative and will rid the region of
the "nonsensical" idea that the United States is the
only possible mediator. The editorial argued that an
increased Soviet role also would provide the geopoliti-
cal balance necessary for meaningful talks as well as
for effective security guarantees in the wake of a
settlement. Prime Minister Rifai publicly stated in
early November 1988 that the United States and the
USSR must cooperate to solve the Middle Eastern
problem.
The Jordanians also have continued to move toward
closer bilateral relations with Moscow. The 25th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions was celebrated in August 1988 with considerable
fanfare, and the two nations reached an agreement to
establish a joint committee for economic, scientific,
and technical cooperation.
A Divided Israel
The Israelis have long been divided on both the issue
of an international conference and Moscow's role in
the negotiating process. The Likud Party, which has
emerged in a dominant position from the Israeli
election of November 1988, rejects the concept of a
conference and therefore considers the Soviet demand
for inclusion in such a conference irrelevant. Likud
Secret
Party leader Shamir has tried to minimize the impor-
tance of any modifications in the Soviet position
because he seeks to place the blame for lack of
progress toward a settlement on the Arabs and their
Soviet backer. He has stated, however, that he would
be willing to allow Soviet involvement in Arab-Israeli
negotiations if Moscow first reestablished full diplo-
matic relations with Israel and permitted large-scale
Jewish emigration from the USSR. He also has made
an effort to establish his own contacts with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe in order to demonstrate
that the Labor Party does not have any advantage on
the issue of Jewish immigration.
Israel's Labor Party, which was weakened by the
November election, has shared the moderate Arab
desire for movement in the peace process and has been
willing to discuss the exchange of land for peace.
Labor Party leader Peres has endorsed an internation-
al framework for talks and indicated that he could
accept Soviet participation in such a conference. Peres
and his followers have focused on signs of Soviet
flexibility on both the peace process and Jewish
emigration to demonstrate that their policies are
effective.
Radical Arab Skepticism
Both Syria and the PLO, Moscow's longtime clients,
have expressed concern about various aspects of Gor-
bachev's new policy in the Middle East. They have
not made serious protests, however, probably because
they both seek Soviet support in defending their
interests internationally and protecting their role in
any negotiating process. We believe that each worries
about its potential isolation and exclusion from sepa-
rate peace talks (as occurred at Camp David) and that
each depends on Moscow's continuing insistence that
movement must be made on all fronts simultaneous-
ly?or on none. It is unlikely that either Syria or the
PLO feels threatened by the negotiating process at
this point, given Israeli intransigence, and both proba-
bly believe that Moscow's tactics are designed in large
part to put the onus for failure on the United States
and Israel.
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Israel's Relations With the USSR
Under Gorbachev's leadership, Moscow has increased
Jewish emigration from the USSR; allowed increas-
ing numbers of Soviet Jews to visit Israel on tourist
visas; improved conditions for Soviet Jews to practice
their religion in the USSR; permitted Poland and
Hungary to exchange interest sections with Israel;
established a Soviet consular presence in Israel; and
agreed to a visit (and probably an extended stay) by
an Israeli consular group. Israel has been responsive
to Soviet overtures both because it wants full diplo-
matic relations with Moscow in order to enhance its
international standing and, more important, because
it wants increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union, one of the largest remaining sources of Jewish
population for Israel.
While Gorbachev has stated that the absence of
diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel is
not normal, Moscow also has indicated that it will
reestablish relations only in the context of movement
toward an international conference. Both Moscow
and Tel Aviv clearly see the utility of maintaining
movement in relations, however, and the existence of
consular delegations in the USSR and Israel will
provide the basis for a continuing dialogue. The
Israeli media has claimed that Moscow and Israel
are discussing the establishment of joint chambers of
commerce in Moscow and Tel Aviv as a first step
toward opening direct trade channels.
Israel's expanding relations with Eastern Europe also
serve the interests of both Tel Aviv and Moscow. In
mid-May 1988, Peres visited Hungary?the first
Israeli foreign minister to visit an East European
country (other than Romania) since 1967?and was
given a high-level reception. In September, Shamir
also visited Hungary, upgrading the bilateral ex-
change still further. Peres met with the Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister in New York in September 1988,
and it is likely that Prague will follow in the path of
Budapest and Warsaw. East Germany's high-level
reception of World Jewish Congress leader Edgar
Bronfrnan in mid-October 1988 indicates that East
Berlin too is taking a more forthcoming position with
respect to Israel.
Economic ties between Eastern Europe and Israel
also are expanding slowly. Trade and tourism be-
tween Israel and both Poland and Hungary have been
growing, albeit slowly, and, according to US diplo-
matic reports, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have
agreed to host Israeli economic delegations.
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Although the Soviets had made clear their preference
for Peres and his views, they took steps to demon-
strate their willingness to deal with Shamir even
before the Israeli election. Their decision to have
Shevardnadze meet with Shamir at the United Na-
tions in June 1988 supported the comment made by
Soviet party official Nikolay Shishlin to an Israeli
newspaper in early June to the effect that the Soviet
Union does not intend to close any doors. Similarly,
following Israel's November election, Shevardnadze
stated that Moscow would continue its contacts with
Israel. For his part, Shamir will use his contacts with
Moscow and Eastern Europe to show that the Labor
Party has no exclusive rights to the Soviet connec-
tion.
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Israel Scene ?
Jeanette Harris ?
Israeli Likud Party leader
Shamir
Israeli Labor Party leader
Peres
The Soviets have been able to mollify both Syria and
the PLO by keeping their position ambiguous with
respect to an international conference, the role of the
PLO, and the terms of an eventual settlement.
PLO leaders believe, or
profess to believe, that Moscow remains firmly com-
mitted to their central role in the peace process.
claimed in late April 1988 that
Moscow supported Syria's preference for the composi-
tion of an Arab delegation to a peace conference. In
fact, the Soviet position on a particular issue often
depends on whom they are talking to.
The PLO. Arafat's probable unhappiness with Soviet
pressure to adopt a more conciliatory position has
been offset by his publicly expressed satisfaction with
the high-level treatment he received when he visited
Secret
Camera Press
PLO leader Arafat
Moscow in the spring of 1988 and by Soviet recogni-
tion of him as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian
cause. We believe he was reassured by the active
Soviet promotion of PLO reunification in the spring of
1987, by Soviet support for the PLO's presence in
Lebanon, and by ongoing Soviet pressure on Syria to
accept his leadership of the PLO. Finally, Arafat's
adoption of a more moderate course in the fall of 1988
coincided with Moscow's advice, and we believe he
appreciated Soviet efforts to persuade more radical
Palestinian elements, such as the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), to
acquiesce in the decisions taken by the Palestine
National Council in Algiers.
Arafat seems to have accepted many of Moscow's
rationales for its new flexibility?or at least indicates
that he has. Although unhappy with increased Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union and with the
upgrading of Soviet-Israeli ties, he stated in an inter-
view with the Italian newspaper L'Unita in January
1988, for example, that these measures were designed
to force Israel into acceptance of an international
conference.
Nonetheless, we believe there is well-founded concern
within the PLO about the long-term Soviet commit-
ment to its interests.
senior PLO officials view the warming
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of relations between the USSR and Israel as alarming
Syria. The Syrians clearly are concerned about the
new emphasis in Soviet policy in the Middle East.
According to reporting from the US Embassy in
Damascus, the Syrians believe that Gorbachev does
not consider Syria as important to Moscow as his
predecessors did and that the Soviets have subordinat-
ed their regional concerns to the pursuit of better
relations with the West. The Embassy reports concern
in Damascus that Moscow may consider Syria to be
more trouble than it is worth.
some Syrians believe the main reason for the
USSR's increasingly "pro-Israeli" foreign policy is
growing "Jewish influence" in the Soviet Union
While it is likely that some Syrians do in fact believe
this allegation, we have no evidence that it is the view
of Assad or other high-level Syrian officials.
Syria has dealt with the new Soviet approach in
various ways. On the one hand, it has sought reassur-
ances of Soviet support.
Assad made an unofficial visit to Moscow in
April 1.988 in an effort to get assurances from Gorba-
chev about Soviet intentions. Gorbachev reportedly
assured Assad that the Soviet Union would continue
to insist on Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied
territories including the Golan Heights.
9
Syrian President Assad with
General Secretary Gorbachev
AP ?
At the same time, Syria has been marginally respon-
sive to Moscow's political pressures. It has handled
the Soviet pressure for reconciliation with the PLO,
for example, by granting some PLO requests while
remaining firm in its opposition to Arafat's leader-
ship.'? Assad has given lipservice to the concept of an
international conference while maintaining his insis-
tence that such a conference have overall authority to
decide on all issues (in other words, no separate deals
could be made and each participant would have de
facto veto power over each issue) and that return of
the Golan be a primary item on its agenda.
Prospects and Implications for the United States
Perpetuation of the Status Quo
The impasse in efforts to create an acceptable negoti-
ating framework is almost certain to continue in
coming months given the Likud Party's domination of
Israeli policy and the postelection periods of consoli-
dation in the United States and Israel. The positive
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US response to the more forthcoming Palestinian
position adopted at the Palestine National Council
meeting in November 1988 and in Arafat's subse-
quent statement, however, have created new expecta-
tions of movement.
So long as Israel refuses to participate in an interna-
tional conference endorsed by every other potential
participant, Moscow almost certainly will criticize the
United States for its failure to move Tel Aviv and will
characterize itself as a more credible mediator than
Washington. We expect Egypt and Jordan to see
Soviet diplomatic activity as a useful means of main-
taining pressure on the United States and Israel. In
this context, Cairo and Amman almost certainly will
continue to be responsive to Soviet diplomatic over-
tures and will sustain their gradual expansion of
political and economic relations with Moscow.
We believe that Moscow will incur little damage in
relations with Syria and the PLO as a result of its
courtship of the moderates. Its clients will continue to
accept, albeit with skepticism and concern, Moscow's
reassurances that it remains committed to protecting
their vital interests.
Over the long term, we believe that lack of movement
toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, particularly if
combined with the continuation of very close ties
between Israel and the United States, will erode Arab
perceptions of Washington as an honest broker and
primary mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Erosion
in the US image could be exacerbated by other
factors, such as chronic unrest and violence in the
occupied territories, and US inability to supply weap-
on systems sought by its moderate Arab friends.
Furthermore, with the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Arab
attention will again focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and lack of progress will be highlighted.
In spite of these tendencies, the moderate Arabs
almost certainly will retain their political and eco-
nomic orientation toward the West and are likely to
upgrade relations with the USSR cautiously and
gradually. We believe that, while they will look to the
Soviet Union for rhetorical support, for help in put-
ting pressure on the United States, and for protection
against radical Arab criticism, they will continue to
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see the United States as the only power that has
leverage with Israel and will continue to seek an
active US role in mediation.
Less Likely Scenarios
A New Soviet Initiative. Periodically, there are re-
ports that Moscow is about to undertake a new
diplomatic initiative in the Middle East, designed to
put the United States on the defensive. Press reports
of such a Soviet effort circulated in the fall of 1988.
The purported plan appears to have been simply a
reformulated version of Moscow's standard position,
presented by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to US
Secretary of State Shultz during their meeting in
September 1988. The only new element of the Soviet
proposal, according to press reporting, was its empha-
sis on a return to UN Resolution 181 of 1947 on the
partitioning of Palestine. Journalists reporting on the
proposal put it in the context of a planned trip by
Shevardnadze to the Middle East.
Although it is possible that the Soviets will undertake
a concerted effort to sell their agenda, we believe they
are unlikely to invest a major amount of credibility or
leverage in an initiative that has virtually no chance of
succeeding. This may well be the reason, in fact, for
the delay in Shevardnadze's long-expected trip. Mos-
cow almost certainly will continue to emphasize its
readiness to participate in negotiations.
Progress in the Peace Process. In the highly unlikely
event that the new Israeli Government decided to
proceed with negotiations of some sort, the question of
an Arab negotiating partner or partners would be-
come crucial. Should Israel indicate its willingness to
meet with a joint, Israeli-approved delegation of
Jordanians and Palestinians (excluding the PLO),
Moscow almost certainly would follow the lead of
Jordan and the PLO?presumably one of rejection. If
Israel were to be more forthcoming and agree to talk
to a PLO-approved delegation, Syria still would be
opposed. Moscow would then have to start making
difficult choices, weighing its newfound status with
the moderate Arabs against its traditional support for
the more radical Arabs. Its ultimate response would
depend on its available options and its assessment of
the prospects that the process would succeed.
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We believe the Soviets would be willing to put
pressure on Syria and the PLO to make concessions in
order to move the peace process forward?if Moscow
were assigned a major role in negotiations. Gorbachev
has demonstrated his willingness to pursue new re-
gional approaches?most dramatically, with the deci-
sion to withdraw from Afghanistan but also in Mos-
cow's efforts to negotiate an end to regional conflicts
in South Africa and Southeast Asia. A Soviet willing-
ness to use its leverage to gain a settlement to the
Arab-Israeli dispute would test the depth of Gorba-
chev's "new thinking" as it applies to the resolution of
regional conflicts.
But the slowdown in Moscow's withdrawal from
Afghanistan in the fall of 1988 suggests that there are
limits to Soviet willingness to pay any price in pursuit
of a new policy. And its ability to bring its clients to
the negotiating table is very questionable. Neither
Reverse Blank 11
Syria nor the PLO has been particularly responsive to
Soviet pressure when Moscow's advice has conflicted
with its vital interests." Should the United States,
Israel, and the moderate Arabs be prepared to move
forward with negotiations and should Moscow prove
unable to pressure or entice its clients into participat-
ing, the Soviets would again be isolated with their
radical clients on the fringes of the political process
and would again appear irrelevant to that process.
'1 Moscow long opposed Syria's military involvement in Lebanon,
but was unable to affect the policy. Similarly, Arafat long resisted
Soviet advice with respect to recognition of Israel and acceptance of
relevant UN resolutions.
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Appendix
Jordan's Disengagement From
the West Bank
King Hussein's July 1988 announcement that Jordan
was disengaging from administration of the West
Bank reflected his deep frustration with a number of
aspects of the Arab-Israeli situation?Israeli intracta-
bility, a perceived lack of support for Amman from
Washington, PLO unreliability, and, finally, Jordan's
weak position in the West Bank as demonstrated by
the intifada. Hussein may well hope that ultimately
all actors will recognize that Jordan's participation in
the peace process is essential and will petition him to
return to a central role. On the other hand, he may
have decided that Jordan cannot play a major role in
the West Bank, that the PLO must assume that
responsibility, that Jordan should no longer act as a
buffer between Israel and the Palestinians, and that
Israel must deal with the PLO if there is to be any
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether his
action was designed as a tactical ploy or was a
strategic decision resulting from a fundamental re-
evaluation of Jordanian interests may never be
known?and may not be relevant. The reactions of
other actors to the new reality Hussein has created
will determine the consequences of his action and
shape the future.
The PLO: New Responsibilities for a Soviet Client
King Hussein's announcement created a vacuum in
Arab leadership with respect to Arab-Israeli conflict
resolution and constituted a challenge to the PLO to
assume the responsibility it had long claimed. Al-
though surprised by Hussein's action and aware that
it was intended not as a favor but as a challenge (and
probably as an attempt to demonstrate the PLO's
weakness), most PLO leaders hailed the move as an
acknowledgement of the organization's status as sole
representative of the Palestinian cause.
Initially the PLO leadership indicated that it would
move toward establishment of a government-in-exile
or a provisional government that could credibly repre-
sent the Palestinians in negotiations. Opposition to
such a move quickly arose within the organization,
however, as well as with outside actors such as Syria.
13
Those opposed were concerned that such a step
implied recognition of Israel as well as concessions
with respect to acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and
338.
As it became clear that the PLO was again divided
internally, its leaders began to emphasize less contro-
versial, intermediate steps, such as placing the West
Bank and Gaza Strip under a UN mandate or
declaring an undefined independence for the Palestin-
ians. Arafat's ability in November 1988 to gain the
support of the Palestine National Council for a decla-
ration of independence as well as for a more moderate
position with respect to the UN resolutions was a
major success for him. It was facilitated,
by Soviet pressure on the
PFLP and the DFLP to acquiesce.
Israel: Problems Mount and Options Evaporate
More than a year of violence in the territories has
deepened concern in Israel about the future and has
increased dissatisfaction with the polarized political
leadership. Hussein's announcement challenged those
who had assumed that Israel and Jordan would
eventually determine the fate of the occupied territo-
ries. As no Palestinian leadership has been permitted
to develop on the West Bank and as all Israeli leaders
reject the idea of negotiating with the PLO, Hussein's
action sends a signal to Israel that it is without a
negotiating partner and that, if it desires a resolution
of conflict, it must consider new options.
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The Jordanian action created particular difficulties
for the Labor Party and its leader, Shimon Peres,
because Labor's emphasis has been on its role as the
party of peace and the Jordanian option has been 25X1
central to its negotiating strategy. In the wake of
Hussein's speech, Labor amended its peace plank to
stress a willingness to talk to authorized (but unidenti-
fied) inhabitants of "Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip"
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on interim arrangements. Labor also has debated the
need to work on a Palestinian option, reviving a
formula involving willingness to talk with any Pales-
tinians who accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338,
recognize Israel, and renounce terrorism. Likud lead-
er Shamir, on the other hand, has repeated his refusal
to talk to the PLO and has dismissed reports of PLO
readiness for mutual recognition as trickery, aimed at
regaining the whole of Palestine.
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