JORDAN'S SOVIET OPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000600620001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Jordan's Soviet Option
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Secret
NESA 88-1007/
November 1988
Copy 4 7 9
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lllrectorate of secret
' Intelligence 25X1
Jordan's Soviet Option
This paper was prepared by~
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 88-1007/
November 1988
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Jordan's Soviet Option
Key Judgments King Hussein is expanding relations with the Soviet Union to meet
/rtforntation avai/ab/e Jordan's arms requirements, gain leverage in regional diplomacy, and
a.s of / / November 1988 establish a more autonomous foreign policy as a result of deteriorating
war used in this report.
relations with the United States. During the last two years, Jordan also has
expanded economic ties to China, increased acquisitions of a range of
military hardware from Western Europe, and expanded its role as a
mediator in inter-Arab politics.
Jordan is dissatisfied with relations with the United States because of a de-
cline in levels of US military aid, repeated US denials of advanced
weaponry sales, and US reluctance to pressure Israel to begin negotiations
on the ultimate status of the West Bank. Given the depth of Amman's frus-
trations, close cooperation with the United States is unlikely to resume for
at least several years.
To help offset the steady decline in the US-Jordanian security relationship
since the early 1980s, Amman has increased its ties to Moscow. Since
1981, Jordan has ordered over $1.3 billion worth of Soviet military
equipment-almost all of which has been delivered.
The two countries have expanded cultural exchanges
and agreed in August 1988 to establish a joint committee for economic, sci-
entific, and technical cooperation. King Hussein increasingly has praised
Soviet policy in the region and sought Moscow's support for Jordanian
efforts to convene an international peace conference.
Improving ties to Moscow will not preclude Hussein from being responsive
to US efforts to engage Jordan in renewed military, economic, and political
cooperation during the next year. But the United States will face a more
skeptical and nationalistic Jordan-able to acquire arms elsewhere and less
susceptible to US diplomatic influence.
Hussein probably will continue seeking advanced military equipment from
both Moscow and Western Europe and will rely on aggressive diplomacy in
the Arab world to win economic aid and diplomatic support for an
international peace conference. Limited Jordanian ties to China also are
likely to grow as Amman seeks additional Chinese trade and diplomatic
support in the United Nations.
Secret
NESA 88-10071
November 1988
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King Hussein is most unlikely to realign Jordanian foreign policy in a
fundamentally pro-Soviet direction in the next few years, despite his
greater openness to Moscow. Hussein is probably not eager to begin
another potentially disappointing dependency on a superpower. Jordan's
Western-oriented military and intelligence officials whose support is vital
to Hussein's survival are deeply opposed to such a realignment. Palestin-
ians in Jordan would oppose any diplomatic initiatives to grant Palestinians
less than an independent state, although Moscow is unlikely to launch such
an initiative at the expense of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Palestinian nationalism is strong among more than 200,000 refugees in 10
camps in Jordan and obliges Hussein to support publicly Palestinian
demands for an independent state while pursuing diplomacy aimed at
granting only limited autonomy to Palestinians.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Domestic Challenges
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Scope Note
economic issues affecting Jordanian-Soviet ties
This-paper focuses on Jordan's attempt to use Soviet ties to pursue its
regional and domestic goals. The analysis addresses key military and
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Jordan's Soviet Option
Jordan has been a major beneficiary of Western
strategic interests since gaining its independence in
1946. British and US financial subsidies, military
assistance, and diplomatic support enabled Jordan in
the 1950s and 1960s to survive as a buffer between
Israel and more radical Arab states. The conservative
Hashemite monarchy, faced with the prospect of
being dominated or even absorbed by Soviet-support-
ed Arab nationalists based in Egypt and Syria, looked
to a strategic partnership with the West as the best
means of self-preservation. These strategic consider-
ations and the monarchy's anti-Communist outlook
precluded the development of significant relations
In return for US arms, training, and direct military
support, Jordan has supported US diplomatic efforts
in the region. US aid to Jordan in 1958 against Arab
nationalist threats and against the PLO in its bid to
seize power in 1970 dramatically demonstrated the
closeness. of US-Jordanian bilateral ties. King Hus-
sein has used the security relationship with the United
States to modernize his small military in an attempt
to provide a minimal deterrent to overwhelming Israe-
li and Syrian forces.
The US-Jordanian security relationship has dimin-
ished steadily since the early 1980s. According to the
US Embassy in Amman, the first two serious blows
came in 1983 with the collapse of a proposed Stinger
missile sale and in 1985 with the collapse of a major
sale of US air defense equipment. Hussein also has
been severely disappointed with Washington's refusal
to supply the F-16 fighter aircraft to help redress
Jordan's vulnerability to Syrian and Israeli airpower.
In May 1988, the United States delivered an artillery
fire control radar system, completing the last remain-
ing approved military sale to Jordan. US military
assistance to Jordan is $30 million annually, only
about a quarter of the 1984 level, and probably
represents only a third of the amount needed to
maintain adequately US equipment in the Jordanian
inventory, according to the US Embassy.
Diplomatic and political cooperation has begun to 25X1
suffer, we believe, largely because of Amman's per-
ception of a US bias favoring Israel. Hussein has
expressed repeated and strong disappointment with
what he perceives to be US reluctance to apply
effective leverage to bring Israel into negotiations on
the status of the West Bank. According to the US
Embassy, Hussein viewed Washington's memoran-
dum of agreement with Tel Aviv on strategic coopera-
tion in April 1988, after four months of harsh Israeli
suppression of the Palestinian uprising, to be confir-
mation of ingrained favoritism toward Israel. Hussein
warned US officials in early 1988 that he is consider-
ing changes in Jordan's foreign relations. His recent
decision to sever administrative and legal ties to the
West Bank and Gaza Strip suggests he will refrain
from supporting US efforts to engage Jordan in a 25X1
peace process he judges to be responsive mainly to
Israeli security concerns.) 25X1
Hussein has taken only limited direct action to cut
back on Jordanian ties to the United States. After two
decades of annual visits to the United States, Hussein
has not visited for more than three years and in 1988
canceled an official visit of his brother and heir
apparent, Prince Hassan. Hussein intentionally de-
layed for several months appointing a new Jordanian
Ambassador to Washington in 1988 and has publicly
blamed Washington for the lack of movement in
regional peace talks.
Despite his pragmatic approach to decisionmaking,
we believe Hussein's Western orientation exerts a
restraining influence on developing ties to Moscow.
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~7CG CL
Figure 1
Jordan: Allocations of US Military and
Economic Aid, 1981-88
? Military aid
Economic aid
Hussein is personally committed to remaining tied to
the Western alliance and remains deeply suspicious of
Soviet aims and Communist doctrine, in our view.
ussein's confrontation in
the 1950s and 1960s with socialist, Arab nationalist,
and Communist parties in Jordan made him deeply
wary of external meddling. Hussein's military train-
ing in the United Kingdom, his dynasty's debt to
British support after World War I, and Hussein's own
Islamic conservatism reflect intellectual and cultural
opposition to Communism.
The decline of Pan-Arab nationalism and the emer-
gence of US-Soviet detente in the 1970s, in our view,
began to alter Amman's hard line toward the Soviet
Union. The surge in oil wealth of Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, Jordan's closest Arab allies and subsequent
financial backers, also freed Amman from total de-
pendence on US financing of arms supplies and set
the stage for Arab-financed Soviet arms purchases.
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Increased Soviet diplomatic activity in the region and
Soviet participation in UN peace efforts almost cer-
tainly provided an additional incentive for Hussein to
expand contacts with Moscow. We believe Hussein
calculated that these strategic developments made
exclusive political and military cooperation with the
West no longer necessary and that broader Soviet ties
could improve his standing in the Arab world and his
leverage with the West.
Jordan has moved cautiously in developing relations
with the Soviet Union. King Hussein waited until
1963 before agreeing to establish diplomatic relations
and did not visit the Soviet Union until shortly after
Jordan's defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Prelimi-
nary discussions on purchases of Soviet arms were
inconclusive, but both sides did agree to an economic
and technical cooperation agreement in 1971. Despite
Hussein's visits to Moscow in 1976 and 1981, bilateral
ties were constrained by strong Jordanian relations
with the United States and Jordanian wariness of
Soviet relations with Syria and revolutionary Iran, in
our view.
Figure 2 .
Jordan: Total Soviet Arms Deliveries,
1982-88 e
We judge that Jordanian purchases of Soviet arms
have been the mainstay of growing bilateral ties.
Jordan's dissatisfaction with US-imposed limitations 50
on the purchase of Hawk missile batteries probably
encouraged Amman to purchase Soviet air defense
equipment in 1981. Jordan has purchased just over
$1.3 billion of military equipment-including air de-
fense equipment and armored personnel and com- a Tocal equals $ ~.3 b;l~~on.
mand vehicles-from the Soviet Union, nearly all of
which has already been delivered.
agreed in August 1988 to establish a joint committee
for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation
similar to the existing US-Jordanian joint committee.
Hussein's Soviet Game Plan
Goals. Hussein's primary objective in expanding ties
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negotiate over the status of the West Bank. Hussein 25X1
almost certainly views improved Jordanian-Soviet ties
as a way of ensuring Jordan's place in mainstream 25X1
Arab politics and gaining influence with more radical
Arab rivals-especially Syria. 25X1
to the Soviet Union is to enhance Jordan's security Diplomatic Strategy. Jordan's inability to act unilat-,
and the prospects for long-term Hashemite rule. We erally in regional politics has forced Hussein to rely on
believe tie views a working relationship with the foreign support to achieve Jordanian goals. Hussein
Soviet Union as assisting his efforts to secure arms,
contain Palestinian nationalism, and pressure Israel to
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Jordan's demographic mix obliges Hussein to seek a
settlement with Israel responsive to Palestinian na-
tionalism. Amman publicly claims that about 30
percent of Jordan's 2.8 million people are Palestinian,
but on the basis of academic sources that count all
Palestinians regardless of their date of arrival in
Jordan we estimate that Palestinians number over SO
percent of the total population. The US Embassy in
Amman reported in late 1987 that 850,965 Palestin-
ians were then registered as refugees with the United
Nations and that 206,595 of the refugees lived in 10
camps in Jordan.
We believe the potential for a destabilizing eruption
of Palestinian nationalism among refugees in the
The Soviet Union's drive for increased influence in
the region has coincided with Amman's calls for a
major Soviet role in an international peace confer-
ence. Diplomatic and press reporting indicate senior
Jordanian officials believe cooperation between
Washington and Moscow offers the best chance for
ultimately achieving a negotiated settlement of the
status of the West Bank. Jordanian Prime Minister
Rifa`i has repeatedly called for a greater Soviet role in
regional diplomacy, suggesting Amman believes the
United States is unable to broker a negotiated settle-
ment on its own, given its perceived alignment with
Israel. Amman's public support for the Soviet Union
suggests it believes Moscow is committed to establish-
ing aless confrontational presence in the region and
that it can harness Soviet ambition in the region to
help launch successful negotiations on the West Bank.
camps is high.
Palestinian youth in the camps face dimin-
ishing employment prospects, resent Jordanian dis-
crimination, and have little respect for King Hussein.
as many as ha11'of the
camp population is under 20 years old, and Embassy
reports indicate Palestinian nationalist sentiment is
strongest among refugee school children. Jordanian
security forces have so far easily squelched small
demonstrations that support the Palestinian uprising
in the West Bank, but
government mass arrests and interro-
anti-Jordanian sentiment.
secret committees have sprung up inside
Jordan's refugee camps to discuss ways to support
the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank.
has tried to use multilateral diplomacy to establish a
forum for negotiations on the West Bank and provide
Jordan a security guarantee for making concessions to
Israel. The multilateral option, in our view, helps
Amman compensate for its military weakness and is
designed to legitimize Jordanian attempts to defuse
Palestinian nationalism. The threat of the Palestinian
uprising in the West Bank spilling over into Jordan's
refugee camps has given Amman an additional incen-
Political cooperation with Moscow, in Jordan's view,
is paying off. Hussein publicly declared in December
1987 that Jordan's relations with Moscow had im-
proved and were excellent.
Amman also believes Moscow will
support its position on convening an international
conference and will support a joint Jordanian-PLO
delegation. According to the US Embassy in Amman,
PLO officials in Jordan suspect Moscow began play-
ing down its ties to PLO Chairman Arafat during
Arafat's April visit to Moscow.
Economic Incentive. Jordan's deteriorating foreign
payments situation has given Hussein another incen-
tive to turn to Moscow and its relatively low-priced
arms. According to the US Embassy in Amman,
declining worker remittances, heavy debt servicing
requirements, and major shortfalls in Arab aid since
1981 have severely drained Jordanian foreign ex-
change reserves, which plummeted from $413 million
at the end of 1987 to a record low of about $19 million
in June 1988. Three years of spending to hold unem-
ployment in check have fueled growing budget deficits
and put additional pressure on a foreign payments
deficit that shot up from about $46 million in 1986 to
$349 million in 1987.
tive to revive multilateral peace efforts.
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Soviet financing proposals for major Jordanian weap-
ons purchases, far more attractive than rival offers of
West European suppliers, have not been enough to
capture the Jordanian market. Defense attache re-
porting indicates the Soviet Union has offered Jordan
easy financing terms on several arms packages, in-
cluding an offer of 20 MiG-29 fighter aircraft in
1987.
Despite Jordan's cas
shortage, Hussein .has not accepted Soviet offers on
the basis of financing alone. His attitude suggests he
is wary of poor Soviet servicing of the equipment and
is reluctant to increase significantly the Soviet pres-
ence in Jordan. We estimate 50 to 60 Soviet military
personnel are living in Jordan.
Constraints on Jordanian-Soviet Ties
Domestic Challenges. Hussein's monopoly on foreign
policy decision making has not protected him from
important domestic opposition to expanded relations
with Moscow. Western-oriented military and intelli-
gence officials, native Jordanians, and Palestinians all
have reservations about rapid improvements in Jorda-
nian-Soviet relations. Hussein, in our view, faces the
dilemma of needing Soviet diplomatic help to contain
Palestinian nationalism, while risking new domestic
tensions that would result from aSoviet-supported
diplomatic initiative to settle the status of the West
Bank.
sition comes from his security forces.
Hus-
sein's decision to reject the MiG-29 offer also suggests
he is reluctant to oppose his military's preference for
more sophisticated Western systems.
Expanding ties to Moscow threatens to disturb Hus-
win's fragile relations with Palestinians in Jordan.
Palestinians 25X1
in Jordan believe Hussein remains committed to
negotiations on the West Bank and view his disen-
gagement in July 1988 as a means designed to lead
the PLO to cooperate with Jordan in an international
peace conference. Palestinians also 25X1
believe Hussein intends to restrict further PLO activi-
ties in Jordan. Intimate diplomatic interaction be- 25X1
tween Amman and Moscow, in our view, would fan
Palestinian fears-especially among refugees who
have little loyalty to the King-that Hussein wants to
dominate the PLO and reach a settlement on the
West Bank giving only limited autonomy to Palestin-
ians.
Developing closer ties to Moscow risks alienating
Hussein's native Bedouin constituency. Embassy re-
porting suggests native Jordanians are wary of Hus-
sein's efforts to convene an international peace confer-
ence because they believe Jordan would be exposed to
Palestinian and Syrian hardline opposition to any
concessions to Israel. These Jordanians believe Syria
should assume the risks of dealing with Israel and that
Jordan lacks sufficient clout to soften US support of
Israel and should maintain a lower diplomatic profile.
The King's Bedouin constituency has welcomed the
disengagement from the West Bank as a sign of a
permanent renunciation of ties to the West Bank and
would probably oppose diplomatic cooperation with 25X1
Moscow leading to a reassertion of Jordan's West
Bank influence. Hussein's small political opposition, -
centered around native Jordanian members of Parlia-
ment, has criticized him for addressing foreign more
than domestic affairs and might seize upon expanded
ties to Moscow as a pretext to broaden its base of
support among predominantly isolationist native Jor-
External Risks. Hussein faces external constraints on
developing closer relations with Moscow. We believe
Hussein calculates that closer ties to Moscow would
extinguish already dim prospects for major new US
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Tahir
Nash'at
al -Masri
King Hussein is the paramount decisionrrtaker in
Jordan and his authority is especially pervasive in
foreign c~/fairs. According to the US Embassy in
Amman, Hussein draws on a small group of advisers
including key members of the military, General Intel-
ligence Directorate, and the Cabinet for advice on
foreign c~fjairs. Hussein has relied on Foreign Minis-
ter Masri only for routine diplomatic missions in
Arab capitals and multilateral forums and does not
include him regularly in the eliteloreign policy
coterie of the Palace.
Since his appointment in 1985, Prime Minister Zayd
al-Rita `i has used his personal status as a boyhood
friend of Hussein to limit the access of other senior
of.~cials to the King and has assumed foreign policy
duties greater than his domestically oriented prede-
Rya `i's pragmat-
is approach to relations with Syria and the PLO
suggests he supports a limited expansion of Soviet-
Jordanian ties to meet short-term military needs and
improve Jordan's diplomatic standing at any interna-
._ tional peace conference but would be wary of inviting
a greatly expanded Soviet presence in Jordan.
have equally good
access to Hussein and are probably even more wary
than RVa'i of expanding Soviet-Jordanian ties. Field
Marshall Bin Shaker, Hussein's commander in chief
and cousin, accompanies Hussein on virtually all
trips abroad and enjoys strong personal relations,
according to diplomatic reporting. The Embassy re-
ports Maj. Gen. Tariq Ala al-Din, director of the
General Intelligence Directorate, also enjoys good
access to the Palace, despite attempts by Rifa`i to
impose limits. We believe Hussein will continue to
give strong consideration to the preferences of his
security services in dealing with Moscow but will try
to win their support for a modest expansion of ties in
the coming months.
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arms sales by helping US critics portray him as
undeserving and unquestionably hostile to Israel.
Hussein probably also sees too rapid a move toward
Moscow as a potential strain on relations with Saudi
Arabia, Jordan's most important Arab financial back-
er and likely critic of a major expansion of Jordanian-
Soviet ties.
Creating Other Foreign Policy and Security Options
We believe that expanded ties to Moscow are part of
Jordan's broader efforts to pursue an increasingly
independent foreign policy and gain wider interna-
tional support for its regional goals. We believe
Hussein's disappointment with Washington has made
him reluctant to depend exclusively on either super-
power for military, economic, and political support.
Aggressive diplomacy in Europe and the Arab world
and expanding ties to China, in our view, are designed
to maximize Hussein's political leverage in regional
diplomacy and establish alternative sources of mili-
tary supply and economic aid.
West European military technology and political in-
fluence with Washington and Moscow have made
Hussein eager to strengthen ties to Western Europe.
Jordan's decision to purchase eight British Tornado
advanced fighter aircraft at a cost of nearly $900
million in September 1988 demonstrated Hussein's
desire to acquire advanced weaponry without having
to accept US restrictions or impose additional unfa-
miliar Soviet equipment on his Western-oriented mili-
tary. Hussein has traveled regularly to London to
consult on Middle East peace efforts, has visited Paris
to discuss French offers of military equipment, and
has sought political support from the European Par-
liament for an international peace conference.
Hussein's skilled diplomacy in the Arab world has
improved Jordan's regional standing and established
Amman as a credible mediator among Arab states, in
-our view.
Hussein successfully brokered the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Oman and Syria in
1987, and diplomatic reporting indicates Hussein has
made repeated attempts to mediate between Syria
and Iraq. Amman also has taken a lead role in
rallying Arab support for Iraq in its negotiations with
Iran and has sought to use its improved standing to
build a consensus within the Arab League for conven-
ing of an international peace conference. Moreover,
Hussein's decision to defer to the PLO by disengaging
from the West Bank for the present was almost 25X1
certainly intended to improve Jordan's standing
among Arab state supporters of the PLO. 25X1
Growing relations with China have enabled Hussein 25X1
to reap modest military and economic benefits.
Amman decided in
late 1986 to permit China to open a new economic
and commercial office to manage expanding economic
ties and to supervise more than 2,000 Chinese workers
in Jordan. in March
1987 Amman decided to give China the main contract
for the construction of a $27 million sports facility,
permitting several hundred more Chinese workers to
enter the country. Amman also has continued to use.
China to satisf ad hoc militar re uirements ur=
Y
Y q ,P
chasing a small amount of defensive chemical warfare 25X1
equipment in July 1988
Hussein's willingness to expand ties to China, in our
view, is also aimed at winning Chinese support for key
UN votes affecting Amman's regional diplomacy.
China's permanent seat on the UN Security Council
gives Beijing veto power over resolutions on the Arab-
Israeli conflict and a major voice in establishing the
structure and content of UN-sponsored peace negotia-
tions. Hussein's frustration with US support for Israel
in the United Nations and other multilateral forums
probably has fueled his desire to develop China as an
advocate of Jordanian interests in the United Nations
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The wide scope of Jordan's foreign policy suggests
Hussein seeks to maximize his options-emphasizing
pragmatism over ideology-and to attempt to build
enough diplomatic support to offset his military weak-
ness and advance his regional interests. Good relations 25X1
with Europe, the Arab states, and China are likely to
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lead to many of the same political, military, and
economic gains Hussein seeks from the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, Moscow's desire to expand its influence
in the region, its greater political leverage, and its
willingness to supply and generously finance major
weapon systems suggest Hussein believes he can make
greater gains by giving priority to developing ties to
Moscow.
Hussein will continue to pursue a gradual improve-
ment of relations with Moscow, in our judgment. The
challenge of equipping the Jordanian military ade-
quately during a period of deterioration in Jordan's
external payments makes inexpensive Soviet arms
attractive to Hussein. Fears of a long-term rightward
shift in Israeli politics, renewed border tensions, and a
spillover of Palestinian unrest from the West Bank
into Jordan are also likely to encourage Hussein to
develop the Soviet Union as a reliable arms supplier.
Diplomatic reporting indicates Jordan is seeking addi-
tional purchases of Soviet air defense and armored
vehicles.
We believe Jordan will lobby Moscow more than
Washington for support of an international peace
conference. Hussein has publicly admitted his inabil-
ity to pressure Israel and Washington to begin negoti-
ations and has conceded his lack of influence among
West Bank Palestinians by dramatically cutting back
Jordan's presence there. We believe the Soviet Union
represents for Hussein an avenue to pressure Wash-
ington and Tel Aviv. Hussein is unlikely to replace the
PLO as the most popular representative of Palestin-
ians in the West Bank, but he probably calculates that
better relations with Moscow and PLO disunity will
permit him to reemerge as the dominant partner in a
joint PLO-Jordanian delegation to an international
conference.
Hussein is likely to maintain correct-even if cool-
relations with Washington. Despite Soviet efforts to
expand influence with all actors in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Hussein does not harbor illusions about
Moscow's still limited sway with Israel. A successful
international conference, in Hussein's view, will re-
quire consensus and pressure from Washington and
Moscow, giving Hussein a strong incentive to balance
his overtures to Moscow with preservation of ties to
Washington. His public statements suggest Hussein
sees himself as a moderate intermediary, encouraging
US-Soviet consensus on regional issues and avoiding
steps likely to reduce Jordan to client status with
either great power.
We believe expanding relations with China and Eu-
rope will attract valuable political and economic
support for Hussein. Closer economic ties will help the
King prepare the way for greater political cooperation
in future UN-sponsored regional diplomacy. Hussein
probably calculates his good relations with Europe
will enable him to enlist European states-especially
the United Kingdom-to forge consensus and cooper-
ation between Washington and Moscow.
Implications for the United States
Close strategic cooperation between the United States
and Jordan-fueled in part by Amman's heavy reli-
ance on past US military and economic assistance-is
unlikely to resume for at least several years. We
believe Hussein's success in building new political and
security relationships with the Soviet Union, Europe,
and China has made him less dependent on refurbish-
ing US ties. Hussein's perception of Soviet modera-
tion, US reluctance to pressure an increasingly hard-
line Israeli leadership, and the King's own pressing
need to develop new ways to contain Palestinian
nationalism are unlikely to fade quickly. We believe
Hussein has accepted the necessity of developing an
alternative, to dependency on Washington to pursue
Jordan's regional goals and improve the prospects for
long-term Hashemite rule.
As a result, the United States will face a more
skeptical and nationalistic Jordan-able to draw on
alternative arms suppliers, including Moscow, and
less susceptible to US diplomatic pressure. Hussein
will have little choice but to accept the United States
as his principal conduit to negotiations with Israel but
almost certainly will try to demonstrate greater inde-
pendence both to his own Bedouin constituency and to
fellow Arab states. The United States is likely to find
that a rapprochement with Jordan will depend less on
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military supply and more on bringing Israel to the
negotiating table, especially if the Palestinian uprising
in the occupied territories continues to threaten unrest
in Jordan.
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