JORDAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000400390001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Intelligence
Secret
Jordan's Military Modernization:
One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back
PFCCECT NUMBER,
OW MJK
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Secret
NESA 88-10042
July 1988
Copy 417
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Intelligence
Jordan's Military Modernization:
One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 88-10042
July 1988
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Jordan's Military Modernization:
One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back
have slipped considerably.
Key Judgments The Jordanian military is experiencing serious problems that are under-
Information available mining its reputation as the most capable military force, for its size, in the
as of 15 April 1988 Arab world. Despite the undertaking by Amman of a comprehensive
was used in this report.
modernization effort during the past decade, Jordan's military strength
and ability to defend against a determined attack by either Syria or Israel
The ambitious military modernization plan begun in the mid-1970s has, in
fact, contributed to many of Jordan's current problems. Jordan has devoted
an inordinate portion of its defense outlays to purchasing expensive new
weaponry and to upgrading programs at the expense of maintaining
existing equipment. In addition, the defense budget is shrinking as a result
of economic difficulties, stemming in part from a decline in foreign
financial assistance.
Prospects for continued economic troubles indicate that no relief is in sight,
making unlikely significant progress in Jordanian military modernization.
Declining foreign assistance from the Gulf Arab states and shrinking
Foreign Military Sales from the United States are depriving King Hussein
of his most important sources of both financing and equipment.
The military's Maintenance Corps, often cited as one of Jordan's key
military strengths, has been overextended as a result of the modern
technology and electronics incorporated in Jordanian tanks and other
equipment. This problem will grow as advanced fighter aircraft are
acquired. Jordan's troubled maintenance and logistic networks, unable to
support the armed forces adequately during peacetime, would probably
crumble in combat.
Unprecedented problems with the quality of manpower in the military is
debilitating the Jordanian military:
? Poor management and planning have led to shortages in crucial spare
parts and maintenance.
? Corruption is increasingly undermining the morale among the lower
ranks, historically one of Jordan's most important strengths, and is
jeopardizing the reputation of the military.
? Unresponsiveness to the burgeoning problems in the military suggests
lethargic leadership, undermining another longstanding strength of the
Jordanian military.
Secret
NESA 88-10042
July 1988
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Jordan's apparent decision to purchase one squadron each of French
Mirage 2000 and British Tornado fighter aircraft probably will magnify
the military's problems. The burden of absorbing two new systems into the
Air Force will minimize for several years the benefit of purchasing such
advanced equipment.
Jordan has increasingly turned to the Soviets for equipment unaffordable
or inaccessible in the West, but dissatisfaction with Soviet support and
dislike for Soviet advisers-along with Hussein's pro-Western outlook-
probably will block significant Soviet political inroads. Nevertheless,
financial imperatives could force King Hussein to purchase more equip-
ment from Moscow, providing the Soviets with more exposure and
opportunities to influence the Jordanian military.
US access to, and influence with, the Jordanian military is declining. Anti-
US sentiment among the military is growing, principally because Washing-
ton has repeatedly rejected King Hussein's requests for arms. Junior
Jordanian officers are becoming less amenable to close relations with US
counterparts. As Jordan looks to other suppliers for arms, its requirement
for US training, maintenance, and advisory support will decline. The
deterioration of military ties will erode Jordan's traditionally strong
incentive to cooperate both militarily and politically with Washington.
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Key. Judgments
Army Programs Suffering
Prospects for Reversing the Downward Trend
18
Can Jordan Defend Itself?
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Jordan's Military Modernization:
One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back
Military Modernization Objectives
Jordan's Perception of the External Threat
Since the mid-1970s, Jordan has been engaged in a
multimillion-dollar program to modernize its armed
forces. King Hussein realizes that Jordan faces insur-
mountable manpower and financial barriers that en-
sure his country will remain militarily inferior to
Syria and Israel. Nonetheless, the King has sought to
maintain at least a credible military force to deter
potential attackers. Hussein also clearly needs to
continue to show his military, the cornerstone and
guarantor of the Hashemite regime, that he can still
provide for them.
The primary obstacle to improving or even maintain-
ing Jordan's military capability is Amman's budget-
ary constraints and the overcommitment of these
scarce resources to modernization at the expense of
maintenance and training.' Hussein has been forced
to rely on the largess of the Saudis and smaller Gulf
states to fund major weapons programs. The Saudis,
however, have shown increasing reluctance to support
the King's wish list, underscored recently by their
refusal to fund Jordan's purchase of a modern fighter.
As a result, Jordan must make its limited purchases
carefully, basing its decisions often more on cost than
on quality or on Jordan's ability to integrate the
weaponry.
Declining foreign assistance will continue to constrain
Jordan's ambitions to modernize its armed forces.
Jordanian officials have indicated that they use about
one-third of their Arab aid to finance military pur-
chases, and this aid has dropped from a high of nearly
$1.2 billion in 1981 to just over $400 million annually
since 1986. Equally important has been the precipi-
tous drop in US military deliveries to the kingdom,
The buildups in Israeli and Syrian arsenals, although
intended to defend against each other, have increased
Jordanian concern that these more numerous and
more capable arms could be used against Jordan.
Although historical enmity with, and distrust of Iraq
is a nagging worry, Saddam Hussein's commitment
to the war against Iran and Jordan's outspoken
support for Bagdhad have muted for the time being
previous strains in the relationship.
Jordanian Armed Forces Commander Bin Shakir
recently estimated the consensus among Jordanian
military leaders is that for the immediate future
Israel would require a green light from the United
States-a go-ahead Jordanians believe will not be
forthcoming to initiate an attack on Jordan,
in Shakir
added that Jordan was not prepared to mount an
independent military effort against Israel. Neverthe-
less, the Jordanians worry that, should events lead to
direct conflict with the Palestinians such as occurred
in 1970, the Israelis might seize the opportunity to
secure territory on the East Bank. Jordanian leaders
are particularly concerned that a Likud-led govern-
ment would act in this manner.
Syria is not viewed as a direct military threat at the
present time,
because it is in a weakened condition stemming from
economic difficulties and involvement in Lebanon.
Bin Shakir believes that these issues are keeping
Syria occupied with its own problems for the short
term and that Assad is trying to avoid conflict with
Jordan for the present. Jordan still has strong, bitter
memories of Syrian military intervention in the Jor-
danian civil war of 1970-71 and during November
1980 when Syria deployed nearly three armored
divisions to Jordan's border. These memories and the
Syrian military's persistent improvements and expan-
sion compel the Jordanians to view Damascus as a
powerful potential adversary.
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which plummeted from about $151 million provided
in 1985 to about $81 million last year, and the
repeated rejection of Jordanian requests for US arms
such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, Stinger missiles, and
Bradley fighting vehicle.
that the defense budget had
remained constant in terms of total Jordanian dinars
allocated since 1984. He estimated that the budget
during those years allowed no growth in the military
and necessitated reduced training time, ammunition
allocations, and maintenance.
The same senior officer reported in 1987 that addi-
tional budget cuts had begun to have a major effect
on overhaul programs and would cut severely into
spare parts ordered by the Maintenance Corps. In
fact, during the past year the military was forced to
reduce spending by at least 15 percent below 1986
levels, according to the US defense attaches. The
budget cuts affected nearly every branch of the
military. Only basic medical care, food, and pay were
that the cuts precluded purchasing neces-
sary spare parts and threatened the military's readi-
ness to conduct combat operations. The military
budget probably can sustain only minimum Jordanian
requirements, eliminating some procurement pro-
grams. Jordanian plans for more advanced self-pro-
pelled artillery and upgrading armored personnel
carriers probably will be scrapped unless Jordan
secures substantial and unforeseen external aid.
Jordan's projected allocations for crucial items over
the next five years reveal continued and, in some
cases, worsening shortfalls. The projections, for exam-
ple, budget for only half the minimum training am-
munition requirements, and the entire amount is to be
divided between training and reserve stocks. The
tion for artillery allows only two of the three battal-
ions in-each division to fire live ammunition each
year, with only the officers from the remaining battal-
ion getting limited live fire experience. Even this low
level of firing exercises is forcing the Jordanians to
borrow from their war reserves. The reduced war
reserve will result in further eroding the military's
Figure 2
Comparison of Jordanian, Syrian, and
Israeli Armored Forces, 1973-88
Israel
Syria
Jordan
2
0 1975 80 85 0 1975 80 85
iy_7 IIII IIIII II
1975 80 85
Following the general pattern in the Middle East in
recent years, Jordan has sought since the late 1970s to
improve the combat effectiveness of its ground forces
by giving increased emphasis to armor, by providing
more fire support at smaller unit levels, and by
improving the mobility of mechanized and artillery
readiness and ability to sustain combat.
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Figure 3
Comparison of Jordanian, Syrian, and Israeli Fire Support Forces, 1973-88
Israel
Syria
Jordan
and sparse funds.
forces. During the past several years, however, pro-
grams to rebuild and upgrade armor and artillery
have been delayed or aborted because of a lack of
required parts, conflicting priorities between upgrade
programs and routine maintenance in the workshops,
Armor
Facing ever-improving weaponry in Israel and Syria,
the Jordanians over the past decade have replaced
their tank fleet with new, rebuilt, and converted
tanks.' The ground forces replaced obsolescent M-48s
with Khalids-advanced British-built Chieftans with
120-mm guns-purchased additional US M-60s, and
upgraded its Centurions, marginally enhancing the
Army's firepower.
' Israel has greatly improved the survivability and effectiveness of
its aging British and US tanks and is producing upgunned Merka-
vas, while Syria continues to receive new T-72 M1 tanks from the
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Jordan's inability to absorb or service the more ad-
vanced technology incorporated in the newer tanks
has eroded much of the potential advantage of mod-
ernizing the fleet. The Jordanians have a larger fleet
of tanks with theoretically more firepower than be-
fore, but a far greater number of the more complex
tanks are unserviceable,
Moreover, greater skill an more training wi e
required to operate the advanced systems optimally,
in our view.
Jordan's Khalid tank program, the centerpiece of
ground forces modernization, faces serious problems.
last year C
fewer than half of the Army's 275 Khalids were
operable. We believe the primary problem is with
ordering sufficient stocks of spares and major compo-
nents-stemming from poor planning and a lack of
funding-but the Jordanians also appear unable to
service relatively minor problems. Many of the tanks
are inoperable because of simple gearbox malfunc-
tions and overheating,
Jordanian mainte-
nance and servicing procedures are causing the prob-
lems. As a result of the problems, senior Jordanian
Army officers have voiced a concern that the Khalid
may be unreliable, and they
worry that the Army could not field an adequate
number of tanks in a military conflict.
Problems with the Khalid's 120-mm main gun ammu-
nition illustrate the faulty planning. Jordan failed to
order required parts to enable the Khalid to fire fin-
stabilized sabot rounds, which were acquired in large
after the problem was discovered, Jordan had not e
a work order to complete the necessary modification
for the Khalid, meaning the entire fleet of Jordan's
most important tanks cannot, for the near term, fire
the basic round designed to defend against a Syrian or
Israeli armored assault.
Artillery
Field artillery modernization and expansion have been
key components of King Hussein's upgrading of the
Army, but Jordanian artillery is still seriously out-
gunned by Israeli and Syrian firepower. Moreover,
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Figure 4. Maintenance prob-
lems have grounded as many as
half the Jordanian Army's 275
Khalid main battle tanks.
Jordan has no modern guns in reserve, only obsolete
towed howitzers to replace destroyed guns. Jordan
also lacks rocket launchers for massing fire, and it has
no extended range weapon to counter Syrian or Israeli
surface-to-surface missiles.
Some improvements have been stalled by funding
shortfalls. For example, mechanized divisions still are
short of guns, and general support artillery battalions
meant to support large field formations have not
progressed beyond the planning stage. Money to
upgrade Jordan's 155-mm M-109 howitzer fleet ran
out before the program was completed, and it appears
Jordan cannot modernize its entire force, as was
originally planned.
The key to Jordan's artillery upgrade plans is procure-
ment of advanced counterbattery radars from the
United States and France. Jordan received four US-
made TPQ-36 short-range radars in late 1986, but
within several months one was beine cannibalized to
keep the others operational.
combination of administrative logistic mistakes an
operator inexperience reduced the radar readiness
rate almost immediately. Some Jordanian artillery
units are equipped with French attila-atiba fire direc-
tion systems, but they lack equipment needed to
communicate with the TPQ-36-equipped units-re-
ducing substantially the effectiveness of artillery in
combat, which requires coordinated, timely firing
The TPQ-36 has been one of Jordan's highest priority
procurement programs in recent years. On future
battlefields these radars will be crucial to locating and
destroying enemy artillery positions. The Israelis'
counterbattery fire is highly effective, and they train
extensively with their own and US-produced radars.
The Syrians are being coached by the Soviets to
improve their ability to neutralize enemy artillery.
Maintenance Programs Suffering
Jordan's Army Maintenance Corps, long considered a
key strength of the military, is experiencing severe 25X1
problems that threaten to undermine overall opera-
tional readiness and effectiveness.
mg poor management, spare parts shortages, an
funding limitations. The problems affect major re-
building programs, especially Chieftain, M-60, and
Centurion upgrades; artillery modernization; and ar-
mored personnel carrier improvements.
Poor Management
Problems result from a combination of poor adminis-
trative procedures and very lethargic management by
the Maintenance Corps leadership. The more senior
officers in charge of Army maintenance are reluctant
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Figure 5. Problems maintaining and operating
TPQ-36 counterbattery radars have seriously
degraded their effectiveness in Jordan's ground
to change their outdated system of ordering, storing,
and distributing spare parts,
reporting. The officers who develop priorities an
oversee maintenance operations increasingly blame
the source of supply-either France, Britain, or the
United States-instead of their own inability to fore-
cast requirements, control the flow of spares, and
correctly prioritize the work to be done.
In addition to leadership deficiencies, the Jordanian
maintenance corps has no long-term expertise in
major weapon systems.
does not retain mechanics with com-
prehensive expertise on specific systems, and it lacks
sufficient technical manuals to train and familiarize
new personnel on the rebuilding and maintenance
programs. Jordan's spare parts system is archaic
compared with those.of other militaries, despite its
modern arsenal of weaponry. Jordan has no computer
system to monitor parts on hand or for determining
which spares must be ordered, according to the
attaches. Moreover, parts ordering is highly central-
ized, with the most routine requisitions needing the
signature of a senior officer.
hat long lines of soldiers with routine
requisitions for parts are a common sight at central
storage facilities, leading to unnecessary delays in
ordering parts and completing the repairs
Spare Parts Shortages
These severe managerial problems coupled with short-
ages of funding have resulted in a critical shortage of
spare parts for virtually all British- and US-made
equipment in the Army. The new chief of the Army
Maintenance Corps,
late last year that
he had no working spare engines, transmissions, or
transfer cases for M-60-series tanks, Centurion tanks,
and M-109 and M-110 howitzers-equipment that is
the foundation of Jordan's ground forces. Karasneh
said that, if an engine or other major component in an
armored vehicle requires more than simple repairs,
the component is transferred to the armor workshops
in Az Zarqa for rebuilding. As a result, the vehicle is
out of service for several months to a year, given the
backlog at the workshop.
the
supply of major assemblies and spare parts required to
service Jordanian artillery and ground support vehi-
cles is insufficient to sustain combat for more than a
few days. Shortages for Jordan's approximately 1,100
M- 113 armored personnel carriers are most apparent.
has six replace-
ment engines for the entire fleet. Such inventory levels
are roughly equivalent to what the United States
would stock for one mechanized brigade, but they are
meant to support the entire four-division Jordanian
Army.
Jordan's Air Force, more than the other services,
cannot compete with the much larger and more
advanced inventories in Israel and Syria. Jordan's
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Figure 6. The terrain along the
Jordan River forms natural
barriers to an Israeli armored
assault on the Jordanian heart-
fleet of 55 aging F-5E fighters and 32 F-Is are no
match for Israeli F- 16 and F- 15 fighters or for Syria's
new MIG-29s. Key weaknesses in Jordan's Air Force
that King Hussein seeks to redress are:
? Lack of radar electronic countermeasures.
? Absence of self-protection electronic warfare
equipment.
? Limited payload, power, and maximum speed.
? Lack of all-aspect missiles (those that can engage a
target from any direction).
? Air intercept radars with insufficient ranges and no
lookdown capability.
A New Fighter-No Panacea
King Hussein has sought a modern fighter since at
least the early 1980s to redress deficiencies in the Air
Force. Although his purchase of even two squadrons
of new planes would hardly affect the balance in air
power in the region, it would return credibility to his
small Air Force, in our view, and give pause to
prospective attackers, particularly the less-than-
proficient Syrian pilots.
Both King Hussein and his Air Force would prefer to
purchase US F-16 airplanes. Given the unavailability
of his first choice, the King recently agreed to pur-
chase 12 Mirage 2000 fighters from the French for
more than $1 billion, with an option to purchase eight
more in the future. The King apparently also intends
to purchase eight Tornados from Britain.
The Jordanian Air Force is short of pilots-there are
only four pilots for every five planes-and Jordan will
be hard pressed to fully man the new planes it
purchases. The Air Force cannot expand because of a
shortage of pilots and limited funding, and we expect
instead that it will retire two squadrons of F-5E
fighters and retrain the pilots on Mirages and Torna-
dos. During the year it is likely to take to get the pilots 25X1
proficient on the new planes, these two squadrons,
which constitute about one-third of Jordan's Air
Force, will be virtually inactive. In addition, since
each Tornado requires a pilot and a weapons control
officer, the Jordanians must train several personnel
Two new types of aircraft will require training two
sets of maintenance crews. The Jordanians have been
frustrated by unsatisfactory French support of an 25X1
earlier purchase of F-1 fighters and can expect equal-
ly poor support for the Mirage 2000s. The Tornado as
well could be very difficult for the Jordanians to keep
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in the air because even the British have had difficul-
ties with this complex, multirole fighter. The Saudis,
with far more British assistance than the Jordanians
can expect, have had considerable problems kee in
their Tornados o erable,
The complications of purchasing two new aircraft
models go beyond difficulties in training pilots and
maintenance crews. If the King follows through with
his intention to purchase both Mirage and Tornado
aircraft, his Air Force will face a logistic nightmare,
given its fleet comprised of four different types of
fighters from three different suppliers. Jordan would
be left with one squadron each of French Mirage
2000s, British Tornados, and US F-5Es, and two
squadrons of French F-1s. Jordan's Air Force would
remain one-fifth the size of Israel's or Syria's, but it
would operate a similar number of aircraft models
and require similarly complex logistic support.F__
reported that very little live fire is conducted-a
crucial phase of training with attack helicopters-and
no antitank missile launches by the Cobras have been
noted.
Moreover, the Jordanian helicopters are assigned to
the Air Force, not the ground forces that they are
designed to support during combat. The Israelis adopt
a similar organization, but closer coordination be-
tween the Army and the Air Force and better under-
standing of the role of attack helicopters have made
the Israelis alert to potential problems and led to
procedures to redress them. By contrast, coordination
between services in Jordan is poor, and combined-
arms exercises including helicopters are rare. Conse-
quently, these expensive assets that could be key to
battlefield success in future hostilities will not appre-
ciably contribute to Jordan's battlefield strength.
Attack Helicopter Problems
Jordan purchased two squadrons totaling 24 air-
craft-AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters-nearly
three years ago for about $200 million to improve the
Air Force's ground attack and troop support roles.
that the operat-
ing proficiency of the helicopter crews is still limited,
the overall mission is not clearly defined, and training
has been lacking.
Air Defenses-Improved But Lacking
Jordan recognized in the 1970s that insufficient air
defense equipment was its most serious tactical defi-
ciency, and this has been Jordan's top priority pro-
curement program in recent years. Air defense is also
the one area in which they have made substantial
progress. Since 1980 the Jordanians have purchased
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nearly $1.6 billion worth of Soviet air defense equip-
ment, including SA-8s, SA-13s, and SA-14s, filling
gaps that existed in the country's air defenses. In
addition, Jordan is studying French and British pro-
posals for acquiring modern air defense radars.
Despite the clear gains in Jordan's air defense, prob-
lems with the Soviet-supplied systems have degraded
their operation and slowed their integration into Jor-
dan's existing network.
as dissatisfied with the quality and reliability
0 oviet-provided radios. Serious problems in com-
municating with other combat units equipped with
British and US radios led the Jordanians to replace
the Soviet communications gear with British and US
radios,
Soviet air defense equipment has received mixed
reviews in Jordan. The ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft artil-
lery system has been highly praised, deemed extreme-
ly reliable, and assessed as superior to US- or other
Western-produced weapons. Jordan, however, has ex-
perienced problems with other systems provided b
the Soviets.
public live fire demonstrations during the system's
initial testing in Jordan in 1984. The missiles were
test-fired again in 1987 and again performed poorly,
The Soviets appar-
Continuing deficiencies and gaps in Jordan's early
warning radar system leave much of Jordan open to
undetected attack by hostile aircraft. The Soviet
missile and artillery systems provide adequate air
defense for Jordan's four maneuver divisions' operat- 25X1
ing areas but do little to detect or engage aircraft
outside their limited deployment areas.
early warning radar, a British Plessy AR-3d, was out
of commission for repairs for several months, leaving
a large gap in early warning coverage. The Jordanians
have attempted to procure gap-filling radars from the
United States and Britain to improve coverage in
northern and western Jordan, but funding limitations
and maintenance problems have prevented them from
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Jordan's military lacks electronic warfare resources.
Despite the immediate operational need for modern
equipment, Jordanian military officials have made
little or no progress in redressing the situation. Fund-
ing limitations and an absence of technical expertise
have combined to prevent Jordan's military from
making significant gains toward resolving this serious
problem.
ently blamed Jordanian incompetence for the fail-
ures-but, according to the attache, the Jordanians
immediately followed the SA-8 failures with a suc-
cessful firing of a US-produced Hawk missile.
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Figure 9
Jordanian Arms Purchases From the Soviet Union
1981
20 SA-8 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems
20 ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft artillery systems
Miscellaneous air defense equipment
1982-83
Small arms, ammunition, and spare parts
1984
Trucks
22 ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft artillery (AAA)
24 SA-13 SAM systems
10-16 SA-8 SAM systems
250 SA-14 missiles, launchers
14 BTR-60 armored command vehicles
75,000 AKM rifles
1985
2 SA-8 SAM simulators
Spare parts
1.986
Undetermined number of SA-8, SA-13. and SA-14
systems
MTLB armored command vehicles
1987
30 BMP-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
9 BRDM command vehicles
1988
Not av
ailable
100 13MP-2 infantry fighting vehicles (proposed)
Summary: Jordan has purchased just over $1.6 billion in arms from the
Soviets. Over $1 billion worth is in Jordan-some of the 1986-88
purchases have yet to be delivered.
In a conflict between Jordan and either Syria or
Israel, Jordanian communications would be vulnera-
ble to jamming and intercept-causing debilitating
command and control problems. At the same time,
the Jordanians are not equipped to disrupt or to
effectively intercept their enemies' communications.
The Jordanians are negotiating with British and US
firms to upgrade existing aircraft in their inventory
with electronics to jam Israeli and Syrian communica-
tions and to warn of hostile radars acquiring Jordani-
an planes, but equipment similar to those in Israeli or
Syrian aircraft cost about $1 million each-beyond
Jordan's limited budget. In addition, Jordan may be
arranging training in electronic warfare for its ground
forces from a US company,
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reports. But merely training troops on basic electronic
warfare techniques will do little to solve Jordan's
backwardness in this important aspect of modern
warfare, in our view.
The average Jordanian soldier has long had the
reputation for being of the highest caliber in the Arab
world, counterbalancing Jordan's many equipment
shortages and size limitations. Our assessments of
Jordan's combat capabilities and of the military's
ability to defend the country and the regime have long
focused on the individual quality and loyalty of the
Jordanian soldier.
Revelations during recent years of pervasive mainte-
nance and logistic difficulties, widespread high-level
corruption, reduced training, and stagnating pay,
however, undermine this highly favorable situation, in
Small Manpower Pool
Jordan lacks sufficient manpower to field military
forces on the scale of neighboring states. Jordan's
population of about 2.9 million cannot support a force
much larger than the current 75,000- to 90,000-man
standing army, particularly given the exclusion of
Palestinians from most combat units. Shortages in
skilled manpower have been further complicated by
low military pay, improved job prospects overseas
during the oil boom, and, increasingly, by a less
favorable view of the military among the general
public and a corresponding decrease in the number of
East Bank Jordanians willing to make the military
The small manpower pool available to the military is
affected by the kingdom's unwillingness to capitalize
fully on the well-educated and technically skilled
Palestinian segment of the population-largely be-
cause of Hussein's memories of the Jordanian civil
war in 1970. We believe Palestinians comprise well
over half the population but are underrepresented in
the military command. Only the Air Force allows a
small number of Palestinians to serve in combat.
Palestinians serve two years like other Jordanian
citizens and make up about 40 percent of conscripts,
but only a small number make the Army a career.'
Unlike the Syrians, the Jordanians cannot make up
for shortcomings in quality with more men. The
Syrians maintain a force more than four times as
large and therefore expect and require far less from
the individual soldier. Jordan spends more per soldier
than Syria and, given its limited resources, cannot
afford to expand conscription or to extend service time
for large numbers of soldiers. Instead, Jordan's man-
power philosophy coincides much more closely with
Israel's-to compensate for its enemy's larger size by
fielding higher quality forces.
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Jordan's officer corps is still, in our view, intensely
loyal to the King, less politicized than most of their
counterparts in other Arab armies, and keenly moti-
vated to defend Jordan. But we believe the military's
esprit de corps is declining.
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Reduced Training
Jordan's budget squeeze has forced reductions in the
frequency and quality of training for the armed
forces. Ground forces' training, in particular, has
declined substantially.
ing, small-unit training at battalion level and below is
still adequate, but brigade-size exercises are held
infrequently. Division or higher exercises have not
been held in nearly five years. Classroom training in
basic military subjects probably remains above stan-
dard for the Middle East, but Jordanian soldiers'
classroom work is rarely tested in the field. The first
realistic military experience the Jordanian soldier is
likely to face is in actual combat. The Israelis and, to
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Lackluster Spring Training Exercise
The culmination of Jordan's spring 1988 training
cycle-one of the Army's two annual brigade-level
exercises-underscored serious weaknesses in Jorda-
nian training and highlighted deficiencies in the
military's capabilities.
ties.
as did the King, the
entire Jordanian military leadership, and several
foreign guests. The attaches assessed that the exer-
cise was essentially an elaborate demonstration that
did not enhance the armed forces' operational abili-
against either Israel or Syria in battle.
Poor Jordanian training in general is the cause of
many of the military's deficiencies that are discussed
in this paper. But this year's exercise gives a detailed
view of the many problems and weaknesses of the
army, and indicates that these problems are worsen-
ing. The poorly executed exercise also reinforces our
judgment that the Jordanians could not compete
Elements of two of Jordan's four divisions participat-
ed in the training along with signal, air defense,
engineer, and other support units, but the exercise
focused primarily on weaponry and did not realisti-
cally incorporate the support elements as would be
required in battle. Moreover, some key parts of the
exercise were well rehearsed beforehand, and thus the
Army's ability to react to combat situations was not
tested. Artillery targets were
support was minimal.
even these aircraft overflights were just for show, and
explosions from airdropped ordnance were pyrotech-
nic, much like on a movie set.
assembly areas.
the attacking armored brigade met no resistance from
a defending infantry brigade as the tanks seemed to
drive straight through the defenders to preassigned
that during the main eature o the exercise
Jordan's difficulty with incorporating helicopters was
also highlighted in the exercise. Four Cobra attack
helicopters supported the armored brigade's attack,
but again apparently for demonstration purposes
only. The helicopters flew much higher than would be
acceptable in combat, probably so the audience could
view them better, and they fired rockets far to the
right of the objective, and did not make use of terrain
to minimize their exposure to enemy fire. According-
ly, the crews probably derived no meaningful practice
in training jointly with armored forces.
The exercise underscored Jordan's nagging problems
with integrating its varied equipment inventory. Sovi-
et-origin antiaircraft systems, designed for direct o
support of maneuver brigades, played no a arent
role in the training, The 25X1
attaches also noted the obvious absence of Jordan's
new reconnaissance assets and of joint operations
between armor and infantry. Troops dismounted long 25X1
before reaching their objective so that the high-level
visitors could view them.
Finally, the Jordanians failed to use terrain during
the exercise although this tactic will be crucial to
warding off attacks. Air defense artillery stopped on
hilltops instead of in concealed positions. Tanks and
armored personnel carriers apparently conducted ad-
vances using no evasive maneuver or natural cover or
concealment. hat the air de- 2FX"
fense equipment would have been destroyed by direct 25X1
antitank fire in the first stages of combat and that the
armored formations and infantry would have taken
high casualties under fire.
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a lesser extent, the Syrians train far more extensively, The Jordanian Military's Role in Past Unrest
preparing their forces for war by exposing them
regularly to simulated combat.
Air Force training, which has long been immune to
budget restrictions, also has been reduced.
late last year
training sorties for pilots had been cut from 15 per
month to six. consid-
ers 12 sorties per month as the minimum requirement
to retain pilot proficiency.
Troubled Supplier Relationships
The US Congressional decision in 1982 to withhold
military sales to Jordan until Hussein initiates negoti-
ations with Israel deprived the King of his primary
source of military equipment, and Jordan has not
found a reliable alternate. Instead, the Jordanian
military has turned to a variety of suppliers, mainly
France, Britain, and the USSR, for major military
purchases. Jordan has experienced difficulties with its
new providers, however, and the diverse equipment
complicates the overburdened command, communica-
tions, and logistic networks
US Role Subsiding
US Embassy reporting makes it clear that Jordan's
relationship with the United States is strategically
important to the King for the near term. He cannot
afford to substantially reduce his contacts without
further impairing Jordan's military capability because
his Army still incorporates large numbers of US
weapons. Over 1,000 armored personnel carriers, of
all the Army's artillery, more than 400 tanks, three
squadrons of aircraft, electronics gear, and support
equipment are US made and require US-origin spare
parts and maintenance support.
Nevertheless, the US military stake in Jordan has
declined as a result of repeated denials by the US
Congress of King Hussein's requests for a major arms
package. The Iran-Contra arms affair added measur-
ably to Jordan's distrust of the United States and to
Hussein's desire to seek other sources of arms and
support.
The Jordanian military, in contrast to most other
Arab forces, has consistently and staunchly support-
ed its commander in chief. Following its devastating
defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1967 and during
its civil war against the Palestinians in 1970, the
Jordanian military remained loyal to King Hussein.
Coup rumors have spread sporadically in Amman
and periodic low-level mutinies have arisen since the
early years of Hussein's reign, but the military
threatened to topple the King only once-in 1957.
According to published sources, King Hussein decid-
ed early that year to dismiss British officers who held
major command positions and a high percentage of
staff and technical positions, resulting in intense
political maneuvering among native officers. The
infighting culminated in a coup attempt against the
King in April, but the plot failed because the King
took prompt action and because he retained the loyal
support of the Bedouin troops in the Army.
Dissatisfaction with low pay has led to less serious
protests by isolated Army units. In each case, howev-
er, King Hussein acquiesced to the protesters' de-
mands and dodged a more serious crisis. For exam-
ple, in 1974 an Army brigade in northern Jordan at
Az Zarqa mutinied, demanding pay raises and a
higher standard of living for the military. The King
quickly increased salaries for all military members,
and subsequently raised military pay again four
times in the next five years to preempt new distur-
bances.
The King's strategy has worked-no serious threats
from, or unrest among, the military have been report-
ed in over a decade. We do not expect the military to
reverse its strong, fundamental loyalty to Hussein,
and repetitions of incidents such as the Az Zarqa
mutiny in 1974 seem unlikely in the near term.
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Since his accession to the throne in 1953, King
Hussein has shown a direct, personal, and enduring
interest in managing major aspects of Jordan's mili-
tary force development. The King has the final word
on major weapons purchases, and promotions of
officers into the leadership of the Jordanian armed
forces are his prerogative. The King's recent decision
to purchase both French Mirage 2000s and British
Tornados against the wishes and advice of most
Jordanian senior officers, including Air Force Chief
Shurdom, underscores his position as the driving
force behind strategic planning.
The King is viewed by the military as more than its
commander in chief' he is its provider and patron.
Hussein has worked to ensure the military's loyalty
by taking care of its needs, often accomplished by
purchasing equipment that Jordan cannot afford. The
military also views Jordan's ability to obtain Arab
financial assistance, overcoming seemingly insur- _
mountable obstacles, as a personal credit to Hussein.
It is largely King Hussein's suspicions of Palestinians
that have prevented them from becoming more inte-
grated into the military. The King's control of the
military's composition that favors native East Bank-
ers and fiercely loyal Bedouin tribesmen has been a
central factor in maintaining its loyalty. At the same
time, the King has distributed important military
posts among the country's ethnic groups. The Chief of
Staff of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Abu Talib, for
example, is a Palestinian, to help assuage their
grievances.
In our view, however, increasing complaints by mili-
tary personnel about declining military benefits, cor-
ruption, and an inability to acquire preferred weapon-
ry jeopardize the King's revered position. Widespread
grumbling has not resulted in disloyalty to Hussein,
largely because Hussein enjoys strong support within
the top leadership. Recent revelations of growing
corruption within this high echelon, however, may
have a strongly negative impact on the morale of the
military, undercut further its favored position in
society, and erode its loyalty to the King
17
After his arms request failed in 1985, King Hussein
said he would look elsewhere, according to the US
Embassy. Over the past three years he has done just
that. He has no illusions that the United States will
reverse its position on selling arms to Jordan.
In the longer term, we expect the military importance
of ties to the United States will continue to decline.
The King has taken steps to distance his military from
the United States to emphasize his displeasure with
Washington. The US Embassy reports that he has
reduced the most visible element of the relationship-
joint military exercises. As Jordan integrates increas-
ing amounts of Soviet and European arms, the mili-
tary will require less and less US assistance, making
Hussein more willing to pare down the military's
contacts with the United States.
Unease over US-Jordanian relations is beginning to
trickle down to younger and less educated Jordanian
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ranking officers in Jordan's elite special forces bri-
gade have a more hostile attitude toward the United
States than do their superiors-a particularly disturb-
ing development in this unit given its long history of 25X1
cooperation with the United States. Embassy report-
ing indicates that Jordanian field units, which feel the
impact of shortages more severely than headquarters
staffs, are beginning to wonder if Hussein can deliver
major arms, but so far they have directed most of
their frustration at the United States.
Soviet Union Gains
The Soviet Union is capitalizing on the friction in
Washington's military relationship with Amman. Jor-
dan has purchased more than $1.6 billion worth of
military equipment from the Soviets since 1981. 25X1
Soviet equipment is affordable because the Soviets
offer generous financing arrangements, and, most
important, it is readily available.
The Soviets, however, have not seen a significant
political return from these sales, as the Jordanians
continue to keep the Soviets at arm's length. Soviet
support, including training, maintenance, and spare
parts supply, is widely criticized in Jordan. The
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Jordanians complain that manuals for Soviet gear are
written in Russian, in which few Jordanians are
trained, and that the Soviets perform all maintenance
procedures. morale
among maintenance troops assigned to the Soviet
equipment is particularly poor. Most resent the Soviet
presence in their units as well as the superior attitude
Soviet officers display toward them.
Britain
To avoid overreliance on the Soviets, the Jordanians
have increasingly turned to the British for advisory
assistance, training, and, more recently, equipment
purchases. Jordan has a long history of satisfactory
relations with Britain, and the military still operates
much British equipment, particularly two armored
divisions' worth of upgraded Centurion and Chieftain
tanks.
The Jordanians are negotiating with the British for
equipment upgrades and purchases, most prominently
the Tornado fighter bomber. Jordan also may look to
the United Kingdom to complete what previously
would have been strictly US contracts-such as up-
grading its US-built F-5E aircraft with advanced
electronics. Britain has guaranteed Jordan more than
$350 million in loans for military procurement, which
is more than four times the amount provided by the
United States this year
Despite the warming of Jordan's military ties to
London, strains persist. The Jordanians blame many
of their problems with the Army's Khalid tank on
insufficient support from London stemming not from
poor maintenance but from a faulty British design of
the gearbox. The Jordanians also are frustrated by
London's reluctant and slow response to requests for
more generous financing terms for purchasing Torna-
do fighters. High prices for British weaponry also
prevent deeper ties. King Hussein recently turned
down a proposal from London to purchase Warrior
Infantry Fighting Vehicles in favor of a much less
expensive Soviet offer for 100 BMP-2s
man.
France
Jordan's military ties to France expanded considera-
bly with Hussein's preliminary decision early this year
to purchase 12 Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft. We
believe the decision was made, however, not because
Jordan values French technology, training, or support
but because Paris apparently offered lenient repay-
ment terms. The purchase, in our view, is unlikely to
lead to appreciably greater French influence in Am-
Ironically, closer contact with the French may con-
vince Jordan to seek future major arms deals else-
where. The Jordanian Air Force has been dissatisfied
with French support for previously purchased F-1
fighters, citing exorbitant spare parts prices, lengthy
delays in delivering the parts, and overall poor French
advisory support. With this past experience in mind,
Jordanian pilots reacted negatively to the King's
decision to purchase new
]Even those pilots ying renc
Tornado would be a better aircraft for Jordan.
Prospects for Reversing the Downward Trend
The depth of the military's problems, the poor pros-
pects for economic recovery, and the apparent unwill-
ingness of the senior leadership to confront and solve
deficiencies suggest that the downward trend in Jor-
danian military capabilities will continue. Financial
assistance from the Gulf states seems unlikely to
increase substantially in the near term, and we foresee
no other country replacing the United States as a
reliable supplier of most military equipment and other
assistance for the armed forces.
18,
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The Jordanian Coast Guard-
A Case Study in Ineptitude
The Jordanian Coast Guard, by far the smallest and
lowest priority service in the country, is also the most
troubled. The Coast Guard's 500 personnel operate
four patrol boats, ostensibly to safeguard the coun-
try's 25-kilometer coastline, conduct search and res-
cue, and patrol Jordan's beaches at Al Aqabah.
The Guard's previous commander, Col. Atef Ra-
sheed, was forcibly retired early this year
was the principal negotiator in purchasing fast patrol
boats from the British. The current commander, Col.
Hussein Al-Kawasneh, describes the boats as exceed-
ing the capabilities of the Jordanian Coast GuardL
Shortly after taking over, the new commander as-
sessed his force as manned with under qualified and
unqualified officers, poorly trained and ineffective
noncommissioned officers, and inexperienced and un-
trained sailors. He claims that not one officer in the
Navy is qualified or capable of operating the Navy's
existing patrol boats because they consistently rub,
scrape, or ram the jetty upon entering port. Many of
the sailors cannot swim when they arrive in Al
Aqabah and achieve only minimal swimming profi-
ciency in basic training,
* accurate tenure presented a e of Coast 25X6
Guard capabilities.
Moreover, many of these deficiencies are unknown to
senior leadership, because Colonel Atef during his
The Coast Guard's attempts to train combat divers
have been a comedy of errors. The first problem that
the Jordanians have to overcome is to train special
forces personnel to swim. The divers also apparently
have an almost total lack of experience with scuba 25X6
gear. During training last year the divers failed to 25X6
check the purity of oxygen in their tanks, resultin in
a number of them blacking out, 25X1
Aqabah harbor, and they never operate at night
The Jordanian Coast Guard cannot fulfill its man-
dated missions. The Jordanians refuse to operate
more than 5 kilometers from the Jordanian coast for
fear of confronting Israeli naval craft. Coast Guard
patrols never venture into the channel just outside Al
think the Israelis will re on them. The patrol boats'
radars are rarely used because of Jordanian concern
about Israeli radar-homing missiles. Coast Guard
officers view the recent purchase of fast patrol boats
as potentially alarming to the Israelis and undoubt-
edly will be reluctant to operate the new craft near
Israeli boats.
Many of the problems the military faces cannot be
reversed only with infusions of money. Continuing
management problems, corruption, poor planning, and
insufficient technical expertise at all levels of the
military severely limit prospects for progress. In our
judgment, these problems pose as significant an obsta-
cle to military modernization as funding shortages.
We assess that the arms race between Israel and
Syria will gradually enhance their military capabili-
ties and in the process intensify Jordan's regional
military weakness. Syria and Israel continue to devel-
op and to purchase increasingly lethal conventional
arms and weapons of mass destruction. Jordan cannot
hope to compete with them.
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The Jordanian military faces daunting obstacles in
improving its current situation. Foremost, the mili-
tary requires more money. Pay and benefits for
Jordan's armed forces personnel have not kept up
with its civilian sector, and, unless this trend is
reversed, declining numbers of skilled personnel will
seek the military as a career. Nevertheless, while an
infusion of money would alleviate many of Jordan's
problems, money alone cannot solve the persistent
manpower constraints that plague the armed forces.
Given the increasing sophistication of military equip-
ment in Jordan's inventory, attracting and retaining
high-quality personnel will be crucial to Amman's
fielding a credible military force in the future.
More money also is needed to procure additional
modern weaponry and to maintain Jordan's present
inventory. The military budget provides sufficient
funds to furnish the military with a minimum level of
new weapons but at the cost of letting the existing
inventory fall into disrepair. Amman, however, has
little hope of obtaining significant new funding. Thus,
Jordan's only other option is to redefine current
spending priorities-specifically, to concentrate less
on purchasing expensive, high-visibility weapon sys-
tems and to devote more resources to basic needs
such as spare parts, maintenance contracts, and
training requirements.
The US military relationship with Jordan is secure for
the short term because of the abundance of US
equipment in Jordan's inventory but will probably
decline over the long term. The current generation of
Jordanian military leaders is clearly inclined toward
purchasing Western, and particularly US, weaponry.
Their successors-the current junior officer corps in
Jordan-receive less Western training than their
elders, have been exposed much less frequently to US
Lacking fundamental changes in Amman's spending
policies, additional funding, if it became available,
almost certainly would be directed at purchasing
additional new systems. Thus, maintenance would
continue to suffer. For example, instead of purchas-
ing eight Tornados for much less money, the King
could have purchased enough spare parts to refurbish
and maintain his entire armored fleet.
comprehensive three-year program to overhaul Jor-
dan's tanks would cost about $360 million. The
Tornado deal could end up costing the Jordanians
twice that.
Another alternative-although an unfavorable one-
would be to reduce Jordan's standing forces similar
to cash-short Syria's deactivation of selected units
last year. Amman could then focus more sharply on
its limited financial and personnel resources, increas-
ing the readiness and capabilities of the remaining
forces. Jordan's leadership could deactivate one of
the country's four divisions, distributing the skilled
maintenance personnel and operable equipment to the
other divisions. In addition, this would allow the
remaining active units to train more extensively and
return to the Jordanian military its past reputation
for fielding a small but effective and well-trained
fighting force.
advisers, and are likely to be less inclined in the future
to be pro-US. Most important, these younger officers
have seen their King's repeated requests for arms
denied by Washington, and hostility toward the Unit-
ed States among this crucial interest group is growing
perceptibly.
The gradual distancing of Jordan's military from the
United States will be aggravated by Hussein's arms
purchases from Soviet and West European sources.
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As Jordan's inventory is increasingly of non-US ori-
gin, the crucial maintenance and spare parts aspect of
bilateral military ties will recede and necessitate
closer relations with other suppliers.
In the longer term, declining US contacts with Jor-
dan's armed forces will lead to concomitant declines
in
e c ose mi rtary re ations hip has
been the cornerstone of US-Jordanian ties for over a
generation and has been largely responsible for close
working ties between the
The deterioration of thi
close military relationship will erode Jordan's strong
incentive to cooperate both militarily and politically
with Washington.
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Appendix
Can Jordan Defend Itself?
The growing imbalance of forces between Jordan and
its more powerful neighbors strongly suggests that
Jordan can no longer rely on its military capabilities
to deter potential attacks. Fortunately for Jordan, the
rivalry between Israel and Syria is much more intense
than those underlying tensions between Amman and
either Damascus or Tel Aviv. Competition and enmity
between Israel and Syria make highly unlikely a
unilateral military move by either against Jordan,
short of a full-scale Arab-Israeli war. Syrian memo-
ries of Israeli assistance to Amman during the Syrian-
supported PLO challenge to Jordan in 1970 almost
certainly would deter Damascus from an all-out
peacetime makes combat against much larger, better
equipped forces a disastrous proposition for Amman.
invasion.
Nonetheless, the King cannot rely passively on this
combination of conflicting forces among his foes to
assure Jordan's continued independence. Jordan's
force development and modernization ambitions un-
derscore Hussein's desire to keep pace with the grow-
ing threat on the country's borders and to continue to
defend Jordanian territory without calling on outside
assistance. Jordanian leaders, however, are beginning
to revise their longstanding judgment that they could
sustain a multifront defense against Israel and Syria
for as long as a week. The Jordanian military leader-
ship has concluded that it could defend Jordan from a
unilateral Syrian attack for about a week but could
counter an Israeli onslaught only briefly, and then
only if the Israel Defense Forces was committed to
fighting on another front.
We judge that even this pessimistic assessment of
Jordan's defensive capabilities is unrealistic. Jordan
has had no combat experience since its limited in-
volvement in the war in 1973, while Israel and Syria
tested each other during the fighting in Lebanon in
1982, have sparred periodically since then in the air
and against each others' proxies in Lebanon, prepared
constantly for war against each other, and trained
their troops accordingly. More important, the long list
of deficiencies in Jordan's maintenance, logistic, and
command networks that are obvious even during
Outgunned by Israel
Several hours after the opening of hostilities between
Israel and Syria, the Syrians probably would call on
other Arab states to support their confrontation with
Tel Aviv. If the Jordanians were to risk going to
Syria's aid, even by moving their limited forces
westward toward the Israeli border or by sending
significant forces to the Golan Heights to fight along-
side Syrian units, the Israelis most likely would react
aggressively.
While combating Syrian forces on the Heights, the
Israelis could divert enough reserve formations to the
Jordanian border to outnumber Jordan's entire Army.
Israel could send three of its four southern divisions
and one from the West Bank to attack Jordan, leaving
one armored division in the south facing Egypt, one on
the Lebanese border, and seven to fight the main
battle against Syria. Four Israeli armored divisions
and associated infantry and support would amount to
over 1,200 tanks and nearly 80,000 personnel.
An Israeli armored attack on Jordan or an Israeli
move through northern Jordan to outflank Syrian
defenses on the Golan Heights would be limited by
the rough terrain dividing the two countries. The
northern border is bisected by the Jordan River- 25X1
creating a deep ravine that is unsuitable for armored
vehicle movement, bogging down Israeli attacking
forces, and giving Jordanian forces the opportunity to
dig into defensive positions.
Israel might choose to limit its attack on Jordan to
airstrikes that would inflict significant damage on
Jordanian forces while minimizing Israeli losses. The
Israelis could, in our judgment, destroy most of
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Jordan's 100-plane Air Force on the ground and
subsequently strike military targets in Jordan at will.
Jordan could not defend against Israeli airpower,
would be vulnerable to electronic jamming and inter-
cept, and would be deprived of any means of retaliat-
ing. The result, after only a day or two of intense
combat, would be the virtual destruction of Jordan's
small armed forces.
Outnumbered by Syria
Syria, like Israel, could commit a force larger than
Jordan's entire Army without significantly weakening
its defenses facing Israel. Syria deployed nearly three
divisions along the Jordanian border in November
1980 to express opposition to the holding of an Arab
summit meeting in Amman and could repeat such a
deployment if Jordan proceeded with peace talks
without Damascus's approval or participation. Since
1980, Syria has formed two additional divisions, more
than doubled the size of its commando forces,
strengthened its Air Force, and substantially strength-
ened key praetorian guard units to defend Damascus.
Thus, a sizable deployment to its border with Jordan
is possible without substantially jeopardizing its de-
fenses elsewhere.
Assuming a drawdown of forces currently in Lebanon
and no concurrent tension with Israel, the Syrians
could deploy at least two armored and two mecha-
nized divisions and one special forces division to the
Jordanian border. This would leave three divisions to
man defenses on the Golan Heights, several special
forces regiments in Lebanon, and two divisions as a
strategic reserve.
Jordan's northern border with Syria favors Jordanian
defense against an incursion but is not as protective as
the terrain in the west facing Israel. The Syrians
could quickly occupy the flatlands in the extreme
northern belt of Jordan, threatening the major Jorda-
nian cities of Az Zarqa, Irbid, and Al Mafraq. At
least two corridors are available between the lava-
fields in northern Jordan through which large Syrian
formations could advance. Syrian attacks would be
impeded by gorges in the western sector, rugged
terrain along the central axes, and fierce initial
Jordanian counterattacks along the length of the
border. Nevertheless, an all-out Syrian attack, accom-
panied by airstrikes, would inevitably wear down the
Jordanian defenders, although at a high cost to the
Syrians. We judge that within less than one week the
Jordanians could not mount significant resistance to
Syrian attackers.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP89SO145OR000400390001-1