MOROCCO: FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000300310001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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1/7. Directorate of secret
Morocco: Foreign Policy
Dilemmas
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NESA 88-10034
May 1988
Copy - i 4 2
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Dilemmas
Morocco: Foreign Policy
Operations.
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 88-10034
May 1988
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Morocco: Foreign Policy
Dilemmas 25X1
Key Judgments Morocco's King Hassan II is promoting closer ties to the United States,
Information available France, and Gulf Arab oil producers because he wants additional foreign
as of 30 April 1988 financial and diplomatic support. Hassan, the architect of Morocco's
was used in this report.
foreign policy, in our view, sees bolstering ties to key foreign benefactors as
the most effective way to combat economic difficulties, obtain financing for
military purchases, and check diplomatic maneuvering by his chief rival,
Algeria.
Over the past year, Morocco's political rivalry with Algeria in the Maghreb
has grown more difficult to manage. Despite Libyan indifference, Algeria
has not given up pressing Tunisia and Mauritania to accept eventual
Libyan accession to their tripartite Treaty of Fraternity and Concord. We
believe King Hassan is reaching out to moderate Arabs and key Western
states in part to counter this continuing Algerian effort to buttress his
position in the Maghreb.
Hassan wants help for Morocco's economy, which cannot keep pace with
the needs of its population-growing at a rate of nearly 3 percent per year.
With unemployment near 25 percent and a youthful population, Hassan is
looking for foreign investment and assistance to spur Moroccan economic
growth and employment opportunities.
We believe Hassan is also concerned about preserving access to much
needed markets for Moroccan goods in Western Europe. Internal trade
barrier reforms in the European Community (EC) scheduled for implemen-
tation in 1992 and the 10-year transition to full Spanish and Portuguese
participation in the EC that began in 1986 will jeopardize this access.
Hassan will increasingly look to France, which has long been the leading
foreign player in Morocco, to intercede and preserve Moroccan trade
access to the EC.
Hassan views strategic. cooperation with the United States as a vehicle to
obtain sizable compensatory financial assistance over the long run. Hassan
views the access and transit agreements with Washington as a starting
point, and we believe he would allow greatly expanded US use of Morocco
for exercises and training. We judge he would prefer such use to occur un-
der a multinational or NATO umbrella to diminish US visibility and his
own identification with Washington.
Secret
NESA 88-10034
May 1988
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Hassan, however, has an exaggerated view of his country's strategic
importance to Washington-placing excessive emphasis on its location
bordering the Strait of Gibraltar, with Atlantic as well as Mediterranean
ports. As a result, he is likely to remain a difficult negotiating partner, de-
manding more compensatory assistance than Washington is willing to pay
for expanded US use of Moroccan military facilities.
We see little danger over the next two years of a fundamental shift in
Morocco's moderate diplomatic course. Even if the King were to believe
Washington had not offered sufficient military assistance or were to
become seriously angry with the United States for some other reason, we
doubt that he would do more than tilt his foreign policy in a more Arab,
nonaligned direction. His deep distrust of Communism and the Soviet
Union, along with his personal affinity for the West, are obstacles to more
dramatic policy shifts. Because there is no large, anti-Western constituency
in Morocco and the King's two sons and the country's military establish-
ment generally share the King's pro-Western outlook, we doubt that his
unexpected departure from the scene would trigger a major shift in Rabat's
foreign policy.
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Underlying Forces in Moroccan Foreign Policy 1
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Scope Note This is our first comprehensive examination of Morocco's overall foreign
policy in nearly a decade. The timeliness of this Assessment stems from the
coincidence of two circumstances-the increasing threat to US military
power projection and readiness resulting from host country restrictions on
US basing and training in Europe and elsewhere and the increasing
willingness of King Hassan to provide the United States expanded military
access to his country.
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Morocco: Foreign Policy
Dilemmas
Underlying Forces in Moroccan Foreign Policy
Europe.
As a moderate Arab leader with strong ties to the
West as well as to the Arab world, King Hassan II
has turned throughout his 27-year reign to Western
Europe and the United States for military and eco-
nomic assistance. He tried recently to support his
claims for that aid by telling the US Secretary of
Defense, as he has told other senior Western officials
in the past, that Morocco's location bordering the
Strait of Gibraltar with "two danger points"-its
Atlantic as well as Mediterranean ports-gives the
West an important stake in his country's future. In
our view, the King believes his assertion that Morocco
is a bulwark on NATO's southern flank against
radicalism and Soviet influence in the Maghreb. This
perceived political linkage to the West is reinforced by
Morocco's strong cultural and historical ties to France
and Spain as well as by the presence of approximately
1 million Moroccans living and working in Western
Morocco remains, nonetheless, an Islamic state de-
spite its French colonial experience. The overwhelm-
ing majority of Moroccans see themselves as Muslims
and Arabs. They identify strongly with Arab causes,
especially the struggle to recover Palestine. Moroccan
soldiers fought in the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. In
addition, Morocco was host to the Arab summit
meeting in 1974 that designated the Palestinian Lib-
eration Organization the sole, legitimate representa-
tive of the Palestinians. It also was host to the summit
meetings of 1981 and 1982 that produced an Arab
consensus on terms for peace negotiations with Israel.
transmitted through the prophet's descendants.
King Hassan is a devout Muslim who traces his
lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. As the spiritual
head of Islam in Morocco, he bears the hereditary
title, Commander of the Faithful. According to the
US Embassy in Rabat, many Moroccans-particular-
ly the rural poor-believe Hassan possesses baraka,
an aura of holiness and manifestation of divine grace
As an Arab country with strong ties to the West,
Morocco has pursued several foreign policy objectives
under King Hassan:
? Securing assistance from the United States, West-
ern Europe, and wealthier moderate Arab regimes
to help him promote his country's development and
maintain its armed forces.
? Expanding Morocco's role in the Maghreb, includ-
ing winning international acceptance for its effort to
extend its control over Western Sahara.
? Promoting better relations between the West and
the Arab world to bolster his standing in each camp
and to reduce the strain on his country's diplomacy
when Western and Arab interests diverge.
? Promoting an Arab-Israeli peace settlement as part
of his effort to enhance his image in the West and to
reduce the principal source of tension between the
Arab and Western world.
Regional Rivalries
Algeria
Algeria and Morocco are longstanding political rivals
with expanding populations of about 24 million each
and roughly equivalent army manpower of 160,000
and 120,000 troops, respectively. The rivalry between
them for regional preeminence is increased by their
differing governmental systems and ideologies. Mo-
rocco is a religiously based monarchy exuding tradi-
tion and maintaining a pro-Western orientation while
Algeria is a socialist, nonaligned regime that depends
heavily on the Soviets for military equipment.[
Diplomacy in the region generally revolves around the
Moroccan-Algerian adversary relationship. The com-
petition between them sparked a limited border war in
1963 and contributed to a 12-year military conflict
between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario
guerrillas over Western Sahara. Algeria's success in
creating a tripartite Treaty of Fraternity and Concord
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Fifty-eight-year-old King Hassan II is the epitome of
a powerful traditional monarch. He is a highly self-
confident, paternalistic leader who believes he is
uniquely qualified to determine what is best for his
country. Although he receives advice from a few
trusted ministers, he alone formulates Morocco's
foreign policy. As a result, he can institute a policy or
reverse it on his own initiative-as he did when he
made the Moroccan-Libyan Union in 1984 and then
reversed it in 1986. According to the US Embassy in
with Tunisia and Mauritania in 1983, in our view,
encouraged Morocco to sign the short-lived treaty of
political unity with Libya the following year. After
Hassan abrogated Morocco's union with Libya in
1986, Algeria sought to improve its relations with
Tripoli and has campaigned since 1987 for Libyan
accession to the tripartite treaty.
Libya
Despite Algeria's maneuvering to include Libya in the
tripartite treaty and King Hassan's abrogation of the
union he made with Qadhafi, we believe Tripoli and
Rabat continue to see mutual benefit in maintaining
an active-if wary-relationship. According to offi-
cial US sources, the King initiated the union in mid-
1984 to gain economic assistance, to ensure that
Rabat, in late 1986 he interpreted a phrase in a
Moroccan newspaper as an attack on his recent
meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres and de-
clared foreign policy to lie within his royal preroga-
tive and to be exempt from criticism.
Hassan's principal priority is the perpetuation of the
Moroccan monarchy. The monarchy traces back with
only brief interruptions to the ninth century, and
Hassan's Alouite dynasty goes back to the 17th
century. With afair for the dramatic, he frequently
focuses on foreign policy issues to mobilize domestic
support and distract public attention from internal
concerns. For example, in 1975, he made Western
Sahara a rallying cry in part to deflect attention from
his country's internal problems.
A fundamental characteristic of Hassan's foreign
policy dealings is his disdain for routine behavior.
This is a reflection of his own authoritarian tenden-
cies His ability to
achieve rapport with other leaders has encouraged
him to seek high-level personal relationships. He
believes he has used private channels with sympathet-
ic leaders to obtain special benefits for Morocco.
Tripoli would refrain from supporting the Polisario,
and to present the Algerians with the potential of a
second military front in a future confrontation. For
his part, Qadhafi was interested in eliminating train-
ing of Libyan dissidents in Morocco and in discourag-
ing Hassan from supporting Chadian President
Habre. According to the US Embassy in Tunis,
Qadhafi also hoped the union would undermine US
efforts to isolate Libya in the Middle East.
Hassan's decision to abrogate the union stemmed,
according to the US Embassy in Rabat, from his
perception that Qadhafi had grown so weak that he
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The economy is the King's biggest domestic problem.
It is not expanding fast enough to meet the needs of
Morocco's rapidly growing population. According to
the US Embassy in Rabat, nearly 56 percent of the
population is under 20, and job creation is becoming
increasingly important. Although export receipts
have increased in recent years, the domestic economy
remains weak. In 1986 inflation reached 10 percent,
the highest level in this decade, and unemployment
exceeded 25 percent, according to the US Embassy in
Rabat. Embassy reporting indicates that neither im-
proved much in 1987 nor is likely to get better in
1988. We believe Hassan is aware of these problems,
and his concern has led him to reach out during the
past year for additional help from the West and from
wealthier, Arab states.
Hassan, nonetheless, has managed to remain relative-
ly untouched by Morocco's economic difficulties,
maintaining broad popular support as the country's
undisputed religious and political leader. He manipu-
lates competing interest groups through divide-and-
conquer tactics and has successfully co-opted most
opposition groups. None of Morocco's political par-
ties, labor unions, or fringe opposition elements ap-
pears capable of mounting a serious challenge to
government policies. Most of those groups are part of
the political establishment in the pay of the palace
and have little standing with the public.
was no longer likely to provide much economic sup-
port to Morocco or significant military assistance to
the Polisario. Qadhafi's confrontation with the United
States also made Libya a growing liability in Hassan's
quest for US economic and military aid.
Although the rupture of the accord no doubt angered
Qadhafi, Hassan and the Libyan leader have main-
tained relations. They apparently believe that they
have more to lose than gain in further antagonizing
each other. The US Embassy in Rabat reports, for
The troubled economy has contributed to the still
limited political challenge of Islamic fundamental-
ism. According to the US Embassy in Rabat, the
poor, the young, the intellectuals, and urban profes-
sionals could turn to fundamentalism to express
discontent with the regime. We believe that funda-
mentalist criticism of Hassan's mishandling of social
and economic problems and the royal family's osten-
tatious lifestyle could erode the King's status as
defender of the Islamic faith-a key element in his
claim to legitimacy. During the riots in January
1984, fundamentalists helped fan unrest by distribut-
ing tracts attacking the King on this score, according
to the US Embassy.
Hassan has tried to counter the fundamentalist chal-
lenge by using his security services to intimidate
religious extremists and by placing greater emphasis
on Islam. He has tripled the budget for officially
sanctioned Islamic activities in recent years and
during Ramadan frequently leads the prayer in vari-
ous mosques, according to the US Embassy in Rabat.
He often tries to overlay political events with a
religious patina. On a trip to Western Sahara, for
example, he stopped to pray when he entered the
territory. In public statements he has struck a note of
humility by saying that he is "but the servant of God
and his people called to do their will."
example, that Hassan still fears that Qadhafi may
engage in terrorism or subversion against his regime
and is reluctant to confront him. The Embassy also
reports that Hassan is concerned that breaking off
contact with Qadhafi would accelerate the warming
trend between Libya and Algeria. Hassan may even
perceive that Qadhafi could again prove useful in his
diplomatic'efforts to stave off Algerian attempts in
the future to isolate Morocco.
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The driving force behind Morocco's pursuit of the
war is a national consensus that Western Sahara is
an integral part of the country. Morocco's claim to
Western Sahara is based on the argument that it
possessed the territory before Spanish colonization.
In our view, King Hassan would lose face at home if
he made concessions that undermined Moroccan con-
trol of the territory. We believe the issue is not as
emotional for most Algerians because Algeria has no
claims to Western Sahara and is involved in the
conflict only for political and ideological reasons. It
insists on the right of the inhabitants to self-
determination and views the Polisario question as a
legitimate independence struggle.a
King Hassan and President Bendjedid failed to
bridge their differences on Western Sahara in a
summit meeting in May 1987 even though both
accept that a military solution will not bring lasting
peace. We do not believe that they will resolve the
conflict soon. Neither side is willing to compromise
enough to allow a settlement. Rabat has the upper
hand militarily and can Pursue the war indefinitely
controls about 80 percent of the territory and may
be planning another extension of the berm-an earth-
ern defensive perimeter that it has been advancing
since 1981.b We believe the King's focus on berm
construction reflects his pessimism about the chances
of reaching a favorable political solution in the near
term. He probably believes that his strong military
position will enable him to reach a settlement on his
terms.
2 The Polisario or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia
el Hamra and Rio de Oro was created in 1973. Its leaders support
non-Marxist Arab socialism and independence for Western Saha-
ra. They claim that as many as 165,000 supporters live in four
refugee camps in Algeria. Morocco, however, contends that the
number is as low as 15,000. Algeria provides most of the Polisar-
io's economic and military support.
The Algerians maintain a tough public stance, but
An important factor in
this changing attitude is the rising cost of supporting
what we estimate to be 20,000 to 40,000 Polisario
refugees living in southwestern Algeria when the
country's economic problems are worsening because
of falling oil revenues. We believe that President
Bendjedid will be forced to make diplomatic conces-
sions because his government is not willing to risk an
all-out war with Morocco.
Bendjedid is trying to push Hassan to negotiate a
settlement, according to US Embassy reporting. To-
ward that end, the Algerian President met for four
days last summer with Qadhafi and reached agree-
ment with him to pursue closer cooperation. Accord-
ing to US Embassies in Rabat and Algiers, he
probably hopes that expanded links to Qadhafi will
lead to financial support from Libya, establish his
preeminence in the Maghreb, help isolate Morocco,
and ultimately force Hassan to compromise on West-
ern Sahara.
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Tunisia
Algeria's most recent efforts to isolate Morocco diplo-
matically and to gain Libyan accession to the tripar-
tite treaty find Tunisia where it usually is-uncom-
fortably caught in the middle. Tunisia shares a basic
affinity with Morocco-both countries are oriented
toward the West and are relatively open societies. At
the same time, Tunisian President Ben Ali, like
President Bourguiba before him, is concerned, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Tunis, about his country's
vulnerability to intimidation by other Maghreb states.
The US Embassy in Tunis reports that Algeria's
urgings that Tunisia support Tripoli's accession to the
tripartite pact have clearly troubled Ben Ali, but he is
reluctant to alienate Algeria and Libya and may
ultimately acquiesce in including Tripoli in the pact.
Maghreb Maneuvering
Algeria's latest efforts to isolate Morocco reached a
high point in February when Algerian President
Bendjedid engineered a summit meeting with Tuni-
sian President Ben Ali to coax Tunisia and Maurita-
nia into allowing Libya to accede to their Treaty of
Fraternity and Concord. According to the US Embas-
sies in Tunis and Algiers, the conflicting goals of the
participants at that meeting at least temporarily
prevented realization of Algerian goals-Bendjedid
wanted Libyan accession to the treaty, Qadhafi want-
ed political unity with his neighbors, and Ben Ali
wanted guarantees of noninterference in Tunisian
internal affairs. This episode suggests to us that, even
if Ben Ali goes along with Libyan accession, there is a
good chance that Algeria will fail again as it has in
the past to isolate Morocco diplomatically. In the
meantime, the US Embassy in Rabat reports that
Hassan is watching carefully the diplomatic maneu-
vering in the Maghreb. We believe the King's concern
on this score probably has led him to seek closer ties
to moderate Arab regimes in the Middle East.
Political Ties
Hassan has maintained longstanding, strong relations
with like-minded Sunni regimes run by royal families
in Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates. Although the full scope of these relations
remains shrouded in secrecy, the Moroccan-Saudi tie
is the most important. The two countries share intelli-
gence and cooperate closely on major Middle Eastern
issues. Hassan also assists Saudi Arabia and the other
Gulf states in internal security and military training.
According to the US Embassy in Rabat, 1,500 to
2,000 Moroccan military personnel are in Saudi Ara-
bia and 3,000 are in the United Arab Emirates. C
approximately
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Saudi grants 25X1
to Morocco amounted to about $3 billion during the
period 1980-85, with an additional $700 million in
loans. The Saudis delivered to Morocco without
charge some two million metric tons of oil in 1985,
worth about $375 million and equal to half Rabat's
annual consumption. This was the only time Saudi
Arabia provided oil to Morocco free of charge. Since
then, it has extended discounts of up to half the world
price. This assistance has helped significantly to ease
Morocco's foreign exchange problems. The Saudis
gave $267 million in assistance in 1986 and a reported
$176 million in 1987. Although the physical quantity
of Saudi oil deliveries to Morocco has been fairly
constant in recent years, the dollar price of the oil has
fallen 36 percent since 1984, which accounts for much
of the apparent decline in Saudi assistance.
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Security Cooperation
Gulf state assistance to Morocco for military pur-
chases grew out of an understanding the two conser-
vative monarchies reached in the mid-1970s as mem-
bers of the defunct Five Power Intelligence
Committee-Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt,
and France-that a multilateral effort was needed to
thwart radical initiatives, counter Soviet inroads in
Africa, and combat international terrorism. Since
then, Saudi financial support has helped Morocco
provide security assistance to several moderate Arab
and African governments. In the early 1980s, Gulf
state military assistance declined, but recent Moroc-
can activity in the military marketplace suggests that
Saudia Arabia and the other Gulf states may have
renewed contributions to Rabat for military outlays.
In 1985, for example, Hassan publicly pledged to
spend $1 billion in five years on military moderniza-
tion. When the King made this promise, he did not
appear to have the funds to carry out the program.
Since January 1986, however, Morocco has signed
agreements worth more than $400 million. We believe
there is a good chance Rabat is counting on grants
from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
It may be no coincidence that the first large contracts
under Morocco's new military modernization program
were signed less than two weeks after visits to Rabat
by the Saudi Crown Prince and the deputy command-
er of the United Arab Emirates' armed forces. King
Hassan also agreed in the summer of 1986 to train
Emirian airmen and technicians on Mirage F-1 s in
the United Arab Emirates and Morocco,
This deal almost cer-
tainly included a sizable Emirian financial commit-
ment to Rabat. In addition a reliable source of the
that $13 million-
earmarked for, but not needed in, the F-5 purchase in
1980-was released by Riyadh in 1986 for military
purchases by Rabat.
Security cooperation probably increased further last
year, when King Hassan was becoming concerned
about Algeria's renewed efforts to isolate him, but few
details are available. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
were increasingly worried about the Iranian threat to
their security, and,
Morocco agreed during this period to provide a rapid
deployment force for Saudi Arabia's use,
We believe it is possible that the
Saudis are showing their appreciation for Hassan's
recent efforts on their behalf by stepping up their
security assistance to him.
We believe close political and security cooperation
between Morocco and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states will continue over the medium to long term.
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Rabat's economic problems point toward close Moroc-
can attention to relations with potential Arab donors
and oil suppliers, even though Hassan's appeals for
increased Western aid during the past year suggest to
us that he still is not receiving as much from the
Saudis as he would like. He would almost certainly be
disappointed if aid from the moderate Arab states
becomes erratic in response to fluctuations in the
international oil market, but we believe he will contin-
ue to receive some help and that shared common
interests will preserve close ties to Riyadh. Saudi
Arabia, for its part, will continue to rely on Morocco
to support Saudi efforts to enhance Arab and Muslim
unity and moderate Arab positions.
We believe Hassan has an exaggerated sense of his
influence with eastern Arab states and Israel and of
his ability to play a key role in the peace process. He
has indicated to US officials that his ties to Israel
qualify him far better than Jordan's King Hussein as
a mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process. This,
along with his interest in securing greater Western
assistance, was almost certainly why he risked Libyan
and Syrian condemnation to talk with Peres.'
The King probably believes that his open policy
toward Tel Aviv wins favor in the West, especially
with Washington. This consideration loomed especial-
ly large, according to the US Embassy in Rabat, when
the King was trying to mitigate US displeasure during
the period of union with Libya (1984-86). Hassan
continues to hope, in our view, that the West will
reward his constructive policy toward Israel-illus-
trated by his meeting with Shimon Peres in July
1986-with increased economic and political assis-
tance.
A further factor in the King's relations with Israel is
Morocco's Jewish population. Hassan's Alaouite dy-
nasty is the protector of the 2,000-year-old Moroccan
Jewish community-the largest in the Arab world
He is one of only five Arab heads of state to meet openly with an
Israeli leader. Three of the others-King Abdallah of Jordan,
President Sadat of Egypt, and President Gemayel of Lebanon-
Figure 2. Hassan and then Prime Minister Peres
oflsraeC_
and the King's principal vehicle for unofficial contacts
with Israel. According to the US Consulate in Casa-
blanca, the community numbers less than 10,000-
down from nearly 350,000 in 1956. Some 600,000
Israelis today are of Moroccan origin. Despite their
limited numbers, Jews still play, according to the
Consulate, important unofficial roles as financiers,
businessmen, technical and professional experts, and
advisers to the King.
Hassan probably hopes that contacts with Tel Aviv
will result in increased Israeli intelligence, military,
and counterterrorist cooperation with Morocco. Ac-
cording to the US Consulate in Casablanca,, he hopes
Tel Aviv will provide limited military assistance to
improve his forces' performance in the Western Saha-
ra war. We believe he also would like to learn about
vulnerabilities exploited by Israel in fighting the
Syrian Air Force, which is Soviet-equipped and
trained-much like Algeria's Air Force. Hassan also
wants to know how Israel counters seaborne guerrilla
infiltration, a subject he presumably is interested in
because of his own extended coastline. Hassan almost
certainly realizes, however, that Israel will only share
limited information with an Arab state. F_
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There are strict limits on how far the King can go in
his relations with Israel. Getting too far ahead of the
Arab consensus, in our view, would increase the risk
of terrorism, assassination, or sanctions from radical
Arab states. He also has to consider the anti-Israeli
views of his chief Arab financial backers-Saudi
The US Embassy in Rabat has reported the King
would like to integrate Morocco into the Western
political, security, and economic system.
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Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
From Tel Aviv's perspective, contacts with moderate
Arab states have long been an Israeli goal. Israeli
leaders hope that informal relations with Morocco
will bolster Israeli legitimacy in the Arab region and
help overcome Arab psychological constraints against
direct contact with Tel Aviv. Accordingly, we believe
Israel may give low-level military assistance by pro-
viding Morocco with tactical advice and specialized
military equipment such as remotely piloted vehicles
in which the Moroccans have shown considerable
interest.
We believe lower level informal contacts between
Morocco and Israel will continue, despite Hassan's
disappointment at the summit meeting with Peres
over Tel Aviv's inflexibility and Washington's failure
to give greater assistance. According to the US
Consulate in Casablanca, as an initial sign of his
interest in continued ties to Israel, Hassan revived
plans for a book to be published in French, English,
Arabic, and Hebrew on his supportive relationship
with the Moroccan Jewish community.
Relations With the European Community
Morocco is closely linked to Europe by its longstand-
ing ties to France and Spain and by the large
Moroccan guest worker communities in France, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands.
Moroccan military offi-
cers see their country-albeit unrealistically, in our
view-as more a part of Europe than the Middle East,
and we believe this sentiment is widely shared among
the educated classes. The King himself has said that
"geography is destiny," and he has suggested publicly
at different times that Morocco's proximity to Europe
makes it part of that continent. He has even expressed
an interest in joining the European Community (EC)
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
far too astute not to realize that he has little prospect
of realizing those goals. We believe he made those
statements primarily to signal an interest in closer
cooperation with the West and, through that coopera-
tion, to bolster his position in his frequently tense
relations with his neighbors in the Maghreb.
In our view Hassan seeks to bolster relations with
countries outside his immediate region in part to
compensate for his potential isolation within it-a
motivation that has increased of late as a result of
Algeria's stepped-up diplomatic maneuvering. The
US Embassy in Rabat reports that Hassan also
appears to believe that West European countries
could help him to achieve a favorable diplomatic
solution to the Western Sahara war. The Embassy
also reports that Hassan made a strong pitch last year
to the Spanish Foreign Minister to throw Madrid's.,
support behind Morocco's proposal for a referendum
on Western Sahara.
We believe that the King's desire for closer ties to
Western Europe also reflects Morocco's considerable
economic dependence on trade with the European
Community. The EC countries take over half of
Morocco's exports and supply 30 to 40 percent of its
imports. According to the US Consulate in Casablan-
ca, approximately 1 million Moroccans work in West-
ern Europe, and Morocco is host to nearly 15 million
foreign tourists-mostly from Western Europe-each
year. Since Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986,
Moroccan officials have expressed concern to EC
officials that preferential treatment for those coun-
tries' products would jeopardize important Moroccan
exports, such as citrus fruits and tomatoes, particular-
ly as Spain and Portugal approach full participation
in the EC in 1996.
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Morocco's Top Ten Trading Partners, 1986 a
9.
10.
Country
Million US $
Percent of Total
France
680.9
29.5
Spain
188.8
8.2
West Germany
177.7
7.7
Japan
136.5
5.9
Italy
136.3
5.9
India
110.0
4.8
Belgium/
Luxembourg
107.2
4.6
Netherlands
75.7
3.3
Turkey
64.5
2.8
a Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics-1986 is the most
recent year for which complete data are available.
Country
Million US $
Percent of Total
France
1,022.6
25.8
United States
511.4
12.9
Spain
341.6
8.6
West Germany
266.7
6.7
Italy
201.1
5.1
Saudi Arabia
137.9
3.4
United Kingdom
128.0
3.2
Belgium/
Luxembourg
125.4
3.2
Canada
124.0
3.1
Netherlands
107.3
2.7
We believe Hassan's goal in making overtures about
entry into the EC is to win economic concessions from
the Community-financial assistance, more favorable
import terms for Moroccan manufactures, and in-
creased quotas for Morocco's agricultural exports.
The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Moroccan
officials hope the EC will favorably consider Hassan's
earlier request that Morocco receive essentially the
same terms as Spain and Portugal for its citrus and
tomatoes. Morocco has limited leverage in this situa-
tion. Hassan recently delayed agreeing to a fishing
accord with the EC-a tactic potentially damaging to
Spain's fishing industry because about 40 percent of
all Spanish fishermen normally fish in Moroccan
waters.
France
In terms of culture, commerce, education, and eco-
nomic and military assistance, France plays the lead-
ing role in Morocco. Morocco's 44 years as a French
protectorate established strong cultural ties that per-
sist despite the occasional strains in relations since
Morocco gained independence in 1956. French is the
second language of Morocco, and most of the elite-
in the palace, the government, and business-are
French educated. Despite French budgetary cutbacks
for foreign scholarships, nearly 25,000 Moroccans
study in France compared with 790 in the United
States, according to the US Embassy in Rabat. The
Embassy also reports that the Moroccan community
in France, over 500,000 strong, is the largest group of
Moroccans abroad and one of the largest foreign
communities in France. In 1986 France received
29 percent of Morocco's exports and provided
25 percent of its imports.
France also exerts a sentimental tug on King Hassan.
At the beginning of his state visit to France in
November 1985, Hassan claimed that, because of his
upbringing, he considered himself "not an Arab who
speaks French, but a man with almost a completely
double culture"-a statement tailored to the circum-
stances but, in our view, one that he, along with many
other educated Moroccans, appears to believe.725X1
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France is the principal Western aid donor to Morocco
and, according to the US Embassy in Rabat, holds
between one-third and one-half of Morocco's foreign
debt of over $15 billion. According to the French-
Moroccan Financial Protocol of 1987, France com-
mitted $61 million to cover Moroccan foreign pay-
ments deficits and $130 million for project assistance.
French tourism also helps the economy-more visitors
come from France than any other country.
Bilateral ties are important to France as well. Eco-
nomically, France values Morocco as as arms
purchaser-even if the Saudis ultimately pay the bill.
In addition, Morocco strengthens France's foothold in
North Africa and acts as a channel for French
dealings with other moderate African countries.
Although France and Morocco have concluded major
economic agreements, provision of new arms and
spare parts since 1983 has depended on Morocco's
ability to pay in hard currency. We believe that
prospects for a large new concessionary military deal
from the French are poor, considering France's al-
ready substantial nonmilitary support and Morocco's
high overall debt. According to the US Embassy in
Rabat, France will sell Morocco the Mirage 2000
aircraft only if the King can secure the funding.
We believe that the King is satisfied with his'relation-
ship with France and that Morocco will continue to
pursue strong bilateral ties. Hassan has contrasted to
US officials the "more understanding" French view of
Rabat's two-year union with Tripoli to the cold
reaction of Washington. He probably will continue to
play up his French ties to urge Washington to com-
pete more strongly for influence in Morocco.
Spain
Spain, although clearly secondary to France, is Mor-
occo's other principal link to Western Europe. Span-
ish-Moroccan relations, however, have been marred
by conflicting claims to the enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla on the north coast of Morocco. Melilla and
Ceuta comprise an area of 32 square kilometers and
have a population of slightly more than 100,000.
Although Madrid has occupied and administered the
enclaves since the 15th century, Morocco claims these
enclaves as its own and asserts that Spain should have
surrendered them when it relinquished the rest of its
According to the US Embassy in Rabat, Hassan
exploits the enclave issue when he wants to divert
attention from domestic economic problems, to press
Spain to support Morocco on the EC, or to increase
Morocco's leverage with Spain. We believe the King
views the enclaves as a diplomatic card that might
help him reduce Spanish diplomatic support for Al-
geria's position on the Western Sahara war. Never-
theless, in our view, both countries see it in their
interests to prevent the issue from becoming a serious
confrontation in the near to medium term.
The King, therefore, seems in no hurry to resolve the
enclave issue and has more immediate goals to
achieve-most notably a resolution of the Western
Sahara war. Hassan's father, Mohamed V, said "ev-
ery King of Morocco shall be a liberator." Mohamed
V liberated Morocco proper, Hassan claims to have
"liberated" Western Sahara, and
the enclave issue may be left to Crown
Prince Sidi Mohamed. The King is aware, moreover,
that the enclaves are important to the economy of
northern Morocco. According to the US Embassy in
Rabat, northern Moroccans display an affinity to
Spain, and northern merchants and businessmen wor-
ry that they and their region could lose economically
if the enclaves are incorporated into Morocco.
The Spaniards worry about a Moroccan takeover of
the enclaves, and to contain that threat, according to
the US Embassy in Madrid, they strongly support
King Hassan as a force for stability in Morocco and
have tried to fashion a strong web of economic,
cultural, and military ties to Rabat. Spain is virtually
tied with the United States as Morocco's second most
important trading partner, according to the US Em-
bassy in Rabat. Joint air and naval exercises, arms
sales, and antiterrorism cooperation strengthen rela-
tions between Rabat and Madrid. In 1986 the two
capitals concluded an approximately $220-million
deal for delivery of Spanish trucks and military
equipment to the Moroccan Army and agreed to
increase security cooperation, according to the US
Embassy in Madrid.
colonial territories in Morocco in 1955
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security assistance.
The United States has been a central part of Hassan's
recent efforts to enhance his country's traditionally
strong relations with the West. Rabat has a long-
standing special relationship with Washington. Mo-
rocco was one of the first countries to recognize the
United States when bilateral commercial relations
were established in 1787. Since World War II, mili-
tary considerations have predominated over economic
ones in Rabat's ties to Washington-the reverse of its
relations with Western Europe. The US Air Force
maintained Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco
until 1963, and the US Navy operated communica-
tion facilities at Kenitra until 1978. In 1982 Washing-
ton and Rabat signed an access and transit agreement
that gives the United States access to Moroccan
airfields to support force deployments in unspecified
contingencies, subject to Moroccan approval. A joint
military commission also was formed that year to
manage US-Moroccan military cooperation, including
training, intelligence, mapping exchange, and US
to the Atlantic.
US Interests
US interests in Morocco stem from its strategic
location. Morocco affords US naval craft-including
nuclear-powered warships-access to ports on the
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Morocco
has become an important training site, second only to
West Germany in hosting US military exercises. In a
crisis, Morocco would be a convenient transit stop for
US forces on their way to either the Persian Gulf or
Sub-Saharan Africa. In a conflict between NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces, a friendly Morocco could
constitute a rear area close to Europe and accessible
Middle East.
Washington benefits from Rabat's refusal to grant the
Soviet Union access to Moroccan facilities. Under
hostile influence, Morocco could be used as a staging
area to threaten NATO's southwestern flank-
particularly Spain and Portugal-and to threaten
maritime traffic to the eastern Mediterranean and the
Morocco's Goals
King Hassan probably hopes that improved relations
with the United States will strengthen his hand in
dealing with his neighbors-particularly as he con-
tends with Algeria's recent diplomatic activism and
pursues his military effort in the Western Sahara war.
The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Hassan
believes military cooperation with the United States
has deterrence value and that he may hope that the 25X1
United States will guarantee Morocco's security
against Algeria. Even though the conservative Gulf
states may be providing financial assistance to Moroc-
co, we believe the drop in oil prices and the current
tension in the Persian Gulf have raised doubts about
the reliability of future financial assistance from that
quarter. This would also encourage Hassan to look to
the West. The King might hope as well that the
United States would help Morocco obtain greater
access to Western markets-especially the EC.
We believe these considerations almost certainly un-
derlie Hassan's increasingly direct statements over the 25X1
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the United States as well as a bulwark against
Communism. He has suggested to US officials that
the United States has not approached the limit of
long-term military access to Morocco and has offered
to provide basing for a US Air Force tactical fighter
wing scheduled to leave from Spain. Although he may
have realized his offer was unlikely to be accepted, he 25X1
probably hoped it would be read as evidence of
Morocco's desire for further cooperation.
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Figure 4
US Assistance to Morocco, 1983-88
Constraints on Cooperation With Washington
An expansion of US military activities would bring
both military and economic development opportuni-
ties for Morocco
but it also could carry liabilities
We
,
.
Million US $ Military Economic believe Hassan is wary of being called a puppet y g of the
United States and is alert to potential nationalist or
Islamic fundamentalist criticism that he is giving too
much to the United States for too low a price. He
would not want to be accused of reversing his deci-
sions to phase out all US airbases in 1963 and the US
naval communication facility at Kenitra in 1978.
Because his greatest domestic challenge is the econo-
my, we believe he would be willing to risk adverse
domestic reaction if he could obtain substantial com-
pensation for US and NATO use of Morocco for
military exercises. Hassan probably would prefer a
multinational or shared NATO use of Moroccan
85 86 87 88 facilities to diminish US visibility and his own identi-
fication with the United States.
Despite US provision of about $36 million in military
assistance and about $70 million in economic aid to
Morocco in 1987, Hassan claims that the United
States undervalues Morocco's strategic importance
and its potential contribution to Western security.
Over the past two years, a favorite theme of the
King's has been that he is cooperating closely with the
United States and that US assistance is not commen-
surate with Moroccan needs and with his willingness
to be accommodating.
Hassan typically avoids putting cooperation on a
specific quid pro quo basis, and he has complained
that the United States demeans Morocco when it cites
specific points of cooperation as justification for for-
eign assistance appropriations for Morocco. It is
difficult for that reason to estimate, however, how
much of an increase he would expect for increased US
military use of Morocco for exercises and training.
We believe he will not expand military cooperation
substantially without what he deems appropriate
recompense
The Soviet Union has far fewer ties to Morocco than
with Algeria and Libya, its friends in the Maghreb.
With an eye to Morocco's strategic location, rich
fishing waters, and large phosphate deposits, however,
the Soviet Union has for years quietly sought to woo
Hassan away from its dependence on the West. The
US Embassy in Rabat reports that in 1987 there was
a slight upswing in bilateral commercial ties. The
Soviets also asked to open a consulate in Tangier-a
request the King has placed on indefinite hold.
Hassan's sense of his own self-interest and his suspi-
cion of Communism make it unlikely that he would
align Morocco closely with the Soviet Union even if
he believed the Soviets would respond by sacrificing
their close ties to Algeria. Nevertheless, if Hassan
becomes sufficiently unhappy with the level of US
aid, we believe he would make an overture or two to
Moscow to increase Washington's interest in main-
taining good relations with his country.
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We believe that King Hassan will continue to experi-
ence stresses both in his relations with other Arab
countries and in his dealings with the West. We also
believe that he probably will continue to keep Moroc-
co on much the same diplomatic course that he has
pursued during the previous 27 years of reign-
burnishing his Islamic credentials and stressing his
Arab heritage while maintaining an essentially pro-
Western foreign policy. Ideological affinity and his
perception of the United States as the world's para-
mount superpower almost certainly will urge him to
sustain strong bilateral ties as an important compo-
nent of his national security. We believe the King's
concern with his economic problems at home and the
diplomatic challenges he faces in the Maghreb have
created an opening for Washington to increase securi-
ty cooperation with Rabat. That opening, along with
the challenges that contributed to it, is likely to persist
for at least the next two years.
Hassan's considerable pride has played a role in his
diplomatic decisions in the past, and we believe there
is a chance that he could reevaluate his foreign policy
if he believes Washington is not taking him seriously
or cannot meet his needs. Early manifestations of
displeasure would include cutbacks in US port calls
and training exercises and discrimination against US
business interests. In our view, however, Hassan's
personal moorings in the West are so strong that he
would be unlikely to go beyond giving his country's
diplomacy a more Arab, nonaligned tilt.
13
Under these circumstances, the most likely-but still
remote-threat to Morocco's Western orientation
over the medium term, in our view, would be Hassan's
unexpected departure from the scene. Although he
remains popular at home and has removed potential
challenges to his regime, there remains a possibility
that radicals from other countries, with or without the
help of Moroccan dissidents, could assassinate him.
Even then, the conservative elements who would most
likely assume control probably would not move Mo-
rocco in a radical direction. There is no large anti-
Western constituency in Morocco. We believe, more-
over, that his most likely successors-one of his sons
or senior military officers-generally share his pro-
Western outlook. They might, however, be less bold
than the King and a bit less willing to be publicly
identified with his diplomatic outlook.
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