IRAN'S GROUND FORCES: MORALE AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000200230001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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11
O TA
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U' MA l all-
Intelligence
Problems
Iran'.s Ground Forces:.
Morale and Manpower
WML NUMBER OF OoPIES
DISSII"I DATE 3~-970X03"
F EXTRA OOPIES
REOORD CII~TI'ER~~ ~~2-v
JOB NUMBER
Secrrt-
NESA 88-1026
April 1988'
Copy 3 7 6
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Directorate of -
Problems
Iran's Ground Forces:
Morale and Manpower
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 88-10026
April 1988
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Iran's Ground Forces:
Morale and Manpower
Problems
Key Judgments In recent years Iran has experienced increasing military morale and
information available manpower problems that have weakened its combat effectiveness. These
as of 15 February 1988 problems probably will continue through 1988, especially if casualties
was used in this report.
remain high and Tehran shows little progress in the ground war. Morale
and manpower difficulties will not stop Tehran from launching offensives,
but they will make increasingly difficult Iranian victories that might be
decisive in the war. Among the factors that have weakened morale:
? Iran has suffered at least 590,000 military casualties in the war.
? Tehran has failed to fulfill its promises of a decisive "final offensive" or
to make significant military progress to win the ground war.
? Harsh living conditions at the front and supply shortages during offen-
sives have demoralized troops.
? Interservice rivalry between the Iranian army and both the Revolution-
ary Guard and the Basij has caused conflict and a lack of cooperation in
combat operations. Tehran's favoritism toward the Guard and Basij has
also hurt army morale.
War weariness and the decline in morale have reduced the number of
dedicated Iranians volunteering to fight:
? Despite Tehran's efforts to boost enlistments, the number of volunteers
has declined probably by at least 10 percent each year since 1985. Major
mobilization campaigns in the spring and winter of 1987 failed to achieve
their goals.
? The decline in dedicated volunteers has weakened the effectiveness of the
Basij forces on which Tehran has relied heavily for its past military
successes.
Tehran's efforts to rectify these problems have not reversed the gradual
decline in military morale and manpower. Iran's heavy reliance on
conscription and coercion in recent years suggests that Tehran's motiva-
tional appeals and material incentives have failed to attract sufficient
dedicated volunteers. Although religion and patriotism retain their power-
ful appeal, they are less effective motivators than in the earlier years of the
war. Offensives that gain some territory-but fail to show real progress
toward defeating Iraq-will only temporarily boost morale.
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Over the long term, the decline in the number of dedicated volunteers and
the inability to meet mobilization goals probably will significantly weaken
Iran's capability to fight Iraq. To offset the shortage of such volunteers,
Tehran probably will rely more heavily on the draft and the use of press-
gangs. Conscription and coercion, however, will yield unenthusiastic
draftees and will further reduce Iranian combat effectiveness.
In the short term, tension between the United States and Iran in the
Persian Gulf will help the clerical regime bolster morale and enlistments. If
the United States launches attacks against the Iranian mainland, Iranian
willingness to fight both Iraq and the United States will significantly
increase. Renewed patriotism in Iran would enable Tehran to mobilize
large numbers of men and rekindle the fervor of the Iranian people to fight
the country's enemies. Iranian morale will decline, however, if Tehran's
blustering does not lead to a reduction in US forces in the Gulf. US defeat
of Iranian forces in limited clashes in the Persian Gulf also would hurt
Iranian morale.
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Tehran's Efforts To Improve Morale and Manpower 6
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Scope Note Military morale is perhaps the most important factor in war, but it is
difficult to assess accurately or to use to predict the outcome of a conflict.
Iranian military morale is especially difficult to analyze
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Iran's Ground Forces:
Morale and Manpower
Problems
Iran's ability to sustain its war against Iraq for seven
and a half years has stemmed largely from Tehran's
success in mobilizing and inspiring a large number of
men to fight fanatically. With its large force of highly
motivated soldiers, Iran halted Iraq's invasion in
1980, forced Iraqi troops to retreat in 1982, and
launched offensives against Iraq each year since 1983.
Tehran's ability to meet its manpower needs despite
the war's human and material costs will help deter-
mine the outcome of the conflict and Iran's future
military operations in the region.
Large numbers of fighting men have been essential to
Iran's efforts to overcome its shortage of modern
weaponry and military expertise. After the fall of the
Shah, the Iranian army was severely weakened by
purges and the clerical regime's distrust of a military
establishment trained by the United States. More-
over, the cutoff of foreign arms and spare parts
crippled Iran's ability to acquire and use modern
weaponry. After the Iraqi invasion, Tehran turned to
masses of lightly armed, poorly trained volunteers-
the Revolutionary Guard and later the Basij-to
overcome with manpower what it lacked in guns and
expertise. The success of Iranian "human wave"
attacks seemed to validate Tehran's infantry-intensive
strategy and its claim that human will is more
important than modern weapons
Without high troop morale and religious fanaticism,
Tehran's reliance on manpower probably would not
have been effective. Iran's highly motivated volun-
teers-despite inadequate training and weaponry-
have attacked aggressively and have often overcome
heavily fortified Iraqi defenses. High morale also has
helped Iran reduce some of the psychological advan-
tage Iraq gains from its superiority in firepower and
modern weaponry. A strong fighting spirit has been
essential in Tehran's long-term strategy to win by
attrition.
Like other countries engaged in protracted combat,
Iran has had problems maintaining military morale
and manpower. We assess that such problems have
increased for Tehran since late 1983 or early 1984.
Although the decline in morale and manpower is not
crippling, it has affected Iranian military capabilities,
planning, and operations. The problems are most
apparent in the Iranian army, but we believe they also
have affected the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij.
Factors Weakening Morale
Despite the clerical regime's propaganda claims that
Iran is willing to continue to suffer high losses, we
believe that heavy casualties have eroded military
morale in recent years.
we estimate that Iran has suffered.
at least 590,000 military casualties in seven years-
equivalent to 2.8 million for a country with the
population of the United States.'
50 percent of troops and equipment
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Revolutionary Guard (Sepah-e Pasdaran)
? Organized in 1979 by the clerical regime to ensure
order following the revolution and to discredit the
army and police forces of the Shah.
? 150,000 to 200,000 men in 19 divisions and 40
independent brigades deployed at the front. An
additional 50;000 men provide internal security in
Iran.
? Volunteers are carefully screened for correct politi-
cal and religious background and serve for life.
? One to three months of basic training.
? Units are primarily infantry, although some may
have tanks and armored personnel carriers.
? Played a major role in stopping the Iraqi invasion
in 1980 and along with Basij troops captured Iraqi
territory at Al Faw in 1986 and Fish Lake in 1987.
We believe a lack of significant military progress has
weakened the fighting spirit of Iranian troops. Teh-
ran's frequent promises of a "final offensive" and an
end to the war probably have led some troops to
become skeptical about eventual Iranian victory.=
the seemingly endless
nature of the war has disheartened some units. Army
personnel, for example, were described as mentally
fatigued and worried about the future as the war with
Iraq drags on. some
soldiers are disillusioned with Tehran's war policy and
blame clerical leaders for not ending the conflict.
Basif (Mobilization of the Oppressed)
? Created in 1979 in response to Khomeini's call for a
20-million-man army to oppose Iraq and the United
States.
? 100,000 to 200,000 men normally at the front.
Numbers increase during mobilization campaigns.
? Volunteers enlist for three to six months. Enlistees
range in age from 13 to 60 or more. Basij veterans
can later be drafted into the army.
? Ten to 15 days of basic military instruction. Revo-
lutionary Guard officers train and lead Basij units.
? Primarily involved in major operations. In offense,
large numbers of Basif overwhelm enemy positions,
while in defense they offer stubborn resistance and
stop enemy advances.
logistic problems,
especially weapon and supply shortages, have led to a
sense of hopelessness and missed opportunity among
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Army (Artesh)
? 300,000 men in four armored and 11 infantry
divisions deployed along the front.
? Conscripts draftedfor two years, although some
men are involuntarily held in service for longer
periods.
? Troops receive two to three months of basic
training.
? Distrusted by clerical leaders because of its associ-
ation with the Shah.
? Since 1984 army units have played a smaller role in
offensives and now primarily provide logistic and
fire support.
rale of some Iranian troops who felt helpless because
they lacked effective air defenses.
Harsh living conditions at the front and the poor
treatment of soldiers have hurt Iranian military mo-
rale, especially in the army I 25X1
troops often go unpaid for six months or longer. 25X1
They complain of water and food shortages and report
We believe interservice rivalry and Tehran's favorit-
ism toward the Basij and Revolutionary Guard have
caused tension and morale problems among Iran's
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Basij: Iran's Fanatical Volunteers
Grade school Iranian boys joining the Basij.
The Basij, or `Mobilization of the Oppressed, " prob-
ably has been Iran's most important military force in
the ground war against Iraq. Most of the volunteers
in the Basij-including many boys and old men-are
highly religious and committed to the fundamentalist
revolution in Iran. Normally 100,000 to 200,000
Basil troops are at the front, but mass mobilization
drives have increased their numbers to 300,000 or
ground forces. Clerical leaders have given the Guard
and Basij credit for victories while charging that the
more in preparation for a major offensive. To shame
others into volunteering, Basil recruiters sometimes
appear at rallies wearing martyr's shrouds to show
their willingness to die for Islam. Because of their
fanaticism and desire for martyrdom, Basij units are
usually given the most difficult objectives in Iranian
offensives. They have suffered higher casualties than
Revolutionary Guard or army units.
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army's disloyalty and incompetence have caused de-
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lerical control and
distrust of the army and interference in its operations
severely damage army morale especially among offi-
cers. clerics
have forced officers to attend religious classes and
participate in political demonstrations. Tehran under-
mines respect for army officers by urging soldiers to
spy on their superiors and report disloyalty to clerical
officials. As a result, soldiers often are disobedient
and insubordinate, or challenge officers' authority by
asking clerics to override orders. Clerics sent to
supervise army commanders have interfered in opera-
tions and have countermanded the orders of officers
during battles. They have promoted religious or sub-
servient officers but have failed to reward competent
nonreligious commanders,
such
conditions have caused a large number of career army
personnel to try to resign or to feign medical problems
in order to be sent to the rear.
Manpower Problems
Tehran's manpower problems have been most evident
in the poor results of mobilization campaigns in recent
years Iranian officials
have admitted that the number of volunteers for
military service has fallen 10 to 20 percent each year
since at least 1985. To compensate for the decline,
Tehran ordered a sharp increase in the quotas of
volunteers during recent mobilization campaigns.
Nevertheless,
a massive recruitment drive in early 1987 fell 70,000
short of the needed 200,000 men. Although the
deadline for the drive was extended, the campaign
failed to meet its goal.
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We believe that enlistment difficulties may be in-
creasing among Iran's rural population, which has
provided much of the manpower for the Basij_ 25X1
a Revolutionary Guard 25X1
official admitted that the percentage of the rural
population that strongly supported the Revolutionary
Guard and the Basij declined sharply from 1983 to
1985. Growing concern over high casualties has
caused some villagers to hide children from Basij
recruiters. A Basij veteran admitted in 1986 that the
appeal of martyrdom was weakening in some rural
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Conditions at the front and the poor treatment of
soldiers have caused a growing number of Iranians to
avoid service in the arm .
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Tehran's Efforts To Improve Morale and Manpower
We believe Iran has tried to ease morale and man-
power problems by intensifying motivational appeals,
modifying military operations, and creating new laws
and bureaucratic procedures. To improve fighting
spirit and encourage enlistments, Tehran has re-
emphasized the religious and patriotic appeals it has
used throughout the war. It also has continued to offer
material incentives to attract recruits. As morale and
manpower problems have multiplied, Iranian leaders
have increasingly adopted coercive measures to gain
needed manpower and apparently have altered their
tactics in the ground war.
Motivational Efforts
Iran depends primarily on the appeal of Islam-
specifically Shia fundamentalism-to maintain or im-
prove military morale and encourage Iranians to
Iran's services, although it is most successful in the
Revolutionary Guard and the Basij. Iranian leaders
emphasize that true followers of Allah have a reli-
gious obligation to fight against the "nonbelievers and
heretics" who lead the secular Ba'thist regime in
Baghdad. Clerics stress the dogma that soldiers who
die in wars on behalf of Islam go immediately to
paradise. The martyrdom and fatalism of Islam seem
to appeal strongly to the uneducated but highly
religious youths who make up most of the Basij units.
Tehran has tried to ease the effects of heavy casual-
ties on morale by assuring soldiers that their sacrifices
are worthwhile and that God will eventually give Iran
victory. All Iranian attacks-no matter how small or
unsuccessful-are portrayed as great victories with
exaggerated enemy human, materiel, and territorial
losses. To counter the harmful effects on morale of its
losses, Tehran never gives Iranian casualty figures
after major battles. Iranian soldiers are not killed but
are "martyred" or "achieve martyrdom in the service
of Allah," according to Iranian press reports.
Iran apparently has increased the number of clerics at
the front to try to maintain or improve morale and
increase the fanaticism of volunteers. In late 1987,
Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranian leaders public-
ly thanked the clerics for their combat activities and
Demoralization and Combat Performance
We believe poor morale among some units contribut-
ed to Iranian military setbacks or limited the success
of some Iranian operations in recent years
~lerics at-
tached to volunteer units instill or reinforce the
powerful religious faith that reduces the Iranian
soldier's fear of death and inspires him to prove his
devotion to Islam. By participating in combat, the
clerics become models for other men to imitate. The
mullahs help keep the volunteers acting as a cohesive
unit and encourage them to achieve their military
objective. Iranian press reports indicate that 40,000
clerics have served at the front since the war began,
and 8,000 have been killed or wounded in combat.
We believe Tehran has skillfully used patriotic ap-
peals to try to maintain Iranian morale and enlist-
ment.
patriotism ranks second only to religion as a reason
Iranian troops volunteer and fight
patriotism appeals more to those who are
not religious zealots or who dislike the clerical regime.
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To take advantage of patriotic fervor, Tehran has
emphasized the need to defend the homeland, to drive
out the Iraqi attackers, and to prevent another inva-
sion by Iraq or other countries. Throughout the war,
Iranian clerics have stressed that Iraq invaded Iran.
Many Iranians see no chance of peace as long as the
leader they believe started the war, Iraqi President
Saddam Husa n remains in Dower
many soldiers hate the Ba'thist regime in Iraq and
blame it for starting the war.
some Iraqi attacks on cities have strength-
ened Iranian military morale because soldiers believe
they have no choice but to fight an enemy who
continues to bomb Iranian territory
In late 1987, Iranian leaders used the increase in US
military forces in the Persian Gulf to encourage more
Iranians to volunteer for the war. According to press
reports, the clerics characterized the increased US
presence as evidence of an impending attack or
invasion and as a challenge to the Iranian revolution.
Tehran told the Iranian people that the war was
entering a new, final stage in which Iran would defeat
Iraq and thwart US policy in the Gulf. Iranians were
urged to enlist in the "Holy Mohammad Corps" to
defend their country against the Americans. Mass
rallies and mobilization drives were planned to gener-
ate and focus anger against the United States and
Iraq.
before a battle.
material incentives probably rank behind religion and
patriotism as an enlistment motivation. We believe
that such incentives have become somewhat more
effective in recent years as wartime economic hard-
ships have increased.
Material incentives are designed primarily to encour- 25X1
age enlistments by the poor and unemployed among
Iran's lower classes. Many large families allow or
encourage a young son to enlist in the Bas- because 25X1
the volunteer's pay is sent to his parents. 25X1
the family of a Basij volunteer 25X1
killed in combat receives a lump-sum payment of
$22,000, while widows get a pension of $250 a month 25X1
for life. Such payments are a strong enlistment incen-
tive in rural areas, where annual family income may
be only $1,000 to $2,000. 25X1
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receives priority in purchasing scarce items.
Operational Changes
We believe that in 1984 Tehran began to change the
size, tactics, and composition of forces in its offen-
sives, in part to address increasing morale and man-
power problems. To offset declines in manpower. Iran
began to use fewer men in major attacks.
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services during major operations.
60,000 men compared with over 100,000 usually
involved in offensives between 1980 and 1983. This
change probably was also intended to reduce Iranian
losses and the morale problems that resulted from
high casualties. Smaller attacks, in turn, led Iran to
alter tactics and use surprise and deception more
often and more effectively. To offset declining morale
in the army, Tehran began to rely increasingly on
Revolutionary Guard and Basij units in offensives
after 1984. Limiting the army's primary role to
firepower and logistic support reduced the impact of
its poor morale and reluctance to cooperate with other
warded with leave, especially after victories.
and squalor of life in the trenches. In late 1985 the
commander of the Revolutionary Guard publicly
called for more raids on Iraqi positions to keep
Iranian soldiers active and raise their morale. To
reduce the numbing effects of major battles, large
numbers of Iranian troops have sometimes been re-
During the lulls between major offensives, the Irani-
ans have launched small-scale attacks and limited the
time men are at the front in order to reduce the
exposure of troops to demoralizing living conditions.
Small-scale attacks on Iraqi positions have been de-
signed not only to build troops' aggressiveness and
confidence but also to distract them from the boredom
Recruitment
Since 1984, Tehran has reacted to declining enlist-
ments by strengthening draft laws for the army and
enacting conscription or manpower quotas for the
Basij:
? In anticipation of conscription, Tehran passed a law
in late 1984 to try to stop 15- to 17-year-old males
from leaving the country.
a government proclamation ended all
The clerics' ability to use religion to inspire Iranians
has been evident in the fanaticism of some Iranian
volunteers in combat. An Iraqi veteran states that he
saw fanatical Iranian soldiers armed only with knives
attack Iraqi tanks
Basil troops have been given letters signed by Kho-
meini confirming the bearer's piety and requesting
that Allah allow him to enter paradise immediately.
Other volunteers have been given magic paper "keys
to heaven, " which the clerics claim will assure the
bearer's entry into paradise. After mass infantry
attacks, the Iraqis have found hundreds of Iranian
corpses clutching such keys or the Koran. A Basij
veteran stated that, unlike Iranian army soldiers,
Basil troops remain in positions being overrun be-
cause they welcome the opportunity to die as reli-
gious martyrs.
? In January 1986, Tehran ordered that 10 percent of
the civilians in government jobs be sent to serve with
the Basij. In the spring, factories making goods for
the government were required to send 20 percent of
their workers to Basij units.
in January 1987
Tehran began unofficially to conscript men into the
Basij for the first time. Six months later, Iran's
parliament passed a law formally allowing the gov-
ernment to draft men into the Basij and the Revolu-
tionary Guard. In late 1987, Tehran extended the
army term of service by four months, according to a
generally reliable source
Continued resistance to the draft has caused Iranian
officials to employ coercive measures to gain needed
manpower. In the spring of 1986 schools were ordered
to give Basij offices the names of 13-year-old students
to help recruiters locate boys and urge them to
volunteer.
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recruits. Press-gangs also have surrounded villages
and conducted house-to-house searches for draft
dodgers. People forced to attend government rallies
supporting the war have sometimes been detained
afterward and sent immediately to the front.
in May 1986 recruiters
began to wait outside some stadiums after soccer
games to catch men who lacked n at they had roo'li
served at the front
The clerical regime also has used more subtle mea-
sures to encourage enlistment. An Iranian defector
reported in 1986 that applicants to universities must
provide proof of military service before they can enter.
Moreover, Iranians cannot get government jobs unless
they have served in the war. If sons of farmers evade
the draft, Tehran cuts off fertilizer allotments to the
farms of the person's family or of his relatives,
We believe Tehran's attempts to halt the slow decline
both in military morale and in the quality and
quantity of its new troops have had little success.
Iran's increasing reliance on conscription and coercion
in 1986 and 1987 suggests a continued lack of
effectiveness in its efforts to gain enough volunteers.
despite intense religious and patriot-
ic appeals, Iran's mass mobilization effort in Novem-
ber 1987 failed to raise the expected number of
volunteers
Continued high casualties probably have helped un-
dermine Iran's religious and patriotic appeals. We
believe that, despite attempts to reduce casualties,
Iranian losses in 1987 exceeded those of 1986 and
perhaps even 1985. Casualties from the largely incon-
clusive Karbala 5 and Karbala 8 attacks near Al
Basrah were particularly heavy and accounted for
over half of Iranian losses in 1987. In a statement
probably inspired by the heavy Karbala casualties,
Iranian Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani expressed
growing concern about high losses. He stressed the
need to limit casualties and warned commanders that
they should be careful because enemy firepower could
inflict excessive losses on Iranian infantry.
Estimated Iranian Manpower
in Major Battles in the
Iran-Iraq War a
March
Dezful
130,000
May
Khorramshahr
130,000
July
Al Basrah
150,000
February
Rud-e Doveyrich
85,000
October
Panjwin
60,000
1984
a Numbers are approximate. Estimates are based on a variety of
sources and our assessment of the size of Iranian units.
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Material incentives-primarily monetary rewards or
the prospect of privileges-have attracted some men
to the Revolutionary Guard and Basij. In recent
years, however, Iran's increasingly weak economy 25X1
most likely has undercut the effectiveness of this 25X1
incentive. death benefits 25X1
paid to martyrs' families did not increase between
1984 and late 1987. During the same period, inflation 25X1
cut the purchasing power of Iranian money by 20 to
30 percent a year, severely reducing the value of
monetary incentives as a reason to volunteer for
service.
Iran's efforts to reduce interservice rivalry.appear to
have failed. Despite Tehran's calls for more coopera-
tion, relations between the army and Revolutionary
Guard have not improved,
regime's increasing use of Guard and Basij units in
i
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Victory Over Iraq and the Iranian
Threat to the Region
Although the defeat of Iraq would significantly in-
crease Iranian military morale, we believe other
factors would limit the willingness of many Iranian
troops to.fight in new, large-scale operations in the
region. After an Iranian victory over Iraq, Tehran
probably would need at least a year to reorganize and
refit its troops. Moreover, longstanding tensions be-
tween the army and both the Revolutionary Guard
and the Basij over the development and control of the
postwar armed forces probably would increase and
could cause armed conflict between the services. War
weariness would lead many servicemen to demand
demobilization. We believe that morale would decline
significantly if Tehran tried to retain large numbers
of draftees and continued conscription to fight new
wars.
To counter this deterioration, Iran probably would
use religious arguments to raise morale and gain
support for military activities abroad. Clerical lead-
ers, for example, might put additional emphasis on
the need to be ready to liberate Jerusalem from the
Israelis or to free the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina from the Saudi monarchy.
major offensives since 1984 probably has lessened the
damage interservice rivalry has caused to major Irani-
an operations. Reducing army participation in such
operations, however, has weakened Iran's offensive
capability. Moreover, the downgrading of the army's
role and Tehran's continued favoritism toward the
Revolutionary Guard probably are the principal rea-
sons army morale has remained poor.
We believe that increased Iranian domestic defense
production and larger imports of weapons in 1986 and
1987 have eased some of the materiel problems that
have demoralized troops at the front.
Tehran has obtained new air
de tense guns and missiles, artillery, and armored
vehicles from China, North Korea, and Eastern Eu-
rope. To reduce shortages, Tehran also has attempted
to increase domestic production of weapons and am-
munition. We have no evidence that Iran, despite the
increased availability of arms, is obtaining the sup-
plies that would significantly improve harsh living
conditions at the front
Troop rotations and liberal leave policies in Iran's
Ground Forces may raise morale temporarily, but it
probably resumes its decline soon after troops return
to the harsh conditions and military stalemate at the
front. The extension of army service in late 1987, for
example, caused some soldiers to demonstrate or
attempt suicide to protest the long terms servicemen
are forced to serve at the front,
We believe morale and manpower problems will not
prevent Iran from launching further offensives that
might be decisive in the war. Iran's 17 major and
minor attacks against Iraq in 1987 indicate that
Tehran still has sufficient troops to pose a serious
threat to Iraq. A major Iranian success-the capture
of Al Basrah-or a series of victories along the border
might cause Iraq to collapse.
Nonetheless, we believe that Iran's morale and man-
power problems will make it increasingly difficult for
Tehran to gain decisive victories. Iranian military
morale and manpower difficulties will worsen, al-
though the decline is likely to remain slow. Tehran's
motivational appeals, increased indoctrination, and
new weaponry may retard the decline, but they are
unlikely to reverse it. In the near term, we believe
Tehran will not lower casualties sufficiently and make
enough progress on the battlefield to reverse the
deterioration in morale. Large-scale offensives that
gain some territory-but fail to show real progress
toward defeating Iraq-will only temporarily boost
morale.
New factors could accelerate the decline in the morale
of the Iranian soldier. We believe that after Khomeini
dies factionalism may lead to increased conflict in the
regime that could weaken the war effort. Infighting
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Secret
among clerical leaders over religious questions or war
policy would undermine the government's moral au-
thority and, thus, the effectiveness of mullahs in
combat units. ,Moreover, a succession of small defeats
or a costly major setback would belie claims of
Iranian military successes and reduce the soldiers'
confidence in the clerics' leadership.
Over the long term, the decline in the number of
dedicated volunteers will significantly weaken Iran's
capability to fight Iraq. Future mobilization cam-
paigns probably will not meet the goals of the regime,
despite Tehran's repeated calls for enlistees. In re-
sponse, clerical leaders are likely to use the draft to
help fill Basij and perhaps Revolutionary Guard units.
Draft evasion will force Tehran to resort increasingly
to press-gangs and coercion to meet manpower needs.
We believe that coercion and conscription will further
erode the morale and combat effectiveness of the
armed forces. Iranians forced to serve will not fight as
well as the fanatical volunteers who have been pri-
marily responsible for Tehran's military successes.
Increasing material incentives may encourage more
men to enlist, but such soldiers are unlikely to fight as
aggressively as those who volunteer for religious or
patriotic reasons. Moreover, logistic problems, poor
living conditions, and casualties are likely to weaken
the morale of unwilling conscripts far more than that
of dedicated volunteers
Increased tension between the United States and Iran
in the Persian Gulf will help the clerical regime boost
morale and encourage enlistment, at least in the short
term. The clerical leaders, for example, used the
redeployment of US forces from the Gulf in mid-
February to claim that Iranian resolve was forcing the
United States to retreat. Conversely, Tehran would
probably react to an increased US military presence
by claiming that the danger of US attack had risen
and would use this argument to bolster Iranian re-
cruiting efforts. Over the long term, the failure of the
clerical regime to carry out its threats to compel the
United States to reduce its military presence in the
Gulf would weaken Iranian morale. US defeat of
Iranian forces in limited clashes in th also
would lower Iranian morale.
Direct US attacks against the Iranian mainland
would significantly increase the Iranian people's will
to fight the United States and Iraq. Such attacks
would validate the clerics' claim that Iran faces a 25X1
serious threat and bolster their calls for the Iranian
people to make more human and material sacrifices.
US attacks also might reduce interservice rivalry and
cause the army, the Revolutionary Guard, and the
Basij to cooperate more in defending against the
common threat. Renewed patriotism and fanaticism,
particularly if there were repeated US attacks on
Iran, probably would cause Iranians to volunteer on a
scale that would exceed the flood of volunteers who
enlisted after the Iraqi invasion in 1980.
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- Secret
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