EGYPT: ASPIRATIONS FOR MISSILE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000200210001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
'Directorate of Secret
Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
. An Intelligence Assessment
PRa7DC.`r NUMBER, /UJ 31g a
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JOB NUMBER ' S 4 -3B -
Secret
NESA 88-10024
April 1988
Copy 3 9 8
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Directorate of Secret
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Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
This paper was prepared byl Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Scientific and Weapons Research. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
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Secret
NESA 88-10024
April 1988
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Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
Key Judgments Cairo has made the development and production of ballistic missiles a high
litformation available
as of 13 April 1988
was used in this report.
priority in its defense planning.
The missile program encompasses at least two surface-to-surface ballistic
missile projects:
? The Egyptians are working on a Scud-like missile, most likely based on a
North Korean-engineered copy of a 300-kilometer-range Soviet Scud.
They have test-fired this missile and, with North Korean assistance,
could begin series production next year. The military may be attempting
to modify some of the Scud-like missiles to extend their maximum range.
begin series production of Vector missiles in the early 1990s.
? The Ministry of Defense is trying, as part of a joint program with
Argentina, to produce a new missile, which it will call the Vector. This
missile is similar or identical to Argentina's Condor II missile and
probably will have a range of some 750 to 1,000 kilometers. Egypt could
ment and production projects.
Egypt's current surface-to-surface missile capabilities are extremely limit-
ed. Cairo appears to be focusing on its missile program to boost its
military's prestige and to keep pace with other states in the region-
especially Libya and Israel-that are pursuing their own missile develop-
defense industries. It will try to export missiles.
The Ministry of Defense wants the technology to produce ballistic missiles,
rather than simply buy them, to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers and
because it believes the technological expertise acquired through the
ballistic missile program will contribute to Egypt's effort to expand its
The Iraqis probably are
providing most of the funding for Egypt's Condor II/Vector development
program and may be involved in the Scud project as well.
Secret
NESA 88-10024
April 1988
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The Egyptians are slowly building their development and production
capabilities, but the missile program will continue to depend on foreign
expertise and foreign funding. Restrictions in the transfer of Western
technology to Argentina and Egypt or, less likely, from North Korea to
Egypt or a reduction in Iraqi financing probably would set back but not
halt Cairo's missile program.
Additional Scud and Condor II/Vector missiles will substantially enhance
Cairo's deterrent and retaliatory capabilities. Cairo probably would use the
missiles during another war to try to achieve tactical goals. It also might
use the missiles to strike strategic targets but would do so, particularly in
the case of Israel, only in retaliation for attacks or to avoid defeat.
Egypt's acquisition of the Scuds and Condor II/Vectors and related missile
production technology will contribute to missile proliferation in the region
and spur other countries with less advanced missile capabilities-Libya, for
example-to keep up with Cairo b lerating their own missile procure-
ment and development program
Ithe
Egyptians, with the Condor II Vector, will have the second-longest-range
system of any Arab state in the Middle East.
The Israelis will continue to be concerned about Saudi and Egyptian
capabilities and the likely spread of missiles to other Arab countries,
especially Iraq. Tel Aviv could respond to Egyptian progress in missile
production by speeding its own ballistic missile research and development
efforts and urging the United States to increase pressure on Arab states to
halt the proliferation of missiles.
A direct US confrontation of Egypt with evidence of its involvement in
missile development probably would result in Egyptian denials, temporarily
strained relations with Cairo, and a brief slowing of the program to tighten
access to information on the program's progress.
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Contents ,
Key Judgments
Desire for Missile Production Technology
5
Production Capabilities
Development Program
Condor II/Vector Project
14
Iraqi Involvement in Egyptian Missile Projects
16
Dependence on Foreign Assistance
18
Implications for the Region and the United States
19
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LYV _1VL
Scope Note This assessment focuses on Egypt's surface-to-surface ballistic missile
development and production program and on related questions concerning
technology transfer and Egyptian goals.
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Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
Despite unsuccessful efforts in the 1960s, Cairo re-
newed its search for technology to develop short-range
ballistic missiles in the late 1970s and has again made
development and production of surface-to-surface
missiles a high priority in its defense planning. A new
program calls for Egyptian production of several types
of surface-to-surface missiles by the mid-1990s
countries. Israeli efforts to develop longer range sur-
face-to-surface missile systems also trouble Cairo.
The Israelis have flight-tested two new surface-to-
surface missiles, both with ranges of at least 600
kilometers. The Egyptians undoubtedly worry about
Israeli conflicts with other Arab states and, though
Cairo wants to abide by its peace treaty with Tel
We suspect Cairo's primary
aim is to obtain a powerful deterrent against other
states in the region-particularly Libya and Israel-
that are pursuing their own missile development and
production projects.
Egypt's current surface-to-surface missile capabilities
are extremely limited.
::::]it acquired about 70 Scud-Bs and 40 FROGs from
the Soviets before Cairo broke relations with Moscow
in the early 1970s. Some of these missiles were used in
the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and a small number
probably have been sold to Iraq over the past eight
years. The number of missiles remaining operational
probably is less than 50,
Cairo probably worries about missile proliferation in
the Middle East and sees its missile capabilities
shrinking when compared with those of other military
forces in the region. In addition to fielding missiles
with shorter ranges, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and
South Yemen already have Scuds.' The Egyptians are
especially concerned about Libya's missile develop-
ment program and anticipate Soviet deliveries of new,
more capable missiles to Libya, Syria, and other Arab
Aviv, the potential for Egyptian involvement.
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The Egyptians probably view the acquisition of addi- 25X1
tional Scuds, FROGs, and more capable missiles as a
feasible deterrent to aggression by Egypt's neighbors
and as necessary to counter the development of
missiles by other regional states. In our judgment, 25X1
countries in the Middle East would find it nearly
impossible to defend against missiles once they were
launched, and the Ministry of Defense probably be-
lieves the threat of possible Egyptian retaliation would
make other countries reluctant to strike Egypt. In
particular, the Egyptian military appears to be seek-
ing a way to discourage possible Israeli aggression and
to respond to Libyan operations without committing
large numbers of forces. Nonetheless, Egypt would
act cautiously in using such weapons to strike enemy
strategic targets, especially in the case of Israel. Even
though the missiles Cairo acquires are likely to be
inaccurate, the military will count on them to weaken
the military and civilian morale of their enemies as
well as to disrupt military activity behind enemy lines.
The Egyptians probably are convinced of the value of
surface-to-surface missiles as psychological weapons
the Iran-Iraq war.
its neighbors in securing new technology.
The military may also regard acquisition of new
surface-to-surface missiles as essential to maintain its
prestige in the region. We believe it sees itself as a
leading force there-especially after regaining its
honor in the 1973 war-and is reluctant to fall behind
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We believe the Egyptians want to obtain a variety of
surface-to-surface missiles to meet the military's re-
quirements. Short-range tactical missiles like FROGs
and Scuds most likely would be fielded with artillery
brigades, perhaps even in battalions, to supplement
longer range artillery. The Egyptians probably believe
such weapons would be especially useful in defending
against another Israeli attack through the Sinai. The
military will probably continue to want missiles with
longer ranges to expand its capabilities to strike deep
into enemy territory without endangering air assets
the military considers the Scud's
In general, the Egyptians appeared to be
looking for missiles that would have a range of at least
700 kilometers, could carry a 400-kilogram or larger
payload, and have an accuracy of about 700 meters
CEP.2 Such longer range missiles would give the
Egyptians the capability to hit targets throughout the
Middle East, possibly an important consideration for
Cairo if its enemies- in the region change during the
next decade.
The Ministry of Defense in the short term probably
intends to use conventional warheads on its surface-
to-surface missiles, but defense
planners expect them eventually to carry a variety of
Cairo is expanding its chemical
industries, and Egypt's use of chemicals in the mid-
1960s in the Yemen war
suggest that the Egyptians
would consider using chemical warheads in a future
conflict. Although the surface-to-surface missiles
Egypt is seeking could accommodate nuclear war-
heads, Egypt will lack the capability to produce such
warheads for the foreseeable future
' The circular error probable (CEP) is the radius of a circle centered
on the target into which half the missiles fired could be expected to
Egypt's Chemical Warfare Capability
Egypt's chemical warfare capability is one of the
oldest and best among the Arab states. The Egyptian
military began developing its chemical capability,
including training, materiel, and indoctrination, in
the late 1950s with Soviet assistance. It used chemi-
cal agents probably tear gas, mustard, and phos-
gene-against Yemeni tribesmen in 1963. After Sovi-
et assistance ended in the 1970s, Cairo continued to
enhance its chemical warfare capabilities.
attempting to acquire technology and precursor
chemicals for indigenous production of chemical
agents, probably to be carried out in their Abu Za'bal
the Egyptians have been
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Figure 1. Sakr-80 rocket. The
Egyptians exhibited this
FROG-like system at their de-
fense show in Cairo in Novem-
ber 1987. The Sakr-80 is an
unguided rocket with a range of
Desire for Missile Production Technology
Cairo wants the technology to produce ballistic mis-
siles rather than buy them,
As is the case with other weapons,
the Egyptians probably fear dependence on foreign
suppliers and are willing to pay high initial costs to
produce their own missiles. We suspect the scarcity of
reliable suppliers of surface-to-surface missiles and
Western efforts to restrict transfers of missiles and
related technology are reinforcing the Egyptians'
commitment to indigenous production. Moreover,
Cairo probably hopes technology acquired through
the missile program will help establish a technological
and industrial base that will benefit other parts of
the Arab Organization for Industrialization offered
the prospect of increased funding and cooperation
A series of joint ventures and contracts with Western
firms has enabled the Egyptians to make gradual
progress in building their missile production capabili-
ties since the late 1970s, but theiroutnut is limited to
smaller scale rockets and missiles.
is producing, RPG-7
antitank rockets, 122-mm light artillery rockets, tar-
get rockets, smoke-generating rockets, and Sakr-eye
surface-to-air missiles (reverse-engineered SA=7s).
The Egyptians also have developed a prototype of a
FROG-like weapon, called the Sakr-80. E
needed foreign exchange by selling missiles and possi-
bly guidance and other missile technolog
Egypt has been seeking to produce surface-to-surface
missiles since the 1950s. Financial difficulties, higher
priorities for other projects, and interruptions of re-
search by war have caused temporary setbacks. Sever-
al missile programs begun in the 1960s-the Victor,
Conqueror, and Pioneer-met with little success and
were canceled after the Arab-Israeli war. in 1967. .
Nonetheless, Cairo's interest in missile development
and production intensified in the late 1970s, when
peace with Israel enabled it to redirect resources and
'The Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOl) was formally
established in 1975 when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the,
United Arab Emirates provided about $2 billion to start an Arab
military industry based in Egypt. Cairo contributed manpower and
four arms factories that could produce aircraft, armor, munitions,
and engines. Egypt's peace treaty with Israel resulted in the
withdrawal of Arab funding from AOI, but Cairo has been
operating the AOI on its own, relying on,foreign credits and money
from arms exports. With the gradual warming of relations with the
Gulf states, Cairo has been trying to rekindle interest in renewed
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but the Ministry of Defense is working to extend its
range to at least 60 kilometers.
gained the capability to manufacture composite
propellants that could be used in rocket motors.
in August 1987, Cairo
While expanding its capabilities to produce small
missiles and rockets, we believe Egypt has been
gradually acquiring some of the technology, expertise,
and facilities it will need to manufacture surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles:
and the work force to increase production of bal-
listic missiles at their Sakr Factory (and the nearby
development, is well equipped with modern Western
machinery and is generally well managed.
Center" in the Cairo area with assistance and
technology from a West German firm, Messer-
schmitt-Boelkow-Blohm,
The center will be used to
improve guidance systems for surface-to-air mis-
siles, but we believe some facilities within the center
or nearby will support work on inertial navigation
systems and components used in ballistic missile
production.
? Egypt is continuing efforts to expand its solid-
rocket-propellant manufacturing capacity at its Abu
Za'bal chemical factory. With assistance from a
West German firm in 1979, the factory probably
expected to obtain a 300-gallon propellant mixer
from a West German firm that will enhance
Egypt's propellant production capabilities (the mix-
er will enable Egypt to produce at one time enough
propellant to load a 2,000-kilogram solid-rocket
motor or several smaller motors). The Egyptians
also are seeking West European assistance to ex-
pand their facilities for producing ammonium per-
chlorate, a key solid-propellant ingredient, and to
improve their ammonium perchlorate grinding
technology in order to reduce Egypt's dependence
on external suppliers of solid-propellant ingredients.
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? Between 1984 and 1985, Egypt acquired a static-
firing rocket test facility and calibration laboratory
from a French company and, with French assis-
tance, gained the capability to manufacture large
rocket motors.
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We believe responsibility for surface-to-surface mis-
sile development continues to rest with the military,
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the following facilities are in
some way related to surface-to-surface ballistic mis-
sile development and production in Egypt:
? Sakr Factory for Developed Industries (formerly
Factory 333). The Egyptians carry out most of their
missile development and production at this factory,
located in the Almaza section of northeast Cairo.
clean and well equipped with machines from West
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Switzerland and has a work force of
about 5,000 people. The Sakr Factory produces a
variety of rockets and missiles including RPG-7
antitank rockets, Hosam antitank handgrenades,
122-mm artillery rockets, trainer flying target
rockets, smoke generating rockets, 122-mm illumi-
nating rockets, Sakr-eye surface-to-air missiles (re-
verse-engineered SA-7s), and the Sakr-80 rocket
(FROG-like weapon). We believe development of
Egypt's Condor II/Vector also is under way at the
Sakr Factory, probably in one of the newer
buildings.
? Arab-British Dynamics Company. This facility is
also part of the Arab Organization for Industrial-
ization and is located in the Sakr Factory com-
pound adjacent to Sakr facilities. The Egyptians
have used the factory to produce British-designed,
1960s-generation Swingfire antitank guided mis-
siles.
? Abu Za'bal Company for Specialized Chemicals.
We believe the Egyptians are manufacturing solid
fuel for rocket motors at this facility and testing
? Jabal al Hamzah Range. The Egyptians probably
conduct most of their surface-to-surface ballistic
missile tests at this range. It is located northwest of
Cairo. The Sakr Factory also uses the range to test
other munitions.
? Egyptian Space Research Center. We believe part
of the center may house surface-to-surface ballistic
missile-related equipment.
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agreement in December 1987 for the transfer of
missile technology-probably for Scuds-to Egypt.
the North Koreans expect
royalty payments on Egyptian-produced Scuds.
to receive some of the Egyptian missiles as part of the
agreement, but the deal may only call for additional
Many of the details of Egypt's missile development
program are unclear, but,
we believe the Ministry
of Defense is developing at least two surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles for Egyptian forces and to
sell abroad. In the next one to five years we expect
Egypt to produce versions of Scud missiles and a
longer range missile system similar to Argentina's
Condor II missile currently under development. The
Egyptians cannot manufacture entire Scud or Condor
systems independently, however, and are involved in
coproduction projects with North Korea and Argenti-
Egypt was to conduct a range test of a missile
assembled in North Korea. The intermediate stage
involves moving to Egyptian assembly and testing of
Scud-"kits" provided by North Korea and developing
the tooling and infrastructure that would enable
Egypt to manufacture all components. During the last
part of the program, Egypt is to begin series produc-
tion of the missiles with little or no North Korean
na, respectively.
Scud Project
The Ministry of Defense, we believe, has been work-
ing with North Korea since the early 1980s on a
project to produce in Egypt missiles similar to Soviet
Scuds. Cairo
provided Scuds to North Korea in 1983 for reverse-
engineering, most likely in exchange for North
Korean promises to assist in production of Scuds in
Egypt. We believe the Egyptians are paying P'yong-
yang a considerable sum for its assistance.
We believe the Egyptians have reached the intermedi-
ate phase of the project-building missiles from kits
and testing them.
Egyptian military officers spent some 18 months in
North Korea during the period 1984-85 conducting
research and receiving training on the Scud system.
by September 1986, the Egyptians and
made more progress in 1987.
North Koreans were assembling missiles-probably
prototypes-in Egypt.6 The Egyptians apparently
license to manufacture North Korean Scuds in 1986,
and North Korean and Egyptian officials signed an
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probably manufactured with North Korean assistance
from kits, at their Jabal al Hamzah test range.
We do not know the specifications of the North
Korean=Egyptian Scud-like missile, but the North
Koreans probably have made few if any modifications
Argentina's Condor II project-an effort to develop a
two-stage, short-range ballistic missile system-as
early as 1983.' We do not know the specifics of the
Argentine-Egyptian cooperation agreement, but we
believe Cairo is helping to fund the program and is
assisting directly in coproducing the system. Egyptian
military technicians have been working with Argen-
tine engineers at Argentina's Cordoba facility since
to the Soviet system
the missiles tested in Egypt were similar in
.maximum range-about 300 kilometers
Nonetheless, we cannot rue out
Egyptian attempts to alter the missile, possibly using
technology acquired from the West or from Iraq, to
achieve greater range and accuracy and perhaps to
carry a different payload.
Egypt in 1986 was exploring possibilities that
might lead to production of a 600-kilometer-range
are are working closely wit European firms from
which they are receiving technology for the-missile
subsystems
similar or identical to Argentina's Condor II.E::
of special projects is sponsoring a separate develop-
ment and production program in Egypt for a missile
Cairo may buy a small number of missiles and key
components in the short term, but the Ministry of
Defense probably expects to gain full production
technology for the Condor II system by the early
1990s through cooperation with Argentina. The office
Condor II/Vector Project
The office of special projects is working with Argenti-
na and West European firms to develop a new
surface-to-surface missile.
the Egyptians began participating in
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Figure 9
Estimated Maximum Ranges of Egyptian Missiles
Z f Sardinia
Foreign technology and material assistance are criti-
cal to Egypt's missile program. Cairo, in our view,
lacks sufficient technical expertise-especially in pro-
pulsion systems, rocket-motor production, and guid-
ance and control-to produce surface-to-surface mis-
siles like the Scud and the Condor independently. In
particular, the Egyptians cannot manufacture in suffi-
cient quality and quantity many of the materials
needed for Condor production, including ammonium
perchlorate for solid propellants and probably the
special steel needed for motor cases. Cairo has ac-
quired or will soon obtain most of the equipment,
technology, and materials to produce Scuds, but,
Caspian'
Sea-, I
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Scud range (300 kilometers)
Condor II/Vector range (1,000 kilometers)
0 1000 Kilometers
1000 Miles
Bar acele accurate at ngttMcr only
given Egypt's poor performance in other military
production efforts, we suspect that assembly of such
missiles would quickly stop without North Korean
technical assistance. The North Koreans must help
the Egyptians overcome even minor difficulties and
assure quality control.
Cairo also depends on foreign financial assistance to
continue its missile program. Even though the Minis-
try of Defense pays for part of the program
it probably cannot cover all costs,
especially with other military programs competing for
funds. We suspect that most of the missile program is
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supported by Iraqi payments and perhaps transfers
from Saudi Arabia either directly or through Iraq.
Cairo is likely to continue making surface-to-surface
ballistic missile development a high priority. The
military's progress with the Scud and Condor II/Vec-
tor projects will sustain high-level support for missile
development, in our view. Moreover, the acquisition of
new or more missiles by other Middle Eastern
states-such as the Saudis' purchase of CSS-2 inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles from China-may
cause the Egyptians to try to accelerate or expand
their program, though they probably would need
additional foreign support.
The military appears more likely to succeed in the
near term with its Scud production efforts than with
its Condor II/Vector project. Series production of
Scud-like missiles in Egypt could begin late next year
if North Korea provides assistance and kits or most of
the parts for assembly. Egypt probably cannot pro-
duce the entire missile independently before the earl
believe Cairo could receive the necessary assistance
from Western firms involved in Egypt's other missile
projects or possibly from Iraq.
We believe Egypt could begin series production of
Vector missiles by the early to middle 1990s. Access
to Western technology and systems, such as the
thrust-vector control for guidance, has advanced Ar-
gentine and Egyptian progress over the past 18
months on the Condor II. Full-scale production of
that system in Argentina may begin by 1990, and we
would expect to see additional technology and compo-
nent transfers to Egypt shortly thereafter that would
enable Cairo to begin producing Vector missiles with-
in two years. Argentina's and Egypt's continued
uncertainty about the missile's second stage and
reliance on Western firms for parts and technology
may slow development and production efforts
Implications for the Region and the United States
Possession of more Scuds and of Condor II/Vector 25X1
surface-to-surface missiles, in our view, will substan-
tially enhance Egypt's capability to deter and retaliate
against enemy attacks:
? Additional secure supplies of Scud missiles-partic-
ularly if Egypt's inventory is larger than that of its
opponent-may increase Cairo's willingness to use
the weapons in response to military threats. Larger
numbers of the missiles would increase the Egyp-
tians' chances of hitting specific targets, since many
missiles often must be used to compensate for their
inaccuracy. The range of the Scud would allow
Cairo to hit targets in Israel as well as Israeli troop
concentrations in the Sinai. Most important targets
in Libya and Sudan, however, would remain out of 25X1
range.
? If Cairo obtains the Condor II/Vector, it will have a
longer range surface-to-surface missile than those
held by other Arab states
The Condor II/Vector would put many targets in
the Middle East and Africa within range, including
those in northern Chad, northern Sudan (including
Khartoum), southern Syria (including Damascus),
and western Libya (including about half of Libya's
ground forces and some Libyan oilfields).
25X1
25X1
Cairo almost certainly would use the missiles in the
event of another war to try to achieve tactical aims. It 25X1
also might use such weapons against enemy strategic
targets-civilian and economic facilities-but proba-
bly only in retaliation for similar attacks against
Egypt or to avoid defeat. In the case of another war
with Israel, Cairo probably would be especially reluc-
tant to escalate the conflict by initiating missile
strikes against strategic targets for fear of devastating
Israeli reprisals.
Egypt's acquisition of additional Scuds and Condor
II/Vectors will contribute to and probably accelerate
the proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles and
missile production efforts in the region
2525X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Iraq's acquisition-probably by altering a Scud-of
the Al-Husayn missile already have weakened con-
straints on the proliferation of missiles with ranges
greater than 300 kilometers. Libya and Syria, in
particular, would want to hasten their missile develop-
ment programs to keep pace with other states in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, Cairo eventually will sell
Scuds and Condor II/Vectors to Baghdad while Iraq
completes its own missile-production facilities. We
cannot rule out sales of the Egyptian missiles to other
countries, including the Arab Gulf states and Paki-
stan, possibly giving Islamabad a delivery vehicle for
nuclear weapons.
wi continue to be concerne
about Egyptian capabilities and the likely spread of
missile systems and production technology to other
Arab countries, especially Iraq.
to Egyptian advances in missile production by speed-
ing its own ballistic missile research and development
efforts as well as urging the United States to increase
its efforts to help halt the proliferation of such Arab
missiles.
US efforts to curtail transfers of missile-related tech-
nology and raw materials to Egypt probably would
slow but not halt Cairo's missile program. Unless
more countries support the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime and those countries in the Regime en-
force its restrictions more rigorously, Cairo will con-
tinue to find firms or countries-such as North Korea
and possibly China-that will be willing to provide
support! A direct US confrontation of Egypt with
evidence of its involvement in missile development
probably would result in Egyptian denials, temporar-
ily strained relations with Cairo, and a brief slowing
of the program to increase security and tighten access
to information on the program's progress
25X1
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L~.)A I
2.5X1
25X1
Tel Aviv could respond
'The Missile Technology Control Regime was announced by the
United States and Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the United Kingdom in April 1987. It attempts to halt the
transfer of ballistic missile technology to potential nuclear prolifer-
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Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05 : CIA-RDP89SO145OR000200210001-2