SUDAN: THE COST OF NONALIGNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000200180001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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i ~EEEIGEM Directorate of .~ ._.~-. Secret
Intelligence
Sudan: '.The Costs.
of Nonalignment
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Secret
NESA 88-10020
April 1988
Copy 3 i 9
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Intelligence 25X1
4 V
Sudan: The Costs
of Nonalignment
This paper was prepared b Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 88-10020
April 1988
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Sudan: The Costs
of Nonalignment 25X1
another issue to challenge his governance.
Key Judgments Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's shift from former President
Information available Nimeiri's pro-Western foreign policy to a nonaligned stance has had
as of 15 February 1988 significant costs:
was used in this report.
? Externally, Sudan's traditional backers have reduced their military and
economic aid.
? Internally, the overall decline in foreign aid has given Sadiq's critics
Nonetheless, Sadiq almost certainly will persist in trying to pursue his
independent foreign policy. He views a nonaligned, "good neighbor" policy
as the best way to promote Sudan's security and his own survival. He feels
a personal debt to Libyan leader Qadhafi and hopes to avoid turning him
into an enemy, loathes the Egyptians, and wants to keep some distance
from the United States. As aid from Sudan's traditional allies has
diminished, Sadiq has sought assistance from Libya and Iran.
Sadiq's nonaligned course will have adverse consequences for Sudan.
Internal political divisions are likely to deepen. Foreign aid from moderate
oil-producing Arabs will become more problematic. Libyan ambitions will
threaten security in Khartoum and Sudan's sovereignty over the western
Darfur Region. Iranian aid could transform political rivalries into armed
disputes between party militias and is likely to stiffen the resolve of John
Garang's anti-Islamic southern insurgent Sudan Peoples' Liberation Move-
ment/Army to continue fighting.
The destabilizing consequences of Sadiq's nonaligned policy will adversely
affect US regional interests. A heightened Libyan and Iranian presence in
Khartoum most likely will raise the security threat to US and allied
diplomats there. That presence also stands a good chance of eliciting more
African support for Garang's rebels and polarizing the Horn of Africa.
If Sadiq is overthrown in the next year, there is a slightly better-than-even
chance that a successor military regime would steer a more pro-Western
course, at least initially. Sudan would press for more US aid, but, if
disappointed in Western and moderate Arab support, Khartoum might
intensify its overtures to regional radical governments for assistance.
Through this whole process, US requests for cooperation in addressing the
problems of drought and famine-stricken populations will get little atten-
tion from regional governments concerned primarily with surviving the
various insurgencies and trying to impose their will on their neighbors.
Secret
NESA 88-10020
April 1988
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Key Judgments
Recasting the Nimeiri Legacy: Sadiq's Rationale 1
Groping for a New Direction 4
Seeking "Dealignment" 4
Defying Egypt 4
Accommodating the Libyans 5
Courting the Iranians 5
Underrating the Africans 6
Consequences of Sadiq's Policies 7
No Payoff From the Superpowers 7
Egypt Alienated 7
Heightened Internal Divisions 8
Diminished Foreign Assistance 9
Mounting Internal Security Threats 9
Long-Term Threats to Stability 9
Prospects for Change 10
Alternative Scenario: What if Sadiq Is Overthrown? 11
Implications for the United States 11
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Egypt
Port Sudan
Central
African
Republic
Bti`ll' a) Ghazal
Zaire .
Region boundary
0 150 Kilometers
150 Miles
Lake
Ilbert
Uganda
Lake
Rudolf
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of Nonalignment
all camps.
Since the overthrow of Sudan's President Nimeiri in
April 1985, his successors-the Transitional Military
Council in 1985-86 and Prime Minister Sadiq al-
Mahdi since the 1986 election-have methodically
changed longstanding Sudanese foreign policy
positions:
? Instead of joining the United States and Egypt as a
partner on regional security issues, Sadiq has sought
security in "good neighbor" relations with all of the
countries in the region.
? Instead of opposing regional radicals, Libya and
Iran, Sadiq has accommodated them.
? Instead of depending on the United States and
regional friends for aid, Sadiq has sought help from
Recasting the Nimeiri Legacy: Sadiq's Rationale
We believe Sadiq sees the departure from Nimeiri's
main policy direction during his last eight years in
power-aligning Sudan almost exclusively with the
United States, Egypt, and other moderate Arabs-as
a way to exploit popular antipathy toward Nimeiri.
Sadiq claims publicly that Nimeiri, who ruled Sudan
from May 1969 until April 1985, was overthrown not
just because he became increasingly dictatorial, but
because the Sudanese linked their mounting troubles
to his foreign policies:
? Sudan's security deteriorated under Nimeiri.
Libya's bombing raid on Omdurman, a section of
the capital, in 1984 and the reemergence and
successes of southern Sudanese insurgents-now
called the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A)-led by John Garang showed
Nimeiri's weakness, despite military aid from the
United States and Egypt.
? Sudan's economy deteriorated over the last decade
of Nimeiri's rule. Nimeiri's imposition of austerity
measures required by the International Monetary
Fund brought regime-toppling demonstrators into
the streets.
Sadiq appears to have concluded that, to the extent
that Sudanese associate their problems with Nimeiri's
failures, he could buy time for himself by disassociat-
ing the new government from the policies of the past.
Sadiq's defense of his shift from Nimeiri's policies
indicates he believes that a nonaligned approach best
suits Sudan's strategic realities. In public, he has
argued consistently that Sudan is too weak militari-
ly-and its borders too long and porous-to afford
enemies in neighboring states. Good relations with
Libya and Egypt, for example, are preferable to good
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Sadiq al-Mahdi: Personalized Foreign Policy
In our view, Sadiq al-Mahdi is a self-confident man
who believes that he has a right to lead his clan, his
sect, and his country. His Mahdi family lineage,
indulgent early upbringing, and privileged education
(degree with honors in economics from Oxford) have
given him the sense that he is someone special. His
meteoric rise in politics-he was elected to the
Assembly as soon as he reached the minimum re-
quired age of 30 and became Prime Minister for the
first time the next year-has. reinforced that belief.
Communists to the Muslim Brotherhood.
of almost every ideological orientation from the
Intelligent, sophisticated, charming, and dynamic,
according to US officials, Sadiq is adept at tailoring
his tactics to suit his audience. He plays several
important roles-leader of the Ansar sect, politician,
head of the Umma Party, and modern intellectual-
and focuses on first one and then another to appeal to
different constituencies and win legitimacy as a lead-
er. He has at various times allied himself with groups
Sadiq has a theoretical turn of mind and can ex-
pound at length on a wide range of historical and
religious topics (he has written many books). Never-
theless, as a leader, he
particulates no coherent policy programs or strat-
egies for furthering Sudan's interests. He demon-
strates little persistence in pursuing the discrete
policy goals he sets forth.
We believe Sadiq's frequently stated resentment of
outside influence over Sudan reflects
position as a Third World leader,
. His com-
plaints that Egyptian governments have historically
tried to make Sudan subservient carry on the Mah=
dist tradition of his great grandfather, who fought
against Egyptian (and British) domination. We be-
lieve that Sadiq's cultivation of relations with
Mu ammar Qadhoii, for instance, reflects not only
his policy of "good neighborliness" and personal
gratitude for the political refuge provided by Qadhafi
during the Nimeiri years,.but also his sympathy for
Qadhafi s defiance of a superpower. Although Sadiq
does not behave like Qadhafi (or Khomeini), the
Islamic radicals' confrontational policies appeal, we
believe, to Sadiq
relations with Egypt alone. A hostile Libya could .
subvert Sudan and renew aid to the southern Suda-
nese insurgents-Libya supplied money and arms to
Garang's SPLM/A in 1984-85 in an effort to topple
Nimeiri-at a time when Ethiopia appears deter-
mined to weaken Khartoum by increasing its aid to
the Sudanese rebels. In any event, Sadiq's statements
suggest'he believes Egypt has done little to help
Sudan overcome its security and financial problems.
Sadiq also argues that nonalignment and a "good
neighbor" approach reduce the prospects for destabi-
lizing internal conflict, as well as diversifying sources
of needed foreign aid. Unlike Egypt, where the popu-
lation is ethnically and linguistically homogeneous
and supportive of a strong central authority, Sudan's
population is diverse. The Sudanese are torn between
allegiance to Khartoum and the desire for autonomy
among many regional tribes, whose traditional lands
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Sadiq al-Mahdi's Traditional Source of Support:
The Ansar
economy, halting development, and threatening to
split the country. We believe that abrogation of
Islamic law-the most potent symbol for the southern
rebels of northern domination-would boost the
chances for a negotiated settlement. But it almost
certainly would spark violent opposition from the
influential National Islamic Front, upset traditional
Arab aid donors, and perhaps dangerously weaken
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The Ansar are those Sudanese Muslims whose politi-
cal loyalty is historically rooted in allegiance to
Muhammad Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah, the
charismatic figure who in the 1880s proclaimed
himself the Mahdi-the savior come to redeem Is-
lam-and led a successful revolt. against Egyptian
hegemony. The revolt resulted in an independent
Islamic state that lasted 13 years before being over-
thrown by British and Egyptian military intervention.
Mahdi's great-grandson.
Ansar loyalty to the Mahdi-Sudan's rough equiva-
lent of the United States' George Washington-has
carried over to his male descendants. Sadiq is the
westward toward Sudan's border with Chad.
The Ansar are Sudan's largest Muslim sect, whose
members are primarily concentrated in western Su-
dan, but with considerable representation in central
Sudan and Khartoum. Their numerical strength gave
an edge in the 1986 election to the sect's organized
political party-the Umma Party, headed by Sadiq.
According to an academic paper presented at a US
Government-sponsored seminar on Sudan in October
1986, Ansar support for the Umma Party has shifted
which regard Darfur as a key stronghold.
straddle Sudan's borders. Thus, for Sadiq to side
unequivocally with Chad against Libya, for example,
would invite clashes between pro-Chadian and pro-
Libyan tribes in Sudan's Darfur Region, fuel the
separatist demands of some groups there, and weaken
the political base of his Ansar sect and Umma Party,
Hard Choices
Civil War. Sadiq must solicit both dwindling aid from
traditional allies and more significant deliveries from
less reliable partners to meet the needs of the Suda-
nese military in the civil war. The southern Sudanese
rebellion against northern Muslim domination, which
has intensified during Sadiq's tenure, is draining the
Sadiq's Muslim credentials.
Economic Crisis. A near prostrate economy forces
Sadiq to search constantly for enough foreign oil and
financial aid to meet growing domestic demand for
goods and services. His dilemma is how to attract 25X1
enough aid to keep the northern economy afloat
without incurring exorbitant domestic costs. Sadiq
has tried to extract aid from both "radicals" like
Libya and "moderates" such as the Saudis, only to
offend the one as he pays the price for aid from the 25X1
other. Saudi aid, for example, has dwindled as Sadiq
has made statements designed to reassure the "radi-
cals." Although the economy continues to stagnate
under statist economic policies, Sudan's rulers hesi-
tate to adopt austerity measures prescribed by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
that might incite regime-threatening riots.
Internal Opposition. Sadiq's search for new and more
supportive allies abroad, despite the attendant risks,
reflects political weakness at home. He lacks not only 25X1
staunch backing from the armed forces, but also the
willingness of key civilian parties to join a nonpartisan
approach to resolving Sudan's problems. US academic
specialists on Sudan point out that intense partisan
rivalry is the norm among Sudan's 30-odd recognized
civilian parties.' The civilians' difficulty in reaching
consensus reflects the lack of a commonly recognized
external threat and the persistent tendency of north-
ern Muslim politicians to undermine one another as
they struggle to share power among themselves and
with their southern, non-Muslim countrymen.
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Groping for a New Direction
In backing away from Sudan's external alignments
under Nimeiri, in seeking new friends in the radical
camp, and in underrating the importance of better
relations with his African neighbors, we believe Sadiq
has launched the country on a new and potentially
dangerous course. His foreign policy has emerged as
an amalgam of conflicting elements as he has re-
sponded erratically to regional and internal events.
Nevertheless, the main themes of Sadiq's foreign
. policy have taken shape.
Seeking "Dealignment. " In his clearest departure
from the policies of the Nimeiri era, Sadiq has sought
to considerably loosen Sudan's ties to the United
States and Egypt. He has:
? Consistently played down Sudan's military coopera-
tion with Washington. In early 1987, without con-
sulting the Sudanese General Staff, Sadiq ordered
the withdrawal from Port Sudan-at an unspecified
future date-of US equipment that had been pre-
positioned for use by the United States in the event
of US military involvement in the Persian Gulf. He
has refused to allow joint military maneuvers with
US troops-a reversal of Sudan's cooperation in the
Bright Star exercises under Nimeiri.
? In late 1987, following the visit of the US
CENTCOM commander, Sadiq portrayed the talks
publicly as nothing more than part of a policy of
dialogue with both superpowers.
? Played up normal relations with Moscow. In late
1986 Sadiq visited the Soviet Union, appearing to
make a point of doing so before he visited the
United States. Since then, he has not publicly
From Sadiq's perspective, Washington has not shown
the will to help counter what he considers Sudan's
greatest security threat-Ethiopia's growing military
support for Garang's southern Sudanese rebels. In
contrast, Sadiq almost certainly believes Moscow-
Addis Ababa's military and economic patron-has
the leverage. Sadiq's one big effort in 1986 to coax
Soviet leaders into coercing Ethiopia to ease pressure
on Sudan failed, but he may still hope that, if he
continues to avoid the close relationship with Wash-
ington that Nimeiri nurtured, he can eventually enlist
Soviet help with the Ethiopian-Sudanese insurgent
problem.
Defying Egypt. A legacy of personal distrust bedevils
Sadiq's relations with Cairo. He has no great love for
the Egyptians, nor they for him. We believe he
remains angry that Egyptian forces helped Nimeiri
crush a rebellion in 1970 by the Ansar sect. Sadiq
chafes at what he considers the continuing conde-
scending Egyptian attitude toward the Sudanese.
differed with the Soviets on any issue.
Sadiq doubts the US commitment to his political
survival, in our view. Since visiting Washington in
October 1986, he has asked for military and economic
aid on a scale approaching that given to Nimeiri-
about $187 million in 1985. Nevertheless, despite his
insistence that he represents one of the few democrati-
cally elected governments in Africa and the Middle
East, Sadiq has seen US economic assistance to
Sudan dwindle. Military assistance also has plummet-
Since his election in 1986, Sadiq seems to have gone
out of his way to trumpet his government's indepen-
dence from Egypt. He visited farflung capitals-
including Moscow and Washington-before visiting
Cairo. He later declared void the Egyptian-Sudanese
ed.
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mutual defense treaty-agreed upon by President
Nimeiri as a symbol of strong bilateral ties. He has
insisted upon a vague Brotherhood Treaty, which, he
says, expresses more accurately the relationship be-
tween Sudanese and Egyptians. He has increasingly
dealt with Libyan leader Qadhafi without consulting
Cairo. Sadiq's contacts with the Egyptians suggest he
does not want an open break, but his behavior indi-
cates his determination to shift the relationship to-
ward one of correct .but not especially close ties.
Accommodating the Libyans. Sudan's interim Transi-
tional Military Council in 1985 reversed President
Nimeiri's policy of hostility toward Qadhafi and
initiated more cordial relations. Since his election in
1986, Sadiq has gone further. He has:
? Refused to condemn Tripoli's international adven-
turism and, terrorism.
? Actively sought Libyan economic and military
assistance.
? Accepted a large Libyan People's Bureau in Khar-
toum
? Acquiesced to a limited Libyan presence in western
Sudan's Darfur Region, even though that presence
causes him security problems.
We believe that several factors account for Sadiq's
accommodation to Qadhafi's activism. On a personal
level, Sadiq probably feels indebted to the Libyan
leader. Qadhafi gave Sadiq asylum during the latter's
several exiles between 1970 and 1978 and offered
military assistance when Sadiq tried to overthrow
Nimeiri in 1976.E
In contrast to Egypt's
President Mubarak, Qadhafi apparently is a. leader
with whom Sadiq feels comfortable doing business.
assistance. Libyan largess
? On the other hand, Sadiq almost certainly believes
Qadhafi can be dangerous. The Libyan bombing of
a radio station in Omdurman in 1984 and Qadhafi's
decision to offer money and military supplies to
John Garang's rebels are reminders to Sadiq of 25X1
Qadhafi's treachery. He almost certainly reasons
that an angered Qadhafi could do the same to him.
We believe Sadiq knows that Libyan officials in
Khartoum have sought and encouraged disgruntled
Sudanese military officers to plot against him, and
he probably believes the Libyans will redouble their
efforts if he arouses Qadhafi's ire.
Sadiq certainly knows from experiences in mid-to-late
1987 that the Libyans can. give Khartoum security
and political headaches with impunity in western
Sudan. Because Sudan lacks a credible counter-
force-a strong Army, Air Force, or intelligence
network-and because Sadiq resists "begging" Egyp-
tian help, he apparently believes he must rely on
personal diplomacy to hold Libyan hostility at bay.
Courting the Iranians. Since taking office, Sadiq has:
? Avoided condemning Iran's role in the Persian Gulf
hostilities while offering to mediate between Iran
and Iraq.
? Welcomed an Iranian Embassy staff in Khartoum,
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We believe that Sadiq is well aware of Qadhafi's
ability to help or hurt him:
? On one hand, press and Embassy reports suggest
that Sadiq sees Qadhafi as a source of important oil
and military aid, made all the more important to
Sudan because of the decline of traditional donor
? Taken at best an ambiguous position on issues such
as Iranian involvement in the disturbances at Mecca
during the Hajj in August 1987, at high cost to
Sudan's relations with the Saudis.
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In our view, Sadiq's immediate objective is to get
economic aid from Iran. Since his visit to Tehran in
December 1986, he has sought from Iran mainly a
reliable supply of oil and easy terms of trade. By
befriending the Iranians at a time when most other
Arabs are hostile to Tehran, Sadiq probably hopes to
gain their aid more easily.
We believe that friendship toward. both Iran and Iraq
advances Sadiq's broader objectives. On the basis of
numerous public statements, we believe Sadiq hopes
to.emulate Sudanese leaders of the 1950s and 1960s.
Their reputations as mediators in regional disputes
made potential foreign donors willing to "buy" their
services and deflected domestic criticism from the
leader who gained regional recognition as a "states-
man." Although Baghdad and Tehran have declined
his mediation offers, the Oxford-trained, staunchly
Sunni Muslim Sadiq. probably still considers himself
best suited to bridge the gap between modernist Iraq
Underrating the Africans. Sadiq's dealings with Su-
dan's eastern and central African neighbors are con-
sistent with those of Sudan's two previous regimes
but, we believe, more. dangerous for Sudan's stability.
Like his predecessors-Nimeiri and the interim mili-
tary government-Sadiq wants to halt or retard sup-
port for Garang's SPLM/A from Ethiopia, Kenya,
Uganda, Zaire, and Chad. As the insurgency drags
into its fifth year with no end in sight,.Sadiq's
coalition government suffers a continuing paralysis in
dealing with issues that might prevent a rise in black
African support for the SPLM/A.
Throughout his tenure in office, Sadiq has taken a
largely belligerent tone toward Ethiopia, citing Ethio-
pian support for Garang's rebels. In our view, he has
allowed openings for constructive dialogue between
the two states to slip away. Most recently, an Egyp-
tian initiative to start talks between Sadiq and Ethio-
pian President Mengistu foundered early this year
with each side challenging the good faith of .the other.
Proposals fora cessation of each side's support to
insurgencies across their border have not been real-
ized.
Sadiq's Uneasy Coalition Government
The coalition government formed in May 1986 under
Umma Party and Ansar sect leader Prime Minister
Sadiq al-Mahdi-the third Sudanese effort since
independence in 1956 to build a parliamentary de-
mocracy-is inherently weak. Deep-rooted party and
personal rivalries among Sudan's civilian elites make
it a daunting task for political leaders to agree on
domestic and foreign policies and implement them.
The election in April 1986 put.the.Umma Party on
top and the Democratic Unionist Party in second
place. The Democratic Unionist Party is led by the
heads of the Mirghani family, whose main support
lies in the Khatmiyyah sect, traditionally the pro-
Egyptian adversaries of the Mahdi family.
In third place came the extreme religious right
National Islamic Front, headed by Hasan al-Turabi,
Sadiq's political nemesis and brother-in-law. Turabi,
according to his statements since the 1986 election,
seeks to weaken and eventually do away with the
political control in the Muslim north of the Mahdi
and Mirghani families.
Because neither Sadiq's Umma Party nor the Mirgh-
anis' Democratic Unionist Party had the electoral
clout to rule alone, they decided to govern together.
Their cooperation, however, is plagued by squabbles
over key ministry posts, the proper direction of ..
Sudan's foreign policy, and the control of the state's
intelligence services. As a result, the coalition has
taken little time or effort to forge a united front to
tackle festering domestic and foreign issues.
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To curtail Kenya's extension of nonlethal aid and
diplomatic backing to the SPLM/A, we believe that
Sadiq must change the prevailing perception in Nairo-
bi that the Sudanese civil war is a conflict between an
oppressed black Christian minority and an oppressive
Muslim majority. Sadiq has largely failed to do this.
He is reluctant to abrogate Islamic law in the south,
and, in our view, he has not made the diplomatic
effort to explain his position to Kenyan President Moi.
In dealing with Zaire and its limited aid for the
SPLM/A, Sadiq has proved unable or unwilling to
allay concerns in Kinshasa about Sudan's relations
with Libya. President Mobutu's main concern is that
a weak and divided Sudan serves as a conduit for
Libyan aid to Zairean rebels. Because Sadiq cannot
point to a reduction in positive Libyan-Sudanese
interactions-indeed, there has been an increase-
Mobutu has an incentive to give the SPLM/A at least
token military aid to keep his options open in Sudan.
Sadiq's dilemma with Chadian President Habre is to
allay suspicion that Khartoum tolerates a Libyan
military presence in western Sudan-a militarily and,
for Sadiq, politically unfeasible undertaking. Sadiq
may be resigned to the idea that Sudan cannot control
Libyan or Chadian forces traversing western Sudan
and may simply hope that a major Libyan-Chadian
clash does not occur on Sudanese soil. In any event,
we believe Sadiq has shown undue nonchalance about
the prospect that Chad will give limited military
assistance to the SPLM/A, allowing it to open anoth-
er front against Sudanese Government forces in west-
ern Sudan
Chadian assistance to the Sudanese insurgents would
be unlikely to result in effective cross-border attacks
from Chad for some time, if at all, but Habre
apparently is determined to raise the costs of Sadiq's
"good neighbor" policy toward Tripoli.
Consequences of Sadiq's Policies
Sadiq's efforts to pursue a nonaligned course are
likely to result in major political costs. Two years of
nonalignment have failed to attract enough foreign
aid to overcome the southern rebellion or Sudan's
economic stagnation. Grumbling among military and
civilian elements is rising over their perception that
Sudan's nonalignment is impeding aid from Nimeiri's
old friends-Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United
States-without attracting compensatory aid from
the USSR, Eastern Europe, Libya, and Iran. More-
over, in our judgment, Sadiq's persistent accommoda-
tion of Libyan and Iranian activism will bring the
Prime Minister far more headaches than benefits.
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No Payoff From the Superpowers. Sadiq's attempts to
enlist Soviet support by putting distance between
himself and the United States probably will continue
to end in disappointment. Eliciting Soviet pressure on
Ethiopia-and indirectly on the SPLM/A-to reduce
hostilities against Khartoum will remain -Sadiq's main
objective in dealing with the Soviets, but Moscow is
unlikely to oblige. From Moscow's perspective, such
coercion risks alienating Ethiopian President Men-
gistu, whose friendship buttresses the Soviets' strate-
gic position in the Horn of Africa and the Persian
Gulf. Moreover, from Moscow's perspective, it proba- 25X1
bly makes little sense to support a Sudanese leader
who shows no commitment to the Soviet Union and
whose domestic troubles make his tenure uncertain.
Egypt Alienated. Sadiq's sour relations with Egyptian
leaders are more likely to hurt him than help him.
Given a perceptible rise in Ethiopian hostility, in
Sudanese rebel boldness, and in the potential for
Libyan-Chadian-Sudanese conflict in Sudan's T-rfur
Region, key internal groups seem to agree thL it is a
bad time to be at odds with Egypt. Those groups-the
armed forces; Sadiq's coalition partner, the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party; and the opposition National 25X1
Islamic Front-will denounce Sadiq for extremely
poor judgment in alienating Egypt if the external
security threat to Sudan increases. 25X1
We believe Egyptian disenchantment with Sadiq is
mounting. From Cairo's perspective, Sadiq is a weak
and indecisive third-rate politician, according to Em-
bassy reports. To his discredit with the paternalistic
Egyptians, Sadiq has dared to challenge Egypt's
traditionally close relationship with Sudan and has
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blatantly flirted with Egypt's Libyan and Iranian
enemies. According to US Embassy officials in Cairo,
most Egyptian leaders do not care if Sadiq falls,
assume his political demise will occur in the not too
distant future, and are working to strengthen contacts
with key groups who may influence Sudan's foreign
policy course following his tenure.
Heightened Internal Divisions. Several groups whose
support Sadiq needs to survive view his Libyan-
Iranian policy as a potential disaster and will blame
Sadiq for any foreign policy failures.
Even if Libya and Iran expand assistance to Sadiq, an
increased Libyan and Iranian presence in Sudan most
likely will give Sadiq's civilian rivals an issue to
exploit. National Islamic Front leader Hasan al-
Turabi, Sadiq's archrival, probably agrees with the
long-term soundness of a nonconfrontational approach
toward Libya. He also probably sees utility in keeping
a channel open to Tehran, an Islamic fellow travel-
er-albeit a radical one. Nonetheless, he probably will
denounce Sadiq for Libyan and Iranian infringement
on Sudan's sovereignty because, in our view, he wants
to undermine Sadiq and win the support of the
military.
We expect that the Mirghani family, traditional rivals
of the Mahdi family and beleaguered leaders of the
faction-ridden Democratic Unionist Party, will con-
tinue to vigorously oppose Sadiq's acceptance of Liby-
an and Iranian inroads in.Sudan. Challenged by a
pro-Libyan element for party leadership, the staunch-
ly pro-Egyptian Mirghanis probably stake their hopes
for overcoming the intraparty rivalry and remaining a
key player in Sudan on the support of Cairo. For that
support, Egypt wants-and almost certainly will
get-the Mirghanis to resist greater influence in
Sudan of Egypt's regional adversaries.
government and programs for future prosperity.
A continuing clash between Sadiq's accommodation
toward Egypt's regional enemies and the Mirghanis'
opposition to that course almost certainly will deepen
.the public perception of the government as incurably
fractious. The argument of National Islamic Front
leaders-that Sudan's rule by the dynastic Mahdi and
Mirghani families should end-probably will gain
credence among students, businessmen, and trade
union members who want clear direction from their
Sadiq might face a widening schism within his own
Umma Party and Ansar sect if the Libyans continue
to entrench themselves in the Darfur Region. In early
1987 Libya's distribution of arms to tribes hostile to
Ansar-Umma members raised the latter's cry that
they were unprotected. Local Umma representatives
of the Darfur constituency, fearful of losing support,
threatened that, if Sadiq did not halt the Libyan
intrusion, they would fight him within the party. At
that time Sadiq temporarily got the Libyans to with-
draw, but the prospects are strong that he will face
the same problem again.
An energetic pursuit by Sadiq of close relations with
Iran, in our judgment, would multiply his internal
political problems. Symbolically, the Arab world
agreed in November 1987 .to condemn Iran. To the
degree that Sadiq ignores this development, we be-
lieve that northern Sudanese sentiment will coalesce
against him. We speculate that most northern Suda-
nese, who are Muslim and identify with the Arab
world, want to join the Arab political mainstream-
including the consensus against Iran. The Sudanese
want not just material aid from the Arabs, but
external political and religious support when dealing
with a civil war that drains them economically and
threatens to tear their country apart.
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Diminished Foreign Assistance. In our view, Sadiq's
continuing attempts to get aid from all camps will
spur an already perceptible decline in assistance from
oil-rich moderate Arabs. Saudi aid-traditionally a
major component of Sudan's foreign assistance-
dropped from nearly $300 million in 1986 to some
$100 million in 1987, according to estimates drawn
from US Embassy reports. Although the Saudis have
lowered their foreign aid region-wide because of their
reduced oil revenues in the mid-1980s, Saudi aid to
Sudan has dropped conspicuously, according to US
Embassy officials in Riyadh. The Saudis disapprove
of Sadiq's courtship of Iran and Libya when the
Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf
pro-Western. Sadiq, in our view, lacks the security
resources to keep the Libyans and Iranians in check.
Any Sudanese effort to substan-
tially curtail Libyan activities in Darfur that are
aimed at undermining the Government of Chad may
prompt Qadhafi to step up subversive measures
against Sadiq.
Long-Term Threats to Stability. In our view, Libya's
states has increased markedly.
The attitude of the Saudis and other Arab leaders in
the Gulf toward Sadiq's nonalignment policy has
soured-and probably will continue to be negative-
as long as the Iranian threat persists. In the first half
of 1987 the Saudis expressed alarm to US officials at
the prospect of an emerging ring of pro-Soviet govern-
ments stretching from Libya, through Sudan, to
Ethiopia. To thwart that development, the Saudis
argued the need to buttress Sadiq in his fight against
Ethiopia's avowed Communist President Mengistu
and his client, SPLM/A leader John Garang, whom
the Saudis suspected of being a "latent" Communist.
The Libyans, we believe,
continue to seek sympathizers in the Sudanese mili-
tary. Even though the Libyan-backed Sudan Revolu-
tionary Committees have proved a disappointing in-
strument for agitation in Khartoum, Tripoli has not
abandoned them..
Iranians in Khartoum are
courting favorable media treatment and are trying to
establish a cultural center, despite Khartoum's ban on
such activity.
In the second half of 1987, the immediate strategic
threat from Iran evidently replaced the long-term
Communist threat in Saudi thinking, and Riyadh is
now trying to press Sadiq to reassess his ties to Iran
by threatening to withhold future aid. The chances
that Saudi aid will be restored to past levels are
further reduced because Riyadh insists that Khar-
toum mend fences with Cairo.
Mounting Internal Security Threats. In our judg-
ment, Sadiq's nonaligned policies are heightening the
immediate threats to Sudan's internal security. We
believe Libya and Iran are determined to enlist
supporters in Khartoum so that they can foster sym-
pathy for their respective causes and, on order, attack
US and moderate Arab diplomats, as well as subvert a
Khartoum regime that Tripoli or Tehran deems too
designs on western Sudan and Iran's plans to train
Ansar militias threaten Sudan's long-term stability.
Libyan actions since Nimeiri's ouster suggest that
Tripoli wants strong influence-if not control-in
western Sudan's Darfur Region. Sadiq has been un-
able or unwilling, or both, to counter Libyan en-
croachments. With a stronghold in Darfur, Libya
would have a permanent base on Chad's eastern
border from which to attack Chadian forces who
oppose Libya's claims and ambitions there. In addi-
tion, Qadhafi's desire to integrate Libya and Sudan
economically and politically-and thereby weaken
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Egypt's influence in Sudan-would get a boost. Final-
ly, Qadhafi probably views a Libyan presence in
Darfur as a useful lever to prevent Sudan's return to a
hardline anti-Libyan policy
Under the guise of improving roads, airfields, and
agricultural production, the Libyans have increased
their presence in Darfur. The Governor of Darfur and
the Governor of Libya's Al Kufra Municipality,
which borders Darfur, agreed in July 1987 to under-
take joint development projects,
although Khartoum considers
the agreement invalid. Meanwhile, Sudan's approxi-
mately 2,000 military personnel in the west-required
to police an area larger than Japan-find it almost
impossible to prevent Libyan troops and Libyan-
backed Chadian rebels from entering the region.
Iranian military assistance to Sadiq's Ansar
sect might easily offend top Sudanese military officers
who, in our view, still consider themselves custodians
of the Sudanese state-not just guardians of a partic-
ular regime. A multiparty scramble for arms-and
the attendant threat to civil order-might prompt
senior officers to intervene in government before
divisive pressures among civilians threatened cohesion
within the military itself.
Prospects for Change
Sadiq's continuing determination to alter the foreign
policy course undertaken during the Nimeiri era, his
conviction that nonalignment best serves Sudan's
interests, and his blind spots regarding Libya and Iran
suggest there is little prospect of basic change in the
policies he has adopted in his two years in office.
Despite mounting short- and long-term costs, Sadiq
appears unpersuaded of the merits of shifting course.
Nevertheless, Sadiq could gradually-or even abrupt-
ly-end his friendly stance toward Libya and Iran in
1988. He might conclude that the domestic political
costs of staying on good terms with Qadhafi and the
mullahs had started to outweigh the military and
economic aid he was getting from them. Such a policy
change would indicate that he believed the civilian
clamor against him from virtually all quarters was
intensifying and that the Sudanese military was on
the verge of overthrowing him.
Indicators of a shift in Sudanese policy-from least to
most abrupt-would include the following:
? Toward Libya-Sadiq publicly criticizes Qadhafi's
regional policies, urging accommodation between
Libya and Chad. He halts official Sudanese visits to
Tripoli.
? He proclaims Libyans a security threat in Khar-
toum and in Sudan's Darfur Region.
? Sadiq orders the expulsion from Sudan of Libyan
diplomats, intelligence officers, and military
personnel.
? Toward Iran-Sadiq publicly condemns Iran's in-
sistence on continuing the war with Iraq. He halts
official Iranian visits to Khartoum.
? Sadiq orders a security clampdown on Iranians in
Khartoum, publicly denouncing incidents where
Iranians are caught recruiting in the capital.
? Sadiq orders the expulsion of some Iranians.
If Sadiq ended his good neighbor policy toward Libya
and Iran, the odds are strong that Tripoli would try to
cause serious trouble for him. Qadhafi, shifting to a
view of Sadiq as an enemy almost as heinous as
Nimeiri, might cut off military aid to Sadiq, renew
military support to the southern Sudanese rebels, and
step up subversive activity in Khartoum, particularly
within the Sudanese military. Iran probably would
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subversive activities.
seek contacts with anti-Sadiq groups, but its preoccu-
pation with the Iran-Iraq war and other Persian Gulf
issues probably would limit its willingness to support
equally unlikely.
Marked change in Sudanese policies on other fronts-
toward the superpowers, Egypt, or the African
states-appears less likely. Sadiq's antipathy toward
the Egyptians and his resistance to close alignment
with the United States probably are too deeply rooted
to allow for a significant change in attitude. His
northern Muslim constituency-together with his role
as leader of a northern Muslim religious sect-makes
a major shift in his attitude toward black Africa
Sadiq's continued rule.
Alternative Scenario: What if Sadiq Is Overthrown?
If Sudanese military officers depose Sadiq, it proba-
bly will happen largely-though not exclusively-
because Sudanese demands for commodities and mili-
tary equipment outpaced the foreign aid that Sadiq
attracted. Shortages in basic commodities will have
become acute and, combined perhaps with Sadiq's
expansion of austerity measures, will have led to
widening, sustained civilian protest demonstrations.
Shortages in military hardware, combined perhaps
with significant battlefield defeats in the south and
more humiliations in the west, will have turned
military commanders in Khartoum decisively against
those from Tripoli.
toward the Egyptians and
Sudan's new rulers-mostly military officers but per-
haps some civilians-most likely would alter Sadiq's
nonaligned policy in several respects. First, we expect
they would take steps to regain strong Egyptian
support for Khartoum, which would include a reduc-
tion in amicable interactions with Libya. The General
Staff usually does not share Sadiq's cold attitude
Second, we expect the new rulers would play up more
to the Saudis and other "moderate" Persian Gulf
states than to Iran.
Nonetheless, Sudan's new rulers might easily resume
a search for aid from any quarter if pro-Western
regional governments, the United States, and Europe-
an democracies failed to supply the assistance they
believed was necessary to counter Sudan's multiple
security threats and to offset economic hardships that
could revive regime-threatening protests in Khar-
toum.
Implications for the United States
The consequences of Sadiq's nonaligned policy ad-
versely affect US regional interests. A heightened
Libyan and Iranian presence in Khartoum most likely
will raise the security threat to US and allied diplo-
mats there. That presence, moreover, stands a good
chance of eliciting more African support for southern
Sudanese rebels and polarizing the Horn of Africa.
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If Sadiq is overthrown in the next year, there is a
slightly better-than-even chance that a successor re-
gime would steer a more pro-Western course, at least
initially. Sudan would continue to press for more US
aid, but, if it failed to get what it believes it needed
from the West and "moderate" Arabs, it might turn 25X1
again to regional radical governments for assistance.
Through this whole process, US requests for coopera-
tion in addressing the problems of drought and fam-
ine-stricken populations will get little attention from
regional governments concerned primarily with sur- 25X1
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