SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT PRODUCTION PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R002201800010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ^
INFORMATION
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0045405
Ni IIM*10009JX-*87
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ILT GENERAL tjCW D J HEINZ, USA=
(A-2-NIC PRODUCTS) 25X1
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July 1987
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Chemical Warfare
Agent Production Program
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NI I I M 87-10009J X
SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENT PRODUCTION PROGRAM
Information available as of 11 April 1987 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved
for publication on 16 June by the Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council.
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................. 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
History ............................................................................................... 5
Production Capability ...................................................................... 7
Production Activity .......................................................................... 11
Supplementary Production Capability ............................................
Production by the Soviet Chemical Industry ............................. 15
Conversion ..................................................................................... 16
Technology Transfer .................................................................... 16
Trends in Soviet Chemical Industry Methodologies ...................... 18
ANNEX A: Soviet Chemical Warfare Agents .................................... 19
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PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum provides a current
assessment of the Soviet capability for producing chemical warfare
agents and addresses questions of production methods and location of
production sites. It describes the background and development of the
production effort and identifies areas of key technologies, as well as
issues of technology transfer. It attempts to explain the inherent
difficulties involved in monitoring either the types or amounts of
chemical agents produced and in identifying chemical production
facilities.
August 1986 the Intelli-
gence Community noted the Soviets are maintaining
chemical warfare agent production capability as part of their industrial
base. a
the Soviets maintain the world's
most comprehensive chemical and biological warfa ram and that
this capability constitutes a serious threat to NATO
This publication was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer at Large and coordinated within the intelligence
Community
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KEY JUDGMENTS
the variety and
combinations of raw materials and intermediate chemicals, as well as
the complex processes and possible variations in design of production
facilities that could be employed, make the identification of a specific
CW agent and its respective production facility very difficult P
Augmented Soviet CW agent production, or breakout production
capability in the event of a CW arms control treaty, is possible using
converted industrial chemical plants (especially those designed to
produce organophosphorous pesticides). Estimates are that as few as
four converted plants could provide 10,000 to 20,000 tons of agent per
year (14 tons/plant/day)-more than enough to replenish operational
stockpiles and conduct training. It would be extremely difficult to locate
industrial plants that had been converted to CW agent production.
There are at least nine Soviet chemical facilities that we believe
have produced or can produce traditional CW agents. Of these nine, we
assess that at present three, and possibly four, are currently active on an
intermittent basis. Two others are facilities suspected to be engaged in
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production of new chemical agents of microbiological origin
With their history of emphasis on CW preparedness, the Soviets
have the production capacity to manufacture a significant stockpile of
various CW agents and could have produced large amounts of agent rel-
atively undetected. While we believe that they currently manufacture
only a few hundred tons of agent per year, their interest in expanding
and modernizing their CW program continues.
The Intelligence Community believes that Western technology is
aiding Soviet military development of chemical weapons. Direct pur-
chase of Western plants has eliminated the time and expense required
for research on and development of process technologies and also
provides a direct conduit for acquiring other Western chemical exper-
tise
We assess that the Soviets recently have achieved the capability to
microencapsulate traditional chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
agents and that they may be developing and testing microencapsulation
of new agents as well.
the Soviets may be
planning to employ new agents derived from biotechnology. Biotech-
nology could be used to produce toxic chemical materials that previous-
ly could not be obtained in large amounts and to create entirely new
Their biotechnologically derived
agent program would not necessarily require unique production facili-
ties or storage sites. Even on-site inspections would not be sufficient to
ensure timely detection of prohibited biotechnology-based activities.
Establishing intent would be a critical factor.
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DISCUSSION
1. The Soviet Union for nearly 60 years has main-
tained an active program in military chemical warfare
(CW) involving both research and development (R&D)
and agent production. The USSR has no equal in the
world in its current capability to produce chemical
agents and munitions.
t ey could have
produced, since the mid-1950s, at east 150,000 metric
tons of various types of such agents.
It was not until March 1987
that the Soviet Union would even admit to having a
chemical weapons program. In April 1987, in a speech
in Prague, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the
Soviet Union has halted the production of chemical
weapons. The Intelligence Community has not been
able to ascertain the veracity of his announcement.
The Soviets probably are aware that they are ahead of
Western nations in many aspects of the CW produc-
tion effort and are likely to continue to go to great
lengths to protect and retain that lead
History
3. Russian interest in CW began in the late 1800s
with the study of the toxic chemical mustard. Though
before World War I the CW emphasis was on R&D of
potential agents rather than on production, Russia's
chemical industry during World War I rapidly devel-
oped a CW production capability and was able to
provide its armed forces with weaponized versions of
the toxic industrial chemicals chlorine and phosgene.
4. Interest in CW continued after the war and led
to extensive research on toxic agents and weapon
stabilization. The Soviet chemical industry was ex-
panded significantly during the 1930s, as was the level
of technical education available in the Soviet Union.
During this period the Soviets produced and stockpiled
blood, blister, and vomiting agents. By 1937 the Soviet
Army was fully equipped to conduct offensive and
defensive chemical warfare operations if the decision
were made to do so. During World War II the Soviets
manufactured a variety of standard agents at both
converted industrial chemical plants and specially
constructed sites. The Hirsch report indicated hun-
dreds of plants involved in the Soviet CW program.'
5. At the end of World War II the Soviets captured
stocks of chemical warfare agent and munitions, as
well as the large-scale (1,000 tons per month) German
tabun (GA) nerve agent plant and a sarin (GB) pilot
plant (100 tons/month) at Dyhernfurth and possibly an
incomplete full-scale (500 tons/month) sarin plant at
Falkenhagen. At least part of the Dyhernfurth equip-
ment was relocated to the Volgograd Chemical Com-
bine, and was used in the construction of a nerve agent
pilot plant It is possible
that plans and some equipment from Falkenhagen
were also captured. Mustard plants at Ammendorf and
Gendorf may also have been captured by the Soviets
and the equipment and technology transferred to the
USSR. The capture of these facilities and information
from the Spandau CW research center gave the
Soviets a production capability for these highly toxic
agents more quickly than if they had had to develop
them indigenously, as well as information on the
production and weaponization technologies and un-
known quantities of finished chemical agents in bulk
storage.' the Soviets began
production of nerve agents (sarin and tabun) by the
mid-1950s. Later information suggests the Soviets con-
sidered tabun an obsolete agent in the late 1950s and
removed it from their inventory. (Annex A summa-
rizes known Soviet chemical agents.)
' Col. Walter Hirsch was an Austrian chemical officer who took
part in the Russian and Italian campaigns, 1917-18, and after the
German annexation of Austria in 1938 became the head of the
German Army Ordnance Office, CW Proving Section. As such, he
controlled and directed German CW research, development, and
testing. After capture by the British in 1945, h wrote I and
definitive report on the Soviet CW program.
2 Preliminary analysis of 1940s Allied in a igence m orma ion
indicates that there may have been a number of German depots on
the Eastern Front after the war with large stocks of bulk and
weaponized chemical warfare agents, including nerve agents.
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6. Since the early 1960s there have been various
reports of Soviet production of soman (GD), the most
deadly of the G-type nerve agents. In 1960 Soviet
scientist M. M. Dubinin at the International Confer-
ence on Biological and Chemical Warfare implied that
the USSR probably had solved the problems of the
industrial manufacture of soman. In 1961 a Soviet
patent was granted for the preparation of pinacoline, a
compound used to manufacture pinacolyl alcohol, a
key precursor of the nerve agent soman. The process
as patented was apparently readily adaptable to large-
scale production. Consequently, in the years since the
patent was issued, the USSR could have manufactured
large quantities of pinacolyl alcohol and have used it
for the production of soman. The Soviets have ac-
knowledged production of the key soman precursor,
pinacolyl alcohol, in their civilian industry. In negotia-
tions for a chemical weapons limitation agreement, the
Soviets have intimated that they make use of signifi-
cant quantities of pinacolyl alcohol.
7. The Intelligence Community believes that Soviet
research on V-agents, organothiophosphorus com-
pounds also used in some pesticides, was well ad-
vanced by the 1960s. Commercial production methods
for a number of these pesticides were readily available
in both Soviet and Western open literature and are
similar to production methods for V-agents. This
would have made it relatively easy for the Soviets to
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produce V-agents using extensions of existing commer-
cial chemical processes and technologies. We are
unsure about the extent to which they produced or
weaponized V-agents and about the amount in the
Soviet inventory.
8. Intelligence Community organizations over the
past years have narrowed to about nine the number of
plants that may be involved with traditional CW
production ome of
these plants were reported by Hirsch to be making
agent in the 1940s~
sources indicate that by the early 1980s these institutes
were doing research and were constructing buildings
capable of producing microbiological products, includ-
ing new agents. Nonliving, biologically produced new
agents would probably be tested at Shikhany.
Production Capability
11. There are at least nine' Soviet chemical facili-
ties that we believe have produced or can produce
traditional CW agent
9. The Soviets allocated almost $2 billion in the
early 1970s to a modernization program to overcome a
perceived US lead in chemical and biological warfare
(CBW). A portion of this Soviet program was directed
to provide a new generation of chemical and biological
weapons to be fielded in the late 1980s.3 F
10. Another part of the Soviet modernization pro-
gram involves the development and production of new
agents that are biologically produced but are capable
of being employed as chemical agents. These agents
are bioregulators and toxins and are produced through
genetic engineering. In the mid-1970s, the Soviets
recognized the military potential of genetic engineer-
ing and established two major military genetic engi-
neering institutes, at Serpukhov and Kol'tsovo. Various
5 There are four general types of new agents. These include:
newly developed types of chemical agents, toxins, and bioregulators
produced by genetically engineered microbes, and microbes geneti-
cally engineered to cause diseases. This last type of agent is not
discussed in this paper
12. Fragmentary reporting over a number of years
has indicated that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
(NSWP) countries have been involved in some aspects
of chemical warfare R&D, at least limited production,
and extensive troop training in a CW environment.
While we do not know the extent of the NSWP
program, it could serve as a residual production effort
and/or as a reservoir of technological expertise for
traditional chemical agent manufacture. We have no
intelligence information that details Soviet policy or
practice on the export of technology or manufacturing
of components to Pact countries, but we believe the
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Soviets would have helped in establishing and moni-
toring the NSWP CW program. We would assume also
that they have considered the possibilities of convert-
ing some NSWP chemical facilities to making CW
13. Romania currently is assessed to have a CW
program for development of indigenous production of
CW agents and antidotes
The Intelligence Community be-
lieves that Czechoslovakia too has had a CW facility
5 Romania is a special case among the NSWP countries because it
does not believe it would get nuclear weapons from the Soviets in
wartime. Hence, it has developed its own CW agents and munitions.
for many years, possibly for limited production as well
as for R&D on CW agents. East Germany during the
1950s reportedly had CW production capability. We
have no recent information, however, to establish the
existence of a current CW agent production program
in East Germany or Poland.
14. The production processes for traditional agents
have been known for a long time, and protective
equipment (masks, suits, etc.) has been developed
against them. The Soviets have the necessary technical
expertise to develop binary systems. We have no
evidence that they intend to produce binary chemical
munitions or that research on binary systems is under
way. Soviet literature indicates a significant research
effort in the areas of organofluorine compounds, or-
ganosilicon compounds, caged organophosphates, tox-
ins, and cyclic peptides. The toxicity, stability, and
penetrating ability of some compounds in these classes
suggest them as possible sources of new agents
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16. Information suggests that the Soviets may be
developing perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB), an organo-
fluorine compound, or a related compound as a CW
agent:
- They have reportedly been developing an agent
containing fluorine that penetrates Western
canisters.
stockpile, we believe that they currently need the
capability to manufacture only a few hundred tons of
agent per year. This is more than enough for testing,
troop training, and stockpile replenishment. Any one
of the identified production facilities could probably
fulfill the training and replenishment demand. We
believe that suspected Soviet CW agent plants are
large enough to produce thousands of tons per year of
- The leading Soviet organofluorine researcher, I.
L. Knunyants (a general officer in the Soviet
Army), has reportedly worked with the USSR's
chemical defense academy.
- Soviet open literature states that PFIB is three to
10 times as toxic as phosgene-indicating that, if
it penetrated masks, it could incapacitate person-
nel. Since the onset of symptoms caused by
PFIB-type compounds are delayed, the Soviets
may be trying to synthesize an agent with similar
toxicity but with more rapid onset of symptoms.
- The Soviets have discussed various methods of
manufacturing PFIB, but claim that it is not
manufactured on a large scale-that they use it
for laboratory synthesis only and that it is pro-
duced as a byproduct at the Kirovo-Chepetsk
and Perm' chemical 1 n .
17. The Soviets already have produced toxins that
they or their allies have used in Southeast Asia.
Although some toxins can be chemically synthesized,
the trichothecene mycotoxins used in Southeast Asia
presumably were produced by Fusarium fungi. There
are eight known or suspected BW plants in the Soviet
Union. Two of the suspected plants, Berdsk and
Kurgan, are known to have produced agricultural
biochemicals using Fusarium fungi; we therefore con-
sider them to be possible sources of the trichothecene
mycotoxins. Although there is no evidence of toxin
production at the six remaining plants, we suspect that
several could produce toxins if required.
Production Activity
18. The Soviet Union, with its history of emphasis
on CW preparedness since World War II, has had a
production capacity to manufacture a significant
stockpile of various CW agents. What makes the
estimates of the production effort difficult is that if the
Soviets had perceived a need they could, given their
industrial capability, have produced large amounts of
agent relatively undetected. Because of the existing
agent if a wartime mobilization required it.
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Supplementary Production Capability
Production by the Soviet Chemical Industry
30. The Soviet Union has a well-developed civilian
chemical industry and is self-sufficient in raw materi-
als needed to produce starting or intermediate chemi-
cals for CW agent production. The required technol-
ogy base imbedded in any established chemical
industry represents a latent CW production capability.
31. While the production of basic and intermediate
chemicals is the primary concern of a nation's chemi-
cal industry, it is difficult to differentiate between
industrial chemical production and the production of
chemicals that could be used to produce CW agents.
Most intermediate chemicals necessary for the produc-
technology process.
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The production of intermediate chemicals, or of the
traditional CW agents themselves, is not a high-
32. Dual-use plants produce chemicals that can be
used as both CW agents and as civilian industrial
chemicals. Chemicals in this category include hydro-
gen cyanide and phosgene. Both have applications as
CW agents and as industrial feedstocks, and both are
produced, handled, transported, and used in very large
quantities throughout the worldwide chemical indus-
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33. Engineering analysis indicates that an augment-
ed Soviet agent production or breakout production
capability, using converted chemical plants, is possible
and, in some cases, relatively straightforward. The
time required for conversion is primarily dependent
on the similarity of the process at a given plant to
nerve agent process. Converted plants could include
those originally designed for conversion, dual-use fa-
cilities, or other industrial chemical facilities that
could be converted. The easiest type of plant to
convert to nerve agent production would be organo-
phosphorus (OP) pesticide plants. Some plants, such as
petrochemical complexes, might require complete re-
made of specialized materials. Both nerve agent and
OP pesticide plants would have detectors and alarms
to detect fugitive emissions and also would have
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fitting-a much longer process.
he Soviets have devoted
Technology Transfer
38. The Soviets have on many occasions contracted
with Western countries for construction of chemical
plants in the USSR. This provides them with the
ability to adapt or copy Western process methods for
use in other Soviet facilities. Direct purchase of West-
ern plants eliminates the time and expense required
for research and development on process technologies
and also provides a direct conduit for acquiring other
significant attention during the past several decades to
planning for versatility in production at their chemical
plants. They might have drafted contingency plans for
such conversions in advance, with production equip-
ment already in place, and might have trained key
operations personnel in the manufacture of agents.
Otherwise, depending on the chemical processes al-
ready in place, the time could vary from a few weeks
35. If the Soviets ceased production at their dedi-
cated military CW agent facilities, because of techni-
cal difficulties, improvements to process technologies,
or new agent programs, or under a CW treaty require-
ment, they would need to convert no more than three
or four commercial plants to meet their current
production needs. As few as four converted plants
could probably provide 10,000 to 20,000 tons of agent
per year (14 tons/plant/day)-more than enough to
replenish operational stockpiles and conduct training.
36. The Intelligence Community believes that the
Soviets could probably convert any of 40 or so pesti-
cide plants into CW agent production in a matter of
weeks to months, depending on the priority assigned to
the project. Such conversions would require changes to
equipment and to operating procedures. OP pesticide
plants lack some characteristics found in nerve agent
plants, but among the shared characteristics are the
ability to handle corrosive and toxic substances, safety
features to protect the workers and the surrounding
environment, and the correct processing equipment
Western chemical expertise.
39. We believe that Western technology is aiding
Soviet military developments in chemical weapons.
Today, the Soviet military controls CW production
lines and freely levies requirements on the chemical
industry. The chemical industry also provides indirect
support by satisfying much of the raw material re-
quirement for military end items. By the mid-1980s
the availability and use of acquired foreign technology
had become an integral part of the planning cycle for
new chemical plant construction in the Soviet Union.
This period also marked the beginning of a dramatic
increase in chemical production capacity that has
depended heavily on imported Western technology.
40. Incorporating Western technology into Soviet
military programs, rather than relying wholly on
Soviet indigenous capabilities, could yield significant
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savings in program costs, free indigenous R&D re-
sources for efforts in other areas, and enable the
Soviets to develop and produce effective military
systems at earlier dates than would otherwise be
possible. The USSR benefits significantly from acquisi-
tion of various Western technologies, such as process
control technology, corrosion-resistant processing
equipment, and microencapsulation.
microencapsulation to military delivery of chemical
and biological agents:'
- In the late 1970s the Soviets negotiated a contract
with a US pharmaceutical firm to obtain a
complete "turnkey" microencapsulation facility.
Though the contract was canceled by the US
Government and most of the equipment never
reached the Soviet Union, the Soviets did obtain
complete design information, including process
specifications and batch reactant recipes.9
45. We assess that the Soviets have recently
achieved the capability to microencapsulate conven-
tional CBW agents and that they may be developing
and testing microencapsulation of new agents as well.
new capability in chemical and biological warfare.
scheme, microencapsulation could give the Soviets a
If pursued to its technologi-
cal limits and integrated into their CBW production
liquid droplet
9 Microencapsulation is a chemical or physical process resulting in
the formation of a protective coating around a small solid particle or
44. Microencapsulation. Since the 1970s, the Sovi-
ets have shown an interest in the application of
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Trends in Soviet Chemical Industry
Methodologies
46. The chemical industry of the USSR is engaged
in a massive effort to develop and acquire state-of-the-
art technologies. Upgrading its technologies and diver-
sification into production of fine chemicals and bio-
technologically oriented products will not only boost
the Soviet economy but also make the Soviet CBW
advances in biotechnology, such as genetic engineer-
ing, to the development of a new class of agents. These
techniques could be used to produce toxic materials
that previously could not be obtained in large amounts
and to create entirely new agents. These new agents
could pose significant problems to medical and protec-
tive systems. In addition, the equipment in the labora-
tory buildings and the expertise required to conduct
such work is an integral part of biomedical research
program more viable.
47. The industry is emphasizing production of spe-
cialty chemicals-integral to the production of hyper-
pure compounds essential to biotechnology industries
as well as to thermonuclear energy, electronics, and
lasers. By the year 2000, the Soviets hope to double
(over 1985 figures) their production of high-purity
compounds, and triple production of biological re-
agents. In the area of biological reagents, techniques
have been developed to produce such products as
amino acid derivatives that have applications in medi-
cine and in genetic engineering.
48. Evidence suggests that the Soviets may be plan-
ning to employ new agents derived from biotechnology.
The Intelligence Community believes that the USSR
initiated a program in the early 1970s to apply
and, therefore, difficult to detect.
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ANNEX A
and HQ (mustard formulas), HN (nitrogen mustard), and L (lewisite).
(c) General toxic action: AC (prussic acid), CK (cyanogen chloride).
(d) Suffocating: CG (phosgene).
(e) Psychochemical: BZ.
(f) Irritants: CN (chloroacetophenone), DM (adamsite), CS, and CR.
In terms of tactical purpose, the Soviets divide toxic agents (table 2) into groups
according to the nature of their action: lethal agents, incapacitants, irritants, and
training agents. In terms of physiological action on the organism, the Soviets make the
following distinctions:
(a) Neuroparalytic action: GA (tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), and VX.
(b) Skin-blistering: H (commercial sulfur mustard), HD (distilled mustard), HT
Table 2
Soviet Chemical and Toxin Agents
AC Hydrogen cyanide
BZ Unknown
CG Phosgene
CN Chloroacetophenone
DA Diphenyl chloroarsine
DM Adamsite
DP Diphosgene
GB Sarin
GD Soman
GD Thickened soman
H Sulfur mustard
H Thickened sulfur mustard
HL Mustard-lewisite mixture
NH-3 Nitrogen mustard
EA-5830 O-ethyl-S-2-dimethylaminoethyl
(Vx) methyl phosphonothioate
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Class of Agent Designation
Physiological Military
Action Action
Psychological Incapacitant
Choking Casualty
Tear gas Riot control
Vomiting; lung irritant Casualty
Vomiting; lung irritant Casualty
Nerve
Nerve
Nerve
Blister
Blister
Blister
Blister
Blister
Blister
Choking
Nerve
Lethal
Lethal
Lethal
Casualty
Casualty
Casualty
Casualty
Casualty
Casualty
Irritant
Lethal
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