ZAMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR KAUNDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R002201800003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DAT E
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
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FORM 56 NO. 241 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Zambia:
Prospects for Kaunda
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
NI IIM 87-10014
October 1987
Copy 3 5 3
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NI IIM 87-10014
ZAMBIA:
PROSPECTS FOR KAUNDA
Information available as of 28 September 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum,
approved for publication on 1 October 1987 by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Key Variables ........................................................................................ 7
Zambia's Declining Economy ...................................................... 8
Internal Political Pressures ........................................................... 9
External Actors .............................................................................. 10
Kaunda's Ability To Cope ............................................................ 11
Outlook .................................................................................................. 11
Alternative Scenarios .................................................................... 12
Implications ........................................................................................... 13
For the Soviet Union .................................................................... 13
For the United States .................................................................... 13
ANNEX A. Senior Zambian Officials ................................................. 15
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SCOPE NOTE
Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda has assumed unusually broad
international responsibilities just as he is facing at home his most
difficult political challenge since independence in 1964. His leadership
in the Organization of African Unity, the Frontline States confronting
South Africa, and the Nonaligned Movement's Africa Fund, as well as
Zambia's seat on the UN Security Council, will enable him to influence
a variety of Third World, African, and regional issues. Yet economic de-
cay and growing domestic criticism of his performance raise doubts
about the durability of his power base in Zambia.
Expectations for Kaunda were last addressed in 1981 during a
similar period of domestic distress. NI IIM 81-10005, Zambia: Kaunda's
Political Prospects, clearly underestimated Kaunda's survival powers,
for it only granted him "at least an even chance" of remaining in office
for the next year. The Memorandum, in anticipating challenges to
Kaunda's rule, drew too strong a predictive link between Zambia's
persisting economic slide and effective political opposition. It also
underplayed his ability to attract economic aid from abroad while co-
opting or intimidating critics at home.
This Memorandum, requested by the State Department, examines
prospects for Kaunda over the next two years. It addresses his interna-
tional agenda, the impact of Zambia's internal situation on his recently
expanded leadership roles, and the implications of these for the United
States and the Soviet Union.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
As the new chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
incumbent chairman of southern Africa's Frontline States (FLS), and
head of a country occupying a rotational seat on the UN Security
Council, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda is likely to be an activist
leader. This will open opportunities for both conflict and cooperation
with the United States on a range of African and Third World issues.
Zambia's worsening economy and rising domestic discontent are likely
to distract him from time to time and may even lead to a serious
challenge to his rule. Nonetheless, he stands a better-than-even chance
of retaining power for the two-year period of this Memorandum.
Kaunda's International Agenda
During his impending visit to North America, Kaunda will sound
themes likely to remain on his international agenda for the next several
years. Driven by Zambia's parlous economic situation and deep antipa-
thy for South African apartheid, Kaunda probably will:
- Demand stiffer international economic sanctions against South
Africa in public while working more constructively behind the
scenes to reduce FLS economic and transportation dependence
on Pretoria.
- Urge a renewed push for Namibian independence by proposing
a UN General Assembly resolution that would bypass the
Security Council.
- Seek to justify Zambia's break with the IMF while pressing for
Africa-wide debt relief and ceilings on debt service payments,
but not call for outright repudiation of debts.
- Appeal for greater Western aid, trade, and investment in Africa,
particularly Zambia.
Kaunda's Prospects
This Memorandum examines several key variables that will affect
Kaunda's tenure and effectiveness in his expanded leadership roles over
the next two years:
- The deteriorating Zambian economy. Kaunda's statist policies
ensure further decline, but economic assistance from Western
donors and short-term buoyancy in prices for Zambia's domi-
nant export, copper, probably will stave off a precipitous
plummet.
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- Internal political opposition. Growing criticism of Kaunda is
unlikely to coalesce into a successful challenge as long as he
continues effectively to balance rival groups and to monitor
opponents using Zambia's relatively capable security service.
- Threats from South Africa. Although South Africa will strike
African National Congress (ANC) insurgent targets in Zambia
whenever it deems necessary, and may step up economic
pressures, it probably will not seek to topple Kaunda and risk
the possibility of a less desirable replacement.
- Kaunda's ability to cope. The burden of his increased leader-
ship roles combined with domestic tensions and strains in his
personal life are likely to cause periods of erratic behavior, but
we believe his personal resilience will carry him through the
next two years.
Alternative Scenarios
Should Kaunda die or be removed from the Zambian scene, no
prospective replacement would have his stature or would accede
automatically to his international posts. Zambia's future direction would
depend on the succession scenario:
- Prospects for a military coup would rise should economically
inspired unrest or South African actions enfeeble Kaunda; the
new regime would be ill equipped to govern and prone to
erratic policies, particularly if such a coup came from junior
ranks.
- A sudden acceleration of Zambia's economic decline, perhaps
coupled with interference from South Africa, could bring
together a coalition of businessmen, labor leaders, and other
disgruntled elements; if successful in toppling Kaunda, they
probably would pursue an economically conservative, pro-
Western course.
- A constitutional succession, made necessary by Kaunda's sudden
death or incapacitation, probably would bring ruling party
leader Grey Zulu to power; he would advocate socialist policies
and closer relations with the USSR and Cuba.
- Least likely, should Kaunda under growing public and personal
pressure decide to step aside, he might move to install protege
Prime Minister Musokotwane as his successor; he would be well
disposed toward the United States but probably ineffective in
coming to grips with Zambia's problems.
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Implications for the United States and the Soviet Union
Although Kaunda is an outspoken critic of many US policies in
Africa and elsewhere, during the next two years he may attempt helpful
mediating efforts when he perceives that he can be effective, especially
if Zambian interests are directly at stake. To improve prospects for
peace in southern Africa, for example, he may encourage negotiations
toward national reconciliation in Angola coupled with independence for
Namibia and a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. He may also
work toward opening a dialogue between the white regime in Pretoria
and key black opposition groups, particularly the ANC, whose head-
quarters is in Zambia. On non-African issues, however, Kaunda is likely
to indulge in rhetorical outbursts that irritate relations with the United
States. Although he is likely to press favored themes such as a new
international economic order, Kaunda's influence beyond the African
stage is likely to be slight.
The Soviet Union values relations with Zambia primarily because
of Kaunda's African leadership roles. Moscow probably will offer
inducements to Kaunda to use his new Third World leadership stature
to criticize the United States and to support Soviet positions in
international forums. Although Kaunda probably will accept more arms
from Moscow, Zambia's continuing need for Western economic aid will
serve to limit Soviet success and lead him to pursue moderate policies on
key issues, particularly regarding southern Africa.
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Figure 1
Zambia and Other Frontline States
DAR ES SA M )-
G~or used
ibr Zambian
Caprivi Strip
(South African
controlled)
South
Afric,a
MASER
esotho
aundery rpprewantetien is
not. necseardy euthorftntwe.
?azara
Tanzania
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Indian
Ocean
Mozambique
Channel
Linguistic Group
Percent of
Population
Bemba
33.9
Nyanja
17.1
Tonga
15.2
Lunda/Luvale
10.4
Lozi
9.2
Other
14.2
,Port used
for Zambian
copper exports
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DISCUSSION
1. As the current chairman of the Frontline States
(FLS), this year's chairman of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), and leader of a country occupy-
ing a seat on the UN Security Council until 1989,
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda is in an unusually
strong position over the next two years to influence
issues affecting US policy in southern Africa particu-
larly and broader US interests in the Third World
generally. These issues include efforts to accelerate the
elimination of apartheid in South Africa. They also
include African proposals to end regional conflicts in
Chad, Mozambique, and Angola; secure independence
for Namibia; resolve the African debt problem; and
establish a more "equitable" international economic
order
2. Although Kaunda has been President of Zambia
since independence in 1964, a seriously deteriorating
economy and rising internal criticism now threaten to
erode further his domestic authority, which may
constrain his international effectiveness. An emotional,
moralistic man of modest education but keen political
instincts, Kaunda carefully apportions power and posi-
tions among rival individuals and groups. He also
exercises his considerable persuasive powers to achieve
consensus, but reserves for himself the final decision
on major policy questions. Kaunda's personal lack of a
strong tribal identification has enabled him to rise
above ethnic rivalries and, by balancing them, to
reduce the influence of large groups such as the
Bemba. He has also narrowed opportunities for politi-
cal competition by establishing a one-party state.
Kaunda has made effective use of Zambia's reasonably
capable internal security service, and he promptly
disciplines those suspected of disloyalty with public
verbal abuse and at least the threat of detention.
Nonetheless, domestic, regional, and international re-
sponsibilities will all compete for his time and atten-
tion and will place significant demands on his personal
stamina and political skills to deliver on all fronts.
Key Variables
3. This Memorandum examines several key variables
that will affect Kaunda's tenure and effectiveness
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Impending Western Itinerary
During his forthcoming visit to North America,
Kaunda will raise issues that are likely to remain on his
international agenda for the next several years. Before
his official visit to Washington in his capacities as OAU
and FLS chairman in early October 1987, he will
address the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 6 Octo-
ber as both head of the OAU and President of Zambia.
He is likely to stress African themes in his address to the
UNGA and to introduce a new resolution emphasizing
the urgency of securing independence for Namibia.
While en route to New York, he may stop in the United
Kingdom to try to convince British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher to adopt stricter economic sanctions
against South Africa.
Kaunda
probably will advocate an approac to ta sanctions
issue that stresses the importance of reducing FLS
dependence on South Africa through greater Western
aid. He may encourage negotiations on withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola. Kaunda also will want to
discuss Zambia's nearly $6 billion external debt and to
justify his country's break with the IMF last May, which
he probably will explain in the context of the larger
African debt crisis. As chairman of the OAU, Kaunda
already has called for a summit on African debt for
December 1987 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Finally, he
may urge President Reagan to use his influence toward
resolving the Iran-Iraq war.
Following his visits in the United States, Kaunda will
attend the Summit of Commonwealth Heads of Gov-
ernment in Vancouver, Canada, from 13 to 17 October
where he probably will raise the African debt problem
again. The sanctions issue probably will also arise in this
forum, particularly if Zimbabwean Prime Minister
Robert Mugabe attempts to force the United Kingdom
and other moderates to implement stern new measures
against South Africa. Although he will take a tough
public stance on the sanctions issue, behind the scenes
Kaunda probably will exert a moderating influence
over proceedings in Vancouver. As chairman of the
FLS, he may initiate discussions on the creation of a
special Commonwealth fund for Mozambique in addi-
tion to the Nonaligned Movement's Africa fund, whose
operation is under Zambia's supervision. The new fund
may be used to provide security assistance to protect the
Beira transportation route through Mozambique, which
is important for most of the FLS countries.
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in regional and international leadership positions:
- The Zambian economy.
- Internal political dissent and Kaunda's ability to
contain it.
- External influences, especially from South Afri-
ca, other neighboring states, and the East and the
West.
- And Kaunda's ability to manage the onerous
competing demands on his time and energy.
efficiency of state-owned enterprises, or resign itself to
a decline in living standards compatible with the rapid
deterioration in its terms of trade, Zambia has com-
pensated for weak copper revenues by borrowing
heavily since the mid-1870s. Accumulated foreign
debt, totaling about $6 billion, now involves debt
service obligations equaling almost 100 percent of
export earnings.
8. In the past few years, however, under a series of
ambitious IMF and World Bank restructuring pro-
grams designed to mobilize domestic savings, efficient-
ly allocate resources, restructure economic incentives,
Zambia's Declining Economy
4. During the period of this Memorandum, Kaunda
will find it increasingly difficult to deflect domestic
criticism for Zambia's grim economic situation. The
economy is handicapped by heavy reliance on a single
export (copper), a longtime decline in its terms of
trade, and landlocked Zambia's need to use transporta-
tion networks that run through neighboring countries.
Moreover, Zambia under Kaunda has suffered from
corruption and mismanagement and has pursued stat-
ist policies-including price controls-that have re-
duced what prospects there were for economic
growth.
5. Dependence on Copper. Because copper (and
ancillary cobalt) exports traditionally account for al-
most half of GDP, from one-third to one-half of
government revenues, and at least 90 percent of
Zambia's foreign exchange earnings, a continuation of
this year's 33-percent surge in global copper prices
offers the only near-term chance of relief for the
economy. Recently higher prices, which reverse a
decade of decline, result from low world stocks and
increased consumption. Prospects for sustained high
prices are uncertain, however; mining companies are
increasing production, and some commodities analysts
expect that prices are likely to decline again once
stocks are replenished.
6. Uncertainty over copper prices, plus Zambia's
rapid depletion of its known deposits of recoverable
ore, bode poorly for maintaining even the present
standard of living as long as the country depends so
heavily on the copper industry. Moreover, the diver-
sion since late 1986 of Zambia's copper exports from
South African transportation routes to less reliable rail
lines and the inefficient ports of Beira, Mozambique,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, could result in irregular
deliveries, higher transportation costs, and a falloff of
purchase contracts.
7. Foreign Debt and the IMF. Rather than work-
ing to diversify the economy, privatize or improve the
Figure 2
Zambia: Selected Economic
Indicators, 1983-88
Before Debt Relief
Percent
2 1983 84 85 86 87 a 88 a 0 1983 84 85 86 87 a 88 a b
Sagging Export Earnings Real GDP Growth
From Copper
Million US $
400 1983 84 85 86 87 a 88 a -4 1983 84 85 86
a Estimated.
Ceiling imposed on debt service payments.
Fiscal year ending on 30 June.
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diversify the production base, and move the economy
toward a sustainable external payments position, the
economy began to show some improvement. It grew in
real terms at a rate of 1.5 percent in 1985 and at 0.5
percent in 1986, reversing the pattern of negative
growth since 1981. Notwithstanding this modest
growth, however, Kaunda calculated that the stringent
IMF and World Bank deregulation and austerity
measures were not politically sustainable. The abrupt
and poorly managed removal of subsidies on maize,
the main staple in the Zambian diet, in December
1986 produced bloody riots in the copper belt, which
forced Kaunda to rescind the price hikes. To lift the
burden of austerity and boost his flagging popularity,
he decided to break with the Fund in early May 1987
and implement Zambia's own economic program.
9. Zambia's new 18-month recovery plan replaces
the IMF-supported program and reverts to greater
government control of the economy, which bodes ill
for stimulating growth and investment. The major
provisions of the new recovery plan slash debt service
payments to only 10 percent of net export earnings,
replace the IMF-sponsored auction system with state
allocation of foreign exchange at a fixed rate, impose
price controls, and retain subsidies on maize. The plan
offers vague proposals for developing agriculture, but
its major emphasis is on continued expansion of min-
ing. This will probably lead to an even greater dispari-
ty between urban and rural incomes and to continued
migration to the cooper belt and Lusaka by those
seeking employment in the mining industry and the
already bloated public sector. Moreover, the reduction
in external donor assistance as a result of the break
with the IMF is likely to aggravate shortages of
consumer items and fuel over the next few months.
10. Although Kaunda probably could regain previ-
ous levels of external assistance and strengthen the
economy by returning to the IMF fold as he has done
in the past, such a move may not be politically feasible
for him before elections in 1988 unless it brings a
timely injection of foreign exchange. Zambia lacks the
foreign exchange reserves to hold out much beyond
the election without suffering severe shortages. Blam-
ing external constraints not only for Zambia's but for
the whole of Africa's economic morass, Kaunda proba-
bly will continue to avoid accepting public responsibil-
ity for the effects of his policies.
11. In the absence of economic growth, much high-
er copper prices, or quick success with ongoing petro-
leum exploration, external donor assistance to Zambia
will be critical if Kaunda is to contain economically
inspired violence and antigovernment protest. He
probably will solicit increased assistance from all
prospective donors to make ends meet over the next
year and a half. External donor response to Zambia in
the wake of its break with the IMF, however, has so
far been mixed. Western technical and project aid
does not require compliance with IMF guidelines and
probably will continue at present levels. Balance-of-
payments support, on the other hand, probably will
decline because Kaunda has canceled the foreign
exchange auction through which this support was
channeled under the IMF program. The ceiling on
debt servicing will also jeopardize critical sources of
assistance because permitted payments will not meet
debt obligations, on which much further assistance is
contingent. Maintaining essential donor support will
depend on Kaunda's ability to attract new assistance
from such countries as Japan, which has granted
Zambia $25 million in 1987 as part of a five-year grant
to the least developed countries, and from internation-
al organizations offering development and financial
assistance to the poorest Third World countries. Con-
tinued World Bank lending is unlikely, however.
Internal Political Pressures
12. Poor economic performance has provided a
rallying point for opposition elements in key constitu-
encies that are increasingly critical of Kaunda's leader-
ship and policies. For instance, it took the Army and a
policy reversal to quell the December 1986 food riots.
Moreover, Kaunda has excited expectations that the
new economic program will improve living conditions,
and, unless external donors make up for the plan's
shortcomings, economic grievances will increase frus-
tration with Kaunda's leadership and act as a catalyst
for political agitation. However, no one has yet
emerged who appears capable of offering new policies
and leadership that would unify the opposition and
win broad popular support. Although a serious chal-
lenge to Kaunda's rule probably will surface during
the time frame of this Memorandum, the chances are
reasonably good that it will fail because of Kaunda's
far-reaching system of patronage and the efforts of his
capable internal security service
13. The Military. Zambia's approximately 17,000-
man armed forces, whose loyalty to Kaunda was once
unquestioned, are probably the greatest potential chal-
lenge to his rule. Kaunda effectively tasks his intelli-
gence service to monitor discontent within the mili-
tary, however, and uses patronage to maintain the
loyalty of key senior officers. He will continue to
shuffle the military leadership, to assign suspect offi-
cers abroad, and to meet regularly with groups of
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officers to prevent active coup plotting. In the past,
Kaunda has overcome military discontent with pay-
offs-such as new equipment, salary increases, and
other perquisites-and, more than likely, he will
divert resources for this purpose again in the future.
14. Although Kaunda's tactics minimize the risk of
a senior officer coup over the next two years, the
worsening economy and potential military confronta-
tion with South Africa could provoke serious plotting
by junior officers and enlisted elements of the mili-
tary. Critical of his failure to improve living conditions
in the armed forces, dissatisfied with pay increases
considered insufficient to keep pace with the rising
cost of living, and nervous about their inability to halt
South African raids on anti-South African insurgents
in Zambia, the Zambian enlisted ranks and junior
officers will remain restive
15. Organized Labor. The Zambian Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU), which represents 60 percent of
nearly 400,000 wage earners, is economically and
politically influential, but Kaunda is moving to curb
the power of top labor leaders. The ZCTU has long
pressed its interests with considerable success. It is
capable of severely disrupting the economy by encour-
aging strikes, particularly by the Mineworkers Union
whose ranks are drawn from the traditionally assertive
Bemba tribe in the copper belt. Kaunda's concern
about his ability to control labor following a wave of
public-sector strikes early in the year led him to place
labor funds under close scrutiny and to revoke the
passports of top ZCTU officials, including the popular
and outspoken chairman, Frederick Chiluba. Kaunda
loyalists have removed Chiluba from his executive
position on a key union council. Additional crack-
downs on labor leaders could provoke protest strikes
that might turn violent.
16. The Sole Party. The United National Indepen-
dence Party (UNIP) dominates national decisionmak-
ing in Zambia, although only 5 percent of the popula-
tion are party members. Kaunda's support within
UNIP appears to be eroding as members of the central
committee publicly criticize economic mismanage-
ment, government inefficiency, and corruption. The
party newspaper recently carried a front page account
of a senior UNIP official's call for the establishment of
a multiparty system, and some party leaders and
others among the rank and file are considering nomi-
nating candidates other than Kaunda to run in the
presidential election slated for 1988. Former UNIP
Secretary General and current Ambassador to Canada,
Humphrey Mulemba, aspires to national office, al-
though he was forced to recant his ambitions recently
when directly confronted by Kaunda.
17. The Business Community. Prospects are for a
further increase in tensions between Kaunda and
Zambian businessmen, who, although few in number,
include several influential party officials. Some busi-
nessmen are resisting the government's newly imposed
price controls on retail goods and probably will oppose
Kaunda's strong stand against privatization of state-
owned companies, which dominate the economy.
Kaunda has attempted to check opposition among
their ranks by withdrawing the passports of some
merchants accused of "economic crimes" or coopera-
tion with South Africa, but that has only fanned their
resentment.
18. Internal Security Forces. A plot to unseat
Kaunda during the period of this Memorandum prob-
ably would be frustrated by Kaunda's loyal and
relatively efficient intelligence service. The Zambian
Intelligence and Security Service (ZISS) has been par-
ticularly effective over the years at monitoring the
activities of the major civilian and military opposition
groups. Kaunda directly controls the service's budget,
and he can use that control to insulate ZISS morale
from the country's economic distress. The 10,000 to
12,000 lightly armed national police perform routine
functions and appear reasonably capable of controlling
localized outbreaks of public unrest. Discipline and
loyalty in the police, however, are not as certain as in
the ZISS.
External Actors
19. With Kaunda at the helm, Zambia's traditional
efforts to balance and exploit relations with the West
and the Soviet Union will continue over the next two
years. As a result of Kaunda's expanded leadership
roles, however, Zambia probably will take on added
importance in the regional foreign policy of both
Western nations and the Soviet Bloc. His increased
stature probably will also enhance Zambia's relations
with other FLS and neighboring countries, and he will
use his new leverage to keep pressure on South Africa
to end apartheid and to encourage a reduction in FLS
dependency on Pretoria. At the same time, Kaunda is
unlikely to confront South Africa directly.
20. The West. Zambia will seek to avoid a cutoff of
US aid under the Brooke amendment, which will take
effect early next year if Zambia is still in arrears on its
loan payments to the United States. Kaunda probably
will appeal to the United States to encourage the IMF
and World Bank to be more flexible in dealing with
Zambia and other African states. Moreover, Zambia's
economic plight ensures that Kaunda will continue to
seek good relations with other Western donors. Japan
probably will continue to allocate funds to Zambia
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In addition to at least 70 Soviet military advisers,
there are about 300 Soviet and 100 East European
civilian economic advisers in Zambia, plus 50 Soviet
Embassy personnel. Soviet economic aid and bilateral
trade are negligible. A cultural agreement signed in
1986 provides for exchanges of health and education
delegations, however, and about 150 Zambian students
are studying in the Soviet Union.
Cuba has 15 diplomats and eight medical personnel
in Zambia. Havana has repeatedly offered military
assistance, but Lusaka fears provoking South Africa.
Although Cuba has provided no significant economic
aid so far, Lusaka reportedly is interested in receiving
Cuban agricultural assistance.
annually under its $500 million five-year grant to
several African states, and the Scandinavian countries,
important donors to development efforts in the south-
ern Africa region, are also likely to continue support.
to address Zambia's economic problems
21. The Soviet Union. The Soviet Union values
relations with Zambia primarily because of Kaunda's
Third World leadership role. Moscow appears to be
seeking modestly improved relations with Lusaka, but
Kaunda is not likely to accept greater Soviet involve-
ment in Zambia beyond traditional arms and military
training assistance. Zambia's continued need for eco-
nomic assistance requires cooperation with the West.
Moscow will remain Zambia's major military supplier,
but the Soviets will not divert the resources necessary
22. Neighboring FLS States. Zambia's relations
with its neighbors remain on an even keel despite
intermittent border tensions over smuggling, refugees,
and cross-border incursions from war-torn Mozam-
bique and Angola. Economic interdependence, shared
security concerns, and the desire among all FLS
countries to develop transportation routes that do not
transit South Africa will continue to provide incentives
for regional cooperation. Zambia has entered into a
joint agreement with Angola and neighboring Zaire to
rehabilitate the Benguela railroad. Regardless of the
reluctance of Kaunda and most Frontline leaders to
impose their own sanctions against Pretoria, which
would provoke South African countermeasures causing
massive economic dislocations, they will continue to
urge the West to impose more severe sanctions.=
23. South Africa. Pretoria barely tolerates Kaun-
da's support for the African National Congress (ANC),
which has its headquarters in Lusaka. South Africa has
on occasion acted with near impunity in attacking
across the border at ANC facilities in Zambia, but both
sides will continue to exercise some restraint over the
period of this Memorandum. Pretoria will monitor
Kaunda's attempts to pursue regional initiatives and
will strike ANC targets in Zambia whenever it deems
necessary, but it probably will not seek to overthrow
Kaunda and risk the possibility of a less desirable
replacement. For his part, Kaunda recognizes the need
to avoid provoking further economic or military retali-
ation by the dominant regional power, which could
take the form of trade disruptions, sabotage, cross-
border attacks, or South African backing for Zambian
dissident groups. Zambia buys 40 percent of its im-
ports from South Africa-including manufactured
goods, machinery, and transport equipment-and 60
percent of its total imports transit South Africa.
Kaunda will act cautiously to avoid raising South
African suspicions about his intentions both at home
and abroad and, as he has done in the past, he may
from time to time offer to talk with South African
leaders to reduce regional pressures.
Kaunda's Ability To Cope
24. The burden of Kaunda's greater regional and
international roles, combined with domestic tensions
and strains in his personal life, are likely to stimulate
periods of erratic behavior and greater isolation from
key advisers over the next two years. Although Kaunda
himself is in good health, one of his sons died from
AIDS last year, a daughter-in-law and a grandchild are
stricken with the disease, and a second son is infected
with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). None-
theless, Kaunda seems to enjoy immersing himself in
international problems, which allow him to indulge in
rhetoric and philosophizing, and we believe that his
personal resilience will carry him through the next two
years.
Outlook
25. Kaunda's eroding authority at home and the
threat of South African intimidation almost certainly
will distract him from his expanded international
leadership roles from time to time, but he stands a
better-than-even chance of retaining power over the
two-year period of this Memorandum. He probably
will muster sufficient support to win the presidential
election slated for next year. Kaunda probably will
want domestic elections early in 1988 in order to
capitalize on the initial popularity of his new econom-
ic recovery program, his break with the IMF, and his
enhanced international standing. As the weaknesses of
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Impact of AIDS
to cope with anticipated economically inspired unrest.
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-
which has an apparent 100-percent mortality, no pre-
ventative vaccine, and no cure-is spreading rapidly
and is out of control in Zambia and throughout central
Africa.
he spread of AIDS
is so rapid in large part because heterosexual contact is
the major mode of transmitting the AIDS-related hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in Africa, and
African health systems are, and will continue to be,
inadequate.
Zambia and other heavily infected countries are
suffering irreplaceable population losses in those groups
most essential to their future development: midlevel
economic and political managers, urban and agrarian
workers, and military personnel:
- The disease strikes hardest at the healthy, produc-
tive, 15-to-50 age group. Zambia's small elite is at
high risk.
- Approximately 15 to 20 percent of Zambia's urban
population may be HIV infected, according to
studies at Lusaka's University Hospital. AIDS is
likely to ravage the mining industry, capital city,
and settlements near the railroad-all concentrat-
ed in central Zambia.
- Rural areas have been thought to have lower
infection rates, but these more sparsely populated
agricultural areas may simply be three to five
years behind the cities rather than somehow at less
risk.
- The Zambian armed forces reportedly are heavily
infected and may become unable to defend the
country and maintain order. Air Force officer
blood donors at University Hospital, for example,
were found recently to be 35 percent infected.
Because a medical breakthough in prevention, sup-
pression, or cure, or a benign mutation of the disease,
are unlikely, Zambian deaths due to AIDS may climb
into the tens of thousands, and the size and intellectual
development of the next generation of Zambians will be
severely stunted. Moreover, epidemics of measles, tu-
berculosis, and other endemic diseases could well get a
foothold in AIDS-weakened groups and spread quickly
to others, rapidly raising the death toll.
the new reform program become evident through
appearances of consumer shortages, however, Kaunda
will look to his security apparatus to ensure stability
and to prevent the formation of a coalition opposed to
his rule. Zambia's security forces probably will be able
26. Kaunda will attempt to parlay his heightened
international profile and enduring stature as an Afri-
can statesman into increased standing at home. He will
focus on issues that draw favorable publicity or help
address Zambia's economic plight.
27. As a skilled and experienced mediator, Kaunda
is likely to be an active chairman of the OAU. He
wasted little time after assuming the post in patching
together a fragile cease-fire between Chad and Libya.
The OAU Conference on African debt that Kaunda
has called for late this year is probably of even greater
interest to him because of its possible direct impact on
Zambia. -If a consensus is reached there on dealing
with Africa's official debt problem, Kaunda probably
will call for incorporating it into the 1986-90 UN
Program of Action for Economic Recovery and Devel-
opment in Africa. To avoid further alienating Western
donors, he will not encourage proposals to repudiate
all foreign debts or moratoriums on debt service
payments. He will, however, support limiting such
payments to a fixed percentage of GNP.
28. Kaunda also will attempt to address broader
Third World initiatives, including a reordering of the
world economic system and cooperation among Third
World countries to compete more effectively in the
global marketplace. Along these lines he may urge the
establishment of a copper cartel, an international
financial organization already proposed by France to
promote development, food security plans, and in-
creased air travel linkages. None of these initiatives is
likely to gain significant momentum during the next
two years, but Kaunda will air his views and work to
shape Third World thought on the issues.
Alternative Scenarios
29. A military coup led by disgruntled junior offi-
cers or enlisted men cannot be ruled out despite
Kaunda's efforts to keep in close touch with military
sentiments. Disaffected military elements might be
tempted to seize power, particularly if there were
widespread disorder in Zambia. A military regime
would lack the skills to govern effectively, however
and Zambia would face a period of instability.
30. In the event of a rapid deterioration of the
domestic economic and political situation causing a
precipitous decline of Kaunda's authority, a broad
coalition of his opponents in party, business, labor, and
military circles might emerge. The current Ambassa-
dor to Canada, Humphrey Mulemba, is perhaps the
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most likely leader of such a coalition. Should he
succeed in ousting Kaunda, Mulemba would support
private enterprise, efficiency, and Western invest-
ment. Depending on the extent to which Kaunda's
grip on power had slipped, of course, he could counter
with his own choice of successor and back him with
whatever weight his endorsement still carried.
31. Although Kaunda appears capable of containing
these threats to his rule for the next two years, the
possibility remains that he might resign, be assassinat-
ed, or die of natural causes. If so, the Zambian
Constitution provides that the secretary general of the
ruling party-currently Grey Zulu, a staunch propo-
nent of socialist policies-would become acting head
of state until a new president can be chosen by a party
congress and confirmed in a general election. As acting
president and the top party official, Zulu would be in
the best position to succeed, in our view.
32. Least likely, in the event of a downtuis
health, Kaunda may try to install a different successor
by naming a new UNIP secretary general. Prime
Minister Kebby Musokotwane might be Kaunda's
choice; he is young, pragmatic, and energetic, and he
probably would carry on Kaunda's basic policies albeit
with an infusion of his own ideas. Musokotwane favors
Western economic principles but lacks support in the
UNIP party and is a member of a small and uninfluen-
tial ethnic group
33. None of Kaunda's possible successors possesses
his international stature, and the new Zambian presi-
dent would not automatically assume his vacant posi-
tions at the OAU or FLS.
Implications
For the Soviet Union
34. Over the next two years, Moscow will try to
improve ties-largely through military relationships
but also through carefully tailored diplomatic and
political moves-with all of the Frontline States that
are not already Soviet clients. Through these efforts,
the Soviets are attempting to increase their influence
in the region, to bolster the capabilities of the FLS to
resist South Africa, and to improve Moscow's own
credentials as an opponent of Pretoria and especially
of its apartheid policy. Zambia, however, will continue
to play only a small part in the Soviet strategy because
the Soviets' primary focus in the region will remain on
their principal clients, Angola and Mozambique.'
35. The Soviets will try to take advantage of Kaun-
da's desire to balance relations with the East and the
West, relying principally on its position as Lusaka's
primary military supplier. Moscow will not signifi-
cantly increase bilateral economic aid, however. The
Soviets are looking for ways to limit their economic
burdens in Africa and probably will rely on their
recent $100 million pledge to the Nonaligned Move-
ment's Africa Fund, some of which will be disbursed
to Zambia.
36. Zambia's break with the IMF and Kaunda's
increased visibility does afford the Soviets a propagan-
da opportunity. Moscow probably will offer induce-
ments to Kaunda to use his new Third World leader-
ship stature to criticize the Fund and to support Soviet
positions in international forums. For instance, Mos-
cow recently offered to replace unserviceable MIG-21
aircraft in Zambia's inventory at no cost, and it offered
a new $5 million line of credit for the purchase of
more military equipment contingent on at least partial
repayment of Zambia's debt.
37. President Kaunda's elevated international status
creates opportunities both for conflict and for coopera-
tion with the United States. Although a moderate by
Third World standards, Kaunda is an outspoken critic
of many US policies in Africa and elsewhere.
38. Where he believes he can be effective, particu-
larly for issues close to home, Kaunda is likely to
attempt to bring parties together and to broker a deal
acceptable to all. Kaunda's notion of pragmatic solu-
tions to specific problems, however, may differ sub-
stantially from US views. Two such issues are:
- Angolan Insurgency and Namibian Indepen-
dence. Although he initially encouraged US sup-
port to National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA) in the 1975-76 civil
war, publicly Kaunda is now vehemently op-
posed to what he characterizes as an unholy
alliance among UNITA, the United States, and
South Africa. He also is a vocal critic of the US
approach to Namibian independence.
he sounds a more moderate tone, moti-
vated by his discomfort with the large Soviet/
Cuban presence in neighboring Angola. He also
fears that South Africa is exploiting its position in
Namibia and its relations with UNITA in order
to aid Zambian dissidents. Kaunda thus will
cooperate in efforts to achieve Namibian inde-
pendence and a withdrawal of Cuban forces
from Angola. If the opportunity arose, he proba-
bly would support negotiations for a Cuban troop
withdrawal and national reconciliation in Angola
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because peace there would stabilize Zambia's
western border.
Political Change in South Africa. Although he
often leads rhetorical charges against apartheid,
Kaunda is sincerely interested in promoting
peaceful political change in South Africa. Since
becoming aware of the high costs that trade
sanctions would impose on the FLS, he has mo-
derated Zambian and FLS policy, continuing to
call for international sanctions but noting that the
FLS members are too dependent on South Africa
to do so themselves. He may offer to broker a
dialogue between the white regime and its black
opponents. Although he would insist that the ANC
be included in any South African internal
settlement, he would not be dogmatic concerning
the final form of such a settlement.
39. Where Zambia's interests are minimally en-
gaged, on the other hand, Kaunda will be harder to
deal with. He will use his leadership positions to press
Third World positions critical of the West. His first
speech as OAU chairman, for example, touched lightly
on Africa but dwelt at length on the Palestinians,
Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq war. In such areas, he
tends to adopt standard Third World rhetoric and is
unlikely to play a constructive role. Kaunda will use
his own country's problems as examples of what is
wrong with Western aid, trade, and fiscal policies.
Such efforts will inject additional irritants into US-
Zambian relations.
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ANNEX A
Senior Zambian Officials
Alexander Grey Zulu
Secretary General, United National Independence Party
(UNIP) since April 1985
Zambia's most prominent leftist, Grey
Zulu, holds the number-two position in the
government. The Zambian Constitution pro-
vides that, should President Kenneth Kaunda
die or become incapacitated, Zulu, the party
Secretary General, would serve as interim chief
executive and have responsibility for organizing
new elections within 90 days. His primary
political asset is his longtime friendship with
President Kaunda, but he also has developed a
personal following among some senior members
of the military, fellow Nyanja speakers, and
other leftist government officials. Zulu uses his
position to feed Kaunda's fears concerning do-
mestic and foreign enemies, to consolidate his
own position, and to move Zambia away from
the West.
He recently
signed a protocol in Havana to establish regular
consultations and exchange study delegations
with Cuba through 1990
Zulu, 62, has a secondary school education.
In 1958 he was banished by the British for his
part in founding Kaunda's Zambian African
National Congress, the forerunner of UNIP. He
was elected to the colonial Parliament in 1962
and since independence has held numerous
Cabinet portfolios. In addition, he served during
1978-85 as Secretary of State for Defense and
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vices
Security with responsibility for the Zambian
military and the intelligence and security ser-
Kebby Musokotwane
Prime Minister since 1985
Kebby Musokotwane, number three in the
government hierarchy, is a loyal protege of
President Kaunda. A longshot to succeed his
mentor, he is a member of one of Zambia's
smallest tribes and has negligible backing in
UNIP. Basically a technocrat, Musokotwane
was, until recently, also Minister of Finance and
has extensive experience working on Zambia's
staggering economic problems.
toward the United States.
Musokotwane, 42, was educated in Zambia
by US missionaries. He taught in local schools
from 1964 until 1973, when he became a
member of Parliament. Besides a previous stint
as Finance Minister (1979-83), he also has held
the Cabinet portfolios of Water and Natural
Resources, Youth and Sports (twice), and Gener-
al Education and Culture. He is well disposed
Humphrey Mulemba
High Commissioner to Canada since 1985
As a former secretary general of UNIP,
Humphrey Mulemba retains substantial support
among Zambian businessmen and parliamen-
and is pro-West.
tarians, despite his posting overseas. Many of his
supporters would like to see him challenge
Kaunda in the 1988 elections. Mulemba's rela-
tions with Kaunda are poor. The President
demoted him to the diplomatic corps because
Kaunda feared he was developing an indepen-
dent base of support through his UNIP position.
Mulemba favors privatization of the economy
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group.
Mulemba, 55, was educated in Zambia and
was active in the preindependence labor move-
ment. He has held several prominent party and
government positions, including serving as a
member of the UNIP central committee from
1971-85. He is a member of a small ethnic
served as deputy Army commander.
years old, is a Tonga speaker. He previously
Garry Kalenge
Commander, Zambian Army since 1987
Lt. Gen. Garry Kalenge is unpopular in the
Army and is disliked by his fellow officers,
many of whom were personally loyal to his
predecessor. Kalenge's apparent lack of political
ambition and his loyalty to President Kaunda
were probably responsible for his elevation to
Army commander. Kalenge, who is about 40
Frederick Chiluba
Chairman, Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
since 1974
Chiluba, a dynamic and effective labor
official, has long been one of President Kaun-
da's most outspoken critics. The politically sav-
vy and ambitious Chiluba aims his criticism at
Kaunda's economic policies but avoids attack-
ing the President personally. He is vocally pro-
Western and critical of socialist development
models. Chiluba's outspokenness earned him
several months of government detention in
1981. The government recently revoked his
passport to hamper his participation in interna-
tional labor conferences and also ousted him
from his executive position in the National
Union of Building, Engineering, and General
Workers.
Chiluba studied financial management in
Italy and the Netherlands. He has been a
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director of the Zambia Industrial and Mining
Corporation, the country's largest parastatal,
since 1982. Chiluba belongs to the Lunda, a
Bemba-speaking tribal group. He is about 44.
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ANNEX B
Armed Forces at a Glance
Army
Strength 14,000 personnel.
Major units Five infantry battalions, one armored regiment, one artil-
lery regiment, various support elements.
Major weapons 34 medium tanks, 31 light tanks, 101 other armored
vehicles, 55 medium field artillery pieces, and more than
30 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.
Capabilities The Army's war-fighting capabilities are marginal. The
force has virtually no capability to conduct offensive
operations beyond its borders and will continue to be
ineffective against border incursions, particularly by South
Africa. It could probably engage a slow-moving force from
Malawi, Zaire, or Mozambique; but any operations would
be hindered by severe logistic, transport, and command
and control deficiencies.
Air Force
Strength 1,800 personnel.
Major units Three fighter squadrons, three transport squadrons, two
flight training squadrons, one surface-to-air missile unit.
Major equipment 26 fighter aircraft, 27 transports, 64 trainers, 41 helicopters,
12 SAM launchers. Aircraft often are not operational.
Capabilities Armed jet aircraft give the Air Force a minor combat
capability, but it lacks the training and equipment to
provide effective air defense or close air support. The force
is capable of airlifting one or two companies, providing
VIP transport, and flying fair weather reconnaissance. The
force suffers from poor maintenance, insufficient qualified
pilots, and heavy dependence on foreign advisers, trainers,
and technicians.
Paramilitary
Strength More than 1,400 personnel.
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Major units One presidential guard force, one police mobile force
battalion, and one police paramilitary battalion.
Foreign Military Presence
Soviet Union At least 70 advisers (providing armor, air defense, and pilot
training; aircraft, and SAM maintenance).
North Korea At least 20 advisers (training army, paramilitary, and
national service personnel).
Foreign Military Assistance
Since independence, Zambia has obtained military assistance from
diverse suppliers. Non-Communist nations have provided about $236
million in military sales and $98 million in grant aid. Communist
countries have provided $410 million in sales and $20 million in grant
aid.
Until the mid-1970s, Zambia depended primarily on the United
Kingdom ($45.6 million in sales and $24 million in grants). With major
arms deliveries between 1979 and 1981 totaling $280 million in military
agreements, the Soviet Union became Zambia's largest arms supplier.
Despite this influx of Soviet equipment and ongoing advisory presence,
the Zambian military has not significantly improved its capabilities.
Testy relations between Zambians and Soviet advisers contribute to the
military's marginal effectiveness.
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