ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD AND THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R002201790012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
~a~e fundamentalism:
~icat~o~s for the Arab World
~~ tie ~Jnted States
l~tfo~t~l intelligence Estimate
N/E 36-87
December 1987
328
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National -Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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N I E 36-87
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD
AND THE UNITED STATES
Information available as of 3 December 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
The Problem ......................................................................................... 7
The Renewal and Spread of Islamic Sentiment of the Arab World. 7
Common Causes ............................................................................... 9
Sectarian Differences ........................................................................ 10
The Dynamics of the Revival in Arab Politics ................................... 12
Differences and Similarities ............................................................. 12
Government Responses ..................................................................... 14
Exceptional Cases: Lebanon and the West Bank ........................... 14
The Islamic Revival and the Outside World ...................................... 15
The American Dilemma .................................................................. 17
Soviet Liabilities ................................................................................ 18
Prospects for the Revival ...................................................................... 18
Regional Impact ................................................................................ 19
Longer Term Effects on Development and Stability ......................... 19
The Optimistic View ........................................................................ 20
The Pessimists' View ........................................................................ 20
Implications for the United States ....................................................... 21
Strengths and Opportunities ............................................................ 23
ANNEX A: Profile of Arab Nations and Status of Islamic Revival .. 25
ANNEX B: Fundamentalism and Islamic Law .................................. 27
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate examines the phenomenon of rising Islamic senti-
ment and activism in the Arab world through the end of the century,
the impact of the Islamic revival on Arab attitudes toward the United
States and the Soviet Union, and considers possible consequences for US
interests and policies. Because the Islamic revival manifests itself
differently in Muslim societies throughout the world, this discussion is
confined to Arab countries where some generalizations can be made
about the causes of the revival, its manifestations, and its direction.
Several key non-Arab countries-particularly Israel and Iran-are
considered, but only as they affect the revival in Arab societies.
The Estimate attempts to analyze the Islamic revival in the
broadest possible context. It considers the effects of the revival on
individual behavior, social patterns, and political activism, and discusses
the various components of the revival. "Islamic fundamentalism" is
often misleadingly used in popular literature as an all-embracing term
for the revival, but, for the purposes of this Estimate, we distinguish the
following as tendencies of the revival:
-Fundamentalist Islam. A belief that the sharia-the sacred law
of Islam-should be strictly followed and that Islamic society
should be purged of non-Islamic influences. Among fundamen-
talists, there are many approaches to this goal, ranging from
moderate and evolutionary to radical and revolutionary with
many positions between the extremes.
- Traditionalist Islam. A belief that the sharia law contains the
guiding principles for Islamic society and that society should be
steered back to more authentic forms of Islam's beliefs and
practices. Attitudes of traditionalists and fundamentalists have
much in common; however, traditionalists tend to be less
political and programmatic, and more accepting of the difficul-
ties of implementing a body of law over 1,000 years old.
- Reformist Islam. A belief that sharia law represents an ideal
that should guide an adaptation of Islamic society to the modern
world. Reformists, referred to also as Islamic modernists, revere
ancient Islam but see a requirement for Muslims to develop its
modern interpretations.
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This is the first estimate on the Islamic resurgence as a regionwide
phenomenon. While this paper examines the diverse doctrines and
elements of the revival and the impact on Arab and regional politics,
the Estimate does not contain acountry-by-country assessment. A brief
description of the revival in individual Arab countries is included in
annex A.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Islamic resurgence is likely to be the most powerful, wide-
spread political force in the Arab world for the remainder of this
century. It is generating a shif t toward a more authentic Islamic culture
in many parts of the region, and focusing antiforeign sentiment-
particularly against the West-within broad segments of Arab society.
No Arab regime appears immediately threatened by the kind of
upheaval that brought about the Islamic revolution in Iran, nor are any
US alliances in immediate danger. However, the destabilizing influ-
ences of the Islamic revival may weaken especially vulnerable regimes,
force more significant accommodations of religious demands, and
contribute to or act as a catalyst for more broadly based political
turmoil. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain are at greatest risk from these
destabilizing influences over the next five years.
Views concerning the impact of the Islamic revival over the long
term divide roughly into optimistic and pessimistic schools. The former
sees the potential for resurgent Islam acting as a stabilizing agent
holding society together in the face of enormous social and economic
challenges, helping to pace change according to human tolerance, and
preserving core values and traditions that give meaning to societal
advancements. The pessimistic view focuses on the reactionary impulses
that distort Islamic tradition, the rigidity that often prevails over
reasonable application of Islamic thinking, and the zealotry that makes
compromise, flexibility, and adaptability dangerous offenses.
Although deeply divided in many ways, sentiment in the revival is
dominated by three common elements:
- Promotion of Islam's concept of justice.
- Opposition to corrupt and oppressive government.
- Rejection of foreign influence.
These sentiments have spread through the lower-middle and middle
classes to challenge Arab leaders and their backers, creating a sometimes
stark difference between the popular Islam of the discontented and the
establishment Islam of ruling families and governing elites.
We believe the majority of Arab Muslims still accept their leaders
and the secular features of daily life, and are not committed to
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significant religious reforms. However, this majority is clearly suscepti-
ble to the sentiments of the revival:
- Large numbers of Arab Muslims are returning to a stricter
practice of Islam.
- Islamic study groups and benevolent societies are forming with
increasing f requency.
- Established political organizations-such as the Muslim Brother-
hood-are becoming more assertive politically and are attract-
ing new members.
Virtually all Arab governments are cognizant of the strong anties-
tablishment sentiment that drives the revival and are using both
suppression and accommodation to attempt to manage it. Most regimes
have been relatively successful in containing violence-prone groups.
However, as regimes attempt to appease the much broader and less
immediately dangerous populist pressures, their actions contribute to a
gradual shift toward a more authentic Islamic culture. We believe this
could be destabilizing for the following reasons:
- Complex social, economic, and political inequities will increas-
ingly be viewed in a moral and religious context, less subject to
political accommodation and compromise.
- The process of development and modernization could be slowed
by efforts to accommodate Islamic sensibilities and demands for
"de-Westernization" that may, in turn, exacerbate existing
economic and social tensions.
- Imposing greater religious orthodoxy will offend and alarm non-
Muslim communities, heterodox Islamic sects, and Westernized
elites.
Islamic fundamentalists regard the United States as the foremost
symbol of Western influences they perceive as responsible for stifling a
more authentic Islamic society. American cultural dynamism, economic
reach, and military capabilities are resented by many of those caught up
in the revival. The enormous appeal and impact of American culture,
US support of Israel, US actions against Lebanon and Libya, and the
larger American presence in the region make the United States more
threatening, dangerous, and a force more to be reckoned with than any
other outside power, including the Soviet Union. However, the depth of
anti-American feelings varies considerably from country to country. In
part, the United States is attacked as a convenient symbol in order to in-
fluence Arab governments to adopt domestic policies perceived more in
accord with Islam.
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The Soviet Union is the target of the same xenophobic tendencies,
is worried that the resurgence will spread among its Muslim minor-
ities-some 45 million strong-and is not likely to be able to take serious
advantage of anti-Western feelings. We are uncertain of the degree to
which these concerns will complicate Soviet handling of the Islamic
revival in the Middle East context. Soviet efforts thus far have been
largely aimed at establishment Islam and are not likely to have much
positive effect on popular attitudes. We have no evidence that the
Soviets have tried to cultivate such groups as the Hizballah or Muslim
Brotherhood. Yet, the Soviets must feel some ambivalence toward the
Islamic resurgence since, at minimum, it is likely to sharply reduce
Western presence and influence and could lead to greater opportunities
for pro-Soviet elements should Islamic oriented regimes founder.
The news is not altogether bad, however:
- Thus far, US friends in the region-Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco-have been relatively successful
in protecting relations with the United States even as they
accommodate and try to dampen sentiment within the revival.
- The revival is less political, and less virulently anti-Western,
among Sunni Muslims-the vast majority of Arabs. While the
Islamic revolution in Shia Iran and the Khomeini regime's
propaganda and covert activities have encouraged the revival's
anti-US bent even among Sunnis, this influence over time may
well abate following Khomeini's death.
- The Islamic revival is not a monolithic movement-it has no
epicenter, is largely unorganized, and lacks leadership. Although
this amorphous character is in some respects a hindrance to
controlling the revival, it also provides opportunities for pre-
empting and diminishing the potentially dangerous impulses of
the phenomenon.
- The broad range of US diplomatic influence, and the potential
to emphasize the incompatibilities between the Soviet Union
and Islam can help redirect and lessen anti-US sentiment.
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Figure 1
Arab Nations of the Middle East and the Historic Heartland of Islam
Boundary repreae ntation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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DISCUSSION
The Problem
1. The Islamic revival is a maior political force in
the contemporary world. It gained strength during the
1970s and influences some 900 million Muslims
throughout the world. Some observers link it to a
worldwide rise in religiosity and liken it to liberation
theologies. Some emphasize the diversity of the revival
and the different effects it has from North Africa
through Europe and the Far East. Others stress the
common features of its influence. Most agree, howev-
er, that the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s is
part of a long tradition of self-renewal within Islam
and of a historical process of shaping uniquely Islamic
but diverse societies in the modern world.
2. Views concerning the impact of this revival in
the Arab world divide roughly into optimistic and
pessimistic schools. The former generally see resurgent
Islam acting as a stabilizing agent holding society
together in the face of enormous social and economic
challenges, helping to pace change according to
human tolerance, and preserving core values and
traditions that give meaning to "Muslim society." The
pessimistic view focuses on the reactionary and revolu-
tionary impulses that often prevail over a more moder-
ate application of Islamic thinking and the zealotry
that makes compromise, flexibility, and adaptability
dangerous offenses.
3. The impact of the Islamic resurgence has been
especially powerful in the Middle East-the birth-
place of Islam-where Muslims constitute a vast
maiority of the populations of all but a few states,
where the holy sites of Islam are located, and where
the most prominent Islamic institutions and thinkers
have given direction to the religion. Because Islam and
Arab culture are so tightly entwined, religious identity
is especially strong, often overrides national loyalty,
and creates natural pathways for the spread of reli-
gious ideas and activism. Thus, the influence of the
current revival has been pervasive in the Arab world.
For most Muslims, the revival has been a spiritual and
personal awakening. In its extremes, however, it has
involved violence and terrorism, challenged the legiti-
macy of political leaders, and demanded total restruc-
turing of the social and political order in accordance
with Islamic law. In less zealous expressions, the
revival has affected social patterns, brought to the
surface widespread economic and political unhappi-
ness, and stimulated pressures for significant reforms.
It has also focused negative feeling toward non-
Muslims and foreign cultural, social, and political
influences.
4. The course of these sentiments has broad impli-
cations for the stability of individual Arab govern-
ments, for relationships with the outside world and,
ultimately, for the development of Arab societies. It
has significant regional and international implications.
The influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the
rise of the Hizballah in Lebanon, and less dramatic
Islamic militancy elsewhere have reverberated
throughout the Middle East, changing alliances and
challenging a regional order that has existed for
decades. Hostility toward outside interference, partic-
ularly toward the superpowers, has the potential to
unsettle bilateral relationships established by the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union. Some aspects of
strengthened Islamic sentiment are potentially harm-
ful to foreign and minority communities.
The Renewal and Spread of Islamic Sentiment of
the Arab World
Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a national-
ity, areligion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text
and sword.
Hasan al-Banna
Founder, Muslim Brotherhood
5. Because Islam contains a complete program for
ordering society and political life, and claims to be the
final, true word of God, the impulse among adherents
to cleanse society and return to Islam's principles is a
recurrent phenomenon. Attempts at purification are as
old as Islam itself. The Wahhabi movement, which
began in the 1700s and was instrumental in creating
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, is the most
durable expression of Islam's puritanical impulse in
contemporary times. The perseverance of Wahhabism
over nearly three centuries, and more recently, the
vitality of the Muslim Brotherhood-an influential,
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highly political religious order founded in the 1920s-
illustrates the persistence and power of reformist
sentiment. The most recent wave of strong religious
feeling is part of this perennial feature of Islam. 0
6. For many Arabs, the turn to Islam is a reaction to
disillusionment with their personal, national, and in-
ternational positions, and the failure of various nation-
alist and socialist ideologies. The clash of tradition and
modernization, deep ethnic and class divisions, defeats
by Israel, the omnipresence of displaced Palestinians,
and debilitating regional feuds have pushed some
Muslims to blame outside influences and to seek
solutions in the one tradition that unites the Arab
majority-Islam. The signs of reinvigorated religious
feelings are present in every Arab state and virtually
every community:
- Mosques have proliferated in recent years and
are now centers of much greater community
activity than was common a generation ago.
- New formal and informal Islamic organizations
have sprung up.
- Islamic studies are becoming common at all
levels of education.
- Islamic legal codes are being debated and
reintroduced.
- Islamic banks and financial institutions have
found a niche as an alternative to the standard
banking systems.
-Arabs of all social classes are returning in signifi-
cant numbers to the basic practices of their faith.
For most Arabs, heightened religious feeling has
simply reshaped their individual behavior. A
small but significant minority, however, has be-
come politically active and views the growing
popular enthusiasm for religious adherence as an
opportunity for gaining mass support for political
change. (See figure 8, foldout map, for sectarian
distribution.)
7. One of the most important features of the resur-
gence is that it is a populist phenomenon with leader-
ship coming from the middle class. The revival has
spread through the lower-middle classes, challenging
ruling elites and their backers, and creating a some-
times stark division between the popular Islam of the
disaffected and the establishment Islam of ruling
families and governing elites. Traditional-less activist
Islam-still prevails among lower classes who nonethe-
less represent a pool of potential recruits for Islamic
activists. Most Arab governments are trying outwardly
to manage heightened religious sentiment as if it were
a positive, or at least neutral, development. In fact,
many regimes feel significantly threatened by the
phenomenon. The essence of the threat is that popular
Islam, although deeply divided in many ways, is
fueled by ideas and forces from outside the political
establishment and, despite differing visions, shares
strong opposition to corrupt and oppressive govern-
ment, foreign influences on society, and violations of
Islam's delineation of social justice.
8. The resurgence of Islamic feeling has stimulated
political activism throughout the Arab world, but both
the tactics and goals of religious reformers vary wide-
ly. Fundamentalists are among the most assertive in
their beliefs, holding that Islam should govern all
aspects of a Muslim's existence and that Islamic law-
the sharia-should be the foundation of the state. In
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, fundamentalism is a
tenet of state policy. Even among fundamentalists,
sharp differences in attitude, tactics, and local condi-
tions distinguish myriad groups. Some, like the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, have adopted evo-
lutionary approaches to establishing Islamic govern-
ment and have often sought legal status and a collabo-
rative relationship with political leaders. Others, such
as Takfir wal Hijra in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood
in Syria (which has no legal options), and the Hizballah
in Lebanon, use assassination, terrorism, and subver-
sion in pursuit of revolutionary change.
9. Although some fundamentalists want to roll back
time and re-create the days when Islam was in its
glory and the Arab world was its center, most funda-
mentalists do not consider themselves antimodern or
antiprogressive. They do believe that modernization
has been determined on Western secular terms and
it-not Islam-must be redirected. Apart from the
fundamentalists, other major groups (often referred to
as adaptationists, reformists, and traditionalists) agree
that the Islamic ethos is dangerously challenged in
today's world but seek less radical changes than those
of the fundamentalists with the objective of preserving
the character of Islamic society. They usually empha-
size bringing individual and social behavior back in
line with the dictates of the Koran and requiring
government to accommodate and encourage Islamic
tradition and practice.
10. Taken together, those calling for sudden, dra-
matic political change in the name of Islam remain a
small minority in the Arab world. The majority of
Arabs are conventional Muslims who, although deeply
attached to Islam, seem to accept most secular features
of government and the forms of modernity that shape
daily life. However, all Arab Muslims are heavily
influenced by Islam both as a spiritual and moral force
and as a body of law and tradition. Consequently,
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Figure 2. Fundamentalist assassins of Sadat on trial.
those who call for a return of true Islam-although a
minority-serve as a kind of conscience for the com-
munity and are difficult to oppose without appearing
anti-Islamic. Many have stature and sympathy among
the manority and a potential to energize believers and
win over adherents from what now appears to be a
generally passive mainstream.
11. While radical reforms have limited appeal to
most Arab Muslims, protests against economic depri-
vation and disparities, the abuses and exclusivity of
power, and foreign interference strike responsive
chords throughout Arab society. Religious activists
have played a key role in expressing popular griev-
ances in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria and to a lesser-but
significant-extent in wealthier oil-rich states and
even in Morocco. Few may be dedicated to Islamic
government as a solution, but many Arabs are sympa-
thetic to the criticisms of society and government
leveled by ardent religious reformers.
12. The seeming suddenness and violence with
which Islamic sentiment asserted itself on the interna-
tional scene in the 1970s obscured its roots in Islamic
history and its underlying causes, which in this current
phase have been building for the past 50 years. The
upsurge in religious feeling has had independent
rhythms in individual Arab countries with wholly
distinct local events bringing the revival to the fore:
civil war in Lebanon, falling economic fortunes in
Morocco, rule by the Alawite minority in Syria, and
Sadat's peace and economic reform policies in Egypt.
Nevertheless, most Arab nations have shared some
experiences and conditions that appear to be related to
the closer embrace of Islam:
- By the 1970s, many Arabs had begun to draw
negative conclusions about the secular ideologies
and institutions they had adopted at indepen-
dence, which were now fudged unable to deliver
stability, military strength, social iustice, and
economic well-being.
- The ruling establishments, even in religiously
conservative states, had become suspect in the
eyes of many who regarded them as corrupt and
un-Islamic in their personal behavior and far too
dependent on one or the other superpower.
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Figure 3. Umayyad Mosque in Damascus built during
apex of Islamic Empire.
- The explosive growth of Arab cities such as Cairo
and Casablanca had created a frustrated urban
population that turned to Islam as the most
promising means of escape from their plight and
a vehicle to combat the alienation that often
accompanies urbanization.
-The revival of Islamic and Arabic education
following the end of colonial rule began to show
effects by the 1970s, and along with the recovery
of Islamic tradition came a fury over the deni-
gration of Islam by Western colonialists and the
perceived continuation of that contempt.
13. A number of specific events beginning in the
late 1960s also helped to encourage Islamic zeal.
Among the most important of these are:
- The calamity of the Arab defeat in the 1967
war-and particularly the loss of Jerusalem, one
of Islam's holiest sites-created a climate favor-
able to a more Islamic orientation. The secular
Pan-Arabism preached by Egypt and Syria
emerged badly battered from the war, and the
Arab losses were seen through the especially
powerful belief in Islam that God punishes de-
parture from faith and the sacred laws.
- Muammar Qadhafi's coup in Libya in 1969.
Although the Libyan leader has badly damaged
his credibility and religious credentials in recent
years, his initial allegiance to Islam and resection
of the West challenged the decades-old trend
toward Western secularization and grabbed the
attention of many Arabs.
- Arab successes in the October 1973 war with
Israel. In this conflict, Syria and Egypt intention-
ally adopted symbols of Islamic jihad (holy war)
both to inspire their armies and to attract maxi-
mum international Muslim support. The war's
enormous boost to Arab self-esteem thus became
directly linked to Islam and the fruits of renewed
faith.
-The rise in oil prices following the 1973 war. The
accumulation of oil wealth by Arab Muslims
reinforced the sense that a close embrace of
Islam yields worldly benefits. Libya and Saudi
Arabia have used their wealth to support Muslim
causes, both conventional and militant.
-The fall of the Shah in 1979. The ouster of the
Pahlavis was important to the Arab world be-
cause it demonstrated that a fully Westernized
leader could be brought down by a religiously
inspired mass movement. The export of Kho-
meini's religious militancy has inspired dissident
Muslims throughout the Arab world, South Asia,
and Europe, contributing to the sense of Islam
"on the march."
- The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by the Israelis
followed by their subsequent retreat under fire.
Israel's withdrawal from Arab territory in Leba-
non and the US retreat are widely believed to
have been forced by Islamic militants, and thus
have heightened the belief that Islamic inspira-
tion succeeds where conventional battle, secular
politics, and diplomacy fail.
14. Arguments have been made that partial or
complete derailment of the influences described above
will significantly diminish the force of the revival.
Qadhafi's discredited image, the Iran-Iraq war, the
tyranny and bleak rewards ~of Iran's revolution, and
the morass in Lebanon are cited as factors that will
deflate Islamic zeal. Like other populist movements,
the Islamic revival in the Arab world is subiect to ebbs
and flows, and these factors no doubt affect that tide.
We believe, however, that the primary motivations for
the reembrace of Islam are largely unaffected by such
setbacks. The social and economic dislocations caused
by modernization and the perception of moral decay
brought on by Western influences are likely to couple
with traditional devotion to Islam to perpetuate the
revival.
15. The Islamic revival in the Arab world is not a
coordinated, unified movement. There is no religious
or political epicenter. The vehemence of fundamental-
ist sentiment in Iran and Lebanon-where there are
maiority concentrations of Shia Muslims-has fostered
the misimpression that Shias are driving the resur-
gence among all Muslims. Certain aspects of Shia
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Islam's Major Divisions
At the time of his death in 632 AD, Muhammad-the
founding prophet of Islam-had established a new
religion and a state in the Arabian peninsula that was in
the process of becoming an empire. Muhammad could
have no successor as prophet and there has never been
any dispute that his revelations in the Koran were the
final and perfect form of God's message to all men.
Difference over temporal succession to Muhammad,
however, arose immediately between those who sup-
ported Abu Bakr-one of the prophet's closest and
ablest companions-who, indeed, took over leadership,
and those who supported Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muham-
mad's son-in-law and kinsman. Tensions between these
two groups reached a crisis when Muhammad's third
successor, Uthman, was murdered in 656 AD and Ali
assumed leadership. Uthman's family accused Ali of
giving the assassins his protection and, in the ensuing
civil war, Ali was killed. Uthman's family, the Umay-
yads established an Arab dynasty that ruled the now
multinational Islamic state for the next century. C
Those opponents of the Umayyad dynasty who ac-
cepted Ali and his family as the lawful ruler were called
the "Shi`a (party) of Ali." Their strength and numbers
were centered initially in Iraq. Those Muslims who
accepted the Umayyad dynasty and its successors be-
came known as Sunnis, a word derived from the Arabic
for "accepted practice." Numerous subsects and schools
of interpretation have developed within these two basic
divisions, but Sunnism has remained the dominant
mainstream of the religion, and Shiism has endured as
the most powerful, challenging alternative.
There is also a crucial distinction between Sunni and
Shia Islam in the role played by the clergy. Sunnis have
no organized clerical hierarchy. It was Iran's structured
Shia clerical establishment, reaching from the great
holy cities into the villages, that facilitated Khomeini's
revolution.)
Generalizations about differences in character and
tendencies between these two primary branches of
Islam are hazardous; both have puritanical impulses and
histories of challenging secular rule. Shias, however,
have generally felt greater tension in relationship to
temporal authority and have periodically derived great
political energy and cohesion from their deep emotional
and spiritual commitment to Ali, whose life has come to
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symbolize struggle against worldly tyrannies. Sunnis, on
the other hand, have placed greater value on precedent
and tradition and thus, in the main, have been more
supportive of the status quo.
More than 80 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis.
Although Sunnis have religious scholars and clerics, they
place greater stress on community consensus than on
the pronouncements of religious elders. Sunnis are
relatively tolerant of the various schools of interpreta-
tion of Islamic law that have developed within the sect
over the centuries.
Shias ascribe supernatural qualities to the descen-
dants of Ali, and believe they are the rightful leaders of
all Muslims. Shias-like Sunnis-have divided into nu-
merous subsects; the Twelvers, who dominant in Iran,
are the most numerous. There is less acceptance of one
another among the various Shia subsects than among
Sunni schools, and, although all Shias share the special
relationship to Ali and have many traditions and prac-
tices in common, some groups that consider themselves
Shia are regarded as heretical. The Alawites of Syria are
one such subsect that is shunned by the Shia main-
stream.
The fundamental difference between Shias and Sun-
nis over succession and the significance of Ali has
contemporary as well as great historical importance.
Ayatollah Khomeini's rationale for clerical rule in Iran
is that it is best suited to hold leadership in trust until
the mystical, rightful heir of Ali returns. No such
rationale could emerge from Sunni doctrine nor are
Sunnis susceptible to conversion to Shiism. The revival
within the two sects is thus on parallel but distinctly
separate doctrinal courses. Although the structure and
particularities of Shia Islamic government have no
grounding in Sunni beliefs, the notion of able leadership
that combines spiritual integrity and temporal authority
is powerful among Sunni fundamentalists and probably
appealing to religiously conscious Sunnis generally.
Although Sunnism may lack the passion for its adher-
ents that Shiism has and does not seem to offer up the
potential for the radicalism of the Iran model, its
doctrine is equally demanding in terms of purity and
righteousness and its greater flexibility on the issue of
leadership certainly does not preclude a drive for major
social and political change.
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doctrine are important factors in the vitality of funda-
mentalist activity in Iran and in the Shia communities
in Lebanon and the Gulf states, but social, political,
and economic conditions have been more important
than doctrines of the Shia faith. Moreover, fundamen-
talist efforts in predominantly Shia Iraq have had
relatively little success. By contrast, the spiritual reviv-
al has strong appeal in such Sunni Muslim countries as
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordon, and Syria. Sunnis
have traditionally used Islam as a political force more
often and more effectively than Shias, and many of
the spiritual and intellectual fathers of this contempo-
rary revival are Sunni figures. Although the revival
seems a tamer phenomenon among Sunnis than among
Shia, we believe Sunni reformers may have the poten-
tial for instigating instability and deep structural
changes in Arab societies.0
16. The feeling among Shias that they are an
oppressed minority in the Muslim world is one reason
they have been quicker to turn religious zeal into
political action:
-Shia resentment of centuries of Sunni domination
is the basic cause of religious agitation among
Shias in the Sunni-dominated countries of the
Arabian Peninsula.
- It is an important motivation behind Iran's ef-
forts to subvert Sunni leaders of neighboring
countries.
- It is a reason Shia militants in Lebanon have not
yet fully Joined forces with their Sunni Muslim
compatriots.
Although individual Sunni and Shia activists are some-
times supportive of each other and gain inspiration
from one another's successes, the ancient antagonisms
between the two sects continue to set them against one
another on a broad scale. Only when members of both
sects are preoccupied with challenging their secular,
non-Islamic foes is their mutual antipathy likely to
remain a somewhat peripheral issue.
17. Wherever they are in the Arab world, Shia
activists are likely to look to Iran for guidance and
support, at least as long as Ayatollah Khomeini is alive.
Under his leadership, Iran has vigorously supported
Shia militants and other dissident Muslims throughout
the world with recruitment and training programs,
direct funding, and the establishment and infiltration
of cultural centers and student associations. We doubt
that these efforts will meet with the same success after
Khomeini dies, however. The new sense of cohesion
among Shia will probably diminish, although the
appeal of fundamentalism will doubtless remain strong
within that sect. The strength and inclinations of
Khomeini's successors and the revolutionary institu-
tions he leaves behind will largely determine Iran's
ability to spread its revolutionary fundamentalism
further afield. Any successor to Khomeini is not likely
to abandon the instrument of Shiism or Islamic zeal as
a tool of domestic and foreign policy, particularly as a
means to gain influence among its immediate Arab
neighbors. The excesses of the Khomeini regime,
traditional Arab antipathy for Persians, and Sunni
distaste of Shia doctrine and mysticism, and its accep-
tance of clerical rule will continue under any circum-
stances to place significant limits on Tehran's appeal to
most Arab Muslims.
18. We can see no monolithic quality to this revival
as yet. For Sunnis-and most Arab Muslims are
Sunni-no single individual, institution, or country has
a dominant impact on religious sentiment or activism.
Some well-established groups such as the Muslim
Brotherhood-with chapters in virtually every Arab
country for decades-have provided doctrinal and
organizational continuity between fundamentalists of
an earlier era and activists of today. The Brotherhood
is also a wealthy organization composed in most
countries of prominent businessmen and professionals,
who have funded younger members and provided
material support to other conservative groups. Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and the oil-rich Gulf states provide
funds to various Islamic groups-both militant and
conventional-and, in some instances, prayer leaders
and community reformers have gained local follow-
ings. It is possible, however, that an individual like
Egypt's Nasir, with charisma and political savvy, who
promotes a religious rather than secular ideology,
might arise to give Sunni Muslims the inspiration that
Khomeini gives many Shia.
The Dynamics of the Revival in Arab Politics
Islam has always been there as a powerful force
behind political unheavals in the Muslim world .. .
Only an otherwise unwatchful world sees this an
awakening of a dormant force.
Hamid Enayat
Islamic Scholar
Differences and Similarities
19. The Islamic resurgence has a unique character in
each Arab country, making generalizations hazardous:
- In Jordan, fundamentalists are found throughout
government, parliament, and the universities,
and have become more active, despite recent
government crackdowns.
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Figure 4. The Grand Mosque in Mecca and the spiritual
center of Islam. Seized by fundamentalists in 1979.
- In Saudi Arabia, where fundamentalism is a key
tenet of the state, religious activism is fueled by
growing popular criticism of corruption within
the royal family and its failure to adhere to strict
Islamic values. Religious activism within the
country's Shia minority is a localized problem
but is a potential threat to order in the eastern
oil-rich Eastern Province.
- In Morocco, King Hassan is the preeminent
religious leader, but he rules through secular
institutions that afford little outlet for popular
grievances that are coalescing within popular
Islam.
- In the smaller Gulf states, religious activism
arises from Shia disaffection, disillusioned stu-
dents, and long-established conservative Sunni
Islamic groups responding to rapid change and
turmoil in the region.
20. In secular-oriented countries, the picture is
equally varied:
- Where central authority is strong and repres-
sive-Syria and Algeria-religious activists have
been forced underground or into exile and are
generally radical but fragmented. Open expres-
sion of strong religious sentiment is clearly dan-
gerous, and the inclinations of the general popu-
lation are thus difficult to gauge.
- In Tunisia and Egypt, where some freedom of
expression is permitted, religious activism runs
the gamut from militant, clandestine organiza-
tions to groups that operate openly within the
system.
- In Iraq's mixed Shia/Sunni population, stern
repression, coupled with strong nationalist senti-
ment, successful modernization efforts, and gov-
ernment attempts to balance the interests of Shia
and Sunnis, has kept the revival weak, despite
Iran's efforts to encourage it.
- In Oman and North and South Yemen, where
development and social charige have been slow
and traditional Islam is strong, there has been
much less religious agitation than elsewhere in
the Arab world.
- Lebanon and the West Bank are wholly excep-
tional (see paragraphs 27 to 29 below). 0
21. Despite these differences, heightened religious
feelings are expressed in similar ways in many parts of
the Arab world, ranging from unorganized believers in
the general population to small, tightly organized
groups of fanatics and revolutionaries:
- Within the general population, increased Islamic
feelings are manifest through high mosque atten-
dance and a closer observance of Islamic rules
and dress. Although usually politically passive,
those caught up in the revival-thought to num-
ber in the tens of thousands in Morocco and
Tunisia and many more in Egypt-have played a
significant role in mass demonstrations and disor-
ders, generally protesting over economic hard-
ships.
- A proliferation over the past decade of Sufi
orders (the Islamic form of mysticism), benevo-
lent societies, and private Islamic study groups-
found, for example, in Arab universities and
militaries-has heightened Islamic awareness.
Although most of these groups are not politically
oriented at this point, many are probably sympa-
thetic to their more active coreligionists.
-Well-established organizations such as the Mus-
lim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan and the
Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia are dis-
tinctly fundamentalist and political. They press
for reforms, generally targeting social and legal
issues, but usually steer away from direct con-
frontation, or even work with the government.
They are often wealthy and provide financial
support to younger activists. Many of today's
radical groups are offshoots of these older
organizations.
- The rise of young, well-educated fundamentalists
and popular Islamic prayer leaders or preachers
is one of the most distinctive features of the
revival. They too are pressing for reforms, but
with greater urgency and a more confrontational
attitude than the older, established groups. Well-
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educated students in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Ara-
bia, and North Africa-including many who
have studied in the West-are turning to politi-
cized Islam in significant numbers.
- At the fringe are radicals committed to the
violent overthrow of the established order.
Though very few in number, their impact on the
Arab world is disproportionately powerful by
virtue of their uncompromising vision of the
ideal Islamic society and their resistance to in-
timidation, co-option, and diversion.
22. Taken together, these manifestations of height-
ened Islamic sentiment do not constitute a movement,
but rather reflect a mood of unhappiness, a desire for
change in the direction of a more "authentic" Islamic
culture, and a disillusionment with established author-
ity. Virtually every Arab government views the Islamic
revival with at least some trepidation and is using a
combination of appeasement and coercion to manage
the challenge. Although radical groups pose immedi-
ate security problems and are the focus of much of the
energies of Arab regimes, we believe the larger body
of those swept up in the revival represents the most
serious long-range challenge to the direction-and
even the stability-of Arab governments and society.
Because of its amorphous character and lack of central
leadership and common objectives, we believe even
the most adept Arab leaders will have difficulty
channeling the impulses of the revival and monitoring
the attitudes and activities of such a wide swath of
Arab society.
Government Responses
23. Arab officials have been fairly successful at
identifying, monitoring, and containing organized ex-
tremists. The record is mixed, however, on the effec-
tiveness of outright suppression. Egyptian President
Sadat, for example, was assassinated by Islamic ex-
tremists shortly after he ordered a crackdown. In
Syria, President Assad-after unsuccessfully using a
carrot and stick approach for years-virtually annihi-
lated the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. While surviv-
ing members still work against him, Assad essentially
eliminated any immediate danger to his regime in one
draconian showdown. The risk in harsh security mea-
sures is that they tend to inspire fanatics, and they
have an uncertain impact on the wider Muslim com-
munity, which-in line with Muslim tradition-op-
poses harsh punishment for any Muslim acting on
strong religious conviction.
24. Virtually all Arab governments are engaging in
some degree of accommodation of religious demands.
Most Arab leaders have increased their public displays
of devotion in an effort to enhance their legitimacy.
Even secular leaders, such as Iraq's Saddam Husayn
and Syrian President Assad, are trying to associate
themselves more closely with religious practices and
the symbols of Islam. Almost all Arab regimes are
enforcing adherence to the restrictions of Ramadan
(the Muslim month of fasting), are using government-
controlled media to purvey an image of Islamic
devotion, and are devoting more resources to religious
affairs ministries and mosques.
25. On the far more contentious issue of imple-
menting Islamic law or the sharia, a primary objective
of fundamentalists, most governments are proceeding
cautiously and with considerable reluctance. The Mu-
barak government, for example, has tried to sidetrack
fundamentalist demands for implementation of the
sharia by embarking on a drawn-out process of exam-
ining every Egyptian law for adherence to the letter
and spirit of the sharia. Other governments that
inherited legal codes from colonial powers are at-
tempting to confine the application of sharia to per-
sonal and family matters, such as marriage, divorce,
and inheritance. They particularly want to avoid the
controversy that inevitably arises over sharia punish-
ments in criminal law such as stoning, amputation, and
decapitation. Only Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya, and
Bahrain have incorporated these aspects of sharia in
their legal systems.
26. Because application of the sharia is a central
goal of fundamentalists and the chief expression of
their faith, the tentative moves most Arab govern-
ments have taken have satisfied only the most moder-
ate reformers. At the same time, even relatively
modest accommodations of Islamic law have alarmed
religious minorities, non-Muslim foreign communities
and those in the middle and upper classes who are
committed to secularism.
Exceptional Cases: Lebanon and the West Bank
27. Two decades of Israeli occupation of the West
Bank and more than a decade of civil strife in
Lebanon have created circumstances especially condu-
cive to the rise of Islamic activism. Although both
areas have experienced the same socioeconomic diffi-
culties that have fueled Muslim sentiment elsewhere
in the Arab world, the struggle by Muslims against
non-Muslims is an important impetus for Islamic
militancy in these unique parts of the Arab world.
Indeed, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in
1967 and Christian and Israeli collaboration against
Muslims in Lebanon since the mid-1970s and the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon reverberated in surround-
ing Arab countries and were contributing causes of the
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Figure 5. The attack of President Sadat by fundamentalists in the Egyptian military.
revival regionwide. The emergence of several genera-
tions of deeply alienated, violence-prone Palestinians
and Lebanese Muslims ensures that these radicalizing
tendencies will continue and probably broaden.
fundamentalism is making slow but steady pro-
gress throughout Palestinian society on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, attracting about 15 percent of the
Muslim population. Its greatest impact has been
among young Palestinians in universities and second-
ary schools. Dissatisfaction with secular politics and
increased restrictions on political activity under hard-
line Israeli leadership have caused West Bankers and,
even more so, Gazans to turn in increasing numbers to
violence and Islamic activism. Ironically, Israeli offi-
cials and Palestinian secular leaders are trying in the
struggle against one another to manipulate Islamic
activism for their individual purposes, and neither side
seems concerned, at this point, that such machinations
might spawn activity that will be difficult to control.
ed to the establishment of an Islamic republic on the
model of Iran. The much smaller Islamic Unity Move-
ment, located in northern Lebanon, also believes in
Islamic government but one in line with Sunni doc-
trine. Revolutionary Iran continues to be the primary
benefactor of Hizballah-providing up to $100 million
annually-and has encouraged its surrogate in a cam-
paign against the United States, Israel, and Western
interests generally. The Lebanese central government
is incapable of controlling Hizballah or any other
fundamentalists group, which are limited in their
actions only by competition from other warring par-
ties-including Syria and Israel-and the deeply frac-
tured nature of society itself. Conditions in Lebanon
are such that no fundamentalist group is likely to gain
the necessary strength or territorial control in the next
several years to establish uncontested hegemony in a
significant portion of the country. However, we expect
fundamentalist groups to fare well in the competition
for new recruits and adherents.
29. In war-torn Lebanon, fundamentalists have be-
come maior competitors in the struggle for control of
the country. The Shia Hizballah movement is dedicat-
The Islamic Revival and the Outside World
Everything around is anti-Islamic barbarousness; per-
ceptions and beliefs, manners and morals, culture,
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Figure 6. The wreckage of US Marine barracks in Beirut following car bombing.
art and literature, laws and regulations, including a
good part of what we consider Islamic culture.
before a truly Islamic power can present an alterna-
tive.
Sayyid Qutb
Noted Fundamentalist Writer
30. Concern over foreign influences on Arab society
and politics is a maior theme of the Islamic revival.
Many who wish to reinvigorate Islamic society accept
at least some foreign innovations in daily life, but wish
to recapture more authentic Muslim values and prac-
tices. They see evolutionary change toward greater
Muslim authenticity as the solution to the erosion of
Islamic culture. In contrast, fundamentalists, in gener-
al, are more openly hostile to foreign encroachment,
are more global in their perspective, and are more
political in their attacks. They, like most Arabs, con-
demn the prevailing international order, often in
rhetoric very similar to Third World and militant
nonaligned movements. They argue that the super-
powers and their allies exploit the Muslim world and
have made Arab countries economically and political-
ly dependent. At the extreme, they believe that this
system is perpetuated by the intermediation of cor-
rupted Arab rulers and elites who must be eliminated
31. From this perspective, fundamentalists take on
both superpowers. The United States, as the principal
Western power and perceived successor to past British
and French colonial rulers, has effectively become the
primary target of anti-Western sentiment.
32. The enormous appeal and impact of American
culture to many Arabs, US support of Israel, US
actions against Muslims in Lebanon and Libya, and
the larger American presence in the region make it a
more serious challenger than the Soviet Union in the
eyes of a Muslim activist. We believe these feelings
will create challenges for the United States and friend-
ly Arab governments in managing the political impact
of the Islamic revival, protecting against militant and
terrorist activity, and preserving a range of bilateral
cultural, economic, and social relations. For its part,
the Soviet Union is excoriated for atheism, suppression
of its Muslim minority, and-more recently-for its
invasion of Afghanistan, where Islamic militants rep-
resent the principal military challenge to Soviet domi-
nation. Although the Soviet Union will also have
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difficulty managing its interests, Moscow is less vulner-
able in view of its much smaller presence in the
region, and is likely to have some opportunities to
capitalize on the greater disadvantage of the United
States.
33. Wary Muslims see similarities in American and
Soviet culture: scientific methodology and the belief in
progress pervade both, customs in such sensitive areas
as the relationship between the sexes are seen as
similar and Muslims sense that Americans and Soviets
are equally convinced of the primacy of Western
civilization. However, the dreary state culture of the
Soviet Union has had virtually no impact on the Arab
world. Even Marxism and atheism-both anathema to
strong Muslim believers-have gained followings
among Arabs via the West; the versions purveyed by
the Soviets are generally considered hidebound and
lacking intellectual honesty. The United States, on the
other hand, has enormous cultural influence, and thus
is closely associated with-or even held largely respon-
sible for-the perceived erosion of religious values, the
encroachment of secularism, and the promotion of
modernizing models that are viewed as dehumanizing,
valueless, and excessively materialistic.
34. American literature, textbooks, products, mov-
ies, and advertising are found throughout the Arab
world, even though much of this material is offensive
even to many moderate Muslims. To religious reform-
ers, the list of American cultural "offenses" is almost
endless, but several are particularly onerous. American
schools, particularly those in the Arab world such as
the American University of Beirut, are regarded by
some fundamentalists as among the most objectionable
aspects of US cultural allure, in that they infect young
Muslims with alien ideas at an early age. Also of
concern is the Christian heritage of many of these
schools and their role in what is regarded as the
continuing export of Christianity from America.
Christian missionaries and clergy are, for fundamen-
talists, adirect threat to Islam. Many fundamentalists
see lingering anti-Muslim sentiment in Christianity,
believe that these feelings are a strong component in
US policies, and are increasingly using the symbols of
ancient Christian-Muslim rivalry and hatred-specifi-
cally the crusades-in their criticism of the United
States. The recently deceased leader of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, considered to be a moderate
and pragmatic voice within the Brotherhood, articu-
lated this concern most concisely: "US attitudes are
motivated by several factors, but the most important,
in my view, is religious fanaticism.... This attitude is
a continuation of the crusader invasion of 1,000
years ago." That American clergy and academics have
not been immune from Muslim terrorism in Lebanon
is not surprising.
35. We believe these religious and cultural sensitiv-
ities can fan anti-American sentiment, particularly
among middle-class, educated youth. Some people
believe that there is an anti-Christian bias articulated
by fundamentalists that may find greater receptivity
at a time when the history of Islam is receiving much
wider attention. Some young people educated in the
West have turned to Islam apparently because of the
cultural disorientation they experience while away
from home and because reembracing their faith is the
quickest way to regain their intellectual and emotional
moorings. Many returning students describe their ex-
perience in America as a psychological onslaught
rather than a stimulating, growth experience.
36. The US relationship with Israel is perceived by
many Arabs, not lust those caught up in the revival, as
one of total and uncritical support of Israel against the
Arabs and, by extension, Islam. Israel's invasion of
Lebanon, its attacks on Iraq and Tunisia, its actions
against Palestinians, and its refusal to give up the
occupied territories are viewed as American supported
on the grounds that the United States has done nothing
to stop such actions and has often supplied the military
equipment to execute them. The US-Israeli agreement
on strategic cooperation is viewed as evidence of
unqualified US backing of Tel Aviv. On the issue of
US support of Israel, the views of fundamentalists and
most other Arabs are the same, thus giving impas-
sioned Muslims a powerful theme that will encourage
anti-American feelings from what would otherwise be
inattentive audience.
37. Moreover, the conflict with Israel has increas-
ingly been viewed as a religious struggle. Israel's
control of Muslim holy sites in east Jerusalem, Israel's
vigorous settlement effort in occupied territories, and
the rise of militant Jewish activism are much more
serious' complicating factors in the peace effort and in
US-Arab relations, when viewed as religious rather
than secular political issues. Fundamentalists and
others have capitalized on these emotional themes at
the expense of US and moderate Arab leaders.
38. Only the most extreme fundamentalists hold
such sweeping negative views of the United States.
Common bonds and interests mitigate in varying
degrees these perceptions of America. Where US
economic aid has promoted development and im-
proved the quality of life, considerable good will
toward the United States exists. US security assistance
is certainly welcomed by many Arab governments
and, although suspect in some segments of the popula-
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lion, is appreciated by those who share a distrust of
Moscow and its proxies. A common belief in one God
creates a special rapport with many Americans and
interfaith discourse has had some success in promoting
mutual understanding among individuals and clergy.
However, these positive forces have clearly not been
sufficient to prevent an anti-US current in the Islamic
revival.
Soviet Liabilities
39. Moscow cannot take much comfort in Ameri-
ca's negative image among many Islamic revivalists. It
is often condemned in the same manner as the United
States, and, in countries such as Syria where it has a
large presence, Soviets are the targets of fundamental-
ist repudiation and terrorism. Over a dozen Soviet
advisers were killed by the Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria between 1980 and 1981, and four Soviet diplo-
mats were kidnaped and one killed in Beirut in 1985.
positive affect on popular attitudes. We have no
evidence that the Soviets have tried to cultivate such
groups as the Hizballah or Muslim Brotherhood,
despite their anti-Western agendas, nor, to our knowl-
edge, have such groups sought Soviet support. Initially,
Soviet theoreticians and academics were cautiously
optimistic about opportunities to use the Islamic revival
against the United States, but they have grown pro-
gressively pessimistic in their evaluation of the extent
to which Islamic sentiments can serve Soviet interests.
We believe this pessimism reflects Moscow's concern
about its internal Muslim problem and a more realistic
appraisal of the powerful antiforeign bias of the
revival. However, Moscow will attempt to take advan-
tage of the phenomenon and encourage anti-US action
and rhetoric when and where its hand in such dealings
can be masked or simply when Soviet and Islamic
interests coincide, such as in Moscow's current dealings
with Iran.
40. Moreover, since the late 1970s, Moscow has
become increasingly apprehensive about the spread of
the Islamic revival from the Middle East into Central
Asia and Azerbiian, where approximately 45 million
Soviet Muslims live.
during the final years of the Brezhnev regime, the
Kremlin perceived Islam as a growing threat to its
southern frontier. A recent intensification of antireli-
gious campaigns in the Caucasian republics-reflected
in party speeches and the media-is shaping into a
move against Islam similar to the anti-Christian cam-
paign during the Khrushchev era. Riots in Alma Ata in
late 1986 following the appointment of a Russian as
party leader in Kazakhstan have probably heightened
Moscow's concern about nationalism and the degree to
which it is bolstered by Islam.
41. We are uncertain of the degree to which these
concerns will complicate Soviet handling of the Islam-
ic revival in the Middle East context. Moscow will
probably continue to use cooperative diplomats, aca-
demics, and clerics from its Muslim minority to woo
Arab Muslims. The Soviets will probably continue a
series of Islamic conferences intended to convince
foreign Muslims that their Soviet coreligionists are free
to pursue Islam and to project the notion that Soviet
interests are compatible with the Islamic community.
The 1986 Baku conference boasted representation
from 60 countries and was by far the most successful
of the seven such conferences Moscow has organized.
42. These efforts are largely aimed at establishment
Islam, however, and are not likely to have much
Prospects for the Revival
43. We anticipate that the Islamic revival will
remain a significant political force into the 1990s and
probably beyond. Issues involving Islamic law and
social practice are becoming a maior component of the
domestic political debate in most Arab states. Although
there may in time be disenchantment with more
extreme fundamentalist solutions, this will not neces-
sarily lessen a heightened sense among many Arabs
that greater respect for Islam in society and govern-
ment and in relations with the outside world is
necessary, nor will it soften criticism of current lead-
ers, political institutions, or the Western forms of
culture that predominate.
44. The most likely impact of the Islamic revival
into the next decade will be a shift toward an authen-
tic Islamic culture where Muslim practices and tradi-
tions have much more influence in social and political
life. This evolution could be politically destabilizing.
Without corresponding economic reform in favor of
the disadvantaged-which is envisaged by Muslim
revivalists-disparities in wealth and living standards
may be cast increasingly in a moral context that could
erode the passive acceptance that has generally char-
acterized the Arab underclass. Although more moder-
ate religious reformers may be mollified by small
changes, determined activists will probably agitate for
even greater change. Imposing greater religious ortho-
doxy will offend and alarm non-Muslim communities,
heterodox Islamic sects, and Westernized elites. Some
or all of these problems are likely to develop or have
already emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco,
and Jordan.
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Develop-
ments in Tunisia may provide signposts in charting the
path of the revival. Tunisia suffers all the ills that have
generated the revival in other Arab countries-dispari-
ties in wealth and living conditions, joblessness, and a
burgeoning population disillusioned and worried about
the future. Strong Western influence on society, govern-
ment, and leadership, the determined secularization of
the country under President Bourguiba, and worsening
economic and social problems have spawned a vigorous
revival with a strong fundamentalist component. At the
end of the Bourguiba era, the issue of the country's
direction under new leadership is likely to put the
strength and direction of the revival there in bold relief.
45. Efforts by Arab governments to accommodate
religious demands and attempts by individual leaders
to project a more Islamic image will contribute signifi-
cantly to the shift toward a more conservative Islamic
way of life in the Arab Middle East. While radical
groups will be largely contained by increased official
vigilance, more moderate forces at work in the revival
are likely to be appeased rather than suppressed and
will attract more followers. We expect that many
Western cultural "offenses"-movies, advertising,
television programing, and the like-will be increas-
ingly restricted. Of greater consequence, birth control
programs, some Western educational practices, and
interest banking will come under increasing fire.C
46. We believe the chances are remote that any
existing government will be overthrown in the next
two years by forces like those that ousted the Shah.
Lessons learned from the Iran experience, greater
government vigilance, and official attention to the
concerns of fundamentalists and others will diminish
the possibility of forces coalescing around an effective
revolutionary leadership-as they did in Iran. Within
this timeframe, however, the destabilizing influences
of the Islamic revival may weaken especially vulnera-
ble regimes and contribute to or act as a catalyst for
more broadly based political turmoil. Moreover, some
extremist Islamic groups and lone fanatics are bound
to go unnoticed and will pose dangers to the safety of
individual Arab leaders.
47. In addition to seemingly intractable socioeco-
nomic problems that will continue to motivate the
resurgence, we believe a number of developments
could take place over the next several years that would
increase religious agitation. These include:
- Major conflict between Israeli and Arab forces.
-The desecration of Muslim holy places in the
West Bank by Jewish extremists.
- A dramatic drop in oil prices that substantially
affects the resources available in oil-rich states
and among the recipients of their assistance.
48. Other events and developments could signifi-
cantly slow the growth of the Islamic revival:
-Abroad upturn in the Arab economies sparked-
most probably-by significant increases in oil
revenues.
- Substantial progress in solving the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
- The collapse of the Islamic revolutionary regime
in Iran.
-Missteps by Islamic fanatics, triggering a back-
lash by moderate and/or secular elements.
Regional Impact
49. Over time, political pressure generated by the
Islamic resurgence will tend to push Arab countries
toward a more nonaligned posture and toward at-
tempts to reduce conflicts among Arab Muslims. Is-
lam's central tenet that Muslims are one community
that transcends all other loyalties is a recurrent theme
in the revival. We doubt that the feuding and distrust
will desist, but the revival will create more incentives
for Arab countries-especially weak ones-to improve
their Islamic credentials. In international forums such
as the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, and
the Islamic Conference, Arab leaders are likely tb
formulate their positions with much greater sensitivity
to the host of issues that have arisen from strong
Islamic sentiment.
Longer Term EfFects on Development and
Stability
50. There exists a broad spectrum of views among
analysts on the longer term meaning of the revival.
The alternative scenarios presented here are to be
considered archetypical examples characterizing the
more optimistic and pessimistic views of the revival.
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The Optimistic View
51. Under this view, Islam will act not as a disrupt-
ing agent but as a stabilizing factor within Arab
societies: a glue holding the culture together in the
face of enormous social and economic challenges.
There has long existed a dynamic tension in Arab
societies between the need for development and the
desire to preserve society's core values. Arab leaders
and populations have a strong, almost desperate desire
to restore Arab and Islamic culture to a stronger
position relative to the rest of the world in science and
technology, military power, and cultural contributions.
In addition, there has been a deeply rooted backlash
against the assault on traditional values and customs
wrought by foreign influence and rapid change.
52. Islam has, in various historical periods, served as
a progressive force in society, and optimists assert that
Islam will be the most effective means for rationaliz-
ing the "modernization/traditions" dilemma. Using
Islamic legitimacy and its mobilizing potential could
provide Arab governments a tool for reshaping mod-
ernization, making the pursuit of development and
positive change not only less threatening, but an
Islamic duty. In addition, even if radical fundamental-
ists were to take over in any given country, they would
have to take pragmatic considerations into account. In
the abstract, their ideas might appear inflexible and
even regressive; in an actual working situation, at least
some compromises would have to be made.
53. Though all analogies between countries in the
Middle East ultimately founder on the particularities
of the individual states, a comparison of the recent
histories of Iran and Saudi Arabia illustrates the
optimists' point. In Iran, the Shah perceived Islam as a
restraining factor in his plans to pull the country
forward. He gave Islamic institutions little means for
affecting the direction, pace, and nature of change. In
Saudi Arabia, the royal family has stuck to an explicit
policy of defending Islamic custom. While pursuing
selective modernization, the Kingdom's survival of the
dramatic change and shocks of the last decade and a
half (first, in absorbing previously unimaginable oil
revenues and then riding the revenue curve back
down again) was aided by the stabilizing influence of
Islam.
The Pessimists' View
54. The pessimists do not argue that Islam is neces-
sarily regressive, but they see the current revival as
driven by reactionary impulses. This colors the appli-
cation of Islamic tradition in such a way that, the
pessimists argue, the revival itself must be seen as
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The oil boom of the 1970s and the rapid moderniza-
tion that it fueled in the Arab world were clearly
contributing causes of the Islamic revival. The rapid
social and cultural changes that accompanied the era of
prosperity were profoundly disorienting to many Arab
Muslims, who sought continuity and refuge in Islam.
Greater educational opportunities, exposure to foreign
cultures and ideas through the mass media, and the
comingling in large numbers of conservative migrants
from rural areas with thoroughly Westernized, secular-
oriented city dwellers created conditions for the rapid
growth of powerful religious sentiment.
The changing oil market in this decade and the
recession that many states in the region are experienc-
ing have not appreciably slowed the expansion of the
Islamic revival, however. Policies by most Arab govern-
ments to slow modernization-for both practical eco-
nomic and political reasons-have not reduced the
tensions that seem to give rise to religious agitation. We
believe this is because rapid change spurred by the oil
boom-while an important factor in the revival-was
only one of many causes of the turn to Islam. Paradoxi-
cally, the economic downturn has affected attitudes in
ways that may even be fueling the religious resurgence:
- Expectations for education, employment, housing,
and a better life generally have been dashed for
many young Arabs whose frustration is being
vented through political Islam.
- Disparities in economic, social, and political power
were brought to the fore during the economic
boom and now seem more entrenched to those
who have little hope of improving their lot
through the conventional means of better educa-
tion and fobs.
-The decline in wealth is evidence for some of
God's punishment for departure from strict faith.
- The complexities of daily life in a world that
lingers between modern and traditional practices
and beliefs have created a yearning for the sim-
plicity that Islam preaches.
- The inconsistencies and abrupt changes in govern-
ment policies have fed the suspicions of many that
current Arab leaders are corrupt, incompetent,
and lack any clear vision of where they are
leading their countries.
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putes into Holy War.
reactionary and a maior impediment to moderniza-
tion. In this view, the more "Islamic" that societies
become, the less able they will be to address problems
pragmatically. The horrifying costs borne by both
sides in the Iran-Iraq war is an extreme example of the
potential to remove any possibility of reasonable com-
promise by transforming territorial or political dis-
Arab countries, especially those without huge oil re-
serves, can improve their economic well-being only by
increasing human productivity to competitive levels.
In an increasingly integrated and competitive interna-
tional economy the practical application of many of
the principles of the Islamic revival is likely to impede
development in the Arab world:
- Strict observance of certain religious duties-
prayers and long fasting-will divert time from
productive economic pursuits.
- Separation of the sexes in the workplace will add
to the marginal costs of production in economic
enterprises.
- Constraints on the education and employment of
women will deprive the Arab economies of a
significant potential pool of productive talent.
- The concept of "revealed truth:" in Islamic
theology will reinforce existing autocratic ten-
dencies in the Arab world, probably making
social and economic organization more rigid, less
adaptable to changing conditions, and less willing
to accept new ideas.
- Conformity will tend to be prized over
innovation.
- Fatalism-a practical though not necessary fea-
ture of Islamic society-will tend to continue to
stifle initiative and personal responsibilty.
- Islamic inheritance laws would divide land into
progressively smaller-and less efficient-
parcels.
- "Morals" laws would inhibit foreign tourism and
investment.
- Islamic governments would be most unlikely to
implement any sort of programs for limiting
population growth.
A competitive environment-in which only a tiny
advantage can spell the difference between success
and failure-will probably leave economies heavily
influenced by the Islamic revival increasingly behind
many other developing economies in the Third World.
On the more positive side, however, the inefficiencies
of an "Islamic" economy could well be less of a drain
on some Arab economies than the "Arab socialist"
measures of the past in countries such as Syria, Algeria,
and Libya.
Implications for the United States
56. The United States has had a mixed experience
with strongly Islamic states. In Libya under the Sanussi
leader, King Idris, and in Saudi Arabia where funda-
mentalist Islam is the foundation of the state, generally
constructive, close relations and protection and ad-
vancement of US interests have been possible. US
experience with revolutionary Iran suggests that,
whenever a regime closely associated with-or per-
ceived to have been supported by-the United States
is replaced by Islamic Revolutionary forces, prospects
for effective dialogue or even pursuit of parallel
interests are poor. We do not foresee such dire circum-
stances arising in the next several years, but Islam's
strong hold on Arab Muslims, the gradually expanding
scope of this revival, the volatility of regional politics,
and the factors for instability in many Arab countries
make the more distant future much less certain.
57. The immediate challenge for the United States
will be to help adjust, along with friendly Arab states,
to the changes that the Islamic resurgence will pro-
duce for as long as it remains a dynamic force. In
virtually every Arab country where the United States
has significant policy and security interests-Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf States, Morocco,
and Tunisia-the Islamic resurgence is either strong or
affecting areas of internal vulnerability. Even in those
countries where US interests are less significant or
bilateral relations are adversarial-Algeria, Iraq, Syria
-the course of Islamic activism will have-at mini-
mum-an indirect impact on US interests.
58. There are serious limits on the influence the
United States can bring to bear directly on the prob-
lems it is likely to face. Hostility toward the United
States from Islamic quarters has as much to do with
American cultural dynamism, economic reach, and
military capabilities as with specific US actions. What
America is, as well as what it does, sometimes offends
and challenges fundamentalists. For this reason, the
United States can do almost nothing directly to satisfy
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59. Thus far, US friends in the region-Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan-have been reasonably
successful in accommodating some fundamentalist de-
mands without significant damage to policies impor-
tant to the United States. We expect that, under most
circumstances, they will continue to balance fairly
well these internal pressures on the one hand and to
protect relations with the United States on the other.
Nonetheless, these leaders may have to accommodate
a steady "de-Westernization" of daily life and in-
creased manifestations of anti-US sentiment, and show
a greater reserve in the conduct of public aspects of
bilateral relations-all a price for maintaining that
balance.
provocative ammunition to those Muslims looking for
evidence of American trespasses.
62. The special relationship between the United
States and Israel will continue to be a major source of
friction with even the most moderate Muslims. US
actions and policies on such sensitive issues as the
status of Jerusalem, control of the Islamic holy sites,
and Israeli settlement policy are potential flashpoints
for explosive anti-US feelings.
63. We do not believe that religious sentiment is
having a major effect on the militaries in any of the
Arab countries currently receiving US military assis-
tance.
60. Harassment of-in some cases even physical
danger toward-US citizens and officials is likely to
increase in those countries where radical fundamental-
ism is strongest. Even though the security services of
most Arab countries are devoting significant energy to
controlling religious agitation, extremist organizations
often have cellular structures that are difficult to
penetrate or even monitor, and random acts by lone
fanatics are virtually impossible to preempt. Experi-
ence to date suggests that the risks for Americans are
higher in those areas where there are significant
concentrations of Shia Muslims-Lebanon and the
Persian Gulf states. Although both Sunni and Shia
fundamentalist groups hold anti-American attitudes,
Shias have more often engaged in direct attacks on US
personnel and installations. Apart from occasional mob
violence, attacks by Sunnis on US citizens have been
rare, although this may not always be so.
61. Bilateral relations could also be complicated by
increasingly severe punishments imposed on US citi-
zens living in Arab countries as more and more states
give greater place to Islamic law. Special exceptions
for private US citizens and leniency arranged through
diplomatic efforts are disappearing practices ~
US Government intervention on behalf of its citizens
will also become more difficult and risk laden. Crimi-
nal offenses in sharia law encompass a broad range of
behavior-much of which could be considered totally
acceptable in the United States. Rules of evidence can
be discriminatory and unfair, and some punishments
would be considered barbarous by American stan-
dards. While the potential for serious, regular friction
between the United States and an Arab government on
such issues is not great, one controversial case-
involving an American diplomat, for example-could
galvanize popular outrage on either side and give
I The extent of funda-
mentalist and anti-US sentiment in Arab military
establishments and the effect of these attitudes on
security assistance programs, treaty agreements, the
security of US military technology, and the safety of
US military personnel will remain a key issue for as
long as the Islamic revival persists. Despite the disci-
pline in professional armies, middle-grade officers,
noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men are ex-
posed to the economic deprivations and social and
political frustrations that give rise to strong Islamic
sentiment. Actions by the governments of Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to weed out
those suspected of subversive religious sympathies or
associations are one measure of their concern. Custom-
ary military secrecy, compounded by the cellular
structure of most covert fundamentalist groups, pose
serious difficulties for assessing with confidence the
loyalty of Arab armed forces to their regimes.
64. The high profile US diplomatic, military, and
unofficial activities in several friendly Arab countries
is both a security and political liability. The conspicu-
ousness of some US diplomatic installations has come
to symbolize Western permeation of Arab culture and
almost certainly invites the attention of those inclined
toward militant anti-US actions. Americans-official
and private-are often perceived as living exceptional-
ly well on host government economies and thus indi-
rectly dispossessing poorer Muslims. They are associat-
ed closely with the Arab elite and with a lifestlye that
arouses the ire of fundamentalists and offends the
egalitarianism of conservative and traditional Muslim
believers. 0
65. The dilemmas and difficulties that the Islamic
revival poses to the United States do not in themselves
constitute tangible gains for the Soviet Union. Soviet
leaders probably do not expect rapid or dramatic
changes in their position but see any erosion of US
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Figure 7. US Embassy Beirut. The target of
anti-American fanaticism.
credibility, whether or not Moscow's standing is en-
hanced, as a net gain. Additionally, Soviet policy
under Gorbachev is gradually improving Moscow's
position and has been adroit in taking advantage of US
liabilities in the region that might be magnified by the
Islamic revival.
Strengths and Opportunities
66. The Islamic revival in the Middle East, with all
it connotes for possible structural changes and pres-
sures on Arab governments, is not monolithic and is
not likely to be. Although common elements and
attitudes exist, the resurgence takes a different form
and moves at a different pace in individual Arab
countries. Using carefully tailored policies, construc-
tive bilateral relations with US friends and allies are
likely to be preserved.
68. Emphasizing the incompatibilities between the
Soviet Union and Islam and the dangers posed by
Soviet policies might help shift fundamentalist criti-
cism from Washington to Moscow. Fundamentalists
could be reminded often that the Soviet Union rules
some 45 million Muslims in Central Asia and the
Caucasus and that the Soviets are brutally suppressing
Muslims in Afghanistan. Where possible, friendly Arab
governments might be asked to cooperate in US
humanitarian assistance to anti-Soviet Afghan forces-
particularly in the medical treatment of victims of
Soviet terror weapons such as explosive toys.
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ANNEX A
Population Profile Status of Revival
(mid-1987)
23,461,000 Open manifestations of militant Islam suppressed by
99 percent Sunni regime. Revival expanding among students and
youth. Some local, violent clashes with authorities.
464,000 Well-developed fundamentalist activity in both Shia
100 percent Muslim and Sunni communities. Evidence of Iranian-encour-
70 percent Shia, aged religious subversion.
30 percent Sunni
51,930,000 Significant popular appeal with organized groups
94 percent Sunni including a few violence-prone dissidents. Moderate
6 percent Coptic Christian and other fundamentalists in parliament. Charismatic clergy
members with local and national following.
16,971,000 Some fundamentalist activity, particularly among
97 percent Muslim Shia. Iraqi religious exiles receive support from Iran.
60-65 percent Shia War has rallied national sentiment but also created
32-37 percent Sunni conditions that may foster revival in future.
4,222,000 Signs of revival. Islamic activists forming new front of
13.1 percent Sunni opposition to Israeli occupation.
West Bank 970,000
80 percent Sunni
Gaza 560,000
99 percent Sunni
2,762,000 Revival is expanding particularly among young peo-
95 percent Sunni ple. Religious activities throughout society and gov-
5 percent Christian ernment but largely reform minded rather than
antiregime.
1,864,000 Revival is expanding among both Shia and Sunni. It is
85 percent Muslim particularly strong among students. Wide range of
55 percent Sunni organized groups, some bent on antiregime activity
30 percent Shia and Iranian inspired terrorism.
3,321,000 Strong fundamentalist appeal among Shia. Expanding
75 percent Muslim religious activism among Sunni. Likely to remain
27 percent Sunni center for religious zealotry for some time. No group
41 percent Shia capable of much more than marginal expansion of
7 percent Druze local control.
25 percent Christian
3,307,000 Repressive nature of regime inhibits religious dissent.
97 percent Sunni Qadhafi's version of Islam offensive to conservative
religious sensibilities of many Libyans. Recent evi-
dence of some religious agitation.
23,361,000 Some mass appeal. Growing attraction among young
99 percent Sunni people. Moderate fundamentalist view among mid-
dle- and upper-class intellectuals. Small organized
antiregime component mainly located outside the
country.
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Profile of Arab Nations and Status of Islamic Revival (continued)
Population Profile Status of Revival
(mid-1987)
6,533,000 Compatibility of Shias and Sunnis, and slow pace of
100 percent Muslim modernization have prevented rapid development of
42 percent Shia revival. Some fundamentalists are politically active in
48 percent Sunni constituent assembly and campuses.
1,227,000
100 percent Muslim
25 percent Sunni
75 percent Ibadi (conservative Islamic
sect)
316,000 Local and expatriate Shia community closely moni-
100 percent Muslim Cored. Regime generally able to satisfy conservative
89 percent Sunni Islamic sentiment.
11 percent Shia
14,905,000 Some criticism of government by students, clerics,
100 percent Muslim Shias. Since attack on Great Mosque in 1979 by
94 percent Sunni radical fundamentalists, no evidence of organized
6 percent Shia dissidence.
2,351,000 Marxist government trying to minimize traditional
100 percent Sunni Islamic influence. Fundamentalist movement driven
underground in early 1970s.
11,148,000 Muslim Brotherhood spearheaded religious challenge
90 percent Muslim to government in late 1970s. Regime's devastation of
75 percent Sunni city of Hamah in 1982 crippled movement.
11 percent Alawi
3 percent Druze
1.5 percent Shia
10 percent Christian
7,562,000 Substantial and expanding Islamic resurgence; stron-
98 percent Sunni Best among urban youth and intellectuals. Occasional-
ly violent, particularly at universities. Major regime
crackdown initiated in 1987. Acts of sabotage and
terrorism by religious agitators.
1,400,000 Conservative religious society. Religious restiveness
100 percent Muslim among Shias inspired by Iran.
a Population figures for these states include significant numbers of
expatriate workers.
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ANNEX B
Fundamentalism and Islamic Law
sharia ideals.
The sharia is central to the moral and cultural lives
of most Muslims. Traditionalists regard the sharia as a
set of lofty standards and aspire to live up to them.
Reformists believe that adherence to the sharia is
desirable but feasible only if its provisions are adapted
to the demands of the present. Even many confirmed
secularists regard the sharia as a source of individual
moral inspiration. Generally, these Muslims accept as
necessary or inevitable the existence of distinctions
between political and religious matters, and they are
disinclined to challenge the existing order in pursuit of
driving force of the Islamic revival.
Islamic fundamentalism is the school of thought
that holds that the Islamic societies of today should be
governed by the sharia as it was practiced in the early
years of Islam. Unlike other Muslims-even devout
ones who also believe that the sharia should be
restored-fundamentalists reject compromise and seek
the implementation of the sacred law in its entirety.
Although greatly outnumbered by more moderate
Muslims, their passion and activism make them the
different places.
The sharia, or sacred law of Islam, provides for a
comprehensive religious, political, and social system.
In some aspects the system is absolutist and inflexible;
in others it avoids extremes and adopts a spirit of
reasonable compromise. The Koran, which is regarded
by Muslims as the literal word of God, and the Sunna,
the narrative reports on the sayings and deeds of the
Prophet, are the primary and preeminent foundation
of the sharia. The remainder of the body of Islamic
law developed over several centuries and in many
Fundamentalists are different. They have promoted
Islam as a political ideology, which they mean to
impose. They acknowledge no valid political consider-
ations outside the embrace of their ideology. In partic-
ular, they believe that:
- Living according to the letter of the sharia is the
primary duty of a Muslim; to abandon or even
tamper with the law is a denial of faith.
- Weakness in Muslim societies and their vulnera-
bility to outside exploitation are consequences of
falling away from the law.
-Faith and thus obedience to the sharia influence
the course of history and the destiny of the
Muslim world.
Divergent Beliefs. Despite their shared devotion to
the divine law, however, there is a great divergency to
the beliefs and attitudes of fundamentalist Muslims.
For one thing, they do not agree on what the provi-
sions of the law are. Sunni Muslims developed no
fewer than four great schools of jurisprudence be-
tween the eighth and 10th centuries. These schools
differ considerably in their degree of strictness and the
emphasis they place on such principles as consensus,
analogical deduction, and public interest. While Shias
regard the sixth Imam, Jafar as-Sadiq, as the founder
of Shiite jurisprudence, there is a vast and heterodox
array of individual Shia groups and schools of Shia
religious law.
Apart from their disagreements about the provisions
of the divine law, fundamentalists also differ over how
literally it should be interpreted. Some have a retro-
gressive vision of Muslim life that involves a return to
ancient ways; others see the sacred law as a set of
principles that can be applied in a way completely
compatible with modern, progressive society. Many
positions exist between these extremes.
Similarly, fundamentalists differ over the types of
tactics and intensity of effort that should be brought to
bear in reforming Islamic society. Most older, estab-
lished groups-such as the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt-have gone through a phase of revolutionary
zeal, have suffered at the hand of established author-
ity, and have as a consequence adopted an evolution-
ary approach to change. The members of these groups
are generally judicious and opportunistic in using their
energy and influence; although they have strong con-
victions, they tend nowadays to be relatively moderate
in pursuing their goals. On the whole, the younger
fundamentalists are more fanatical and inclined to-
ward revolutionary violence, even when they have
older and milder spiritual mentors. The outcast men-
tality of Shia Muslims has tended to make them even
more zealous in their quest for change than their Sunni
counterparts
Conditions Under the Sharia. The most puritanical
fundamentalists would ban alcohol, interest payments,
gambling, music, human representations in art and
pictorial media, and the public mingling of the sexes.
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They call for the strict application of all Islamic law
concerned with criminal justice, family life, mortmain
trusts, the Ramadan fast, the alms tax, the right to
pray, and the execution of Muslim apostates. They
believe that any law developed to cover changes over
the 1,000 years since the sharia was revealed-print-
ing, insurance, traffic, and commercial codes-must
be in harmony with the spirit of the sharia. They hold
that providing for the preeminance of the sharia is the
only true source of political legitimacy. Therefore,
they would require that all political and military
offices be filled only by Muslims. They would reverse
the integration of religious minorities in political life.
They would purge the cultural contours and social
practices of modern day Muslims of their Western and
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other non-Muslim features. Hour by hour and act by
act, the sharia would govern every aspect of a Mus-
lim's life-spiritual, social, political, cultural, and be-
havioral.
Over the past 20 years, the Islamic fundamentalist
activists have shunted aside the Islamic reformers who
dominated political thinking in the Arab world earlier
in this century. Today, political regimes that have not
acquired Islamic legitimacy find themselves vulnera-
ble to challenge from religious activists, some with an
evolutionary approach, some who seek immediate and
drastic change. How well the various governments
deal with these fundamentalist challenges will heavily
influence the response of the traditional majority and
shape the long-term impact of the Islamic resurgence.
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