"(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R001701310015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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IC STAFF
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EA-D/ICS
SA-D/ICS
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from 5 16 miles up, France's
SPOT satellite scrutinizes the
S oviet Union's nuclear test
site at Semipalatinsk. The
small white spots, like the
one circled, are craters from
underground blasts. U.S. mili-
tary satellites provide even r
better images: the U.S.S.R.'s
-011 first full-sized nuclear aircraft IL
- carrier under construction
near Odessa (inset, top), an
f SU-27 bomber (near right),
Soviet aircraft at Cam Ranh
Say in Vietnam (for right).
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MS. CONTROL PACTS
CAN BE VERIFIED
J ar e greatest share of the U.S. intelligence budget (at least
Snon15-billionintrusivea year) nowtechnicalgoes for what those in the business can
means
of information-gathering, or
TECxtNT (technical intelligence), in contrast to HUMINT (human
intelligence). These include giant hydrophones linked by cables
on the ocean floor for monitoring the Soviet fleet of 375 subma-
rines, reconnaissance satellites equipped with sharp-eyed cam-
eras, radars on the perimeter of the Soviet Union looking out for
missile launches, ELIIVT (electronic intelligence) listening posts 'in
Turkey, Pakistan, and China, ships bristling with a variety of an-
tennas, and large arrays of seismic detectors that pickup virtually
every creak and groan of the earth, natural or man-made. Much of
the information gathered by these electronic eyes and ears is
screened, analyzed, and stored by computers that can process
data at rates of billions of bits per second.
On balance the great investment in such sophisticated intelli-
gence-gathering has been a force for peace. Nasty international
incidents, like the crisis that ensued when Francis GaryPohers was
Kosta Tsipis, a physicist, is the director of Mfl-'s Program in
Science and Technologvforlntemational Security.
ILLUSTRATIONS er.1AMES A. 8arANT
DISCOVER ? APRIL ? 1987 79
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B Y K 0 S T A T S I P 1 g
A dazzling When fire broke out aboard a Soviet nuclear sub-
marine east of Bermuda last October, its captain
collection of high- and crew weren't the only ones to hear the
boat's alarms go off. The signals were also
tech devices- Picked up loud and clear by secret American lis-
tening devices on the continental shelf several
from spy satellites hundred miles away. Indeed, thanks to these un-
derwater acoustic detectors, which can record the reverberations
to radars that of an explosion halfway round the world, the Pentagon may well
have known about this accident, which eventually led to the ves-
lookoverthe set's sinking, before the Kremlin did.
Strategically placed along the East, Gulf, and Pacific coasts, horizon-makes it all well as in other militarily significant areas, such as the approaches
horizon-makes used by Soviet subs into the North Atlantic above Norway and
but Impossible into the Pacific near the Kuriles, the automated listening
just one link in a vast network of high-tech snoo ' are
for cheating keep a continual watch on Soviet mill ping devices that
tion Nicaragua, the Iran-Iraq frontier, tary activities, not to men-
to go undetected camps in North Africa and the Middle East. terrorist training
B f th
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP89M00699R001701310015-1
shot down in his U-2 spy plane
over the U.S.S.R. in 1960, are
avoided. ? Nor is one side likely
to spring unpleasant surprises
on the other. In 1967 President
;ohnson defended the billions
spent for spy satellites by ex-
plaining that they told him
"how many missiles the ene-
my has." Today they also pro-
vide clues to their quality and
potential for destructiveness.
Even before the Soviets test-
fire new intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs), the
Pentagon usually has a good
idea about such characteristics
as "throw weight," number of
warheads, even accuracy.
However, as useful as such
equipment may be for collect-
ing military intelligence, it has
another important role that
has yet to be fully exploited: it
can monitor Soviet compli-
ance with the terms of arms
control agreements-or, in the
shorthand of diplomacy, veri-
fication. At the moment, to be
sure, there isn't much to verify.
Only a handful of agreements
exists to curb the arms race be-
tween the superpowers, nota-
bly the Limited Test Ban Trea-
ty, which forbids nuclear test-
ing everywhere but under-
ground; SALT II, which limits
the number of strategic mis-
siles, warheads, and launch-
ers, and forbids camouflaging
launch sites (but which has
never been ratified by the
Senate, and was effectively
broken by President Reagan in
November when he ordered a
131st B-52 bomber with cruise
missiles deployed; and the
ABM (antiballistic missile)
Treaty, which prohibits the in-
'Although the Soviets originally
considered satellite overflights a
violation of their national sover-
eignty, as do many other nations,
they stopped complaining once
their own surveillance program
got under way. However, the issue
of where national sovereignty
ends and space begins has never
been satisfactorily resolved.
EARLY WARNING
FROM A HIGH RISE
PAVE PAWS phased-array
radar at Otis AFB In Massa-
chusetts can observe planes
or missiles 3A00 miles away
with 1,800 transmitting and
receiving elements (top) on a
10-story building (right).
troduction of exotic systems
for intercepting ICBMs in
flight, except to defend one
mutually agreed upon site on
each side. (The Soviets have
chosen to defend Moscow;
we've opted not to exercise the
right, on the ground that any
available defense would be
easily penetrated.)
One reason for the lack of
real progress in arms control is
the widespread opinion that
the Soviets will cheat on any
agreement, and that undetect-
ed deception will give them the
upper hand. The Reagan ad-
ministration has used this ar-
gument to reject out of hand a
proposal by the U.S.S.R. to
halt all underground nuclear
explosions. It insists-counter
to the arguments of some U.S.
seismologists that Soviet tests
could be detected-that the
U.S.S.R. could secretly contin-
ue to conduct such tests and
leap ahead in weapons design.
In any case, on Feb. 26 the So-
viets ended their 18-month
moratorium on testing by ex-
ploding a 20-kiloton nuclear
bomb at Semipalatinsk. And
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the U.S. is continuing to deto-
nate nuclear bombs under the
deserts of Nevada.
The Kremlin, which long op-
posed on-site inspection, seems
willing to accept it now for the
sake of getting an agreement
on arms reduction. Moscow's
change of heart has been sig-
naled not only by the statements
of high-level spokesmen, from
General Secretary Mikhail Gor-
bachev on down, but also in
such direct action as permitting
the Natural Resources Defense
Council, a Private American
environmental group, to place
seismic equipment inside the
Soviet Union that could pickup
the vibrations of underground
tests. On Feb. 28 the U.S.S.R.
proposed the withdrawal of all
Soviet and American medium-
range missiles in Europe inde-
pendent of an agreement on the
Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), a proposal quickly wel-
comed by President Reagan.
But, as Reagan stressed, be-
fore we can sign an arms control
deal with the Soviets, we must
first ask ourselves howgood our
ability to detect violations is.
Clearly, the same equipment
that keeps tabs on Soviet mili-
tary activities will have to be
used to monitor the Kremlin's
compliance with a pact. But af-
ter the initial intelligence col-
lection, the two processes-
military reconnaissance and
treaty monitoring-diverge
subtly. In the analysis of the
data, verification must decide
whether a suspicious activi-
ty--say, the construction of a
new radar or a change in the
throw weight of a new mis-
sile-violates the agreement or
not. Often the decision may be
clouded by ambiguity. The sus-
pected violation may not have
been observed in enough detail
to show an undisputed trans-
gression. Or even if it shows up
clearly, the treaty provisions
may be too murky for it to be
declared a violation. Thus veri-
fication makes its own very
stead, there will be exchanges
like those that occurred in 1973,
a year after the signing of SALT
I. U.S. satellites had spotted
what looked like the excavation
of silos for a powerful new
ICBM in northern Siberia in vi-
olation of the new treaty, and
the Nixon administration com-
plained to the Soviets. Keep
watching, they replied. Sure
enough, as the work continued,
satellite observations showed
that the Soviets weren't digging
missile silos. They were build-
ing underground command
posts, which were in fact per-
mitted by the treaty.
Finally, verification must
satisfy domestic political re-
quirements. No U.S. adminis-
tration can hope for ratifica-
tion of an arms control treaty
by the Senate, to say nothing of
acceptance by the public, un-
less it can convincingly show
that it can monitor compliance.
Proponents of a compre-
hensive test ban claim that
since the U.S. is able to detect
an underground nuclear deto-
nation with a yield of only a
few hundred tons of TNT, our
means of verification are ade-
quate. The explosive power of
some of the Soviet warheads is
equivalent to millions of tons
of TNT. Therefore a test of a
single warhead of less than
a kiloton, even if undetected,
couldn't alter the strategic bal-
ance or threaten our national
security. In other words, ade-
quate verification is a function
of the size of the arsenals, a rel-
ative, not an absolute, concept.
The argument goes some-
thing like this: If we agreed
with the Soviets to allow
10,000 nuclear bombs each,
our security couldn't be affect-
ed very much if they secretly
increased their inventory to
10,100. But if we agreed to re-
duce our total arsenals to only
50 bombs each, it would matter
a great deal if they secretly tri-
pled their number to 150, even
though the actual increase-
100 bombs-is the same in
How much detail a camera can see Is determined by;
height (h)
focal X diameter of a pixel d
length (f) () diameter of resolution patch (s)
IT'S ALL A MATTER OF RESOLUTION
Whether a satellite can Identify a tank, say, depends on
the diameter of the smallest detail, or resolution patch, It can
see. This is determined by its height, the focal length of
Its optics, and the size of the picture elements (pixels) of its
film or electronic detector. A resolution patch of the size shown
on the tank would produce the Image to the right of it.
special demands on intelli-
gence analysts.
These demands are complex
and interrelated. First and
foremost, verification must en-
hance national security. We
have to be able to tell whether
the Soviet Union is doing any-
thing forbidden by the terms of
an arms control treaty that
could damage us if undetected
for any length of time.
Second, verification must
have a deterring effect: if the
Soviet Union knows that cheat-
ing will be discovered, it won't
attempt it.
Third, verification should
enhance stability, mutual trust,
and confidence among the sig-
natories of an arms control
agreement. If we're convinced
that the U.S.S.R. is abiding by
the terms of the pact, we won't
engage in the paranoia of
"worst case"analyses, whereby
even the suspicion ofa violation
leads us to declare bomber or
missile "gaps" and begin ex-
pensive arms build-ups. In-
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Electric
generator
both instances. (The oppo-
nents of arms control agree-
ments say that what matters, at
least for now, isn't whether
those 100 secret bombs pose a
military threat but that we be
able to verify that there's no
cheating at all.)
If we're to be assured that
we can always monitor Soviet
compliance with any arms
control agreement, we should
be able to determine whether
an event has or hasn't hap-
pened, or is in the process of
happening. There are two
kinds of event: one, like the fir-
ing of a missile, changes the
scene temporarily; the other,
like the construction of a large
radar or a missile silo in the
middle of a forest, creates a
permanent change.
P ermanent changes, or even
semi-permanent ones-for
example, the slow movement
of a division of troops or a wing
of mobile missiles from one
part of the country to anoth-
er-are detected by before-
and-after comparisons. Usual-
ly this is the task of photo re-
connaissance satellites, which
routinely photograph whatev-
er comes into their field of view
(it can also be done by high-fly-
ing planes like the U-2, whose
ceiling is 90,000 feet, and the
SR-7 1, or Blackbird, which
can travel at Mach 4 at 125,000
feet, or by small remotely pi-
loted vehicles). By comparing
different images of the same
scene, taken under similar
lighting conditions over a peri-
od of time, we can detect
changes-the laying of a keel
for a nuclear submarine, say.
But such transient events as
the flight test of a new missile
or the underground detonation
of a nuclear explosive must be
observed while they're occur-
ring. Therefore the detection
systems (radars and telemetry
receivers in the case of missile
tests, seismographs for under-
ground explosions) have to be
on at all times. Such vigilance
can be`expensive. And so we
depend on the synergy of a va-
riety of intelligence-gathering
tools, e.g., if satellite photos tell
us the Soviets are preparing a
missile for launch, we may be
able to get the exact time of the
test by listening in on their tele-
phone calls. Or we can be on
the lookout for the activation
of Soviet radars whose bea-
cons track their missiles in
flight. Then we can turn on our
own monitoring radars and te-
lemetry receivers to "see" and
"hear" the details of the test.
One such missile-watching
installation is the Cobra Dane
phased-array radar on Shemya
Island in the western Aleu-
tians, which tracks warheads
as they head from their launch
sites at Tyuratam or Plesetsk
across eastern Siberia for im-
pact areas on the Kamchatka
Peninsula or in the Pacific. We
may also send up reconnais-
sance planes, usually lumber-
ing RC-135s called Cobra Ball
aircraft, to track a warhead
with a battery of cameras
working in various wavelength
ranges while the plane's ELINT
equipment searches for the
missile's telemetry. (Some U.S.
officials think the Soviets may
have shot down Korean Air
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Lines Flight 007 because they
mistook the Boeing 747 for an
American spy plane on just
such a mission.)
In the seas, the Navy's hy-
drophone network, known as
sosus (sound surveillance sys-
tem), can recognize the dis-
tinctive patterns of individual
Soviet submarines from thou-
sands of miles away. Each de-
tector consists of a score or
more of hydrophones sealed in
large vats, said to be as big as oil
storage tanks, and buried in the
sea floor. Because the micro-
phones are tuned to different
frequencies, they can pick
up different and distinctive
sounds-engine noise, prop
wash, the whirr of pumps-
from a submarine. This ca-
cophony is relayed by satellites
in geosynchronous orbit to
analysis centers, where com-
puters sort and compare the
signals with those in their
memories. The objective is to
form a sonic profile of each
submarine in the Soviet arma-
da, which can then be used to
identify it wherever sosus may
pick up its telltale sounds.
Because a single source of
information-whether a ra-
dar, a camera; or a hydro-
phone-can rarely tell the
Workmen at the Nevada
nuclear test site preparing
the tunnel for the Feb. 3
underground detonation
whole story, the intelligence
analyst must fit together myri-
ad pieces of information from
different sources, from real-
time detectors like radars that
observe events as they unfold
and from off-line detectors like
photo satellites that provide
delayed but consecutive obser-
vations of the same scene, be-
fore he obtains a complete pic-
ture of a suspicious event.
Of course, even without any
agreements, simply as a matter
of national prudence, we must
be able to observe the develop-
ment, testing, and deployment
of Soviet nuclear weapons sys-
tems. We must be able to de-
THE 'LONG AND SHORT OF TEST DETECTION
An unmanned seismic station, opposite page, could help verify
a test ban by picking up tremors-from a nuclear blast mostly
high-frequency body waves that travel through the earth, from
a quake mostly low-frequency surface waver-.and relaying the
data to a satellite. When the magnitudes of the waves are plot.
ted on a graph (left), their origin becomes readily apparent.
tect and measure the amount
of energy released by under-
ground nuclear explosions. We
must also make sure that nucle-
ar explosives aren't placed un-
der water or in earth orbit, and
we must be certain the Soviets
aren't secretly exploding nu-
clear weapons in such exotic
locales as behind the sun (a site
physicist Edward Teller once
suggested they might use). ?
We also have to be able to
count the number of Soviet
ICBMs and bombers; know
how many warheads each can
carry; and tell whether new So-
viet missiles vary from older
ones by more than five per cent
in any of a number of impor-
tant performance characteris-
tics (because this would be a vi-
olation of SALT II). If the
types of sweeping arms control
agreements discussed by Rea-
gan and Gorbachev at Reykja-
vik are ever to be signed, we
should also be able to count
how many missiles have been
destroyed, and to make sure
their nuclear warheads are
dismantled. We should deter-
mine that no intermediate-
range ballistic or cruise mis-
siles are deployed in European
Russia, and we should have a
? Even a test of this sort could
probably be spotted by keeping
watch on the moon for a faint flash
of reflected light from the blast.
'way of finding out whether the
Soviets are producing any
more plutonium or weapons-
grade uranium and other in-
gredients for nuclear explo-
sives. Finally, we must be cer-
tain they aren't developing or
testing ballistic missile defense
systems beyond those allowed
by the 1972 ABM Treaty, or
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon-
ry that could knock out our un-
manned orbital observatories.
Many technical experts work.
ing on arms control verification
systems now think that such a
task can be accomplished,
thanks to recent advances in
technology. Detection depends
on the fact that all objects emit
or reflect electromagnetic radi-
ation of some sort (infrared or
visible light or radio waves) and
that almost all events involve
the release of some energy in
the form of electromagnetic or
sound waves.
C onsider the testing of a new
missile. As it sits on the
pad, the missile reflects sun-
light, which allows the optical
camera on a satellite to photo-
graph it. As its engines start up
and it lifts off, the exhaust
plume of hot gases sends out
large amounts of infrared and
visible radiation, which can be
detected by special infrared
cameras that stare at the entire
Soviet land-mass from a fixed
position in geosynchronous
orbit 22,300 miles above the
earth. As the missile arcs
across the sky, we can follow
its motion in the minutest de-
tail, spotting course deviations
of much less than one degree,
by illuminating it with giant
radars directed toward the in-
terior of the Soviet Union.
And as the missile's sensors
broadcast data about its per-
formance in flight-telemetry
signals-for Soviet engineers
on the ground, antennas aboard
our satellites and at our listen-
ing posts intercept them, de-
code them, and let us know
how the missile behaves.
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The best known system for intercepting
these electromagnetic waves is the satellite-
borne photographic camera. The first suc-
cessful photo reconnaissance satellite, a
300-pound package of miniaturized optics
publicly called Discoverer to create the
impression that it was purely for scientific
purposes, though known privately in the in-
telligence community as Corona, was
launched in 1960. Three years earlier the
Soviets had orbited a similar machine,
Sputnik 1, the earth's first artificial satellite,
which astonished the world but could do
little more than send out beeps. The cam-
eras aboard Discoverer satellites and suc-
ceeding spies in the sky contained large rolls
of film, which enabled them to record many
sequential images of the terrain below..
When a roll was completely exposed it was
ejected inside a protective canister. As it
entered the atmosphere a parachute
opened to slow its descent and a plane
equipped with special hooks snared it in
mid-air. Once the film was developed, an
analyst could see what the camera had seen.
E ven the early photo reconnaissance sat-
ellites told us how many ICBMs and
bombers the Soviets had, how many war-
ships they were building, and how many
submarines were in their pens. They could
be raised or lowered through adjustments
in their orbits, which allowed them to
sweep down for a closer look at suspicious
activity. But the satellites had disadvan-
tages. First, they were wasteful. A single
camera-satellite complex cost many hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, only to become
a piece of space junk once all its film was
exposed, sometimes within only weeks or
months. Second, additional time would
elapse before the film was developed and
analyzed. That was all right for monitoring
events that proceeded slowly, like the con-
struction of a missile silo, but not for more
rapid developments, like the installation of
mobile missiles and radars, or even a short
conflict like the Six-Day War. Third, bad
weather might keep large areas hidden un-
der clouds for months at a stretch.
The first two drawbacks.were overcome
in the mid-'70s with a new technology
called charge-coupled devices (CCDs).
Using essentially the same technology as
that in home video cameras, they take and
transmit pictures electronically. Each
CCD consists of an array of tiny sensors, or
pixels (for picture elements), numbering in
the thousands, arranged in a grid. As light
waves fall on the array, each sensor stores a
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quantity of electrons proportional to the
intensity of the light that has hit it. A
counter tallies up the number of electrons
each sensor has accumulated, and that
number, as well as the location of the sen-
sor in the grid, is transmitted to a receiving
center on the ground. There a computer
uses the information to construct on a TV-
type screen an exact cony of the on fin
l
a
image captured by the CCD. Meanwhile,
aboard the satellite, as the electrons drain
from the individual pixels the array be-
comes ready for another exposure. All this
happens in milliseconds. No film has to be
ejected, captured, and developed. Some-
one sitting at a console in Fort Belvoir, Va.,
the site of the CIA's satellite imagery cen-
ter, can see in real time what the satellite is
seeing in the Soviet Union. If something
tweaks his curiosity, he can zoom the lens
and take a more detailed picture on the
next pass. And the CCD array can be used
again and again, inexhaustibly.
How much the camera will see depends
on its resolution, the size of the smallest
object s it can distinguish. That depends
on its distance from the scene, its focal
length, and the size of the individual pixel.
The smaller the pixel dand the longer the
f
l l
oca
ength f thll
,e smaer swill be-that is,
the, better the resolution of the system.
Lets say the satellite is at an altitude h of
100 kilometers, that the individual pixel
size is 2 microns, and that the focal length
of the camera is 4 meters. You quickly find
out that the resolution on the ground of the
hypothetical camera is 5 centimeters,
which means it can detect objects as small
as two inches from an altitude of about 60
miles above the earth..
Although the capabilities of the satellite
cameras are secret, stories circulate that
we've been able to follow the pucks during
ice hockey games at outdoor rinks in Mos-
cow or see astonishing closeup details of
Soviet submarines. Says one intelligence
analyst, "You can tell if the guys on the
bridge watch have their parka hoods up.,,
lgh resolution can be a mixed blessing,
Nhowever. Say the camera takes a pic-
ture of a scene 100 x 100 meters on the
ground. If the resolution is one meter, the
picture will be composed of 100 x 100, or
10,000 pixels. But if it's S centimeters, the
number ofpixels increases to 2,000 x 2,000,
or 4,000,000 pixels. As a result, 400 times
as much information will be transmitted
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to the ground In digital
form, where a com-
puter re-creates the
object on a screen.
GETTING A PICTURE
OUT OF A CHARGE
As light from an object
strikes a CCD, the CCD aeur
mulates electrons at each
pixel in proportion to the
nwnber of photons hitting
It. Then a counter sweeps
the pixels, line by line, and
the nwnbers are relayed
to the receiving station. This
means the satellite must have a
very large transmitting antenna
(to handle the increased flow of
data) and a lot of electrical
power, which isn't always
available from its solar cells.
Ground controllers often order
photo satellites to conserve
their energy by taking pictures
at lower resolution.
Also, the satellites may take
too many pictures, overload-
ing the analysts. Since new pic-
tures are compared with earli-
er ones of the same scene, the
process can be mechanized
with the help of electro-optical
scanners. A flesh-and-blood
photo-interpreter would be
needed only when the machine
points out a change. Even so,
the number of pictures would
be overwhelming if the satel-
lite camera took pictures of all
the terrain it flew over. So the
camera is turned off when it
encounters clouds, or when it's
over oceans or other areas
where we would expect noth-
ing to be happening, like the
Sahara or the Soviet Arctic.
But this practice can lead to
oversights, such as the alleged
installation of a nuclear explo-
const action had begun. (The
Soviets presumably have pho-
tographed our modernizations
of the early-warning radars in
Thule, Greenland, and Fyling-
dales Moor, England, which
they claim are breaches of the
treaty. We insist that they're
"grandfathered" under the ac-
cord and therefore legitimately
open to upgrading.)
Besides cameras, some sat-
ellites, like the Air Force's Big
Bird, one of the KH (for Key-
hole) series, carry sensitive lis-
tening devices that allow us to
intercept radio and microwave
telephone signals within the
Soviet Union as well as trans-
missions from Soviet satellites.
Such eavesdropping is supple-
mented by listening posts in
Norway and elsewhere that
can pick up the Russians' own
ferret satellites (so named be-
cause they fly low enough to
trigger tracking radars) as they
download streams of intercept-
ed American signals. This tech-
nology, which is of the same
kind that enables us to receive
and interpret signals from the
eight-watt radio aboard the
spacecraft Pioneer, now al-
most four billion miles away
from earth, not only listens in
on internal Soviet communica-
tions but also picks up the te-
lemetry from Soviet missiles
during testing. These signals
establish a missile's rate of ac-
celeration, fuel consumption,
and temperatures and pres-
sures at different points in the
engine. Even though the Sovi-
ets encode some of these mes-
sages-in violation of SALT II
say some experts, but not in m'
view-we can compensate fo,
the loss of a portion of this in
formation through radar an(
satellite tracking.
T hese satellites monitor oth
er activities as well. Whe!
American bombers attacke
Libya last April, their target
were picked outwith the help c
a photo reconnaissance sate
lice and a signals intelligent
Tiny charge-coupled devices (CCDs), like thew In home video
came as, have made real-time observations from space a snape
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sives test facility by South Afri-
ca-which was discovered by
a Soviet photo reconnaissance
satellite-or the construction
of a large early warning radar
near Krasnoyarsk, in central
Siberia, in apparent violation
of the ABM Treaty, which was
only noticed by one of our sat-
ellites two to three years after
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satellite (sIGINT) whose orbit
had been changed so that it
passed over North Africa rath-
er than Eastern Europe. Some
satellites, like the Velas, orbit-
ing in Pairs at an altitude of
70,000 miles, nearly a third of
the distance to the moon, carry
a varietyof sensors to detect nu-
clear explosions in the atmo-
sphere. (The chores of the Velas
are gradually being assumed by
the new NAVST,ut global posi-
tion system [GPS); its primary
function is as an extremely
Precise navigation aid, but its
satellites also carry detectors
for spotting detonations.) Oth-
er satellites are designed to fer-
ret out the characteristics of So-
viet radars and electronic jam-
ming devices. Still others are
equipped with special radars to
obtain images at night or to
penetrate cloud cover. These
are known as synthetic aperture
radars (SARs). Conventional
radars, even when they send
out beacons at veryshort wave.
lengths, can't provide very
high-resolution images, be-
cause theirresolution is limited
by the ratio of the wavelength
of their radiation to the diame-
ter of the antenna. Even if the
wavelength were one millime-
ter and the antenna ten meters
long, the resolution of the radar
flying 800 kilometers above the
surface of the earth would still
be only 80 meters (in contrast
to my imagined camera's five-
centimeter resolution).
But in the case of the SAR,
after the radar's waves are
bounced off the ground they're
tricked electronically into
"thinking" the satellite's re-
ceiving antenna is as long as
the distance the spacecraft has
traveled during that interval. A
typical SAR with a ten-meter
antenna, orbiting at 800 kilo-
meters, will have a resolution
of just five meters. (To achieve
this resolution with an ordi-
nary radar would require an
antenna almost 20 kilometers
long, or about twelve miles.)
The Landsat "t"he observed Chernobyl from more than 400
miles up (top), Reactor Iles whhln rectangle, enlarged at bot-
tom. lelow, Computer enhancement sharpens a blurry image.
The size of the antenna can't
be reduced to achieve higher
resolution because the radar
beam will be spread out and
diffuse by the time it reaches
the ground, thereby spoiling
the image. But even with this
limitation, satellite SARs can
achieve resolutions approach-
ing one meter and provide al-
most photographic images of
the terrain they survey.
In radar systems of this sort
the amplitude and arrival time
of each reflected wave must be
briefly stored. Then all the
Pulses returning from a given
point on the earth must be
added up electronically. In the
past this information had to be
transmitted to the ground and
processed by computers be-
fore it could be viewed on a
monitor. But now that com-
puters have shrunk in size and
their power requirements have
been reduced, very complex
computational capability can
be carried on board the satel-
lite, which makes it possible to
send back pictures in real time.
This is a significant advance,
considering that large areas of
the Soviet Union are blanket.
ed by clouds for extended
Periods and that the north-
ernmost regions are cloaked
in the darkness of the polar
night for several months a year.
Of course, such surveillance
requires that we have at least
one fully operational photo re-
connaissance satellite in or-
bit-preferably more. The halt
in space shuttle launches after
the Challenger catastrophe
and the loss of two Titan boost-
ers and their satellite payloads
,
all in the past year and a half,
have crippled our satellite-or-
biting capability. Before the
Air Force finally managed to
loft a ferret satellite in Febru-
ary,our watchdog capacity had
dwindled. For notable exam-
ple, we were left with only a sin-
gle ICR-11, the workhorse of
our reconnaissance program.
This advanced satellite is
equipped with a large optical
telescope that has a primary
mirror of 70 or 80 inches, high-
resolution CCDs, and multi-
spectral and infrared imagers.
It will be replaced by a new su-
per satellite, the KH-12, which
will have not only extraor-
dinary resolution-less than
three inches, according to re-
ports'-but also extraordi-
narynight-seeing ability. How-
ever, it's so heavy it can only be
carried into orbit byashuttle or,
a modified Titan booster.
Large phased-array radars
on the ground and on ships
monitor the maneuverings of
satellites (which are also ob-
served with very large optical
telescopes installed on Maui
and in Florida), the testing of
missiles and aircraft, and the
trajectories of ballistic missile
re-entry vehicles. Activities
that take place too deep inside
Soviet territory to be observed
bYmdarsontheperipheryofthe
'This means you couldn't quite
tell whethera man sitting in Gorky
Park was reading Izvestia or
Pravda, as it is often said you
could. But as former CIA director
William Colby once testified be-
fore Congress, "You can see the
tanks, you see the artillery, [even
if] you may not quite see the insig-
nia on the fellow's uniform."
DISCOVER ? APRIL ? 1987 d
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EYE ON MURMANSK
The Soviet port of Murmansk
Is "on by Landsat from about
400 miles up. The smaller plc.
hire Is an overview of the
Murmansk fiord; the larger
one, a ebseup of the Severo-
morsk naval base, shows
ships, piers, and airfields.
country are monitored by "over
the horizon" radars thatseem to
defy the physical law that all ra-
dio waves travel in a straight
line. They bounce powerful
beams at small grazing angles
off the surface of the sea. These
are reflected off the ionosphere,
floodingthe interior ofthe Sovi-
et Union with radar waves. If
missiles or aircraft happen to
pass through them, the waves
are disturbed in characteristic
ways, so that when they're
eventually recaptured by re-
ceivers at the other end of the
continent-by listening posts
in the Aleutians, say-they can
provide information about the
performance of the vehicles
that caused the disturbances.
B eginning with Eisenhow-
er, every American presi-
dent except Reagan has tried to
limit or to ban nuclear testing.
John Kennedy agreed with the
Soviet Union to stop all tests
except those conducted under-
ground. During the Nixon
years, Washington and Mos-
cow agreed to stop detonating
nuclear explosives with a yield
greater than the equivalent of
150,000 tons of TNT. Al-
though Congress had urged the
U.S. to join in the U.S.S.R.'s
moratorium, the administra-
tion continued its test program.
If we could in fact get a com-
prehensive test ban treaty, as
the Carter administration had
hoped, could the U.S. confi-
dently detect a small, clandes-
tine Soviet nuclear explosion?
When a nuclear explosive
detonates underground, it re-
leases a portion of its energy as
earthquake-type waves. In ad-
dition to pinpointing the test
site with standard seismic tech-
niques, seismologists can cal-
culate the size of the explosion.
They start by measuring the
amplitude of the waves, which
are proportional to the amount
of energy released. They then
take into account what type of
rock the pulses have traveled
through, since the terrain will
affect how quickly they lose
their strength. (In general,
higher-frequency waves are at-
tenuated more rapidly than
those of lower frequencies.)
From these two measurements
they can estimate the size of
weapon yields with an accura-
cy of 10 to 20 per cent, with the
uncertainty reduced further as
their knowledge of the geology
of the test site increases. In any
event, seismometers are now so
sensitive that the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. both claim to have re-
corded unannounced tests by
the other with yields as low as
one kiloton.
The detection technology
consists of arrays of sensitive
seismometers and the record-
ing and computerized analysis
of the signals they pick up.
Such arrays are located in Nor-
way, Montana, Turkey, and Ja-
pan, and two new ones may be
operating now in China's Sin-
kiang province, only 300 miles
from the U.S.S.R.'s under-
ground test site at Semipala-
tinsk in Kazakhstan. To ensure
that an underground test will
be detected, the seismometers
must be permanently on. Un-
fortunately for analysts, the
earth's crust is a noisy place,
shaken by numerous earth-
quakes, big and small, by the
pounding of the oceans on
shorelines, the rumbling of
construction and mining oper-
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ations, even the swaying ofsky-
scrapers and large trees buffet-
ed by high winds. As a result,
there's always a risk that the
waves caused by a detonation
will be drowned out by the
earth's other tremors, or that a
nuclear test will be mistaken
for an earthquake.
Nonetheless, seismologists
have learned to discriminate
between quakes and under-
ground nuclear detonations.
They've found that the relative
magnitudes of the surface and
body waves generated by a
quake are distinct from those
given off by an explosion. So
when the needles of their seis-
mographs come alive, they
compare the size of the two
types of waves that have been
recorded. This tells them
unambiguously whether they
were generated by an earth-
quake or a nuclear test. Yet
in spite of these advances, or
perhaps because of them, the
Defense Department has cut
funding for the seismic re-
search. Some scientists suspect
the reason may be the Reagan
administration's distaste for
any test ball.
T est ban monitors might be
duped in two ways. One,
an underground nuclear test
might be conducted at the very
moment an earthquake is tak-
ing place in the area (the Soviet
Union has many quake-prone
regions). The waves from the
quake might obscure the waves
generated by the explosion.
Two, a cavity hundreds of me-
ters in diameter could be dug
and a nuclear explosive deto-
nated at its center. The waves
from the blast would be very
small, because the giant hole
would have "decoupled" the
explosion from the surround-
ing soil, and they might escape
detection.
Both these possible ploys
have been overcome by seis-
mologists at the U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey in Menlo Park,
Calif., and the University at
Colorado at Boulder, who can
now detect very small detona-
tions, even those under 1,000
tons of TNT and even if they
occur during an earthquake or
take place in a muffling under-
ground cavity. The technique
is based on the fact that a quake
releases its energy over a large
area, from a rupture in the
earth that may be tens or hun-
dreds of kilometers long, pri-
marily in the form of long, low-
frequency waves, whereas a
nuclear blast is effectively a
point source that emits pre-
dominantly short, high-fre-
quency waves. Consequently,
seismometers used to monitor
test-ban violations are tuned to
pick up higher-frequency seis-
mic waves. So even ifa quake is
occurring at the same time as a
test, the instruments will ig-
nore the quake's low-frequen-
TRICKS THAT TURN
NIGHT INTO DAY
To pierce the night or douds,
spy satellites use synthetic
aperture radar. It has much
higher resolution than ordi-
nary radar, thanks to elect
tronic trickery that seems to
increase the receiving anten-
na's size to the distance trav-
eled in the time the signals
echo from the ground.
cy waves and "see" only the
high-frequency signature of
the explosion. This selective
monitoring also works for tests
conducted in decoupling cavi-
ties, since they attenuate the
low-frequency waves but not
the high-frequency ones.
However, there are limita-
tions. High-frequency waves
don't travel underground as far
as low-frequency ones, so if
we're to be confident of our de-
tection procedures, we must
place seismometers near the
test sites. This creates a sticky
political problem, because nei-
ther superpower likes the idea
of foreign scientists snooping
on-or under-its soil, partic-
ularly around test sites. Sandia
National Laboratories in Al-
buquerque, N. Mex., may have
provided a solution with the
development of an unmanned,
tamperproof seismic station. It
can be installed inside the So-
viet Union and monitored by a
satellite, which relays the sig-
nals detected by the seismome-
ter and alerts the controlling
facility in the U.S. if anyone
tries to tamper with the equip-
ment. Several of these seismic
stations are now in operation
in the U.S. and Canada to test
their sensitivity and tamper-
proof qualities. Although the
Soviet Union had resisted the
placement of these "black box-
es" on its territory, it has now
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agreed to accept them, so there
no longer seems to be a techni-
cal barrier to monitoring com-
pliance with a complete test
ban agreement down to explo-
sions of one kiloton or less.
As the new detection sys-
tems indicate, our intelli-
gence gathering has achieved
extraordinary levels of sophis-
tication. These capabilities are
even better than the govern-
ment will admit in public. Giv-
en this rosy assessment, what
kinds of arms control measures
could be undertaken with the
Soviet Union without threat-
ening our national security?
A prime example would be
a comprehensive test ban trea-
ty, ending all explosions of
nuclear weapons. With un-
manned seismic monitoring
stations inside the U.S.S.R., we
should be able to detect even
the sub-kiloton blasts. But po-
litical obstacles remain. When
the Soviets said they would re-
sume underground testing in
response to the U.S. testing,
they told visiting American
seismologists to halt their stud-
ies of Soviet geology during the
test period.
BOUNCING ACROSS
THE U.S.S.R.
Uke a skimming stone, an
over-the-horizon radar beam
bounces off the sea, then
the Ionosphere, to penetrate
deep inside the U.S.S.R.
A second objective could be
a ban on the testing of ballistic
missiles, especially those with
several warheads, or MIRVs
(multiple independent re-en-
try vehicles). It could easily be
verified because a multi-stage
rocket lifting off is hard to miss
even if you've got only a few ra-
dars and listening posts. Be-
sides, new missiles require tens
of tests, and honing their accu-
racy at least twenty more, so
the probability that the Soviet
Union can develop, test, and
deploy an improved ICBM
without our knowledge is vir-
tually zero.
Missiles that can carry many
warheads must be able to re-
lease them sequentially with
great precision by performing
delicate maneuvers in flight.
Such maneuvers can readily be
observed by radar. But they
would be still easier to spot if
the Soviets and we agreed to
install a transponder on all test
missiles. During flight it would
broadcast a continuous stream
ofsignals that would enable the
other nation's detectors to spot
changes in speed or direction,
thereby providing a foolproof
check on whether the missile
had been MIRVed.
Another class of arms-con-
trol agreement that we could
verify with confidence is the
sort of drastic reduction in
nuclear arms discussed at
the Reykjavik summit. Photo
reconnaissance satellites and
other spaceborne intelligence-
gathering devices can see and
count the dismantling of ballis-
tic missiles and their silos,
fleets of bombers, and ballistic-
missile-carrying submarines if
the Soviets agree not to con-
ceal them. However, they can't
monitor the disassembly of nu-
clear warheads and the peace-
ful disposal of their radioactive
materials, since this work has
to be done indoors in special
laboratories. The only work-
able check would be the pres-
ence on site of inspectors.
Cruise missiles pose a special
verification problem. Tac-
tical cruise missiles with con-
ventional explosives and long-
range ones with nuclear explo-
sives look alike, so it would be
very difficult to check compli-
ance with an agreement limit-
ing the number or means of de-
ployment of these weapons un-
less both types were barred.
This is a good example of a
more general principle in arms
control: it's easier to monitor a
complete ban than a partial
one, since the discovery of only
a single event or a single pro-
scribed weapon would be a
clearcut tip-off to a violation.
In conjunction with any
drastic reduction in the num-
ber of nuclear arms each coun-
try would be allowed, there
would. probably have to be a
limitation on the production
of plutonium, weapons-grade
uranium, and large quantities
of deuterium and tritium-all
of them components of nuclear
warheads. This ban could be
monitored with existing tech-
nical means by making sure
that nuclear reactors dedicated
to the production of these ma-
terials were shut down, a rela-
tively simple assignment for
infrared sensors. Yet small
quantities of fissile materials,
enough perhaps to build a few
tens of new warheads per year,
could be produced clandes-
tinely in small research reac-
tors or reactors ordinarily used
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A kmar iike crater, 320 het deep and 1,280 across,
was created In 1962 by a 100-kiloton underground nuclear
explosion at the Nevada test site. The sequence at the top shows
what happened within one second during a more recent blast.
for power production. At pres-
ent, with the U.S. and the Sovi-
et Union each having approxi-
mately 25,000 nuclear war-
heads-enough to blow the
planet to eternity many times
over-a few additional war-
heads wouldn't make much
difference in the strategic
scheme of things. But in a fu-
ture arms regime, when each
side has slashed its nuclear ar-
senal by, say, 90 per cent or
more, a handful of contraband
warheads could be significant.
To avoid such a situation, So-
viet and American power reac-
tors would have to be moni-
tored by on-site inspectors to
reassure one another that no
weapons-grade materials were
being diverted. The necessary
monitoring technology exists,
and all it would take is the po-
litical will to install it.
In recent years, because of
the emergence of President
Reagan's Strategic Defense ini-
tiative to provide a shield
against ballistic missiles and be-
cause of the administration's
complaints that the Soviet
Union has been violating the
ABM Treaty, which bars cer-
tain Practices related to land-
based ballistic-missile defenses,
considerable work has been
done on devising technical
methods to monitor the testing
of systems that could be used in
ballistic missile defenses. While
laboratory tests of small SDI
components could perhaps be
conducted unobserved, there's
little doubt that testing of full
Star Wars systems in space-or
even on the ground-can be
monitored. One can't hide a la-
ser or a Particle accelerator the
size of a factory or fire their
beams inftor from space with-
out beingcaught. Nor can a na-
tion conduct secret tests of the
kinetic energy kill weapons or
the radars needed for a defen-
sive network.
If these assertions seem
overly Optimistic, consider the
detail in which the U.S. has
DISCOVER ? APRIL ? 1987 91
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BY WILLIAM E BUUOWS
WE HAVE AN EDGE IN QUALITY, BUT THE SOVIETS OVERWHELM US IN QUANTITY
I f U.S. reconnaissance satellites are the Rolls-Royces of space-
based espionage, their Soviet counterparts are its Chevrolets. Both
do their job more than adequately. the differences between them
have to do with their degree of refinement and with sheer numbers.
Overseeing the design and operations of American spy satellites is
the highly secret, CIA-dominated National Reconnaissance Office in
the Pentagon. It prefers a relatively small number of hand-made,
extremely sophisticated spacecraft that reflect the substantial
American lead in optics and high-speed digital computers indis-
pensable for the collection of intelligence from orbit
The Soviets try to offset superior American technology by
modifying their basic spacecraft-dependable workhorses like
Vostok and Soyuz-on the assembly line to carry either cosmo-
nauts or a wide array of hardware, much of it for reconnaissance.
The technique is similar to the way aircraft manufacturers pro-
duce passenger and cargo versions of the same plane.
Although the types of Soviet reconnaissance satellites close-
ly match those orbited by the U.S.-photographic intelligence
(PHOTNIT), electronic intelligence (E. NT), radar ferreting (SIGHT),
and radar ocean reconnaissance (RORSAT)-the numerical dif-
ference is startling. Only two KH-11s carried the photo recon-
naissance load for the U.S. in 1985, while the U.S.S.R sent up 34
camera-carrying spacecraft, which was about average. Further-
more,64 of the 98 satellites of all kinds launched that year by the
Soviets were on some sort of reconnaissance or surveillance
mission, often involving electronic snooping or ocean surveil-
lance in addition to picture taking. The KH-11's orbital lifetime is
about three years, that of its Soviet counterparts from days to
about seven months, depending on how quickly their intelligence
cache is needed.
Soyuz spacecraft, which are more than two decades old and
whose latest version (named, in a bit of unintended humor, the
model T) carried two cosmonauts back from a four-month
space station mission last July, have been the mainstay of the
Soviet photo reconnaissance program.
The basic Soyuz is made of three parts. Asa manned satellite,
it's composed of a cylindrical propulsion module, a bell-shaped
descent module, and a spherical orbital module through which its
occupants crawl when the ship is linked up to another spacecraft.
(depending on the mission). The craft, a little more than 23 feet long,
is seven feet in diameter, and weighs about seven tons (the KH-11
is 50 feet long, 15 feet wide, and weighs about 29,000 pounds):
When its mission is completed, the orbital module, contain-
ing cameras and exposed film, is separated from the other two sec-
tions and fired back down toward the Soviet Union, landing under
a billowing parachute. Most of the expensive cameras are no doubt re-
used The Soviets have also developed their own electro-
optical real-time system, using a variant of the Soyuz without
the jettisonable sphere (see diagram). This new breed can
remain in orbit for seven months or more, uses charge-
coupled devices, and can probably produce images similar
to those from the KH-11. Any limitations would come
from inferior computers on the ground, not from the quality
of its telescope.
The pictures returned by the Soyuz and Vostok satellites
(which fly under the generic name Cosmos) are thought
to be slightly Inferior to those sent down by U.S. spacecraft.
Still, they would easily be equal to the task of supplying
high-quality technical intelligence and ensuring ade-
quate monitoring of the various arms control agreements, in-
cluding SALT II's prohibition on changing the sizdbf
ICBMs by more than five per cent. Ave per cent of Minute-
man's 5.6-foot width is a shade over three inches. This
implies that in 1979 the Soviets were sufficiently confident in
the resolving power of their spacebome cameras to sign
the treaty, knowing that even so slight a change would
be spotted from orbit
But useful photographic intelligence depends upon a great
deal more than resolution It also means getting the data
quid* and than being able to manipulate them for analysis.
Moscow's new near-real-time capability is overcoming the
first shortcoming, but imagery enhancement, which re-
quires very high speed digital computing and enormous data
iik~: ii 'N banks, is another matter. Although Soviet satellites have
A Sayuz spacecraft
lifts off from Tyura-
tam on Feb. 6.
The Soyuz's photo reconnaissance version uses the descent module
for its tiny maneuvering rockets and their fuel, the orbital module to hold
film canisters and batteries for operating the cameras, and the cylin-
drical segment to store the high-, medium-, or low-resolution cameras
William Burrows, director of the science and enviromental reporting
program at New York l/hiversity, is the author of the new book
Deep Black Space Espionage and National Security
.
V. kUZNIN-wvroro
complained of Soviet viola-
tions of the ABM Treaty. The
charges themselves are proof
of how well we watch Soviet
activities relating to ballistic
defenses deep inside their ter-
ritory. In my view, an agree-
meat to ban the testing and de-
ployment of both antiballis-
tic missiles and anti-satellite
weapons appears verifiable.
Together, verification and
arms control create a bootstrap
process: advances in verifica-
for many years carried the same kind of infrared and multi-
spectral scanners used on Keyhole spacecraft, Soviet com-
puter enhancement techniques are probably very crude
by U.S. standards, and that would limit the amount of intelli-
gence the imagery could be made to yield. A technique known as elec-
tro-optical subtraction, for example, uses data banks to show U.S.
analysts what has changed in a given scene over a period of time by
automatically filtering out everything that remains the same from
the time a previous picture of the area was taken. What's new is made
to stand out, for closer scrutiny. This system has been used by the
CIA for years, but is almost surely well beyond Soviet capability.
Quantity is another matter. While it takes months to plan and launch
tion make arms control agree-
ments possible, and the confi-
dence and trust these agree-
ments breed make more
cooperative verification ap-
proaches acceptable. Untilvery
recently, verification was based
exclusively on non-intrusive,
unilateral national technical
means. Now the Soviets are
showing a refreshing willing-
ness to use advances in technol-
ogy in a more cooperative man-
ner, viz, their acceptance of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP89M00699R001701310015-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP89M00699R001701310015-1
a Keyhole, the Soviets can send up a Cosmos in hours, the assembly
lines In effect extending to the launch pad Several Cosmos reconnais-
sance craft are mounted on their boosters and kept on flatcars in
sheds to be rolled out, erected, fueled and fired when a mission
is ordered up. Since 1975 the U.S.S.R. has orbited an average of three
reconnaissance satellites a month; it sent up a record six photo re-
connaissance satellites and four ocean reconnaissance types during
one seven-day period in September 1985.
The high launch rate allows the Soviets to cover virtually the whole
world at all times But they can't keep their snooping very secret. Their
satellites are tracked by the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) radar network their mission "envelopes"-apogees,
perigees, inclinations, periods, orbital eccentricity, and a great deal
more-are fed into the computers soon after a launch has been
i observed. Since there's an optimal flight envelope for every kind of
mission, and since classes of satellites follow characteristic envelopes,
the mission of a particular Cosmos quickly becomes apparent. Cos-
mos 1603, launched in 1984, initially threw NORAD Into confusion
bor-dering on panic because its flight fitted no established envelope. It per-
formed three major maneuvers and
changed its orbital inclination (its
jangle relative to the earth's poles) twice, in addition to changing al-
titude from 200 kilometers to 850. it was finally calculated to be
a heavy intelligence satellite. A new envelope had been established.
Soviet reconnaissance satellites are also monitored when they
;maneuver to change orbit, as frequently happens when a political or
military event occurs that the Kremlin's intelligence directorate wants to
This fifths-1116 (n Soviet spy satellite has been stripped
of the usual Soyuz orbital module (boxd) and Crammed with
deetro'optiu that provide virtually real-time Imaging.
or -0 1180,162-1.
am "isio-i
S.ym: "Weer raft
orbital nxxV9
2) Descent module
3 Propulsion module
appraise from overhead In January 1985, for example, Cosmos 1616
was maneuvered to provide coverage of eastern Afghanistan and west-
ern Pakistan, possibly to search for arms shipments going to the Af-
ghan rebels Two months later, with the 'War of the Cities" between Iran
and Iraq boiling over, Cosmos 1630, which had been launched to relieve eunched on Feb.
Cosmos 1616, was directed out of its normal orbit into one
that placed it over the battle area. And Cosmos 1647, sent up on April
19 to replace Cosmos 1630, spent 20 days on normal surveillance
before being maneuvered to pass over the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon
while Israeli troops were withdrawing. The short duration of most Soviet
photo reconnaissance missions means that valuable space aboard
the satellites can be allocated to sensors rather than to all the
fuel needed for long-term, extensive maneuvering.
And the large number of spacecraft, combined with quick-launch capa-
bility, brings a far more important potential advantage. Were a war to
break out in which it was considered necessary to blind the opponent's re
connaissance satellites as a prelude to an all-out onslaught, the U.S.S.R.
would have a distinct edge by the sheer size of its flotilla of space-
craft. (This advantage, however, doesn't take into account hardening, de-
coys, spoofing-taking command of an enemy's satellite with your own
signals-wand other means of protecting space "assets") It's conceivable
that the relatively few Rolls-Royces would be picked oft during the first
hour or so; the fleet of Chevys, on the other hand, might well keep coming
for as long as their launch complexes remained undamaged
Soviet reconnaissance satellites have their share of problems, includ-
ing some spectacular failures. The two most widely publicized in-
volved RORSATS, powered by small nuclear reactors and designed
to work closely with electronic ocean reconnaissance satellites
(EORSATS) to follow NATO surface vessels in real time. When one of
them, Cosmos 954, came tumbling out of the sky in January 1978,
its highly radioactive fuel survived re-entry and plowed into the Great
Slave Lake area of the Canadian tundra, leaving a trail of hot de-
bris and a lingering black eye on Soviet intelligence activity (only partly
compensated for by a $3 million payment to the Canadians). A simi-
lar accident happened five years later to Cosmos 1402, whose reactor
sailed out of orbit and plunged into the Indian Ocean
Nor have photo reconnaissance satellites been spared. The Soviets
have destroyed several that experienced control problems in orbit rath-
er than have them hit a populated area or fall into the hands of U.S.
intelligence. Since the ball that carries the cameras and film must sur-
vive a fiery descent through the atmosphere before its chute can open,
it's extensively shielded and could land anywhere in one piece. In the
latest such occurrence, on Jan. 29, Cosmos 1813, which had been
launched two weeks earlier, was blown up after it failed to descend as
ordered NORAD recorded the explosion and tracked more than 100
fragments, some of which went into higher orbit, as the doomed space-
craft Passed over the northeastem U.S.S.R.
seismic stations on their soil.
If the sweeping reductions of
nuclear arsenals so grandly en-
visioned by Reagan and Gor-
bachev at Reykjavik are to be
implemented, verification will
have to move into its third and
final stage: the bilateral, coop-
erative use of technical means
and human observers to moni-
tor agreements that preserve a
common security for both the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and for
the rest of the world.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP89M00699R001701310015-1