ADDENDUM TO SAFE PROGRAM REVIEW REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R001701310009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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4/i,d - 3 - 5 /'c
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Edward J. Heinz, USAF
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Addendum to SAFE Program Review Report
DCI/ICS 4145-87
10 November 1987
1. In response to your direction (Attachment A), the following
information is provided.
a. Request: Provide CIA, DIA and CSPO responses to SAFE report.
Answer: No responses were requested nor recommended when the
report was distributed to CIA, DIA and CSPO. No formal reply has
been received from DIA or CSPO. However, an unsolicited response
was received from Director of Information Resources, CIA, (see
Attachment B). The SAFE review team prepared comments to the
D/OIR memorandum in Attachment C. Informally DIA's Director for
Information Systems advised that he liked the report. The CSPO
Director, however, is concerned that revising the SAFE schedule
will "take the pressure off the vendor to meet SAFE milestones,"
and without the additional funds requested in FY 1988 the program
will have to be descoped, (see Attachment D).
b. Request: Expand Option D (FY 1989 Buyout) with detailed
implications and provision for CSPO disestablishment.
Answer: Option D, funding the SAFE program 50/50 through
FY 1988 with a CIA buyout ($7-15 million) beginning FY 1989, has
two fiscal issues that must be considered:
1. DIA must acquire and install a development computer in
FY 1988 to support continued SAFE development. This
procurement is not planned or funded in FY 1988 or FY 1989.
2. CSPO SAFE deliveries will not be finished in FY 1988, but
FY 1989 remaining work cannot be quantified at this time. A
CIA buyout in FY 1989 leaves DIA solely responsible for this
fiscal unknown which could be significant. Inability of DIA
to fund the unprogrammed shortfall would impact critical
mission activities.
REc.ADE TO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS
A AND B
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SUBJECT: Addendum to SAFE Program Review Report
In addition to funding issues, it would take at least one
year for DIA to prepare internally to assume full program
management responsibilities such as building an experienced
in-house IBM support division, acquiring training on CIA's
minimally documented AIM system, and contracting vendor support
to continue program development. Given these considerations,
disestablishment of CSPO under option D would be scheduled no
earlier than 1 April 1989. This assumes a transition plan can be
developed and approved by 31 January 1988 and activities to
disestablish CSPO commence February 1988, concurrent with ongoing
development activities.
c. Request: Consider Option D1 for buyout in FY 1990 with
provision for CSPO disestablishment.
Answer: Option Dl stipulates funding SAFE 50/50 through
FY 1989, with CIA buyout at beginning of FY 1990 with a sum of
money equivalent to 25 percent of remaining program costs
(estimated $0-5 million). Concurrent with development
activities, commence transition activities to disestablish CSPO,
according to an approved transition plan, completing
disestablishment of CSPO no later than 1 October 1989. On
1 October 1989, DIA assumes full responsibility for funding and
managing any remaining SAFE activity.
Option Dl permits a reasonable time for CSPO to complete
joint program activities under the shared costs arrangement,
while forcing DIA to commence immediate activity to prepare for
independent SAFE development and management not later than
1 October 1989. However, under this option, CIA continues to pay
for activities from which they perceive no benefit. DIA absorbs
100 percent of all further program costs.
d. Question: Who decided the 70/30 (DIA/CIA) split for 1RW work
on Delivery 4?
Response: The 70/30 arrangement was reached between
previous CSPO Director, an previous
from DIA, attempting to prorate costs on TRW CSPO Deputy contract
tasks. No formal agreement was signed.
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SUBJECT: Addendum to SAFE Program Review Report
e. Question: Why has CSPO refused to provide DIA information on
contract tasking, vendor expenditures, and monthly status reports?
Response: DIA VP-SIA, advised the review team of
DIA's persistent requests for contract information and the
negative responses received from Director of CSPO,
According to ~ D/CSPO responses have included
"contracts contain sensitive IA data;" "contract information
requires interpretation;" and "these reports contain alarming
data." Contents of Section D. Subsection (b) of the SAFE report
which introduces this issue were based upon the team's interview
with hence they were only coordinated with DIA. The
information was included in the report because the review team
also considers it outrageous; the issue is still unresolved.
Edward J. Heinz
Lieutenant General, USAF
Attachments:
A. SAFE Report and DDCI Query
B. D/OIR Comments
C. ICS Response to Attachment B
D. CSPO Memorandum
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SUBJECT: Addendum to SAFE Program Review Report
DCI/ICS 4145-87
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - D/ICS Chrono
1 - D/PBO
1 - ER
1 - IHC Subj
1 - IHC Chrono
1 - ICS Reg
DCI/ICS/IHC
(10Nov87) 25X1
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C
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDI #04555-87
6 November 1987
NOTE TO: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
CR
This is a critical review of the IC Staff's
paper on SAFE, but it makes some good points.
Obviously, it has the bias of the DI, but it
also has some important facts about DI needs and
DIA's performance. I didn't find the IC report
all that objective. I sympathize with DIA's
problem, but I don't feel responsible for it.
Richard J. K-61r
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
DDI #04584X-87, dtd 3 Nov 1987
IA-RDP89M00699R001701310009-8
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3 November 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Information Resources
SUBJECT: Response"to the IC Staff Report on SAFE
REFERENCE: IC Staff Report on Support for the
Analysts's File Environment (SAFE)
Program Review dated 7 October 1987
Overview
1. We have reviewed the IC Staff report recommending
the continuation of the current CIA/DIA/CSPO relationship
for two more years. We find it misrepresents the actual
situation on several counts and leaves unanswered several
important questions with regard to a continuing commitment
to DIA. Specific comments are presented below. This
memorandum was coordinated with the Director of Information
Technology.
2. The greatest single impact on the DI analyst of
holding CIA to the IC Staff recommendations and schedule is
that the DI will receive no SAFE improvements until at least
1990. We must begin now to develop our own capability for
maintaining SAFE, managing the overall SAFE program, and
designing and developing new SAFE functions for analysts.
Any resources given to DIA will directly affect what can be
done for the DI.
The IC Staff Report
3. The program review by the IC Staff includes a
synthesis of considerable SAFE history (Sections A through
D) which is as much based on personal recollections of
people involved in the program as it is on solid
documentation. While accurate for the most part, it also
All portions classified SECRET.
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SUBJECT: Response to the IC Staff Report on SAFE
illustrates how muddled this entire issue has become. For
example, the generally-held assumption that CIA must pay 30
percent of DIA's Delivery 4 development is derived not from
any formal agreement. As best as we can determine It is
based on a CSPO decision of several years ago apparently
after discussion with someone in the DI--not further
identified--who stated we "might" have an interest in
Delivery 4. CSPO translated that "interest" into 30 percent
share of software development costs.
4. The report's three observations (Section E).seem
incomplete and shallow. This section, which presumably is
intended to form the basis for the alternatives and
recommendations, addresses only three issues: (1) the
intense schedule for SAFE deliveries in FY88; (2) whether
pro rata costing can be introduced; and (3) CSPO
disestablishment. It does not address the impact on CIA if
/1, /we are to continue an open-ended arrangement with DIA; it
o build up its infrastructure to support SAFE; it offers no
judgment as to what should be CIA's prorated costs for
software deployment intended solely for DIA; it fails to
recognize that other SAFE users are entering the picture--
the DO in 1988 and NMCC in 1989; and it says nothing about
the CIA technical support DIA needs to operate SAFE.
5. The alternatives (Section F) presented by the IC
Staff represent a reasonable range of solutions, although
the descriptions of disadvantages for Options A, B and D
fail to note that CIA gets no SAFE improvements for at least
2 years. For Option D the IC Staff claims DIA is not
currently capable of managing SAFE. The IC Staff fails to
recognize the recent organizational and staffing changes in
DIA, all of which are intended to provide DIA the capability
to manage its own SAFE program. In fact, DIA has
successfully installed several software deliveries over the
past several months. Under disadvantages for Option C the
IC Staff implies that it is only fair that CIA should pay
for 50 percent of the remaining Delivery 3 and 30 percent
for Delivery 4 software developments because DIA provided
funding to earlier deliveries of SAFE which benefited only
CIA. In fact, DIA has nearly 1,000 analysts on SAFE
Delivery 1; it had the opportunity to put Delivery 2 into
its production system but could not because it had not
developed the necessary support structure; it now has some
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SUBJECT: Response to the IC Staff Report on SAFE
500 analysts on SAFE Delivery 3; and most importantly, DIA
required the development of Deliveries 2 and 3 so that
Delivery 4 could be built on their foundation. In-short the
Alternatives section is a biased presentation.
6. Our reactions for the team's conclusions and
recommendations (Section G) are listed below:
Recommendation A. CSPO develop a more realistic
schedule and associated FY 1988 and FY 1989
funding profiles for implementation of remaining
SAFE deliveries, addressing the identified $7.2
million funding shortfall as a FY 1989 issue.
We feel strongly that CSPO should develop a
realistic delivery schedule--within budgetary
constraints--and then be held to it. Spreading
out the delivery schedule over two years will add
to overall costs and probably lead to a slippage
into a third year.
Recommendation B. Continue DIA and CIA SAFE
funding responsibilities on a 50/50 basis (except
TRW work on Delivery 4, Set 1 at 70/30 and
separate hardware procurements) until all
remaining Deliveries 3.2 through 3.8 and Delivery
4, Set 1 have been completed and user acceptance
achieved.
This is the DIA position. It fails to
recognize the impact on CIA, and it is
inconsistent with Recommendation D in that D
recommends a firm divorce date.
Recommendation C. Alter CSPO's implementation
approach to install new SAFE deliveries only at
DIA, not CIA unless specifically requested.
OIR and OIT were, in fact, not planning to
incorporate these deliveries into our production
SAFE system.
Recommendation D. CSPO prepare a joint agency
transition plan and schedule for disestablishing
CSPO no later than 1 October 1989. CSPO submit
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SUBJECT: Response to the IC Staff Report on SAFE .
the transition plan for DCI approval by 31 January
1988. On or before 1 October 1989 DIA assume full
responsibility for managing any remaining SAFE
development activities in a DIA development
facility.
A transition plan is needed, but it must
allow CIA to begin developing its own SAFE program
office in FY88. This recommendation appears to be
inconsistent with Recommendation B which advocates
continued CIA funding of DIA SAFE until Deliveries
3 and 4 are completed with no explicit termination
date.
Recommendation E. Starting immediately, CSPO
provide DIA VP-SIA and CIA DDI/OIR detailed
contract information on vendor task activities and
expenditure to facilitate agency cost accounting
and task management.
We agree. In fact, over the past year we
have been getting more cost data from CSPO than in
the past.
Recommendation F. Starting December 1987, CSPO
provide monthly program reporting to Intelligence
Community Staff/IHC, DIA VP-SIA and CIA DDI-OIR,
until program completion.
Inserting the IC Staff into the SAFE program
review will accomplish nothing other than to tie
up CSPO and contractor resources to prepare and
provide the extra briefings. In view of what came
out of this IC Staff review, I see only continuing
IC Staff support for the DIA position.
Funding Issues
7. If we are required to continue to support DIA SAFE
development at the 50/50 level through Delivery 3 and 70/30
level for Delivery 4, Set 1, we will be hard pressed to find
funds for CIA-unique requirements in the same time frame.
Efforts to provide DI analysts with a single user-friendly
and easy-to-learn interface to widely used applications are
already under way. Working groups have met to design a
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SUBJECT: Response to the IC Staff Report on SAFE
programmer interface for SAFE so that DI programmers can
write applications to meet a single office's unique needs.
These efforts require continued funding to reach fruition.
8. There will likely also be significant delays and
increased costs in other, programs, including Dossier (the
new biographic reference system), ARM (CRES's project to
allow the automated generation and tracking of
requirements), and projects sponsored by the Mobile Missile
Assessment Center to provide new tools to DI and DS&T mobile
missile analysts. While each of these has a source of
funding independent of OIR, ARM and Dossier estimate
increased costs of $2M per program for a two-year delay.
Their development will be greatly hampered by the
prohibition on asking for changes to SAFE to accommodate
them. OIR will be in the position of holding up other
crucial systems to protect the SAFE schedule. The DI would
have to wait until 1990 to begin to integrate these projects
into SAFE.
9. Lastly with regard to funding, it must be noted
that much has changed since CIA agreed to support joint
development at specified funding levels. Analytic needs at
both CIA and DIA have changed to meet a changing
environment; expectations of and demands on the SAFE system
have also changed and diverged. Development priorities and
budgetary responsibilities have not shifted in the interim
to keep pace.
OIR Recommendations
10. We believe we have more than met our financial
obligations to DIA SAFE development with some $5M in FY87
and another $3M in FY88 for such purposes. We recognize
that past commitments were made in various forums, but
holding CIA to these commitments fails to recognize DIA
failure in the past to help itself, and the fact that much
has changed since those commitments were made. Accordingly,
we recommend the following:
-- A buy-out of DIA on 1 October 1988. A fair
figure in our view is on the order of $2M,
which follows recent funding trends. This
would provide DIA a supplement to their SAFE
budget to assist it to complete remaining
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SUBJECT: Response to the IC Staff Report on SAFE
software development for Delivery 3 or 4. It
would allow CIA to provide new functionality
and add data bases to SAFE for the DI analyst
starting in FY89. Any additional CIA monies
provided for DIA-unique development in FY88
beyond the $3M already promised would be
subtracted from the $2M projected for FY89.
-- As part of this buy-out proposal OIT would
provide DIA assistance in program management,
technical support for AIM, and contract
management. DIA, of course, may assume these
responsibilities any time before FY89.
-- A SAFE program office in OIR. We would begin
developing in FY88--with much needed OIT
assistance--a capability to manage and maintain
all aspects of the SAFE program, including
operations and maintenance. We must start this
program now--while meeting our fiscal
obligations to DIA--so that we can provide DI
analysts with SAFE improvements in FY89. At an
appropriate time we would bring the DO into
this program office; the DO/IMS fully concurs
with this approach.
11. In sum, DIA needs money, program management, and
technical support from CIA. OIT is willing to provide the
technical support and program management, and we are ready
to offer additional funds. But neither OIT nor OIR can live
with a continuing open-ended commitment to DIA.
cc: DDA
D/COMPT
D/OIT
D/CSPO/IISG/OIT
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ICS COMMENT TO D/OIR RESPONSE
There are no issues raised in the D/OIR response that were not considered
and/or specifically mentioned in the team's analysis.
The key issue is money. Our considered judgment is that CIA has an
obligation to share funding until the program is completed, regardless that
the remaining activities are of primary benefit to DIA. Given the lack of
historical cost accounting for SAFE, the realistic solution to cost sharing is
to maintain the 50/50 split until completion. Unfortunately, obligating CIA
to fulfill this commitment means DI funds will be diverted from CIA/SAFE
enhancements to the joint program. (Note Attachment 5 of the SAFE report
provided by D/OIR.)
D/OIR clearly misses the point that the funding issue and disestablishment
of CSPO are two separate issues. It is our judgment that either agency,
properly prepared, could manage the remaining development activity. The
report specifically encourages DIA to prepare for this management
responsibility now. Regardless of whether CSPO or DIA is managing the
program, the remaining activity should be funded by both agencies until
completed.
The team's recommendations were not expected to be popular. At this
juncture four things are perfectly clear: 1) Swift decisions on funding and
CSPO disestablishment are required so that the program can be brought to a
successful completion; 2) Both agencies originally committed to a joint
program fully recognizing the commonality and uniqueness of the program
objectives. Key to completion of these objectives are the remaining
deliveries for DIA; 3) Continued cost sharing is the only equitable
alternative; and 4) Management of the program should be fully separated from
CSPO as soon as DIA can handle the responsibility. OIT's technical assistance
is essential to DIA's readiness effort.
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21 October 1987
CONSOLIDATED SAFE PROGRAM OFFICE DIRECTIVE #14
In mid-June, 1987, D/CSPO identified to all appropriate
Government parties a potential shortfall in the FY-88
$10.5 million. It is now mid-October, 1987 program of
in sight. This situation is exacerbated by ' no apparent relief is
cuts which could result in reductions to thepFY-88iSAFErpmm-Rumman
ranging from 20-35%. program
Therefore, as a first step in the process of reviewing our
entire program for FY-88 and beyond, effective immediately all CSPO
Engineering Review Boards (ERBs) and Configuration Control Boards
(CCBs) are suspended indefinitely. All contractor organizations are
put on notice to prepare for a significant reduction in the FY-88
program. CSPO priorities still remain Delivery 4.0, IOC in August of 1988 and all activity on that criticaltpathystem
Director, CSPO
STAT
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