LETTER TO HONORABLE CASPER W. WEINBERGER FROM JACK KEMP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00610R000100020034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 15, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

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ILLEGIB
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Office of Legislative Counsel
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Acting Legislative Counsel
The attached letter is sen to you from
Senator Glenn's office for y ur perusal. The
letter deals with the f;-1 ornber and you can
expect a call from Co ressman Kemp concerning
this issue.
 Jl CK KEMP
38TN DI,TRICT. New Yong
.? COMMtTTEESt
APPROPRIATIONS
/000OMMITTEE:
FOREIGN OPERATIONS
RANKING MCMHER
C. ongre5.4 of tfje Uniteb &tate~
3ou5e of 3epre5entatibe5
Jiaabington, .C. 20515.
15 June 1981
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TASK PONCES 00ft
NATIONAL SECURITY AND VETERANS
ECONOMIC POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY
TAX POLICY
is
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
WASHINGTON OFFtCL,
2235 RATsup, House OFFICE Bu.I.DING
AIEA Coot 202: 223-5265
DIET111CT OFFICE.
1101 FEOEIAL BUILDING
111 WEST HURON STREET
GU-FALO. NEW YOwK 14202
AREA CODE 716: 846.4123
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I know that you are in the midst of.one of the most important
decisions this Administration will have to make in terms of our national
defense posture and the budget. I want to offer you some insight as to
what I believe are the feelings of a majority of my Republican colleagues
with respect to the decision to deploy a new manned strategic bomber system.
During the 1980 campaign, President Reagan sharply criticized the
Carter Administration for cancelling the B-1 in light of the time-urgent
need to modernize our bomber force. The President also took exception to
Carter's reliance upon the Advanced Technology Bomber, charging that the
ATB was a 1990s' solution to a 1980s' problem.
Accordingly, I view a new manned strategic bomber as a visible
commitment by this Administration to redress the serious strategic imbalance
which has developed over the last 20 years, and to make a clear break with
the legacy of the misguided Carter defense program. For almost two decades
our nation has endlessly studied and planned bomber systems, but we have
not procured one heavy strategic bomber. Today the Congress and the American
people strongly favor a new manned bomber to replace the ageing B-52s. The
B-1 constitutes the only reasonable candidate for the near term. This
airplane is a tested, reliable proven weapon system and not merely a theoretical
concept. The real and perceived impact of having a force of modern bombers
in the mid-1980s versus the wishful capabilities of theoretical airplanes
is truly significant, whatever the future holds for bomber design.
Better than any other aircraft, the B-1 satisfies our mandate to
pursue a near-term multi-role bomber. Not only will this airplane be able
to challenge an enemy's sophisticated defense network throughout the 1980s,
but its superior defenses, the incorporation of elements of "stealth"
technologies now, and its potential for further growth in the future will
ensure its usefulness well into the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the aircraft
could evolve to standoff roles, such as cruise missile carrier, in much the
same way that our B-52s are doing today. My consultations with defense
experts convince me that the B-1 will be highly effective as a multi-role
bomber for at least 30 years -- a truly worthwhile investment.
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0
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
June 15, 1981
page 2
In too many instances, the modernization efforts being planned for
TRIAD have been hampered by delays and insufficient funding. These problems
continue to worsen our already distressing strategic posture and erode
confidence in America's military strength. In this regard, I have been
deeply disturbed during recent years by the aggressive actions of not only
the Soviet Union, but Third World nations as well. Prompt, visible examples
of American force and resolve have in the past and can in the future help
alleviate or at least decrease some of this adventurism in the world, and
bombers are the portion of the TRIAD most capable of accelerated improvements.
Today more than ever,.we need to exhibit our continued leadership and our
commitment to world peace.
The Air Force leadership has been unanimous in their expression of
the importance of modernizing our bomber force. I share that conviction and
emphasize that we need to do it now. General Ellis has voiced some reservations.
about the B-1 as an interim bomber, but his concerns have been focused on
program costs and the potential for losing the Stealth airplane, not on the
B-i's operational utility, which he has certainly supported. CINCSAC's
concerns are nonetheless very important and they lead me to my last few points.
If we buy a B-1 now and a Stealth bomber later, I think we gain in
several respects: (1) We do not accelerate the Stealth technology imprudently
in an attempt to remedy a worrisome near term defense posture. Such an
effort may well result in severe compromises in aircraft design for the sake
of program pace. (2) We reduce the risk in our commitment. Otherwise, if we
rely solely on a Stealth airplane for the 1980s and find that we encounter
significant problems, or we find that the Soviets have concurrently developed
an effective defense against it, we would have only a B-52 force that would
be'over 40 years old before another new bomber could be developed. Such a
course would lead to an intolerably feeble U.S. bomber force. (3) On the
other hand, the B-1 facilitates an orderly transition through this century
regardless of Stealth developments. If the Stealth does become a viable bomber,
the B-1 can assume the B-52's conventional mission and cruise missile carriage
roles. Only the B-1 provides for the orderly and expeditious retirement of
the B-52s. (4) In order to accommodate both aircraft within existing budget
constraints, the IOC of the Stealth bomber could be put off two or three years.
The B-1 would be capable of performing the penetrating bomber mission until the
ATB was operational, and a delay in the advanced bomber's IOC would incur the
advantages of a carefully paced development of the new Stealth technology.
During the course of your confirmation hearings, you recalled that
when you were running the budget a few years back, "the B-i was almost ready
for production, and it was called back...for some redesign because some new
technologies had become available. And the result is, as you- know, we not
only do not have [the B-13, we do not have authorization for it any more. So
I think it is vital to get decisions and get them made and proceed on them."
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is
JK/mkv
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
June 15, 1981
page 3
Mr. Secretary, I could not agree more. While we in Congress
recognize the complexity of the decision, I cannot overemphasize the need
to take firm, visible timely steps to improve our worsening strategic
balance. It is important to recognize that we currently have a favorable
political climate for remedying the situation, thanks in large part to
President Reagan's elucidation of the critical defense issues facing our
nation, and his promise of prompt action to correct our growing strategic
force deficiencies. In my judgment, the acquisition of a new bomber force
is the best alternative available to us, and the B-1 is the best choice
among the proposed aircraft. I pledge my tireless efforts to you to
support this important program.
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