SS-20 PRODUCTION ESTIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 3, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21
: CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
SUPPLEMENTAL BACKGROUND
FOR
5 FEB 88 - SSCI HEARING -- RE: INF Treaty
Please Return to Exec Staff
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21
: CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
R
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for-Relea-s-e-2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
DCl/DOCI Executive Staff
NOTE FOR: DCI
1 February 1988
Attached is some supplemental background for your INF
hearing on Wednesday. It covers former NATO Commander Rogers'
line of attack on the INF Treaty and responses to his principal
arguments. Also attached is a long letter from Jesse Helms
written in 1985 which contains an exhaustive and typical range
of Helms' assertions about CIA's inadequacies. We've responded
to this letter point by point and Bob Gates thought that both
the Helms' letter and our responses might be useful background
in the event the Senator tries to put you on the defensive on
the broader issues of CIA's competence and objectivity.
TAB A Bernie Rogers' thesis about INF.
TAB B An all-purpose response to General Rogers' thesis.
TAB C A point-by-point response to General Rogers' thesis.
TAB D Jesse Helms on CIA's objectivity and competence.
TAB E Responses to Senator Helms' charges.
Attachments
JLM:gg
Ti'ECRET
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4 III
A
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Issue
1
Relations with Allies: Does the INF Treaty strength-
en or weaken NATO?
General Bernard W. Rogers was the Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) for eight
years. having been elected to an unprecedented
tour terms. General. Rogers was deeply involved
with all of our NATO allies during the period of
debate, planning. and deployment of NATO's INF.
This experience gave him unique insight Into the
military and political needs of NATO. The fol-
lowing Is excerpted from General Rogers' current
article in Global Affairs.
Relations with Allies
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Bernard W. Rogers
ARMS CONTROL AND NATO
DETERRENCE
0 ie day after the 200th birthday of our Constitution, the
president announced that the United States and the So-
viet Union had agreed in principle to conclude a treaty
. eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) on
Page 3
a global basis. The coincidence of those two events seemed re-
markably ironic.
On the one hand, the Preamble of our Constitution sets out .
SIX objectives which the government, formed by the Constitution.
is expected to promote. Among them are:
? "to provide for the common defense" and
? "to secure the blessings of libert% to ourselves and our pos-
terity." These two objectives are the basis for the highest moral
imperative of our democratic government: to keep its people
alive and free.
On the other hand, is the prospective INF reduction accord,
in the long term, consistent with the best interests of the people
governed by the Constitution?
To address that question is the purpose of this essay. I. will
discuss some aspects of NATO's strategy that impact on arms
control negotiations; expand on NATO's mission of deterrence
.
and its requirements: discuss arms control in general and the
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
prospective double-zero INF agreement in particular; list my
concerns with the latter; and indicate what NATO must do if the
agreement is implemented.
NATO Strategy
Among the many alliances that this nation has joined in order
to secure its freedom, the most important is the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization of sixteen sovereign. independent nations.
NA U) was founded in .1949 as a body to deter further Soviet
? expansion to the west. But the liarmel Report. adopted by
NATO in 1967. concluded that the alliance has two main
functions:
I) To maintain eldftpljte military strength and political
cohesion to deter aggression and other forms ol pressure,
and to defend NATO territory if deterrence (ails.
2) To pursue the search fur progress towards a more stable
relationship in which the underlying political issues can
be solved.
In May 1984 the North Atlantic Council confirmed the contin-
uing validity of the liarmel Report.
At about the time M iilistet Hai mels repot t, the deterrent
strategy of NAT() changed Iron) "tripwire-massive retalia-
tion" (which had bet bankrupt) to "flexible response." Over
the past twenty year. the NATO nations have cm ll i ll ually reaf-
firmed the viability til this war prevention strategy. which envi-
sions three responses:
I) Direct defense to defeat an attack or to force the burden
of escalation onto the shoulder of the aggressor.
'2) Deliberate escalation on NATO's part. to include the pos-
sible first use of theater (non-strategi() inn lear weapons.
3) The general (strategi( ) nudear response whit It. in the
final analysis. is the guarantor of NATO's deterrence.
The flexible response strateg% requires a triad iii lorces: con-
ventional, non-strategi( nuclear. and strategit nuclear. After
commencing in December 1983 to deploy the longer-range INF
(1.KINF) weapons ? ground-launched cruise and Pershing II
ballistic missiles?the major deli( iencv within the triad remains
NATO's conventional forces. These have never been adequate
to the task since budgetary constraints and the appeal of public
and social programs have led NATO to mortgage its deterrence
to the nuclear response.
Since the early 1910s. the gap between NATO's conventional
lone capabilities and those ol the Warsaw Pact (WP) has been
getting wider each year. The WI' advantage is at least two to one
in nearly every area ()I measurement and greater in most. With
its mission. NATO does not need to match the WP one for one
in anv area of force comparison?tanks, howitzers, aircraft, ships
?but it must not let the gap widen to the point where the militarii
situation is beyond restoration for an alliance whose mission is
the prevention of war. Should that situation Occur. the Soviets
would be able to achieve their objective of being able to intimi-
date, coerce, blackmail, and neutralize the West ?European na-
tions without calling the WP troops out of their barracks. Or. as
put. better by 'another. be able "to gather the fruits of victory
without the pains of war."
Should NAT() bit in its mission of deterrence and be attacked
conventionally by the Warsaw Pact, NNW forces would respond
in an excellent manner. The problem is that these forces would
only be able to fight conventionally (Or less than two weeks. Why?
Because of an inability to sustain themselves in the light due to
inadequate ammunition stocks, insufficient trained replacements
for casualties, and lack of replacements for material losses on the
battlefield, such as tanks. (The U.S. forces' sustainability is better
than that of its allies?with the length of U.S. lines of commu-
nication it should be?but the United States also has deficiencies
in all three areas cited.)
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
With respect to a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact, the
guidance to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SA-
CEUR) from his political authorities is: Before you. SACEUR.
lose the cohesiveness of your detente you will toot "may") request
the release of nuclear weapons. The reason? 1ti signal to the WP
that NATO is prepared to resort to nuclear %%capons to defend
itself, thereby trying to convince the pact to tt.ISC and desist in
its attack. Under such circumstances. SACEL R would request
the initial use of a limited number 14 land-based theater nuclear
weapons upon militarily significant Soviet targets on Soviet and
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil. Striking Soviet targets would send
the message that the USSR would not he immune to NATO's
response to pact aggression. Certainly at this stage SACEUR
would not wish to request the use of nuclear weapons on targets
on the territory of NAM nations.
NATO's Mission: Deterrence
Flaying discussed sonic aspects of NA.1.0's strategy that impact
on arms control negotiations. I wish to return to the mission of
NATO: the deterrence of war. Deterrence is in the eve of the
beholder, the Soviet Union. To be deter, ed I rom attack, or from
exerting pressure through the threat of attack. the Soviet Union
must perceive that the disadvantages it would sutler from aggres-
sion would be greater than any advantages it might accrue. In
other words, it would receive greater pain titan gain. It .must be
convinced that the consequences of its aggression would not be
suffered solely by the victims of that aggression. The Soviets must
always face the ultimate risk that pact aggression could result in
NATO's first use of theater nuclear weapons. which might es-
calate further to a strategic nuclear exchange, the one thing the
Soviets fear. The loss of twenty million citizens in World War
II
still preys on the minds of the Soviet people. Chernobyl con-
firmed the mental impact that would result front a strategic nu-
clear exchange.
--1?). A1IIOA
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
The Soviets may doubt that NATO would resort to the first
use of nuclear %%capons. but they cannot he. certain inasmuch as
capitulation would be NATO's alternative. This Soviet uncer-
tainty is an important factor in NATO's equation of deterrence.
If NATO is to make its full contribt ll i (( n to deterrence it must
possess two key tools. They are set forth in NATO's "General
Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons."
The first is the ability with land-based, theater nuclear weapons
to hold at risk?with certainty?militarily significant targets deep
in the Soviet homeland. ?Flie second is to have a number of
escalatory options between NATO's disadvantaged conventional
forces at one end of the force spectrum and U.S./U.K. strategic
nuclear forces at the other end.
It was to provide these two tools, and thereby fill a gap in
NATO!s spectrum of deterrence, that NATO made the decision
it) 1979 to deploy the ground-launched t ruise missiles (GI.CMs)
(range: 1.50(1 miles) and the Pershing I Is (Pik) (range: 1,100. Page
miles) on West European soil. With thelfritish Vulcan aircraft
being .retired. NATO had concluded by the end of the 1970s
that the U.S. F- I II aircraft based in Englattd-the only NATO
air( rah with any chance of penetrating to Soviet territory ?
would no longer be adequate to quality as the first tool. This
conclusion was especially cogent in view of the increasing diffi-
culty of manned aircraft to penetrate the inactive and expanding
WI' air defenses. The two new NATO weapon systems also in-
creased the number of escalatory options.
Arms Control
As I mentioned earlier, the flannel Report concluded that one
of the functions of the alliance is to seek a more stable relationship
with the Soviet Union. Dialogue, detente, and arms control ne-
gotiations play a role in that function. I believe that dialogue at
the highest level is important. Today it is being conducted with
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who is charming, clever,
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
.211111111201111011111=
and charismatic. But he is also Russian and a t aminumist, some-
thing we should never forget. Further, Andrei Gromyko has
reminded us that while Gorbachev smiles a lot, lie has iron teeth.
The West must be wary and not mistake the general secretary's
rhetoric for substantive change in Soviet foreign policy; we have
noted none to date. Gorbachev does seem intent upon domestic
reforms that appear to be causing some internal tensions. In this
regard. we should not let a lesson of history be lost on us; that
is, autocratic regimes often lind a rationale for external excur-
sions in order to distract attention from internal dif ficulties.
Turning to the matter of arms control in general. I believe
there are two cardinal principles to keep in mind during
negotiations:
1) Accept no agreement that impacts adversely on the cred-
ibility of NATO's deterrence in the Soviet mind.
2) Arms control accords are not an end in themselves, lint
are a means to the end of greater security at less cost.
? Further, when negotiating proposals are tabled, there are certain
questions which should be asked as the proposals are evaluated. ?
For the SACEUR, an international officer serving sixteen NAT0
nations, his overarching question must be: "What's best for
NATO as a whole?" not, "What's best for any nation or group
of nations?" Other questions to be asked include: Dots the pro-
posal lessen the threat? Does it improve NATO's response to the
threat? Does it impact on NATO's continuum of escalation? Does
it tend to make the Soviet Union a sanctuary? What is its impact
on nuclear burden-sharing among the allies? Would it result in
an overdependence on one of the remaining nuclear systems? -
What is the level of risk if the proposal is accepted? And whose ?
risk is it ?that of the United States? ? of the West European
nations??or both?
Having reviewed some aspects oh NATO's strategy :IS they
relate to arms control, set birth wine of the requirements for
credible deterrence, and taken a brief look at arms control in a
general was let me remind you of how NATO got to where it
As today with respect to the potential INF accord. It was not easy.
From Two-Track to a Double-Zero
As I hate mentioned, as the end of the 1970s approached,
NATO's political authorities recognized the gap that had opened
in NATO's spectrum of deterrence, what with the British Vulcan
being retired and only the U.S. F-1 I I remaining as a theater
system that could be perceived by the .Soviets as lending credi-
bility to NATO's deterrence. To fill that gap. NATO decided in
December 1979 to deploy the 464 GI.CMs and 108 P11 ballistic
missiles in Wcstern Europe. Although this deployment was "sold"
to NATO's publics as a means to capture the SS-20s?utilizing
the negotiating track of the two-track decision?the fact was that
even without the SS-20s, the deployment was deemed necessary
if the credibility of NATO's deterrence was to be kept sufficiently
high. The fact that the SS-20s were being deployed in the late
1970s just made more urgent NATO's decision to get on with
deploying the two 1.RIN I' systems by December 1983.
In the early 1980s many demonstrations against deployment
were staged in a number of NATO nations. In order to dampen
this opposition. the president, nI981?at the behest of some
allied leaders?proposed an agreement between superpowers to
reduce to let* I all I.RINF wealmins. 01. stated another way: If
the Soviets would eliminate their 55-4 and SS-20 ballistic missiles,
NATO would not deplot its GI .CM. and PHs. No one then
believed that the Soviets would ;kr( ept such a proposal. (However,
today there ? are some [timer dish whet yrs who now claim that
they thought all along that the Soviets would accept it.) There.
were some of its in 1981 who stated that the pres-ident's proposal
made a lot of sense politically. but not militarily. (I said then that
it gave me gas pains.") The proposal would have re-
' turned NATO to its iirostut?e ol 1979. dependent again solely
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Page (
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
upon the F? Ill to undergird the i redibilitv of its deterrence.
Some of us also 'mimic:T(1 at the time why it was that the Soviets.
did not jump at the zeto-level LION!: plop's:II since the advan-
tages were all in their favor.
1 do wish to observe. however. that the zerO-level LRINF pro-
posal did have a dampening elle( t upill the demonstrated. op--
position to deployment of the U.S. I.R INF ss stems.
The continued deployment on solo:dole id the GIA:Ms and
P1 Is. beginning in December 1953. also lit might the Soviets back
to the negotiating table and has kept them there. They are es-
pecially worried about the Pershing II ballistic missiles, which
C.111 hold at risk important targets on Soviet soil with the Certainty
of penetrating WP air delenses iil sulking with great ac-
curacy within thirteen minutes id laittu h. With PI Is deployed.
the Soviets found themselves in the same 1)11%1111'C In which they
had held the West European nations lor Si) many sears?vul-
nerable to nuclear warheads lawn bed [rout land-based theater
systems. The USSR did not like it: and. .is described by one of
the senior members of the U.S. negotiating team. dies. set out
to capture the I'lls no Waller %hal tile prire.'
By early 1986 we started hearing uoises that the latest Soviet
leader. Gorbachev, might be leaniug towards ar?liting the "un-
asceptable" proposal of 1981. Some wondered: ?Vliv now. after
all those years? I believe that I !envy Kissinger's explanation is
on target: Anatoly Dobrynin. the Soviet ambassador to the United.
Suites for two decades and now loreign policy adviser to Gor-
bachev, convinced his boss that what sou see horn the Amy' tilts
is what you get. and not something devious. Sim e the gains ,ere
all Soviet. Gorbachev started shossing an interest in die suigle
zero-level proposal.
With a possible agreement in the oh tering. sonic of its ssanted?
to link full implenvotation of the elimination ol I.RINE weapons
to a satisfactory agreement by the superpowers ou reduced and
1111RelatiOns with Allies
balanced conventional and chemical forces. As Lord Challintt.
chairman of the House of Lords All-Party Defense Group, has
noted:
. . . the arms control agreements that have been reached oser
the past 25 years have all been based on one central as-
sumption?that.in the disarmament process it is dangerons
to try to approach nuclear weapons and conventional fort to
separately. If they are ever to be eliminated: they must he
reduced together, in a phased. controlled process.!
But the response we got to the suggestions ol linkage" revealed
that the principle of preemptive .concession would prevail: that
is. "the Soviets won't agree to such linkage, so we won't try to get
it...
Along came the Reykjavik Summit in late 1986 and, to their
consternation. the West Europeans found that the fundamental
elements of NATO's deterrent strategy had come very close to
being negotiated away by the United States without consultation
with its allies. Suddenly it dawned upon the West Europeans that
the two superpowers might negotiate the fate of Western Europe
over their heads and without their input. Living in Europe. I
found it very interesting to observe how nervous the West Eu-
ropeans became alter Reykjavik and how they thanked Gor-
bachev for saving the West from itself.
In the aftermath of Reykjavik many senior personnel in the
govt.i ntnents of Western Europe realized how unwise it had been
to pi ',mote the zero-level LRINF proposal. But after trying for
six sears to convince their people that zero-level was the course
to pursue, how could governments walk the cat back and tell
then people that they had misled them all that time? They could
not .and still retain any political credibility. So, like it or not, it
became necessary for political credibility to take priority over the
credibility of NATO's deterrence.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Page 7
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
In February 1987. Gorbachev firmly hoisted NATO by its own
petard when he openly accepted the zero-level LRINF proposal
of 1981.
NATO. seeking a way out of the corner into which it had
painted itself, cried out that it could not give up its GLCMs and
I'l Is while the Soviets still had shorter range INF (SRI IN weap-
ons forward de1)l4)yed?SS-225 and SS-23s?which would be able
to strike most of the same SS-20 targets in Western Europe after
the SS-20s had been eliminated. SI). in April 1987, Gorbachev
?true to form?told Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow
that he would throw in the SRI N I' as well. After all, he pointed
out, the Soviet Union was tlw only country that had any. And
he was correct, inasmuch as the United States had withdrawn its
Pershing IA ballistic missiles (range: 42(1 miles) from West Ger-
mans when it had deployed the I'lls.
With a dutible-Leth accord now a possibility, the United States
pressed its allies to make a quick decision on Gorbachev's zero-
level SRI N F proposal, suggesting they decide within three weeks.
The United States also informed its allies that it would take to
the negotiating table the position on the proposal that the allies
desired. At the same time the U mica mates made it clear that
Gorbachev's proposal made sense, bet MISC ii the allies did not
agree with his proposal. they would, according to the United
States. have to deploy a "new" SR I N F iiiisik 111 WeSi El1144Wall
Some of us suggested to the West European allies that the
better course of action would be to accept Glirbachev.S previous
proposal to destroy the forty-two Soviet SRI N F systems that were
forward deployed on non-So% let territory and lieu match the
Soviets at the level of their eighty remainiug SRI N F (or at an
equal. lower level). This match could base been accomplished by
removing one stage from die appropriate number oI PI Is.
thereby converting them to PI Bs with a range of 440 miles. The ?
Pills, resulting From converting Ills eilrrady dephrved. would not
result in deployment of a "new- missile as described by the United
States. We also advocated retaining and modernizing the seventy-
two German PlAs.
Althoukh the PI As and PIM could not hold at risk militarily
significant targets on Soviet soil, they could at least hold such
Soviet targets at risk in western Poland, East Germany, and much
of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would know that NATO would
be capable of bringing pain to them, thus keeping the credibility
of NATO's deterrence as high as possible in their minds, al-
though not as high as with deployed PI Is that could strike the
Soviet homeland.
1 believe that West European allies missed a golden oppor-
tunity to halt the slide down the slippery slope of denuclearization
of Western Europe at a range of 440 miles instead of 300 miles
where agreement on double-zero will stop it. at least momentar-
ily. But it was not to be. Before the British general election in
early June 1987, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher accepted
zero-level for SRIN F. Her action astonished some in the French
government who told me she had promised them she would not
accept it.' Then French President Francois Mitterrand also
agreed with zero-level SRI N F, this time to the consternation of
some senior members of his government.' 'Illus. Chancellor
Helmut Kohl was left out on a limb, trying. as a minimum, to
protect the seventy-two German PlAs from elimination, with the ?
Free Democratic and Social Democratic parties feverishly sawing
away at it.
The North Atlantic Council accepted the double-zero proposal
during its meeting in Reykjavik in June 1987, arguing that third
country systems (such as West (;ermany's) should not be included.
Although the chancellor tried bravely to salvage his country's
PlAs, in the end, alter what he described as having been urgent
discussions with U.S. officials over the previous forty-eight hours.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Page
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
vommemimilmmemeem4) zat=t51=tz.
SOVIET TANKS OUTGUN THE WEST
? gm
k. UNSTABLE TANK IMBALANCE
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
IIIIIpewelone dernoYn'eId
...?14"2i4
\....
NATO:
. 3o d.r.
Ills ea anopy ninacre,)
Moen./ neon . IS day.
1,1011.m.? I l0.1 horn rf KO
r?..lanmo am Imy. ormil?ty I.
(Habil/ room*
? ?
Warsaw Pact:
-i - 1.44,4,,s.... . 10 days ?
itissn sliehyirc mu/Tyra)
Leant anon . IS day,
IV.,11..., 5....Illtotmni
rem erne of In. rivrl.m I, on
tom. al I ?ImcmIr
Antitank Guided
Missile Launchers
In taxman*.
? Armored
? FICAVehicies
In
et'
sr.. Cory r wry.. ...err... Mr..* ??? ?????? ? ...rm. err?????.?
DIlletintIQ With Allies
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Main tattle Tanks
Technologitel Inodegnicallon
1957.5, lhouaande
1111
ttnn.liaa
att..
11176?-111.1
'111111111111
MAIO Woos.* Pact
?b rmre ?????
he announced on August 26, 1987. that West Germany would
destroy its seventy-two PI As when the double-zero accord had
been agreed to and implemented. Thus, one of the major ob-
stacles to the Soviets accepting the double-zero accord was
eliminated. * * *
As for the ability to verify adequately any !inure agreement.
Adelman has concluded:
?
Already verification requires more than national technical
means, and already confidence III Si % kr compliance with
arms control is beginning to require more than any mere
verification package can offer."
He also quotes the president's recent CI Ilitillent that "a govern-
ment that will break faith with its i twit pell plc cannot be trusted
to keep faith with foreign powers."'.
Lord Chalfont admonishes that "arms contr441 agreements that
are either unverifiable or unenforceable will only serve the ptir-
poses of Soviet foreign policy.'
Concerns About Double-Zero
First and foremost, 1 am concerned over the elimination of the
Plls, the theater-based system that the Soviets fear most. I he
His, when coupled with the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. would
keep the credibility of NATO's deterrence very high in the So-
viets* mind. They could foresee the pain the West could bring?
to bear should the WP aggress. Secondly. elimination of the
GLCMs and Pt Is reduces the number 4)1 escalatory options as ail-
able for use by the political authorities, should circumstances
dictate. The total impact ol losing these two key tools is that the
credibility ol NATO's deterrence is reduced in the Soviet mind,
and the future security of the West?including the United States
?will be affected.
Another concern is that the potential agreement puts NATO
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
?=i1=5?1==a1.,
on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western. Europe,
whit h is what thr Soviets. want. Such denuclearization would
make Western Europe sale for WP conventional aggression with
titi lear of nuclear escalation. More likely, however, in view of
the imbalance iii conventional forces. it would result in acceler-
ating the achievement of the Soviet objective of neutralizing
Western Europe witl I having to lire a shot. Such neutralization
would impact adversely upon the United States.
The risk (il starting down the slippery slopes of denucleari-
zation is that it brings NATO Irons a range of 1,500 miles (GLCM)
to a range of 300 miles for its theater land-based systems. This
may well open the door?with the German people applying the
pressitt e?to slide on down to a range of zero?total denuclear-
ization. Alter all, the theater systems that will remain will gen-
erally be able to strike targets otil? on German territory?West
and East German.
I am also concerned by the glib rathwales being put forth by
some persons to justify the double-zero-agrcement. One is: "The
Montebello decision. Id t 4,1)00 land-based nuclear warheads in
Western Europe; surely that is plents ." I lowever, when one strips
away the. 572 NATO LAIN I: weapons we would eliminate, what
is the composition 01 the iemaindes ? A kw maritime nuclear
depth charges with zero range. Hundreds of artillery-fired
ttttt tit projet tiles with a?iange til 9 miles. About eighty Lance'
missiles with 66-mile lange. Moth the artillery and the Lance
would need to be sited well behind the I rout-hue troops to reduce
their vidnetabilits to clients lite. thus reducing their effective-
ness?1 There would be the scs ems -two FRG PlAs with a range
of 420 miles which, as mentioned, will be eliminated. The other.
system temaining consists of bombs to be delivered by NATO
air( tali (range: 180-200 miles), with the U.S. F-111 being the
mils one that (mild peneti ale die WI' au t defenses. Should we
expet these residual loll t?S tIP (1/111Ille Up a perception of pain
in the Sias let mind% ILudh.
. 7.72-T7- =77777..
One might well declare: Does not this put NATO back where
it was in 1979 when it decided the F-,11 I was not enough to fill
latge gap in NATO's spectrum ol deterrence? And one would
be correct! One also might properly ask: "And what has changed
since 1979 to cause NATO to conclude there is no longer a need
to fill that gap, as the soon-to-depart GIA:Ms and PI Is did?"
Answer: "Nothing"!
As noted, it is not a question of the ntimber of land-based
theater nuclear warheads remaining after the agreement. The
real question is: "Will NATO retain the appropriate types of
theater nuclear warheads remaining after the agreement. The
real question is: "Will NATO retain the appropriate types of
theater nuclear weapon platforms to enable it to place nuclear
warheads on significant Soviet militarv targets, and do the Soviets
believe that NATO cats do it?" Alter the agreement is imple-
mented the answer will be -no."
Aniither rationale often heard to instil y double-zero INF is:
"The Soviets are giving up over 1.550 warheads and the United
States and West Germany only about 430; surely that is a good
deal for NATO." Again, numbers only count if NATO has to
light. But for NATO, the name of the game is deterrence, the
? prevention of fighting, so long :IS 111161/11S cats retain their
freedom. The fact is that the Soviets will be giving up only about
3 percent of their current nuclear warheads; almost all of the
remaining 97 percent ?thousands of warheads?can strike'
Western Europe if the Soviets wish. And fourteeh of the sixteen
NATO nations are in the Western European area. And what is
NATO giving up? The one theateroweapons system that. in the
eyes of the Soviets. makes NATO's deterrent highly credible?
the PH.
Some who argued most vigorously in 1977-79 against using
the 400-plus warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLEIMs) committed to SACEUR as a substitute for deploying
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Piss* 1(
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
tthe [JUNE are today claiming just as loudly that NNW should
now use those SLBMs in order to "t ompensate- for eliminating'
the LRI NE. Technically this is possible. but does it .make any
more sense now than it did eight sears agn'f lite MAI M% are a
key component of the U.S./U.K. )11riirifIC nuclear arsenal. Al-
though Soviet surveillance t an discriminate between the launch-
ing ol land-based theater ballistic nussilt..s and submarine-latinched ?
ballistic missiles. it cannot ddlerentiate between the ?I00-phis stra-
tegic SLBM warheads committed to SACEUR and the remainder
of the SLBM warheads belonging to the strategic nuclear forces
of the United States/United Kingthint. Especially is this so since
there can Iv an intermingling of SACEUR assets and U.S. assets
on the same submarine since there are ten nuclear warheads on
eachl the sixteen Missiles deplos VII in a U.S. boat. lithe Soviets
sighted strategic SI it being launched and heading their way,
how (mid they tell whether they were SA( EU warheads being
used lor theater purposes or were part of a strategic nuclear lay-
(It twit 114 the two ,Western nuclear powers? They could not.
Should the Soviets 1K' geared to launch their strategic nuclear
but es under at tat L. why should the United States and United
Kingdom hear the risk (41 being devastated because NATO used
strairgir SI.BMs lot Omar, purr rses? They slmuld not. The SA-
CFA IR should contitmr to coordinate the use of the SLBMs com-
mitted to him with the empinyment ol the other strategic. nuclear
weal)''' s of the United States/United Kingdom, just as he has
done I. ir veal S.
St11114 have suggested that :dui the INF agreement the West
should threaten to use ails strategir system. no matter
where based. to strike targets on Soviet soil should the WP stage
a conventional attack on N Al 0.1 his smacks (tithe old, defunct
"massive retaliation- m1:flew ol the I (.60s that NA F() discarded
because it was no longet t reclible by the late 1960s. Eliminating
NATO's INF weapons does tint make that strategy any more
,-111111r?te,?,7=
? Others have suggested that the U.S. sea-launched cruise mis-
siles (51.Ctsis) could be used to "compensate- for the loss of
LRI N F. Again. such use is technic:ilk leasible. But aside from
the lact that the SI CN1s ? like their cousins, the GLCMs ?are
relatiyels slow (lying. small. unmanned aircraft vulnerable to WP
air delenses? as well as subject to other constraints that I will
not detail?there is an overriding political reason for not com-
pensating with SLCMs. I dun't believe that it is politically credible
lot the West to be seen withdrawing nuclear weapons with one
hand :ind replacing then., with similar systems with the other.
Altei all, il political (11(1,1)11k% did not now have the highest
priority. N 0 would not be primed to eliminate all its I.R1 N F.
To me it appears that the rationales offered by persons seeking
to instil 4 the prospectis agivement stiller from either not being
based nil t ou logic, up, they are transparent?or both.
MY final cont?ern is thai NATO. following the apparent ac-
celerated timetable of the United Suites, is about to sacrifice, the
long-term credibility of its deterrence on an altar of short-term
political expediency and image enhaticement ih smile of its lead-
ers. And all because of a l 98 I proposal that t lose analysis over
time has proven we should not have ollered. especially il we did
mit expect. or want, the Soviets to accept it. Unlortunatels, 0heti
the full adverse impact of this accord is [eh, today's leaders and
their governments will be long gone. And who w ill bear the brunt
of this short-term approat h? The people of NATO's nations,
especially those in Western Europe.
* * *
Summary/Conclusion
I have concluded that:
1 The double-zero INF agreement will retinue the I redibilitv
of NAT()'s deterrence in the (24 es 4)1 die So. let Union., thus
impacting adversely oil Western suctirit%.
ci edible now
u.lotInnc with AMPR
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Page 11
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
2) The INF agreement puts NA FO on the slippery slope lead-
ing to the denucicarization of Western Europe, which is what the
Soviets want.
3) The denuclearization ol Western Europe would make that
region safe for Soviet conventional aggression, or. ?more
result in the neutralization of Western Europe from the threat
of WP conventional might.
4) NATO, prodded by the United States, is sacrificing the long-
term credibility of its deterrence for short-term political expe-
diency and, the burnishing of the images ()I sonic of its leaders,
5) Even if the INF accord appears to be in the short-term
interests of the United States. the long-term impact could be
detrimental to the United States.
6) There are certain actions that NATO must and can take
whether or not a double-zero accord is implemented. and its
implementation only makes the undertaking of these actions all
the more important.
7) It is doubtful that adequate resources will be forthcoming
to implement the requisite actions.
8) Planning by NATO to use strategic nuclear weapons for
theatre purposes to -compensate- lor the INF accord would not
be ti edible to the Soviets and should not be to the West.
9) Whatever NATO does in the backwash of double-zero, it
will nod be able to raise the credibilit% of its deterrence in the eyes
Of the Soviets to the level that NATO's ERIN!: have done, es-
pewit% the Pershing his.
Notes
I. pps imports during Bilderberg Meeting.. Avid l4.lti. 1987, Villa d'Este. Italy.
'2 "A I ll Perspei site," In laird Clialltim. World & I. September IMO.
3. lbs....sums with SeltIOT he'll, Is ollis ials during my farewell calls as SACELIK.
raii? lune to. 19/47.
4.?
5. "%Ilan:anon in Ali Age id Nubile Missile..." Kenneth Adelman, World & I.
Sep.. tuber 1987.
ii. lint
7. Ilml
K. I Aird "A hiltipraii l'erspei its,"
Ibid
to Awl
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
O
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4 25X1
NtI
RESPONSE TO GENERAL ROGERS ARTICLE ON INF TREATY
will not comment on General Rogers comments on the adequacy of NATO
deterrence and nuclear modernization plans, as these are matters that Admiral Crowe and
Secretary Carlucci have already addressed and are in a position to provide the Committee
with more detailed information than the Director of Central Intelligence. I have no doubt
that some Europeans share General Rogers' fears that an INF Treaty could lead to the
complete denuclearization of Europe and thereby undermine the credibility of NATO's
Flexible Response strategy.
--However, this is by no means a foregone conclusion, as the Alliance maintains
a broad range of conventional and nuclear systems and there is broad agreement
among the allies that NATO must retain nuclear systems as part of its defense
strategy. Also, Europeans believe that NATO's credibility as an effective Alliance
rests as much on its ability to follow through with decisions like the 1979
deployment decision and ratification of the treaty as it does on military
capabilities.
--More importantly, European officials across the political spectrum endorse the
treaty and believe that there is a far greater danger now of discrediting NATO's
cohesion by not ratifying the treaty. In such an event, General Rogers' fears
about the Alliance may start coming to pass very quickly and with little that a US
leadership perceived as vacillating could do about them.
25X1
SE 1968 25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
11
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
R
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
0
I
?
?
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
D
?
a $
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
F
'CnUcZialcz ,Scuale
WASH I N GTON. D.C. 20S I 0 BS- 3911 -
4.
October 2, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
In the past we have written to you seeking information about the long-
standing problem at the Central Intelligence Agency regarding an apparent
analytical bias which continuously under-estimates Soviet intentions and
capabilities. Sane have even characterized this bias as "pro-Soviet." We
posed a series of questions, the answers to which would assist us in
reviewing this problem, on April 25, 1985; to date no respionse has been
received.
Ncw the problem has surfaced in public again. According to a recent
newspaper article, the CIA's internal publication Studies in Intelligence,
recently published a book review of a volume by two distinguished academic
scholars on the topic of Soviet Disinformation. Soviet Disinformation is a
very serious intelligence and political problem to which you, Mr. President,
have personally called world-wide attention. Soviet Disinformation
techniques are part of a larger intelligence problem which entails Soviet
"Active Measures"?the so-called Maskirovka techniques of Camouflage,
Concealment and Deception.
Yet acoording to the article attached, the review by CIA's
publication reads as though it were written in Moscow. Instead of
criticizing the analysis of the authors, it attacks the very concept that
Maskirovka actually exists. Indeed, according to the information available,
the CIA's review reads like a piece of disinformation itself, and appears to
serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Of course, we do not have the actual
text, so we ask that you supply the text to us. The article we seek is an- - -
unclassified review by Avis Boutell in Studies in Intelligence of the book.
Dezinformatsia by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson.
It seems strange for the CIA to be attacking the-serious analysis of -
Soviet Disinformation, when the CIA should be taking the lead in unmasking .
Soviet Disinformation. This appears to be part of the well-docurnented, much -
larger problem at CIA--the long-standing habit of the CIA of under-
estimating Soviet intentions and military capabilities. America is ncw
faced with the dangerous implications of Soviet military supremacy, as you
have confirmed by at least eight statements you have made since 1982, and by -
the numbers ani trends in canparative U.S.-Soviet armaments.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
.LleCLeS1Cietil.
October 3, 1985
Page 2
In the most ixportant measures of military power, the gaps between
U.S. and Soviet capabilities are grading larger, not smaller, despite your
vigorous Defense Modernization Program. We are still losing ground to the
Soviets?and these gaps will continue to widen over the next five years. In
fact, we are over 38 billion dollars behind President Carter's Five Year
Defense Program, as you pointed cut on March 22, 1985. Thus the
"correlation of forces" has indeed decisively shifted against the United
States, as Soviet political and military leaders frequently assert.
The bias of the CIA for under-estimating Soviet intentions and
capabilities over the last 25 years has already had a deleterious effect on
U.S. national security. But the recent inplicaticns of information
resulting from KGB defections suggests that we should inquire further into
the problem of this bias. Acoordingly, we therefore request answers to the
following additional questions as soon as possible:
1. Why does the CIA produce single-source analysis of Soviet and _
Consnunist Chinese cpen publications such as is 'dale by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service?
2. Is there an internal CIA review process to identify possible pro-
Soviet bias in published unclassified or classified analytical products?
3. Was the attached article mentioned above screened to detect its
possible pro-Soviet bias? If not, voty not? If so, why was it published
under the official imprimatur of the CIA?
4. Is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA products over the
past 20 years?
-5. Is there any evidence of the influence of possible pro-Soviet
penetrations, moles or bias in the preparation, analysis and dissemination
of intelligence products on the Soviet Union over the past -20 years?:-_-
6. Has any important-intelligence analysis or evidence related to-
the Soviet Union ever been withheld or suppressed within or by the CIA? Did
any of this intelligence evidence or analysis reveal Soviet deception? What
is the Counterintelligence significance of the suppression of intelligence ?
on Soviet deception? -
7. Could a possible pro-Soviet:bias have played a role in the - ..-
prolonged and worsening CIA under-estimates of Soviet strategic forces in
the 1960's and 1970's?
8. We have recent reports that the CIA:
a.) Has further down-graded Soviet Backfire bomber range --
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
-Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
? - October 3, 1913
Page 3
estimates;
b.) Is negatively reassessing evidence of Soviet Biolcgical and
Chemical Warfare arms ccotrol violations;
?c.) Is trying to change seismic verification methodology to make
Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty disappear;
d.) Has dodn-graded the accuracy of the Soviet SS-19 IC in a
belated attempt to disprove the B Team;
e.) Is denying and do.n-playing evidence of Soviet Ounouflage,
Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka);" .
f.) Is denying the possibility of Soviet mole penetrations and
deception in humint espionage channels;
g.) Has finally cxxrpleted National Intelligence Estimate 11-11 on
Soviet Strategic Deception after three years, but continues to
deny Soviet SALT I negotiating deception on the size of the
Soviet SS-19 ICBM, the range of the SS-N-8, the number of
Soviet Sin.% in 1972, the "geographical asymmetries" rationale
for Soviet SL84 superiority, Brezhnev's pledge not to build
mobile ICBMs, Brezhnev's Backfire bccnber pledge, Soviet-
supplied Backfire bomber range data, and the Soviet SALT II
Data Base.
Are these recent reports correct? Are they best explained by an
under-estimative analytical bias, a possible pro-Soviet bias,
bureaucratic incarpetenoe, or all of the above?
9. Was John Paisley likely to have been a Soviet KGB mole inside the
CIA, who my have been assassinated by the KGB in order to protect other CIA
soles? at is the best assessment of Paisley's full career and death?
Have traces of other CIA moles ever been detected?
10. Are reports that CIA has regressed into continued under-estimation
of Soviet military spending correct? -
11. Did the CIA misccunt both the Soviet ICEM and SLBM totals, thejam =
limitations, during SALT I?.... Did Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and-
Deception play a role in causing these miscounts? - -
12. Did the CIA also fail-to project either the heavy thrcw-weight of
the SS-19 or the long range of the SS-N-8 at the -time SALT I was signed in -
1972? Was Soviet Camouflage, Ccncealinent and Deception involved in these
under-estimates? - -
13. Has the CIA consistently under-estimated Soviet global objectives
and misunderstood Soviet arms control objectives?
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
? The .PreSlaellt
Declassified Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
rage 4.
?
14. Can at least five years of the 10 year 1980-1990 U.S. "window of
vulnerability" be attributed to under-estimates by CIA of Soviet ICBM
accuracies?
In sum, we strongly agree with CIA Director Casey's initial assessment
of the CIA's analytical track record made on February 13, 1981:
"The most frequent criticism is that our (CIA's) interpretations and
assessments have shown a tendency to be overly optimistic, to place a
benign interpretation on information whidh could be interpreted as
indicating danger. It's our Obligation to present conclusions Which
emphasize hard reality undistorted by preconceptions CT by wishful
thinking...I found in SALT I, for example, that some of the [CIA]
judgements were soft. They leaned toward a kind of benign
interpretation rather that a harder interpretation cl-ssing or
viewing a situation as being more dangerous."_ (Epphasis added.)
We fear, however, that despite Director Casey's best efforts, the
CIA's performance has not imprcmed.
Thank you for your prompt response to these important questions. W
*also again request belated answers to our April 25, 1985 questions (letter
attadhed.)
Sincerely,
Copies to:
Director, CIA__ _ _
Deputy Director for Intelligence ---
Director CIA Counter-Intelligence- -
National Intelligence Officer for Deception
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff _
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
R
Next 16 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 : CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010009-4
25X1