LETTER TO WILLIAM WEBSTER FROM CLAIBORNE PELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000900010004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 20, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21
CIA-RDP89G01321 8000900010004-9
SENATE SELECT CuP~M4ITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)
3 FEBRUARY 1988 - 1400 hours - 219 Hart
RE: INF
Please Return to Exec Staff
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21
CIA-RDP89G01321 8000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB A Your Opening Statement
fully or partially:
TAB B Questions to which you should be prepared to respond
--The "Bottom Line" Question
--The "Cheating Issue"
--Soviet Data
--Some Key Substa ~ve Issues
--Our Estima
--Intelli~ce Resources and Capabilities
--Cou erintelligence Issues
a
trategic Issues; Europe and Conventional Arms Control
TAB C Questions on which we recommend you defer to the
accompanying experts. (Read for Background Only)
1. Compliance Issues
2. Conventional Arms Control Issues
3. European Reactions
4. Counterintelligence Issues
TAB D Committee Member Biographies
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 ~..r, _ __._. .. q
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
~ a. aw.wwnca. ,wwni~wnv nti.v u. cvw.t mvw~n
AlAll CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA NANCY l RASSESAUM, KANSAS
C ~TO-NEII J. DODO. CONNERICUT RUDY SOSCNWITZ MINNESOTA
P
T
"
'
T
E
r++1
. MASSACHUSETTS 1A11RY MIE86LE0. SOU
H DAKO
A
11',LINOIS FRANK N. MVRRDWSKI, ALASKA ~lnit~d ~tate~ senate
y'RD. NORTH CAROLRIA -AUl S. twISLE. JR., vIR01NIA ,
IS, WASHINGTON DANIEL J. EVANS. WASHINGTON
D ~ -. MfOYNR1AF1. NEW YOUR MRCH McCONNELL. KENTUCKY
6ERYLD 6. CHRISTIANSON, STAFF DIREROR
JAMES -. LVCIE0. MINORT' STAFF DIREROR
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225
January 20, 1988
The Honorable William H. Webster
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear. Judge Webster:
I txeaure ncglsuy ..__.~.,~
1
I am writing to confirm your appearance before the
Committee on Foreign Relations to testify in regard to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Your testimony
is scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, January 29, 1988, in
Room S-407, the Capitol.
You will be appearing at the close of the first week of
testimony before the Committee. Earlier in the week, the
~~ Committee will have heard from Secretary of State Shultz,
former secretaries of state, the treaty negotiators and
Ambassador Paul Nitze, who will deal with verification. I hope
you will be accompanied by representatives of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. You
should be prepared to address the monitoring tasks the
intelligence community will face and how well these tasks can
be accomplished; the validity of the data provided by the
Soviet Union and of our own related intelligence estimates; the
role of confidence-building measures, including on-site
inspection, in monitoring compliance; the resources the
intelligence community has available and expects to have under
current plans to monitor compliance; and potential military
steps which the Soviet Union might take to compensate for the
reductions required by the treaty.
Your oral presentation should be limited to 30 minutes,
but you may submit a longer statement for the record. The oral
presentation will be followed by questions and general
discussion on this subject. It would be appreciated~if you
would submit copies of your prepared statement at least two
working days in advance of the hearing. If you have any
further questions, please let me know or have your staff call
Bill Ashworth at 224-9033.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
I look forward to seeing you and hearing your views on
this very important matter.
With every good wish.
Ever sincerely,
~~
Claiborne ell
Chairman
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Thc Director of Ccntr,l Intclligcncc
wr-ur~on ~ c zosos
January 25, 1988
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Helms:
I am responding to your letters of January 22, 1988 to
General Odom and me. We have reviewed the highly sensitive
classified information cited in the attachment to your letter.
This information is, in fact, contained in a recent draft of
Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 4/11-88. The
. information is substantively accurate, although the final
wording in the published version will, in some cases, be
_ slightly different. In some cases, the .citations omit
reference to important caveats and additional. observations.
These statements are excerpts from a much broader set of
judgments and issues regarding the monitoring of the.INF Treaty
and, in my view, by themselves do not constitute a sufficient
basis on which to draw .conclusions about the overall
monitorability of the Treaty. This volume of the NIE, which
contains highly source-sensitive information, has not yet been
published. The judgments and information therein have been
briefed to policy officials, negotiators, and in response to
requests from members of Congress and security-cleared staff.
A summary has been published.
I and my colleagues from the Intelligence Community will be
prepared to discuss the issues you have raised during my
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
January 29. However, it is my understanding that intelligence
monitoring capabilities will be discussed in detail in several
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
?
hearings scheduled by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. I would ask you to consult with Chairman Pell,
SSCI Chairman Boren, and SSCI Vice Chairman Cohen regarding the
appropriate forum for detailed discussion of sensitive
intelligence information regarding the monitorability of the
INF Treaty.
Sincerely,
W .,(.,(,,~,,,,,,,, ~'
William H. Webster
cc: Senator Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senator David L. Boren
Chairman, Senate Committee on Intelligence
Senator William S. Cohen
Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 ~
A
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21
CIA-~R~D/P89G013218000900010004-9 ~~
Gz4it... GJ G ~- sti ~ ~ ~-~ Gc. s- c z~f ? iU /L'G `~4 `~-~r~
G,.,~ a..,y, h o ~ ~ ~ -rye.. ~, v~.c~-s ~N
~, M C~e_S ~. ~ ~ u 1~4 ?c~~'f-o S ~2 l..v~--i (~.S
1 ~s--Z~t~- ~oir. ray v.~ ~ ~s J ~ h Cc it-5 ?S use
(r-~ ---fG~, ti~ L V~ ~ N~ ~ ti a h _
~LM
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21
CIA-RDP89G01321 8000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
?
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 / 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
?
?
?
The "Bottom-Line Question"
Q. What is your judgment about the overall monitorability of
the INF Treaty?
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 ~ 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
The "Cheating Issue"
1. Q. Do you not believe the Soviets will cheat on INF and
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaties, given
their past record of violating treaties?
?
The role of the Intelligence Community is to be keenly
aware of all this background and analytical framework
but not~to enter into the monitoring process with hard
and fast, pre-conceived conclusions as to whether the
Soviets will cheat or not. Our job is to report and
analyze as objectively as possible all relevant
available intelligence.
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
?
2. Q. How carefully have you looked at how the Soviets might
cheat? How many ways are there for them to cheat?
3. Q.
an infinite number of possibilities for illegal
activity and, therefore, we would not claim to have
investigated each one, nor would we say that any
particular scenario is the most likely. Analysts
throughout the Community have identified a number of
possibilities that seem unlikely and others that are
A. We have looked at many potential cheating scenarios,
some in a general sense and others representative of
particular types of cheating in more detail. There are
25X1
25X1
A. The military risk assessments are in the purview of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and should be addressed to
eir representa ive .
4. Q. The Soviet "Maskirovka" program is very extensive and
effective. How can you overcome this, and why has this
not been outlawed in the treaties?
25X1
25X1
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
5. Q. Because the most likely cheating scenario for the INF
Treaty is for the Soviets to deploy covertly SS-20s
together with SS-25s, which we know that they have
already done, can we detect and prevent such cheating
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
?
Soviet Data
1. Q. What is the Intelligence Community's Assessment of the
technical data provided by the Soviets in the
Memorandum of Understanding?
2. Q. How can the differences between the Soviet data given
us in November and December, 1987 be explained? Did
the Soviets attempt disinformation and deception and
outright falsification?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Some Key Substantive Issues
2. Q. Why are nuclear warheads explicitly exempted from
elimination?
?
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
5. Q. What is the evidence for testing or deployment of an
extended-range Scud missile?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
Our Estimate
1. Q. The Intelligence Community recently completed a
National Intelligence Estimate on "U.S. Capabilities to
Monitor Arms Control Limitations on Soviet Strategic
Forces: (NIE 4/11-88)." What was the purpose of this
Estimate? Who initiated it and when? Did all agencies
participate fully in the preparation of this Estimate?
What are the major areas of disagreement among agencies?
?
A. NIE 4/11 was initiated by the National Intelli e,~?c,e~
Offic,~r for Strategic Pr amp in the summer of 1986.
ts~o iginal purpose was to update the arms control
monitoring Estimate completed in 1983. As it became
clear last summer that we were moving closer to an
actual INF Treaty, we decided to treat our INF
monitoring judgments separately from the more generic
discussion in the main text of the Estimate, and we
have done so in a sep~ara~te volume (Voaume III.~~~A11
major intelligence agencies participated fully and were
well-represented in our coordination process. This
includes CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, and the military
services. There are relatively few disagreements among
agencies over the fundamental monitoring judgments in
the Estimate. Finally, it should be noted that the
judgments in the Estimate are consistent with the
Community's views expressed often to the policymakers
over the past few years.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Intelligence Resources and Capabilities
1. Q. Are your resources, on-hand and planned, sufficient to
do the INF monitoring job?
A. As I noted in my remarks, current fiscal restraints and
future program cutbacks could possibly cause some of
our monitoring needs to suffer, or be satisfied only at
the expense of other national requirements.
?
?
2. Q. The Intelligence Community has traditionally had
responsibility for monitoring activities related to
arms control treaties. Does the incorporation into the
INF Treaty of on-site inspection and other cooperative
measures change in any way this responsibility? Has
there been any change in the community's organizations
or procedures for monitoring INF?
A. The Intelligence Community will continue to have
responsibility for monitoring the INF Treaty. My new
Monitoring Manager will coordinate the activities of
the various agencies involved and provide all-source,
coordinated interagency monitoring assessments.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co A roved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
pY pp
?
Strategic Issues; Europe and Conventional Arms Control
1. Q. What do the allies think about the INF agreement?
A. West European allies have welcomed the agreement
-- As a visible sign of better East-West relations;
-- As a first successful step toward disarmament;
-- As a hopeful precedent for verification;
-- As evidence the U.S. is capable of a leading role
in shaping a constructive relationship with Moscow.
Public welcome of the agreement has been wide and strong.
2. Q. Don't the allies have reservations?
A. Many senior officials in key allied countries harbor
private reservations about the agreement's impact on
European security.
That a double-zero accord weakens NATO's spectrum
of deterrence and defense;
That it will weaken nuclear linkage between Europe
and the U.S.;
That it will undermine NATO's strategy of flexible
response;
That it portends a further American withdrawal from
Europe;
That it will leave Europe vulnerable to Soviet
conventional chemical and shorter-range nuclear
forces .
?
But, despite these concerns, West European leaders --
without exception -- now support ratification of the treaty.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
1
3. Q. How would Europeans view non-ratification of the INF
agreement?
A. They would regard this as catastrophic.
-- As a severe downturn in East-West relations
-- As a cut-off of prospects for arms control
-- As a return to a more dangerous world with a
greater Soviet threat
-- As evidence that the U.S. is incapable of a
leadership role in handling East-West relations
4. Q. What are the chances of agreement on conventional arms
reductions in Europe?
The long negotiation on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR) has not produced agreement.
At the Vienna meeting between 16 Members of NATO
and seven of the Warsaw Pact -- the "conventional
stability talks" -- several issues still divide the
two sides.
Alliance countries continue to be divided over the
details of their proposal after the formal talks
begin.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
~II,-~'~'. ~I~CKOIlO~t
xcxTe~'rxep
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
OTP-22, TpaHCnapTxoe
cpeRcTxo ~
paR@TbT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
?
?
Q: Do you agree with the President's Finding of Soviet
noncompliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)?
A: The question of noncompliance is a policy judgment, and the
Intelligence Community is neutral on this issue.
Q: Have. you made your opinion on this matter clear to the
Administration policy officials?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X11
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 W 1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
s
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
~J L\.. l\L 1 I I
Q: Are the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies really
interested in new negotiations on conventional arms control?
A: The Warsaw Pact in June 1986 called for negotiations on
reducing conventional ground and air forces--and tactical
nuclear weapons--that exist in Europe from "the Atlantic to
the Urals." It called for two stages of reductions that
would result in cuts of up to 500,000 military personnel
and their associated equipment by the early 1990s. Since
February 1987, representatives from the seven Warsaw Pact
and 16 NATO countries have been meeting in Vienna to
formulate a mandate for the new negotiations--which the US
refers to as "Conventional Stability Talks." The Soviets
and their allies appear serious about beginning the new
negotiations, but they are not pressing the West and have
been willing to accept the pace of the "pre-negotiations"
in Vienna that the West has set.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Q: Would the Soviets reduce their forces as part of a
conventional arms control agreement? Why?
The Soviets would save money by such a reduction,
because conventional forces cost a great deal (about
34 percent of the USSR's defense expenditures). How
much money they would save would be determined by what
and how much they reduced.
They would reap political benefits in Europe by
showing they do not present a threat. Already public
opinion polls show that most West Europeans believe
the military threat from the Warsaw Pact has
diminished--or does not exist.
?
They probably would benefit militarily, because a
Soviet reduction would make it even more difficult for
West European leaders to convince their
parliaments--and their people--that it remains
necessary to increase defense spending on modernizing
military forces and equipment. The Soviets remain
very concerned about matching or offsetting NATO's
modernization programs.
They might be able to "trade" cuts in their tank and
artillery forces for cuts in NATO's helicopters and
anti-tank weapons. The Soviets believe NATO has an
advantage over the Warsaw Pact in these latter items
of equipment.
They almost certainly will be able to trade cuts in
their forces for reductions in the West German
Bundeswehr, because Bonn had made known that it must
cut its military forces. The Soviets regard the
Bundeswehr as their main potential foe in the
conventional forces arena.
They might be able to trade cuts in their forces for
withdrawals of US forces.
Ideally, from the Soviet's viewpoint, they might be
able to trade reductions in Warsaw Pact Forces for
cuts in NATO's air forces. The Soviets regard NATO's
superior air forces as the greatest threat to the
success of a Warsaw Pact conventional ground forces
offensive in Europe.
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
?
?
Q: How do the Soviets regard the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction (MBFR) talks?
A: These talks have been going on in Vienna for 14 years, and
the Soviets and their allies show no inclination to make
any concessions that would bring them to a successful
conclusion. In fact, verious Soviet officials have stated
that the talks are "dead," and the Warsaw Pact has proposed
new negotiations that would replace MBFR. They proposed
talks that would lead to large reductions of conventional
forces in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The MBFR
talks, of course, focus on a much more limited area--that
is, Central Europe.. The Soviets, however, do not want to
bear the onus for breaking off the MBFR talks and seem
content to exchange old arguments with the West until
possible new negotiations replace the current talks.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Q: What are Soviet views on tactical nuclear weapons after
INF? Are they about to spring a "Third Zero?"
A: The Soviets have just recently suggested a formula for
dealing with "tactical nuclear weapon" systems (what the
West calls "short-range nuclear forces," with ranges less
that 500 kilometers) in Europe that would separate
consideration of their nuclear components from
consideration of their delivery means. Under this formula,
the delivery means (aircraft, missiles and launchers, and
artillery tubes) would be included in new talks on
conventional forces in Europe, whose mandate is under
discussion in Vienna, and the nuclear component (nuclear
bombs, missile warheads, and artillery projectiles) would
be discussed in future "corresponding negotiations," which
they have said should not be put off for long.
This move seems to bring the Soviet position closer to
NATO's view that armaments can be included in new
conventional talks only to the extent that they use
conventional munitions, and it could remove an obstacle to
progress on the mandate. Although various Soviet spokesmen
have advocated the elimination of tactical nuclear arms,
they have done so in the broad context of the goal of a
? nuclear-free~~world, and have not yet specifically proposed
zeroing out either the delivery means or the nuclear
munitions. However, the formula recently suggested by the
Soviets would permit them to call in the future for a
"third zero"--to follow the present "double zero"
elimination of medium and shorter range nuclear missile
systems--on just the nuclear munitions. Such a proposal
would serve the Soviet goal of "denuclearizing" Europe,
while protecting Soviet interests in maintaining
dual-capable delivery means as conventional weapon systems.
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
SECRETI
?
Q: What do the Allies really think about the INF accord?
Despite these concerns, West European leaders--without
exception--now support ratification of the treaty. Public
opinion strongly favors the accord, making it politically
risky for any government to voice concerns about the
treaty's political or military implications. Given their
publics' support, NATO leaders hope to gain credit with
them, by pointing out that the agreement was the result of
steadfast Alliance resolve to deploy INF systems in the
face of leftist opposition. West European leaders also are
softening their criticism of the accord for fear it could
be used during the US Senate ratification debates to kill
the treaty, which all Allies agree would be a catastrophe
for the Alliance. They also view the INF verification
provisions as precedent--setting and hope that the accord
will lead to progress in other arms control areas,
particularly in START and conventional stability talks in
Europe.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
.,A.,,...~.
?
Q: Where do the Allies stand on negotiations over
shorter-range nuclear forces (SNF)?
?
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Q: What are the prospects for modernization of NATO SNF
systems in the wake of an INF treaty?
?
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Q: What are the chances of reaching an agreement on
conventional arms reductions in Europe?
A: The sixteen members of NATO and seven members of the Warsaw
Pact are meeting informally in Vienna to hammer out a
Mandate for new conventional arms control
negotiations--dubbed "conventional stability talks"--in
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
r
?
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
With the elimination of INF systems, many believe that NATO
must do more in the conventional arena. Can the Allies do
more?
A: Most allies have acknowledged the importance of improving
their conventional defenses to rectify current East-West
imbalances, but we do not believe that they will support a
major increase in defense spending. Moreover, many
European leaders doubt that their publics would tolerate
large increases in defense spending at a time when the INF
treaty is symbolizing a reduction in East-West tensions and
holding out new opportunities for further arms reductions
in Europe.
?
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9 25X1
?
Q: After INF what are the next steps for the Europeans in arms
control?
A: There is no clear consensus among the major allies on arms
control priorities. At best they all endorse movement
toward START and progress toward conventional and chemical
weapons treaties.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9
?
?
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/21 :CIA-RDP89G013218000900010004-9