LUNCHEON MEETING WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN WHITEHEAD, AND MESSRS. ABRAMOWITZ, ARMACOST, AND KAMPELMAN. 22 DECEMBER 1988, 1230 HRS., STATE DEPARTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000500180006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 21, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP ZECREIT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: EA/DCI
~A/D
SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Deputy Secretary of
State John Whitehead, and Messrs. Abramowitz,
Armacost, and Kampelman.
22 December 1988, 1230 hrs., State Department
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TAB B I 25X1
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TOP SECRET
TAB C Impact of Leadership Change in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia on Moderate Reformers in the Bloc. The
Deputy Secretary may ask for your views on what the
recent leadership changes in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia portend for moderate reformers in the
Bloc. We do not believe the changes will have
significant effect on the other regimes in the East.
Talking points addressing the regional impact and the
impact in each of the states are at TAB C.
TAB D Cohesiveness of the Nicaraguan Resistance. The Deputy
Secretary may express an interest in our view of the
cohesiveness of the Nicaraguan Resistance. At TAB D
are talking points addressing the issue of the
TAB E India-Pakistan: Prospects for Improved Relations. The
Deputy Secretary may seek your views on the prospects
for improved Indo-Pakistani relations as a result of
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Pakistan in
late December 1988 in the context of the South Asia
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit
which will take place 29 December through 1 January.
The first meeting between Gandhi and Bhutto can be
expected to produce some short-term improvement in
atmospherics but no significant progress over the long
term. Talking points are at TAB E.
TAB F Gorbachev's Absence from Public View. The Deputy
Secretary of State may share State's concern that
Gorbachev has not made a public appearance since he
left Yerevan, the Armenian capital, on 11 December.
You may note such an absence is not unusual, to wit
after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 he was out of
sight for two weeks, but we are increasing our
attention to the issue. We recognize Gorbachev's
effort to defuse the ethnic tensions in the Caucasus
while emphasizing the regime's relief efforts has not
succeeded. Talking points expanding on Gorbachev's
absence and Armenian response to his early December
visit to Armenia are at TAB F.
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SECRETI 25X1
21 December 1988
Talking Points for DDCI
Bulgaria: Implications of Leadership Changes
Recent Bulgarian leadership changes reflect party chief Todor Zhivkov's newly
tough posture toward dissent, interest in only very limited economic
restructuring, determination to maintain his tight personal political control,
and willingness to buck Moscow.
Zhivkov shifted the party leadership at a Central Committee plenum which ended
Wednesday, 14 December, and the governmental leadership at a National Assembly
session on the 15th. The main changes were:
-- Interior Minister Stoyanov and Sofia party boss Panev were promoted to
the Politburo; Ognyan Doynov (the top economic policymaker until 1987)
and Stoyan Markov (head of the Committee for Quality Control) were
dropped.
-- Two Politburo members removed last July, Chudomir Aleksandrov (former top
succession candidate and a Moscow favorite) and Stoyan Mikhaylov
(identified with a modest glasnost trend), were ousted from the Central
Committee.
-- A hardliner identified with forcibly assimilating the country's large
Turk minority, Georgi Tanev, was named new Interior Minister.
The implications of the changes are:
-- Clampdown on Dissent, Turks. The elevation of the former Interior
Minister to the Politburo and appointment of a tough new one underscores
Zhivkov's intent to control a slowly growing dissident movement,
eliminate some reformist elements from the leadership, and continue the
anti-Turk campaign.
-- Modest Economic Reform. Zhivkov's plenum speech signaled continued slow
movement toward economic restructuring. By ousting Doynov and Markov, he
gained scapegoats for a disorganized reform effort and performance
problems. While Zhivkov called for implementing measures he raised with
Deputy Secretary Whitehead last October -- such as issuing stocks for
firms and substituting economic incentives for administrative controls --
these vague proposals almost certainly will result in no significant
introduction of market forces.
-- Frictions with USSR. Zhivkov's repudiation.of political reforms and
latest downgrading of Aleksandrov will newly irritate Moscow, which
probably received only perfunctory advance notice. The Kremlin was
angered by Zhivkov's earlier sudden removal of Aleksandrov from the
Politburo.
-- Zhivkov Still in Charge. The shakeup also shows that the 77-year-old
Zhivkov is still firmly in control and will continue to remove any
potential rivals notwithstanding Soviet disapproval.
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CONFIDENTIALI 25X1
21 December 1988
Talking Points for DDCI
Czechoslovakia: Implications of Leadership Changes
The recent leadership shakeup and announced greater tolerance of dissent
continue party leader Jakes's effort to consolidate power and his cautious
approach to change without significant political liberalization.
Hardliner Vasil Bilak and moderate Josef Kempny were removed from the presidium
at the Central Committee plenum on 15-16 December and Mikulas Beno lost his
domestic economic portfolio in the party secretariat. Slovak minister of
culture Miloslav Valek resigned at a Slovak party meeting on 19 December. Party
ideologue Jan Fojtik said that political demonstrations would be allowed if they
were peaceful and that RFE jamming would be discontinued.
-- Jakes probably removed Bilak, a staunch opponent of reform and one of the
leaders in calling for Soviet intervention in 1968, as a gesture to
Gorbachev and to party moderates that he is sincere in his efforts to
effect changes in the party and economy. Bilak's ouster and those of
Kempny and Beno, reportedly supporters of previous general secretary
Gustav Husak, will together allow Jakes to put his stamp more firmly on
the senior leadership.
-- Valek, who had called for a reassessment of the "Prague Spring" at the
October plenum, probably was removed as a warning to party moderates that
the reform debate is still subject to strict limits.
-- RFE jamming was stopped on 16 December, and dissidents were able to hold
an officially sanctioned rally on 10 December (before Fojtik's
statement). Since then dissidents have not tested regime sincerity by
staging an independent rally.
J,IThese actions signal Jakes's intention to rejuvenate the party and possibly
loosen somewhat the regime's tight control of independent activity. He,
however, is not prepared to countenance wide-ranging debate on reform nor
implement major political and economic liberalization. The future will likely
bring continued intra-party tensions, Soviet watchfulness over the pace of
change, and dissidents testing regime promises.
Despite worsening economic problems, the most recent plenum makes clear that
Prague will continue to approach economic reform cautiously.
-- Prime Minister Adamec insisted that the economy's problems are not the
result of central planning, but stem from individual failings.
-- New policies approved or planned focus on stricter labor discipline, the
reduction of bureaucratic red tape, and the selection of more competent
managers, rather than systemic reforms needed to improve economic
performance.
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SECRET I 25X1
21 December 1988
Talking Points for DDCI
Implications of Developments in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia For
Developments Elsewhere in Eastern Europe
The recent leadership changes and plenums in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia will have little if any direct effect elsewhere in the
region, but the other regimes will carefully monitor Moscow's
attitudes toward the orthodox leaders in Sofia and Prague.
-- The Honecker leadership in East Germany will continue to try to
maintain a generally orthodox course, Ceausescu will maintain
Romania's insular totalitarianism, Jaruzelski in Warsaw will
keep trying to co-opt Solidarity and the church, and the
Hungarian regime will try to regain control over an
increasingly strong-willed opposition.
-- Both East Berlin and Bucharest probably view favorably the
continued conservatism of the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak
regimes, although they likely are concerned that the visit by
Soviet party secretary Yakovlev to Prague earlier and other
suggestions of Soviet pressure in favor of a somewhat more
dynamic course have had some effect on Jakes.
-- Honecker, Ceausescu, and the other regime leaders will watch
Sofia closely for signs of heightened Soviet pressure on
Zhivkov, including a campaign to oust him.
-- Hungarian party leader Grosz, however, is much more concerned
with the problem of implementing a relatively farreaching
economic reform program without further undermining the leading
role of the party, and maintaining Soviet support for further
breaks with orthodoxy.
-- Warsaw faces even more dangerous challenges as its confronts
the issues of whether and how to engage Walesa in "roundtable"
talks and implement relatively major economic changes,
including stiff austerity, in the absence of greater worker
support.
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TOP SECRET I
Talking Points for the DDCI
21 December 1988
India-Pakistan: Prospects for Improved Relations
Prime Ministers Gandhi and Bhutto both hope to use the
Islamabad South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
Summit, 29 December-1 January to establish personal rapport
and work for improved relations. The meeting will be the
first between the two and the first visit of an Indian Prime
Minister to Pakistan since the early 1960s. Both leaders have
noted that they are of the generation born after independence
and so do not carry the history of animosity that may have
afflicted those who experienced the partition of pre-
independence India.
Of the two, Bhutto appears to be the most anxious to ease
tension between the two states.
-- Bhutto probably hopes that a significant reduction in
tension would justify her cutting the defense budget in
favor of increased spending for social programs.
-- By contrast, Gandhi wants to improve relations, but
probably does not have as much to gain by rapid movement.
In our view, some short-term improvement in atmospherics
and limited progress on confidence-building measures is likely
to result from the meeting.
Bhutto and Gandhi have indicated an interest in
formalizing the no-attack on nuclear facilities pledge
proposed in 1985.
-- Indian officials would like to include such an agreement
in a package which would also include an agreement on
double taxation and cultural exchange.
-- Bhutto has publicly pledged to cease aid to Sikh
separatists which will play well with the Indians
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Nonetheless, significant progress is unlikely over the
long term.
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Talking Points for the DDCI: Gorbachev's Absence
Gorbachev has not made a public appearance since he left the Armenian capital,
Yerevan, on 11 December.
? An absence of this length is not unusual, but we are increasing our attention to it
because of the political stresses we perceive in the Soviet regime.
? We have no evidence indicating unusual activity behind the scenes, nor is there
evidence that he has left Moscow.
? Because he returned early from a foreign tour that was to have lasted until 15
December, a clear appointment calendar may account for part of his absence
from public view.
Even excluding his one-month summer vacations, Gorbachev he has been out of
sight for similar lengths of time.
? After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, for example, he remained out of sight for
almost two weeks, after which he made a major speech concerning that event.
On Tuesday, a congress of education workers opened in Moscow, attended by
most of the Moscow-based top leaders.
? Premier Ryzhkov and other top leaders on the Armenian earthquake commission
were still in Yerevan at the time, but arrived in Moscow later in the day. She-
vardnadze was, and still is, on official visits abroad.
? The only top leaders unaccounted for were Gorbachev and Secretary Chebrikov,
who was last observed on 9 December. Gorbachev frequently attends such meet-
ings, but not always.
The Politburo will hold its weekly meeting today, and is likely to hear a report
from Premier Ryzhkov on the Armenian earthquake rescue effort.
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? Gorbachev will probably be there, but the media do not normally specify his
presence at Politburo meetings.
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TOP SECRETI
The earth quake offered Gorbachev some opportunity to defuse
tensions in the Caucasus at least temporarily--by highlighting
regime relief efforts while portraying those who continued
national agitation as extremists who were detracting from the
authorities' ability to deal with the catastrophe. He has not,
however, been able to allay Armenian anger at Moscow or him
personally.
o-- Gorbachev apparently received a rough reception in the
city of Leninakan, which was devestated by the
earthquake. An American journalist stated that he was
jeered by crowds. Soviet television showed no footage
of his visit to Leninakan.
o-- Many Armenians apparently believe that Gorbachev came to
Armenia solely for the publicity. Others blame him for
not staying longer. One woman noting that he came and
went "like a thief in the night".
o-- The leadership's decision to use the 18,900 troops in
Armenia,for security rather than rescue efforts has
generated harsh criticism.
o-- Gorbachev's speech in Yerevan on 10 December was
reportedly widely resented by Armenians because of its
spirited attack on local nationalists.
The crackdown against Armenian dissidents since the
earthquake 7 December--our Embassy reports 300 nationalists have
been arrested--has been an especially sore point.
o-- Sakharov's wife Elena Bonner, who is half-Armenian, has
scathingly criticized Gorbachev, indicating the recent
arrests combined with other Gorbachev shortcomings she
has seen, have destroyed her trust.
o-- Gorbachev is being criticized as callously attempting to
derive political benefit from the tragedy by moving to
arrests activists
The possibility of more serious intercommunal violence and
terrorism against Soviet security forces has increased.
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TOP SECRETI 25X1
o-- Sources of Western Embassies and journalists report
raising support for political and ethnic violence.
Firearms are readily available in Armenia, and there are
reports in the Soviet media that dissidents have bought
automatic weapons and grenades.
At the same time, the regime has been able for the timebeing
to bring to an end communal unrest. No violence has been
reported in Armenia since 14 December. The republic party and
the church have fallen into line with Moscow, effusively praising
the relief effort. Some moderate nationalists have also
expressed gratitude, suggesting limited success in splitting the
nationalist movement.
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