WHITE PAPER ON SDI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01126R000100050041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: March 11, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
'/ ~ ~ ~~-~~I Ili I'
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Kenneth W. Dam
Deputy Secretary of State
VADM John M. Poindexter, USN
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
SUBJECT White Paper on SDI
As the debate on SDI proceeds, one subject notably absent
from the discussion has been Soviet work on new kinds of weapons
-- including SDI-type technologies -- for strategic defense.
Accordingly, we have prepared the attached unclassified
background paper describing Soviet work on directed energy
weapons and their role in strategic defense.
We have provided the paper to the Defense Intelligence
Agency with a suggestion that DIA or DoD consider publication of
an unclassified White Paper. In any event, I hope you will find
this material useful for subsequent public discussion, regardless
of whether the White Paper is published. Needless to say, if we
can be of further help, let me know.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As Stated
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lilit/ tuiuaLes ~ ae llriara~
Distribution:
0 - Addressees
1 - D/OSWR
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DDI Chrono
STAT
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SOVIET DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS --
Perspectives on Strategic Defense
March, 1985
STAT
Defensive Systems Division
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rev 5Mar85
Preface
Since the President's announcement on March 23, 1983, which
marked the birth of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a
controversy has arisen over it which is concerned not only with
the technical feasibility and costs of strategic defense against
ballistic missiles but also its impact on the strategic balance
between the US and the Soviet Union, on US allies, and on arms
control negotiations.
In the past few months, however, lines of argument have be-
gun to be made which involve counterpart Soviet defensive systems.
And though we believe that in the planning and development of
defensive weapons attention should be directed primarily at the
threat posed by the enemy's offensive systems, i.e., the numbers,
characteristics, performance and vulnerabilities of Soviet ICBMs
and SLBMs, it is becoming necessary to provide basic information
on Soviet defensive, :or counterpart-SDI, research and developments.
Opponents and proponents aiike of the SDI should have a basic
understanding and an appreciation of the nature and magnitude of
Soviet efforts in strategic ballistic missile defense.
This paper is intended to meet a part of that requirement. It
addresses Soviet research and development in directed-energy
weapons: high-power/high-energy lasers, particle beams, and the
microwave or radio-frequency beams.
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"Directed energy" is a term that has become popular
in the past decade and is used to refer to three types of
beam weapon concepts based on lasers, radiofre-
quency (microwave) devices, or particle beams:
? In a laser weapon, an intense beam or pulse of
visible or invisible (infrared, ultraviolet, X-ray,
gamma-ray) electromagnetic radiation is aimed at a
target by a telescope or other aiming device. The
target's surface may be damaged by explosive
shock, melting, or vaporizing; optical components
can be damaged and personnel injured or blinded.
? In a radiofrequency (R~ weapon, electromagnetic
radiation at wavelengths close to those of conven-
tional radars is aimed at a target by an antenna;
electronic components, or possibly the target struc-
ture itself, may be damaged or destroyed by circuit
overloading or thermal effects.
? In a particle beam weapon (PBW), intense beams of
electrons, protons, or atoms are produced by a high-
energy accelerator and aimed at a target by mag-
nets. In addition to thermal or mechanical damage,
such beams can produce damaging secondary nucle-
ar or X-ray radiation deep within a target.
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SOVIET DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS --
Perspectives on Strategic Defense
K_Y Judgements
o The Soviet Union is believed to be interested in the
development of directed energy weapons (lasers, parti-
cle beams, and microwaves) for ballistic missile
defense and anti-satellite (A SAT) applications.
o The Soviet Union has been engaged in research on the
directed energy weapons technologies for as Zong as the
United States. Soviet efforts are under the leadership
of some of the finest scientific minds in the USSR. The
resources the Soviets have applied to these efforts are
believed to be greater than those which the United
States has applied.
STAT
o The Soviets are believed to have progressed beyond the
stage of pure or basic laboratory research in directed
energy technologies; the Soviets have begun to develop
and test laser weapons. The .Soviets already have a
ground-based laser capable of damaging some US satellites
and which may be used to investigate the feasibility of
lasers for ballistic missile defense applications.
o Hostile Soviet reactions to the US Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) and lobbying against the SDI by high-
level Soviet scientists must be tempered by the fact
that the Soviet Union has not admitted to its own long-
standing counterpart research and the most vocal Soviet
scientists have themselves been heavily involved in that
weapons research.
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Key Judgements
iii
Introduction
1
Laser Weapons
2
Management ~ Resources
4
Technologies
7
Advanced Developments
11
Particle Beam Weapons
12
Macro-Particle Streams
13
Microwave Weapons
13
Soviet Responses to the SDI
15
Bibliography
18
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Introduction
Strategic defenses are important to the Soviets' overall
strategy for nuclear war. The Soviets believe that nuclear war
could occur and, if it does, they intend to do everything pos-
sible to survive and prevail. The operations of their defensive
and offensive forces are closely coupled; offensive strikes would
reduce the burden of the defensive forces. In the Soviet concept
of a layered defense, effectiveness is achieved through multiple
types of defensive capabilities compensating for shortcomings in
individual systems.
The Soviets have devoted considerable resources to strategic
defense. Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent
roughly as much on defense as it has on. its massive offensive
forces. The Soviets have been working on traditional and advanced
technologies with the potential-for defending against ballistic
missiles.
-- The Soviet Union has the world's only operational
ballistic missile defense system (at Moscow) and it
has had, for over a decade, an operational anti-
satellite (ASAT) system (the orbital interceptor).
Within the constraints of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets are
currently upgrading their present systems. But they are also en-
gaged i~ research and development on rapsdly deployable systems
which raise concerns about their potential ability to "break out"
of the ABM Treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM system in the next
decade.
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The USSR has an improving potential for large-scale deploy-
ment of modernized ballistic missile defenses beyond the 100-
launcher Treat- limits. Since the signing of the Treaty, the
Soviets have built large phased-array radars with improved cap-
abilities to provide target tracking data in support of ABM deploy-
ment, they have upgraded the Moscow system, and continued develop -
ment of a rapidly-deployablesystem. Also, they are deploying a
surface-to-air missile system, the SA-X-12, which has the potential
to intercept some types of US ballistic missiles.
Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has also been pursuing
advanced technologies for stratel~ic defense--technologies which the
US is intending to explore in its Strategic Defense Initiative
Program. The Soviets have expectations that military applications
of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weak-
nesses in their conventional air and missile defenses. The Soviets
have been working as long as the United States in laser, particle
beam, and microwave technologies applicable to strategic weapons.
Of these, the Soviet emphasis has been on laser weapons.
1,a~er WeagQns
The Soviet laser weapons program began in the 1960s. Many
Soviet organizations .and personnel, both civilian and military,
are involved. Key institutes and design bureaus are located in
and around Moscow and Leningrad, and the Saryshagan proving ground
is the traditional site for most of the Soviet Union's ballistic
missile defense testing since the 1950s.
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LOCATIONS OF I~EY SOVIET DIRECTED-CNERGY AND BALLISTIC ~'~ISSILE DEFENSE FACILITIES
Black
Sea
~'~'9
-:.Scal,~
Saryshagan
Kara Ses
evesibink=
Laptev
Sea
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NORTH
KOREA
Pacific
Ocean
Sea of ,7
Jaaan QQQJJJI
IAPAN
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Management and Resources
The Soviet laser weapon effort is guided and supported by
some of the best scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union.
Yevgeniy Velikhov, the rising Vice President of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences, made his early mark in directed-energy
related research; Nobel Laureates Basov and Prokhorov are be-
lieved to be driving forces behind the Soviet effort for over
twenty_ years .
The level-of-effort that the Soviets have applied to their
laser weapons program is considerable. Cost data are unavailable
and the estimates have had to be more subjective. Some have esti-
mated that the Soviet effort is some 3-5 times greater than that
of the United States. We believe that it is not possible to make
an estimate of this ratio but that it .seems clear, based on the
observed scale and scope of the Soviet effort, that the Soviet
program is larger than that of the US. Exaggeration of the rela-
tive effort is not warranted, as the Soviet effort is clearly
appreciable.
-- The Soviets have built over half a dozen
major R$D facilities and test ranges.
-- The Soviets have an estimated 10,000
scientists and engineers associated with the
development of lasers for weapons.
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Yevgeniy Pavlovich VCLIKIIOV
(Phonetic: VELikuf)
Vice President, Academy of Sci-
ences
One of the leading policy-
makers in Soviet science.
A physicist, he is Deputy
Director of the Ilurchatov
Atomic Energy Institute.
Considered to be a
central figure in Soviet
laser and particle beam
wea~ion efforts. '
Nikolay Gennadiyevich BASOV
(Phonetic: BAHsuf )
Director, Lebedev Physics In-
stitute, Academy of Sciences
/ln internationally recog-
nized expert in quantum
electronics, Basov shared
the 1964 Nobel Prize in
Physics with Prokhorov
(below) and Charles
Townes (US) for work
leading to the development
of lasers. Believed to be
a scientific adviser to
laser weapon programs.
Aleksandr Mikl~aylovicl~ PROKIIOROV .
(Phonetic: PROkuhruf)
Academician Secretary, General
P/tysics and Astronomy Depart-
ment, Academy of Sciences
Prominent Soviet scientist
and administrator, .he is
th.e Director of the Insti-
tute of General Physics
in Dloscow. Also believed
to act as a scientific
adviser in Soviet laser
weapon programs.
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-- Estimates have been made of the amount of
floorspace-that the Soviets have allocated to
laser weapons R~,D. The growth was very rapid
in the first decade; now it is leveling off
with a growth rate of a few per cent per year.
Currently, the Soviets appear to have space
for lasers that is comparable to that of a
typical large Soviet missile or space design
bureau.
SOVIET LASER FACILITIES--GROY;TH IN FLOORSPACE~
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Technologies
The United States is judged to be currently ahead of, or
equal to, the Soviet Union in many of the technologies that are
relevant to a strategic ballistic missile defense system. These
include: computers, signal processing, command and control, and
radar or electro-optical sensors and sensing systems.
In lasers, the Soviets have conducted research in the three
types of gas lasers that the US considered promising for weapons
applications: the gas-dynamic laser (GDL), the electric discharge
laser (EDL), and the chemical laser. These lasers operate at
various wavelengths in the infra-red region, from about 10.6 to
2.7 microns, depending upon the lasing medium that is being used.
Laser Type
------------------
Medium
-----------
Wavelength
----------
GDL, EDL
C02
10.6
GDL, EDL
CO
5.0
chemical
DF
3.8
chemical
HF
2.7
Soviet achievements, as measured by output power, are impres-
sive. Their work on GDLs, EDLs, and chemical lasers seem to mir-
ror US efforts. The Soviets have not only "followed suit" with
the US--they have continued to work on certain types of lasers
which the US abandoned in favor of other, more attractive, short-
wavelength lasers. Soviet work is cumulative; the US is progressive.
Yet there are asymmetries: the Soviets have been working on other
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Soviet and US CW High Energy Laser Developments
Gas Dynamic Lasers
US
USSR
i
i
-$-
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types of lasers that the US has not seriously considered for
weapons applications until very recently. These are the lasers
which operate at about a micron wavelength.
The Soviets are aware of the visible and very short wave-
length lasers and their potential for military applications. The
Soviets are investigating the excimer and free-electron lasers.
For over a decade, researchers at Novosibirsk have been develop-
ing argon-ion lasers; the Soviets continue to dominate in litera-
ture published on metal-vapor lasers. And the Soviets have pub-
lished work on X-ray lasers; the use of nuclear explosions has
been proposed as a method for creating conditions for X-ray lasers.
(a)
(bl
DESCRIPTIONS OF A SOVIET GDL IN THE POPULAR LITERATURE ACA 1975)
(a) Gas-dynamic continuous-wave laser with output power of 15
kW. It operates on ignition of carbon monoxide. (b) Gas-dynamic
laser in operation. Its emission is directed by means of a mir-
ror to a target in the upper part of the photograph. The burn-
ing torch is formed by the incandescent particles of the target
material.
Aside from the asymmetries already toted, we believe the
Soviets are on a par with the US in high-power/high-energy lasers
and laser technologies for weapons applications.
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We believe the Soviets are generally capable of supplying
the requisite prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary com-
ponents for .most laser (and other directed=energy) weapons.
-- The Soviet magneto-hydrodynamic (MHD) power
source development is the largest in the world;
they have developed a rocket-driven MHD gener-
_ ator which produces over 15 MW of electrical
power. This device has no western counterpart.
~~ S ?? ~~ a'~r~ ir"'
11 ROCKET ENGINES ' !";~;,' ,.~+%!'"'`:.; ..'~-
The Soviets may have the capability to develop the necessary
optical systems for laser weapons. They produced a 1.2-meter seg-
mented mirror, the AST-1200, for an astrophysical telescope in
1978 and claimed that this was a prototype for a 25-meter mirror
that would be constructed in the future.
-10-
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Advanced Developments
The Soviets have progressed beyond basic technology research
in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. They
already have a ground-based laser that could be used to interfere
with US satellites.
This directed-energy R&D site of the Sary Shagan proving ground in the central USSR could provide
some anti-satellite capabilities today and possibly ABM prototype testing In the future.
In the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes of
ground- and space-based laser weapons for use against satellites
and ballistic missiles. They may deploy operational space-based
laser systems for antisatellite purposes in the 1990s if their
technology developments prove successful. And they can be expected
to pursue development of space-based laser weapons for ballistic
missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000.
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Particle Beam Weapons
Soviet research and development of those technologies that
could support a particle beam weapon have been impressive. Work
on ion sources has been spectacular. And a recent Rand study has
noted that "Soviet development of ion induction linear acceler-
ators has been remarkable in its steady pursuit of such goals as
high current levels, reliability, efficiency, reduced size, and
simplicity of operation." It was noted also that the Soviets
acknowledge only peaceful, high-energy physics research as the
intended applications of these developments, but it was observed
that "Soviet ion linac development (appears) singularly applicable
to the task of propagating particle beams in space."
-- Soviet ion source designs, developed in
their fusion research but applicable to beam
weapons, have been superior to those of the
West.
The Soviets are believed to have had research projects since
the early 1970s to explore the feasibility of a space-based particle
beam weapon. A prototype weapon intended to disrupt the electronics
of satellites could be tested in the 1990s; a weapon designed to
destroy satellites could follow later.
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Macro-Particle Streams
In the particle beam weapon, the particle (electrons or
protons) are accelerated to velocities approaching that of
light. A macro-particle stream, on the other hand, consists of
heavier particles with velocities of less than one per cent of
the speed of light.
Open literature indicates that as early as 1966 the Soviets
had an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles
of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at velocities of
over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum and nearly 25 kilometers
per second in air.
-- The impressive target penetration effects of
the macro-particle streams in air have been pub-
lished openly. The effects of the higher velocity
streams in vacuum have not.
Microwave Weapons
We believe there are no technological obstacles to Soviet
development of a radio-frequency or microwave weapon for strategic
applications. The Soviets have conducted research for decades on
sources of high-power microwaves (magnetrons, gyrocons, gyrotrons)
and the antennas which would be required to direct and focus the
beams on distant targets. Soviet capabilities to develop microwave
weapons are on a par, if not superior to those of the US.
-- Many systems would be vulnerable to an rf
weapon; critical electronic components could
be damaged or disrupted.
-13_
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SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS IN RADIQF.RE(1UENCY SOURCES
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Soviet Responses to the SDI
Soviet reactions and responses to the SDI have, not unex-
pectedly, been negative. Their statements on the SDI must be
tempered by~.the knowledge that well before the President's
speech on March 23rd, 1983,~the Soviets were themselves pursuing
most of the technologies that are to be investigated in the US
SDI and were heavily involved in applied research toward testing
the feasibility of advanced weapor_s for ballistic missile defense.
Within a month of the President's announcement, a letter
signed by a large group of senior Soviet scientists was published
in the New York Times, denouncing the US initiative. But it is
significant to note that of the more than 200 signatories of the
letter, a number of them have been instrumental in the develop-
ment of both conventional and exotic ballistic missile defense
systems: Grushin, Semenikhin, Bunkin, Velikhov, Prokhorov, and
Basov.
-- Velikhov was the director for several years
of the Institute of Atomic Energy laboratories
at Troitsk where lasers for strategic and tac-
tical applications are being developed.
-- Avduyevskiy has long been involved with
strategic systems, and he now has responsibility
for a number of projects for the military use
of space, including a space-based laser weapon.
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Other signatories have spent their careers developing strategic
offensive weapons and other military systems: Chelomey, Glushko,
Nadiradze, and Makeyev in ICBMs and SLBMs; Antonov, Belyakov,
and Yakovlev have designed military aircraft; Isanin is a chief
designer of nuclear submarines; and Dollezhal and Khariton are
long-standing leaders in the Soviet military nuclear energy pro-
grams.
Last year, a group of scientists published a technical report
critical of space-based weapons. The report was prepared by a
working group of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace,
Against Nuclear Threat and headed by Academician R. Z. Sagdeyev,
Director of the~Institute of Space Research of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences. We believe this report was written and disseminated
to serve as a propaganda tool against the SDI. The report was
made widely available in the West, but it has apparently been
given little attention within the Soviet Union. The report asserts
that space-based systems are too technically complex, expensive,
and easily counter-measured to be worthwhile. The report examines
only the hydrogen fluoride chemical laser in detail; neutral
particle beams, x-ray lasers, and excimer lasers are barely dis-
cussed. Ground-based terminal defense systems and space-based
kinetic-energy weapons are omitted.
* "A Space-Based Anti-Missile System with Directed Energy Weapons:
Strategic, Legal, and Political Implications," Committee of
Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against Nuclear Threat, Moscow,
1984.
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The Soviets probably wish that the March 23rd announcement
had never been made and that they could pursue their own research
on strategic defense without real competition from the US. With
the advent of the SDI, the Soviets are faced with a mobilization
of efforts on strategic missile defense in the US and their
actions of late are intended to persuade the US to drop it. The
Soviet lobbying and criticism of the SDI is the cheapest and
least risky approach to undermining congressional and public sup-
port for the SDI.
The Soviets have not admitted to their own efforts in SDI-
counterpart activities. And they may never do so. But perhaps we
are now on the threshold of an alternative Soviet line of attack--
to compete with the US.
-- Nikolay Basov declared in January that Moscow
would have 'no technological difficulty' in
matching the US SDI program.
And from what we have observed thus far of Soviet capabilities in
directed energy research, development, and testing, his claim is
not without foundation.
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