AMATEURISM IN THE WHITE HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 10, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03
: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Public Affairs
[phone]
6fit,fs)
ro: DPG.
:
AZOt4h-r/
X-?*??
siwP4,STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03
: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTICLE LOS ANGELES TIMES
ON PAGE 444044fa 10 June 1987
Amateurism in the White House
The Iran-contra scandal has exposed the blun-
ders and chicanery that flowed from the Reagan
Administration's efforts to evade public scrutiny
by conducting U.S. foreign policy through private
parties. Now this week's testimony before con-
gressional Investigating committees by a young
White Rouse lawyer named Bretton G. Sciaroni
offers further evidence of the slapdash and delu-
sive way the Administration approached funda-
mental lept questions about what it was up to.
Sciaroni is counsel for the oresidentiallv an-
pointaitinteWgence Oversight Board. which is
summed to review the legality of Intelligence
activities. It was be who wrote the i9er legal
opinion saying that the National Security Council
staff was exempt from Congress( ban on giving
U.S. military aid to the Nicaraguan contras. That
finding has ever since been the basis for claims,
by President Reagan and others, that the NSC's
activities did not violate the law.
It might be thought that an opinion of such basic
importance would have been reached only after
the most incisive and scrupulous study. It was not.
Sciaroni says that he spent no more than five
minutes questioning Lt. CoL Oliver L North of
the National Security Council staff about possible
illicit behavior, and that North misled him. Fur-
ther, Sciaroni was denied documents directly
relevant to his study. Sciaroni had passed the Bar
examination, after four earlier failures, little more
than a year before he drafted his opinion. A more
experienced lawyer would have asked tougher
questions and demanded more thorough access. It
seems a fair conclusion that this is precisely why
Sciaroni was chosen to provide a legal justification
to prop up the NSC's dubious activities.
nprlacRifien in Part - Sanitized COPY Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTICLE AP LOS ANGELES TIMES
ON PAGE 15 May 1987
An Unconvincing Gesture
? Robert C. McFarlane, President Fteagan's former
-national security adviser, has loyally tried to take
-upon himself all responsibility for the clandestine
efforts by the White House to get around the ban
once imposed by Congress on aid to the Nicara-
guan rebels. Some may see this as a brave and
'Selfless gesture, but it is also an 'unconvincing one.
The policy McFarlane helped carry out, as his
testimony before congressional investigating com-
mittees suggested, was not something whose
means he always understood nor, at least in
retrospect, that he always believed in. Certainly
McFarlane can be faulted for failed judgments, and
maybe worn. But he cannot by any means be held
wholly accountable for the broader failure of
executive responsibility.
McFarlane's testimony, the weight of which was
to confirm information obtained earlier, further
A supported indications that William J. Casey, the
late director of the Central
was a princilial figure in the affair. But the secrets
that Casey knew?along with the chance to defend
himself against charges of possible wrong-
doing?went with him to the grave. , Evidence of
Casey's involvement in efforts to circumvent and
deceive Congress is strong. even comoelling. But
so also now is the suspicion that others may be
tempted to heap an excess of blame upon a man
who can no longer answer his accusers.
The central figure in the affair, Lt. Col. Oliver L
North, is due to be heard from next month,
provided investigators don't change their minds
about granting him limited immunity. Rear Adm.
John M. Poindexter, McFarlane's successor in the
White Howe, is also scheduled to testify. Between
them these two can probably provide the most
definitive answers to the most crucial questions,
high among them just what Reagan knew and
approved of in the whole shady business of
channeling aid to the Nicaraguan rebels.
Meanwhile it's hard, after observing his four
days of testimony, not to feel some sympathy for
McFarlane. The portrait that emerged is that of an
essentially decent man who dedicated his life to
public service, but who in the end let his
commitment to honor be compromised by the far
less noble cause of trying to protect his boss?and
by his odd fear that if he spoke out against a bad
policy he might be denounced as a "commie" by
Administration hard liners. Robert McFarlane
deserved a better end to his public career than the
one he invited.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTICLE APP
ON PAGE LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 March 1987
Far From Leakproof
The world's great and small powers spend bil-
lions of dollars annually on technological means
for collecting intelligence. But high- tech spying
still hasn't eliminated the most ancient tools of
espionage. Sea, money and appeals to personal
grievances remain potent lures in enlisting spies.
The Soviet Union has lately been seen to have had
n lot of success in using such means of recruitment.
The costs to the United States, though still not
? 'filly known, are believed to be enormous.
The latest case involves allegations that Soviet
intelligence was able to penetrate the most
.secretive inner sanctums of the U.S. Embassy in
?Moscow. One Marine guard at the embassy has
.,been charged with abetting these intrusions in
1985 and 1988. Another is under suspicion. U.S.
officials fear that Soviets were able to enter top-
secret communications facilities and W identify
CIA sources in the Soviet Union. One official
describes the intelligence losses as "horrible."
Disclosure or the embassy penetration comes
after a string of recent revelations about Soviet
intelligence successes against the United States.
The most damaging of those by far revolved
around John Walker, who, first alone and then
with confederates, sold the Soviets vital military
information over a period of nearly 20 years. The
eventual exposure and punishment of the Amer-
icans involved in no way mitigate the damage.
The American system rejects the notion that
anyone with access to highly classified information
must be kept under constant suspicion. But recent
cases?involving the Walker spy ring, the defec-
tion to the Soviets of one-time CIA employee Ed-
ward Lee Howard, and now the embassy Marines
?raise the most disturbing questions about laxity
in protecting secrets. Counterintelligence can
never be foolproof. But where U.S. efforts to
counter Soviet recndtment of American agents are
concerned, it can be a lot better than it has been.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
- LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 March 1987
Too Many Clouds
President Reagan has enough top aides moving
out of their jobs under a cloud. The last thing that
he needs is one moving into a job under a cloud. He
would be wise to withdraw the name of Robert M.
Gates and find someone else to direct the Central
Intelligence Agency. .
The cloud over Gates, now deputy director of the
CIA, has been gathering since confirmation hear-
ings before the Senate Intelligence Committee
began earlier this month. Chairman David Boren
( D-Okla.) was supportive, largely on the ground
that Gates seemed more willing to cooperate with
Congress than did his cantankerous predecessor,
William J. Casey. Other members were not so sure.
Assillialiserin his appearance before the commit-
tee, seemed bright and pleasant enough. eager
to please. but his manner did not suggest the
presence of command that would equip him to ride
the CIA tiger, let alone tame it.
The cloud began to rain on Gates' parade Thurs-
day with the release of the Tower Commission's
report on the Iran-contra scandal. One question
during confirmation hearings was whether he
would be his own man or whether he was so intent
on the next rung of his career ladder that he would
do anything that someone of higher rank might ask
him to do.
The Tower Commission on Wednesday seemed
to confirm earlier published reports that Gates
circulated a meinorandum about the potential for
Soviet mischief in Iran that was at odds with the
consensus of others at the agency but was just
what the National Security Council wanted to
hear.
The memorandum, written in May, 1985, said
that the Soviet Union was in a good position to take
advantage of the chaos in Iran that the National
Security Council feared would follow the death
of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and that the
United States was not. Using that assessment, two
aides to Robert C. McFarlane, former national-
security adviser, proposed that the United States
"encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran
meet its important requirements," including arms,
as a means of establishing an American. presence
to match that of the Soviets.
The rest is history?including the resignation of
the man whom Gates succeeded as deputy, John A.
McMahon, who resigned when he lost a fight to
have the CIA wash its hands of arms shipments
to Iran.
The Senate committee, which plans to examine
Gates' role in excruciating detail during closed
hearings next week, is already divided over
whether to vote now or wait for more evidence to
accumulate. That could take months, and Chair-
man Boren would rather the committee decide
soon whether to confirm or reject Gates or ask the
President to withdraw the nomination.
The President should not wait. He should
withdraw the nomination and find a nominee who
walks around under clearer skies.
for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
? ON PAC.X?.. ?-?,? 1 J.
25 March 1987
Diplomatic Challenge
The United States cannot sit meekly by while a
nuclear race develops on the Indian subcontinent.
But finding the right combination of carrot and
stick to head off such a race poses a formidable
challenge to this country's diplomatic skills.
Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) wants to suspend all
U.S. aid to Pakistan until that country halts its
nuclear program. That is too much stick. Sen. Alan
Cranston (D-Calif.) is closer to the right combina-
tion with a plan to cut military aid by half while
diplomats try to reason with Pakistan.
What makes the task so formidable is that Paki-
stan is not the only country that must be persuaded
to prevent nuclear- weapons production from
jumping any more national fences. India and Israel
are also part of the problem.
? American experts have long suspected that Pa-
kistan is trying to make nuclear weapons?a sus-
cion that recently hardened to a near-certainty.
Pakistan is producing bomb-grade, highly en-
riched uranium at a plant in Kahuta, and is widely
assumed to have all the necessary components for
a bomb.
If Pakistan pushes forward, India, which explod-
ed an atomic device in 1974, may well react by
producing its own nuclear weapons. If India goes
into the bomb business, that could set off alarm
bells in Beijing. The political chain reaction could
interfere with U.S.-Soviet efforts to scale back
their own nuclear forces.
The worst-case scenario is that to break the
chain India or the Soviet Union might bomb Paki-
stani nuclear facilities.
As part of an effort to discourage the spread of
nuclear weapons, U.S. law bans military aid to any
country deemed to be in the business of making
or acquiring nuclear weapons. The American am-
bassador, Dean Hinton, warned recently that the
Pakistani nuclear program will make it very diffi-
cult for President Reagan to certify to Congress
that Pakistan does not have a "nuclear explosive
device." Still Reagan is pressing for congressional
approval of a six-year, $4-billion package of econ-
omic and military aid for Pakistan.
Pakistan is of great strategic importance to the
United_Statex It stands as a barrier tn Snviekt. smhi-
tions in South Asia, and its cooperation is crucial to
.U1iiIlience agencies and their installations in
Pakistan from which they eavesdrop electronically
on the Soviet Union. Pakistan also is an irreplace-
able conduit for arms and other aid to guerrillas in
Afghanistan who are fighting the Soviet invaders.
If the United States leans too hard on Pakistan,
it could be charged with applying a double stan-
dard. Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program is pre-
sumably a response to that atomic test in India
years ago. Pakistan also has offered, on one condi-
tion, to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty,
which obliges signatory nations to accept inter-
national inspection of their nuclear facilities.
The condition is that India also sign. So far India
has not agreed.
Israel is an even pricklier diplomatic problem.
Israel has never admitted that it has nuclear
weapons, but the consensus among international
nuclear specialists is that it has the components
for at least 25 bombs ready for assembly, and one
recent report claimed that the number was closer
to 100 or 200. Yet there has never been a serious
suggestion that the United States withhold mili-
tary aid to IsraeL
Faced with these realities, U.S. officials fear that
too much American pressure on Pakistan would be
counterproductive, that it might goad Pakistan
Into testing a nuclear device Just to show its
independence. That would almost certainly trigger
renewed Indian testing, and a nuclear arms race
would be under way.
The lesser evil is also unacceptable?that the
Pakistanis might be tempted to listen harder to
the Soviet Union's less-than-satisfactory propos-
als for peace in Afghanistan.
Clearly Cranston's combination of carrot and
stick is the place to start But if US. pressure on
Pakistan is to enjoy even a shred of credibility, it
must be accompanied by strong representations
to India to accept proposals for mutual Pakistan-
India inspection of nuclear facilities, and firmly
expressed concerns that Israel, by building a large
nuclear deterrent, is guaranteeing the ultimate
development of nuclear capabilities by its Arab
neighbors.
nne-ImccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
fr AP
.,;N PAGE LOS ANGELES TIMES
4 March 1987
Strong Choice
President Reagan's decision to name William
H. Webster, director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to succeed William J. Casey as
director of Central Intelligence is a wise move
that should go far toward restoring the people's
confidence in the integrity of the CIA. Webster's
willingness to accept a messy and complicated
challenge speaks of his honor and sense of duty as
a public servant.
"Judge" Webster, as he is known from his pre-
vious service on the federal bench, is the kind of
public official in whom the United States abounds
but whose numbers have been conspicuously
sparse recently at the top levels of the Reagan
Administration. He is a straightforward man of
integrity who, by all accounts, puts personal con-
siderations aside in favor of his obligations to his
public charge.
The CIA is in need of such a man. By its secretive
nature naturally prey to the abuse of power, the
CIA in Casey has had for the last six years a
director who was as indifferent to constitutional
restraints as he was enthusiastic about the use of
secret means and covert wars.
The agency must give honest reports and
untainted assessments to its master, the govern-
ment; when the CIA acts, it must act in strict
conformity to the demands of the Constitution and
the requirements of Congress. Judge Webster's
record in restoring the integrity of the FIN is
testimony to his fitness for doing the same for the
CIA.
Well, sweet can be the uses of adversity. After
humiliating himself and his office and his country
with the help of some of his top assistants, the
President has replaced his headstrong chief of
staff, Donald T. Regan, with the eminently
sensible Howard H. Baker Jr., and now he has
given us Webster for Casey. There is much more to
do. This is a beginning, but it is a good beginning.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTICLE APPEARED "I
ON PAGE-1:.'
LOS
ANGELES TIMES
2 March 1987
Following the Contra Trail
The Tower Commission's report was clear, and
distressing. on the Reagan Administration's arms
shipments to Iran. It was less clear, but no less
disturbing, about the other end of the arms deal
?funneling arms profits to Nicaragua's contra
rebels.
In reconstructing the National Security Coun-
cil's Iranian misadventure, commision members
came across a series of memorandums, cdmputer
messages and anecdotes indicating that NSC staff
members, primarily Lt. Col Oliver L. North, en-
gaged in an extensive secret campaign to provide
support for the contras during the two-year period
when Congress barred U.S. government aid for the
Nicaraguan rebel'. "Indeed." the Tower report
says, "the NSC staff's role in support for the
contras set the stage for its subsequent role in the
Iran initiative."
Thus the special committees of Congress investi-
gating the scandal and Special Prosecutor Law-
rence E. Walsh must answer questions like these
?Precisely how much money was raised for the
contras, and how was it ipent? The commission
estimated that at least 123 million in arms profits
was available, but it found no evidence that any
money actually reached Nicaraguan rebel leaders.
The commission did find evidence that the funds
were put into an elaborate network of secret bank
accounts and fake companies that North dubbed
"Project Democracy." Among the "assets" of
Project Democracy were vehicles, aircraft and
ships, several warehouses and leased homes, large
quantities of arms, ammunition and commsmica-
dons gear, and even a secret airfield in Costa Rica.
?When was this private contra-aid network set
up? The commission found that North was seeking
a donor who could buy a helicopter for the contras
in September, 1914, not long after. Congress
ordered the Central IMAM/axe AsencY to Itco its
covert war against Nicer's= and banned U.S.
government efforts tInsajbaLs64111.4:et
Sandinista government. The language of that law,
the Boland amendment, was vague, but its intent
was clear?Congress did not want the Administra-
tion running amok in Nicaragua Just as dearly,
North and other White House officials were
determined to ignore Congress.
?Whose idea was it to encourage private donors
and even foreign governments (apparently includ-
ing Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Brunei, Guatemala and Costa Rica) to give help to
the contras? Was it North alone, or were former
CIA Director William J. Caw and Assistant Sec-
retanv of State Elliott Abrams in on the Winning?
The commission even found notes written by
North suggesting that President Reagan was
aware of the private aid network and approved of
its activities. But Reagan told common mem-
bers that he was unaware of ll until last November,
when U.S. Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese UI made the
matter public.
The questions demand answers because, in
prolonging a covert war against Nicaragua after
Congress called a halt, NSC staff members violated
the spirit if not the letter of the Boland amend-
ment. In encouraging private U.S. dtizens to help
overthrow a foreign government, they may have
encouraged violations of the Neutrality Act. And
there have been allegations elsewhere that some
of the fringe characters whom North recruited to
operate his contra-aid network?shadowy figures
like retired Air Force Gen. Richard V. Secord and
his business partner, Albert Hakkim, and arms
dealers like Adnan M Kbashoggi and Manucher
Ghorbanifar ?may have skimmed off some of the
Iranian arms profits for themselves.
Pagan's dealings with Iran can be criticized and
faulted on many grounds, as the Tower Commis-
sion so eloquently did. But the glimpse that the
report gives of America= skulking around the
world in the Iran affair may in the end seem
positively innocent compared with what investiga-
tors will find as they follow the trail of money into
the jungles of Central America.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
' ON PAGE liNCO
17 December 1986
The Deepening Morass
A recent series of articles by a team of Times
correspondents about the rebels fighting Nicara-
gua's Sandinista government illustrates yet again
what a serious mistake President Reagan made by
building his Nicaragua policy around the contnzit.
The series made clear that there are many
grievances in revolutionary Nicaragua, frustra-
tions that have led many patriotic ? Nicaraguans
to abandon the hope that they once had in the
popular revolution that overthrew the hated
Somoza dictatorship in 1979. Ever since then
the increasingly authoritarian nature of the new
Nicaraguan government, controlled by the San-
dinista militants who were the principal fighters
in the rebellion that overthrew Gen. Anastasio
Somoza, has alienated many of its own citizens?
Roman Catholics, business leaders, independent
unionists and peasant farmers among them.
Clearly there would be opposition to the Sandinis-
tas even if the United States had not helped create
the contras.
Unfortunately, the United States did help create
the contras. Or, to be precise, operatives of the
Central Intelligence Agency did so at the behest
of Reagan Administration officials who saw tiny
Nicaragua as a test case of U.S. resolve against the
Eastern Bloc. Creating a Nicaraguan opposition
was a profoundly ignorant mistake from the
perspective of Nicaraguan history. The Somoza
dynasty was created by past U.S. interference in
Nicaragua, after all. And the CIA compotuxled this
error by dealing with the most visible remaining
symbols of the Somoza regime?the officers of
Somoza's defeated National Guard. Somociatas
remain in key positions of authority in the contra
movement to this day, tainting other contras
who are former Sandinista allies with democratic
credentials.
Now, with the $100 million in aid that Reagan
wrested from a reluctant and craven Congress
earlier this year, the Administration is trying to
turn the contras into an effective guerrilla army.
But it is too late. Convinced that the United States
wants to overthrow them at all costs, the Sandin-
istas have heavily armed themselves with the help
of the Soviet Union, and have tightened their
political grip on Nicaragua. Budging them even
slightly will require more than firepower. It
demands a basic. ingredient of guerrilla warfare
that the contras lack?widespread popular support
among the people they claim to be fighting for.
Thus, as the contras infiltrate into Nicaragua to
engage the Sandinistas early next year with their
new weapons and supplies from the United States,
the reality is. that they have little chance of
success. Reagan's contra war is shaping up as a
disaster akin to the Bay of Pigs in slow motion. His
surrogates can't win, and the longer that they flail
about in futility the greater the chance that they
will spark a regional war in Central America,
which the United States could easily be drawn into
with unpredictable consequences.
The tragedy of this deepening morass is that
Reagan has an alternative for dealing with
Nicaragua, even if he does not want to dirty his
hands by negotiating directly with Managua
He has been advised many times by our Latin
American allies, principally the Contadora Group
( Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama), to
step back and let them negotiate with Nicaragua
Latin American diplomats believe that if the
Sandinistas let down their guard long enough to
talk with their neighbors, they will realize that
Nicaragua has more to gain from cooperation with
the Western democracies than it has by becoming
a Soviet client like Cuba.
Despite resistance and even outright hostility
from Reagan, the Contadora Group quietly and
patiently continues trying to negotiate peace in
Central America Contadora is a viable alternative
to the contras. But the United States mutt give it
a chance to work.
n,,,-inecifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
A._
CN PAGE 2r-t4
LOS ANGELES TIMES
lg December 1986
Clear and Confounding
Emerging from a closed session of the Senate
Intelligence Committee the other day, panel
member William S. Cohen ( R-Me. ) noted that
with each new witness who is heard in the
investigation of the arms-for-hostages deal with
Iran ."the picture becomes clearer, the story more
confounding." Both knowledge of what the Reagan
Administration was up to and bewilderment over
its follies seem certain to grow in the weeks and
months ahead. What began as a fairly simple effort
to fix responsibility for a scandalous foreign-policy
blunder is now leading to the exposure of many
covert and dubious connections that high Reagan
Administration officials thought they could keep
hidden. Alice had no inkling of what adventures
lay before her when she followed the White Rabbit
into his hole. High officials little knew what
would be revealed by their misbegotten efforts
to deceive.
The limited dimensions of the enterprise that
Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III sought to depict a few
weeks ago?that of a U.S.-Israel plan to court
putative moderates in Iran's leadership, get back
American hostages from Lebanon and throw some
dough to the Nicaraguan contras?have consider-
ably expanded. The cast of characters involved in
the deal has grown and become more gamy. It now
inc.ludes, among others, a Saudi Arabian billionaire
with close ties to the royal family; an expatriate
Iranian hustler who may double as the ayatollahs'
chief intelligence agent in Europe, and some
Canadian investors who are sore because they say
they-ended up shortchanged on the arms deal. This
represents a new and bizarre twist in the story, a
kind of limited partnership to profit from ransom -
paying. In Sen. Cohen's apt phrase, it signifies the
privatization of American foreign policy.
William J. Casey, the director of Central Intel-
,ligence, confesses to only a vague and untimely
,awareness that Iranian arms money was ear-
parked for the contras. Casey is supposed to be the
man who knows all the secrets. His problem is that
lie has a terrible time remembering them when he
pes before a congressional committee. Secretary
of State George P. Shultz, who is in charge of
carrying out foreign policy, either by the design of
others or by personal choice was largely cut out
of the information loop on the Iran-contras con-
nection. This put him in the odd and ultimately
humiliating posture of vigorously propounding a
policy of no deals with terrorists while behind his
back the Administration he works for was dealing
for all Ames worth.
The revelations up to now seem not to have
shaken President Reagan's conviction that if his
means were flawed his aims were still noble. The
self-evident fact that the aims themselves were
both a betrayal of principles and just plain dumb
remains unacknowledged. Nor has the President
apparently weakened in his determination to keep
around him advisers whose counsels have repeat-
edly proved to be monumentally inept. Reagan has
25 months remaining in his presidency. He faces a
difficult time at best. He faces infinitely worse if
he does not act quickly to rid his Administration
of maladroit officials while putting the full weight
of his authority behind the effort to have the full
story of this mess disclosed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Rei
poue I V ) LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 October 1986
arbitration of disputes among those lead-
ers, encouragement of private gun-run-
fling and support for strategies of attacks
on civilians within Nicaragua?that
would evoke revulsion within the United
States were they more widely known.
Most alarming, to protect the policy the
Administration has revived some of the
worst practices of the Nixon Administra-
tion. The Nixon Administration created
the "plumbers unit" to bypass relevant
agencies?the FBI, for example?and the
Reagan Administration has used members
of the National Security Council staff to
continue U.S. funding of contra military
activities, when Congress has explicitly
banned such support. As a result some in
Washington are now beginning to ask
whether a new Watergate-type scandal
may be brewing.
Administrations always get in trouble
when they forget standards they prom-
ised to respect and end up doing some-
thing they shouldn't The Reagan Admin-
istration's policy toward Nicaragua
breaks a period of respect for the law and
democratic standards that distinguished
the Ford and Carter administrations. The
new policy threatens to return the execu-
tive branch to an earlier darker period
that lowered U.S. prestige worldwide.
Thus the Eisenhower
ligsrabout the_B-2_11ightssiv --er _the Roviet
Union; the Kennedy Administration tried
to assassinate Fidel Castro and in the
process nearly destroyed the CIA as an
effective agencyi the Johnson Adminis-
tration so repeatedly misled the country
about U.S. policy in Vietnam that it
ultimately lost the confidence of the
people as well as America's first major
war.
The Nixon Administration, through
such actions as the illegal bombing of
Cambodia. broke the law abroad and then
broke. it at home?authorizing illegal
wiretaps, breaking and entering and the
systematic obstruction of justice. Several
high officials went to jail; and the nation
lost its first President through resignation
tinder threat of impeachment
Because of its obsession with Nicara-
gua, the Reagan Administration may now
be joining the list of Administrations that
get in trouble by forgetting that the U.S.
system rests on two foundation stones?
legality and accountability.
In effect, the Reagan Administration
has declared war against Nicaragua with-
out informing the U.S. public or obtaining
the necessary authorization from Con-
gress. Its determination to wage that war
explains such otherwise inexplicable ac-
tions as the illegal mining of Nicaragua's
territorial waters, the brochures encour-
Dgiwn
Dirty.
In Nicaragua
By Clones Willem Marta
WASHINGTON
Last week the Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua put on trial Eugene
Hasenfus, the American pilot
shot down when delivering mili-
tary supplies to the contras.
Hasenfus' timing was terrible and his
testimony was troubling, for together
they raised the possibility that senior
members of the Reagan White House
have systematically been involved in
illegal activities.
At the time of the crash, the President
had still not signed legislation making it
legal for the U.S. government to provide
military assistance to the Nicaraguan
rebels, yet Hasenfus contended he was a
participant in an operation supported by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Soon it
surfaced that he reported to a Cuban-
American. Max Gomez, who has met two
or three times with Vice President George
Bush and with his staff.
For those with a long memory, Hasen-
fus' plight recalls that of Francis Gary
Powers in May, 1960, when the Soviets
shot down Powers' U-2 reconnaisance
plane. The Eisenhower Administration
lied about Powers and Nikita S. IChrush-
chev broke up the Paris summit Powers,
like Hasenfus. was pawn in a larger
geopolitical game.
It may be that strictly speaking, the
Administration has not violated the Teter
of the law?although only a congressional
investiptiOn can determine Otis?and
Hasenfus was misled hi cifficiars who
falsely saiihe was workirqf for the CIA.
But if the Administration is not in strict
violation of the letter of the Taw, it is in
gross violation of its spirit. Given the
Administration's beim it would. be al-
most impossible for a_low-levelemplovee
like Hasenfus not to believe that he was
workinf for the CIA and enjoying the
protection of the U.S. government
For several years now the Administra-
tion has engaged in an extremely danger-
ous game in Nicaragua. Its goal has been
to overthrow the Sandinista regime, yet it
has told the American people otherwise.
To carry out this policy, it has been
involved in highly questionable activi-
ties?direct contacts with contra leaders,
- cnniti7pri r.onv Aooroved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
aging the assassination of Nicaraguan
officiaLs and now the possible violation of
an explicit congressional prohibition
against U.S. military aid to the contras.
Some cynics say any violation of previ-
ous laws regarding aid to the contras is
irrelevant, because the President on Fri-
day signed into law legislation that will
make such aid legal. But this is a
shortsighted approach to the problem of
legality and accountability in a democrat-
ic society. The issue is not whether the
law now permits what was previously
illegal. It is whether the Reagan Adminis-
tration will be allowed to put its private
desire to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua over public law. And if the
answer is yes, then in what sense does the
United States follow democratic practices
in conducting its foreign policy?
It is critical that some key questions
regarding this affair be answered. Who
paid the salary of Hasenfus? Where did
the money come from? To whom does
Gomez report? Did the aircraft flown by
Hasenfus' company regularly use U.S.
military air fields? Who authorized this?
George Washington once reminded his
fellow citizens that the "nation which
indulges toward another an habitual ha-
tred or an habitual fondness is in some.
degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity
or to its affection, either of which is
sufficient to lead it astray from its duty
and interest."
The Reagan Administration has be-
come a slave to its hatred of Nicaragua.
And just as Washington warned, the
hatreds it has nourished have now led the
nation astray from its duty and its
interests. It is time for the the Adminis-
tration to recognize what is happening
before it is too late and its lawless actions
trigger a major political scandal. CI
'Charles William Mayttes is the editor of
Foreign Policy magazine
A
, ralr(Wed for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTICLE APPEPAga
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
A1NLJELt3 11MES
9 October 1986
A Likely Story
It looks bad enough for the United States to have
anJ airplane packed with arms for Nicaragua's
rebels and flown by an American crew crash inside
that country's borders. It makes it look unaccepta-
bly worse to have one of President Reagan's chief
advisers on Latin America use the incident to
encourage free-lance attacks a sovereign govern-
ment with which we are officially at peace.
There will be more details in the days to come on
thi, activities of Marine Corps veteran Eugene
Hapenfus, the Wisconsin man who is the sole
survivor of the four-man crew aboard the C-123
trafisport that Nicaraguan troops shot down
Sunday near the Costa Rican border. Two other
citizens, and a Nicaraguan, were killed when
it crashed. Hasenfus has reportedly admitted his
mission was to resupply anti-Sandinista contra
rebels.
The U.S. government has disavowed any official
connection with the airplane or its crew, but there
can be little doubt the flight was part of a pattern
of covert operations, either overseen directly or
encouraged indirectly by the Central Intelligence
Agency. in support of the contras, who Reagan
considers freedom fighters. That an Administra-
tion irrationally obsessed with Nicaragua is linked
to such activities is no surprise. What is amazing is
how consistently U.S. officials, and their contra
allies, botch up these operations and embarrass
themselves before the world.
Take the way Assistant Secretary of State Elliot
Abrams, the chief coordinator of Reagan Adminis-
tration policy in Central America, praised the work
of piivate U.S. groups that aid the contras, going so
far-As to call the downed plane's crew "heroes."
They probably were brave men. But there are
serious questions as to whether such activities are
even legal under the Neutrality Act of 1972.
Quite apart from their legality, there are millions
of Americans who consider such activities improp-
er and unwise. Even the Republican chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, Minnesota's
David Durenberger, is asking whether the CIA
could bring free-lance contra aid operauons under
control if Congress were ever to allow it to go after
Nicaragua unhindered. For Abrams to go out of his
way to praise that kind of activity reflects
profound arrogance.
But then, ignorance and a belief that we know
better than the rest of the world what to do in
Central America runs through all of the Adminis-
tration's tactics and pronouncements with respect
to Nicaragua. Reagan, Abrams and the rest are
apparently determined to wage their war there
regardless of what it costs in human lives or
damaged U.S. prestige. The only way their
campaign to overthrow the Sandinistas will be
forced into a more constructive channel?like the
Contadora negotiations suggested by our Latin
American allies?will be if Congress flatly refuses
to go along with it.
Congress should now delay final approval of the
$100 million in contra aid it voted recently, until
the Administration answers the many questions
raised by the aircraft's downing. Congress must
find out if the Administration is already the
contra aid money despite the fact it has not ? ? n
finally approved, or whether the CIA is using its
operating funds against Nicaragua, a strategy
Congress specifically banned two years o when
it was revealed that CIA o ? - ? ? ?? ? ?
icaragua s bore.
Congress must have a clear answer to those
questions before allowing Reagan and his fellow
adventurers to plunge deeper into the jungles of
Central America.
Q.nifi7prinnnvApproved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTICEE ;OAP LOS ANGELES TIMES
ON PATE 4,4444g 14 August 1986
Sloppy Silence
Measured by what its highest officials say or
don't say, the Reagan Administration seems to
have a curious sense of priorities when it comes to
dealing with the loss of sensitive information. Let
word. of some politically embarrassing blunder or
dubious covert enterprise leak to Congress or the
press, and the highest officials rush to warn that
the very foundations of the Republic may have
been imperiled, while threatening lie-detector
tests for everyone in sight. But let an administra-
tive fiasco occur that could genuinely jeopardize
national security, and top people keep silent while
lesser functionaries are sent to mumble uninfor-
mative explanations. Two recent cases illustrate
the point.
Last month, to take the more current example
first, a House subcommittee revealed?no doubt on
the basis of a leak?that Lockheed Corp. had
managed to lose an incredible 1,400 documents
dealing with a project so secret that the Defense
. Department refuses even to acknowledge its exist-
ence. Some of the documents have been missing
since 1983. An official of the Pentagon, which sets
security standards for contractors working on
classified projects, described the loss of the docu-
ments as a "near-disaster," but now says that his
department has either located or knows what hap-
pened to them. The ambiguity of the second part of
that statement is somewhat less than reassuring.
Losing documents is bad enough. Losing people
is worse. A few years ago the CIA hired Edward
Lee Howard and trained him to become an
espionage agent in Moscow, telling him a lot of
secrets in the process. Then the CLA found out that
Howard had certain disqualifying character de-
fects, and fired him. It let a year go by, though,
before it told the FBI that Howard might be some-
one to keep an eye on. Meanwhile, the unhappy
Howard had established contact with Soviet
intelligence. The FBI got on to him, but one night
Howard evaded surveillance and disappeared.
Now, the Russians say, he is in Moscow, telling
all. At least one Russian working for the CIA is
believed to have been killed as a result
It is impossible to say how much harm may have
been done by the Howard defection, or what if any
damage was done in the Lockheed case- What is
clear is that here are two recent examples?there
have been others in the near past, including that of
KGB defector/redefector Vitaly Yurchenko?in
which inexplicable sloppiness has occurred in the
security area. The Administration has had little to
say about these serious matters, and what explana-
tions it did offer came only under .congressional
pressure. Left to its own, the Administration
probably would have had nothing to say at all.
Onr+ - Caniti7Pd Cony ADproved for Release 2014/04/03 CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
04(a. 1,U3 July
1MLS
22 1986
Chilling Effect
.flt the last year the Reagan Administration
has broadened the use of the espionage laws to
pmeecute people who are not spies. jt successfully
intelli-
gence analyst for ? *: classified
photograobs to the presehmifts and
id
the Washington Post that they could be prosecuted
for ?divulging intelligence information, To the
government, these activities constitute spying no
less than what the Walker family did.
At the same time, Congress has sought to do
something about the epidemic of real spying cases
that erupted. in 1965. Late last month the Senate
passed a bill intended to prevent spies from
profiting by selling their stories. The bill would
require that "any person convicted" under the
eseienage act "shall forfeit to the United States
. any of the person's property used. . . in any
manner or part. . to commit or to facilitate the
ctimmission of such violation."
If this bill becomes law, a newspaper that is
convicted of espionage for publishing information
coidd have its assets seized?including its presses.
Nothing like that has ever happened in the history
of this country. It would be anathema to the First
Anlindinent and to the goal of an informed public.
The term chilling effect is overused, but in this
case it accurately describes what will happen if
Congress adopts the Senate measure. The cost of
being convicted of espionage would be to put the
newspaper or television network out of business.
So the press is likely to be overly cautious about
what it prints, and news about intelligence
activities is likely to disappear. The ability of the
people to monitor what the government is doing
will disappear with it
Sen. Ted Stevens ( R - Alaska ) probably didn't
realize the sweeping consequences of his measure,
which has been called the "You Spy, You Die" bill.
The Senate didn't realize it, either. They were
thinking about spies, not about leakers who give
information to the press or leakees who publish it.
But that is what the law would require. Notice
that the applicable verb in the statute is shall
forfeit. A judge would have no discretion.
The perniciousness of the Administration's
approach to this subject becomes clearer all the
time. The espionage laws should be restricted to
spies and spying, which is what Congress intended.
And the House-Senate conference committee that
is to take up the Diplomatic Security and Anti-
Terrorism Act should either drop the Senate's
forfeiture provision or make clear that it applies
to spies and not to the press.
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
ARTMLE APPEANtli
PAGE_Y. (NJ'
LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 June 1986
Scandal Worsens in Israel
The scandal Involving Israel's domestic intelli-
gence service has ?My deepened as a result of the
deal giving the head of that lviencylmmunity from
criminal 2,,Essuissi The deal aims at quashing
?an?$, further investigation into the behavior of
Avraham Shalom, chief of the Shin Bet, who has
been accused of covering up the killing of two
captured Palestinian terrorists.. Shalom was given
immunity, in exchange for his resignation, ostensi-
bly to prevent further disclosures that could harm
state security. The widespread and not implausible
.suspicion in Israel is that the deal in fact was made
largely to protect some of the country's political
leaders from embarrassing revelations about their
own involvement in the cover-up.
The cam began on April 12, 1984, when four
young Palestinian, hijacked an Israeli bus. Hours
later, security agents stormed the bus. An official
statement claimed that all four hijackers, along
with one passenger, died in the attack. But Israeli
newspspers had pictures of two of the terrorists
being taken from the bus alive. Publication of the
pictures, in defiance of military censorship, forced
an official inquiry. In time it came out that the two
Palestinians had been beaten to death, in clear
violation of Israeli law that forbids killing un-
armed prisoners. Who ordered the killings and
who carried them out remains unknown. But
Shalom, the head of Shin Bet, was on the scene
' at the time. He is also believed to have been in
close touch throughout the incident with then-
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who is scheduled
to reclaim that office in October.
Three senior Shin Bet officials resigned last
December to protest Shalom's alleged attempts to
hide the truth about the affair. Earlier this month
Israel's attorney. general also quit after he was
prevented from further investigating the case.
Now Shalom, though he has been convicted of
nothing, has been granted executive immimity in
a move that. prominent Israeli judicial authorities
denounce as illegal and a whitewash.
Shamir, who currently serves as foreign minis-
ter, hap never denied that he knew of the cover-
up. It also seems likely that Shimon Pores_ who
succeeded Shamirabout sprime minister, at some point
foundwhat was going on within the
in uigence agency. It is these things that give
the shalom immunity deal the aroma of political
self-protectiveness, and that have prompted an
outcry among many Israelis. Terrorism has no
constituency in Israel. The rule of law does, and
the signs most unmistakably are that the rule of
? law is being shamefully compromised.
nprlaccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1
miltwvir LOS ANGELES TIMES
ON PAGE 13 June 1986
Let the Chips Fall
As part of a plea-bargain agreement Jonathan
Jay Pollard, who has confessed to spying for Israel
while working as a civilian analyst for the U.S.
Navy, is talking to the Justice Department about
what he did and what he knows. On the basis of
this, some people at the department are saying that
there may be more to Israeli espionage activities in
the United States than has so far has come to light.
William H Webster, the director of the FBI, has
added to these suspicions by suggesting that the
Israeli government has been only selectively
cooperative in providing information about the
Pollard case. Last week the State Department
seemed implicitly to agree when it once again
called on Israel for full cooperation in illuminating
the affair. That drew a sharp complaint from Prime
Minister Shimon Peres, who professed to see a
deliberate attempt by some to foul the atmosphere
between the two countries. Now the State Depart-
ment, in a carefully worded statement, says that
it knows of "no evidence of any espionage ring
involving Israeli officials." The statement had
White House approval, but rumblings of discontent
from the Justice Department are still being heard.
The State Department's interest right now is
directed at trying to contain the political damage
produced by the Pollard case. One highly publi-
cized incident involving American secrets bought
and paid for by Israel has been bad enough for the
course of bilateral relations. Revelations of other
Israeli spying, separate from or linked to the
Pollard case, could do far more to erode political
bonds between the two countries and weaken an
already shaky Israeli government. That's what the
State Department hopes to avoid.
The interest of the Justice Department is in
finding out who besides Pollard and four unindict-
ed Israeli co-conspirators may have broken U.S.
laws. Some in the department are upset by what
they see as pressures, presumably inspired by
reasons of state, to limit the investigation and
potential prosecutions. The main reason is that
law-enforcement officials plainly are not satisfied
that the Israel government has told all that it
knows and done all that it can to aid the espionage
investigation. There is a lot of circumstantial
evidence to support that view.
Israel's contention from the beginning has been
that the Pollard case was an unauthorized depar-
ture from policy, conducted by a "rogue" intellig-
ence unit without the knowledge or approval of
higher political authorities. Legal filings by the
Justice Department as well as events in Israel cast
strong doubt on that contention.
One of Pollard's Israeli co-conspirators is a
veteran intelligence official. In the wake of the
Pollard case, which is said to have embarrassed
and distressed his government, he was transferred
from his intelligence post to a comfortable civilian
job. Another unindicted co-conspirator is an Israeli
air force officer who, after the Pollard case broke,
was promoted from colonel to general and put in
charge of an air base. If these are the punishments
for rogues, the rewards must be enticing indeed.
If Pollard's spying was unsanctioned and un-
known to higher authorities, what became of the
secret U.S. information?literally suitcases full
of it?that he passed on to his Israeli handlers?
At some point some of this material must surely
have entered the intelligence stream reaching
such officials as the prime minister, the defense
minister, the foreign minister, the chief of staff.
Did no one ever ask where this information came
from and, having been told, order an immediate
stop to an activity that supposedly was in defiance
of a policy not to spy against the United States?
Israel's actions in the Pollard case have done
more to promote suspicions than to allay them.
All this supports the Justice Department's view
that there is much more to be learned. Now,
apparently with Pollard's cooperation, the depart-
ment is pursuing leads. The deal struck long ago
between Israel and the United States was that the
two countries would not spy on each other. That
agreement, and the trust underlying it, has been
breached. An American citizen was paid to spy for
Israel. Perhaps others were involved. The effort
to find out should be allowed to run unimpeded.
im,,,-.1.-,c?c?ifinr4 in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900080003-1