LETTER TO ROBERT GATES FROM CURT ANDERSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000900010001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

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Coalitions for America

Paul M. Weyrich
National Chairman
Curt Anderson
President
Kingston Group
Robert S. McAdam
Library Court
Connaught Marshner
Stanton Group
Henry L. Walther
721 Group
Patrick B. McGuigan
Carroll Group
Michael Schwartz
Jewish/Conservative Alliance
Sam Kane
Resistance Support Alliance
Charles A. Moser
February 27, 1987
Mr. Robert Gates
Acting Director
Central Intelligen'ce Agency
Room 7060
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
721 Second Street, NE
Capitol Hill
Washington, DC 20002
[phone]
On behalf of Mr. Paul Weyrich allow me to extend an invitation to you to join him at our
next Stanton Group meeting. As you are probably aware the Stanton Group meetings
bring together leaders of conservative organizations which are committed to and working
toward a strong national defense. The group routinely meets with policy leaders in
Congress and the Administration. Thus far in 1987 we have met with former Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, Senator Jesse Helms, and Elliot Abrams of the State Department.
We generally have about 50 people in attendence and the setting is informal allowing for
brief remarks followed by questions and answers. Admittance to these meetings is tightly
regulated and all remarks are strictly off the record. It can honestly be said that this is
the best possible forum for anyone to get in touch with the principle players in the
conservative movement.
Our next meeting is on Thursday morning, March 12, from 8:30 to 10:30 AM at the Free
Congress Foundation (721 2nd St., N.E.) in the Kingston room. Earlier contact with your
office has indicated that 9:00 am would be best for your schedule, and that would
certaintly be fine. I would anticipate that 30 minutes of your time would be sufficient
for meaningful interaction, although you are certainly welcome to stay longer.
Thank you for your consideration of this request. I believe that a meeting of this
magnitude would be beneficial for you as well as for us. We look forward to hearing from
you.
Sincerely,
Curt Anderson
President
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%211
efitagrPoundatiort
A tax-exempt public policy research institute
February 26, 1987
Honorable Robert Gates
Acting Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington D.C. 20505
Dear Bob:
This is to confirm your scheduled appearance before the "Stanton
Group," of conservatives at 9 a.m. on Thursday, March 12. This is a
gathering of conservatives that meets every other Thursday under the
aegis of Coalitions for America, of which Paul Weyrich is chairman.
I understand that Paul is sending you a separate invitation.
The Stanton meetings are held specifically to discuss foreign policy
and defense issues of interest to cOnservatives, and about fifty leaders
or representatives of conservative groups normally are present. Guests
frequently appear before the group, including recently Alexander Haig,
Elliott Abrams, Pete Wilson and Malcolm Wallop.
At an earlier meeting I was concerned to hear you criticized on
the following three points:
- Concern was expressed about the CIA estimates reported last year as
showing Soviet weapons spending as being almost flat for a decade and
unlikely to grow much in the next five years. This is seen by some as
an attack on the justification for the Reagan defense program.
- Criticism was voiced about the reported revision by the CIA early last
year of the mathematical multipliers used to calculate the yield of
Soviet nuclear tests in a way that reduces the number of apparent
Soviet violations of the TTBT.
- It was claimed that Stansfield Turner had said that you had inspired
and helped him carry out the deep cuts in the Agency during the Carter
administration.
In view of these allegations, you may want to say a few words on each
of them by way of reassurance. But I think more important would be for you
to say something about your background as a Soviet specialist, making it
clear that you have no illusions about the nature of the communist threat.
Herbert B. Berkowitz, Vice President
Gordon S. Jones, Vice President
Burton Yale Pines, Vice President
David R. Brown, M.D.
Joseph Coors
Midge Decter
Robert F. Dee
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., President
Phil N. Truluck, Executive Vice President
Board of Trustees
Hon. Shelby Cullom Davis, Chairman
Robert H. Krieble, Ph.D., Vice Chairman
J. Frederic Rench, Secretary
Joseph R. Keys
Lewis E. Lehrman
Hon. Clare Boothe Luce
Peter E. S. Pover, Vice President
John A. Von Kannon, Vice President
Bernard Lomas, Counselor
Thomas A. Roe
Richard M. Scaife
Hon. William E. Simon
Arthur Spitzer
Jay Van Andel
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. ? Washington, D.C. 20002 ? [phone]
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2.
It might be useful to repeat some of the marvelous points about
the Soviet military buildup and the dangers of a Soviet ABM breakout
that you made in your San Francisco speech last November 25. I am
sure that most of the Stanton participants had not seen or heard about
those remarks. Your strong support of early deployment of SDI would
be well received by this group. Similarly, your views on the Reagan
Doctrine, as you expressed them to the Commonwealth Club, would be of
interest to the Stanton participants.
Of course, your total appearance will only be for 20 to 30 minutes,
including questions and answers, so in five to ten minutes of remarks
there will only be time to touch on a few points, but I believe the
ones mentioned above are the most important. This group can be very
influential with conservative Members of Congress, thus, it is helpful
when they understand what a person really stands for, as opposed to
superficial impressions based on press reports.
I will meet you at the front entrance at 721 Second Street, N.E.,
which is two blocks down from the Heritage Foundation, just off Massa-
chusetts Avenue, at 9 a.m. on March 12. I look forward to seeing you
then.
Sincerely,
?
T. Hackett
tor
ational Security Record
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National Se curl
Record
A Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION ? 214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. ? WASHINGTON, D.C. ? 20092 ? [phone]
NO. 99
FEBRUARY 1987
In this issue . . .
A Space-Based Defense in Seven Years, p. 1
A number of recent reports agree that space-based defenses are
possible as early as 1994.
The Disarming of Canada, p. 3
by Major John Hasek
A Canadian looks at efforts to sever Canada's defense relationships
with the U.S. and NATO.
Insiders Report, p. 4
?East-West Traders Riding High.
?SDI-type Program for Tactical Missile Defenses.
?State and AID Lobbying for Foreign Aid.
?PLO Offices Should be Closed.
?U.S. Aid Helping the Angolan Resistance.
Trashing the B-1, p. 5
The anti-defense groups are at it again. Now they are trashing
the B-1 bomber.
A Space-Based Defense in Seven Years
On March 23, 1983 Ronald Reagan announced a major
research program to determine whether an effective non-nu-
clear defense of the American population against ballistic
missiles could be built. Now, less than four years later, strate-
gic defenses are emerging as a near-term reality.
A number of recent reports agree on one crucial point: that
space-based defenses using existing technology are possible
and deployable as early as 1994. Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger and Lt. General James Abrahamson, director of
the Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO),
now agree with that timetable. They informed President Rea-
gan of their views on December 17 and since then Secretary
Weinberger has been discussing publicly the need to get on
with the planning, development and testing of these technol-
ogies. To do so, funds must be included in the Defense budget
for fiscal year 1989, which will be prepared by the Reagan
administration, for a development program leading to deploy-
ment of strategic defenses (in contrast with the present SDI
program of open-ended research).
This is startling news, because it generally has been as-
sumed that space-based defenses would be the last to be built.
Of the three or four layers of a comprehensive nationwide
ballistic missile defense, it has been assumed by many that a
ground-based point defense would be built first, followed by a
ground-based mid-course defense. The boost-phase was ex-
pected to be most difficult and to take the longest time to
develop. Now it is believed that development work on all three
phases could begin at the same time, with deployment of the
different layers occurring as the work progresses.
Point Defenses
Point defenses of specific high-priority targets have been
possible all along. The U.S. built a ballistic missile point
defense at Grand Forks, North Dakota, in the early 1970's to
protect a Minuteman ICBM site. That ABM defense con-
sisted of a large phased-array radar and two layers of defen-
sive missiles, the Spartan and the Sprint, which were designed
to intercept incoming warheads with nuclear explosions both
outside the atmosphere (Spartan) and inside (Sprint).
The Grand Forks site was deactivated in 1975 when Con-
gress cut the funds to operate it. But the technology has long
been known. The Soviet ABM defense of Moscow is based on
the same technology?nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles de-
fending in two layers. The Soviet interceptor missiles are
known as the Galosh and Gazelle.
President Reagan ruled out the early deployment of point
defenses, saying that he wanted to "defend people, not mis-
siles." His orders were to seek a system that could defend the
whole country and its entire population, and which would not
require nuclear weapons to defend against nuclear weapons.
To do this effectively, it was assumed from the outset that
boost-phase defenses would have to be a key part of the
program. This would require either putting weapons in space,
or putting mirrors there to deflect ground-based laser beams.
And it would depend for success on a very sophisticated and
complex computerized battle-management system.
The Delta Experiment
As SDI research progressed, it became increasingly clear
that much of the technology, including most of the new weap-
ons, such as high-energy lasers and particle beams, could take
decades to develop to an operational weapons capability. But
the development of kinetic energy weapons technology pro-
ceeded much faster than expected.
The potential for kinetic energy weapons in the boost-phase
was enhanced by a highly successful experiment with two
satellites in space conducted by the Air Force last September.
The so-called "Delta experiment" proved it is possible to track
and target a rising ballistic missile from space with infrared
sensors on satellites. despite problems caused by the exhaust
71-1--J. ---
f.
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plume of the missile. Put together in just 14 months, the
experiment required one million lines of new computer code,
which was written in less than six months. It worked perfectly
the first time, demolishing the claims of so-called computer
experts that computer programs of such complexity cannot be
designed with assurance of success.
Another result of this experiment was the realization that
kinetic-energy kill vehicles (small missiles that destroy their
targets by whacking into them) can be directed by infrared
sensors to strike a ballistic missile in the boost-phase. This
means that the development and early deployment of a space-
based, boost-phase defense, using existing technology, is now
entirely possible and awaits only a political decision by the
president.
The High Frontier Report
The first of the recent reports on the early deployment of
such defenses was issued by High Frontier, the pro-SDI
lobby, last October. After reviewing the available options,
High Frontier's president, retired Lieutenant General Daniel
Graham, presented his conclusions at a Capitol Hill press
conference. Graham's report called for three layers of missile
defenses, all using kinetic energy weapons. According to Gra-
ham, the initial operation of all three could be underway 71/2
years from a deployment decision by the president.
Graham believes that his proposed system would deter a
Soviet first strike and provide a "high degree" of protection
for both the U.S. strategic deterrent and the U.S. population.
He claims that it would provide near perfect protection
against an accidental launch or a limited attack.
The High Frontier proposal consists of three layers:
? The terminal layer would be a ground-based point de-
fense of high-priority targets (missile sites and command
and control centers) with one of two systems: a high
velocity cloud gun firing thousands of metal flechettes, or
a swarmjet firing salvos of small rockets. Either would
destroy incoming warheads on impact. Deployment
could be underway in five years, with 200 locations de-
fended at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.
? The mid-course layer would consist of either Lockheed's
ERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry Intercept System) or
the similar VM-3 system developed jointly by Vought
and Martin Marietta. ERIS would destroy warheads
with kinetic energy intercepts as far as 2,500 miles away,
providing a limited defense of the whole United States.
Either system could be operational in five years. An
initial site with 100. ERIS interceptors could be estab-
lished at an estimated cost of $3 billion.
? The third layer, a space-based boost-phase defense also
using kinetic energy weapons, could follow one of two
models. One would be an array of a thousand satellites
armed with both homing intercept rockets and "cloud
guns." High Frontier's other option is to deploy 1,125
satellites, each with eight small kinetic energy intercep-
tors. Either system could be initially deployed in 71/2
years at a cost of up to $25 billion, including the rockets
needed to lift the satellites into space.
General Graham concluded that the initial deployments of
High Frontier's layered defense could be made over a period
of five to eight years at a cost of about $30 billion. The
complete program would cost more, depending on the size of
the total system. It would be 50 to 70 percent effective against
a theoretical full attack of Soviet missiles, and much more
effective against lesser but more realistic attack scenarios.
The Worden Report
In December, Lt. Colonel Simon (Pete) Worden, a Ph.D in
astrophysics who made a reputation during the first two years
of the SDI program as one of its driving forces, wrote an
article for National Review that presents an insider's view of
"what we can do and when we can do it." Now a senior
research fellow at the National Defense University, Worden
reached essentially the same conclusions as High Frontier. He
also suggests three layers of kinetic-energy weapons:
? Worden's point defense would be based on FLAGE
(Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment), firing
rocket interceptors at warheads to destroy them by im-
pact at altitudes up to ten miles. Worden claims that a
system based on FLAGE technology could be in service
by the early 1990's for a few billion dollars.
? For the mid-course layer, Col. Worden also proposes
ERIS, the most advanced longer-range kinetic energy
weapon system. He suggests that ERIS might be de- .
ployed in conjunction with HEDI (High Endoat-
mospheric Defense Interceptor), a much shorter-range
interceptor, effective from 10 to 30 miles compared to
2,500 for ERIS. Worden claims that both ERIS and
HEDI could be deployed in the early 1990's, together
with a system of airborne infrared sensors and a point
defense such as FLAGE, for about ten billion dollars.
? Worden's boost-phase defense would consist of small,
space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs), four or five
to a satellite. He claims that such a system, with several
thousand defending missiles, could be in place in space
by 1995 at a cost of roughly $20 billion.
The Marshall Report
Perhaps the most significant of the recent reports was is-
sued on December 15 by the George C. Marshall Institute.
Signed by five distinguished scientists and engineers,* the
Marshall report found that a three-layer kinetic energy de-
fense, including a space-based boost-phase component, could
be deployed by 1994 with the first layer operational as early
as 1992, if a decision to deploy is made this year. The Mar-
shall report calculates that the three-layer defense would be
well above 90 percent effective, or more than enough to make
it impossible for an attacker to achieve his objectives.
The Marshall Institute report recommends the following
principal components:
? A ground-based terminal defense based on the HEDI
heat-seeking missile, which would destroy any warheads
that escape the boost and mid-course defenses.
? ERIS is the system of choice for the mid-course, com-
bined with an airborne optical system of infrared detec-
tors to track the warheads. ERIS would provide a true
area defense of much of the North American continent,
although at present it has difficulty distinguishing war-
heads from decoys. This discrimination problem does not
reduce ERIS's value as a defense against an accidental or
limited launch, but improved discrimination capability
would be important for ERIS if it is deployed as part of a
comprehensive defense against a major assault.
*Authors of the Marshall Institute Report: Frederick Seitz, past president,
National Academy of Sciences; Robert Jastrow, former director, Goddard
Institute for Space Studies; John Gardner, vice president for engineering,
McDonnell Douglas Corp.; Edward Gerry, president of WI. Schafer Assoc.;
William Nierenberg, director, Scripps Institute of Oceanography.
(Continued on page 6)
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The Disarming of Canada
by Major John Hasek
The capability of the Canadian Armed Forces to defend the
nation from even a low-intensity conventional threat has virtu-
ally disappeared over the past twenty years. Soviet strategies,
echoed by the Canadian "peace movement," apparently have
been steering Canada's defense policies without the policy
makers being aware of it. Now the Soviet strategy is to shatter
the solidarity of the Western Alliance by inducing Canada to
pull out of both NATO and the North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD).
The decline of Canada's military capabilities began in the
mid-sixties with the unification of the three services, a reduc-
tion in the size of the militia, the disbanding of the university
officer training corps and a drastic reduction of the regular
forces from 120 thousand to less than 75 thousand men (since
up to 83,000). Canada's Europe-based NATO commitment
was cut in half and the Canadian military was subordinated to
the civil service. These steps seriously weakened the ties that
bind the armed forces to the society they protect.
In the seventies the defense budget and even the very exis-
tence of the military were based on Canada's membership in
NATO and NORAD. As a result, Canadian forces ceased to?
have an independent combat capability and now are able to
function only as a part of the forces of larger allies.
Today we are witnessing the last phase of a concerted
propaganda campaign to Finlandize Canada and sever its
links to NATO and NORAD. After several years of psycho-
logical preparation, the mass appeal of the "peace" movement
started with a recent nationwide television showing on the
CBC of the National Film Board series entitled "Defense of
Canada." This series of films casts doubt on the value of
Canada's sacrifices in past wars, with the theme that those
were foreign wars that had nothing to do with the defense of
Canada. The series presented the view that Canada should be
concerned only with the protection of its own sovereignty and
should withdraw from NATO and NORAD.
Another part of this propaganda effort has been the unilat-
eral disarmament campaign of the National Film Board. The
NFB has produced a whole catalogue of "peace" films, the
most famous of which are "If you Love this Planet" and
"Speaking Our Peace." The first of these is virulently anti-
American while the second is pro-Soviet propaganda. Yet
another NFB film attacks the foundation of public support for
the armed forces by attempting to destroy the reputation of
Billy Bishop, Canada's most famous air ace.
The appearance of wide national support for Canadian neu-
trality is maintained by a network of "progressive" groups. In
addition to their own agendas, these groups routinely incorpo-
rate in their public issuances anti-defense resolutions that are
straight from the party line. For example, more than $60
million in government funds goes to the support of a multitude
of women's groups for which the umbrella organization is the
National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC).
The committee's 1985 annual report describes its defense
policies as calling for the withdrawal of Canada from NATO,
NORAD and the U.S.-Canada defense agreement, a reduc-
tion of the defense budget by 50 percent, the declaration of
Canada as a nuclear weapons free zone, and the rejection of
any Canadian involvement in SDI.
Seemingly unconnected events in November 1986 show
just how far this campaign for the neutralization of Canada
has advanced. A conference in Edmonton on Canadian de-
fense policy listed 27 speakers, debaters and moderators, yet
only one was a critic of the Canadian "peace" movement. A
resolution passed at this high-visibility conference called for
the neutralization of Canada, the making of the entire country
into a nuclear weapons free zone, and the denunciation of the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
In Remembrance Day ceremonies across the country (com-
parable to Veterans Day in the U.S.), the theme that Cana-
da's sacrifice had been in vain was apparent, as pacifists in
white berets attempted to disrupt ceremonies. Then on No-
vember 14 the Ontario legislature passed by a large majority a
motion to make the province a nuclear weapons free zone.
Finally, the month ended with a national policy conference of
the Liberal Party at which the participants resolved to make
all of Canada a nuclear free zone and to review continued
membership in the NATO Alliance.
Coming at a time when NATO is threatened by the with-
drawal of nuclear weapons from Britain by a possible future
socialist government in that country, these events in Canada
are serious psychological blows both to Canada's will to make
the hard decisions necessary to meet its defense requirements
and to the cohesiveness of the Western Alliance. And this
"peace" campaign is reaching its peak, perhaps deliberately,
just as the government is preparing to issue its first Defense
White Paper in a decade and a half.
Networking by anti-defense non-governmental organiza-
tions such as the NAC creates enormous pressure on the
government to play down defense requirements and to cut
defense spending, while most conservative organizations are
mute on these issues. With the help of the media, the "peace"
groups are creating what may appear to the government to be
a ground swell of opinion in favor of pulling Canada out of
NATO and severing its defense relationship with the U.S. It is
interesting that the intensification of this effort over the past
year has coincided with the increased emphasis that Mikhail
Gorbachev has placed on indirect and sophisticated propa-
ganda against the West, since his accession to power in the
Soviet Union.
The government's forthcoming White Paper, which is ex-
pected in March, must contest the idea promoted by the
"peace" groups that Canada is a helpless hostage in a sea of
nuclear worries, with only one possible option: withdrawal
from the Western Alliance. The government must clearly
identify current and possible future threats to Canada, take
the steps necessary to re-establish confidence in the nation's
armed forces, and explain the importance for Canada's secu-
rity of its commitments to NATO and the U.S.-Canadian
defense relationship. It is time for Prime Minister Mulroney's
government to stand up and be counted on Canada's future
role as a responsible partner in maintaining the security of the
Western Alliance.
John Hasek is a retired Canadian Army officer, now an
associate professor at the Canadian School of Management
in Toronto.
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Insiders Report
Tracking the Policy Process in Washington
News and Views from Washington
? The administration's trade promoters are engaged in a ma-
jor effort to reduce the Defense Department's role in re-
viewing exports to assure that militarily useful technology is
not transferred to the Soviet bloc. One insider complains
that "the rope-sellers now are in full control of East-West
trade policy." Some indicators:
?the issuance of a one-sided study by the National Academy of
Sciences that proposes a major weakening of export controls;
?the issuance of new regulations by the Commerce Department
to ease export controls on many technological products;
?the attempted exclusion of the Defense Department from an
inter-agency committee that is reviewing export control regu-
lations for the White House;
?State Department domination of the inter-agency working
group that provides guidance to the U.S. delegation to the
CSCE talks in Vienna on technology transfers;
?the continuing efforts by East-West trade officials on the Na-
tional Security Council staff and in the State and Commerce
departments to reduce controls on technology transfers to the
Soviet Union; and
?sanctions against Poland soon will be lifted and the adminis-
tration will restore most-favored-nation trading status to that
communist military dictatorship.
All of this activity reflects the efforts of the "trade comes
first" forces inside and outside the administration to blunt
export controls and increase trade with the Soviets and their
puppet regimes. An example of what this can mean was
illustrated by a brief report in the February 4 Wall Street
Journal that a U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
had signed a letter of intent to form a joint venture with the
Soviet Ministry of Oil Refining and Petrochemical Indus-
tries. The purpose would be to transfer engineering technol-
ogy to the Soviets and to arrange co-production of oil indus-
try instrumentation in the USSR.
? The Pentagon is giving a high priority to the development of
defenses against Moscow's new tactical ballistic missiles
that now threaten NATO and Israel, and which could be
deployed against Japan and South Korea. Senator Dan
Quayle (R-Ind) and others have long been urging the ad-
ministration to take steps to counter the Soviet SS-21s, SS-
22s and SS-23s that are being deployed in large numbers
against NATO. This major research and development pro-
gram will be run by a new U.S. Army office called the Joint
Tactical Missile Defense Program Office, which could be-
come a counterpart to the SDI Office.
The first step probably will be to upgrade the Patriot air
defense missile, six thousand of which are being deployed to
NATO, to give it the capability of intercepting the shorter-
range missiles of the type the Soviets are now putting in the
field. The FLAGE and HEDI projects, which are major
terminal defense components of the SDI program, are ex-
pected to be given priority attention by the new office. Key
components of the defense against tactical missiles still are
likely to come from the SDI program, which is funding
research on the surveillance, tracking, targeting and battle
management systems that will be essential to ballistic mis-
sile defenses, whether strategic or tactical.
? The program recently launched by the State Department to
lobby for more federal funds both for foreign aid and the
State Department budget is picking up steam. Insiders re-
port that AID Deputy Administrator Jay Morris has moved
to a new office in the State Department to direct the lobby-
ing effort. In support of this program the AID Information
Resources Management Office is said to be preparing com-
puter lists, by congressional district, of U.S. businesses and
academic and other institutions that have benefitted from
foreign aid programs. The idea is to generate pressure on
Members of Congress from constituents who might lose
contracts if foreign aid is cut. As part of the effort, the AID
Office of Legislative Affairs is said to be helping set up a
new trade association composed of companies that benefit
from foreign aid.
? Amid reports that the deputy commander of the Palestine
Liberation Organization had a friendly 41/2-hour meeting
with Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, Senate Minority Leader
Robert Dole (R-Kan) and liberal Senator Ted Kennedy (D-
Mass) both called for the closure of the PLO offices in
Washington and New York. Closing the U.S. offices of the
terrorist PLO, which are in constant contact with Soviet
and East-bloc officials, enjoys wide bipartisan support. But
the administration has taken no action, apparently because
of bureaucratic concerns that there may not be adequate
legal grounds for such a step. If justification is not found
soon, look for an effort in Congress to pass legislation that
would give the administration the legal grounds it needs.
? The anti-communist resistance in Angola, UNITA, claims
to have downed 42 aircraft and helicopters since U.S. aid to
the resistance began last year. As in Afghanistan, the U.S.
shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles have been
highly successful, forcing government planes and helicop-
ters to fly higher and to be less aggressive in attacking
resistance forces. As the Marxist MPLA regime shows in-
creasing signs of failure, Moscow's enthusiasm for support-
ing its distant puppet seems to be waning. Although the
Soviets have provided huge infusions of military equipment
in the past, Soviet support is down considerably as the low
world price of oil, Angola's main source of foreign ex-
change, cuts sharply into the government's ability to pay for
arms. U.S. aid to the resistance, only $15 million last year,
should be increased to take advantage of the situation. In
particular, more of the highly effective Stinger missile
launchers, of which only 50 have been sent to UNITA,
should be provided as soon as possible.
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Trashing the B-1
When Congress and the Pentagon work together to come
up with a major weapon that costs less than estimated, is
being delivered ahead of schedule and really works as in-
tended, one would expect congratulations all around. Instead,
one of the best successes of U.S. procurement management,
the B-1 bomber, is being systematically trashed.
Anti-B-1 articles began appearing late last year as the new
planes entered on duty with the Strategic Air Command
months ahead of schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars
below estimated cost. Broadsides against the B-1 have been
authored by David Evans and Molly Moore in the Washing-
ton Post and Bruce Van Voorst in Time magazine. They all
say pretty much the same thing. Evans and Van Voorst, who
seems to have derived his Time piece largely from Evans'
Post article, both describe the B-1 as a "flying Edsel," con-
tending it is underpowered and overweight because of Air
Force additions to the original design. The result, they write,
is a weight gain of over 40 tons, which with other factors
prevents the 131 from climbing higher than 20,000 feet.
Moore adds that the plane does not handle well, describing
a B-1 that bucked and pitched so much that aerial refueling
was impossible. Van Voorst echoes Evans' claims that the
plane is insufficiently maneuverable to fly at the low levels
needed to penetrate heavily-defended Soviet airspace. The
impression is that the B-1 does not work properly and will
have to be fixed at great cost to the American taxpayer.
Here are a 'few facts about the B-1:
? The 40-ton weight gain. The original B-1A was designed
to carry nuclear bombs, not cruise missiles or conven-
tional bombs. Congress later mandated that the follow-on
model, the B-1 B, be able to deliver such weapons. The
design changes made to meet these new requirements
added only 7,000 pounds, or 31/2 tons. But those changes
enable the plane to carry 37 tons of bombs, missiles and
fuel more than originally planned. Thus, for 31/2 tons of
additional weight the plane has gained 37 tons of carry-
ing capacity, including 20 cruise missiles.
? The B-I can't fly over 20,000 feet. When fully loaded,
and a full load is almost twice that of the B-52, the B-1
is limited to lower altitudes. But high flying aircraft are
increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defenses, which is
precisely why the B-1 was designed to fly low, at altitudes
as low as 200 feet, at very high speed (mach .8). The B-1B
fully meets those design specifications. Air Force Chief
of Staff General Larry D. Welch, in responding to Evans'
article, wrote that the B-1 "penetrates enemy airspace
under all-weather conditions at markedly lower altitudes
and at speeds 50 percent faster than the B-52. It carries a
substantially larger bomb load, which it delivers with
much improved accuracy, and it has a radar cross section
a hundredth of that of the B-52."
? The B-1 doesn't fly well. The allegation that a fully
loaded B-1 cannot maneuver around hills or other obsta-
cles is simply wrong. At least some of the B-1 pilots
compare its handling to the much smaller and lighter T-
38 fighter-trainer. The criticisms also ignore the plane's
future mission as a cruise missile carrier. When flying
with 12 cruise missiles hanging under its fuselage and
eight more internally, the B-1 would launch its missiles
1,500 miles or more from their targets and only then,
lighter and drag-free, drop to very low altitude to pene-
trate Soviet airspace to drop its bombs.
? Fixing the B-1 will require massive cost overruns. The
Air Force is asking for $600 million over the next two
years to improve the B-1, but this is within the original
cost estimate for the bomber. In 1981, when the Air
? Force projected a cost of $20.5 billion for 100 B-lBs, that
estimate included money for "fixes" that were expected
following flight tests. Therefore, the $600 million cur-
rently budgeted for corrections and improvements still
will not exceed the original cost estimate.
? The B-I has major design defects. To listen to the critics,
one would think that the B-1 could hardly get off the
ground, that it is impossible to refuel and that its lack of
maneuverability makes it dangerous in terrain-hugging
flight. Author Evans writes, "It cannot be fixed."
The B-1 suffers from the kind of minor problems that occur
in any complex new system. The turbulence that reportedly
interfered with refueling was an isolated instance in the test
program that has been corrected. And initial problems with
the terrain-following radar were corrected with improved
computer software.
The most significant problem has been poor performance of
the defensive avionics used to jam enemy radar (electronic
countermeasures). Both hardware and software changes are
being made to improve the plane's ECM capability. Yet even
with the current ECM problems, the B-1 can perform its
mission effectively against present Soviet capabilities. In any
event, overcoming enemy radar is a constant and shifting
challenge that will require continuing attention as the Soviets
strengthen their air defenses.
The criticism of the B-1 is similar to that made against
almost every new weapon by opponents of defense spending.
The article that seems to have started the current round was
authored by David Evans, a former Pentagon management
analyst who now works for Business Executives for National
Security (BENS). By a strange coincidence, journalist Van
Voorst's boss, Time Inc. chairman J. Richard Munro, is vice
chairman of BENS. This left-leaning group appears to be a
successor to an organization known as Business Executives
Move for Vietnam Peace, which was supported by some of the
same sponsors. And BENS has spun off another group known
as Business Executives for Nuclear Arms Control.
Funded by leftwing activists such as Beverly Hills million-
aire Harold Willens and businessman Stanley Weiss, BENS
invites business executives and prominent personalities to con-
ferences and dinners, trying to create a patina of bipartisan
respectability. Yet BENS' agenda includes support for a nu-
clear freeze, a freeze in defense spending and a "more produc-
tive relationship" with Moscow. Having attacked the B-1, the
MX missile, the new "Stealth" bomber and the 600 ship navy,
BENS now is busy developing arguments against the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative, which appears to be its next target.
Despite such critics, the B-1 will be America's first-line
penetrating bomber into the 1990's and a high-speed cruise
missile carrier well beyond. The bottom line was stated by
General Welch, "The capability to penetrate Soviet airspace
and locate and attack targets deep in the Soviet Union is an
absolutely essential element of a credible deterrent force."
And, he adds, the B-1 does the job.
PAGE 5
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/03/28: CIA-RDP89G00720R000900010001-0 ?
A Space-Based Defense (Cont. from page 2)
? The crucial boost-phase defense would consist of space-
based kinetic-kill vehicles, five to ten on each satellite,
orbiting between 300 and 500 miles altitude. These
SBKKVs, as they are called, would be fired at enemy
missiles both during and after the several minutes of the
boost-phase. The SBKKVs would be supported by sensor
satellites, ten orbiting at between 500 and 1,000 miles
altitude and four more in high geosynchronous orbit.
The comprehensive layered defense proposed by the Mar-
shall Institute would consist of 11,000 SBKKVs, 10,000
ERIS interceptors and 3,000 HEDI interceptors. Assuming a
massive Soviet attack of 1,200 ICBMs with 11,200 warheads
and 90,000 decoys, the Marshall team estimates a boost-phase
kill ratio of 76 percent, and for all three layers, 93 percent.
But if effective decoy discrimination can be developed for the
mid-course, the Marshall Institute claims that its proposed
system could be more than 99 percent effective, fully meeting
President Reagan's original goal of a comprehensive popula-
tion defense.
In answer to the argument that Moscow will just build more
missiles and overwhelm such defenses, the Marshall team
observes that with no U.S. strategic defenses the Soviets now
can allocate two warheads to each U.S. target with a high
assurance of target destruction. But with defenses in place
that are 90 percent effective, Moscow would have to assign 42
warheads to each target for high confidence of success. This
would make any effort to overwhelm such defenses very ex-
pensive and highly implausible.
The Marshall Institute report concluded that a robust
three-layer defense could be deployed at least initially in
seven years, while the ERIS mid-course layer could start
operating as early as 1992. The initial operating capability of
the layered system could be achieved at an estimated cost of
$54 billion, while the fully-deployed system would cost on the
order of $121 billion.
Report Similarities
All three reports emphasize the importance of the boost-
phase. The Marshall Institute lists three reasons why it is the
most important component: first, the attacker cannot concen-
trate his attack on high-priority targets with confidence,
whether or not individual targets are defended by point de-
fenses, because he cannot tell which of his missiles will get
through the boost-phase; second, a boost-phase defense
greatly reduces the value of multiple warhead missiles, since
if the missiles are destroyed on launch all the warheads are
lost; and third, a boost-phase defense reduces potential com-
plications in the mid-course from the use of decoys. Thus, a
boost-phase defense is by far the most effective.
The three reports are remarkably similar in conclusions and
recommendations, with wide variations appearing only in the
cost estimates. While admittedly very rough, even the highest
estimate for a fully deployed system is $121 billion, which is
only about 40 percent of one year's U.S. defense budget and a
far cry from the trillion dollars mentioned by SDI opponents.
Conclusion
Secretary of Defense Weinberger has expressed "an un-
precedented degree of confidence in our ability to intercept
ballistic missiles." In January, he told the Senate Armed
Services Committee that strategic defenses should be de-
ployed "as soon as possible." In a February 3 meeting with
President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger and National Secu-
rity Adviser Frank Carlucci endorsed the early deployment of
SDI, seeking a presidential decision to permit the Defense
Department to follow the broad interpretation of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile treaty and move the SDI program from re-
search to full scale engineering development.
Ronald Reagan now has what he said four years ago he
wanted, an effective and affordable system of population de-
fense against ballistic missiles. He should authorize its devel-
opment and deployment without delay.
PAGE 6
rNational Security Record, James T. Hackett, Editor; W Bruce Weinrod, Publisher. The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachu-
setts Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; [phone]. CABLE: HERITAGE WASHINGTONDC: TELEX: 440235.
Subscription rate?$50/year. Nothing herein is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or
as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. Reproduction is granted provided that proper attribution is
given. ISSN #0162-3206.
pp
WeE
cliefitagePoundation,
214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. ? WASHINGTON, D.C. ? 20002
NSR #99: A Space-Based Defense in Seven Years
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?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/03/28:
CIA-RDP89G00720R000900010001-0
UENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Jim Hackett (Heritage Foundation)
Paul Weyrich - Head of the Coalitions
for America (Stanton Group)
A coalition of conservative activists.
(about 50 people)
0900
on either 12 or 26 March
(no more than 20 minutes)
Location: 721 2nd Street, N.E.
(townhouse)
people like Haig/Abrams have
spoke before them.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/03/28 :
CIA-RDP89G00720R000900010001-0