SOVIET REQUIREMENTS FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY; A FORECASTING METHODOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000800170006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800170006-9
TTAC
Technology
Transfer
Assessment
Center
Soviet Requirements For Western
Technology: A Forecasting Methodology
yOt9071;101:1\
011;10:1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800170006-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800170006-9
SOVIET REQUIREMENTS FOR WESTERN
TECHNOLOGY: A FORECASTING
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The following paper presents a proof-of-concept
for a methodology which demonstrates how the
Soviets use Western technology in future military
systems, and forecasts Soviet requirements for
Western technology.
Although the methodology is only a proof-of-
concept, our aim is to demonstrate its value on a
larger scale to the U.S. export control community
for forecasting future Soviet technology acquisition
targets. The paper provides a brief overview of the
Soviet process for identifying Western technologies
required for development and production of future
weapon systems. The methodology, which simu-
lates this process, is presented with a detailed case
study of its application in the area of microelec-
tronics.
BACKGROUND
Intelligence has played and will continue to play an
active role in deftning export control priorities.
However, its impact is often obscured by the host
of other interests that result in our current control
list. We believe it is important to identify the list
of technologies and equipment which are expressly
critical to development and production of future
Soviet military systems.
We have searched for a means to systematically
identify future Soviet acquisition targets. Previous
studies on Soviet acquisition of Western technology
have outlined the Soviet collection process and the
way in which they go about identifying their targets
of interests. These studies were based on a large
volume of historical evidence. While we assume
Soviet collection tactics will likely remain the same,
future acquisition targets for military applications
will largely be based on requirements for future
Soviet military programs. Past deficiencies resulted
in the collection efforts we observe today; today's
deficiencies will be the object of future collection
efforts.
We believe that intelligence assessments of future
Soviet military systems, combined with estimates of
Soviet technological capabilities, can offer a means
to predict a large share of their future collection
targets. This proof-of-concept provides an assess-
ment of Western technology requirements for these
future systems. We believe that emerging technolo-
gies--those not yet ready for application to military
systems--and technologies acquired to study U.S.
capabilities constitute a smaller percentage of over-
all technology acquisition requirements.
SOVIET PRIORITIES FOR WESTERN
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION
As described in the White Paper on Soviet
technology acquisition, Soviet acquisition efforts
can be divided into two separate but overlapping
programs: an espionage program, and an illegal
trade program. The former is managed by the
Soviet Military Industrial Commission (VPK), and
carried out primarily through the Soviet and East
European intelligence services; the. latter is managed
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and carried out
primarily by Western traders under contract to the
Soviets. A more detailed discussion of these two
programs may be found in appendix I.
In the VPK program, requests for Western
technology are generated by individual 'engineers
and scientists working at design bureaus and
institutes which are tasked with design and
development of military systems. These requests
are forwarded to the VPK, where they are ranked
both in terms of their critical need to a specific
development program and in terms of their broad
application to several development efforts. The
membership of the VPK includes senior representa-
tives of the defense industries. The VPK, in
coordination with the Ministry of Defense and
others, compiles and prioritizes the list of Western
technologies and equipment for acquisition (see
figure 1).
In the illegal trade diversion program, requests for
Western technology are generated by organizations
within the various defense industrial ministries
"Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western
Technology: An Update," September 1985.
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Figure 1
Soviet Bureaucracy for Weapons Acquisition
Policy guidance
Program control
Budget control
L.. Quality control --11
310264 8-86
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Figure 2
Soviet Weapons Development Cycle:
Application of Western Technology
Weapons Cycle
Concept
Development
Prototype/
Testing
Production/
Testing
?
Requirements
Requirements
Acquisitions :
V
VPK Col ection: One-of-a-kind
acquisition through espionage
Technology Acquisition Programs
86 87
A
A
Production/7
Deployment
A
Acquisitions
Trade Diversion: Volume acquisitions
of production equipment and know-how
88 89 90 91 92
93 94 95 96 97
responsible for production of military systems.
These requests are forwarded to the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, which directs large volume acquisi-
tion of the required equipment. The illegal trade
diversion program probably has a much larger
budget than the VPK program, with each defense
industry allocated a portion of the acquisition
budget for its specific needs.
The Soviet decision maker uses two measures to
determine which Western technologies should be
targeted for acquisition: how important a given
technology is to perhaps only one military system,
but a system which is essential to Soviet military
planning; and how pervasive a given technology is
across the spectrum of military systems, and would
therefore benefit many systems. The methodology
developed here simulates Soviet decisions in search-
ing for those technologies and equipment improve-
ments which are required for development and
production of future Soviet military systems.
USING SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
TO FORECAST TECHNOLOGY
REQUIREMENTS
The Soviet approach to military systems devel-
opment and the associated identification and
application of new technologies is highly
structured. Figure 2 generally depicts the lead
times required for acquisition of technologies to be
incorporated in new military systems. For
example, Soviet weapon systems which have
transitioned from the concept development phase
to the prototype/testing phase in the last few years
will benefit from current Soviet large volume
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technology acquisition efforts. Future Soviet large
volume acquisition efforts are associated with those
Soviet military systems which have yet to enter the
prototype/testing phase.
Systems which are more than three years from
prototype/testing, however, will benefit from
acquisitions of one-of-a-kind technology to feed
concept studies for these future military systems.
One-of-a-kind technology requirements are satisfied
largely through the VPK-directed collection efforts
of Soviet intelligence services and export controls
have little or no impact. Systems which will soon
enter the prototype/testing phase will benefit from
future acquisitions of large volumes of the required
production equipment and technology. These
volume acquisitions will be satisfied largely through
the illegal trade diversion program and export
controls will have an impact on their acquisition.
In order to be useful, the methodology must alert
the policy-maker to equipment and technologies
which will be sought in large volume by the Soviets
during the next several years. Thus, we selected
Soviet military systems entering prototype/testing
during the period 1987-1990 for our study--systems
whose production cycle will benefit from large
volume acquisitions of equipment and technology
far enough in the future to allow effective reaction,
but soon enough to be relevant to export control
decisions.
METHODOLOGY
The Concept
The methodology was conceived as a tool to
identify future Soviet collection requirements for
Western technology and equipment based on
analysis of Soviet military system development
programs. These programs, which contain systems
entering the prototype/testing phase between 1987
and 1990, represent military systems expected to
enter operational status usually between 1995 and
2003. Those programs which will result in
operational systems beyond 2003 are beyond the
scope of this level of intelligence analysis. Indeed,
these programs are largely in the very early stages
of concept development and likely have not
resulted in requirements for volume acquisition of
Western technology, but rather in requirements for
classified or proprietary documents to be acquired
through espionage. The methodology is a dynamic
process which requires the most recent intelligence
assessments in each mission area in order to remain
current.
In concept, each system is examined to determine
the perceived performance improvements or
innovations required to achieve the specific mission
requirements. The performance gains are then
characterized by the subsystem improvements or
innovations required to attain them. Each
subsystem is assessed in order to determine the
critical components required. The components are
characterized in terms of the technologies required
to implement them.
In addition to identifying specific technology
requirements, the methodology results in two key
estimates: an estimate of the critical need
(i.e.,"criticality") to a specific military system, and
an estimate of span of application (i.e., "profusion")
of a. technology both within a specific weapon
system and to Soviet military systems in general.
In this proof of concept, we have taken those
microelectronic technologies requirements and
further expanded them to specific materials,
production and process technologies and test
equipment requirements. A full-scale version of
this methodology would similarly link equipment
and processes to each technology requirement
category.
The Procedure
Military systems to be surveyed were selected by
dividing Soviet systems into three major categories:
Strategic Systems, Tactical Systems, and Space
Systems. We subdivided strategic systems into
Offensive, Defensive, and C3I*. We subdivided
tactical systems into C3I, Land, Air, and Naval.
We subdivided space systems into Military and
Civil. The various tactical systems were then
further subdivided into detailed categories,
depending upon their mission. Within each
subdivision we listed the specific types of Soviet
systems which meet that mission requirement. A
listing of the system types surveyed is contained in
appendix
* Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence.
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For this study we interviewed the analyst in CIA's
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research
responsible for each listed system type. Interviews
generally lasted from one to two hours, during
which the analysts were asked to identify the
particular Soviet systems, if any, which will enter
the prototype/testing phase between 1987 and 1990.
For each particular system identified, the analysts
were then asked to list the system's predicted
critical performance requirements based on their
experience in Soviet design practices for that
category of weapon system. For each performance
requirement the key subsystems were listed, for
each subsystem the key components, and for each
component the key technologies. The different
levels are interlinked, with a clearly defined path
from each military system through its performance
requirements, subsystems, components, and down
to its specific required technologies.
The Results
'To measure the criticality of each technology to
system performance requirements, the analysts were
further asked to provide an assessment for each
component of the importance (high/medium/low)
of improvements in that component to meeting
performance goals (a 'high" ranking signifying that
without significant improvements the performance
goal could not be met, a "medium" ranking signi-
fying that improvements in that component play a
major role in meeting the performance require-
ment, and a "low" signifying that improvements in
that component are not required for that perfor-
mance improvement but rather would only incre-
mentally enhance an already satisfactory capabil-
ity). Similarly, analysts were asked to provide an
assessment for each technology of the importance
(high/medium/low) of that technology in meeting
component performance requirements. We then
generated a measure of the criticality of each
technology to meeting system performance goals by
combining these two rankings. Using classified
sources we could then compare the needs with the
indigenous technology base levels to determine
whether technology transfer requirements would be
levied. Soviet technology base shortfalls would
become prime candidates for collection
requirements.
To determine the absolute criticality of any given
technology to a particular system level of perfor-
mance, even though that technology might appear
several times under different components, we con-
sider the path having the maximum criticality as
the absolute criticality. To measure a technology's
span of application within a given military system
we developed a numerical "profusion" score (see
appendix III for a mathematical discussion of this
score). The profusion score takes into account a
technology's maximum criticality, and then adds a
diminishing increment to its score for each
additional entry within that system. A profusion
score spanning all systems was generated in a
similar fashion.
RESULTS SUMMARY
We believe this proof-of-concept adequately simu-
lates the Soviet decision-making process. The
analysts we interviewed play the role of the Soviet
military systems designers, choosing technologies
for use in specific development programs. The
analysts' assessments of the criticality of a given
technology for their particular system can be used
by U.S. policymakers and experts on Soviet
military strategy, jointly playing the role of Soviet
decision-makers, in evaluating the need for that
technology in light of the place of that system in
Soviet military planning. Our profusion score aids
the U.S. policymaker in understanding the Soviet
resource allocation decision-making process, in
which highly profuse technologies are acquired to
aid a wide variety of military systems.
Overview Matrix
An overview of the results from this proof-of-con-
cept is presented in the fold-out (figure 3, found at
the back of this report). This overview matrix
relates all technologies to all military systems which
will begin prototype/testing between 1987 and
1990. Based upon analyst input, we have assigned
three criticalities to each entry: helpful, important,
and essential. Using the profusion score, described
in detail in the appendix, we generated an overall
"importance" score. 'This score is presented in
figure 4. Because of the nature of this exponen-
tially diminishing calculation, values between 40
and the maximum 45 signify that the technology in
question has critical applications in a wide variety
of components in most, if not all, military systems.
On the other hand, values below 9 signify that the
technology in question is not rated with the maxi-
mum criticality in any system. Values between 9
and 40 signify that the technology is likely critical
to at least one system, with higher values signifying
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WEIGHTED PROFUSION
45-
FIGURE 4
TECHNOLOGY PROFUSION ACROSS ALL SOVIET WEAPONS
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