THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000800150010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 14, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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STAT
STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
7 October 1988
NOTE TO: Robert Blackwell, Nb/USSR
in, D/SOVA/DDI
DI/SOVA
DDI/SOVA
D/EURA/DDI
Thanks for your updates and suggestions on the
speech. Attached is the revised version. I would
appreciate any comments, corrections or disagreements.
I call your attention especially to pages 1-6 and
the last paragraph on page 10. I would appreciate
your reaction by COB Tuesday, 11 October.
Attachment:
As Stated
Robert M. Gates
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STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505
7 October 1988
NOTE TO: The Secretary of Defense
Frank --
Attached is the Soviet speech I mentioned yesterday.
While you may want to go through the whole thing, I
think you will find pages 1-10 and 18-20 of greatest
Interest.
Attachment:
As Stated
Robert M. Gates
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STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
NOTE TO: DDO
C/SE/DDO-
For your information.
Attachment:
_ AAAS Speech
Qr.
7 October 1988
ates
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME CASES
THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
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AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION,
STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44
MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED,
RETIRED, HIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN
DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A
POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE
THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT
ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE
LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN
THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE
SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF
PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT
BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST -- WHAT CHANGES
ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV
IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING
THEIR MILITARY POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE
ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2
TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S
CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.
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THESE TRENDS, TOGETHER WITH WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH DEVELOPMENTS FORCED
THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO
LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS.
THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM
THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS
REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY
EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
OR POLITICAL CHANGE HAS BEEN -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- A
STRUGGLE. THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS
INITIATIVES VARIES FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE. WHILE HIS POTENTIALLY
FAR REACHING REFORM PROGRAM WAS APPROVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT
THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, WHEN GORBACHEV WENT ON VACATION
IN AUGUST, CONSERVATIVES LED BY LIGACHEV AGAIN VOCALLY CRITIZED
ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM.
GORBACHEV HAS NOW COUNTERATTACKED. HE HAS SHOWN REAL
POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND SUPPORTERS
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WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV HOLDOVERS. BUT
EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL STROKE IN THE
KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEV'S POWER -- OR AT LEAST THE
DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE APPARENT. TWO
SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN MAJOR
OBSTACLES TO FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- LIGACHEV AND CHEBRIKOV --
REMAIN ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH
WITH DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN
UNABLE TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES,
RAZUMOVSKIY. HE CAN COUNT ON ONLY 3 OR 4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO
MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY IN HIS CORNER. SO, WHILE WE MUST
AWARD THIS SET TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS
CLEAR THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE
STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER
POLITICAL POWER.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE OUTSIDE THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE
-- AND ESPECIALLY FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- IS MUCH WEAKER.
SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE
MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE
IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE
MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES
? UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A
HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER
CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED
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BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED
BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE COUNT
SOME 600 POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF
THEM RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR
NATIONALIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS
SINCE JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY
SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND
GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE
LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA
ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING
WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY
ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND
HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY
STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT
POSITION HIMSELF, AND THEN TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO
DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY
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SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO
DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.
IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS
MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930S. THE DIFFERENCE
IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR
JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE
CAN SO RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE AND
WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO WEAKENED
AND EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS
POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S
SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY
HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO
CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
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?
NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE
REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. IT FEARS THAT IF ENTERPRISES
AREN'T TOLD WHAT TO PRODUCE, THEY WILL MANUFACTURE THE WRONG
ITEMS. WITH THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN MIND, IT WORRIES THAT IF
SUBSIDIES ON FOOD ARE REMOVED, CIVIL DISORDER WILL RESULT. AND
IT HESITATES TO RELAX THE CONTROLS OVER PRICES BECAUSE IT
THINKS THE OUTCOME WOULD BE RAPID AND PERVASIVE INFLATION.
BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO
MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY
IMPLEMENTED BY 1991 AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY,
AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS
DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ABOUT LESS THAN 1% IN 1987,
DOWN FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986, AND WILL BE ABOUT 2-3%
THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER
YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN
TARGETS.
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-- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM
CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONS IN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR,
FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT?DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN
DONE SO FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE
INITIATIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THREE YEARS AGO GORBACHEV
CREATED A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISM, THE INTERBRANCH
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMPLEX, TO SPEARHEAD THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL
MODERNIZATION. THE 20?SOME COMPLEXES ARE PERFORMING
DISMALLY, HAVING FAILED UTTERLY TO PRODUCE INCREASED
VOLUME OR QUALITY OF NEW PRODUCTS OR TO SHORTEN THE R&D
PROCESS.
TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
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LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE
LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY
OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT
RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE
NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD
WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE
SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT
TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.
UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET
HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT
7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF
COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO
YEARS AGO.
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN SUBSTANTIAL
MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK.
BY PRINTING MONEY TO FINANCE THE BUDGET DEFICIT, THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED INCOMES TO RISE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN
THE SUPPLY OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES. THE UNSATISFIED
CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY SHELVES, LONG LINES IN
STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN RETAIL MARKETS.
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INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND RECOGNITION
THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER SUPPORT HAS
PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF NEW POLICY
INITIATIVES.
TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING ON HOUSING,
EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND INVESTMENT IN
THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. THE SHIFT TOWARD
GREATER PRIORITY FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY
INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE CRITICAL ENGINE
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
EVEN SO, THE POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS
LIVING STANDARDS IN THE SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE
INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW RESULTS AND THE
SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE SO
LARGE.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. THE GAP
BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING.
IT IS THIS REALITY THAT LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND
THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.
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POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL?DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT AN IMPORTANT
MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF HIS VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT
THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF
THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL.
THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO
CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM. HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN
EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A 50 YEAR FARM LEASE
DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM WERE, AT
THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.
-- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
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REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. BUT, THE PARTY
CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO
WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE
DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED
RESULTS.
THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL?EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD?FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
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GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE. THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND. SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
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DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA,
AZERBAJAN, ESTONIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW. THIS IS EVIDENT
IN THE RECENT PASSAGE OF NEW LAWS THAT AGAIN CLAMP DOWN
ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND PROTEST.
IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL
RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY
CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL
DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC
DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY.
BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS
DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN
ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER.
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WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF
THE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR, THE
PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING
PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS
INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT
REALLY IS. EVEN GORBACHEV ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR
DECADES.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR?REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT
AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY
EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV
MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT
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THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST
GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO
DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL?EQUIPPED.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO
SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET
RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL
OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW
STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING
STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR?FIGHTING.
AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN,
THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION
DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN
1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN
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ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT
TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR -- TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE,
CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH
YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS
SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
AT THE SAME TIME THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD LIKE TO EASE THIS BURDEN AND WANTS TO RESOLVE SOME
OF THE TROUBLING THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE
REACTIONS IN THE WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF
DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN
UNWINNABLE WAR, THE CURRENT KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ITS OWN BEHAVIOR AND CONCLUDED THAT
SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD WERE BETTER SERVED BY
LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE
APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT
NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY
IN MY VIEW REFLECTS INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE
KREMLIN THAT -- FOR ALL ITS BENIGN APPEARANCE -- MAY BE AN EVEN
GREATER CHALLENGE TO US INTERESTS IN THE YEARS AHEAD. SOVIET
OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA -- AS DEMONSTRATED IN GORBACHEV'S
RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES IN THE
PHILIPPINES -- REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH US
INFLUENCE.
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THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD
INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION.
SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND PERHAPS ALSO JAPAN
SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO
IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE
US.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE
AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
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FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE
PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY
ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS
ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF
THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY
THROUGH SIdNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A
GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV ARE EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD
PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY
MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN
THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES
CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES
THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER
COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
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ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE?BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD
ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE
THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM?LINE POSITIONS
WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED ON THE DEFENSIVE.
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CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION SO
FAR HAVE BEEN VERY SMALL AND FREQUENTLY NEGATIVE, WHAT
GORBACHEV ALREADY SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A
SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE
FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
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AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE
PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY.
GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION"
SOVIET?STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM
MARXISM?LENINISM. HIS ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC
UNION AND OTHER SUCH EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE
POINT. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS
UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
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STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES INTO BELIEVING OTHERWISE,
IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS
WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR
FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE
THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE
STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE
SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET
SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON?INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A
SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY
EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND
DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE
BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE
SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME
SOVIET?WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD
PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS
BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING
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PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE
SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE
TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE
CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS,
FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET
GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED
BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND
FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING
THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE --
AND AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY
CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN
THE YEARS AHEAD.
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