SECURITY AFFAIRS SUPPORT ASSOCIATION; THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1990'S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

125v1 '
I...
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
SECURITY AFFAIRS SUPPORT ASSOCIATION
THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1990'S
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
16 APRIL 1988
I WANT TO WELCOME ALL OF YOU WHO HAVE COME OUT ON THIS
SATURDAY MORNING TO CONSIDER INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURES OF THE
FUTURE, TO DISCUSS SHORTFALLS, AND TO PROJECT JUST WHAT WE WILL
BE SEEING IN INTELLIGENCE IN THE NEXT DECADE.
JUST AS WE "SCOUT THE FUTURE" TO IDENTIFY TOMORROW'S
INTELLIGENCE OPPORTUNITIES, WE MUST CONSIDER HOW OUR OWN LIVES
WILL BE AFFECTED BY A CHANGING INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT. WE
CAN ACCEPT AS A GIVEN THAT TECHNOLOGY WILL PROFOUNDLY AFFECT
HOW WE COLLECT AND ANALYZE INTELLIGENCE, THE AMOUNT OF DATA
AVAILABLE TO US, AND THE TOPICS AND TARGETS WE WILL BE ABLE TO
EXPLOIT. OUR INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES IN THE COMING YEARS WILL
BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR ABILITY TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE
TOOLS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.
CONTINUING ISSUES
I'D LIKE TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE INTELLIGENCE ISSUES --
EXISTING AND NEW -- THAT WILL DOMINATE OUR WORK THROUGH THE
90'S.
25X1 SE T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25v1 nrrnrm
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
TERRORISM
TERRORISM PROVIDES A READY EXAMPLE OF TODAY'S SUCCESSES
OFTEN LEADING TO TOMORROW'S PROBLEMS. SINCE WE HAVE FOCUSED ON
THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF TERRORISM, TERRORIST INCIDENTS
HAVE DECREASED. SINCE 1984, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS
DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES TO
COLLECTING INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS, ANALYZING THEIR MOTIVES
AND MODUS OPERANDI, AND DEVELOPING CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH
FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS SIMILARLY AFFECTED BY THE THREAT. ALL OF
THIS HAS ENABLED US TO ACHIEVE IMPORTANT SUCCESSES AGAINST
TERRORISTS. TO CITE ONLY ONE EXAMPLE, THE ABU NIDAL
ORGANIZATION, ONE OF OUR PRIME TARGETS, HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO
INTENSE PRESSURE, AND ITS FINANCIAL OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN
SEVERELY DISRUPTED.
IRONICALLY, THE WEST'S SUCCESSES AGAINST SEVERAL TERRORIST
GROUPS MAY MAKE OUR JOB MORE DIFFICULT IN THE FUTURE AS
TERRORISTS DEVELOP NEW TACTICS. WHILE TERRORISTS WILL CONTINUE
TO RECRUIT FROM THE POOLS OF SEMI?LITERATE, UNEMPLOYED, AND
FRUSTRATED, THEY ARE ALSO MOVING TOWARD HIGH TECHNOLOGY --
DEVELOPING SOPHISTICATED DEVICES, USING TIME?DELAY AND REMOTE
CONTROL DETONATORS, AND ACQUIRING LIGHT ASSAULT WEAPONS. LIGHT
ASSAULT WEAPONS WILL GIVE TERRORISTS A STAND?OFF CAPABILITY TO
ATTACK "HARDENED" TARGETS SUCH AS EMBASSIES AND DIPLOMATIC
VEHICLES. THEY MAY ALSO TRY TO USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS TO TERRORIZE THEIR TARGETS.
2
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25?" ? _ _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS
THAT TERRORISTS MAY FIND IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN CHEMICAL OR
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS POINTS TO ANOTHER ISSUE -- THE
PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL AND THE
INCREASING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH THE CAPABILITY TO USE IT.
FIFTEEN TO TWENTY COUNTRIES NOW HAVE A CBW CAPABILITY. AND CBW
IS ITSELF PART OF A LARGER ISSUE -- THE PROLIFERATION OF
WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS.
BOTH NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION WILL
BE IMPORTANT IN THE 1990'S. WE CAN EXPECT THE EMERGING TIER OF
NEW NUCLEAR POWERS -- INCLUDING ISRAEL, SOUTH AFRICA, PAKISTAN,
AND INDIA -- TO BE MORE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED AS NUCLEAR
CAPABLE. THERE WILL BE HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT AND
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY
SYSTEMS BY THESE COUNTRIES. AT THE SAME TIME, COUNTRIES LIKE
LIBYA AND IRAN WILL BE MOVING TOWARD A NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CAPABILITY. AND, OF COURSE, AS WE HAVE SEEN RECENTLY, EVEN
NON?NUCLEAR STATES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA ARE ACQUIRING LONG
RANGE MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS THAT CAN CHANGE A REGIONAL
STRATEGIC CALCULUS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE POTENTIAL TO FIT THESE
DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS.
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25)(1 . _____ _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
?
MONITORING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
AN ISSUE FOR THE 1990'S WILL BE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTION STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS ANALYTICAL
METHODOLOGIES TO MONITOR THE PROVISIONS OF ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES. AT ISSUE WILL BE LOCATING MOBILE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT
AREAS, MONITORING CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND
STOCKPILES, AND NUCLEAR TESTING ACTIVITIES.
WHETHER OR NOT WE REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS
PERMITTING A TRANSITION TO A DEFENSE?DOMINANT STRATEGIC REGIME,
SOME RENEGOTIATION OF THE ANTI?BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY
PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO OCCUR IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS.
DEVELOPMENTS ON BOTH SIDES IN THE FIELD OF SPACE?BASED SENSORS
FOR EARLY WARNING AND FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS ARE ALREADY PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE ABM TREATY, AND
THESE TRENDS WILL INTENSIFY IN THE FUTURE.
POSSIBILITY OF GLOBAL RECESSION
THE RECENT TURMOIL IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS HAS MADE A
DOWNTURN MORE LIKELY IN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. BECAUSE OF
INCREASED GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE, MANY ECONOMIES WOULD
SUFFER DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WAY THEY DID IN THE 1980-82
RECESSION. FOR THE US, A DOWNTURN COULD DRY UP EXPORT MARKETS
25X1 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25V1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
AND SOURCES OF FOREIGN CAPITAL. POLITICALLY, IT WOULD MAKE IT
MORE DIFFICULT TO FOSTER STRONGER DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN THE
THIRD WORLD, UPGRADE NATO FORCES, AND ENHANCE COOPERATION OF
ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC ISSUES.
A RECESSION WOULD REALLY HIT COUNTRIES IN THE THIRD WORLD
HARD. THE OVERRIDING ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE MID-1980'S WAS
THIRD WORLD ECONOMIC DEBT. DESPITE PROGRESS FROM THE SITUATION
EARLY IN THE DECADE, MOST THIRD WORLD DEBTORS REMAINED IN
TROUBLE DURING THE PERIOD AND WERE ABLE TO MANAGE FINANCIALLY
ONLY AT THE COST OF WRENCHING AUSTERITY IN THEIR OWN
ECONOMIES. A NEW GLOBAL RECESSION WOULD PLACE EXTRAORDINARY
PRESSURE ON THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AND COULD UNDERMINE MANY OF
THE NEW THIRD WORLD DEMOCRACIES, LEADING TO A RESURRECTION OF
SUPPOSEDLY MORE COMPETENT MILITARY GOVERNMENTS.
IN FACT, THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IS LIKELY TO WORSEN AS THE REAL PRICE OF
MOST COMMODITIES CONTINUES TO DECLINE AND SHOULD A WORLD
RECESSION CUT EXPORTS, FURTHER DEPRESSING DOMESTIC PRODUCTION,
EMPLOYMENT, AND LIVING CONDITIONS.
SHIFT IN ECONOMIC POWER
EVEN WITHOUT A RECESSION, ECONOMIC POWER IS LIKELY TO SHIFT
FURTHER TOWARD EAST ASIA AT THE EXPENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE AND
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25)(1 ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
THE UNITED STATES. THIS SHIFT WOULD AFFECT US LEADERSHIP IN
BROAD AREAS OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND DEFENSE AND COULD
INCREASE US SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AS FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF
US ASSETS RISES RAPIDLY AND PRODUCTION AND FINANCE BECOME
INCREASINGLY INTERNATIONALIZED. BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, IT
IS LIKELY THAT EAST ASIA WILL HAVE BECOME THE WORLD'S LARGEST
CREDITOR AND TECHNOLOGICAL LEADER, AND ITS COMBINED ECONOMIC
OUTPUT WILL HAVE SURPASSED THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
LET ME NOW TURN TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, SO
ELOQUENTLY NOTED BY JOHN MCMAHON. WHATEVER MYRIAD OTHER
PROBLEMS WILL FACE US, THE SOVIET UNION WILL REMAIN OUR
PRINCIPAL CHALLENGE, ESPECIALLY AS IT ENDEAVORS TO REFORM AND
MODERNIZE IN AN EFFORT TO SUSTAIN ITS SUPERPOWER ROLE.
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR MODERNIZATION
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV
SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS
A STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES
SHIFTS CONSTANTLY.
BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE -- AND ESPECIALLY
FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER. OPPOSITION FROM THE
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS IS A CRITICAL
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25)(1 .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO
DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
INSTABILITY AT HOME -- AS IN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN -- AND IN
EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL
CONTROLS. THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY
SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND
GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE
LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA
ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING
WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT.
IN SUM, GORBACHEV STILL VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTS RESTRUCTURING,
HAS MADE SOME HEADWAY IN OBTAINING POLITBURO SUPPORT, BUT FACES
A LARGELY HOSTILE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY AND A
CONSERVATIVE AND APATHETIC POPULATION. EVERY RUSSIAN AND
SOVIET LEADER FROM PETER THE GREAT TO THE PRESENT SEEKING
CHANGE OR MODERNIZATION HAS FACED FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION. BUT,
UNLIKE THEM, GORBACHEV REALISTICALLY CANNOT RESORT TO
WIDE?SCALE TERROR AND VIOLENCE TO ELIMINATE THOSE WHO STAND IN
7
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25)(1 ?
Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
HIS WAY. HE MUST REPLY ON A LONG TERM, LARGELY NON?VIOLENT
PURGE OF PARTY AND BUREAUCRACY AND PLACEMENT OF HIS SUPPORTERS
IF HE IS TO REMAIN IN POWER AND TO SUCCEED AT ALL. THE CENTRAL
QUESTION IS WHETHER HE WILL GET ENOUGH TIME.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S TWO AND A HALF YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE
PACKAGE THAT IN SCOPE AND SPECIFICITY GOES WELL BEYOND THE
SO?CALLED KOSYGIN REFORMS ADOPTED IN 1965. NEVERTHELESS,
BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY
ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS HAVE YET TO BE
IMPLEMENTED. AND EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THEY ARE FULLY IN
PLACE IN 1991 AS INTENDED, THEY WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. INSTEAD, THEY
SPELL TROUBLE FOR HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAM GENERALLY. INDEED,
AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS
DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY AND WILL CAUSE MORE
AS THE BUREAUCRATIC FACTIONS ATTEMPT TO ADJUST TO THE MANY
CHANGES BEING IMPOSED FROM ABOVE. SPECIFICALLY:
-- GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING
PRODUCTION.
25X1
8
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25Y1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT?DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE.
A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE
RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF
THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS
FROM THE WEST.
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS
REFLECTED IN CONTINUED LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND
RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS.
(STORY?CAR, FEB. 9, 1994)
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM MUST STILL BE FOUGHT AND WON.
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25v1
De i
classified n Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL?DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT HE AND HIS ALLIES
HAVE SHOWN A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO
BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL
CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT.
THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. MOST
OF THIS IS RHETORIC; THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY A FEW
EXPERIMENTS ALONG THESE LINES, AND IN RECENT MONTHS
EVEN GORBACHEV HAS BACKED AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE
CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF HIS "DEMOCRATIZATION" CAMPAIGN.
10
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25Y1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. I SEE
SEVERAL MOTIVES BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF WHICH IS
USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO ACHIEVE SOME
RATHER OLD?FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
- GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
- IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
- HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
- IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY, GORBACHEV
BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND PUT AN
OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25"1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN A MORE
OPEN AIRING OF PROBLEMS, BUT ONLY A VERY LIMITED EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE. EVEN THIS HAS LED TO CONTROVERSY OVER
THE POLICY ITSELF AND OPEN CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE
POLITBURO THAT "OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR.
WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC
HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET CHANGED IT. THE
REGIME'S ACTUAL REFORM INITIATIVES HAVE SO FAR BEEN CAREFULLY
CIRCUMSCRIBED TO INSURE THAT THEY DO NOT DEPART TOO BOLDLY FROM
EXISTING APPROACHES. BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY
IS LIKELY TO GROW AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT
BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, A
WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER.
SECRET1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
MODERNIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR?REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND,
ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP
AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, ESPECIALLY SDI, THAT THREATENS
NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT
WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE
NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL?EQUIPPED. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE
IN THE EARLY 1970S CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD
PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOWED MILITARY
MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN
THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPENED TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25?" i
Declassified n Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22: CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE SOVIET RHETORIC,
WE STILL SEE NO LESSENING OF THEIR WEAPONS PRODUCTION. AND,
FURTHER, SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS SUCH AS LASERS,
STEALTH, AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES APACE.
VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE
REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S,
AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS
ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR
WAR?FIGHTING. AS OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS
CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE NOW PROVIDING MORE THAN A
BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
NICARAGUA; MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN THE FIRST
SIX MONTHS OF LAST YEAR; MORE THAN FOUR BILLION DOLLARS IN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SENT TO ANGOLA SINCE 1984. AND, OF
COURSE, CUBA GETS ABOUT FIVE BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT
EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE
COMMITMENTS SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
14
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
?
25X1
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO CONVEY MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS, WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT NEW AND
BOLDER INITIATIVES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS --
POSSIBLY UNILATERAL -- THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE
COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN WILL
BE ATTEMPTED TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED
RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE US.
AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.
THESE NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO BREAK SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL DEADENDS AND TO
MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS
PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
IS SUCH AN INITIATIVE. THE RESULT OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW
THINKING" IN FOREIGN POLICY IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL
CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR
OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE
FUTURE THAN THE HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY
CHALLENGE. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING, FLEXIBILITY AND
POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN PART TO ANTICIPATE
AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID BEING OUTMANEUVERED
AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
15
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
' 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
THERE IS A NEW DYNAMIC AT WORK INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AND
IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OR
POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST,
WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. ONE CANNOT, IT SEEMS TO ME, DISMISS WHAT HE IS
SAYING OR ATTEMPTING AS SIMPLY NOISE OR MORE OF THE SAME,
BETTER PACKAGED. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN
A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE --
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE
FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. AMERICANS MUST NOT
MISLEAD OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO
BELIEVING OTHERWISE. PREVENTING THIS WILL BE THE SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
125Y1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25X1
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALL THESE CHALLENGES FOR
INTELLIGENCE? THERE ARE SEVERAL. FIRST, POLICYMAKERS WILL
BECOME MORE DEPENDENT ON OUR ASSESSMENTS AS THE ISSUES
AFFECTING POLICY BECOME MORE COMPLEX, INTERRELATED, AND
SOMETIMES -- AS IN THE SOVIET CASE -- OFTEN CONFUSING. THE
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES -- DEBT, NARCOTICS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS, THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS MARKET -- CALL
FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN WORLD ECONOMY. IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY
EXPERTISE, INTELLIGENCE WILL BECOME A MORE IMPORTANT PART OF
THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS ITSELF.
CONCLUSION
OUR INFORMATION ACQUISITION CAPABILITY IS EXPONENTIALLY
INCREASING. THE IMPACT TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION HAS HAD ON OUR
ABILITY TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH USEFUL, TIMELY
INTELLIGENCE ON GLOBAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IS
REMARKABLE. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE WILL REQUIRE FURTHER
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS TO KEEP PACE WITH THE COMPLEXITIES
OF TOMORROW'S WORLD. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE WILL DRIVE BOTH OUR
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AND OUR COLLECTION EFFORTS. AND,
SOMEHOW, WE MUST FIND THE RESOURCES FOR INVESTMENT IN FUTURE
17
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
25V1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1
CAPABILITIES. REMARKABLE NEW COLLECTION CAPABILITIES COMING ON
LINE ARE THE RESULT OF INVESTMENTS BEGUN 5-10 YEARS AGO.
WITHOUT SIMILAR NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE NEAR TERM, WE FACE A
BLEAK FUTURE. SO IT IS INDEED ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT YOU IN
SASA ARE HERE TODAY TO HELP US ANTICIPATE AND PREPARE FOR A
RAPIDLY APPROACHING FUTURE BY EXPLORING AND ADDRESSING THE
SHORTFALLS OF THE 1990S.
25X1 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000701010001-1