DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000700930002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 19, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNIST PARTY.
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IN GORBACHEV THEY HAVE GOTTEN MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED
FOR. THE EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE OF HIS INITIATIVES, HIS ENERGY,
AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES, HAS PROMPTED
DEBATE NOT ONLY AT HOME BUT IN THE WEST AS TO GORBACHEV'S
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. WITH ALL THE SPECULATION, IT IS WORTH
TAKING A LOOK AT WHAT IS GOING ON -- WHAT HE ACTUALLY HAS DONE
AND WHERE HE INTENDS TO GO.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR MODERNIZATION
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. WHILE POLITBURO POLITICS ARE ALWAYS
OVER SIMPLIFIED AND OFTEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST, FOR
CLARITY AND BREVITY ONE MAY PRESUME THREE APPROACHES TO
MODERNIZATION IN THE POLITBURO. THE FIRST, LED BY GORBACHEV,
SEES A NEED TO UNDERTAKE A FAR?REACHING RESTRUCTURING OF
STALINIST ECONOMIC POLICY AND ITS SLUGGISH CENTRALIZED
BUREAUCRACY, AND, FURTHER, THAT REAL MODERNIZATION AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE REQUIRES A LOOSENING OF POLITICAL
CONTROLS -- INCLUDING CONTROLS ON INFORMATION.
ANOTHER APPROACH, PROBABLY BEST REPRESENTED BY LIGACHEV, IS
THAT MODERNIZATION CAN BE ACHIEVED BY REDUCING CORRUPTION, BY
IMPROVING MANAGEMENT (AND MANAGERS), BY MEASURES MAINLY
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DESIGNED TO MAKE THE EXISTING SYSTEM FUNCTION MORE EFFICIENTLY
AND BY SOME CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM AT THE MARGIN. THOSE WHO
HOLD THIS GENERAL VIEW SEE ALMOST ANY POLITICAL LOOSENING UP AS
UNNECESSARY AND DANGEROUS. THE THIRD, MIDDLE APPROACH, PERHAPS
LED BY PREMIER RYZHKOV, IS MORE ATTUNED TO GORBACHEV'S VIEW OF
THE NEED FOR FAR?REACHING ECONOMIC REFORM -- THOUGH MORE
SELECTIVE, BUT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF LOOSENING
POLITICAL CONTROLS.
NONE OF THE THREE APPROACHES HAS A MAJORITY OF SUPPORT IN
THE POLITBURO AND MOST INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS PROBABLY FIND
THEMSELVES TAKING DIFFERENT POSITIONS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE.
NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL
ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE
POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY. FOR EXAMPLE,
HIS PROPOSALS FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE AND FOR CONVENING A HISTORIC
PARTY CONFERENCE WERE REJECTED IN JANUARY 1987, BUT ADOPTED IN
JUNE. AND, DESPITE SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS IN JUNE, HIS PROGRAM
HAD AGAIN RUN INTO TROUBLE BY FALL. BY YEAR'S END, HE WAS
DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM THE RADICAL APPROACH TO REFORM HE HAD
EMBRACED EARLIER IN FAVOR OF MORE POLITICALLY TENABLE MIDDLE
GROUND. SO, HE FACES A DAY TO DAY STRUGGLE EVEN IN A POLITBURO
WHERE A MAJORITY OF MEMBERS ARE NEW SINCE BREZHNEV'S DEATH.
AND, AS WE SAW IN NOVEMBER WITH THE EXPULSION OF MOSCOW PARTY
BOSS YELTSIN, EVEN HIS ALLIES CAN BE A HINDRANCE IN THE
DELICATE POLITICAL BALANCING AND BARGAINING HE MUST PURSUE TO
ACHIEVE PROGRESS.
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BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE -- AND ESPECIALLY
FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER. OPPOSITION FROM THE
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS IS A CRITICAL
PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO
DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY
RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS
TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR
CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S
EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE
PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT
(i)MES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT.
IN SUM, GORBACHEV STILL VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTS RESTRUCTURING,
HAS MADE HEADWAY IN OBTAINING POLITBURO SUPPORT, BUT FACES A
LARGELY HOSTILE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY AND A CONSERVATIVE
AND APATHETIC POPULATION. EVERY RUSSIAN AND SOVIET LEADER FROM
PETER THE GREAT TO THE PRESENT SEEKING CHANGE OR MODERNIZATION
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HAS FACED FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION. BUT, UNLIKE THEM, GORBACHEV
REALISTICALLY CANNOT RESORT TO WIDE?SCALE TERROR AND VIOLENCE
TO ELIMINATE THOSE WHO STAND IN HIS WAY. HE MUST RELY ON A
LONG TERM, LARGELY NON?VIOLENT PURGE OF PARTY AND BUREAUCRACY
AND PLACEMENT OF HIS SUPPORTERS IF HE IS TO REMAIN IN POWER AND
TO SUCCEED AT ALL. THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER HE WILL GET
ENOUGH TIME.
REJUVENATION OF THE ELITE
A PURGE IS UNDERWAY. EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO ARE
NEW SINCE GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. FORTY PERCENT OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS NEW SINCE HE ASSUMED THE REINS.
THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER LARGE SCALE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS.
-- OF THE ELEVEN OTHER PARTY SECRETARIES, NINE ARE NEW
GORBACHEV APPOINTEES.
-- 59 OF 105 MEMBERS OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ARE
NEW SINCE GORBACHEV ASSUMED POWER.
-- HE HAS APPOINTED TWELVE NEW DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OUT OF FOURTEEN.
-- 47% OF THE OFFICIALS IN THE AGRO?INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
HAVE BEEN REPLACED.
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-- 15 OF 20 CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT CHIEFS HAVE BEEN
REPLACED.
-- 88 OF 157 REGIONAL FIRST SECRETARIES HAVE BEEN REPLACED.
BEYOND A SENSE OF PERSONAL JEOPARDY, MANY WHO OPPOSE
GORBACHEV'S POLICIES BELIEVE THOSE POLICIES TO BE INHERENTLY
MISTAKEN AND BAD FOR THE COUNTRY, THAT THEY ARE NOT
IDEOLOGICALLY SOUND, AND THAT THEY COULD THREATEN PARTY CONTROL.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR
SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW
ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED
THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET
UNION. ACCORDINGLY, HE SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO
MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE. MANY OF HIS RECENT REMARKS
SHOW INCREASING FRUSTRATION OVER THE LIMITS IMPOSED ON HIS
FREEDOM OF MANEUVER BY THE STALINIST?ERA ECONOMIC DOGMA HE HAS
INHERITED.
ESSENTIALLY, HE SEEMS TO HAVE ADOPTED A THREE STEP APPROACH
TO REVIVING THE ECONOMY. INITIALLY, GORBACHEV RELIED ON A
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COMBINATION OF MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL, IMPROVE
WORKER ATTITUDES, AND WEED OUT INCOMPETENCE -- WHAT HE REFERS
TO AS "HUMAN FACTOR" GAINS. THE MOST VISIBLE AND DRAMATIC PART
OF THESE EFFORTS HAS BEEN HIS CAMPAIGNS FOR DISCIPLINE AND
AGAINST CORRUPTION AND ALCOHOLISM. THESE MEASURES ARE INTENDED
TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND GNP SIMPLY THROUGH HARDER AND MORE
DISCIPLINED WORK FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS UNTIL MOMENTUM CAN BE
SUSTAINED BY THE SECOND AND THIRD STEPS -- GENUINE IMPROVEMENTS
IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH MODERNIZATION OF THE
COUNTRY'S PLANTS AND EQUIPMENT, AND THROUGH ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL REFORM.
THE JUNE 1987 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM PROVIDED THE CLEAREST
EVIDENCE SO FAR THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS A RADICAL OVERHAUL OF THE
STALINIST COMMAND ECONOMY. THE BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM ADOPTED IN
JUNE CONTAINS THE OUTLINES OF A NEW, MORE MARKET BASED
MECHANISM FOR RUNNING THE ECONOMY THAT I BELIEVE GORBACHEV WILL
PUSH.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S TWO AND A HALF YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE
PACKAGE THAT IN SCOPE AND SPECIFICITY GOES WELL BEYOND THE
SO?CALLED KOSYGIN REFORMS ADOPTED IN 1965. NEVERTHELESS, THE
REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW
CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE
PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL PLANNING.
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BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO
MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS HAVE YET TO BE
IMPLEMENTED. EVEN IF FULLY IN PLACE IN 1991 AS INTENDED, THEY
WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV
SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP
WITH THE WEST. INSTEAD, THEY SPELL TROUBLE FOR HIS ECONOMIC
PROGRAM GENERALLY. INDEED, AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE
ECONOMY AND WILL CAUSE MORE AS THE BUREAUCRATIC FACTIONS
ATTEMPT TO ADJUST TO THE MANY CHANGES BEING IMPOSED FROM
ABOVE. SPECIFICALLY:
-- GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING
PRODUCTION.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT?DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE.
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A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE
RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF
THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS
FROM THE WEST.
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS
REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND
RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS.
BEYOND THE SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES FACING GORBACHEV'S
ECONOMIC PROGRAM, THERE ARE BROADER REASONS FOR THE SHARP
CONTRAST BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S RADICAL RHETORIC AND HIS MORE
MODEST RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT TO DATE:
IT IS IN PART A MATTER OF TIMING. GORBACHEV, WHO
HIMSELF CHARACTERIZED PROGRESS ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT SO
FAR AS "INSIGNIFICANT" AT THE JUNE 1987 PLENUM,
APPRECIATES THAT IMPLEMENTING HIS VISION WILL TAKE
YEARS, IF NOT DECADES.
-- A SERIES OF OBSTACLES -- FROM POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS -- HAVE SLOWED GORBACHEV'S
MOMENTUM AND FORCED HIM TO COMPROMISE.
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-- BUT DESIGN FLAWS, GAPS, AND CONTRADICTIONS IN THE NEW
LEADERSHIP'S APPROACH, IN MY VIEW, REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF THE PROBLEM.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM MUST STILL BE FOUGHT AND WON. AND,
AS GORBACHEV PERCEIVES THAT THE CAUTIOUS CHANGE THUS FAR
ACCOMPLISHED IS INADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE HIS GOALS, HE MAY SEE THE
NEED TO TAKE MORE AND MORE RADICAL MEASURES AND DISRUPTIVE
REFORMS IN ORDER TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS. THIS, IN TURN, WILL
GENERATE FURTHER OPPOSITION AND CONTROVERSY.
POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL?DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT HE AND HIS ALLIES
HAVE SHOWN A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO
BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL
CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
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THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. GORBACHEV TOLD
THE JANUARY 1987 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, THAT "THE
THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF SOCIALISM REMAINED AT THE LEVEL
OF THE 1930S AND 1940S." HE SEEKS TO EXPAND HIS ROOM
TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN ATTACK ON
STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS OWN
PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S ORIGINAL
INTENT.
THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
GORBACHEV WANTS TO SANCTION MULTIPLE CANDIDATES FOR
LOCAL AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE PARTY AND STATE
APPARATUS BOTH TO HELP DISLODGE CONSERVATIVE OFFICIALS
WHO ARE RESISTING HIS REFORMS BUT ALSO TO SANCTION A
MEASURE OF DIVERSITY AND DEBATE. MOST OF THIS IS
RHETORIC; THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY A FEW EXPERIMENTS ALONG
THESE LINES, AND IN RECENT MONTHS EVEN GORBACHEV HAS
BACKED AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS
OF HIS "DEMOCRATIZATION" CAMPAIGN.
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THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL?EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT.
I SEE SEVERAL MOTIVES BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD?FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
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BY ALLOWING UNORTHODOX CULTURAL WORKS TO APPEAR,
GORBACHEV IS HOPING TO REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO
BYPASS OFFICIAL ORGANS AND PUBLISH MATERIALS IN THE
UNDERGROUND PRESS.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY, GORBACHEV
BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND PUT AN
OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO
OBSERVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DIRECT CRITICISM OF
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY OR HIS LEADERSHIP.
SIMULTANEOUSLY, UNDER HIS AUTHORITY, THERE HAS BEEN
CONTINUED REPRESSION OF SOME UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS OF
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INFORMATION, AND SEVERE REACTIONS TO NATIONALISTIC
DEMONSTRATIONS SUCH AS IN LATVIA. WITH RARE
EXCEPTIONS, ONLY THOSE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE
CENTRAL THRUST OF GORBACHEV'S POLICIES ARE ALLOWED TO
VOICE THEIR VIEWS. IN SHORT, THERE HAS BEEN A MORE
OPEN AIRING OF PROBLEMS, BUT ONLY A VERY LIMITED
EXPANSION OF POLITICAL DEBATE. EVEN THIS HAS LED TO
CONTROVERSY OVER THE POLICY ITSELF AND OPEN CRITICISM
BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT "OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO
FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS
NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES
OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS.
YET, GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL
BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST
HAPPEN AT SOME POINT.
WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC
HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET CHANGED IT. THE
REGIME'S ACTUAL REFORM INITIATIVES HAVE SO FAR BEEN CAREFULLY
CIRCUMSCRIBED TO INSURE THAT THEY DO NOT DEPART TOO BOLDLY FROM
EXISTING APPROACHES. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM
WILL DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS
IMPLEMENTATION OVER THE NEXT DECADE IN THE FACE OF DESIGN
FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE,
APATHY. BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS LIKELY TO
GROW AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE
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RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, A WORSENING
SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY
CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE
BUREAUCRACY. ONCE AGAIN, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR
CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR?REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND,
ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP
AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, ESPECIALLY SDI, THAT THREATENS
NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT
WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE
NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION
FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL?EQUIPPED. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE
IN THE EARLY 1970S CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD
PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOWED MILITARY
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MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN
THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPENED TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE SOVIET RHETORIC,
WE STILL SEE NO LESSENING OF THEIR WEAPONS PRODUCTION. AND,
FURTHER, SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS SUCH AS LASERS
AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF
THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW
STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING
STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR?FIGHTING.
AS OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW,
ALBEIT SLOWLY. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE -- AND, I
THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT PAST
PRACTICE SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT PROTECT
EXISTING ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL GAINS, OR TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS
OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A LIMITED ABM AS
PERMITTED BY THE TREATY).
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THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE NOW PROVIDING MORE THAN A
BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
NICARAGUA; MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN THE FIRST
SIX MONTHS OF LAST YEAR; MORE THAN FOUR BILLION DOLLARS IN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SENT TO ANGOLA SINCE 1984. AND, OF
COURSE, CUBA GETS ABOUT FIVE BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT
EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE
COMMITMENTS SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES. THERE HAS
BEEN NO REPUDIATION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT NEW AND
BOLDER INITIATIVES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS --
POSSIBLY UNILATERAL -- THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE
COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN WILL
BE ATTEMPTED TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED
RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE US.
AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.
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THESE NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO BREAK SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL DEADENDS AND TO
MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS
PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT IS LIKELY TO BE A
SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD THAT COULD POSE
GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ALLIANCES AND
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL
SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
CONCLUSIONS
THERE IS A NEW DYNAMIC AT WORK INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AND
IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OR
POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST,
WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. ONE CANNOT, IT SEEMS TO ME, DISMISS WHAT HE IS
SAYING OR ATTEMPTING AS SIMPLY NOISE OR MORE OF THE SAME,
BETTER PACKAGED. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN
A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE
FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
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INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. AS THE SOVIETS SAY, IT IS NOT BY ACCIDENT THAT
GORBACHEV CONSTANTLY REFERS TO LENIN OR THAT OTHERS SPEAK OF
THE OSSIFIED IDEOLOGY OF THE 1930S AND 1940S. GORBACHEV SEEKS
TO RESTORE IN THE USSR A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE
PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY.
GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION"
SOVIET?STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM
MARXISM?LENINISM AND ITS ESSENTIALLY TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE.
I, FOR ONE, DO NOT FIND A RETURN TO LENINISM COMFORTING.
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WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
THERE IS A CHANCE -- A VERY SMALL ONE IN MY VIEW -- THAT
GORBACHEV IS SETTING LOOSE FORCES THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE PARTY
WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR INTENTIONS
AND EXPECTATIONS, ULTIMATELY MAY BRING A FUNDAMENTAL AND
WELCOME TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT HOME AND ABROAD.
AS WE HOPE THAT THIS REMOTE POSSIBILITY SOMEDAY COMES TO PASS,
I WOULD ADVISE, IN OLIVER CROMWELL'S FAMOUS WORDS, THAT WE
"TRUST IN GOD, BUT KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY."
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING
OTHERWISE.
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HOW THEN DO I ANSWER WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR
GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL? I BELIEVE THAT TO THE DEGREE HE
IS EVEN MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL THE UNITED STATES WILL FACE IN THE
19905 AND BEYOND A MILITARILY POWERFUL, DOMESTICALLY MORE VITAL
AND POLITICALLY MORE ADROIT SOVIET UNION -- A SOVIET UNION
WHOSE AGGRESSIVE OBJECTIVES ABROAD AND ESSENTIAL
TOTALITARIANISM AT HOME REMAIN LARGELY UNCHANGED. I BELIEVE A
STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE
BEFORE US. SEEING THIS REALITY CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS
WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS
AHEAD.
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