CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000700920002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 19, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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DALLAS ASSEMBLY/CHARTER 100/ATLANTIC COUNCIL
19 JANUARY 1988
CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES,
TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS, HEADLINES
GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER
SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND
STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN
INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST
EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE SOMETIMES ARE ABLE TO REFUTE PUBLICLY
ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN
SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES OF CIA
AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT.
TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO ILLUMINATE, AND I HOPE
EXPAND, YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.
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THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:
FIRST, CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS
AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE
PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE AND MANY OTHER
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
SECOND, CIA IS CHARGED WITH THE CONDUCT OF COVERT
ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE IMPLEMENT POLICY. THIS
IS A SUBJECT SO COMPLEX AND SO CONTROVERSIAL AS TO
REQUIRE SEPARATE TREATMENT AT ANOTHER TIME, ANOTHER
PLACE.
THIRD, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CIA'S ROLE IS PLAYED OUT
IN THE INTERACTION, PRIMARILY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN
CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF
THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA
ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDED
OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND
TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE AND
PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT
IS THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
THAT IS THE LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA
THAT I WILL FOCUS ON TODAY.
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WHAT THEN, DOES CIA DO? BECAUSE OF THE MEDIA'S FOCUS ON
COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 95
PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF
CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION.
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
NOW, IF WE ARE NOT SPENDING MOST OF OUR TIME AND MONEY
ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES CIA DO?
CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS RESOURCES TO
MONITORING AND REPORTING ON DAY TO DAY DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE
WORLD, AND DETERMINING AND RESPONDING TO POLICYMAKERS' LONGER
RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS.
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER
-- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND
DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR
OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.
-- SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS
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OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES.
NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.
THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE
ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE
TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.
FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY
INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH
PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE
RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC
WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER
AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY;
MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE;
SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS;
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO
COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.
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CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS-
SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK
DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. IT IS NEAT,
UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE --
AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA
OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE;
OR THOSE WHO SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO
INFLUENCE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICY; OR USERS WHO LABEL
INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT, TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDAS OR BIASES; OR THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD
AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR ONE WHO IS HELD
TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING
EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE
OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES?
THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY
AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES-AND THE
INTERACTION AMONG THEM COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP
-- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF
JERUSALEM DESCRIBES AS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."
THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH
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FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT
OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD --
PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL
YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY
COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE
SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS
OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE
SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF
THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE
CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS
ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."
THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS
CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH
AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH
A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND,
THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, MANY LEGITIMATE,
SOME NOT.
POLICYMAKERS LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY
DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET
THEIR NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY
BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE
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IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE
WERE-ABLE-TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL
CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE EVEN SOME AREAS
WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES
POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, I
WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND
ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE SUCH
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER
COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED.
-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT VERY FEW POLICYMAKERS
WELCOME CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE
CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR
THE ACCURACY OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS. INDEED, DURING
THE VIETNAM WAR, A CONSTANT REFRAIN FROM POLICYMAKERS
WAS, "AREN'T YOU GUYS ON THE TEAM?"
-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER IS OFTEN SUSPICIOUS
THAT WHEN CIA'S ANALYSIS SUGGESTS POLICY IS FAILING OR
IN DIFFICULTY, THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE, WITH MALICE,
WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE AGENCY FOR USE AS AMMUNITION
BY CRITICS OF THE POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH,
WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC.
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-T MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO
DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA
OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO
PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A
WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE.
INDEED, THE INTERNAL DEBATES ARE FIERCE AND SOMETIMES
BRUTAL -- AFTER ALL, THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. IT IS
NOT A PLACE FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED. WE HAVE ELABORATE
PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER
OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE
AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE
ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT
AS A PERSONAL VIEW.
BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT
AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE
BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN
INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET
INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC
POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR
ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE
AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USUALLY
AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY,
WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS
DO NOT.
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POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE --WITH CIA
-- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES
WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN
CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR NEW
INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY,
AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS
BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER
WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO
SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND THAT IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT
THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR
ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.
-- CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS ALSO IS A SPECIAL
PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND IT
PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA
ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. IN
1986, CIA SENT SOME 5000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO
CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF BRIEFINGS. ALL THIS
IS NEW IN THE LAST DECADE OR SO. AS A RESULT, AND
THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES ARE OFTEN BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S
INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE
POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO
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CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE EXECUTIVE
AGENCY-AGAINST' ANOTHER; AND 'TO EXPOSE-DISAGREEMENTS
WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION.
MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE CHANGED BALANCE
OF POWER IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND
CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CITE WATERGATE
AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A
THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR -- WHEN CONGRESS OBTAINED ACCESS
TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THE MID-1970S
ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THIS SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES.
POLICYMAKER SUSPICION OF CIA USING INTELLIGENCE TO
SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IS OFTEN NOT
FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. AND NOT A FEW MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS ARE WILLING TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY THEIR
OWN SELECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR
VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE
CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND TO HEIGHTEN
GREATLY THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
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LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION
DURING WHICH I HAVE SERVED THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF
SENIOR POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO
WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO
AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY
DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT
SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD
UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE
PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY
CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE
SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN
DIRECTLY TASKED US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO THE
INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT
DEAL. THIS IS TRUE ALSO OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES,
WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS
CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE,
TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER
SUPPORT. IT IS A DYNAMIC, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP, EVEN
THOUGH IT IS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CURRENT ISSUES.
-- THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT REPORTING IS, FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE, A MAJOR PROBLEM. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD,
THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN
GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS
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UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, VERY
COSTLY TO OUR COUNTRY. ONE OF OUR GREATEST-CONCERNS
OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY
OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE
ISSUES -- LOOKING AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS -- OR IN HELPING
TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS.
-- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON
INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT,
WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO
ANYTHING.
-- IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE
POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE
WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT;
SOMETIMES, THEY WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO
NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE
SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE
THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN
21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A
POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER)
CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH
WHICH HE AGREED. ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET
POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE
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YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH
COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS.OF THE _._
POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON
PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM
PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.
POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT
SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO
INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY
WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY
SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW
THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO
INTIMIDATE. THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS
WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED
BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN
ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY
TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.
A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE
NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES HE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL
PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH
-- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN
ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF
CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE
SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE
SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND
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OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND
TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN,
OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY
NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF
THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS
THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS,
PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE
WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY
CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED,
OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE
CHANGED."
CONCLUSION
WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO
BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE
STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND
RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN AND DAY OUT,
REAL LIFE IF YOU WILL -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS
IMPACT. CIA'S AUTONOMY IS UNIQUE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A
DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT.
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THE REAL INTELL-IGENCE- STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS
BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS,
PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE
UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT
AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION
AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.
THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS --
ALBEIT SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK
US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S
BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND WITH CIA EXCEPTIONALLY
CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY FASCINATING CAREERS.
IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF HIS RECENT HISTORY OF CIA, JOHN
RANELAGH STATES, "IN ITS MOMENTS OF ACHIEVEMENT AS WELL AS
CONDEMNATION, THE AGENCY WAS A REMINDER THAT IT WAS A FAITHFUL
INSTRUMENT OF THE MOST DECENT AND PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST OF THE
GREAT POWERS, AND CERTAINLY THE ONE THAT EVEN IN ITS DARKEST
PASSAGES PRACTICED MOST CONSISTENTLY THE VIRTUE OF HOPE."
THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE IN THE WORLD. FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
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LAWS, IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOM AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES
AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER U-NDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN
DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE
OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT,
TO BORROW A PHRASE USED BY ERIC LARRABEE TO DESCRIBE GEORGE
MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER."
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