WAR BY ANOTHER NAME AN ADDRESS TO THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA BY ROBERT M. GATES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600750008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 25, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
War By Another Name
An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California
by Robert M, Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986
The most divisive and controversial part of American
foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in
the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments,
to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote
economic development and democracy,
Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and
sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two
generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's
relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence,
establish strategically located client Communist states, and to
gain access to strategic resources.
But while we may debate strategy and how to .respond, the
facts of Soviet involve;-.,ent in major Third World conflicts are
undeniable, Consider two very painful memories:
-- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin
personally, played a central role in prompting North
Korea's invasi:n of the South in ? 5u,t,e cause of our
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
first great post-war strategic debate over strategy in
the Third World.
Although the strategic consequences of a victory by
North Vietnam were hotly debated in the US, we now see
the Soviet Navy well entrenched in the great naval base
at Cam Ranh Bay, and Vietnam's economic and military
dependence on the Soviet Union; we recall the Soviet
military supplyline that made Hanoi's victory possible,
and remember Soviet help in the conquest of Laos and
Cambodia. The resulting human suffering in Southeast
Asia was even more horrifying than predicted,
Somehow many Americans thought their first loss of a major
foreign war -- Vietnam -- would have no important consequences,
especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by so-called
"detente" with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet,
it was in fact a major watershed in post World War 11 history,
especially as it coincided with the collapse of Portugal's
colonial empire in Africa: revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia and
Nicaraguc; and Congressional actions in the mid-1970s cutting
off all US assistance to the non-Communist forces in Angola,
thus signaling the withdrawal of American support for opponents
of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World.
The effects of American defeat in Vietnam, the revolutions
in Iran and Nicaragua, and the coming to power of bitterly
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
antagonistic and aggressively destabilizing governments in all
three countries undermined the confidence of US friends and
allies in the Third World (not to mention in Europe and Japan)
and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the
Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for
years to come,
And they moved aggressively to create or exploit such
opportunities. Throughout the Third World, the Soviet Union
and its clients for the past ten years have incited violence
and disorder and sponsored subversion of neutral or pro-Western
governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, various
Caribbean States, Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Yemen, Oman,
Pakistan, New Caledonia, South Korea, Grenada, and many
others. The Soviet Union has affixed itself as a parasite to
legitimate nationalist, anticolonial movements or to those who
have overthrown repressive or incompetent regimes and tried
wherever possible to convert or consolidate them into
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships as in Nicaragua, Angola,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. And now these same regimes in the
process of consolidating power are fighting their own people,
Open warfare by invading Communist armies is being waged in
Cambodia and Afghanistan, And in most instances of state
support for terrorism, the government involved is tied in some
way to the USSR.
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
These contemporary challenges to international order and
stability -- and to democratic values -- certainly grow
primarily out of localized and specific circumstances, To be
sure, there are local economic, social, racial, human rights
and other injustices, And many -- too many -- governments have
demonstrated their capacity to inflict hardship and violence on
their own people, But, that said, we cannot close our eyes to
a common theme across the entire Third World and that is the
pervasively destructive role of the Soviet Union and its
clients,
In 1919, Trotsky said that, "The road to London and Paris
lies through Calcutta." This conviction that the West could
more easily and effectively be weakened and made vulnerable
through the Third World than by direct confrontation remains
central to Soviet foreign policy, And if you question how
critical this is for Moscow, remember that the Soviets allowed
detente with the US, which was highly advantageous to them, to
founder substantially with successive Presidents in the 1970s
because the USSR refused to moderate its aggressive pursuit of
Tnird World opportunities -- in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and
Afghanistan,
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
Subversion, Violence and Repression
In the mid-1970s, new Soviet tactics in the Third World,
combined with historic events and opportunities, emerged to
challenge Western presence, progress toward democracy and sound
economic development in the Third World, The new tactics were
designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of disastrous
setbacks such as their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and the
ouster of a Marxist regime in Chile in 1973, The strategy had
five parts:
First, the cornerstone of the new Soviet approach was
the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the
power of "revolutionary governments". They first
helped consolidate radical power in Angola, This was
followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops
to Ethiopia where that regime also became dependent on
their support,
This tactic of using Third World Comr?ur:~t or
radical states as surrogates in the Third World
subsequently involved assisting Vietnam's conquest of
the remainder of Indochina, Libya's designs in Chad and
plotting against Sudan, South Yemen's aggression
against Oman and North Yemen, and Cuba's support for
regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada and Sur inorr,e :s well as
the insurgency in El Salvador.
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
-- Second, when radical governments came to power without
the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua, Soviets
directly or through their surrogates such as East
Germany helped in the establishment of an internal
security structure to ensure that any possible
challenge from within would be stamped out,
-- Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these
tactics with more traditional offerings such as
technical and political training in the USSR, the rapid
supply of weapons, and the use of a wide range of
covert actions to support friends and to help defeat or
destabilize unfriendly challengers or governments.
-- Fourth, the USSR proved in Afghanistan that it would
still be willing to launch its own forces at targets on
its periphery -- and perhaps elsewhere -- when and if
circumstances are right,
-- Fifth, and finally, the Soviets advised new radical
regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try
to keep their links to Western commercial resources,
foreign assistance and international financial
institutions. Soviet ambitions did not cloud their
recognition that they could not afford more economic
dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam,
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600750008-5
Soviet support for the radical regimes that it has helped
established has been sustained, The Soviets and their East
European allies have provided military and economic assistance
to Nicaragua over the past five years approaching $2,5 billion
dollars. Compare this with the highly controversial $100
million American progran to assist the resistance in that
country, The Soviets have provided a full range of military
weapons and support and also have become Nicaragua's major
source of economic aid. They are attempting to shore up a
Nicaraguan economy rapidly deteriorating because of slumping
industrial and agricultural production, falling export earnings
and cutbacks in Western funding, The Soviet nion has replaced
Mexico as Nicaragua's primary supplier of oil.
In Angola, total Communist military and economic assistance
now stands at almost $3.5 billion, most of it since 1984,
Almost all of that assistance is military, T-e Soviets are not
particularly generous, however, and because A-,gola in the past
has had the ability to pay, the Soviets and :bans have
required payment for material and techniciar-~ in hard currency,
thus adding to the country's economic probleT:.
It is in Afghanistan, however, that the `jll measure of
Soviet ambitions in the Third World can be tc