SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENTS TESTIMONY BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600730007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 26, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENTS
TESTIMONY BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
JUNE 26, 1985
BY
ROBERT M. GATES
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, AND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LAWRENCE K. GERSHWIN
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
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By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed
intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic missiles
and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems. New mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a variety of cruise missiles
are about to enter the force. The number of deployed strategic force warheads
will increase by a few thousand over the next five years, with the potential
for greater expansion in the 1990s. We are concerned about the Soviets'
longstanding commitment to strategic defense, including an extensive program
to protect their leadership, their potential to deploy widespread defenses
against ballistic missiles, and their extensive efforts in directed-energy
weapons technologies, particularly high-energy lasers. Their vigorous effort
in strategic force research, development, and deployment is not new, but is
the result of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to build up
and improve their strategic force capabilities.
Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their military forces for the
possibility that they will actually have to fight a nuclear war. They have
seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in
a nuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many
contingencies of such a conflict.
We judge that the Soviets would plan to conduct a military campaign that
would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms--by neutralizing the ability of
US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces to interfere with Soviet
capabilities to prevail in a conflict in Eurasia.
II. Strategic Offensive Forces
The most notable recent trend in offensive forces is the construction of
bases for mobile strategic missiles--SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) and new ICBMs:
--During 1984, the Soviets embarked on an unprecedented program for
constructing new SS-20 bases, starting more new bases than in any
previous year.
--The Soviets have made major strides in preparing for the
deployment of their two new mobile ICBMs--the road-mobile SS-X-25
and the rail-mobile SS-X-24. The Soviets' commitment to deploy
mobile ICBMs represents a major resource decision; such systems
require substantially more support infrastructure than do silo-
based systems, and thus are much more costly to operate and
maintain.
All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forces will be extensively
modernized by the mid-1990s, as the result of programs that have been in train
for many years. While the Soviets will continue to rely on fixed, silo-based
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ICBMs, mobile ICBMs will be deployed in large numbers (see figure 1), and
major improvements will be made to the sea-based and bomber forces. The major
changes in the force will include:
--An improved capability against hardened targets. The Soviets
already have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehicles
today to attack all US ICBM silos and launch control centers and
will have larger numbers of hard-target-capable RVs in the
future. In such an attack today, they would stand a good chance
of destroying Minuteman silos. The projected accuracy
improvements for the new heavy ICBM we expect the Soviets to
deploy in the late 1980s would result in a substantial increase in
this damage capability.
--Significantly better survivability from improvements in the
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force--through quieter
submarines and longer range missiles--and deployment of mobile
ICBMs. Today, a large part of the Soviet silo-based ICBM force
would survive an attack by US forces. However, with the
increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos in the next ten
years if more accurate US missiles are deployed, the Soviets will
increasingly depend on the survivability of their mobile ICBM and
SLBM forces.
--A substantial increase in the number of deliverable warheads for
the bomber force as a result of the deployment of new bombers with
long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
Chart 1 shows new Soviet strategic ballistic missiles, land- and
sea-based, and submarines--those recently deployed or now in testing and those
we expect to see tested over the next five years.
The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2, will have been almost entirely
replaced with new systems by the mid-1990s:
--The Soviets are preparing to deploy the SS-X-24 ICBM in silos in
1986 and on rail-mobile launchers in 1987. We expect SS-X-24-
class ICBMs equipped with 10 multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to replace the MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19
silo-based ICBMs, which carry fewer warheads.
--The Soviets have started to retire older silo-based single-RV
SS-11s as they prepare to deploy the single-RV road-mobile
SS-X-25. We expect the SS-X-25 to be operational by late 1985.
--We expect at least three new ICBMs will be flight-tested in the
1986-90 time period:
- A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace the SS-18.
- A new version of the SS-X-24.
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- A new version of the mobile SS-X-25, which could have a MIRVed
payload option.
SS-20s
The SS-20 force of intermediate-range ballistic missiles is expected to
expand to over 450 deployed launchers by 1987, as a result of an extensive
program of constructing new bases. More new bases were started in 1984 than
in any previous year. The total would have been considerably higher if the
Soviets had not deactivated SS-20 bases in the central USSR to convert to
SS-X-25 ICBM bases. A follow-on to the SS-20, which also carries three
warheads and is probably designed to improve lethality, began flight-testing
in 1984.
An extensive modernization program will result in replacement of the
entire MIRVed Soviet SLBM force and deployment of much better nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The major changes, as shown in
figure 3, will include:
--Deployment of Delta-IV and additional Typhoon SSBNs. These boats
have improvements that will contribute to their survivability. In
addition, a new class of submarines is likely to enter the force
in the early 1990s.
--Deployment of the new SS-NX-23 SLBM beginning in late 1985 or
early 1986 on Delta-IVs and on Delta-IIIs. The increased range of
the SS-NX-23, relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile currently on
Delta-IIIs, will make SS-NX-23-equipped SSBNs more survivable
because they will be able to operate closer to Soviet shores,
where the Soviet Navy can better protect them.
--A replacement for the SS-N-20 on Typhoon SSBNs will probably be
flight-tested in late 1985 or 1986, and a missile in the SS-NX-23
class will probably be tested later in the 1980s.
Heavy Bombers
Chart 2 shows new Soviet strategic bombers and a variety of new long-
range, land-attack cruise missiles.
The Soviet heavy bomber force is undergoing its first major modernization
since the 1960s; by the mid-1990s, as shown in figure 4, most of the older
bombers will have been replaced. The heavy bomber force will have a greater
role in intercontinental attack:
--The AS-15 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) became operational on
newly produced Bear H aircraft in 1984. By using newly produced
aircraft of an old design, the Soviets were able to deploy ALCMs
at least four years earlier than if they had waited for the new
Blackjack bomber.
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--We project Blackjack will be operational in 1988 or 1989, carrying
both ALCMs and bombs.
The ALCM is the first in a series of deployments of long-range, land-
attack cruise missiles. Over the next 10 years, we expect them to deploy
2,000 to 3,000 nuclear-armed ALCMs, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The deployment of cruise missiles
provides the Soviets with new multidirectional capabilities against US
targets.
Growth of Intercontinental Attack Forces
The projected growth in the number of deployed warheads on Soviet
intercontinental attack forces, under various assumptions, is shown in
figure 5:
--The force currently consists of over 9,000 deployed warheads on
some 2,500 deployed ballistic missile launchers and heavy
bombers. Most warheads are in the ICBM force.
--Warheads are increasing: new Soviet Typhoon and Delta-IV
submarines, Bear H bombers, and SS-X-24 ICBMs will carry many more
warheads than the systems they are replacing.
--By 1990, if the Soviets continue to have about 2,500 missile
launchers and heavy bombers and if they are within the
quantitative sublimits of SALT II, the deployed warheads will grow
to over 12,000.
--The 1983 Soviet proposal at the strategic arms reduction talks
(START) would also result in an expansion in the number of
warheads, although under its limits the Soviets would have about
1,000 fewer by 1990 than under SALT II limits.
--The effect of the 1983 US START proposal would be to reverse this
trend and, by the 1990s, lead to substantial reductions.
--While the Soviets would not necessarily expand their
intercontinental attack forces beyond some 12,000 to 13,000
warheads in the absence of arms control constraints, they clearly
have the capability for significant further expansion, to between
16,000 and 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s. The lower
figure represents a continuation of recent trends in deployment
rates; the upper figure is not a maximum effort but would require
a substantially greater commitment of resources.
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The Soviets will face important decisions in the next few years, as they
proceed with flight-testing the ballistic missiles which are scheduled to
begin deployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (See Chart 1)
Specifically, they have technical options to test new ICBMs in such a way as
to conform with, or exceed, the limitations on characteristics and
improvements in the unratified SALT II Treaty.
III. Strategic Defense
Soviet active and passive strategic defenses, while unable to prevent
large-scale damage from a major attack, are intended to provide a degree of
protection for the leadership, military, and military-related facilities
necessary for wartime operations. The Soviets will significantly improve the
capabilities of their strategic defenses over the next 10 years,-as a number
of new types of weapons are introduced and many of the older systems
retired. Significant developments include the following:
Ballistic Missile Defense
--The Soviets have actively engaged in antiballistic missile (ABM)
research, development, and deployment programs for many years.
--When completed by about 1987, the improved Moscow ABM system will
consist of 100 silo-based high acceleration missiles and modified
Galosh interceptors, providing an improved intercept capability
against small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow.
--By the end of the decade, when a new network of large phased-array
radars (including the Krasnoyarsk radar) is expected to be fully
operational, the Soviets will have a much improved capability for
ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and accurate
target tracking. These radars will be technically capable of
providing battle management support to a widespread ABM system,
but there are uncertainties about whether the Soviets would rely
on these radars to support a widespread ABM deployment.
--The SA-X-12 system, to be deployed in the Soviet ground forces in
1985-86, can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and
tactical ballistic missiles. It could have capabilities to
intercept some types of US strategic ballistic missile RVs. Its
technical capabilities bring to the forefront the problem that
improving technology is blurring the distinction between air
defense and ABM systems. This problem will be further complicated
as newer, more complex air defense missile systems are developed.
We are particularly concerned that the Soviets' continuing development
efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM deployments. The Soviets
have the major components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread
ABM deployments well in excess of ABM Treaty limits. The components include
radars, an aboveground launcher, and the high acceleration missile that will
be deployed around Moscow. The potential exists for the production lines
associated with the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system to be used to support a
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widespread deployment. We judge they could undertake rapidly paced ABM
deployments to strengthen the defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the
western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of the Urals, by
the early 1990s. In contemplating such a deployment, however, the Soviets
will have to weigh the military advantages they would see in such defenses,
against the disadvantages of such a move, particularly the responses by the
United States and its Allies.
Deployment of new low-altitude-capable strategic air defense systems will
increase. (See figure 6.) The Soviets are continuing to deploy the new SA-10
all-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM), are deploying new aircraft with
much better capabilities against low-flying targets, and will deploy the
Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in 1985.
Penetration of Soviet air defenses by currently deployed bombers would be more
difficult as improved systems are deployed. These defenses, however, would be
considerably less effective against US cruise missiles. Against a combined
attack of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles, Soviet air defenses during
the next 10 years probably would not be capable of inflicting sufficient
losses to prevent large-scale damage to the USSR. We judge, however, that the
Soviets will be able to provide an increasingly capable air defense for many
key leadership, control, and military and industrial installations essential
to wartime operations.
The Soviets still lack effective means to locate US ballistic missile
submarines at sea. We expect them to continue to pursue vigorously all
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the
problems of countering US SSBNs and defending their own SSBNs against US
attack submarines. We are concerned about the energetic Soviet ASW research
and technology efforts. However, we do not believe there is a realistic
possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that
could pose any significant threat to US SSBNs on patrol.
Leadership Protection
The Soviets have a large program to provide protection for their
leadership. We judge that, with as little as a few hours' warning, a large
percentage of the wartime management structure would survive the initial
effects of a large-scale US nuclear attack. We estimate there are at least
800, perhaps as many as 1,500, relocation facilities for leaders at the
national and regional levels. Deep underground facilities for the top
national leadership might enable the top leadership to survive--a key
objective of their wartime management plans.
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IV. Command and Control Considerations
While significant improvements in the capabilities of both Soviet?and US
strategic offensive'forces will occur throughout the next 10 years, sizable
forces on both sides would survive large-scale nuclear strikes. The Soviets'
confidence in their capabilities for global conflict and in their ability to
limit damage to the Soviet Union would be affected to a large extent by
command and control considerations--the-need for continuity in their own
command and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and
destroying the ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to
operate their forces.
--Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed command,
control, and communications facilities, the Soviets' emphasis in
this area has. resulted,in their having many key hardened
facilities and redundant means of communications; thus, it seems
highly likely that the Soviets could maintain overall continuity
of command and control, although it would probably be. degraded and
they could experience difficulty in maintaining endurance.
--We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and
Allied strategic command, control, and communications to try to
prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby
easing the burden on Soviet strategic defenses,. and impairing US
and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources to
reconstitute forces. While the Soviets would devote. substantial
efforts to this mission, they probably are not confident that they
could accomplish these objectives.
V. Space Program
The vigorous Soviet space program is predominantly military in nature.
More than 70 percent of Soviet space missions are for military purposes only,
with much of the rest serving a dual military-civil function. The Soviets
view space'as an integral part of their overall. offensive and defensive force
structure, not.as a separate arena or as a sanctuary. While the Soviets seek
to be able to deny enemy use of space in wartime, current Soviet?antisatellite
capabilities are limited and fall short of meeting this apparent
requirement. Today, in addition to the dedicated nonnuclear orbital
interceptor, other systems--the nuclear Galosh ABM interceptor and two ground-
based high-energy lasers--have the potential to destroy or interfere with some
satellites in near-Earth orbit, but the potential threat to satellites.in
higher orbit is limited. It is likely that the Soviets would attempt to
destroy or interfere with US satellites during an intense conventional
conflict, and in the initial stages of a nuclear war. These capabilities,
however, would not survive a nuclear attack. Some improvements in Soviet
antisatellite capabilities are expected. .. I
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VI. Directed-Energy and Hypervelocity Kinetic-Energy Weapons
Directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons potentially could be developed
for several strategic weapons applications--antisatellite (ASAT), air defense,
battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile defense (BMD).
There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to develop high-energy laser
weapons, and these efforts have been taking place, in some cases, since the
1960s:
--We estimate a laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet
effort would cost roughly $1 billion per year if carried out in
the United States.
--Two facilities at the Saryshagan test range are assessed to have
high-energy lasers with the potential to function as ASAT weapons.
--We are concerned about a large Soviet program to develop ground-
based laser weapons for terminal defense against reentry
vehicles. There are major uncertainties, however, concerning the
feasibility and practicality of using ground-based lasers for
BMD. We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of such a
system during the 1980s, probably using one of the high-energy
laser facilities at Saryshagan. An operational system could not
be deployed until many years later, probably not until after the
year 2000.
--The Soviets appear to be developing two high-energy laser weapons
with potential strategic air defense applications--ground-based
and naval point defense.
--The Soviets are continuing to develop an airborne laser.
--Soviet research includes a project to develop high-energy laser
weapons for use in space. A prototype high-energy, space-based
laser ASAT weapon could be tested in low orbit in the early
1990s. Even if testing were successful, such a system probably
could not be operational before the mid-1990s.
The Soviets are also conducting research under military sponsorship for
the purpose of acquiring the ability to develop particle beam weapons
(PBWs). We believe the Soviets will eventually attempt to build a space-based
PBW, but the technical requirements are so severe that we estimate there is a
low probability they will test a prototype before the year 2000.
The Soviets are strong in the technologies appropriate for radiofrequency
(RF) weapons, which could be used to interfere with or destroy components of
missiles or satellites, and we judge they are probably capable of developing a
prototype RF weapon system.
We are concerned that Soviet directed-energy programs may have proceeded
to the point where they could construct operational ground-based ASAT weapons.
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The Soviets have expended significant resources since the 1960s in R&D on
technologies with potential applications for hypervelocity kinetic-energy
weapons.
VII. Resources for Projected Developments and Arms Control Considerations
Strategic offensive and defensive forces account for about one-fifth of
total defense spending--about one-tenth each. The Soviets are increasing
their resource commitments to their already formidable strategic forces
research, development, and deployment programs. We estimate that total
investment and operating expenditures for projected Soviet strategic offensive
forces (intercontinental attack and intermediate range) and strategic
defensive forces (assuming no widespread ABM deployments) will result in a
growth in total Soviet strategic force expenditures of between 5 and 7 percent
a year over the next five years. (The rate would be 7 to 10 percent if
widespread ABM defenses were deployed.)
A growth rate of 5 to 7 percent a year for strategic programs, combined
with the projected growth rate for nonstrategic programs of about 3 percent,
would lead to a growth in total defense spending of between 3 and 4 percent
per year--at the same time that we foresee sluggish growth in the Soviet
economy for the rest of the decade. Increasing the share of the GNP devoted
to defense will confront the Soviets with the difficult choice of reducing the
growth in investment, which is critical to modernizing the industrial base, or
curtailing growth in consumption, which is an important factor in the Soviet
drive to improve labor productivity.
Despite serious economic problems since the mid-1970s, Soviet military
procurement has been at high annual levels; in particular, the Soviets have
continued to procure large quantities of new strategic weapons. Since the
mid-1970s, for example, the Soviets fielded their MIRVed ICBM force, and then
improved it; deployed the MIRVed SLBM force on new SSBNs; and deployed their
mobile SS-20 force. In recent years the Soviets have increased their resource
commitments to emerging new systems, particularly with respect to the
deployment of costly mobile missile systems.
While Soviet economic problems are severe, we see no signs that the
Soviets feel compelled to forgo important strategic programs or that they will
make substantial concessions in arms control in order to relieve economic
pressures. Soviet force decisions and arms control decisions are likely to
continue to be driven by calculations of political-strategic benefits and the
dynamism of weapons technology. We judge that strategic forces will continue
to command the highest resource priorities and therefore would be affected
less by economic problems than any other element of the Soviet military. We
believe, however, that, as a result of the stark economic realities, decisions
involving the rate of strategic force modernization probably will be
influenced by economic factors more now than in the past and some deployment
programs could be stretched out.
We believe the Soviets are determined to prevent any erosion of the
military gains the USSR has made over the past decade. They recognize that
new US strategic systems being deployed or under development will increase the
threat to the survivability of their silo-based ICBM force, complicate their
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ASW efforts, and present their air defense forces with increasingly complex
problems. By their actions and propaganda, the Soviets have demonstrated they
are very concerned about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its
focus on advanced technology. In their view, it could force them to redirect
their offensive ballistic missile development programs to reduce
vulnerabilities or could stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technology
competition for which they probably are concerned that the United States can
outpace their own ongoing efforts. They are probably also concerned that SDI
will lead to a sustained US effort in strategic defenses.
Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an important factor in
advancing their strategy of achieving strategic advantage. They have been
willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it
served their interests. Moscow has long believed that arms control must first
and foremost protect the capabilities of Soviet military forces relative to
their opponents. The Soviets seek to limit US force modernization through
both the arms control process and any resulting agreements. A salient feature
of Soviet arms control policy will be its emphasis on trying to limit US
ballistic missile defense and space warfare capabilities. The Soviets will
try to use arms control discussions as a means of delaying or undercutting the
US SDI program.
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Figure 1
Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces,
Warhead Mix
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Figure 2
Modernization of Soviet ICBMs
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New heavy
ICBM
New heavy
ICBM
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Figure 3
Modernization of Soviet SLBMs
0
D-11I,
D-IV
New SSBN
Note: Color changes for D-lll and Typhoon in the mid-1990s
indicate new missiles deployed in existing submarine classes.
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Figure 4
Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers
Heavy Bombers
Heavy Bomber Weapons
Bison Bear H Older tsears
Bear H
Older
Bears
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Figure 5
Growth in Number of Deployed Warheads on Soviet Strategic
Intercontinental Attack Forces
1990
Thousands of warheads
1994
Thousands of warheads
SALT II
numerical
restraints
until mid-1990
Expansion beyond
arms control
Soviet
START
proposal
1985 SALT II Expansion beyond Soviet US START
numerical arms control START proposal
restraints proposal
until mid-1990
US START
proposal
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Figure 6
Modernization of Soviet Strategic
Air Defense Forces
Strategic SAMs
Air Defense Interceptors
Air Defense
District Aviation
a Represents different assumptions about our projections of modernization.
b New interceptors are: Foxhound, Fulcrum, Flanker, long-range interceptor.
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